Common Ground – Lessons Learned from Five States that Reduced Juvenile Confinement by More Than Half, JPI, 2013
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JUSTICE P.LICY COMMON GROUND: LESSONS LEARNED FROM FIVE STATES THAT REDUCED JUVENILE CONFINEMENT BY MORE THAN HALF JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE | FEBRUARY 2013 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 2 MEASURING REFORM: FOCUS ON JUVENILE CONFINEMENT ............. 4 Mission: Reducing the use of incarceration and the justice system and promoting policies that improve the well-being of all people and communities. METHODS..................................................................................................... 5 CAVEATS ABOUT THE ANALYSIS: .................................................................... 6 THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONFINEMENT, 2001 - 2010 ........... 8 FEWER YOUTH ARE BEING HELD FOR LESS SERIOUS OFFENSES. ...................... 9 DISPROPORTIONATE CONFINEMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR INCREASED FROM 2001 TO 2010. ....................................................................................... 11 COMMON ELEMENTS AMONG STATES THAT WERE THE ‘TOP PERFORMERS’ ........................................................................................ 12 LITIGATION ................................................................................................. 12 THE CASES ................................................................................................. 14 MOVING AWAY FROM ADULT CORRECTIONS AND TOWARD CHILD WELFARE INTEGRATION.......................................................................................... 15 CROSSOVER AND DUALLY-INVOLVED YOUTH ................................................. 17 COLLABORATION COMMISSION OR COORDINATING BODY ............................... 18 ENLIST THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE OF NATIONAL INITIATIVES......................... 19 RECOMMITMENT TO THE DEVELOPMENTALLY APPROPRIATE TREATMENT OF YOUTH ................................................................................................... 19 DIVERSIONARY AND RESTORATIVE INTERVENTIONS ....................................... 20 THE AGE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE JURISDICTION AND ADULT TRANSFERS ........... 21 EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES ...................................................................... 24 AREAS OF CONTINUED NEED........................................................................ 24 THE CONFINEMENT OF MINORITY YOUTH....................................................... 24 DETENTION ................................................................................................ 25 A NOTE ABOUT ARREST RATES..................................................................... 26 BRIEF DATA ANALYSIS OF ‘TOP PERFORMERS’ ................................. 28 th 1012 14 Street, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20005 TEL (202) 558-7974 Fax (202) 558-7978 CONNECTICUT ............................................................................................ 28 TENNESSEE................................................................................................ 29 LOUISIANA .................................................................................................. 31 MINNESOTA ................................................................................................ 33 ARIZONA .................................................................................................... 35 RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................ 37 WWW.JUSTICEPOLICY.ORG (443) 764-9490 After decades of expanding correctional populations in the United States, there is a growing awareness that we need to end the era of over-incarceration. Primarily this realization has formed around the adult correctional population, with less attention paid by the media or the general public to young people who are confined for delinquent behavior or prior to adjudication. This is perhaps because of the small percentage of youth that makeup the total incarcerated population: in 2010, approximately 2,270,100 adults were incarcerated in the U.S., compared to 70,792 youth.1 Simply by its scale, the “adult problem” dominates counties and local jurisdictions to send youth to the conversation. However, as confinement is the state-run and state-funded institutions. Certainly, least effective method of addressing delinquent the current economic environment has played a behavior in young people and increases the role in states wanting to reduce their juvenile likelihood that they will become justice-involved corrections expenses, which run upwards of $240 adults, systemic reforms that will reduce the per day, per youth.3 Creating financial incentives number of confined youth are urgently needed. for counties to keep youth close to home has the 2 potential to lower net costs (state confinement and Such reforms–including reducing the number of local community-based services), and improve youth held in secure confinement, improving the outcomes for youth. Because this approach has conditions of juvenile facilities and expanding showed early success in several states, other community-based services that can be used instead jurisdictions are considering whether they, too, of confinement, among other issues–have been should reform the fiscal architecture of their state aggressively pursued in a number of states around juvenile justice systems to reduce youth the country for over a decade. In fact, juvenile confinement. correctional populations have dropped by about a third, nationally, since 1999, when they peaked at Four years ago, the Justice Policy Institute, in its over 107,000 confined youth. publication, Costs of Confinement: Why Good Juvenile Justice Policies Make Good Fiscal Sense, highlighted Restructuring the “fiscal architecture” of juvenile fiscal reform as a promising practice. Given the justice is one approach to reducing youth drop in juvenile confinement just in the past four confinement that has attracted national attention. years, we decided to look at what role fiscal This approach seeks to remove the incentive of changes–and other reforms–have played in the creation of a juvenile justice reform committee reducing the number of youth locked up in the U.S. within a state is one way to further deinstitutionalization reforms but this process is We discovered that adjusting funding schemes was often the result of settlement agreements among just one of many successful strategies for juvenile litigants over poor juvenile justice conditions. In confinement reform and, in fact, there are many this report, each of these strategies will be states that have significantly reduced their juvenile addressed. confined populations without fiscal reform. States have initiated top-down policy changes, requiring After discussing commonalities of reform activities police and courts to treat juveniles differently, among the states, we provide a brief overview of resulting in fewer youth confined. Others have each state’s experience. These are not case studies simply closed their state’s juvenile correctional per se of specifics of each state’s work, but more of facilities, forcing judges to adopt less restrictive an aerial view to further describe the responses to juvenile delinquency. What follows is transformations made. a critical analysis of those elements that appeared to contribute to the greatest reductions in rates of Through the diversity of strategies, as well as the confinement over the past decade. commonalities between states, we hope advocates and policymakers who seek better outcomes for Keeping in mind juvenile justice in each state youth will find inspiration and pursue those operates as a system, the actors, policies and strategies that are fiscally and politically achievable problems are necessarily intertwined. For example, in their jurisdictions. Juvenile corrections is a multi-faceted and complex topic with policies and practices that vary from state to state and sometimes from courthouse to courthouse. Finding uniform measures and comparable data can be challenging. For that reason, the current report takes the snapshot approach; examining states within a set time period across a limited number of variables. Such a method is imperfect and will surely miss placement per 100,000 in the population between examples that lie outside of such rigid criteria, but the years 2001 and 2010 were chosen. They are: the goal is to engage the reader in a conversation Connecticut (-57.2%), Tennessee (-55.0%), Louisiana about reducing juvenile confinement and to open (-52.7%), Minnesota (-50.6%) and Arizona (-50.2%).ii minds to new paths to juvenile correctional reform. These states managed to reduce their youth The methods used to look at various juvenile justice confinement rates by at least half during the outcomes are described in detail in this section. period. iii Data from the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and However, using the same criteria within a different Delinquency Prevention’s (OJJDP) Easy Access to date range, say between 1997 and 2006, changes the the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement above list of states dramatically, with only (EZACJRP) were used for our analysis.4 It provides Louisiana remaining. Again, this method and this the only federal repository of such information but report are meant to expand the conversation about is limited in its coverage and how it defines various confinement reform rather than provide a detailed aspects of youth incarceration such as ‘residential’ history of all such efforts. and ‘diversion.’ It is, however, the only data set available at this time.i Using these data, the five states that showed the greatest drop in the rate of juveniles in residential For a more detailed discussion of the methods and limitations of the EZACJRP data, see http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/methods.asp. i One explanation as to why these states, all with above average confinement rates in 2001, would have lower rates in 2010 is the phenomenon of regression toward the mean. That is, the tendency of sample outliers to move closer to the group mean on subsequent measurement. iii This example further illuminates the imperfect nature of the snapshot method. ii States and National Juvenile Confinement Rates and Ranking, 2001 and 2010 2001 Rate* 2001 Rank** 2010 Rate 2010 Rank % change Connecticut 215 42 92 49 -57.2 Tennessee 260 34 117 44 -55.0 Louisiana 505 3 239 19 -52.7 Minnesota 322 24 159 38 -50.6 Arizona 305 28 152 40 -50.2 United States 335 n/a 225 n/a -32.8 State *Youth under the age of 18 confined per 100,000 youth in population. **Of 50 states and District of Columbia, with “1” having highest youth confinement rate. Source: Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/. This report will examine the ‘top performers’ (the meant to provide a definitive picture of all state term to be used throughout) for the 2001 to 2010 reform efforts, only to shine a light on some recent period, defined as those states with the greatest successes and the themes that connect them. decrease in juvenile incarceration rates (see above Table), according to the EZACJRP data. These Types of confinement: In this report the states, each unique in its makeup, history and term ‘confinement’ is used to describe the approach to juvenile justice, share some experience that some juveniles face when held in commonalities in their decreasing juvenile secure or semi-secure residential facilities as a result incarceration rates. Areas of continued need, such of contact with the juvenile justice system. The as the disproportionate incarceration of youth of OJJDP, which provides the data, defines three types color, will also be addressed. of confinement as follows: 1. placed in the facility as part of a court Time: For the current analysis, data on states’ ordered disposition. juvenile confinement were gathered for the time period between 2001 and 2010. This period was Commitment: juveniles include those 2. Detention: juveniles include those held chosen because it is the most recent for which awaiting a court hearing, adjudication, useful data are available and allows a look at recent disposition or placement elsewhere. success stories. The risk of looking at many states across one time period is that such analysis may overlook states that successfully reduced their juvenile 3. Diversion (Shock): juveniles include those voluntarily admitted to the facility in lieu of adjudication as part of a diversion agreement. confinement numbers prior to 2001 or have more The term ‘diversion’ carries a different meaning in recently begun to make gains in that area. Readers the juvenile justice community than the OJJDP should keep in mind that the current analysis is not definition. It typically describes an intervention that steers youth away from the justice system, rather than one that uses incarceration, even short-term, as a response. The OJJDP definition of the term describes what we will refer to as “shock” Sources: Almost invariably, as states reshape incarceration; that is, short-term periods of the way they handle youth in the juvenile justice confinement meant to shock youth into compliance system, there is a need is for richer, more accurate by introducing them to the harsh realities of and complete data and for greater data accessibility. incarceration. The current analysis uses data from a variety of sources which readers may find differ from what is Offenses: This report also examined the type of available through alternative sources. For example, offense for which accused or adjudicated youth are juvenile arrest counts, which have taken almost confined. Typically, as states attempt to reduce the exclusively from state sources, often differ from the use of confinement, one method is to limit numbers provided by the FBI’s Uniform Crime confinement eligibility to those charged with Reporting program. In fact, state arrest counts may offenses against other persons or to youth deemed differ from other state sources as some databases to be serious or repeat offenders. and reports are not always updated when numbers Ethnicity: The OJJDP data we used provides a limited view of the ethnicity of confined youth. As change. By exploring data across time from the same source, we can accurately show trends, even if the numbers may differ from source to source. the disproportionate confinement of youth of color remains a problem across the juvenile and adult Ranking: The states have been ranked from 1 to justice systems, it is crucial to determine if current 51, including the District of Columbia, by the reform movements address such disproportionality percent change in juvenile confinement rates or if the inequity has increased in recent years. between 2001 and 2010. Ranking is a notoriously Arrests: Juvenile arrest rates have fallen steadily touchy endeavor as one party will inevitably bristle at having been placed below another in a list. While in recent years across the United States, decreasing this ranking does not account for limitations and by 27 percent between 2000 and 2010.5 Most states confounding factors that impact states’ reduction of have experienced a drop in the arrests of young confinement rates, this approach is valid for this people, to a greater or lesser extent. However, some report’s purposes for two reasons. First, by using states with minimal changes in arrest rates have rate per 100,000 youth, states with large and small made great gains in reducing confinement while juvenile populations are leveled, proportionally. others with significant arrest decreases have Second, the ranking is not intended to put states actually increased their rates of confinement. The into ‘good’ or ‘bad’ categories, rather, the ranking absence of a correlation between arrest rates and are designed to continue an important discussion. confinement rates makes it clear that a state need Ranking improvement allows us to examine not dramatically reduce the number of youth potentially effective strategies and areas for arrested in order to begin reforming their improvement. confinement practices. Context: As this report will show, there are many reasons why a state’s juvenile confinement population has or has not fallen between two points in time. We have placed the data in the context of each state’s unique reform history. For all states, accompanying detail to produce a reader-friendly local juvenile justice experts were consulted to help document of reasonable length. Any of the make sense of the numbers and trends. indicators we discuss in this report can be explored Depth: Reporting on five states’ experiences requires a balance of broad strokes and further and in much more detail; such analysis is encouraged. In 2001, 21 states had juvenile incarceration rates greater than the national average of 335, with the highest in Wyoming, where 526 out of every 100,000 youth were held in secure confinement. Almost a decade later in 2010, 24 states were above between those youth who were committed, the much-lower average of 225, with South Dakota detained or diverted. The data show that the at the top end with 575 youth in secure confinement number of youth in detention decreased by almost per 100,000. Although many states made great 7,000 from 2001 to 2010. However, because the strides in reducing the rate at which they percentage decrease in detention didn’t keep pace incarcerate young people, 17 out of the 21 above with that of commitments, their proportion average states in 2001 remained above average in increased relatively, from 26.3 percent to 29.1 2010. percent of all confined youth. For all states and the District The total number of youth in secure confinement in the U.S. has dropped dramatically in the past 15 years. of Columbia, the number of youth in residential 105,055 from its high of 107,493 in 1999 to 70,792 in 2010. The confinement data used for the analysis in this report provide a breakdown Number of youth confined placement dropped steadily 107,493 104,219 96,531 92,721 86,814 70,792 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007 Source: Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/. 2010 The proportion of detentions to commitments increased from 2001 to 2010. Juvenile justice experts and practitioners typically agree on a few standards regarding 2.5% 0.5% the imprisonment of children. The first is that confinement, if used at all, should be reserved 26.3% for cases where a young person is a threat to 29.1% their community. In keeping with this, youth adjudicated delinquent for non-violent offenses and even youth with records of delinquent behavior who aren’t a public safety risk generally can and should be supervised in the community, preferably at home. Reforms 73.1% 68.4% 2001 2010 over the past decade, as reflected in national data on youth confinement, have shown some improvement in terms of a decreased percentage of youth in confinement for nonviolent delinquent behavior. Committed Detained Shock confinement is more often being used to respond to violent behavior, such as assault, and less in response to property offenses, such as theft or vandalism. In looking at the offenses for which youth were confined, the proportion of youth held for offenses Likewise, there was a shift away from holding against a person increased from 33.5 percent in 2001 youth for drug offenses, moving from 8.7 percent of to 36.7 percent in 2010. Confinement for property all confined youth in 2001 to 7.0 percent in 2010. offenses decreased from 28.2 percent to 24.1 percent Youth accused or adjudicated for drug offenses–of during the period. These changes are in line with which 73.2 percent and 79.3 percent were the ideals of reform in that they suggest that possession charges in 2001 and 2010, respectively– Fewer youth are being confined for property and drug offenses. 36.7% 33.5% 28.2% 24.1% 14.8% 8.7% Person Property 7.0% Drug 2001 16.4% 4.5% Tech Vio 2010 4.3% Status are better served through treatment or diversion status offense only changed from 4.5 percent in programs, not by confinement in institutions where 2001 to 4.3 percent in 2010. This small percentage access to services is secondary to punishment and still represents over 3,000 young people held in security. confinement in 2010 for behavior that would not be considered an offense if they were adults. However, other offense categories for which confinement should rarely, if ever, be used showed Relative increases in confinement for technical proportional increases or stagnation nationally. violations may actually mask the continued practice Offenses against the public order, a wide category of incarcerating youth for status offenses. Following that includes minor infractions along with the JJDPA prohibition of the detention or potentially dangerous activities, increased from 10.4 commitment of youth for status offense violations, percent of the total to 11.5 percent. Public order many youth receive terms of probation for such offenses range from disorderly conduct to bringing offenses.8 If that youth fails to comply with the a weapon to school. However, on whole, these conditions of probation, they may be charged with offenses are skewed toward being non-violent in a technical violation. In some jurisdictions, certain nature and those for which confinement should not technical violations, such as contempt of court, are be a response. classified as serious offenses for which a child may be incarcerated. The proportion of youth confined for technical violations also increased from 14.8 percent to 16.4 percent. These are cases in which a youth under the supervision of the juvenile justice system, such as those on probation, has been accused of breaking In 2010 youth of color comprised a greater proportion of all youth confined than they did in 2001 the conditions of that supervision. The use of incarceration as a response to technical violations has plagued the adult correctional system and a body of evidence exists showing that a graduated response of increased supervision and non- 60.3% restrictive interventions can be more effective than 67.6% incarceration; the same applies to juvenile justice.6 Finally, the percentage of confinement totals comprised of status offenses–that is, offenses which are not considered criminal and are only a violation 39.7% due to a juvenile’s age, such as truancy and running 32.4% away–barely fell. The U.S. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) “prohibits the 2001 2010 use of secure detention or confinement for status offenders and nonoffenders.” 7 The Act calls for the “deinstitutionalization of status offenders” and carries negative funding consequences for noncompliance. Nationally, the proportion of confined youth whose most serious offense was a White Youth of color deinstitutionalization policies and laws. However, the problem persists in many states, as reflected in the national averages. Disproportionality in the juvenile justice system permeates every stage of the process: from who and where we police, to the sentencing stage of adjudication, to community supervision policies and practices. Scant research Despite representing only about 13 percent and 16 has been done on why these disparities are percent of the U.S. population, respectively, deepening. A renewed focus not just on the juvenile African American and Latino youth are confined at justice system, but the failings of the other youth disproportionately high rates, a trend that has serving social systems, will be needed to truly drive gotten worse since 2001. down the over-incarceration of African American 9 and Latino youth. Reducing this disparity has become a reform movement of its own and is often woven into A number of factors were common to states with the greatest declines in the youth they confined. The following commonalities were the most numbers of youth of color at every level of its frequent: juvenile justice system and to detain low-risk youth prior to adjudication. There are instances where The state was the target of class action these states improved some of these factors but, on litigation concerning conditions of the whole, they continue to wrestle with these confinement or other legal or issues. administrative scrutiny; Juvenile corrections split from the adult system and/or partnered with child welfare; Finally, all states would benefit from improved data collection and public accessibility. In addition to collecting data on the number of youth arrested, adjudicated and treated, states should document There was improved inter-agency systemic developments and changes to provide a collaboration and communication, often historical context for understanding the changes, or through the formation of a high-level task lack thereof, in the system. Two states provided force or commission ; and such a timeline that proved useful in tracking State leaders recommitted their systems to developments. a holistic juvenile justice ideal that acknowledges that youthful behavior is inherently different than adult behavior According to the OJJDP, litigation-based reforms and that it requires different interventions “are the most divisive and protracted means of and services. achieving systems change” and may involve ”years Despite dramatic reductions in confinement, the juvenile justice systems in these states have areas that are of needed improvement. Each state continues to experience disproportionately high of expensive investigation and negotiation to reach a settlement.” However, they also “may be the only way to achieve systemic reforms.”10 As documented in No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration, state-run juvenile facilities are frequently overcrowded, outdated, and dangerous. Too often, they lack sufficient numbers of properly-trained personnel or adequate health care, education or other rehabilitative programming. These and other negative conditions place states at risk of lawsuits. In fact, sometimes the threat of litigation is enough to kick start reform in a state. State leaders and stakeholders understand that successful lawsuits may result in costly settlements and other sanctions if remedies are not met. Savvy community leaders also recognize that negative media attention on a state’s treatment of young people–adjudicated delinquent or not–influences public opinion about their government. Whether litigation or the threat of litigation opens a state’s eyes to problems previously overlooked or it motivates a state through the threat of sanctions or funding cuts, several of the top performing states began confinement reform in earnest following litigation. Of the five states examined in this report, four were the target of litigation following claims of mistreatment of youth in confinement. Lawsuits played a part in several states’ confinement reform activities. State Year of litigation/action Year of decline Claim 11 Suit initiator Emily J. v. Rowland Connecticut complaint: 1993 settlements: 1997, 2002, 2005 By 2001* Harsh detention used for status offenses in lieu of treatment or therapeutic placement. Connecticut Civil Liberties Union By 2003 Dysfunctional child welfare system with poor management and oversight. Child welfare was coupled to juvenile corrections as DCS in 1996. Children's Rights By 2001 Unconstitutional conditions in state’s facilities Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana and DOJ By 2006 Widespread physical and sexual abuse in facilities DOJ Brian A. v. Haslam Tennessee† complaint: 2000 settlement: 2001 Louisiana United States v. Louisiana complaint: 1998 settlement: 2000 United States v. Arizona Arizona complaint: 2004 settlement: 2004 * Because confinement data are only available at 2 to 3 year intervals, the years shown are those following the highest rates of confinement.. **Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. † The suit in Tennessee was brought against the child welfare system in the state, which shares a department with juvenile corrections. This report assumes some collateral changes as a result of that settlement. Sources: Dick Mendel, Juvenile Justice Reform in Connecticut: How Collaboration and Commitment Have Improved Public Safety and Outcomes for Youth (Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, 2013); Children’s Rights, “Tennessee (Brian A. v. Haslam): Overview,” February 2013. http://www.childrensrights.org/reform-campaigns/legal-cases/tennessee/; State of Louisiana, Office of Juvenile Justice, “History of Juvenile Justice in La.,” February 2013. http://ojj.la.gov/index.php?page=sub&id=229; Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, “A History of the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections,” February 2013. http://www.azdjc.gov/FactsNews/ADJCHistory/ADJCHistory.asp The table demonstrates three important points According to Beth Rosenberg of the Children’s relevant to juvenile confinement reform. First, Action Alliance (CAA), an Arizona-based youth measurable decreases in each of the four states’ advocacy organization, ”judges certainly reduced confinement rates appeared soon after litigation the number of kids sent to ADJC [Arizona was initiated. Department of Juvenile Corrections] when the DOJ said the facilities conditions were Second, despite the hundreds of employees in a unconstitutional.”12 state’s juvenile facilities, outside service contractors and counselors who visit and work in those Connecticut: A lawsuit brought against the facilities and the thousands of children and their state of Connecticut is another example of families who experienced confinement in the litigation-based reform. It is also a lesson on the facilities, in many instances legal action was sometimes-delayed nature of that reform. The case, initiated when heinous conditions were exposed by known as the “Emily J. suit,” named after one of the a tragic event such as a suicide or abuse of residents plaintiffs in the case, was originally filed in 1993. by staff. However, settlements weren’t reached until 1997, 2002 and 2005. The state now finds itself held up as Finally, the process has been initiated and pushed a model for juvenile justice reform, 20 years after by non-profit advocacy groups. The Civil Rights this “crucial first step in Connecticut’s juvenile Division of the U.S. The Department of Justice justice reform movement.”13 (DOJ) joined the suit in Louisiana and spearheaded the action in Arizona, but for the states profiled Louisiana: here, it has been the tireless efforts of the juvenile DOJ and the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, a justice and child welfare advocacy communities juvenile justice advocacy non-profit organization. that have forced change. The suit alleged abuse and mistreatment of the In 1998, Louisiana was sued by the roughly 1,600 youth the state held in secure confinement. The original complaint was filed Arizona: The state had been the target of following a 1995 Human Rights Watch lawsuits related to poor conditions in youth investigation that reported “that substantial confinement since the late 1980s, but had only numbers of children in the state training achieved minimal success in improving the system. institutions are regularly physically abused by In 2004, a Department of Justice CRIPA (Civil guards, are kept in isolation for long periods of Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act) time, and are improperly restrained by investigation found “widespread physical and handcuffs.”14 In 2000, the state entered into a sexual abuse of youth by staff, ... excessive and settlement agreement with the DOJ and other inappropriate use of disciplinary isolation, as well plaintiffs. Among other things, the settlement as failure to protect youth from attacks by other mandated immediate and sweeping improvements youth” in three of Arizona’s juvenile correctional to juvenile incarceration in Louisiana. facilities. By 2006, the next year for which there are data, the state’s juvenile confinement numbers had begun to decline, falling by over seven percent from the 2003 level. Louisiana is a prime example of how litigation can help a state begin its journey to a safer, more fair and more effective juvenile justice system. Since the suit was brought against the state rather than against a town or parish, the response took the form welfare and the harsher approach of juvenile of top-down, state-level reform. Rather than justice. In 2000, the child welfare side of DCS was address each of the agreement’s conditions hit with a civil rights lawsuit that forced them to piecemeal, Louisiana formed a Juvenile Justice undergo major reform, much of which had already Commission (JJC) to investigate and advise on the begun. The suit’s settlement agreement held DCS to best way forward (more on advisory committees implementing changes that “actually spurred much later in this report). When the JJC released its of the department's progress.”15 recommendations in 2001, the focus shifted from cleaning up the state’s secure facilities to restructuring and rethinking the juvenile justice system as a whole. Rather than merely “hire 220 additional staff to work with the juveniles” or “develop substance abuse treatment programs throughout the facilities”–both conditions of the settlement agreement–the state embarked on a holistic reform program that addressed issues from improved prevention efforts to re-entry services for youth released from secure confinement. There was a time in our nation’s history when young people found guilty and sentenced for breaking the law were treated like adults: they were tried in adult courts, sentenced as adults and, as prison was used less frequently at the time, youth Tennessee: Tennessee provides an were sent to adult correctional facilities. More opportunity to bridge the notion of litigation-based recently, overwhelming research–much of it reform with another characteristic of the five ‘top produced through the MacArthur Research performers’: attention to the appropriate placement Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile of youth corrections within the state’s bureaucracy. Justice–has shown that young people are In 1996, Tennessee restructured some of its youth fundamentally different in their perceptions of risk services, combining juvenile justice with child and harm, their ability to control their behavior, welfare into a Department of Children’s Services amenability to change and, perhaps most (DCS). The new department struggled to find its importantly, they respond to punishment identity between the therapeutic ideals of child differently than adults.16 Decades of juvenile justice Four of the five top performing states uncoupled juvenile and adult corrections and/or integrated juvenile corrections with child welfare services. State Department Last year changed Connecticut Dept. of Children and Families (juvenile corrections and child welfare) 1976, coupled with child welfare Tennessee Dept. of Children’s Services (juvenile corrections and child welfare) 1996, coupled with child welfare Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice (placement and support of adjudicated youth) 2004, split from Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections Arizona Dept. of Juvenile Corrections 1990, split from Dept. of Corrections; 2006 Child Welfare/Juvenile Justice Integration Initiative formed Connecticut Department of Children & Families, “About DCF,” February 2013. http://www.ct.gov/dcf/cwp/view.asp?a=2565&Q=314326; Child Welfare League of America, “Six to One: The Evolution of Children’s Services in Tennessee,” February 2013. http://www.cwla.org/articles/cv0211cstn.htm; Gregg Halemba, Gene Siegel, Charles Puzzanchera and Patrick Griffin, Louisiana Models for Change Initiative Background Summary (Pittsburgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2006); Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, “A History of the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections,” February 2013. http://www.azdjc.gov/FactsNews/ADJCHistory/ADJCHistory.asp practice and brain research has led to contemporary as abuse, neglect or exposure to trauma, and theories that hold young people apart from adults behaviors that can lead to justice involvement. 19 and promote the use of the least-restrictive The same research has found that obstacles exist response to unwanted behavior as a more effective that impede collaboration between the two systems, strategy for public safety and better outcomes for often as a “structural barrier, such as a clear the youth themselves. statement of understanding concerning the sharing of information, assessment processes, and joint case Throughout the 20th century, the ideals and management.”20 methods of juvenile justice drifted away from those of the adult systems, bringing laws and policies that The importance of the connection between these formalized the inherent differences between the two systems has recently been recognized at the two groups. High youth crime rates in the 1980s national level in the 2003 amended version of the and 1990s began a trend of “get tough” policies for Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act youth as well as “adult time for adult crime” (CAPTA). The Act lists as one of its purposes, approaches to violations committed by young “Supporting and enhancing interagency people, but those changes have already begun to collaboration between the child protection system erode. and the juvenile justice system for improved 17 delivery of services and treatment, including Some states split their juvenile corrections agencies, methods for continuity of treatment plan and philosophically and bureaucratically, from adult services as children transition between systems.”21 corrections decades ago–in fact, of the ‘top performers,’ Minnesota is the only state that Two states in our purview, Connecticut and continues to operate a combined system and is one Tennessee, have bridged this service gap by of only about a dozen states to do so–but some have combining their juvenile justice and corrections done so more recently as part of reform efforts. departments with the state child welfare agencies. For example, in Louisiana, prior to 2004, juvenile Tennessee’s merging of departments is the most corrections was housed within the Department of recent–changing the Department of Youth Services Public Safety and Corrections. Several years into its to Department of Children’s Services (DCS) in recent reform movement, justice services for youth 1996–and very likely a valuable precursor to that split off into the Office of Youth Development, state’s subsequent improvement in juvenile renamed Office of Juvenile Justice (OJJ) in 2008. The confinement indicators. Initially, the move bred fear new department, given cabinet-level status, that the punitive nature of juvenile justice would allowed for more focused attention to the reforms taint the healing approach of child welfare, underway at the time and, according to the OJJ, however the opposite seems to have occurred. “provided the framework for reform.” Thanks in part to the mandated reforms following 18 the Brian A. v. Haslam case,22 the juvenile justice side In addition to different correctional systems for of the department has benefitted from the youth and adults, the ‘top performers,’ including improved connection of youth to appropriate Minnesota, have some integration between their services that child welfare provides and a juvenile justice and child welfare systems. Recent recognition of the benefits of early positive research has overwhelmingly shown a clear intervention. Coupling post-adjudication services connection between a child’s needs that might put with child welfare services allows a state to better them in contact with the child welfare system, such provide ‘wrap-around’ care–that which dual involvement in the child welfare and juvenile encompasses health, social and family, as well as justice systems.”25 justice-related, factors–and to access a wider range Louisiana’s experience has been similar to that of of alternatives to confinement. Arizona. When the state split adult and youth The creation of Connecticut’s Department of corrections in 2004, it kept its child welfare Children and Families (DCF) in 1976 cannot be department separate. However, the Governor’s directly linked to that state’s recent drop in youth Louisiana Children’s Cabinet has been coordinating confinement, but it likely helped contemporary policy between the five state departments that changes take hold more easily, accelerating reform. provide services for young people since 1992. Most Many components go into the kind of systemic recently, in 2011, the Children’s Cabinet has change that can cut a state’s youth confinement rate partnered with another Governor’s office project, in half in ten years or less, such as visionary Coordinated Systems of Care (CSoC) that seeks to leadership, public sentiment, growing awareness do just what its title implies: coordinate care that a problem exists and organizational structure. between systems that service youth. The Children’s Although Connecticut’s child welfare and juvenile Cabinet, with its state-level and legislative justice services have shared a department since connections, is able to smooth legal and policy 1976, other conditions did not exist to take full roadblocks that hamper such coordination. advantage of such a design. The DCF makes full acknowledgement of the benefits of its structure on Crossover and dually-involved youth its website, stating, “This comprehensive approach Children who experience the child welfare system enables DCF to offer quality services regardless of and the juvenile justice system can be described by how a child's problems arise. Whether children are two main terms: crossover youth and dually- abused and/or neglected, are involved in the involved youth. Crossover youth are those who juvenile justice system, or have emotional, mental move from one system to the other, typically from health or substance abuse issues, the Department child welfare to juvenile justice. Dually-involved can respond to these children in a way that draws youth are those who experience both systems at upon community and state resources to help.” once, e.g., a foster child who is arrested for 23 runaway. Regardless of the category, determining The Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections the numbers of these youth has proved frustrating (ADJC) was created in 1990 as a cabinet-level for researchers and practitioners alike. agency, splitting juvenile services from the larger Department of Corrections as a result of class action Depending on one’s starting point, figures may be lawsuit involving the State’s treatment of juveniles as high as a 79 percent delinquency rate for child in confinement.24 While Arizona has not made the welfare-involved youth or 83 percent of justice- structural changes seen in Connecticut and involved youth reporting a history of Tennessee, former Governor Janet Napolitano maltreatment.26 The reason that exact numbers of “recognized the need to address the link between youth within these systems are difficult to come by child welfare and juvenile justice” as early as 2003. is a lack of coordination and shared information, After several years of research and planning, the not to mention competing organizational cultures. state produced a blueprint to direct “better Combining juvenile justice and child welfare coordinated responses to, and improved outcomes responsibilities into one agency or directing for, youth who are dually involved or at risk of cabinet-level bodies to provide such coordination are ways that some of the top performing states associated with and in compliance with the Juvenile have sought to bridge this service gap. Justice and Delinquency Prevention Program (JJDP), but the groups discussed here go beyond Collaboration commission or coordinating body that role.27 They focus on nurturing collaboration and maintaining focus on reform ideals. All of the Because of the complex needs of many juvenile top performing states have some form of juvenile justice involved youth, juvenile correctional justice oversight body. Arizona and Louisiana are systems cannot function in a vacuum. They must examples of states that have formed such groups as coordinate with a myriad of other service agencies part of recent reforms with great success. ranging from court support to mental health and substance abuse counseling in order to provide a In 2004, Arizona reached a settlement agreement full spectrum of supervision and services to justice with the DOJ to address the findings of a CRIPA system involved youth. Coordination between investigation. To facilitate resolution efforts, agencies and service providers is important in the Governor Napolitano created a Task Force on adult criminal justice system, but perhaps more so Juvenile Corrections Reform. The Task Force is in the juvenile system, where the urgency and composed of experts and professionals in the areas delicacy of serving troubled youth is heightened. of juvenile justice, behavioral health, education, and medicine. Its mandated functions fill the basic States that have been successful in reducing youth requirements of such a committee: it exists to confinement have created coordinating bodies that provide oversight and to advise. More importantly, appear to have had a marked influence on as a state-level body, the Task Force has been able confinement practices. Each state has a State to help coordinate the various parts of the system Advisory Group (SAG) to carry out work while promoting the overall vision of a smaller, State Commissions and Task Forces State Coordinating body Year formed Arizona Task Force on Juvenile Corrections Reform 2004 Connecticut Connecticut Juvenile Justice Strategic Plan Task Forces ~2006 Louisiana Juvenile Justice Commission, replaced by Juvenile Justice Implementation Commission 2001, 2003 Minnesota Minnesota Juvenile Justice Task Force 1999 Tennessee Tennessee Commission on Children and Youth 1955, statutory update in 1988 Source: Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, “Juvenile Justice & Youth Development,” February 2013. http://www.ct.gov/opm/cwp/view.asp?a=2974&q=383614; State of Louisiana Juvenile Justice Initiative, “Juvenile Justice Implementation Commission,” February 2013. http://www.louisianajuvenilejustice.la.gov/index.cfm?md=misc&tmp=aboutCommiss; Minnesota Office of the Revisor of Statutes, “2012 Minnesota Statutes,” February 2013. https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=299c.65. safer and more equitable juvenile justice system in Arizona.28 The Juvenile Justice Commission of Louisiana was formed in 2001 in order to facilitate changes required from the settlement of federal investigations reached one year earlier. The body has since morphed into the Juvenile Justice Implementation Commission (JJIC). A state website states the group’s “main purpose is to oversee the reform of the state’s juvenile justice system by implementation of the recommendations contained in the Juvenile Justice Reform Act and House timing. As a means to achieve its mission of Concurrent Resolution 56, both of Regular Session reducing the detention of pre-adjudicated youth, 2003,” which seek to reform the state’s system the initiative promotes improved collaboration beyond the demands of the settlement agreement. among agencies. Also, the Center for Juvenile However, the site also describes the group’s role as Justice Reform at Georgetown University seeks to to oversee, evaluate, make recommendations, enable agencies in participating jurisdictions to advocate, scrutinize, and study alternatives. “create a seamless process from case opening to 29 Perhaps most importantly, the JJIC “listen(s) to case closing that improves outcomes” for youth.33 testimony from stakeholders and hold(s) accountable those responsible in the system.”30 Another benefit to collaborative groups is their ability to coordinate ‘stream of offender’ decisions and resources. So, if a decision is made to divert a particular group of justice-involved youth, the collaborative group can recognize that these youth Distinguishing the impact of various actions–such will need other services and make funding and as separating juvenile corrections from the adult policy decisions accordingly.31 system or forming a juvenile reform advisory committee–in the analysis of confinement reform is Enlist the technical expertise of national initiatives a difficult, if not impossible, task; the system States need not recreate the wheel when forming a changes presented here can be described by one coordinating body to help steer reform. The overriding theme: the developmentally appropriate technical expertise of national, foundation- treatment of youth or what Barry Krisberg calls, the supported initiatives is available; groups for whom “American juvenile justice ideal.”34 reforms are interconnected. However, many of the increased collaboration and communication is a key part of their strategy. Krisberg tells of a group of foreign judges who described to him the American model of justice that For example, in Louisiana the Models for Change their own juvenile systems have been built upon. initiative, a project funded by the John D. and Such a model emphasizes “compassionate and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, assisted in enlightened care for vulnerable children” and seeks promoting collaboration at the state and parish “to substitute treatment and care in lieu of a stark levels to explore alternatives to formal processing regimen of punishment for wayward youths.” They and secure confinement as well as in the areas of then expressed surprise at America’s abandonment Drug Courts, family welfare and juvenile indigent of those philosophies for the heavy-handed defense.32 The Annie E. Casey Foundation’s approaches of mass incarceration and transfer to Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) is adult courts. another program that may bring technical assistance to the reform process. Four of the five top The history of juvenile justice and corrections is performing states have some level of JDAI often portrayed as a pendulum: swinging from one involvement, though it is difficult to attribute extreme to another, from punitive and harsh to reductions in overall confinement to that program, forgiving and therapeutic. The reform work of the given the limited scope of JDAI rollout and the last decade or so to correct the extreme policies of the “get tough” era of juvenile justice represents systems seeking equilibrium. States are now focus on more developmentally appropriate coming to understand that adult-style punishment diversion programs. for young people is more harmful than helpful. As these states ratchet down the use of incarceration, Minnesota, for example, has a long history of they are looking to more developmentally programs that divert youth from the more formal appropriate models and trying to create systems aspects of the justice system. The state, recognizing that simultaneously acknowledge the physiological the importance of such an approach in 1995, and behavioral differences of young people, while required for counties to have at least one juvenile holding them accountable for delinquent actions. diversion program in place.36 The juvenile justice ideal aligns neatly with what Another example of a diversion policy is the many practitioners and researchers consider to be program in Louisiana’s 16th Judicial District. elements of best practices. Across the nation, a Established in 2006, the program seeks to divert rediscovery is taking place that the methods of youth accused of status offenses or other minor juvenile justice that work best are those based on offenses from formal processing. Participants in the philosophies that shaped the founding of the Prosecutor’s Early Intervention Programs must take juvenile justice system in the U.S. part in a family meeting where a team decides on a schedule of services and expectations. Once In addition to commonalities among the ‘top program requirements are met, the youth is performers’ already mentioned, these states have released from obligation with no formal charges on enacted or implemented other changes that adhere his or her record. This kind of program enables the to the developmentally appropriate treatment of state to address unwanted behavior and demand youth. accountability without saddling youth with the Diversionary and restorative interventions negative collateral consequences of justice system involvement. Rather than funnel all youth accused of violating Other diversionary programs do not steer youth the law into the justice system, many jurisdictions away from formal processing but rather direct have created or enhanced programs that steer them adjudicated youth away from out-of-home out of the system and toward services such as placement. Allowing youth to stay at home while family, mental health or substance counseling. being sanctioned and treated has numerous Utilizing diversionary responses demonstrates the benefits, not the least of which is immense savings recognition that juvenile behavior is often driven, when compared to the costs of confinement. It also not by bad intent or ‘bad kids,’ but as a reaction to enables the youth’s family to take part in services, other influences in a child’s life. the child to continue to attend his home school. This approach also enables interventions and their Many states’ juvenile justice systems began to benefits to continue over a longer period of time.37 enhance or create diversion programs in the 1990s Obviously, if the youth’s home environment is as a part of the national trend toward alternative harmful or not conducive to providing services, the sanctions. Unfortunately, some of these included child may be placed out-of-home, but the trend Scared Straight programs or harsh interventions nationally, and in the top performing states, is to such as boot camps.35 Those ineffective and harmful keep the child at home when possible. practices have begun to wane in recent years, allowing states, the ‘top performers’ included, to Tennessee, for example, recently clarified its rules complicated the placement of these youth. The on the processing of “unruly” children, stating that Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of a juvenile-family crisis intervention program must 1974 declared that youth, even when convicted and first determine there is “no other less drastic sentenced as adults, must be held separately, using measure than court intervention” before the sight and sound rule (meaning, there can be no committing a child to state custody.38 visual or auditory contact between adults and young people who are imprisoned).41 Another approach, often a part of diversionary programs, is the use of balanced and restorative Many states, including the ‘top performers,’ have justice (BARJ). BARJ programs seek to treat not begun to reverse the laws that encouraged courts to only accused or adjudicated youth but also crime treat more youth as adults, some going as far as to victims through involving victims in some decision- increase the age limit of juvenile jurisdiction in their making aspects of the justice process and by more states. directly linking punishment to the harm caused. Some restorative justice sentences give victims a Connecticut is perhaps the poster child of the ‘raise chance to address adjudicated youth and some the age’ movement. In 2012, after a seven-year require youth to perform services that benefit their struggle, juvenile justice advocates successfully community. The end goal is the same: to heal the managed to change state law so that 16 and 17 year- harm caused by an offense and restore the sense of olds were no longer automatically under adult community and trust among community court jurisdiction.42 Prior to that, Connecticut had members.39 one of the nation’s lowest juvenile jurisdiction limits at age 15. Critics worried that shifting 16 and Four of the five ‘top performers’ (excluding 17 year-olds, the ages with the highest arrest and Tennessee) are among a minority of states that adjudication rates, would overwhelm the system. articulate ideals of BARJ or some variation in their However, because advocates were correct in juvenile justice legislation, according to a 2008 acknowledging that these youth would respond survey. For example, Connecticut incorporates the better to services and treatment rather than balanced approach with the goal of the juvenile imprisonment, the system has improved rather justice system to: “provide individualized than collapsed. supervision, care, accountability and treatment in a Of the five ‘top performers,’ only Louisiana has an manner consistent with public safety to those juveniles who violate the law.” Minnesota also upper age limit below 17, at age 16, youth in that specifies victim-offender mediation in statute. state are considered adults in the eyes of the courts. 40 The other four states treat all youth under the age The age of juvenile justice jurisdiction and adult transfers of 18 as juveniles, with limited exceptions for statutorily defined serious or repeat offenses. Through the perceived youth crime scare of the 1980s and 1990s, several states either lowered the Statutory allowances for a transfer of a young upper age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction or person to the adult criminal justice system may also increased the number and type of crimes for which have an impact on juvenile confinement rates, not a young person could be tried as an adult. The to mention crime and recidivism in general as the movement increased the numbers of teens who practice has been shown to garner worse outcomes received sentences of imprisonment and than keeping youth within the juvenile system.43 Despite recent reforms that have limited when a transfer can occur, according to the Department of merit, it seems, as the top performing states do Justice, “The surge in youth violence that peaked in have, on average, higher numbers of youth held in 1994 helped shape current transfer laws.” In many adult facilities. Unfortunately, there are critical cases, these laws stipulate a mandatory transfer to information gaps in what we know about the adult court if certain conditions are met, thwarting numbers of youth who are sent to adult correctional the discretion of courts that embrace a more institutions, what services they receive and what developmentally appropriate response. becomes of them upon release and we are once 44 again at the mercy of very shallow data provided Arizona, Connecticut, Louisiana and Tennessee by the United States Department of Justice in their have all made changes in recent years regarding Prisoners series.46 which youth may be treated as an adult in criminal court. Some, like Connecticut’s, have been In comparing the 10 states that reduced their youth sweeping; while others, such as in Tennessee, confinement the most between 2001 and 2010 with merely allow more judicial discretion in the the 10 states that showed the smallest reductions or matter.45 They all are part of a national trend to increases (see table on page 23) we find a difference restrict the numbers of youth tried in the adult in the average rate of youth held in adult facilities, system and to care for those youth in more 5.6 versus 1.4, respectively. As rates, these figures developmentally appropriate ways. should allow comparison between states with differences in population. It is beyond the scope of In the context of the current analysis, an important this report to examine this issue in the detail it question is whether the top performing states have requires. The figures illuminate an area of future fewer youth in confinement because they send research. more young people to adult prisons. The notion has States with reductions in youth confinement have a higher average rate of youth held in adult facilities. Confinement change in juvenile facilities, 2001-2010 Number of youth held in adult facilities, 2010 Rate of youth held in adult facilities, 2010, per 100,000 Connecticut -57.2% 217 26.6 Tennessee -55.0% 29 1.9 Louisiana -52.7% 22 2.0 Minnesota -50.6% 32 2.5 Arizona -50.2% 131 8.0 Massachusetts -47.2% 3 0.2 Mississippi -46.7% 25 3.3 Texas -44.4% 150 2.2 New Jersey -44.3% 18 0.9 North Carolina -42.3% 184 8.1 State Average: 5.6 Alaska -11.9% 7 3.7 Missouri -10.5% 22 1.5 Maine -7.8% 0 0.0 Pennsylvania +7.1% 58 2.1 North Dakota +9.3% 0 0.0 Nebraska +10.2% 23 5.0 Arkansas +10.6% 9 1.3 South Dakota +11.9% 1 0.5 Hawaii +16.9% 0 0.0 West Virginia +24.4% 0 0.0 Average: 1.4 Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Prisoners in 2010, (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011). Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, “US & State Profiles,” February 2013. http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/ . Evidence-based practices Evidence-based practices are not limited to the The most effective interventions for justice-involved therapeutic programs discussed in Greenwood’s young people are those supported by evidence of work. An EBP can be any type of program leading achievement. Peter Greenwood’s recent study of to a desired and positive outcome that has been evidence-based practices, or EBPs, defines them as proven effective through evidence. Many times, practice that “involves the use of scientific programs for youth are implemented and principles to assess the available evidence on continued because they seem intuitive or strike a program effectiveness and develop principles for chord with politicians or the public. For example, best practice in any particular field.” Evidence- the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) based programs and this way of assessing them– program was repeatedly found to have "a limited to through outcome-related evidence–has been a essentially non-existent effect" on drug use in growing trend in the fields of juvenile justice young people.48 Despite this, the program, the most prevention and intervention for at least the past expensive anti-drug program in the United States at decade. the time, was refunded for many years because of 47 its political and public support. In these fields, Greenwood assesses states on their “number of “therapist teams” from “proven programs” divided by the total population” and produces his own ‘top five’ list. These programs included Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care The confinement of minority youth (MTFC), Functional Family Therapy (FFT) and A 50 percent reduction in the rate of juvenile Multisystemic Therapy (MST). Greenwood’s top confinement in a state over a ten-year period is five group includes two of this report’s top five remarkable and deserves high praise. However, it is confinement reducers, Connecticut and Louisiana, only one aspect of the state’s justice system. It is which have 10 or more family therapy teams per equally important to critically examine other million people. In fact, all ‘top performers’ but aspects of confinement practices in the top Tennessee show up on the author’s list of states performing states that need improvement. utilizing significant numbers of EBPs. One area where most states, the ‘top performers’ Arizona has recently taken part in a study to score included, have not made much progress is in and track EBPs in the state using a tool called the addressing the disproportionate confinement of Standardized Program Evaluation Protocol (SPEP) youth of color. In these states, youth of color to enable a more uniform cataloging and continue to be confined at rates from two to four measurement of effective programs. Use of such a times higher than their percentage in the protocol not only helps a state maximize its use of population. For example, in Arizona where youth EBPs but also helps to find and fill gaps in the data of color comprise about 17 percent of the juvenile collection processes that enable evaluation of the population, they were 66.5 percent of all confined EBPs’ effectiveness. youth. This disproportionality increased from 2001 when youth of color made up 59.9 percent of the confined population in the state. whole. For example, in Louisiana in 2001, Percent of confined population that are of color The disproportionate representation of youth of color increased in all five states, following the national trend. detained youth 81.0% 78.0% 73% 66.5% 60% 61.2% 58.2% 58% accounted for 23.4 67.6% 60% 51% 46% percent of all juveniles confined. In 2010, this had increased to 32.2 percent. Arizona’s detention proportion did fall from 39.7 percent in LA AZ MN TN 2001 CT US 2001 to 34.4 percent in 2010, but that figure is still 2010 relatively high The movement to reduce the disparity of minority compared to the national average of 29.1 percent. youth in the juvenile justice system is a national one embraced by OJJDP and the Models for Change The national average increased as well, from 26.3 initiative, among others. However, as the data percent in 2001. However, with the exception of show, even among states leading in the reduction of Arizona, the top performers saw a larger increase in juvenile confinement, the problem remains. their ratio of committed youth to detained youth. What do these figures indicate? It is difficult to say Nationally, the decrease in youth confinement has with authority, however they do seem to point to a not been borne evenly among racial groups. In fact, greater focus on commitment reduction over across most offense categories white youth saw the detention reduction in these states and the nation as greatest reduction in commitments, compared to a whole. African American and Latino youth. Only within the drug offense Except for drug offenses, white youth in the U.S. saw the largest drops in the committed population for all offenses from 2001-2010. category did the reduction in commitments of youth of color outpace that of white youth. 0% Detention As confinement rates have declined, the rates of detained and committed Looking at the percent of confined -40% youth who were classified as -50% the five states increased the proportion of detained youth to the Drug -20% -30% prior to a court appearance–four of Property Violent Crime Crime Index** Index* -10% youth have not fallen equally. “detention”–that is, held securely Total -60% -70% White African American Latino Status offense In all the states in question, the In the U.S. and 4 of the 5 top performers the ratio of detained youth increased. number of youth being held in 29.1% 26.3% 41.0% 23.3% 24.0% 17.1% 23.4% in post-adjudication commitments. 14.3% 32.2% detentions did not match the decrease 23.0% analysis, the rate of decrease of 34.4% reasons beyond the scope or our 39.7% detention did go down; however, for During the period under analysis, the youth arrest rate fell by 27 percent in LA AZ MN TN CT US the United States. Three of the five top performing states saw their youth arrest rates drop greater than the national average: Connecticut by 32.4 percent, Minnesota by 34.3 percent and Louisiana by 50.1 percent. Arizona’s rate dropped just less than the national rate, falling by 24.2 percent. Tennessee was the only top performing state with an increase in its juvenile 2001 2010 a helpful, but not prerequisite, part of confinement reform. Indeed, West Virginia decreased its youth arrests by 28.3 percent, greater than the national average, but its confinement rate actually increased by 24.4 percent. arrest rate, increasing 11 percent to a rate of 2,472 Reformers in states with stagnating arrest rates who youth arrested per 100,000 in the population. may be waiting for a “break in the action” during Fewer arrests allow a state’s juvenile justice system more “breathing room” within which to make changes. However, the unclear pattern between arrest rates and confinement rates in the top performing states and the increase in Tennessee demonstrate that a decline in youth arrests may be which to push for change should take note: arrest rates do not necessarily need to decrease in order to reduce the number of young people sent to confinement. In fact, changes that limit the number of youth who are committed or detained may force changes upstream, prompting police and courts to divert or counsel and release more youth. From 2002 to 2010 the arrest rate of young people fell in the U.S. and in all top performing states but Tennessee. Rate of youth arrests per 100,000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 2002 2003 2004 LA MN 2005 TN 2006 AZ 2007 CT 2008 2009 2010 US Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reports,” February 2013. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr Uniform Crime Reports: Publications & Queriable Statistics, “State of Connecticut Department of Public Safety,” February 2013. http://www.dpsdata.ct.gov/dps/ucr/ucr.aspx ; Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, “Tennessee Crime Statistics,” February 2013. http://www.tbi.tn.gov/tn_crime_stats/stats_analys.shtml In 2010, Connecticut's confined youth population was 40 percent of its 1999 peak. Number of youth confined The number of young people confined in Connecticut in 2010 was about 40 percent of what it was in 1999. Those numbers dropped by 20 percent–from the high of 783 in 1999 to 680 in 2001–then leveled off for a few years. Between 2003 and 2010 the number of youth confined decreased by half to 315. Connecticut’s significant decreases can 783 684 630 627 498 426 315 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007 2010 mostly be attributed to a concerted statewide effort to change the culture of juvenile justice in the state, sparked by a 1999 civil rights lawsuit and child welfare services to enhance wraparound care subsequent settlement. Following that, Connecticut services and to refocus its programs on evidence- formed high-level collaborative commissions and based models such as multisystemic therapy (MST) task forces to ensure compliance with the reform and restorative justice interventions. agenda and facilitate communication between The numbers of committed and detained youth agencies and partners. The state was also able to both fell during the period, however the proportion take advantage of the existing organizational structure of a juvenile justice system partnered with CT 2001 2010 of detained youth within all those confined Total Commitment Detention Shock 630 483 147 0 Percent of total 76.7% 23.3% 0.0% 315 183 129 3 Percent of total 58.1% 41.0% 1.0% color are confined at a higher rate than Drug offenses accounted for a smaller percentage of confined youth in Connecticut in 2010, however a greater proportion of youth were held for technical violations. percent of the confined youth population was of color, while 35.2% representing only about 20 percent of the state’s youth population. The number of young people arrested in Connecticut fell by 32.4 percent 3.8% 6.2% 20.5% 12.4% 15.7% 3.8% 11.9% 15.7% 14.3% 30.5% 30.0% in previous years. As of 2010, 81 between 2001 and 2010, outpacing the national decline of 27 percent. This Person Property Drug Public order Tech vio 2001 Status decrease, a reflection of progressive, 2010 systemic reforms in how the state treats young people in contact with the justice increased from 23.3 percent of confined youth in system, allowed reformers to capitalize on a less- 2001 to 41 percent in 2010. burdened system to achieve greater gains. Connecticut’s confinement reduction applied fairly evenly to the ‘person’ and property’ offense categories, maintaining a similar distribution in During the time period covered in this report, 2010 as in 2001. However, there was an increase in Tennessee decreased its youth confinement by 55 the percent of youth confined for technical percent. However, if we examine the trend in violations–breaking a court-ordered condition such confinement beginning in 1997, the state has as probation–and, in 2010, more than a third of all reduced confinement by nearly 63 percent, confined youth in Connecticut were held for such a dropping from 2,118 youth confined in 1997 to 789 charge. in 2010. As with the other ‘top performers,’ such an astounding shift can be attributed to a convergence Despite laudable progress in reducing overall of factors in the state’s juvenile justice system. confinement in the state, Connecticut’s youth of Disporportionate minority confinement endures in Connecticut's secure facilities. 76.5% 67.1% 69.7% 81.0% 73.9% 64.6% 58.1% 16.3% 17.0% 17.3% 17.7% 18.3% 18.5% 20.8% 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007 2010 Youth of colorin residential confinement Youth of color in state population Source: OJJDP, “Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990-2011,” February 2013. http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezap op/. First, a restructuring in 1996 coupled Apart from a bump in 2001, youth confinement inTennessee has steadily decreased since 1997. Tennessee’s juvenile corrections Number of yout confined department with child welfare services, enabling better access to health and treatment services for court-involved youth. Then, in 2000, a civil rights lawsuit against the state’s child welfare system brought sweeping changes. As conjoined agencies, it is very likely that the 2,118 procedural and cultural reforms 1,533 1,434 1,419 1,263 789 1997 brought on by the suit had a collateral 1,656 impact on the correctional half of the agency. In 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007 2010 youth in 2010, an increase from 47.5 percent in 2001. fact, a Deputy Commissioner in the department stated that, about ten years ago (circa 2002) “there Other states have been able to capitalize on a was a clear message that there was going to be a decrease in youth arrests in realizing systemic change in culture.”49 The department then began to reforms, but Tennessee has not experienced the forge and strengthen relationships with same reduction. In fact, between 2002 and 2009 (the years for which TN Total Commitment Detention Shock 1,656 1,410 237 9 Percent of total 85.1% 14.3% 0.5% 789 594 189 6 Percent of total 75.3% 24.0% 0.8% quality data was available), the 2001 2010 number of young people arrested increased. Tennessee’s experience is a good example of how community-based service providers and increase the resources that would allow youth to be served lower arrest rates may be helpful in achieving at or close-to-home. Also at that time a state reform, but are not essential. forecast recognized that a plan to youth of color in its juvenile justice system. Despite comprising only 21.8 percent of the population, AfricanAmerican youth in Tennessee made up over half (54.4 percent) of confined 2006 2007 36,958 2004 36,578 2003 37,747 see disproportionate numbers of 37,636 The state is another that continues to 36,649 based care over state commitment. 35,766 with one that promoted community- 32,566 advisable. That plan was replaced Number of youth arrested people was neither necessary nor 35,880 In contrast to other states, Tennessee's juvenile arrests have increased in recent past. build more secure facilities for young 2002 2005 2008 2009 Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, “Tennessee Crime Statistics,” February 2013. http://www.tbi.tn.gov/tn_crime_stats/stats_analys.shtml The offense types for which In Tennessee, African American youth continue to be confined at over twice their numbers in the population. youth were held in confinement did not 75.8% significantly change, apart from drug offenses. In 54.4% 49.5% Louisiana, the percent of youth 47.5% held for drug offenses 39.2% decreased from 10.9 percent in 21.8% 2001 to 5.5 percent in 2010. These decreases also resemble the national-level changes. White % committed 2001 Despite a significant decrease African American % committed 2010 % in pop. in youth confinement between 2001 and 2010, the disproportionate representation of minorities–in Louisiana, particularly African American youth– In 2001, Louisiana had the third highest juvenile increased during the period. The ratio of white confinement rate in the nation at 505 youth per youth to African American youth in the general 100,000. With such a high baseline rate, it seemed population remained mostly the same over the likely that Louisiana would show a Number of youth confined reduction by 2010. The state was able to lower its rate to 239 in 2010, making it only the nineteenth highest for that year and representing a 52.7 percent decrease in its rate of confinement. Within the 52.7 percent drop, the bulk can be attributed to a decrease in postadjudicated, committed youth. There The number of youth held in Louisiana fell from 2,745 in 1997 to 1,035 in 2010 2,775 2,457 1,821 1,200 1997 was a much smaller drop, a -34.7 2,745 1999 2001 2003 2006 1,350 1,035 2007 2010 percent change, in detained youth. In fact, the percent of detention cases with all confined decade, with white youth making up roughly 60 youth increased from 23.4 percent to 32.2 percent. percent of the youth population and African- This mirrors the national experience. American youth counting for around 40 percent. However, in 2001, African American youth made LA 2001 2010 Total Commitment Detention Shock 2,457 1,857 576 241 Percent of total 75.6% 23.4% 1.0% 1,035 687 333 15 Percent of total 66.4% 32.2% 1.4% From 2001-2010, confinement fell for drug offenses but remained mostly unchanged for person and property offenses in Louisiana. 37.1% 36.5% 32.4% 31.0% 10.9% Person Property 2001 5.5% Drug 2010 up 71.9 percent of all confined youth, compared to 26.9 percent for whites. By 2010, the African American share of confined youth had risen to In Louisiana, the proportion of committed African American youths increased between 2001 and 2010. 76.5 percent, and white confinement dropped to 22 percent of the total. 71.9% 76.5% During the period, arrests of young people fell 57.8% by 55.6 percent, a change greater even than the 39.5% 52.7 percent change in juvenile confinement. 26.9% 22.0% However, Louisiana’s success in reforming juvenile confinement was not the static result of White fewer cases at the front end of the juvenile justice system. Rather, it represents the African American % committed 2001 % committed 2010 % in pop. commitment and collaboration of many key players and departments as well as a sense of urgency driven by deplorable conditions within the state’s institutions. Because of Louisiana’s involvement the state’s methods and successes 35,055 thoroughly. The following timeline is 16,582 18,674 a simplified description of activities 19,068 24,445 22,355 have been tracked and documented 23,806 35,285 in the Models for Change initiative, 35,560 37,382 Number o fyouth arrested Juvenile arrests in Lousiana fell by more than 50 percent, from 2001 to 2010. 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Source: OJJDP Juvenile Arrests Series. http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/jar.asp that played a role in helping Louisiana reduce its population of confined youth. Timeline: 1995 Human Rights Watch report critical of confinement conditions 1998 DOJ and JJPL lawsuit charging Office of Youth A court-appointed expert, after a 1999 inspection, wrote of Tallulah's teen inmates: "If we can't control them and make some difference in their lives now, God help us when we meet them on the street." Development (OYD) with “chronically abusing and mistreating its incarcerated juvenile population”50 Source: “Louisiana shuts down youth prison -- Move comes after decade of abuse allegations,” CNN, May 27, 2004. http://www.nospank.net/n-m20r.htm 2000 Suit settlement agreement, subsequently amended in 2003 and 2004 2001 State legislature created the Louisiana Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) 2003 Legislation passed intended to, among other things: close one of the state’s most notoriously abusive facilities, restructure the juvenile justice system to develop community-based interventions, better fund juvenile indigent defense and create a juvenile justice planning and coordination board 51 2004 Separation of Youth Services from Correctional Services; creation of Children and Youth Planning Boards in each judicial district 2005 OYD released strategic plan, emphasizing contemporary evidence-based best practices 2006 State joined JDAI project 2007 MacArthur Foundation funded survey showed broad public support for juvenile justice reform 2009 Introduction of a therapeutic model at the Jetson Center for Youth in 200952 After peaking in 2001, Minnesota has reduced its youth confinement by more than half. confinement, more than half since 2001, is all the more interesting because the state experienced no obvious catalyst to drive such change. There was no lawsuit forcing the reform of overcrowded or poorly run facilities and no major changes to state’s Number of youth confined Minnesota’s decline in youth juvenile justice organizational 1,947 1,761 1,527 1,521 1,623 1,317 912 1997 structure. 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007 2010 result of two factors: decreasing youth arrests and According to juvenile justice professionals and significant changes to Minnesota’s juvenile statutes advocates in the state, the reduction was likely the as part of the state’s 1999 crime bill. MN Total Commitment Detention Shock 1,944 1,557 333 54 Percent of total 80.1% 17.1% 2.8% 912 681 210 21 Percent of total 74.7% 23.0% 2.3% 2001 2010 Overall, the number of young people arrested in increase in the percent of confined youth who were Minnesota fell by 35 percent from 2002 to 2010, a awaiting adjudication, up from 17.1 percent in 2001 change slightly greater than the national average. to 23 percent in 2010. Like other states profiled in Minnesota’s declining arrests may also have been this report, minority youth continued to be lowered through a change in how young people confined at a disproportionate rates as the overall were processed for certain offenses, following an rate of juvenile confinement fell. update to the state’s statutes in 1999. Youth of color continue to be confined disproportionately in Minnesota in 2010. Those changes effectively decreased the pool of arrested youth who would be eligible for detention or commitment by 58.2% 53.9% 46.1% expanding the list of offenses considered 41.8% ‘petty misdemeanors.’ The new list included many charges that would be considered misdemeanors if the accused were an adult. 17.4% 13.0% Since youth charged with petty misdemeanors cannot be detained or committed according to Minnesota law, 2001 confinement rates dropped as a result of the white revised statutes.53 2010 youth of color % pop. of color Minnesota lowered youth confinement fairly evenly compared to other states, showing only a slight Number of youth arrested In Minnesota, juvenile arrests fell 35 percent from their peak in 2002. 59,348 54,384 52,266 52,452 50,942 50,949 47,229 44,615 43,170 38,795 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reports,” February 2013. http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr confinement rate in Arizona following a 2004 CRIPA investigation that found unconstitutional and abusive conditions in some of Arizona’s youth facilities. According to state advocates, after the investigation, judges were reluctant to send youth to the facilities because of the Number of youth confined The graph shows a steady decline in the recognition that they were substandard or even dangerous. Add to this sentiment a Confinement of youth in Arizona decreased dramatically follwing a 2004 CRIPA investigation. 1,869 1,902 1,890 1,884 1,737 1,485 1,092 1997 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007 2010 concerted effort by the governor and the state is still above the national average of 29.1 Department of Juvenile Corrections to improve percent. community-based services and access to care and As seen in other states, decreases in youth the stage was set for a drop in confinement. confinement have not been borne evenly across racial groups. In AZ 2001 2010 Total Commitment Detention Shock 1,881 1,128 747 6 Percent of total 60.0% 39.7% 0.3% 1,074 693 Percent of total 64.5% Arizona, despite comprising only 17.6 percent of the youth Disproportionate minority confinement has 369 12 increased in Arizona since 2001. 34.4% 1.1% 66.5% 59.9% The Governor’s Task Force on Juvenile Corrections Reform was instrumental in coordinating the changes necessary for 40.3% 33.5% shifting from a reliance on confinement to a focus on local services and 17.6% 15.0% evidence-based practices. All these factors were likely enhanced by a 25 percent drop in youth arrests during the period, slightly lower than the national 2001 2010 average. white Of the five states examined in this report, Arizona population, young people of color are confined at is the only one that reduced the proportion of nearly four times that rate, accounting for two- detentions within all confined youth during the thirds of all securely held youth. This disparity period. With detained youth accounting for 34.4 increased from 2001. percent of all youth confined in 2010 however, the youth of color % pop of color 45,318 51,602 2006 54,259 51,697 2005 53,346 51,291 53,697 52,941 52,373 Overall, arrests of youth in Arizona fell 24.2 % from 2002 to 2010. 2002 2003 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reports,” February 2013. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr The national trend to confine fewer youth for the suspicion of or adjudication for breaking the law is good news for young people and for juvenile justice systems across the country. The experiences of five states that have reduced juvenile confinement in recent years provide lessons for other jurisdictions seeking the same result. The Justice Policy Institute recommends the following: 1. Consider the legal route. Many of the most litigation-driven reforms and falling arrest rates effective reform movements have begun through to shift their systems from confinement-heavy to the process of settling litigation. If a case can be ones that favor treatment and the least restrictive made against poor conditions or unconstitutional treatment, advocacy sanctions. 6. Address issues that may be collateral to organizations have it in their power to kick start confinement reduction. The problems of pre- reform by litigating changes in practice. adjudication detention and the disproportionate 2. Create or re-energize existing juvenile justice commissions or cabinet-level task forces that will promote collaboration and communication amongst stakeholders. 3. Utilize experts for technical assistance. confinement of youth of color should not be neglected in a state’s reform strategy. 7. Utilize the experience and lessons learned from states that have reduced youth confinement. The methods of reform are many: fiscal Initiatives such as the John D. and Catherine T. architecture reform, statutory changes, MacArthur Foundation’s Models for Change organizational restructuring or a combination of and the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Juvenile all of the above and more. Through research and Detention Alternatives Initiative are designed to collaboration, states can craft a unique reform help states coordinate reform and tailor it to strategy that is relevant to their circumstances. their unique situation. 4. Promote the American juvenile justice ideal of 8. Establish a richer data repository. The data used for this report came from the OJJDP treating young people differently than adults. EZACJRP data set. These data suffer from major States need to use developmentally appropriate, limitations of scope and accuracy. The OJJDP therapeutic interventions rather than harsh should improve the data for better tracking and punishment. analysis of youth incarceration and out-of-home 5. Recognize opportunities to push change. The top performing states were able to capitalize on placement. Note: Unless otherwise noted the source for all graphs and tables is: Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/. 1 U.S. Department of Justice, Prisoners in 2010, December 2011, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf. 2 Edward P. Mulvey, Highlights From Pathways to Desistance: A Longitudinal Study of Serious Adolescent Offenders (Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2011); Richard A. Mendel, No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration, (The Annie E. Casey Foundation: Baltimore, MD, 2011) http://www.aecf.org/OurWork/JuvenileJustice/~/media/Pubs/Topics/Juvenile%20Justice/Detention%20Reform/NoPlaceFor Kids/JJ_NoPlaceForKids_Full.pdf 3 Justice Policy Institute, The Costs of Confinement: Why Good Juvenile Justice Policies Make Good Fiscal Sense (Washington, DC, 2009) http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_CostsofConfinement_JJ_PS.pdf. 4 Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, “US & State Profiles,” February 2013. http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/ . 5 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Statistical Briefing Book,” February 2013. http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05200 . The National Academies, Committee on Law and Justice, Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental Approach (Washington, DC: The National Academies, 2012). http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/dbassesite/documents/webpage/dbasse_073318.pdf 7 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders Best Practices Database,” February 2013. http://www.ojjdp.gov/dso/dsoAbout.aspx 6 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders Best Practices Database: Background,” February 2013. http://www.ojjdp.gov/dso/dsoAboutBackground.aspx 9 United States Census Bureau, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010 (Washington, DC: 2011) http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf. 8 10 James Austin, Kelly Dedel Johnson and Ronald Weitzer, Alternatives to the Secure Detention and Confinement of Juvenile Offenders (Washington, DC: OJJDP, 2005). 11 Disability.gov, “Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA)” February 2013. https://www.disability.gov/home/i_want_to/disability_laws/civil_rights_of_institutionalized_persons_act_(CRIPA); Beth Warren, “Tennessee child welfare system reforms still under court-ordered oversight,” July 16, 2012. http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2012/jul/16/tennessee-child-welfare-system-reformsstill/?print=1;http://www.youthlaw.org/publications/fc_docket/alpha/emilyjvweicker/ Personal correspondence with Beth Rosenberg, Director of Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Children's Action Alliance. 13 Richard A. Mendel, Juvenile Justice Reform in Connecticut: How Collaboration and Commitment Have Improved Public Safety and Outcomes for Youth, (Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, 2013). 12 14 Human Rights Watch Children’s Rights Project, Children in Confinement in Louisiana (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2000) http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Us3.htm. 15 Child Welfare League of America, “Six to One: The Evolution of Children’s Services in Tennessee,” February 2013. http://www.cwla.org/articles/cv0211cstn.htm. 16 Edward P. Mulvey, Highlights From Pathways to Desistance: A Longitudinal Study of Serious Adolescent Offenders (Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2011). 17 Emily A. Polachek, “Juvenile Transfre: From “Get Better” to “Get Tough” and Where We Go From Here,” William Mitchell Law Review 35, no. 3 (2009): 1162-1193. 18 State of Louisiana, Office of Juvenile Justice, “History of Juvenile Justice in La.,” February 2013. http://ojj.la.gov/index.php?page=sub&id=229. 19 Shay Bilchik and Judge Michael Nash, “Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice: Two Sides of the Same Coin,” Juvenile and Family Justice Today (Fall 2008): 16-20.; 19 Shay Bilchik and Judge Michael Nash, “Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice: Two Sides of the Same Coin, Part II,” Juvenile and Family Justice Today (Winter 2009): 22-25. Gina M. Vincent, Screening and Assessment in Juvenile Justice Systems: Identifying Mental Health Needs and Risk of Reoffending (Washington, DC: Technical Assistance Partnership for Child and Family Mental Health, 2011). 20 Denise Herz, Philip Lee, Lorrie Lutz, Macon Stewart, John Tuell and Janet Wiig, Addressing the Needs of Multi-System Youth: Strengthening the Connection between Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice (Washington, DC: Center for Juvenile Justice Reform, 2012). 21 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (Washington, DC: Administration on Children, Youth and Families Children’s Bureau, 2003). 22 Children’s Rights, “Tennessee (Brian A. v. Haslam): Overview,” February 2013. http://www.childrensrights.org/reformcampaigns/legal-cases/tennessee/ 23 Connecticut Department of Children & Families, “About DCF,” February 2013. http://www.ct.gov/dcf/cwp/view.asp?a=2565&Q=314326. Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, “A History of the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections,” February 2013. http://www.azdjc.gov/FactsNews/ADJCHistory/ADJCHistory.asp 25 Arizona Governor’s Office for Children, Youth & Families, State of Arizona Blueprint Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Systems Integration Initiative (Phoenix: 2008). 24 26 Denise Herz, Philip Lee, Lorrie Lutz, Macon Stewart, John Tuell and Janet Wiig, Addressing the Needs of Multi-System Youth: Strengthening the Connection between Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice (Washington, DC: Center for Juvenile Justice Reform, 2012). 27 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “State Advisory Group (SAG) Training Grant,” February 2013. http://www2.dsgonline.com/sag/Default.aspx. 28 The Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections, Creating a Difference for Arizona’s Youth: FY ’04 Annual Performance Report, (Phoenix: 2004). http://repository.asu.edu/attachments/78513/content/AnnualRpt04.pdf 29 State of Louisiana, February 2013. http://www.louisianajuvenilejustice.la.gov/index.cfm?md=misc&tmp=aboutCommiss 30 State of Louisiana, February 2013. http://www.louisianajuvenilejustice.la.gov/index.cfm?md=misc&tmp=aboutCommiss 31 32 Personal correspondence with Jason Ziedenberg. Models for Change, Models for Change Louisiana Work Plan, (Chicago: 2007). http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/118/Models_for_Change_Louisiana_Workplan.pdf. Center for Juvenile Justice Reform, “Crossover Youth Practice Model,” February 2013. http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/pm/practicemodel.html, 34 Krisberg, Barry (2006). “Rediscovering the Juvenile Justice Ideal in the United States,” in Comparative Youth Justice, (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 6-18. 33 35 Anthony Petrosino, Carolyn Turpin-Petrosino and John Buehler, "Scared Straight and Other Juvenile Awareness Programs for Preventing Juvenile Delinquency: A Systematic Review of the Randomized Experimental Evidence,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 589, no. 1 (2003): 41-62. 36 State of Minnesota, Minnesota Juvenile Diversion: A Summary of Statewide Practices and Programming, (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Department of Public Safety Office of Justice Programs, 2012). 37 Jacob Z. Hess, Wayne Arner, Eliot Sykes and Andrew G. Price, “Helping Juvenile Offenders on Their Own “Turf”: Tracking the Recidivism Outcomes of a Home-based Paraprofessional Intervention,” Journal of Juvenile Justice 2, no. 1 (2012). http://www.journalofjuvjustice.org/JOJJ0201/article02.htm. 38 State of Tennessee, “TENNESSEE COMPILATION OF SELECTED LAWS ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, 2011 EDITION,” February 2013. http://www.state.tn.us/tccy/tnchild/37/37-1-132.htm. 39 South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice, Balance and Restorative Justice: Approaching Juvenile Crime in a Different Way (Columbia, SC: 2012). 40 Sandra Pavelka, “Restorative Juvenile Justice Legislation and Policy: A National Assessment,” International Journal of Restorative Justice 4, no. 2 (2008): 100-118. 41 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Legislation,” February 2013. http://www.ojjdp.gov/about/legislation.html . 42 Raise the Age CT, “Raise the Age Timeline,” February 2013. http://www.raisetheagect.org/timeline.html 43 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States 1994-1996,” February 2013. http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/reform/ch2_j.html. 44 Patrick Griffin, Sean Addie, Benjamin Adams and Kathy Firestine, Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2011). 45 National Juvenile Justice Network, Advances in Juvenile Justice Reform: 2009-2011 (Washington, DC: NJJN, 2012). U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Publications & Products: Prisoners,” February 2013. http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=40. 47 Peter W. Greenwood, Brandon C. Welsh and Michael Rocque, Implementing Proven Programs for Juvenile Offenders (Downington, PA: Association for the Advancement of Evidence-Based Practice, 2012). 46 48 Dennis Cauchon, “Studies Find Drug Program Not Effective: Yet high-level supporters argue "it's better to have it than not have it",” USA Today, October 11, 1993. 49 Personal correspondence with Albert Dawson, Deputy Commissioner, Juvenile Justice, Department of Children’s Services, State of Tennessee. 50 State of Louisiana Juvenile Justice Initiative, “Office of Juvenile Justice,” February 2013. http://www.louisianajuvenilejustice.la.gov/index.cfm?md=misc&tmp=aboutOfficeOf 51 Sarah Alice Brown, Trends in Juvenile Justice State Legislation: 2001-2011 (Washington, DC: National Council of State Legislators, 2012). http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/trendsinjuvenilejustice.pdf. 52 WBRZ.com, “Local News: Jeston Center for Youth making changes,” November, 2012. http://www.wbrz.com/news/jetsoncenter-for-youth-making-changes/. 53 Personal correspondence with Cheryl Kreager, Director, Juvenile Justice Coalition of Minnesota and Dana Swayze, Juvenile Justice Analyst, Minnesota Department of Public Safety, Office of Justice Programs. This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The Justice Policy Institute would also like to express gratitude to Sarah Bryer, Jason Ziedenberg, Dick Mendel, Beth Rosenberg, Dana Swayze, Cheryl Kreager, Linda O’Neal, and Albert Dawson for their technical assistance and insightful contributions to this report. JPI staff includes Paul Ashton, Spike Bradford, Zerline Hughes, Adwoa Masozi, Melissa Neal, Kellie Shaw, and Keith Wallington. Spike Bradford is a data analyst, project manager and educator with experience in criminal justice, drug policy and public health. Prior to joining the JPI team, Spike lived in Kenya and Zambia where he taught English and applied his data analysis skills to public health issues, especially related to women’s health. Spike’s work at JPI includes: Working for a Better Future: How Expanding Employment Opportunities for D.C.’s Youth Creates Public Safety Benefits for All Residents, For Better or For Profit: How the Bail Bonding Industry Stands in the Way of Fair and Effective Pretrial Justice and Crime, Correctional Populations and Drug Arrests Down in 2011. Spike has also worked at the Department of the Attorney General of Hawai`i evaluate a variety of criminal and juvenile justice initiatives and oversee the collection of data for the Uniform Crime Reports. Spike holds a Master of Education from Bowling Green State University and a Master of Arts from the University of Hawai`i. Thank you for your interest in our work! Please consider contributing to the Justice Policy Institute, your gift helps to fund ground-breaking research, education, and awareness pieces. 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