UNCLASSifIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMAITON

March 2013

WATCH LISTING
GUIDANCE

**
UNCLASSIFIED//fOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMAITON
WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR
parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to
know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation.
Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies,
public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

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2013 WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: WATCHLISTING PROCESS AND PROCEDURES ...................................... 5

I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................... ............................................................ 5

II.

WATCHLISTING AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... 6

111.

CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES ............................. ............... .... I 0

IV.

WATCHLISTING POLICIES ...................................................................................... 11

V.

WATCHLISTING STANDARD: IDENTIFYING AND SUBSTANTIVE
DEROGATORY CRITERIA ......................... ............................. ................ ................ 12

VI.

WATCHLISTING PROCESS OVERVIEW ..................... ......... ... ....... .......... ...... ...... 13

VII.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBJLITES FOR THE WATCHLISTJNG AND SCREENING
COMMUNITY ..·............................................................................................ ... ............ . 16

VITT.

QUALITY CONTROL MEASURES ............ ......................... ...... ... ... ... .............. ... .... 17

IX.

NOMINATION PROCEDURES ......... .. ...... ....... ........................................................ 20

X.

PROCEDURES TO REMOVE AN INDIVIDUAL FROM THE WATC HLIST ... 27

XI.

REDRESS PROC EDURES .............................. ............................................ ...... ......... 28

XII.

PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE WATCHLISTING GUIDANC E ............................ 29

CHAPTER 2: MINIMUM IDENTIFYING CRITERIA ......................................................... 30

I.

BIOMETRIC NOMINATIONS .................................................................................... 30

JI.

MINIMUM BIOGRAPHIC NOMINATION REQUIREMENT ... ... .... ................. ..... .. 30

lll.

MINIMUM BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR EXCEPTIONS TO THE

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MINIMUM SUBSTANTIVE DEROGATORY STAN DARDS FOR TERRORIST
WATC HLI STING ............................. ...... ..................... ....... ........ .................. ..... .. ......... 32

CHAPTER 3: MINIMUM SUBSTANTIVE DEROGATORY CRITERIA ......................... 33

I.

INTRODU CTION AND PURPOSE ....................... ..................................................... 33

II.

REAS ONABLE SUSPICION ......... ................................ .............................................. 33

111.

KNOWN TERRORISTS ..................... .......................................................................... 35

IV.

SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ............................ ............ ..................... ...... .................... 37

V.

EXCEPTIONS TO SUPPORT IMMIGRATION AND VISA SCREENING ACTIVITIES
BY DI-IS AND DOS ........... ............... .. .......................................................................... 42

VI.

SPEC IAL CONSIDERATIONS ....................... ... .... ............................... ...................... 45

Vll.

EXAMPLES OF TERRORISM AND/OR TERRORIST ACTlVITIES ................. .... .47

CHAPTER 4: NO FLY, SELECTEE AND EXPANDED SELECTEE LISTS
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE .......................................................................................... 50

I.

BACKGROUND ...................... ..................................................................................... 50

11.

PRE-CONDITIONS FOR PLACEMENT ON THE NO FLY OR SELECTEE LIST. 50

III.

NO FLY LIST CRITERIA ............................................................................................ 5 1

IV .

FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF NO FLY CRITERIA ............................................ 51

V.

SELECTEE LIST CRITERIA .................. .................... ................... ............................. 54

VI.

EX PAND ED SELECTEE LIST CRITERIA .................................... ............................ 54

V II.

ACTIONS BASED UPON POSITIV E MATCHES TO THE NO FLY, SELECTEE, OR
EXPANDED SELECTEE LISTS ................................................................................. 54

VIII.

IMPLEM ENTATION GUIDELINES .......................................................................... 5

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IX.

SPECIAL S ITU A TIONS .............................................................................................. 56

X.

NOMINATIONS THAT ARE INELlGlBLE/NOT SUITABLE FOR E1TIIER TllE NO
FLY OR THE SELECTEE UST ..................................................... ..................... ........ 57

CHAPTER 5: ENCOUNTER MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS ...................................... 58

l.

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE ............ ... ........ .................................... ................. 58

Il.

PROCESSING TERRORISM INFORMATION FROM ENCOUNTERS WITH
POSTTIVEL Y IDENTIFTED KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORTSTS ................. 59

Ill.

CATEGORIES OF TERRORlSM INFORMA TfON FROM ENCOUNTERS WITH
POSITIVELY IDENTfFIED KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS OF
POTENTlAL INTEREST ............................................................................................. 65

IV.

ENCOUNTER MANAGEMENT ACTIONS ................. .............. ................. ...... ........ 69

V.

ROLES AND RESPONSlBlLITIES FOR UPDATING EXISTING KNOWN OR
SUSPECTED TERRORIST RECORDS AND NOMINATING NEW KNOWN OR
SUSPECTED .TERRORISTS BASED ON INFORMATION FROM POSITIVE
ENCOlJNTERS ..................................................... .............. ..... .................................. .. 71

VI.

RESPONSIBIUTY TO COORDINATE ANY ACTIONS CONTEMPLATED BASED
ON 1NFORMATION FROM ENCOUNTERS W1TH A KNOWN OR SUSPECTED
TERRORIST .................................................... ................ ...... ............ ............... ............ 73

VII.

EXAMPLES OF TERRORISM INPORMATTON TYPICALLY AVAILABLE FROM
ENCOUNTERS ............................................................................................................ 74

vm.

OBTAINING ENCOUNTER lNFORMATION THROUGH TSC'S DAIL y
ENCOUNTER REPORTS ............................................................................................ 77

PPENDIX 1: DEFINITIONS
APPENDIX 2: HSPD-6
APPENDIX 3: TSC MOU
APPENDIX 4: ADDENDUM B TO TSC MOU

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APPENDIX 5: INFORMATION SHARING MOU
APPENDIX 6: EXECUTIVE ORDER 13388
APPENDIX 7: DOJ PROTOCOL ON TERRORIST NOMINATIONS
APPENDIX 8: REDRESS MOU
APPENDIX 9: PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM REGARDING 12/25/2009 TERRORIST
ATTACK
APPENDIX 10: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
APPENDIX 11: SUMMARY OF CHANGES AND UPDATES FROM THE 2010
WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE

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CHAPTER 1: WATCHLISTING PROCESS AND PROCEDURES
I.

INTRODUCTION
1.1

A key foundation for TERRORI ST 1-related screening is the U.S. Government's TERRORIST
watchlisting process managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The TSC was
established by the Attorney General, acting through the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, and the then Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence
Community (lC). The TSC is supported by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),
the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Homeland Security (DI-IS), the IC, the FBI,
Law Enforcement Agencies, Regulatory Agencies and Diplomatic Bureaus. The TSC has
created and maintains the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) or Terrorist Watchlist to serve
as the U.S. Government's consolidated watchlist for TERRORISM SCREEN ING INFORMATION.

1.2

The current TERRORTSTwatchlisting process supports the U.S. Government's efforts to combat
TERRORISM by: (1) consolidating the U.S. Government's Terrorist Watchlist in the TSDB; (2)
helping SCREENERS and intelligence agencies accurately identify individuals on the Terrorist
Watchlist; (3) providing SCREENERS with information to help them respond appropriately
during ENCOUNTERS with KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS; and, (4) subsequently collecting
information about the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST for use in assessing threats and
conducting investigations. 2 The collected information may be incorporated into the Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) and TSDB to enhance the records of KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS and may be made available to the wider watchlisting and screening
communities. Today, the TSDB also includes information about certain foreign nationals who
are associated with TERRORISM, TERRORIST ACTIVITY, or KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORJST(S)
but for whom there is insufficient DEROGATORY INFORMATION to be independently
watchlisted. This may include certain immediate famiJy members of KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS, or known associates of KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. These additional
categories of records (also known as exceptions to the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard) are
maintained to support immigration and screening activities primarily conducted by DOS and
DHS . 3

1

See Appendix 1, Definitions for words or phrases appearing in all capitalized letters throughout thi s Watch listing
Guidance.
2
A SCREEN ER is a Department or Agency that is authorized to conduct TERRORISM screening to determine if an
individual is a possi ble match to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST in the TSDB . The term "SCREENER" is used
throughout this document as a general reference to a government official who compares an individual's information
with information in the TSDB to determine if an individual is in the TSDB. Certain SCREENERS have components
which perform both screen ing and law enforcement duties and law enforcement officials who engage in such activities
may normally describe their targeting or other actions in this context as other than "screening." For ease of reference,
government officials who compare an individual's information with information in the TSDB will be referred to in the
Guidance as "SCREENERS." The internal guidance set forth herein is not intended to create or confer any rights,
privileges, or benefits in any matter, case, or proceeding. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741.
See Chapter 3, Section V, infra, for more details. Aside from these limited exceptions, references to the TSDB in this
Watchlisti ng Guidance denote the TSDB as containing information about KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.

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1.3

This Watchlisting Guidance has been developed to help standardize the watchlisting
community's nomination and screening processes. It is important to remember, however, that
watchlisting is not an exact science. There are inherent limitations in any primarily namebased system and analytic judgments may differ regarding whether subjective criteria have
been met. Given these realities, the U.S. Government's watchlisting process attempts to
safeguard the American people from a TERROR1ST attack while safeguarding privacy, civil
rights and civil liberties.

1.4

Thus, when reasonable minds could disagree on a record, a NOMINATOR will make a
determination in favor of sending the nomination to NCTC for consideration and additional
review. The TSC has the final decision authority regarding watchlisting determinations and
will add an individual 's name to the TSDB, consistent with TSC Actions and Processes as
further described in Paragraph 1.56.

II.

WATCHLISTING AUTHORITIES
1.5

On September 16, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6
(HSPD-6), which directed the Attorney General to "establish an organization to consolidate
the U.S. Government's approach to TERRORfSM SCREENING and provide for the appropriate
4
and lawful use of TERRORIST INFORMATION in screening processes." TERRORIST
INFORMATION was specifically defined to mean " information about individuals known or
appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for,
in aid of, or related to TERRORISM." HSPO-6 also directed the heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies to provide to NCTC on an on-going basis, "all appropriate
TERRORIST INFORMATION in their possession, custody, or control," to the extent permitted by
law.

1.6

The intent ofHSPO-6 was to consolidate all TERRORISM INFORMATION at the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC) - whose functions were assumed by NCTC 5 - in a classified
database that would then extract Unclassified, For Official Use Only (U//FOUO) TERRORI ST
IDENTI FIERS for passage to the new organization created by the Attorney General. Thus,
concurrent with the issuance of HSPD-6, the TSC was established via the Memorandum of
Understanding on the Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against
Terrorism (TSC MOU), which was signed by the Attorney General, the Secretaries of State
6
and Homeland Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence (on behalfofthe IC).

4

See Appendix 2, HSPD-6.
See FN 8, infra.
"See Appendix 3, TSC MOU; see also Appendix 4, Addendum B to the TSC MOU. In 2004, the Secretaries of State,
Treasury, and Defense also became signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding between the Intelligence
Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information
Sharing, dated March 4, 2003 (Information Sharing MOU). By doing so, they agreed that all provisions of the TSC
MOU and the Information Sharing MOU apply to all entities that are or become a pa1t of their respective Departments.
5

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1.7

Under HSPD-6, consistent with the U.S. Constitution and applicable laws, including those
protecting the rights of all Americans, the TSC was to develop and maintain an unclassified
database containing the most thorough, accurate, and current identity information possible
about KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. The TSC created the TSDB to meet these goals. 7
The TSDB is also known as the Terrorist Watchlist. The TSDB receives TERRORIST
IDENTIFIERS from two sources: NCTC's TIDE provides information concerning KNOWN or
SUSPECTED international TERRORISTS and the TSC's Terrorist Review and Examinations Unit
(TREX) provides the identities of KNOWN or SUSPECTED domestic TERRORfSTS who have no
link to international TERRORISM. NCTC's TIDE contains identifying and substantive
DEROGATORY fNFORMATION on KNOWN or SUSPECTED international TERRORISTS and the FBI's
Sentinel system contains supporting information regarding purely domestic TERRORISTS.

1.8

Pursuant to Paragraph (2) of HSPD-6, the NCTC is mandated to "provide [TSC] with access
to all appropriate information or intelligence in the [NCTC's] custody, possession, or control
that [TSC] requires to perform its functions." NCTC fulfills this function by providing TSC's
TSDB with U//FOUO information about KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS from NCTC's
TIDE and by providing access to TIDE Online, a read-only copy of the TIDE database, to
those in the watchlisting community who require access.

1.9

NCTC's establishment by the President was codified by section 1021 of the intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004 (IRTPA). 8 Pursuant to TRTPA, NCTC shall
"serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on KNOWN and SUSPECTED TERRORJSTS and
international terror groups." In addition, NCTC "may, consistent with applicable law, the
direction of the President, and guidelines referred to in [the statute], receive intelligence
pertaining exclusively to domestic counterterrorism from any Federal, State, or local
government or other source necessary to fulfill its responsibilities and retain and disseminate
such intelligence." 9
1.9.1 All Departments and Agencies are required to provide NCTC with all TERRORISM
fNFORMA TfON. Due to the amount of information involved, only a subset of this
information is provided in the NCTC prescribed format designed to facilitate direct
ingestion into the TIDE. NOMINATING DEPARTM ENTS and AGENCIES, however, should
remain focused on reviewing and watchlisting TERRORISM INFORMATION from datasets
most likely to contain information about KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.

Addendum B to the TSC MOU, which superseded Addendum A, incorporates by reference all provisions of the

Information Sharing MOU. See Appendix 5.
7

The TSDB consolidates the U.S. Government's TERRORI SM screening and lookout databases into a single integrated

TERRORJST identities database.
8

NCTC initially was created by Executive Order 13354 (August 27, 2004) to serve as the primary organization in the
U.S. Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S. Government
pertaining to TERRORISM and counterterrorism, excepting purely domestic counterterrorism information . Executive
Order 13354 was revoked by Executive Order 13470 (July 30, 2008) after NCTC was codified in IRTPA section I 021.
9 In addition to the provision of domestic KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS directly to the TSC, the TSC's TREX unit
also provides the identities of international KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS to NCTC for inclusion in TIDE.

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1.10 On August 27, 2004, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11
(HSPD-11), which "builds upon HSPD-6," to enhance TERRORIST-related screening to more
effectively detect and interdict SUSPECTED TERRORISTS and TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. HSPD-11
defines "SUSPECTED TERRORISTS" as "individuals known or reasonably suspected to be or have
been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to TERRORISM ...
and TERRORIST ACTIVITIES."
1.11 To enhance information sharing, another key component of the consolidated terrorist
watchlisting system, the President issued Executive Order 13388, which provides that the
head of each Agency that possesses or acquires TERRORISM INFORMATION shall promptly give
access to that information to the head of each other Agency that has counterterrorism
functions. 10
1.12 On June 5, 2008, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 24 (HSPD24) to further build upon the TERRORIST screening policies announced in HSPD-6 and HSPD1 I to protect the nation from TERRORISTS by enhancing the use of biometrics. In HSPD-24,
the President directed that" ... agencies, shall, to the fullest extent permitted by law, make
available to other agencies all biometric and associated biographic and contextual information
associated with persons.far whom there is an articulable and reasonable basis for suspicion
that they pose a threat to national security" (emphasis added). HSPD-24 underscores the
value of biometrics in achieving effective TERROR ISM screening and emphasizes the need for a
layered approach to identification and screening of individuals, as no single mechanism is
sufficient.
1.13 The relevant TERRORISM screening Presidential Directives use words and phrases to describe a
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST subject to TERRORIST screening without defining them:
"TERRORIST INFORMATION" (HSPD-6), "TERRORISM" (HSPD-6), "appropriately suspected"
(HSPD-6), "reasonably suspected" (HSPD-11 ), and "articulable and reasonable basis for
suspicion" (HSPD-24). Thus, previous watchlisting guidance supplied definitions of key
terms and the standard that would apply to terrorist watch listing decisions.
1.14 Neither HSPD-6 nor HSPD-11 defines "TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES." While
federal law contains numerous definitions of"terrorism" 11 , for watch listing purposes under
this Guidance, "TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES" combine elements from various
federa l definitions and are considered to:
1.14.1
10

involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure

Appendix 6, Executive Order 13388.
50 U.S.C. I80 I (c) (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) definition of"intemational terrorism");
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)§ 2 I2(a)(3)(B)(iii) [8 U.S .C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)] (defining "terrorist activity");
INA§ 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) [8 U.S.C. I I82(a)(3)(B)(iv)] (defining to "engage in terrorist activity"); 18 U.S.C. 233 l(I)
(defining "international terrorism"); 18 U.S.C. 2332(b) (defining "federal crime of terrorism"); Executive Order 13224,
66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (September 23, 2001) (defining "terrorism").
11

See
See

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which may be a violation of U.S. law, or may have been, if those acts were committed in
the United States; and,
1.14.2

appear to be intended-

1.14.2.1

to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

1.14.2.2

to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or,

1.14.2.3 to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
kidnapping, or hostage-taking.
1.15 This includes activities that facilitate or support TERRORI SM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVIT[ES such
as providing a safe house, transportation, communications, funds , transfer of funds or other
material benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical,
biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training for the commission of an act of
TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACT1VITY.
1.16 HSPD-24 speaks in terms of"articulable and reasonable basis for suspicion" to describe a
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST who should be watchlisted and represents the President' s
most recent explanation concerning U.S. policy regarding the individuals who pose a threat to
national security and should be screened to better protect the American people. Accordingly,
that standard has been adopted and is clarified in this Watchlisting Guidance in Chapter 3,
Section II.
1.17 On December 16, 2005, in accordance with section 1016 of IRTPA, the President issued a
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies prescribing the
guidelines and requirements in support of the creation and implementation of the Information
Sharing Environment (lSE). In Guideline 5 of that Memorandum, the President directed, as
he had earlier in Executive Order 13353 12 , that the information privacy rights and other legal
rights of Americans must be protected and that guidelines be developed and approved to
ensure that "such rights are protected in the development and use of the TSE." In December
2006, the President approved for issuance the ISE Privacy Guidelines by the Program
Manager. 13
1.18 A second addendum to the TSC MOU, Addendum B 4 , which supplements and incorporates
by reference all provisions of the TSC MOU, superseded Addendum A and became effective
on January 18, 2007. The Directors of National Intelligence, NCTC, and the TSC joined as
signatories in Addendum B. Paragraph 7 of Addendum B introduces the term TERRORIST
IDENTIFI ERS to more clearly describe the type of TERRORIST identity elements that are deemed
12

See Executive Order 13353, Establishing the President's Board on Safeguarding Americans' Civil Liberties (August
27, 2004).
13
See Guidelines to Ensure that Information Privacy and other Legal Rights of Americans are Protected in the
Development and Use of the Information Sharing Environment (December, 2006).
14
See Appendix 4, Addendum B to the T'SC MOU.

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U//FOUO, without regard to the classification of the source material from which it is drawn.
TERRORIST IDENTIFI ERS include those listed in Addendum B (i.e ., names and aliases; dates of
birth; places of birth; unique identifying numbers; passport information; countries of origin
and nationality; physical identifiers; known locations; photographs or renderings; fingerprints
or other biometric data; employment data; license plate numbers; and any other TERRORIST
IDENTJFI ERS that ORIGINATORS specifically provide for passage to the TSC). For example,
email addresses and phone numbers are increasingly useful for screening purposes.
ORIGINATORS should mark email addresses and phone numbers as U//FOUO whenever
possible and pass these TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS to NCTC to forward to the TSC for inclusion
in TSDB. ORIGINATORS are encouraged to provide all relevant and unclassified information,
to include social media information when appropriate.

III.

CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITIES
1.19 First Amendment. First Amendment protected activity alone shall not be the basis for
nominating an individual for inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist. 15 The following are
examples of protected Constitutional activities:
1.19.1 Free Speech. The exercise of free speech, guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution,
includes more than simply speaking on a controversial topic in the town square. It
includes such symbolic or other written, oral and expressive activities as carrying
placards in a parade, sending letters to a newspaper editor, wearing a tee shirt with a
political message, placing a bumper sticker critical of the President on one's car, and
publishing books or articles. The common thread in these examples is conveying a
public message or an idea through words or deeds. Speech that may be repugnant to
ideas of the majority may still be protected by the U.S. Constitution. For the purpose of
this Watch listing Guidance, the right of protected free speech under the U.S.
Constitution applies to U.S. PERSONS wherever they are located and to non- U.S. PE RSONS
located inside the United States. The right of protected free speech, however, is not
unlimited and may not extend to some lawless action.
1.19.2 Exercise of Religion. The free exercise ofreligion covers any form of worship ofa
deity - even forms that are not widely known or practiced - as well as the right not to
worship any deity. Protected religious exercise also extends to dress that is worn or food
that is eaten for a religious purpose, attendance at a facility used for religious practice,
observance of the Sabbath, raising money for evangelical or missionary purposes, and
proselytizing.
l.19.3 Freedom of the Press. Freedom of the press includes such matters as reasonable
access to news-making events, the making of documentaries, and the posting of "biogs."
15

The First Amendment does not apply to non-u.s.

PERSONS

outside the United States. Before submitting nominations,
a specific person is a U.S.

NOMINATORS may consult with their Department or Agency counsel to determine whether
PERSON and whether the questioned activity is entitled to First Amendment protection.

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1.19.4 Freedom of Peaceful Assembly. Freedom of peaceful assembly, often called the
right to freedom of association, includes gathering with others to protest government
action, or to rally or demonstrate in favor of, or in opposition to, a social cause. The
right to peaceful assembly includes more than just public demonstrations - it includes,
as well, the posting of group websites on the Internet, recruiting others to a lawful cause,
marketing a message, and fundraising, which all are protected First Amendment
activities if they are conducted in support of an organizational, political, religious, or
social cause.
1. I 9.5 Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances. The right to petition the
government for redress of grievances includes, for example, writing letters to Congress,
carrying a placard outside the city hall that delivers a political message, recruiting others
to one's cause, and lobbying Congress or an Executive Agency for a particular result.

l.20 Equal Protection. The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S . Constitution provides in part that:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that
this applies as well to the official acts of U.S. Government personnel. Nominations, therefore,
shall not be based solely on race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affi liation. Any
activities relating to this Guidance that are based solely on such considerations are invidious
by definition, and therefore, unconstitutional.
IV.

WATCHLISTING POLICIES
1.21 Watchlisting Disclosures. The general policy of the U.S. Government is to neither confirm
nor deny an individual's watchlist status. In addition to the provisions in Addendum B to the
TSC MOU, which require NOMINATOR approval before TSDB information can be used in any
process that might result in public disclosure, the 2007 Memorandum of Understanding on
Terrorist Watch/isl Redress Procedures (Redress MOU) 16 requires SCREENERS Lo wnlact the
TSC if it receives a request for information or records that might reveal an individual's
watchlist status. Approval would also be required from any entity which provided
information used by a NOMINATOR during a nomination. Per the Redress MOU, ORIGINATJNG
and NOMlNATING AGENCIES are obligated to support SCREENER determinations - both at the
administrative level and in litigation - and provide appropriate information, including
unclassified substitutes as necessary. TSC, in conjunction with NCTC, the NOMINATORS, and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), as appropriate, will ensure that representations regarding an
individual's potential watchlist status are properly coordinated and approved.
1.22 Legal or Use Restrictions. Because information in the TSDB comes overwhelmingly from
intelligence sources and methods or sensitive law enforcement techniques, Paragraph 12 of

16

See Appendix 8, Redress MOU.

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Addendum B to the TSC MOU17 requires that any recipient of information from the TSDB
seeking to use TERRORIST identity information in any legal or administrative process or
proceeding obtain NOMINATOR approval before doing so. Approval from the entity which
provided the information, if other than the NOMINATOR, is also required. Additionally,
information from Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) collections may only be used
in a proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney General. Therefore, any
SCREENER seeking to use TSDB information in any process or proceeding must contact TSC
so that TSC can assist in obtaining approval from the NOMINATOR, owner of the information,
or Attorney General, as required.
1.23 In addition to the foregoing restrictions, there are restrictions on sharing information with
foreign governments. Any TERRORIST IDENTIFIER (as described in Addendum B to the TSC
MOU) will be deemed U//FOUO and shared with the watchlisting community and foreign
governments for watchlisting purposes pursuant to the terms of the TSC MOU. Accordingly,
NOMINATORS sho uld include, as appropriate, TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS in documents that contain
non-releasable warnings (e.g., a report is not releasable to xxx/yyy/zzz countries), unless the
TERRORJST IDENTIFI ERS are restricted by some other authority that limits dissemination. If U.S.
PERSON information is otherwise authorized for release to the foreign government, the nonreleasable warning is disabled to allow dissemination of the information.

V.

WATCHLISTING STANDARD: IDENTIFYING AND SUBSTANTIVE
DEROGATORY CRITERIA
I .24 Before a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST is added to the Terrorist Watchlist, TSC reviews
the nomination to determine whether it meets the following minimum identifying criteria and
minimum substantive derogatory criteria for inclusion in the TSDB.
1.24.1 Minimum Identifying Criteria. Each nomination must contain minimum
identifying criteria for inclusion into the TSDB. Without this minimum identifying data,
the nomination is not eligible for inclusion into the TSDB, or any of the TSC 's
supported systems. Chapter 2 sets forth gu idance regarding both the minimum
identifying biometric and biographic criteria for inclusion into the TSDB. Although
TIDE accepts records containing less than these minimum criteria, such records will not
be exported either to the TSDB for watch listing or to the various supported systems used
by the SCREENER.B absent an exception described in the Watchlisting Guidance.
1.24.2 Minimum Substantive Derogatory Criteria. In addition to the minimum
identifying criteria, nominations to the TSDB are accepted based on a REASONABLE
SUSPICION that the individual is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORJST derived from the

17

See Appendix 4, Addendum B to the TSC MOU.

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totality of the information reviewed for nomination. 18 To demonstrate that the
nomination has sufficient indicia of reliability to suppo1t this REASONABL E SUSPrCION
determination, NOMINATING AGENCIES should implement processes designed to ensure
that nominations are free from errors, that recalled or revised information is reviewed
regularly, and that necessary corrections to nominations based on those
revisions/retractions are made. NOMINATING AGENCIES should, to the extent possible
given the nature of the reporting, verify the accuracy and reliability of the information
included in nominations. In some cases, the NOMINATING AGENCY may not be able to
evaluate the reliability of the information received; however, in such situations, the
NOMINATING AGEN CY can ensure that the information provided is an accurate
representation of the information obtained. Chapter 3 sets forth further guidance
· regarding the application of the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard to TSDB nominations.

VI.

WATCHLISTING PROCESS OVERVIEW
1.25 The authorities referenced in Section I1 of this Chapter created the framework for the
watch listing enterprise by combining various functions of existing government entities and
joining them to new organizations with counterterrorism responsibilities. The resulting
watch listing enterprise consists of ORIGINATORS, NOMINATORS, AGGREGA TORS, SCREENERS
and encountering agencies that are supported by the community-wide collection, nomination,
and consolidation processes.
1.26 ORIGINATORS, NOMINATORS, AGGREGATORS, and SCREENERS. All Executive Departments
and Agencies have responsibility for collecting, collating, and sharing TERRORISM
INFORMATION to support the watchlisting process. They are called ORIGINATORS because they
initially collect and identify information supporting the conclusion that an individual is a
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. An ORIGINATOR is the Department or Agency that has
appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority and collects TERRORISM
INFORMATION (i.e., raw information) and disseminates it or T ERRORIST IDENTIFI ERS to other
U.S. Government entities via an intelligence report (i.e. , finished intelligence) or other
mechanism. In general, when an ORIGINATOR has identified international TERRORISM
INFORMATION and determines that information should be provided to NCTC, the ORIGINATOR
takes on the NOMINATOR role. A NOMINATOR is a Federal Department or Agency that has
information to indicate that an individual meets the criteria for a KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST and nominates that individual to TIDE and the TSDB based on information that
originated with that Agency.
1.27 While all NOMINATORS have the duty of upholding informational standards, the NCTC and
TSC are distinctly responsible for ensuring data quality and the integrity of their respective
repositories. NCTC and TSC are themselves potential NOMINATORS. Analysts from the

18

Please note that there are also certain exceptions to the minimum biographic information and minimum substantive
derogatory criteria required for Terrorist Watch list nominations that support immigration and visa screening activities
conducted by DHS and DOS . See Chapter 2, Section l1J and Chapter 3, Section V.

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NCTC may discover an individual who is eligible for watchlisting while reviewing all-source
information. In these cases, NCTC analysts will request that the ORlGINATOR submit a
nomination for inclusion into TIDE; or, on a limited basis or during exigent circumstances,
NCTC analysts may update TIDE directly with a disseminated report and notice to the
ORIGINATOR(S). In instances where disseminated reporting is used to enhance TIDE, NCTC
will provide notice back to the collecting agency via TIDE. TSC may also nominate
TERRORISM TNFORMATION received pursuant to TERRORISM screening conducted by foreign
governments.
1.28 NCTC and TSC are responsible for reviewing both newly nominated individuals, as well as
subsets of existing records, to determine if additional and/or enhancement (research) is
required to locate missing information critical to the watchlisting process. In some cases, this
will require research to locate additional DEROGATORY INFORMATION to meet the minimum
substantive derogatory criteria for watchlisting. In other cases, this will require research to
locate additional biographic or biometric identifiers, in order to provide a comprehensive
record maximizing the probability of confirming a POSITIVE MATCH to an identity contained in
theTSDB.
1.29 AGGREGATORS are those who receive and hold TERRORISM INFORMATION and certain other
non-TERRORISM INFORMATION they are authorized to receive and retain. For example, two of
NCTC's main statutory missions are to serve as the (1) central and shared knowledge bank on
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS and (2) primary organization in the U.S. Government for
analyzing and integrating all intelligence information possessed or acquired by the U.S.
Government pertaining to TERRORISM and counterterrorism. 19
1.30 TSC takes on the role of an AGGREGATOR when a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST is
encountered and the individual 's record is enhanced or updated with ENCOUNTER-related
information. As noted in Paragraphs 1.1 and 1.7, the TSC manages the watchlisting process
and plays a key role in helping Departments and Agencies determine whether an ENCOUNTER
with a member of the public is one with a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. Additional
TERRORISM INFORMATION or TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS are generated during ENCOUNTERS and the
Encounter Management Application (EMA)2° uses that information to update records of
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.
1.31 SCREENERS vet against the TSDB to determine if an individual is a possible match to a KNOWN

or SUSPECTED TERRORIST in the TSDB. SCREENERS can include federal , state, local, tribal,
territorial, or foreign governments and certain private entities. Screening officials include
homeland security officers, consular affairs officers, transportation safety personnel, and
officials of foreign governments with whom the United States has entered into a TERRORISM
SCREENING INFORMATION sharing agreement pursuant to HSPD-6. Ce1tain Departments and
Agencies have components which perform both screening and law enforcement duties. If a
19

20

See 50 U.S.C. §4040.
EMA is an application used by the TSC to administer ENCOUNTER information.

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believes an individual may be on the Watchlist, the screener contacts the TSC 's
Terrorist Screening Operations Center (TSOC). The TSOC wi ll determine w hether the
indi vidual the SCREE1 ER has encountered is, in fact, a POSITIVE MATCH to the individual who
is on the Terrorist Watchlist. The TSOC may also notify the FBT's Counterterrorism Divi sion
(CTD) that there has been a positive ENCOUNTER with a watchlisted subject. TSC' s Terrorist
Screening Operations Unit (TSOU) coordinates the appropriate operational response to the
ENCOUNTER. Based on the TERRORI SM INFORMATION made available by the ORIGINATING
AGENCY, the SCREEN ER wil l take action based upon its specific authorities (e .g., req uiring
additional screening at an airport checkpoint, denying a visa app lication, determin ing
admi ss ibility into the Uni ted States) and fo llow appropriate ENCOUNTER procedures, as set
forth in Chapter 5.
SCREEN ER

1.32 Collection, Nomination, Consolidation and the Use of the Terrorist Watchlist to Perform
Screening Processes. The following is a chart de picting the collection, TERROR IST
nomination, consolidation and screening processes:
Immigration
Screenlng

•

Domestic
Terrorism

N1tfon1I Crime
lnfonnaUon center

Borders

Terrorist
Screening
Database

(TSDB)

U.S Cuslornsand Border
Protcct,oo

r•

Fly/S,1,ae,/T SOI

Transp01'1ation Security
Administration

PmeortlVISA

International
Terrorism

Departmentof State
Consulllrlookoot&
Support System

FBI
Sentinel

Foreign

Partners

Department of
Defense

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I

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1.33 The arrows fade inside the 1 SDB cylinder because not every nomination from NCTC (for
international TERRORISM) or the FBI (for domestic TERRORISM) is exported from the TSDB to
21
SCREENERS (represented by the multi-colored blocks at the far right of the chart).
For
examp le, certain categories of individuals that do not meet the minimum identifying criteria
(see Chapter 2, Section II) or the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard (see Chapter 3, Section If)
can be watchlisted to support immigration and visa screening activities by OHS and DOS (see
Chapter 3, Section V) but are not exported to state/local/tribal SCREENERS or foreign partners.
Similarly, when ORIGINATORS provide FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION to NCTC for inclusion in
TlDE, such information will not be exported from TIDE to the TSDB, unless the NOMINATING
AGENCY believes there is REASONABLE SUSPJCION to believe that the individual is a KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORIST. FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION is provided to NCTC where it can be
further analyzed, connected to existing information, and added to TIDE for export to TSDB
because NCTC, and not individual ORIGINATORS, has access to all the information available to
the U.S. Government on a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST.

VII.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITES FOR THE WATCHLISTING AND SCREENING
COMMUNITY
1.34 Delineation ofroles and responsibilities of NOMINATING AGENCIES, SCREENERS, NCTC, and
the TSC is critical to provide for an effective and efficient integrated Terrorist Watchlist
enterprise. While HSPD-6 describes the broad mandate of developing an integrated watch list
system, and the TSC MOU provides a level of detail needed to fulfill that mandate, further
clarification is required to ensure there are neither gaps in the nomination process, nor
wasteful redundancies.
1.35 Pursuant to HSPD-6, Departments and Agencies in the Executive Branch are required, to the
extent permitted by law, to provide TERRORISTlNFORMATION to NCTC. This process will be
accomplished either through direct nomination to NCTC, or through a specific component
designated by a Federal Department or Agency head for doing so (e.g., all DOJ components
are directed to nominate through the FBI; DHS Intelligence and Analysis (l&A) has oversight
responsibi lity for all DHS nominations). Except as detailed in the sections applicable to
expedited nominations (see Paragraphs 1.58 and 1.59), NOMINATING AGENCIES will endeavor
to provide comprehensive nominations and include the maximum amount of identifying and
22
DEROGATORY INFORMATION.
NOMINATING DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES should prioritize
21

The Terrorist Screening Database Annex D to the FBI Memorandum of Understanding with Department of Defense
(DoD), signed February 22, 2012, established DoD as a screening agency customer of the TSC. The dashed line in the
latter chart represents that DoD is finalizing procedures to receive and use infonnation from the TSDB for its screening
grocesses.
2
In May 2010, the Deputies asked that NO MINA TING AGENCIES "ensure that nominations are comprehensive and
include the maximum amount of identifying and DEROGATORY INFORMATION." In 2012, the Interagency Policy
Committee (IPC), in coordination with NOMI NA TORS, SCREENERS, NCTC and TSC, developed a prioritized list of data
identifiers that are critical to screening and identity resolution activities. This Identity Resolution and Enhancement
Tiers document is available on NCTC's Watch listing Community oflnterest portal on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System (JWlCS).

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the identification of new KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS who meet the REASONABLE
SUSPICION standard, along with the identifying and DEROGATORY INFORMA TlON most useful to
watchlisting, and screening effort, as well as assisting in identity resolution.
1.36 Each Department or Agency that nominates a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST to NCTC for
watch listing is under a continuing obligation to provide NCTC with newly identified
DEROGATORY INFORMATION or exculpatory information obtained by that Department or
Agency. Each Department or Agency also has the responsibility to provide NCTC with newly
identified identifying and DEROGATORY INFORMATION obtained from their Department or
Agency, regardless if they were the original NOMINATING AGENCY.
1.37 With the noted exception of the Visa Viper Program, Departments and Agencies should not
nominate KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS to NCTC based on information that they do not
originate without first coordinating with the ORIGINATOR.

Vlll.

QUALITY CONTROL MEASURES
1.38 In order to produce and maintain the most reliable and accurate information in TIDE, TSDB,
and screening databases, quality control is considered a responsibility of all entities.
NOMINATING DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES must establish and maintain processes, including
appropriate training and guidance, to ensure information transm itted to NCTC is consistent
with the source of the information.
1.39 HSPD-6 Requirements. HSPD-6 requires the TSC to maintain thorough, acc urate, and
current information concerning KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. For watch li sting purposes,
"current" means information that the NOMINATING AGENCY reasonably believes is valid and
accurate. The requirement that information be current does not necessarily preclude
information that is several years old from being included in the TSDB if there is no reason to
believe the information may have changed (e.g., information regarding an individual's date of
birth or TERRORIST ACTIVITY was collected 20 years ago but has not been superseded by
additional information is still relevant). NOMINATORS shou ld consider the date of the
DEROGATORY INFORMATION in the context of analyzing the overal I quality of the data, as well
as the severity of the threat, to determine whether the individual warrants watchlisting. The
date of the DEROGATORY INFORMATION may refer to both the date the information is collected
(such as a report that was collected 50 years ago) as well as the date of the information that is
referenced in the reporting (such as a recent report that references an event that occurred 50
years ago).
1.40 TSC MOU Obligations. Paragraph 15 of the TSC MOU provides that the TSC "wi ll
determine, according to criteria established jointly with the entity responsible for each
supported system, which supported screening processes will query that entry in the
consolidated TERRORIST screening database." Pursuant to that paragraph, the TSC is required
to "make these determinations based on criteria and procedures developed in coordination
with the Parties to this Memorandum and in consultation with the heads of appropriate Federal

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Depatiments and Agencies based on factors, including but not limited to, the following:
1.40.1

the nature of the person's association with TERRORISM;

1.40.2
the quality of the data, including credibility, reliability, and extent of
corroboration; and,
1.40.3

the extent of uniquely identifying data .... " 23

1.41 Provide Guidance and Training. Each Agency will provide guidance on the watchlisting
business process. Analysts will receive periodic refresher training, as needed .
1.42

NOMINATING AGENCY Procedures. Each NOMINATOR providing international TERRORIST
watch listing nominations to NCTC is responsible for the accuracy of its information and has a
continuing responsibility to notify NCTC or any changes that affect the validity or reliabi lity
of such information. 24 NCTC analysts wiII review each nomination for TERRORIST
watchlisting prior to its inclusion into TIDE and its export to the TSDB.

1.43 Each NOM INATING AGENCY should implement processes designed to ensure that nominations
are free from errors, that recalled or revised information is reviewed regularly, and that
necessary corrections to nominations based on those revisions/retractions are made.
NOMJNATING AGENCIES should, to the extent possible given the nature of the reporting, verify
the accuracy and reliability of the information included in nominations. The fo llowing
represents the type of processes that each NOMINATING AGENCY shall develop that are tailored
to each Agency 's particular mission and operational environment:
1.43.1 Develop Adequate Factual Predicate. Each NOMINATING AGENCY wi ll seek to
obtain as much DEROGATORY INFORMATJON and identifying information as practicable
concerning the KNOWN or SUS PECTED TERRORIST who is being nominated.
l.43.2 Provide Guidance and Training. Each NOMINATING AGENCY will provide guidance
on the TERRORIST watchlisting nomination process and ensure that analysts involved in
the nomination process are trained on a periodic basis.
1.43.3 Require Quality Assurance Review. Each NOMINATING AGENCY will use a quality
ass urance process to review nominations for accuracy prior to forward ing the
information to NCTC.
1.43.4
23

Heightened Review for

U.S. PERSONS.

The nominations of U.S. PERSONS require

See Appendix 3, TSC MOU.

24

PURELY DOMESTIC TERROR ISM INFORMATION is provided directly to TSC by the FBI and is subject to the same
conditions app licable to the nomination procedures for those associated with international TERRORISM .

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special considerations and procedures. 25 See Paragraph 3.15.
1.43.5 U.S. PERSON Determinations. NOMINATORS must take reasonable steps to determine
whether an individual is a U.S. PERSON.
1.43.6 U.S. PERSON Review and Confirmation. Nominations of U.S. PERSONS to the
Terrorist Watchlist shall be reviewed by the NOMINATING AGENCY'S legal counsel or a
designated reviewer to confirm that the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard has been met
or that the nomination meets an exception to the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard, and
to ensure that the nomination conforms to Agency specific U.S. PERSON authorities and
guidelines.
1.43.7 Reliability and Accuracy Limitations. Nominations will include any limitations on
the reliability or accuracy of the information.
1.43 .8 Periodic Reviews. The NOMlNATJNG AGENCY will conduct peri.o dic reviews of their
nominations of U.S. PERSONS to the Terrorist Watchlist, at minimum on an annual basis,
when there is no corresponding FBI investigation to ensure that the U.S. PERSON
continues to meet watchlisting criteria.
1.43.9 Redress Procedures. As per the establishment of a formal watch list redress process
(see Chapter 1, Section XT), entities involved in the watchlisting process shall establish
internal reviews and redress procedures.
1.44 Each NOMJNATlNG AGENCY will have procedures that facilitate the prevention, identification,
and correction of any errors in information that is shared as part of the watch listing process.
Procedures will include the review ofretractions and/or corrections of information that may
have been used to support a nomination. In cases where a retraction or other information has
become available, the NOMINATING AGENCY will promptly send a watchlist removal request or
modification, as appropriate, to NCTC. Each NOMINATING AGENCY must provide notice of
any errors or outdated information to NCTC immediately unless there is an articulated reason
why such notification could not be made immediately. NCTC will process and transmit to
TSC such corrections upon receipt.
1.45 NCTC Review. Tn addition to review by NCTC analysts, NCTC will employ a quality
control process to ensure that all standards and appropriate procedures have been employed,
the data is accurate, and the presentation of the material is clear, concise, and complies with
established definitions and conventions. NCTC must also have processes and procedures in
place to ensure the information documented in TIDE and provided to the TSC is accurately
transcribed. NCTC shall ensure there is a process in place for review and/or auditing of TIDE
records.

25

See Executive Order 12333, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7).

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1.46 TSC Review. TSC personnel will review the nominations received as described in Paragraph
1.56. TSC personnel evaluate whether nominations meet watchlisting standards and weigh, as
appropriate, all-source analysis before accepting or rejecting a nomination. The TSC has a
critical role to play in quality control, as the TSC review is the last step before any record
(including a biometric nomination where no name is available) is sent to various screening
systems. As with NCTC, the TSC should ensure there is a process in place for review and/or
auditing of TSC nominations and TSC records.
NOMINATION PROCEDURES

TX.

1.4 7 Distinctions between U.S. PERSONS under Executive Order 12333 and Aliens under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. This Watchlisting Guidance generally adopts the
definition of U.S. PERSON from Executive Order 12333 (as amended) for nomination
procedures. Executive Order 12333 defines a U.S. PERSON as "A United States citizen, an alien
known by the inteJligence element concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an
unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent
resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation
directed or controlled by a foreign government or governments." The Watchlisting Guidance
also contains certain exceptions to the minimum substantive derogatory standards for
TERRORIST watchlisting that support immigration and visa screening activities by the OHS and
DOS to determine whether ineligibilities exist for admission to the United States or visa
adjudication pursuant to the ImnJi'gration and Nationality Act (INA). Because the INA
defines "aliens" as any person not a citizen or national of the United States, the TNA
admissibility provisions also apply to Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), in certain
circumstances, who are considered U.S. PERSONS under Executive Order 12333.
Consequently, NCTC developed a mechanism in TIDE to identify and distinguish U.S.
citizens from non-U .S. citizens in order to further distinguish between "aliens" under the INA
and U.S. PERSONS under Executive Order 12333. 26
1.48

ORIGINATOR'S Nominations Procedures. As mentioned in Paragraph l.26, when an
ORIGINATOR becomes a NOMINATOR, it prepares a nomination document and forwards
NCTC through the NOMINATOR tool.

it to

1.48.1 As a general rule, NCTC will attach all disseminated communications (cables or
forms) to the TERRORIST identities record as a "source" document, which will be
available on NCTC Current or the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
System (JWICS) to individuals who have been granted access to TIDE.
l .48.2 Because NCTC is the conduit for passing international TERRORISM INFORMATION to
TSC for TERRORISM screening purposes, there is no longer a need to send watchlist
requests to multiple Government Agencies. By sending a Terrorist Watchlist
nomination cable to NCTC, all potential U.S. Government TERRORISM screening
26

See INA § I0l(a)(3) [8 U.S.C. I 10l(a)(3)].

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responsibilities should be accounted for.
1.48.3 The DOJ has approved a Protocol to govern TERRORIST nominations for its non-FBI
components, which requires components to provide the FBI with all TERRORISM
27
INFORMATION. The FBI is responsible for submitting watchlisting nominations based
on information received from other DOJ components pursuant to the FBI's nomination
procedures.
1.48.4 OHS has designated the Under Secretary for I&A as the Executive Agent for DHS '
centralized TERRORIST watchlisting process and he/she shall be responsible for providing
a OHS wide-mechanism for nominating all identifying or DEROGATORY lNFORMATTON
about KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS to TIDE. OHS l&A is also responsible for
providing training/certification programs to the components.
1.49 In providing information to NCTC for inclusion into TIDE, the ORIGINATOR is responsible for
determining whether it may, by law, provide the information to NCTC, in accordance with
section 1021 (d)(6) ofIRTPA. This information shall be provided with any applicable caveats
or dissemination controls, which will be reflected in TIDE. The biographic and biometric
identifiers derived from this information will be deemed U//FOUO for passage to TSDB
unless the ORIGfNATORdesignates them as "TIDE Restricted," as outlined in Addendum B to
the TSC MOU.
1.50 NCTC Actions and Processes. NCTC reviews TERRORIST nominations from Federal
Departments or Agencies (NOMINATORS) as described in Paragraph 1.28.
1.51 In determining whether an individual is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, NCTC will rely
on the designation of "KNOWN TERRORIST" provided by the NOMINATOR as presumptively
valid. This presumption can be overcome ifNCTC has specific and credible information
within its possession that such designation is not appropriate, at which point NCTC will
provide such information to the NOMINATOR.

1.52 In reviewing whether to include the TERRORISM INFORMATION about the KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST in TIDE, NCTC reviews the totality of information. The totality of information is
evaluated based on the experience of the reviewer, and the facts and rational inferences that
may be drawn from those facts, including past conduct, current actions, and credible
intelligence concerning future conduct. As part of this review, NCTC will determine if the
information pertains to, or is related to, TERRORISM. TIDE includes TERRORISM INFORMATION
on KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS and may include additional TERRORISM INFORMATION
beyond what meets the minimum substantive derogatory and identifying criteria required for
nominations to the TSDB, as described in Paragraph 1.24. Upon conclusion ofNCTC's
review, NCTC will either accept or reject the nomination:

27

See Appendix 7, DOJ Protocol on Terrorist Nominations.

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1.52.1
Accept Nomination. lf a nomination contains TERRORISM lNFORMA.TlON, NCTC
will create or enhance the associated TIDE record with the data contained in the
nomination. If the minimum substantive derogatory and identifying criteria are met,
NCTC will forward the TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS to the TSC for placement in TSDB with
the NOMINATOR'S watchlist recommendation.
1.52.2 Reject Nomination . If a nomination does not contain TERRORISM INFORMATION,
NCTC may reject the nomination. NCTC will review rejected nominations and search
holdings for additional data that may support a TERRORISM INFORMATION finding. If no
information is found to support the nomination, NCTC will notify the NOMINATING
AGENCY of the rejection.
1.53 Types of records in TIDE. There are two types of records in TIDE:
1.53.]
TERRORIST Records. The vast majority of records in TIDE are for KNOWN or
SUSPECTED international TERRORISTS. These records are labeled "TERRORISTS." Only a
small percentage of TERRORIST records in TIDE concern U.S. PERSONS.
1.53.2 Non-TERRORIST Records. A small percentage of records in TJDE are identified and
labeled "Non-TERRORISTS." 28 These records are generally of familial family members
or associates of KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS and assist DOS and OHS in, for
example, adjudicating visas and immigration processing, or assist the IC in tracking
KNOWN TERRORISTS. These "Non-TERRORISTS" include:
1.53 .2.1
Alien Spouses and Children of TERRORISTS. Based on section
212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX) of the INA, alien spouses and children of TERRORISTS may be
inadmissible to the United States. 29 TIDE exports records pertaining to alien
spouses and children of alien international TERRORISTS (also known as TIDE
Category Code 17) to support immigration and visa screening activities by DOS
and DHS;
1.53.2.2 Other Relatives. TIDE also includes "non-TERRORIST" records of
individuals who have a close relationship to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED international
28

TIDE records for non-U.S. citizens, including LPRs, with insufficient DEROGATORY tNr:QRMATION to meet the

standard (TIDE Category Code 99) and records relating to an individual who has a defined
relationship with the KNOWN or SUSPECTE D TERRORI ST, but whose involvement with the KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST' S activities is unknown (TIDE Category Code 50) are exported to the TSDB as TSDB exceptions to the
REASONABL E SUSPI CION standard. Additionally, individuals described by sources as " TERRORI STS", "extremists",
''jihadists", " militants", " mujahideen" or "insurgents" (TIDE Category Code 03, also referred to as a " labels plus"
nomination) will be accepted into the TSDl3 as exceptions for export to OHS and DOS for immigration and border
processing. See Paragraph 3.14.6. A complete list of TIDE Category Codes can found under the " Watch listing Criteria
Guidance" section on the Intel ink website at http ://www.intelink .gov/tsc/ legal.htm .
29
" Any alien who . . . . is the spouse or child ofan alien who is inadmissible under this subparagraph, if the activity
causing the alien to be found inadmissible occurred within the last 5 years, is inadmissible." See INA §
2 12(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX) [8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX)].
REASONABLE SUSPICION

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TERRORIST but are not alien spouses or children of a TERRORIST. For instance, the
father or brother of a TERRORIST could have a record in TJDE (also known as TIDE
Category Code 160). Thus, these "other relatives" could be U.S. PERSONS or nonU.S. PERSONS. Identifiers for these other re lations reside in TIDE but are not
exported to the TSC for watchlisting, absent independent DEROGATORY
INFORMATION. Instead, these records may be retained in TJDE for analytic
purposes;

1.53.2.3

Passports. Unrecovered lost or sto len passports in the hands of international
(also known as TIDE Category Code 89);

TERRORISTS

Associates. Individuals who have a defined relationship with the KNOWN
SUSPECTED TERRORIST, but whose involvement with the KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST'S activities is unknown (also known as TIDE Category Code 50);

l .53.2.4

or

1.53.2.5 Individuals with a Possible Nexus to TERRORISM. Individuals with a
possible nexus to TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITY but for whom additional
DEROGATORY INFORMATION is needed to meet the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard
(also known as TIDE Category Code 99).
1.54 Identification of U.S. PERSON Status in TIDE. NCTC analysts will review the totality of
information available on a subject to discern U.S. PERSON status prior to creating or
enhancing a record in TIDE, whenever possible. For existing TIDE records, this status is
available to the analyst in the first field of the TIDE record. In case of external
nominations or ENHANCEMENTS from the IC, the standard nomination template provides a
means for NOMINATORS to identify U.S. PERSON status pursuant to Executive Order 12333
and the Agency's specific guidelines. The U.S. PERSON status field on the standard
nomination template is a required field and it is the responsibility of each NOMINATING
AGENCY to ensure the field is properly annotated in accordance with established policy.
1.55 Types of Records in TIDE and the TSDB. Not all records in TIDE are included in the
TSDB. For example, records with FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION that do not meet the
minimum derogatory standard or records that do not meet identifying information criteria
remain in TIDE and are not included in the TSDB, absent direction for temporary, threat
based categories pursuant to Paragraph 1.59. 30 The nominations process for TIDE records
that will be considered for entry in the TSDB begins with an automated data transfer process
that moves an individual TIDE record containing the identity of a KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST or other exportable category or record nominated for watch listing to the TSDB.
1.56 TSC Actions and Processes. The TSC's Single Review Queue (SRQ) enables the TSC's
Nominations and Data Integrity Unit (NDIU) to review each KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERROIUST

3

°

Certain categories ofnon-TERRORlST records (see Paragraph 1.53.2) or nomination s to the No Fly and Selectee List
based on an expedited waiver of"full date of birth" requirement (see Paragraph 4.18) may also be eligible for inclusion
in the TSDB.

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record nomination to ensure it meets the watchl.isting standard. 31 The SRQ also helps ensure
that all qualified records are made available to the appropriate SCREENERS for use in
TERRORISM screening. During the SRQ process, every request to add, modify, or delete a
TSDB record is reviewed by a TSC analyst to ensure the accuracy of watch listing records and
the removal of inaccurate records from TSDB.

1.56.1 Within the TSC's NDTU, experienced analysts and/or designated Agency
representatives serve as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) with respect to specific
databases (e.g. , No Fly or Selectee List) that receive TSDB data for TERRORI SM
screening purposes. The NDIU currently has four types of SMEs who specialize in the
information/systems from their respective organizations: DI-IS/Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) for the No Fly, Selectee and Expanded Selectee Lists, FBI for
National Crime Information Center (NCIC)/KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST File
(KSTF), DOS for the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD)32 and DHS for TECS (and
its components) and the Automated Targeting System (ATS). SMEs provide guidance
regarding their specific information/systems to the TSC and watchlisting standards to
their Agencies. ln some cases, the SME coordinates the data export to the supported
system, provides feedback to NOMINATORS, and responds to inquiries regarding their
supported system from other TSC customer Agencies.
1.56.2 Upon the conclusion of TSC's review, TSC will either accept or reject the
nomination:
1.56.2.1
Accept Nomination. Consistent with Paragraphs (7) and (8) of Addendum B
to the TSC MOU, if a nomination contains the minimum substantive derogatory
criteria and the minimum identifying information, TSC will create a TSDB record,
include the TERROR!ST IDENTIFIERS from the TIDE record , and export the TSDB
record to its supported systems (i.e., databases and systems eligible to receive
records from the TSDB) for the benefit of SCREENERS that conduct TERRORISM
screening. The current supported systems include, but are not limited to, the
following:
1.56.2.1.J

NCIC/KSTF ;

1.56.2.1.2 DOS Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS)-VISA and
CCD;

31
32

1.56.2.1.3

OHS Watchlisting Service (WLS) (e.g. , TECS, ATS, Secure Flight);

1.56.2.1.4

TSA Transportation Security Vetting Center;

1.56.2.1.5

TSA-Office oflntelligence Analysis (OIA);

1.56.2.1.6

Tipoff United States Canada (TUSCAN);

See Chapter l , Sccti.on VU I, supra.
CCI) is an application used by DOS to administer its visa and passport applications.

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1.56.2.1.7 Tipoff Australia Counterterrorism Jnformation Control ystem
(TACTICS).
1.56.2.2 Reject Nomination. If a nomination lacks either the minimum substantive
derogatory criteria or the minimum identifying information, and is not an
exception to those requirements (e.g., TJD Category Codes 50 or 99 as described
in Paragraph 1.53.2), TSC will reject the nomination and notify NCTC directly of
its determination or coordinate with NCTC to notify the NOMINATOR of its
determination. Records nominated to TID that are ineligible for TERRORIST
watchlisting may remain in TlD until additional information is obtained to
warrant either watchlisting or removal from TIDE. NCTC analysts will review al lsource information for additional identifying or substantive DEROGATORY
INFORMATION. If additional information is discovered, NCTC wi ll enhance the
TIDE record and submit the record to T C for inclusion in the TSDB. The TIDE
record will be reviewed again by the T C to determine whether it is eligib le for
watchlisting in TSDB and export to certain supported screening systems. 33
1.57 The number of T C' s supported systems will continue to grow a · TSC, OHS , and DOS
expand their domestic and international outreach efforts and finalize additional agreements to
exchange TERRORISMS REENING INFORMATION. T Chas modified the TSDB so that certain
customers may query the TSDB remotely instead ofreceiving exports ofTSDB data to their
own systems.
1.58 Expedited Nomination Procedures for Individual Nominations. If exigent
circumstances exist (imminent travel and/or threat) where an individual nomination into the
T DB needs to be expedited after normal duty hours, a NOMINATOR, with coordination from
NCTC, may contact the TSC's TSOC directly. If a NOMINATOR coordinated with NCTC, the
nomination will be received by the TSC via the SRQ in TSDB and the TSO Watch
Commander will coordinate with a NDJU Senior Analyst to process the nomination . A
NOMINATOR may also contact the TSC directly and provide all relevant information using the
following process :
1.58.1 The NOMINATOR must first contact the T O at 866-at571--

(toll free number) or

1.58.2 The NOMTNATOR will be instructed by a TSOC Specialist on how to telephonieally
complete a Terrorist Screening Center Expedited Nomination Request Form.
1.58.3 ln addition to ba ic identifying information, the NOMINATOR will be requested to
provide a 24/7 point of contact should the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST he
encountered by a s REENER.

33

See Paragraph 1.24.2 supra.

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1.58.4 Within 72 hours of contacting the TSOC, the NOMINATOR must provide appropriate
follow-up documentation that articulates, through either classified or unclassified means,
the substantive DEROGATORY INFORMATION used to establish the basis for TERRORIST
watchlisting.
1.59 Expedited Nomination Proccdur·cs for Temporary, Threat-Based Categories. This
provision is intended to enable categories of individuals to be temporarily upgraded in
watchlist status based on current and credible intelligence information or a particular threat
stream that indicates a certain category of individuals may be used to conduct an act of
domestic or international TERRORISM. This temporary, threat-based expedited upgrade (TB U)
is made at the direction of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism or his/her designee (Appropriate Official) and should be narrowly tailored to
address the threat.
1.59.1 The goal of this provision is to fashion a watch listing response that is appropriate to
the nature, specificity, and severity of the threat. To achieve this goal, in addition to
verifying the credibility of the threat intelligence, due consideration should be given to:
1.59 .1.1

The harm to public safety posed by the threat;

1.59.1.2 The clarity and specificity of the information giving rise to the threat as to
time, place, method, and identity of the suspected perpetTators;
1.59.1.3 The anticipated impact on international and domestic travel, civil liberties,
and foreign relations; and,
1.59.1.4 The best available screening tools, other than the No Fly or Selectee Lists,
given the type and specificity of identifiers and travel data.

1.59.2 When necessitated by exigent circumstances, and where there is current and credible
intelligence information or a particular threat stream that indicates a certain category of
individuals may be used to conduct an act of domestic or international TERRORISM, the
Appropriate Official may direct the TSC and NCTC to place categories of individuals
from TIDE or TSDB on the No Fly List, Selectee List, or into the TSDB for up to 72
hours before concurrence is obtained from the Deputies or Principals Committee. To the
extent practicable, the initial direction to NCTC and TSC from the Appropriate Official
will be in writing. Absent DEROGATORY INFORMATION supporting individual nomination
or watchlist upgrade, if written concurrence is not obtained within 72 hours of the initial
direction to TSC and NCTC, the TSC will automatically remove any individuals added
to the No Fly List, Selectee List, or TS DB pursuant to the TBU, .until such written
direction is received.
1.59.3 The addition of categories of individuals to the No Fly List, Selectee List, or TSDB
pursuant to Paragraph 1.59.2 shalJ be effected for a period oftime, consistent with the

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nature of the threat involved, not to exceed 30 days but may be renewed for additional
30-day periods upon written approval of the Deputies or Principals Committee. A TBU
is valid until the threat no longer exists. To the extent that such threat recedes or is
otherwise mitigated prior to the expiration of 30 days or during any extension approved
by the Deputies or Principals Committee, TSC and NCTC and members of the
watch listing community shall immediately request of the Deputies or Principals
Committee to downgrade these TB Us to their original or appropriate status. All threatbased records transmitted through automated mechanisms (i.e., WLS, CCD) will include
a "TBU indicator" at the message level to differentiate this category of records from
non-TBU records and to provide the TBU directive for which the record is upgraded.
1.59.4 Until such time as the Deputies or Principals provide additional, written guidance,
DOS will defer visa actions with respect to these expedited upgrades in watch list status.
1.59.5 Departments and Agencies will advise the Deputies or Principals of other
consequences that may result from a change in watchlist status and seek guidance as to
how to proceed .
1.59.6 After these categorical moves are accomplished or renewed, there will be an
expedited procedure for the review of all u . s. PERSONS that are part of the TBU to ensure
their watch listing status is appropriate (including whether continued categorical
watch listing may be warranted based on the nature of the threat).
1.60 Arbitration of Watch listing Disputes. If a NOMINATOR wishes to dispute TSC's
watchlisting determination, it may contact NCTC (for international TERRORlST nominations)
to discuss the watchlisting status and/or submit additional substantive derogatory and
identifying information to support its initial nomination. Additional information provided to
NCTC by a NOMINATOR will be passed to the TSC for review and final watchlisting
determination. In the case of an FBI dispute over the TSC' s watch listing determination of an
international TERROIUST'S nomination, a case agent must contact the TSC.
1.61 In the case of domestic TERRORIST nominations, if the FBl wishes to dispute TSC 's
watch listing determination, it may contact the TSC to discuss the watchlisting status and/or
submit additional substantive derogatory and identifying information to support its initial
nomination.

X.

PROCEDURES TO REMOVE AN INDIVIDUAL FROM THE W ATCHLIST
1.62 A NOMINATOR desiring to remove an international TERRORIST identity record previously
nominated to TIDE should contact NCTC and provide written justification for the request.
NCTC will promptly process the request when received. NCTC will be the final arbiter of
whether the identity is removed from TIDE and TSC will be the final arbiter of whether
TERRORIST IDENTIFI ERS are removed from TSDB.

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1.63 If the NOMINATOR requesting removal of an international TERRORIST identity record from
TIDE is the only NOMINATOR to have provided information on that record, the removal request
will be immediately processed by NCTC. The removal information is then sent to the TSC,
which, in turn, makes a determination regarding removal of the TERRORIST identity from the
TSDB.
1.64 If multiple NOMINATORS have provided information on an international TERRORIST identity
record, NCTC will coordinate with all relevant parties in an attempt to reach a consensus on
the TERRORI ST identity' s most appropriate watchlisting status.
I .64.1
If the multiple NOMINATORS arrive at a consensus that the watchlisted identity is not
reasonably suspected of engaging in TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, or an
applicable exception, the identity is removed from the TSDB and TIDE. In certain
circumstances, NCTC may retain records in TIDE to prevent inappropriate rewatchlisting.
1.64.2 If the multiple NOMINATORS cannot arrive at a consensus regarding the watchlisting
status of an identity, TSC may decide to remove the identity from the TSDB, but NCTC
may retain the identity in TIDE.
1.64.3 For cases in which the FBI has conducted an investigation on an individual
(independently nominated by another NOMINATOR) and has concluded that the
watchlisted individual is not a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, the individual may be
removed from the TSDB. 34 In such cases, the TERRORIST IDENTIF IERS from the FBI's
investigation may be used to supplement the TIDE record.
1.65 The FBI will review domestic TERRORIST identity removal requests according to applicable
FBI procedures.
l .66 TSC has an established, on-going process to review every record in the TSDB in accordance
with Paragraph (8)(b) of the TSC MOU and its mission under HSPD-6 to maintain the most
thorough, accurate, and current information in the TSDB. If TSC determines that the
watch listing standards arc not met for an individual record, TSC will remove the record from
the TSDB, in coordination with the NOMINATING AGENCY.

XI.

REDRESS PROCEDURES
1.67 In January 2005, the TSC established a formal watchlist redress process that allows Agencies
34

After an FBI determination that the individual is not a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, NCTC may determinebased on a NOMINATOR'S independent nomination- that the individual should remain in TIDE as records that have been
fully vetted and shou ld not be screened against (TIDE Category Code 140), the individual be watchlisted based upon the
NOM INATOR'S independent determination that the individual is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED T ERRORIST or that the individual
warrants watchlisting based upon an exception to the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard.

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that use TSDB data during a TERRORISM screening process to refer individuals' complaints to
the TSC if it appears the complaints may be related to the watch listing process. The goal of
the watchlist redress process is to provide for timely and fair review of individuals'
complaints and to identify and correct any errors in the TSDB.
1.68 The watchlist redress process is a multi-Agency process involving the DHS, TSC, NCTC,
NOMINATORS, and SCREENERS. On September 19, 2007, Agencies participating in the
watchlist redress process executed the Redress MOU to set forth a coordinated redress process
to respond to individual complaints about adverse screening experiences. 35
1.69 TSC's Redress Office is responsible for receiving, tracking, and researching watchlist-related
complaints that SCRE ENERS refer to TSC. For each redress complaint received, the Redress
Office conducts an in-depth analysis to determine if the person's complaint is related to a
TSDB record, including a determination of whether the complainant is the watch listed
individual or merely a near-match to a watchlist record. If the complainant is the watch listed
individual, the TSC ' s Redress Office will determine whether the watchlisted individual still
meets all the watchli sting criteria.
1.70 For each complaint, the TSC Redress Office coordinates with the NOMINATOR (via NCTC
when the NOMINATOR is not the FBI), who assists in the evaluation of the complaint to ensure
the most current, accurate, and thorough information available is used to review the person ' s
watchlist status. Where appropriate and warranted by the current information and applicable
criteria, a person ' s watchlist status may be adjusted (e.g. , downgraded from the No Fly to
Selectee List or the person ' s identity may be removed entirely from the TSDB). lf the redress
complaint was referred to the TSC from the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS
TRIP), the individual ' s adjusted watchlist status will be provided to OHS TRIP for issuance of
an appropriate response.

I .71 OHS TRIP is a single point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution
regarding difficulties they experience during their travel screening or inspection at, for
example, transportation hubs like airports, or when crossing U.S. borders. The DHS TRIP
website is www.dhs.gov/trip. OHS TRIP ensures a thorough review is completed by
consulting and sharing information with other OHS Components and other Agencies, as
appropriate, to address the issues identified by the complainant.

XII.

PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE
1.72 This Watchlisting Guidance shall be reviewed no less than every two years following the
conclusion of the previous review, or as needed.

35

See Appendix 8, Redress MO U; see also FN 16, supra.

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CHAPTER 2: MINIMUM IDENTIFYING CRITERIA
I.

BIOMETRIC NOMINATIONS
2.1

II.

Biometric information refers to the measurable biological (anatomical or physiological) and
behavioral characteristics that can be used for recognition. Examples include facial
photographs, fingerprints, iris scans, digital images, latent prints, DNA and gait. A biometric
is sufficient to meet the minimum identifying criteria for nominations to the NCTC's TIDE
and/or the TSC ' s TSDB, provided that the nomination also meets the minimum substantive
derogatory criteria, or one of the exceptions. Biometric nominati.ons without minimum
biographic information will be provided only to those SCREENERS that have the technical
capability to screen against or otherwise make assessments using the biometrics.
Notwithstanding the above, all NOMINATORS are encouraged to include all available associated
biographic information with any biometric nomination.

MINIMUM BIOGRAPHIC NOMINATION REQUIREMENT
2.2

TIDE.

shall provide NCTC, for inclusion into TIDE, FRAGMENTARY
that suggests an individual may have a nexus to T ERRORISM and/or T ERRORIST
ACTIVITI ES and any additional information that will facil itate identification of these
individuals. Nominations to TIDE under this section will be considered for inclusion in the
TSDB if the NOMJNATING AGENCY believes there is REASONABLE SUSPICION to believe that the
individual is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORI ST.
NOMI NATORS

IN FORMATION

2.2. 1 Nominations of individuals based on FRAGMENTARY IN FORMATION who fail to meet the
minimum identifying criteria for nomination to TSDB should be provided to NCTC for
inclusion in TJDE when there is DEROGATORY INFORMATlON suggesting that the
individual is associated with TERRORISM and the NOMINATING AGENCY determines that
there are sufficient identifiers for possibly facilitating a match to existing TIDE records.
Unless otherwise directed, NOMINATING AGENCIES should prioritize the nominations of
individuals who satisfy the minimum identifying criteria before addressing nominations
based on FRAG MENTARY INFORMATION .
2.3

SCREENER Discretion.

2.4

TSDB. Nominations to the TSDB must include a last name. NOMINATlNG AGENCIES should
also provide any additional identifying information available. In addition to a last name,
nominations must include:

As appropriate, SC REENERS have the discretion to decide not to
include in their screening systems common names received from the TSDB, where
insufficient identifying information exists for identification.

2.4.1 first name;

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2.4.2 Or any one of the following additional identifiers:
2.4.2.1

Full date of birth (eight digit "mm/dd/yyyy" format);

2.4.2.2

Passport number (with or without country of issuance);

2.4.2.3
Unique identifying numbers such as alien registration numbers, visa numbers,
and social security numbers;
2.4.2.4

Telephone number(s) 36 ;

2.4.2.5

E-mail address(es) 37 ;

2.4.2.6

License plate number(s).

2.4.3 Or any two of the following additional identifiers 38 :
2.4.3. l

Country of citizenship, if different from place of birth;

2.4.3.2

Place of birth (city or country), if different from country of citizenship;

2.4.3.3

Circa or partial date of birth (partial: e.g., 1960; or range: e.g., 1960-1965);

2.4.3.4
Full name of an immediate family member (e.g., parent, spouse, sibling, or
children);
2.4.3.5

Occupation or current employer;

2.4.3.6

Specific degrees received;

2.4.3.7

Schools attended;

2.4.3.8

Physical identifiers such as race, height, or weight;

2.4.3.9

Unique physical identifiers such as scars, marks or tattoos;

2.4.3.10

Street address or other suffici ently specific location information.

36

Only unclassified phone numbers that are authorized for passage to TSC pursuant to Paragraph 7(m) of Addendum B
to the TSC MOU, will be included in TSDB. See Appendix 4. Unclassified phone numbers will only be provided to
those SCREENERS that have the technical capability to receive this data.
37
Only unclassified email addresses that are authorized for passage to TSC pursuant to Paragraph 7(m) of Addendum Il
of the TSC MOU will be included in TSDB. See Appendix 4. Unclassified email addresses will only be provided to
those SCREENERS that have the technical capability to receive this data.
38
As required here, there must be two distinct identifiers that must be sufficiently specific to account for the large
number of possible matches common identifiers may produce. For example, if one identifier is rather common (e.g. ,
physical identifiers), the other identifier must be more specific to permit the screening official to successfully match a
record with an individual. As a further example, a nomination with the last name listed as Khan, location listed as
Kabul, Afghanistan, and occupation listed as a baker alone would be insufficient for screening purposes because it is
highly unlikely a successfu l match could be made against such data. However, a nomination with the name listed as R.
Khan, location li sted as residence of 123 Sunshine Street, Kabul, Afghanistan, and occupation listed as a baker at ABC
Bakery, would be sufficient for screening purposes.

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III.

MINIMUM BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR EXCEPTIONS TO THE
MINIMUM SUBSTANTIVE DEROGATORY STANDARDS FOR TERRORIST
WATCHLISTING
2.5

There are certain exceptions to the minimum substantive derogatory standards for TERRORIST
watch listing that support immigration and visa screening activities by DHS and DOS. 39
Examples of these categories of records include, but may not be limited to, records relating to
an individual who has a defined relationship with the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, but
whose involvement with the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST'S activities is unknown (TIDE
Category Code 50) and those with insufficient DEROGATORY INFORMATION TO meet the
REASONABLE SUSPlClON standard for watchlisting (TIDE Category Code 99).

2.6

NOMINATING AGENCIES should provide all additional identifying information available.

All

nominations under this section must include a full name (first name, last name) and one of
the following identifiers:
2.6.1 Full date of birth;
2.6.2 Full passport number (with or without country of issuance);
2.6.3 Unique identifying numbers such as alien registration numbers, visa numbers, and social
security account numbers;
2.6.4 Telephone number(s);
2.6.5 Email address(es);
2.6.6 License plate number(s);
2.6. 7 Biometrics, such as facial image, iris scans or fingerprints.

39

See Chapter 3, Section V.

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CHAPTER 3: MINIMUM SUBSTANTIVE DEROGATORY CRITERIA
I.

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
3.1

TSC issued an updated U.S. Government Protocol Regarding Terrorist Nominations on
February 25, 2009, that included an appendix identifying the minimum substantive derogatory
criteria for acceptance of KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST nominations into the TSDB.
Based on the attempted terror attack of December 25, 2009, the Watchlisting Guidance was
reviewed to determine whether adjustments were needed. The revised guidance was approved
by the White House Deputies Committee on May 25, 2010 and issued to the watchlisting
community on July 16,2010, after a multi-agency classification review.

3.2

This Chapter of the Watchlisting Guidance has been updated to reflect the watch listing
community's experiences with the Guidance since issuance in July of2010 by the Deputies
Committee. One of the more notable changes of this updated version of the Watch listing
Guidance is the restructuring of instances for when PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY
INFORMATION is required. Another notable change includes the re-introduction of guidance
relative to the TERRORIST facilitators or supporters from an earlier version of the Watchlisting
Guidance and the inclusion of additional exceptions to the minimum substantive derogatory
standards for TERRORIST watchlisting that support immigration and visa screening activities of
the DOS and DHS.

II.

REASONABLE SUSPICION
3.3

For purposes of watch]isting an individual to the TSDB, the NOMINATOR should determine
whether there is REASONABLE SUSPICION that an individual is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST.

3.4

40

REASONABLE SlJSPICION. To meet the REASONABLE StJSPICION standard, the NOMINATOR,
based on the totality of the circumstances, must rely upon articulable intelligence or
information which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts , reasonably
warrants a determination that an individual is known or suspected to be or has been knowingly
engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to TERRORISM and/or
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. There must be an objective factual basis for the NOMINATOR to believe
that the individual is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. Mere guesses or hunches are not
sufficient to constitute a REASONABLE SUSPICION that an individual is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TER RORIST. Reporting of suspicious activity alone that does not meet the REASONABLE
SUSPICION standard set forth herein is not a sufficient basis to watchlist an individual. The
facts, however, given fair consideration, should sensibly lead to the conclusion that an
individual is, or has, engaged in TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

40

In instances where REASONABLE SUSPICION is not found, NOMINATORS should also determine whether the individual
should be nominated to support immigration and visa screening by OHS and DOS (see Chapter 3, Section V).

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3.5

Due Weight. In determining whether a REASONABLE SUSPICION exists, due weight should be
given to the specific reasonable inferences that a NOMINATOR is entitled to draw from the facts
in light of his/her experience and not on unfounded suspicions or hunches. Although
irrefutable evidence or concrete facts are not necessary, to be reasonable, suspicion should be
as clear and as fully developed as circumstances permit. For additional guidance regarding
the nomination of U.S. PERSONS, see Paragraph 3.15.

3.6

NOMINATORS

3.7

Criteria and Data Quality. To demonstrate that the nomination has sufficient indicia of
reliability to support a REASONABLE SUSPICION determination, NOMINATlNG AGENCIES should
incorporate processes designed to ensure that nominations are free of errors, and to the extent
possible given the nature of the reporting, have not come from sources known or determined
to be unreliable. NOMINATING AGENCIES should, to the extent possible, verify the accuracy
and reliability of the information included in nominations. In addition to ensuring that
nominations are free from errors, NOMINATING AGENCIES should implement procedures
designed to ensure that recalled or revised information is reviewed regularly, and that
necessary corrections to nominations based on those revisions/retractions are made.

3.8

PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY INFOKMATION. PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY
lNFORMATION is the type of information relied on to determine whether REASONABLE
SUSPICION is met. This is information that demonstrates the nature of an individual's or
group's association with TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES that is descriptive and

shall not nominate an individual based on source reporting that NOMINAT ING
personnel identify as, or know to be, unreliable or not credible. Single source information,
including but not limited to "walk-in", "write-in", or postings on social media sites, however,
should not automatically be discounted merely because of the manner in which it was
received. Instead, the NOMINATING AGENCY should evaluate the credibility of the source, as
well as the nature and specificity of the information, and nominate even if that source is
uncorroborated, assuming the information supports a REASONABLE SUSPICION that the
individual is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST or there is another basis for watchlisting the
individual.

specific to an event or activity, and is more than a label. For example, "S ubject X provides
false travel documentation for AI-Qaida operatives" is PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY
INFORMATION, whereas "Subject Y is a supporter," standing alone, is not considered
PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION.

3.9

Potential Behavioral Indicators. In making a REASONABLE SlJSPlC LON determination,
NOMINATORS should consider behavioral indicators known to be associated with particular
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. The following is a list of a few examples of those
indicators. It is not an exclusive list and it includes activity that may have innocent
explanations wholly unrelated to TERRORISM. Furthermore, some activities conducted by U.S.
PERSONS or activities taking place within the United States, may be an exercise of rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Watchlisting an individual for engaging solely in

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constitutionally protected activities is prohibited. 41 For these reasons, it is critical that each of
these activities- as with all possible indicators of TERRORIST ACTIVITY- not be judged in
isolation. Each must be viewed in the context in which it occurs and considered in
combination with all other known information to ensure that any nomination based in whole
or in part on this behavior comports with the standards set forth above:
3.9.1 Attendance at training camps known to the JC as facilitating TERRORIST ACTIVITIES 42 ;
3.9.2 Attendance at schools/institutions identified by the re as teaching an ideology that
includes the justification of the unlawful use of violence or violent extremism;
3.9.3 Repeated contact with individuals identified by the IC as teaching or espousing an
ideology that includes the justification of the unlawful use of violence or violent
extremism; or,
3.9.4 Travel for no known lawful or legitimate purpose to a locus of TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

III.

KNOWN TERRORISTS
3. JO Definitions.
3.10.1

KNOWN TERRORIST. A KNOWN TERRORIST is an individual whom the U.S.
Government knows is engaged, has been engaged, or who intends to engage in
TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITY, including an individual (a) who has been
charged, arrested , indicted, or convicted for a crime related to TERRORISM by U.S.
Government or foreign government authorities; or (b) identified as a TERRORIST or
member of a designated foreign terrorist organization pursuant to statute, Executive
Order or international legal obligation pursuant to a United Nations Security Council
Resolution.

3.10.2 TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. In general, TERRORISM and/or
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES are acts that: (a) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human
life, property, or infrastructure that may be a violation of U.S. law, or may have been, if
those acts were committed in the United States; and, (b) appear intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion, or affect the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination,
kidnapping, or hostage-taking. This includes activities that facilitate or support

41

See Chapter l , Section III.
Attendance at TERRO RIST training camps alone meets the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard. Note that under the INA
section 212 (a)(3)(B)(i)(VIII)[8 U.S.C. l 182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VIII)], an alien who has received military-type training (as
defined in section 233 9D(c )(1) of Title 18, United States Code) from or on behalfof any organization that, at the time
the training was received, was a terrorist organization as defined in clause (vi), is inadmissible. Note also that 18 U.S.C.
section 233 9D criminalizes receiving military type training from a designated foreign terrorist organization.
42

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TERRORISM

and/or TERRORLST ACTIVITIES. 43

3.11 Types of KNOWN TERRORISTS for Whom REASONABLE SUSPICION is Established by
Recognized Authority and for Whom Particularized Derogatory Information is Not
Required.

3 .11.1 Arrested or Convicted TERRORISTS. 44 Individuals who have been arrested or
convicted for TERRORIST ACTIVITY are considered KNOWN TERRORISTS who should be
nominated. The arrest or conviction is presumed to meet the REASONABLE SUSPICION
standard for watchlisting unless there is reason to believe that the information is
questionable (e.g., faulty or erroneous), of dubious origin (e.g., poison pen, source
known to be unreliable, or politically motivated) or the result of an unreliable process
(e.g., conviction by a court that does not adhere to minimally acceptable due process
standards). Nominations should include the charge, location, and date of the arrest or
conviction, if available.
3.1 1.2 Individuals Identified Pursuant to Statute or Executive Order. 45 Pursuant to
Executive Order 13224, as amended, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions
with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism," Executive
Order 12947, as amended, "Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to
Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process," and section 302 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the U.S. Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) publishes, updates, and maintains an
integrated and comprehensive list of designated parties with whom U.S. PERSONS are
prohibited froi:n providing services or conducting transactions and whose assets are
blocked. The names on this list include persons designated under country-based and
list-based economic sanctions programs, as well as individuals and entities designated
under the various Executive Orders and Statutes aimed at TERRORISM. Persons
designated under Executive Order 13224, Executive Order 12947, or the AEDPA are
included on this integrated and comprehensive list and are 'Specially Designated Global
Terrorists' (SDGTs), 'Specially Designated Terrorists' (SDTs), or 'Foreign Terrorist
43

TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITI ES include acts that the actor knows or reasonably should know affords
material support to any individual who the actor knows or reasonably should know, has committed or plans to commit a
terrorist activity, to a terrorist organization or to any member of such an organization. Material support includes
providing a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material benefit, fa lse
documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or
training for the commission of an act of TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITY.
44
See Paragraph 3.13. I for situations involving individuals who are acquitted or against whom charges are dismissed
for a crime related to TERRORISM.
45
These authorities generally authorize the Secretary of State (in consultation with either the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or a combination thereof) to designate and block the assets
of foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of TERRORISM that threaten
the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. Additionally,
leaders or members of a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), an Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under
Executive Order 13224, or an organization named to the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) may be designated as a terrorist
organization by the Secretary of State for immigration purposes pursuant to INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(ll) [8 U.S.C .
1189(a)(3)(B)(vi)(ll)].

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Organizations' (FTOs), respectively, and should be nominated accordingly. 46
NOMINATORS should regularly check the Specially Designated Nationals List (SDNL) as
individuals are added and dropped as new information becomes available.
3.11.3 Individuals Identified as TERRORISTS Pursuant to a United Nations Security
Council Resolutions (UNSCR) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals
and Entities. Under UNSCR resolution 1267 (1999), modified and strengthened by
subsequent resolutions, including resolutions 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1445 (2003),
1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), and resolution 1989
(2011 ), sanctions measures now apply to designated individuals and entities associated
with AI-Qaida, wherever located. The names of the targeted individuals and entities are
placed on the AI-Qaida Sanctions List. 47 Under the UNSCR sanctions regime, the
United States has an international legal obligation to prevent the entry into or transit
through its territory of designated individuals listed on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List. 48
NOMINATORS should regularly check the AI-Qaida Sanctions List as individuals are
added and dropped as new information becomes available.
3.11.4 Individuals Identified as TERRORISTS Pursuant to the National Intelligence
Priorities Framework of Counterterrorism. Members of groups (not support entities)
that are identified on the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of
Counterterrorism, (NIPF-CT) are presumed to meet the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard
so long as the group name is not just a regional or activity-based characterization.
Neutral associations such as janitorial, repair, or delivery services of commercial goods
do not meet the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard.

IV.

SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
3.12 Definition.
3.12.1 A SUSPECTED TERRORIST is an individual who is REASONABLY SUSPECTED to be, or
has been, engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to
TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITI ES based on an articulable and REASONABLE
SUSPICION.

3.13 Types of SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.

46

The comprehensive list ofSDGTs and SDTs is accessible through the OFAC website at the following URL:
http://www .treasury .gov/resource-center/sanction s/S DN-L ist/ Pages/ d efau lt.aspx
47
Narrative summaries of the reasons for li sting individuals, groups, unde11akings and entities on the Al-Qaida
Sanctions List (where available) can be found at the following URL:
http ://www. un .org/sc/comm ittces/ I ?..67/narrati vc.shtm I.
48
Many persons designated under UNSCR 1267 and Executive Order 13224 are or have been engaged in financial
support, facilitation , and other activities in support of TERRORI SM. They often, however, do not meet the current criteria
for placement on the No Fly List. OHS and DOS will review the information provided about these individuals and take
actions, as appropriate.

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3.13.1 Individuals Who are Acquitted or for Whom Charges are Dismissed. An
individual who is acquitted or agains whom charges are dismissed for a crime related to
TERRORISM may nevertheless meet the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard and
appropriately remain on, or be nominated to, the Terrorist Watchlist. 49 Each case should
be evaluated based on the facts of the underlying activities, the circumstances
surrounding the acquittal or dismissal, and all known DEROGATORY lNFORMATION to
determine if the individual should remain on the Terrorist Watchlist.
3.13.2 Individuals Identified as TERRORISTS Pursuant to Other Internal Department or
Agency Processes. Departments or Agencies that nominate individuals associated with
a terrorist group that is not designated by Statute or Executive Order (see Paragraph
3.11.2) or groups that fall outside of the NIPF-CT construct (see Paragraph 3.11.4) must
have internal processes to review the activities of TERRORISTS and terrorist
organizations. So long as a Department's or Agency's internal process has determined
that a group is engaging in TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIV ITIES, REASONABLE
SUSPICION can be met for members of the group, or active participants in, that gro up 's
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. Departments and Agencies that use this clause to recommend
subjects for watchlisting are required to provide written notice to NCTC and TSC (an
email will suffice) of the Department or Agency's determination. While members or
active participants of such groups may be nominated without PARTICULARIZED
DEROGATORY INFORMATION, the watchlisting of an individual pursuant to this clause
must be based on the determination by a Department or Agency's internal processes that
the group is engaging in TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. Neutral associations
like janitorial, repair, or delivery services of commercial goods do not meet the
REASONABLE SUSPICION standard.
3.13.3 Individuals Identified as TERRORISTS Pursuant to Agreements by U.S.
Government Agencies/Foreign Governments for Sharing of TERRORIST Identity
Data. The U.S. Government may enter into agreements with foreign governments for
the sharing of TERRORIST identity information. Pursuant to such agreements, data will
be provided to the TSC for TERRORIST screening, as required under HSPD-6. The
Information Sharing and Access (ISA) Jnteragency Policy Committee (IPC) or an IPCdesignated interagency body, will make a determination, country by country, prior to the
final agreement on whether the data provided will (1) be presumed to meet the standard
for inclusion in TSDB; or (2) undergo the Foreign Partner Vetting Process.
3.13.4

Individuals Identified as Associates or Affiliates of KNOWN or SUSPECrED
TERRORISTS or TERRORIST Cells or Networks. so Individuals who are associated
affiliated with a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, or TERRORIST cells or networks
should be nominated when there is PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION

or

49

Because the REASONABL E SUSPICION standard required for watchlisting is lower than that required for a criminal
conviction (i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt), an individual that is acquitted or for whom charges are dismissed may
qualify for watch listing based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the acquittal or dismissal.
50
This section applies as well to persons "linked to," "related" and other similar descriptors to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST, TERRORIST cell s or networks.

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regarding the context of the relationship that gives rise to a REASONABLE SUSPICION that
the individual is engaging or has engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in
aid of, or related to TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACT1VITIES. Neutral associations such
as janitorial, repair, or delivery services of commercial goods are not sufficient.
Information about the pe1tinent activities of the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERR.ORlST,
TERRORIST cell or network should be included in the nomination. These nominations
should include context or content to demonstrate the membership, association, or
affiliation to the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, TERRORIST cell or network.
Individuals who merely "may be" members, associates or affiliates to a terrorist
organization may not be accepted into the TSDB, unless the REASONABLE SUSPICION
standard is met and PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION accompanies the
nomination.
3.13.4.J
Inferences that Support REASONABLE SUSPICION. REASONABLE SUSPICION
may be rationally inferred from the context of the relationship with the KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TEl{RORIST. The following factors should be considered when
determining whether REASONABLE SUSPICION may be inferred:
3. 13.4.1.1

The nature of the activity engaged in with the KNOWN or SUSPECTED

TERRORIST;

3.13.4. 1.2

The frequency, duration, or manner of their contact;

3.13.4. 1.3

A close, continuing, or direct relationship with a KNOWN or
that reasonably suggests the individual is knowingly
involved in or willfully supporting the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST'S
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; or,
SUSPECTED TERRORIST

3.13.4.1.4 Other malevolent or illicit factors that can be articulated that would
support a REASONABLE SUSPICION that the individual is engaging in
TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
3. J3.5 Individuals Identified as TERRORIST Facilitators. TERRORIST facil.itators are
presumed to meet the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard. The nomination should include
PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION concerning the type of "facilitation"
involved and the role of the facilitator when this information is known. Individuals who
are considered facilitators include, but are not limited to, financial fundraisers, document
forgers, travel facilitators, money launderers, and arms merchants. There must be
REASONABLE SUSPICION that the facilitator knew that his or her actions would aid in the
furtherance of TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
3.13.5.1
Criminal Activity Supporting TERRORISM. If intelligence or information
indicates that the individual is engaging in criminal activity related to smuggling,
providing safe houses, forging documents, or any other support to TERRORISTS or
terrorist groups, NOMINATORS should presume that the individual is knowingly
engaging in criminal activity that supports TERRORISM and/ or TERl'WRIST

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ACTlVlTlES. In these circumstances, REASONABLE SUSPICION is based on
TERRORIST criminal activity and should be described in the nomination .

the

3.13 .6 Individuals who Incite Others to Commit Acts of TERRORISM. 51 Inciting an
individual to commit an act of TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES under
circumstances that indicate an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm is
considered engaging in TERRORIST ACTIVITY and is sufficient to meet the REASONABLE
SUSPICION standard. The nomination should include PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY
INFORMATION concerning the type of " incitement" involved and the role of the
individual when this information is known. Normally, speech will not rise to the level of
"inciting" unless there is a clear link between the speech and an actual effort to
undertake the TERRORIST ACTIVITY. The individual may have incited TERRORIST
ACTIVITY, even if a terrorist attack does not actually occur (e.g., because an attempt to
commit such activity is thwarted). Speech advocating a violent or dangerous TERIWRIST
ACTIVITY is incitement if such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. 52
3.13.7 Individuals Who Solicit Others to Engage in TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. In an
individual capacity or as a member of an organization, any individual who solicits
another to engage in a TERRORIST ACTIVfTY and/or for membership in a terrorist
organization is considered to be engaging in TERRORIST ACTIVITY. Nominations that
include PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION concerning the type of solicitation
involved and the role of the individual are sufficient to meet the REASONABLE SUSPICION
standard. An individual may fall outside the scope of engaging in the solicitation of an
individual for membership in a terrorist organization if there is information that
demonstrates that the individual did not know and should not have reasonably known
that the organization was a terrorist organization.
3.13.8 Individuals Identified as Sympathizers and Supporters of a Designated Terrorist
Organization. 53 Sympathizers and suppotters of a designated terrorist organization
(DTO) (see Paragraph 3.11 .2) may be watchlisted when the REASONABLE SUSPICION
standard is met, and the nomination includes PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY
INFORMATION concerning the how the individual 's activities warrant watchlisting, as
opposed to information about why the organization is a DTO.
3.13 .8 .1
A sympathizer or supporter of TERRORISM should be nominated if the support
is operational in nature. lf support is merely ideological , the individual should not
be nominated.

51

For situations where there is no PARTIC ULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION, individuals may be watch listed as an
exception to the REASON ABLE SUSPICION standard. See Paragraph 3. 14.3.
52
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 122 S.Ct. 1389 (2002); 9 FAM 40.32 N2.5, "Advocacy of Terrorism
Not Always Exclusionary."
53
For situations where there is no PARTI C ULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION , supporters of a designated terrorist
organization (OTO) may be watchlisted as an exception to the REASONABLE SUSPIC ION standard. See Paragraph 3.14.4.

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3.13.9 Individuals Identified as FOREIGN FIGHTERS. roREIGN FIGHTERS are defined as
nationals of one country who travel or attempt to travel to another country to participate
in TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, and to the extent possible, the nomination
should include PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION. Behavior that qualifies as
PARTICULAR1ZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION is the travel to a foreign country to
participate in TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
3.13.9.1
A person is not considered a FOREIGN FIGHTER when he or she traveled from
Country A to Country B for non-TERRORIST reasons (e.g. , enrolling in school).
Inferences that someone is a FOREIGN FIGHTER may not be drawn solely from
biographic facts that indicate a person was born in one country and is found in a
different country and suspected to be participating in TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES.
3.13.10 Special Consideration for Individuals Involved with TERRORIST-Associated
Weapons. Individuals who possess, handle, use, manufacture, sell, or transfer
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP),
Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD), or improvised chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) devices, are presumed to meet the REASONABLE
SUSPICION standard due to the inherently dangerous nature of these items or when it can
reasonably be inferred from the context that there is a connection to TERRORISM and/or
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES (e.g., Iraq, presence of other KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS,
previous attacks on or threats to U.S. Forces).
3.13.11 Targets of Raids Conducted by the U.S. Military or the Intelligence
Community. REASONABLE SUSPICION is presumed where an individual was identified as
the target of a raid to disrupt a FTO. When an individual is identified by discovery of
information found during the course of such a raid conducted by the U.S. Military or the
IC, however, REASONABLE SUSPICION is met where the available PARTICULARIZED
DEROGATORY INFORMATION explains why he or she can be reasonably suspected of
engaging or having engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or
related to TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITY. If there is no PARTICULARIZED
DEROGATORY INFORMATION on the individual for whom information was discovered
during the raid, he or she should not be nominated.
3.13.12 Individuals Identified as TERRORISTS via Documentation or Media Exploitation
Efforts. Any individuals identified in documents or media otherwise captured by U.S.
or allied forces or obtained from a NOMINATING AGENCY must have a connection to
TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITlES in order to be nominated to the Terrorist
Watchlist. REASONABLE SUSPICION for an individual to be nominated from document
and media exploitation (DOM EX) materials may be established either by the content or
context of the DOMEX, or other sources. Nominations under this section must include
PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION. For example, REASONABLE SUSPICION for
watch listing can be met based on the acquisition of documents/media identifying a
person from the counterterrorism operation that targeted the residence of Al-Qaida

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leader Usama bin Laden on May 2, 2011. 54 Likewise, individuals Iisted on a roster of an
IED cell could be nominated solely on the presence of their name on the list. An
identity from a captured passport, however, would only be watchlisted if additional
reporting documents REASONABLE SUSPlCION to believe that the individual is connected
to TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITY.
3.13.13 LONE WOLVES. Because the focus is on the individual's TERRORISM-related conduct,
"LONE WOLF" TERRORISTS should be nominated when PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY
INFORMATION and their actions support a REASONABLE SUSPICION that they are engaged
in, or have engaged in, TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. No present known
affiliation with a terror group, organization, or cell is required but prior affiliations, if
they exist, may be taken into account for supporting a rational inference that the
individual is reasonably suspected of engaging in TERRORlSM and/or TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES.

V.

EXCEPTIONS TO SUPPORT IMMIGRATION AND VISA SCREENING
ACTIVITIES BY OHS AND DOS
3.14 TSDB Minimum Substantive Derogatory Exceptions to Support Immigration and Visa
Screening Activities by the DHS and DOS. The Watchlisting Guidance contains certain
exceptions to the minimum substantive derogatory criteria for TERRORIST watchlisting that
support immigration and visa screening activities by the OHS and DOS to determine whether
grounds exist to deny admission of aliens to the United States (including denials of visas) or to
deny other immigration benefits pursuant to the INA. 55 PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY
INFORMATION is not required for nominations made pursuant to the following sections.
Because the INA defines "aliens" as "any person not a citizen or national of the United
States" 56 , the INA admissibility provisions also apply to LPRs, in certain circumstances
including those described in INA section 10l(a)(13)(C)[8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)], who are
considered as U.S. PERSONS under Executive Order 12333. Consequently, NCTC developed a
mechanism in TIDE to identify and distinguish U.S. citizens from non-U.S. citizens in order
to further distinguish between "aliens" under the INA and U.S. PERSONS under Executive
Order 12333 . The following subsections are exceptions to the REASONABLE SUSPICION
standard and will only be transmitted to DOS's CLASS (via the DOS CCD) and DHS 's WLS
to support immigration and visa screening processes.

54

Such documents/media, however, sti ll need to be reviewed to ensure that innocent individuals are not erroneously
watch listed.
55
INA section 2 12(a)(3)(8)[8 U .S.C. I I 82(a)(3)(8)] sets forth several grounds for inadmissibility based on terrorist
activities, which is defined in lNA section 212(a)(3)(B)(ii i)[8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)]. For example, LNA section
212(a)(3)(B)(i)(Vlf) states that any alien who "endorses or espouses terrorist activity or persuades others to endorse or
espouse terrorist activity or support a terrorist organization" is inadmissible to the United States. 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(3}(8Xi)(VIT)]. All other uses of the term "terrorist activities" within this Watchiisting Guidance that do not
specifically reference the INA follow the definition outlined in Chapter I and Appendix 1.
5
See 1NA § 101 (a)(3)[8 U.S.C. 110 l(a)(3)].

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Spouses and Children. Spouses and children 57 of a KNOWN or SUSPECTED alien
TERRORIST cannot be considered TERRORISTS without a R EASONABLE SUSPICION that they
are engaging or have engaged in conduct constitutini, in preparation for, in aid of, or
related to TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVTTTES. The TNA provides that the alien
spouse or alien child of an alien who is inadmissible for certain specified reasons
relating to terrorist activities, if the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible
occurred within the last five (5) years, is inadmissible.59 An alien spouse or child of an
alien who is believed to be inadmissible under the INA for terrorist activities should be
nominated. No additional DEROGATORY INFORMATION (in addition to familial relation)
is required for nomination under this section, if the individual meets the below
qualifications.

3.14. l

3.14.1.1

To qualify for watch listing, alien spouses and children of a
must:

KNOWN

or

SUSPECTED TERRORIST

3. 14.1.1.1

Be an alien (not a U.S. citizen or national), which includes LPRs; and,

3 .14.1 . 1.2

Be an unmarried child under the age of 21 or a spouse of an alien.

3.14.1.2

Ex-spouses, widows, or widowers should not be nominated unless there is a
to believe that they themselves are engaging or have
engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to
TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. Deceased spouses should not be
nominated unless they are specifically covered in Paragraph 3 .17.

REASONABLE SUSPIClON

3.14.1.3 Once a spouse or child no longer meets the definitional requirements under
this section, such an individual should no longer be watchlisted unless there is a
REASONABLE SUSPICION to believe that the individual is engaging in TERRORISM
and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. For example, if a child reaches the age of2l and
there is REASONABLE SUSPI CION to believe he or she was knowingly involved in
TERRORIST ACTIVITY by providing material support to a FTO, he or she can remain
watchlisted based upon this DEROGATORY IN FORMATION. On the other hand, once
a child of a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST turns 21 years of age, the individual
should no longer be watchlisted under this exception because he or she is not
considered a child of the KNOWN or SUS PECTED TERRORI ST and additional
DEROGATORY INFORMATION would be needed to meet the REASONABLE SUSPICION
standard.
57

The lNA defines "child" as "an unmarried person under 21 years of age . .. ." INA § 10 I (b )( I )(8 U.S.C. I IO I (b )( 1)] .
The discussion in Paragraph 3.14. 1 is limited exclusively to spouses and children; all other family members
(including mothers, fathers, sisters and brothers) should be nominated for inclusion in the TSDB only ifthere is
DEROGATORY INFORMATION that the individual has a close connection to a KNOWN or SUS PECTED TERRORIST and that
connection meets the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard. Absent independent DEROGATORY INFORMATION, records for
these individuals may be retained in TIDE for analytic purposes. See Paragraph 1 .53.2.2 for treatment of these other
family members as " non-TERRORIST" records that may reside in TIDE for analytic purposes but are not exported to the
TSDB (known a s TIDE Category Code 160).
59
See INA § 2 12(a){3)(B)(i){IX)[8 U.S.C. 1 l 82(a)(3)( B)(i){I X)]. While this provis ion does not a pply when the activity
caus ing the alien to be found inadmissible occurred more than 5 years before the spouse or child's admissibility is being
considered, the analysis of the time limit's application will be detennined by SCREENERS upon ENCOUNTER.
58

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3.14.2 Endorsers and Espousers. An alien who endorses or espouses TERRORIST ACTIVITY
or persuades others to endorse or espouse TERRORIST ACTIVITY or support a terrorist
organization may be inadmissible under the INA and should be nominated.
3.14.3 Incitement. Inciting an individual to commit an act ofTERRORlSM and/or TERRORIST
ACTIVlTY under circumstances that indicate an intention to cause death or serious bodily
harm is considered engaging in TERRORIST ACTlVJTY . The individual may be
inadmissible under the INA and should be nominated.
3.14.4 Supporters of a Designated Terrorist Organization. Supporters of a DTO may be
inadmissible under the INA and should be nominated if the support is operational in
nature. If support is merely ideological, the individual should not be nominated.
3.14.5 Representatives. Representatives of terrorist organizations and representatives
of any political, social or other group that endorses or espouses TERRORIST ACTIVITY
may be inadmissible under the INA and should be nominated. Representatives include
an officer, official, or spokesman of an organization, and any person who directs,
counsels, commands, or induces an organization to engage in TERRORIST ACTIVITY.
Neither membership in, nor association with, the organization or group is required.
3.14.6 TERRORISTS, Extremists, Jihadists, Militants, Mujahideen or Insurgents. 60
Nominations of individuals described by sources as "TERRORISTS" , "extremists",
"jihadists", "militants", "mujahideen" or "insurgents" 61, (an exclusive list) will be
accepted into the TSDB as exceptions for export to DHS' WLS and DOS' CLASSVISA and CLASS-PASSPORT for immigration and border processing when the
following four conditions apply:
3.14.6.1 The individual is a not a U.S. Citizen or National (e.g. , the individual is a
foreign national or a LPR);
3.14.6.2

The context suggests a nexus to TERRORISM;

3.14.6.3

Adequate identifiers are available to permit identification 62 ; and,

3.14.6.4

The information has been evaluated as being credible.

3 .14.6.5 It is important to recognize that some activities associated with extreme
political or religious views expressed by aliens in the United States may constitute
the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment (e.g. , the rights to free
speech, assembly and religious exercise). 63 Therefore, someone so labeled based
60

This exception is commonly referred to as "label plus" nomination.
Insurgency is defined as an "organized movement" aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the
use of subversion and armed conflict.
62
An adequate identifier is a biometric, or a last name, first name and any one of the additional identifiers listed in
Chapter 2, Section II.
63
See Chapter 1, Section III concerning constitutionally protected activities.

61

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in part on this type of constitutionally protected activity, must have other
substantive DEROGATORY lNFORMATION indicative of TERRORIST intent. As
previously noted, nominations may not be made based solely on protected activity.
3.14.7 Additional Derogatory Information Required (TIDE Category Code 99s and
50s). NCTC will retain a record in TIDE if it is determined that the information pertains
to, or is related to, TERRORTSM. 64 However, if a record involving an alien, which
includes LPRs, does not contain sufficient DEROGATORY INFORMATION to meet any of
the aforementioned exceptions to the TSDB's REASONABLE SUSPICION standard for
inclusion, NCTC will generally designate the record as a Category Code 99 (the TIDE
category code "applied when DEROGATORY INFORMATION does not meet the
REASONABLE SUSPICION standard for watchlisting because it is very limited or of
suspected reliability but there is a possible nexus to TERRORISM") or a Category Code 50
(the TIDE category code applied when an individual has a defined relationship with the
KNOWN or SUSPECTF,I) TERRORIST, hut whose involvement with the KNOWN or SUSPECTED
65
TERRORIST'S activities is unknown) , making it available for export to TSDB for use by
DOS and OHS for visa adjudication and immigration processing.

VI.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
3.15 Nominations of U.S. PERSONS. Nominations of U.S. PERSONS, in accordance with the Attorney
General approved procedures applicable to each element of the IC 66, will be made pursuant to
the procedures set forth below to ensure compliance with this REASONABLE SUSPJCIO
standard. Nominations of U.S. PERSONS shall be made based on information from sources of
known reliability or where there exists additional corroboration or context supporting
REASONABLE SUSPICION. NOM INATING AGENCIES will review information on U.S. PERSONS
pursuant to procedures set forth below consistent with the nature of the reporting supporting
the nomination and the protection of sources and methods.
3.15.1
Special handling is warranted for U.S. PERSONS nominated for watchlisting, especially
by an Agency other than the FBI. To ensure compliance with the Watch listing Guidance
that the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard exists for U.S. PERSONS in the TSDB, as well as
to ensure proper interagency coordination, a formal process has been implemented that:
3.15.1.1

Ensures the FBI is aware of U.S. PERSONS nominated by any other Department
or Agency ;

64
65

See Paragraph 1.26.
See FN 28, supra.

66

The referenced procedures are those approved for each element of the JC pursuant to Executive Order 12333, as
amended, which states in relevant part, "Elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain, or
disseminate information concerning United States persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head
ofthc fntelligence Community element concerned or by the head of a Department containing such element and
approved by the Attorney General, consistent with the authorities provided by part J.of this Order after consultation
with the Director." See Executive Order 12333, Paragraph 2.3, as amended by Executive Order 13618 (July 6, 2012).

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3.15.1 .2 Requires review of the watch list nomination decision and concurrence by the
TSC that REASONABLE SUSPfCION exists for watchlisting;
3.15.1.3 Ensures there is interagency awareness of all U.S. PERSON nominations (FBI
or otherwise); and,
3.15.1 .4 Ensures there is U.S. Government coordination in the investigation and/or
intelligence gathering on these individuals, including strategies for engagement
with foreign partners if required .
3.15.2 NCTC should include in TIDE U.S. PERSONS who are under International TERRORISM
Preliminary Investigation by the FBI but who have not been deemed to meet the
REASONABLE SUSPICION standard and U.S. PERSONS with a nexus to TERRORISM, but for
whom there is insufficient DEROGATORY INFORMATION to support entry in TSDB. These
TIDE records on U.S. PERSONS will not be provided to TSC for export via the TSDB
unless approved of as an exception to the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard pursuant to
Section Vin this Chapter of the Watchlisting Guidance, infra, or as part of a TBU
pursuant to Paragraph 1.59 of the Watchlisting Guidance.
3.15.3 For U.S. PERSONS nominated by other Government Agencies who are not under FBI
investigation, NCTC analysts receive, process, and export these subjects for inclusion in
the TSDB, as appropriate under current procedures. As part of the processing, NCTC
analysts identify and share these U.S. PERSON identifiers with the FBI's Foreign Terrorist
Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) for assessment, and notifying the FBI case agent of the
inclusion.
3 .16 Political Figures or Purposes. Heads of State or other Government officials should be
nominated when there is PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION to support a
REASONABLE SUSPICION to believe the individual is engaging or has engaged in conduct
constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST
ACTJVlTIES. Waivers or other appropriate action can be requested from U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) in coordination with DOS to facilitate the travel of a properly
watchlisted Head of State or other government officials to the extent necessary.
3.16. l
Watchlisting an individual is prohibited based on political purposes, retaliation, or
any other reason unconnected to the REASONABLE SUSPICION standard.

3.17 Identities of Deceased Individuals.
3.17. l

The TSDB will not include identity information of KNOWN or SUSPECTED
that are confirmed dead 67 unless:

TERRORISTS
67

Subjects are considered "confirmed dead" under the following circumstances:
a. The subject's death became a high profile case in the public sphere (e.g. , media footage confirming suicide
bombers' deaths, 9/11 hijackers, death of Abu Musaq al Zarqawi); or,
b. Reporting on the subject's death has been corroborated by at least two credible sources (e.g., United States or
"friendly" foreign government, fully-vetted asset).

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3.17.1.1 PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION supports a REASONABLE
SUSPICION that an existing KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST is using that identity
information; or,
3.17.1.2 A recognized terrorist organization 68 collects KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST
identity information for use by its members in preparing for or committing
TERRORIST acts and identity or travel documents (e.g., related to a deceased KNOWN
or SUSPECTED TERRORIST of that organization) have not been recovered. "Trusted
travel documents" include all documents used for border crossings.
3. 17.2 NOMINATING AGENCIES will share information regarding a watchlisted or nominated
individual's deceased status under Addendum B of the TSC MOU, section (7)(m) ("Any
other TERRORISM INFORMATION that ORIGINATORS specifically provide for passage to the
TSC"). NCTC will export deceased status to the TSC, and the TSC will export deceased
status to end user screening systems. NOMINATING AGENCIES will mark deceased status
information "TIDE Restricted" in cases where the status, because of sensitive sourcing,
should not be forwarded to the TSC. TIDE restricted information will not be exported to
the TSC. When a nomination is made on a deceased person in accordance with this
paragraph, the status indicator within TIDE that is exported to the TSC will be marked
to reflect that the person is deceased.

VII.

EXAMPLES OF TERRORISM AND/OR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
3.18 Examples of TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES may generally include conduct
intended to intimidate, coerce, influence, or affect civilian populations or government policy
consisting of:
3.18.1 destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities (18 U.S.C. 32);
3.18.2 violence at international airports (l8 U.S.C. 37);
3.18.3 biological weapons (18 U.S.C. 175 or 175b);
3.18.4 variola virus (18 U.S.C. 175c);
3. I 8.5 chemical weapons (18 U.S.C. 229);
3.18.6 assassination and kidnapping of Congressional Members, Cabinet Officials, and
Supreme Court Justices(l 8 U.S.C. 35 1 (a)(b)(c) or (d));
3.18.7 nuclear materials(] 8 U.S.C. 831);
3.18.8 participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats to the United States
(18 U.S.C. 832);
3.18.9 plastic explosives (18 U.S.C. 842(m) or (n) footnote 1.);
3.18. 10 arson and bombing of Government property risking or causing death (18 U.S.C.
844(f)(2) or (3));
3.18.11 arson and bombing of property used in interstate commerce (18 U.S .C. 844(i));
68

A classified list of recognized terrorist organiz.ations that are known to reuse TERRORIST identity information is
available on the Watchlisting Community oflnterest portal on NCTC Current.

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3.18.12 killing or attempted killing during an attack on a Federal facility with a dangerous
weapon (18 U.S.C. 930(c));
3.18.13 conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim persons abroad (18 U .S.C. 956(a)( I));
3 .18.14 damaging a protected computer used in interstate or foreign commerce or that is used
exclusively by a financial institution or the United States Government (18 U.S.C.
1030(a)(1 ); 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) resulting in damage as defined in
1030(a)(5)(B)(ii) through (v));
3.18.15 killing or attempted killing of officers and employees of the United States (18 U.S.C.
1114);
3 .18.16 murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally
protected persons (18 U.S.C. 1116);
3.18.17 hostage taking (I 8 U.S.C. 1203);
3.18.18 damage to Government property (18 U.S.C. 1361 );
3.18.19 destruction of communication lines, stations, or systems (18 U.S.C. 1362);
3.18.20 injury to U.S. aircraft or vessels (18 U.S.C. 1363);
3.18.21 injury to U.S. diplomatic, consular, military, or other property (18 U.S.C. 1363);
3.18.22 destruction of an energy facility (J 8 U.S.C. 1366(a));
3.18.23 Presidential and Presidential Staff assassination and kidnapping (18 U.S.C. 175l(a),
(b), (c), or (d));
3.18.24 acts of violence against railroad carriers and against mass transportation systems on
land, on water, or through the air (18 U.S.C. 1992);
3.18.25 destruction of national defense materials, premises, or utilities (18 U.S.C. 2115; 18
u.s.c. 2156);
3.18.26 violence against maritime navigation (seizing a ship by force, destroying a ship or
damaging its navigation systems) (18 U.S.C. 2280);
3.18.27 violence against maritime fixed platforms (an artificial island, installation or
structure permanently attached to the sea-bed for the purpose of exploration or
exploitation of resources or for other economic purposes (18 U.S.C. 2281 );
3.18.28 homicides and other violence against U.S. nationals occurring outside of the United
States(] 8 U.S .C. 2332);
3.18.29 the use of weapons of mass destruction (18 U.S.C. 2332a);
3.18.30 acts of TERRORISM transcending national boundaries (18 U.S.C. 2332b);
3.18.31 bombing of public places and facilities (18 U.S .C. 2332f);
3.18.32 producing, transferring, or threatening to use missile systems designed to destroy
aircraft (18 U.S.C. 2332g);
3.18.33 producing, transferring, or threatening to use radiological dispersal devices (18
U.S.C. 2332h);
3.18.34 harboring TERRORISTS (18 U.S.C. 2339);
3.18.35 providing material support to TERRORISTS (18 U.S.C. 2339A);
3.18.36 providing material suppmt to terrorist organizations (18 U.S.C. 2339B);
3.18.37 financing TERRORISM (18 u.s.c. 2339C);
3.18.38 receiving military-type training from a FTO (18 U.S.C. 23390);
3.18.39 torture (18 U.S.C. 2340A);
3.18.40 developing, transferring, possessing, or threatening to use atomic weapons (42
u.s.c. 2122);

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3.18.41 sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel (42 U.S.C. 2284);
3.18.42 aircraft piracy (49 U.S.C. 46502);
3.18.43 assault on a flight crew with a dangerous weapon (49 U.S.C. 46504);
3.18.44 carrying a weapon or explosive aboard an aircraft (49 U.S.C. 46505(b) or (c); 49
U.S.C. 46506 if homicide or attempted homicide is involved);
3.18.45 damaging or destroying an interstate gas pipeline facility, an interstate hazardous
liquid pipeline facility, or either an intrastate gas pipeline facility or intrastate hazardous
liquid pipeline facility (49 U.S.C. 60123(b)); or
3.18.46 manufacturing, distributing, or possessing controlled substances intending to provide
anything of pecuniary value to a FTO, member, or group (Section IO 1OA (iv) of the
ControJled Substances Import and Export Act).

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CHAPTER 4: NO FLY, SELECTEE AND EXPANDED SELECTEE LISTS
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE
BACKGROUND

I.
4.1

On October 21, 2004, the Deputies Committee established the criteria for the No Fly and
Selectee Lists. On January 10, 2005, the DI-IS released the No Fly and Selectee Lists
lmplementation Guidance (Implementation Guidance) to provide direction on how to
implement the No Fly and Selectee List criteria. The Implementation Guidance was updated
and supplemented on July 25, 2006.

4.2

On February 8, 2008, the Deputies Committee approved the addition of a third and fourth
criterion to the No Fly List. The Terrorist Screening Center Policy Board Working Group6 9
revised the Implementation Guidance on March 5, 2008, to provide direction on how to
implement these new criteria.

4.3

Following the attempted TERRORIST attack on December 25, 2009, the President directed that
a review of the current No Fly and Selectee List criteria be conducted and recommendations
be made regarding whether any adjustments were needed. The Terrorist Screening Center
Policy Board Working Group, in conjunction with the Information Sharing Access IPC,
recommended certain changes in the lists' criteria and implementation guidance. Those
recommendations were approved by the Deputies Committee on July 16, 2010.

U.

PRE-CONDITIONS FOR PLACEMENT ON THE NO FLY OR SELECTEE
LIST
4.4

Generally, in order to be included on either the No Fly or Selectee List, two pre-conditions
must both be met:
4.4. l Minimum Identifying Criteria. Absent a Special Situation as described below 7°,
minimum identifying biographic criteria consisting of .First Name, Last Name, Full Date
of Birth are required; and,
4.4.2 Minimum Substantive Derogatory Criteria. The minimum substantive derogatory
criteria for inclusion must be met. 71

69

Th is Working Group included representatives from Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of
Homeland Security, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Transportation Security
Administration, National Counterterrorism Center, Terrorist Screening Center, Department of Treasury, and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection.
10
See Chapter 4, Section lX, for additional information regarding the full date of birth requirement and applicable
exceptions.
71
See Paragraph 1.58 for expedited nominations procedures.

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III.

NO FLY LIST CRITERIA
4.5

Any person, regardless of citizenship, who represents:
4.5.1 a threat of committing an act of "international TERRORJSM" (as defined in 18 U .S.C.
2331 (1 )) or "domestic TERRORTSM" (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2331 (5)) with respect to an
aircraft (including a threat of air piracy, or a threat to airline, passenger, or civil aviation
security); or,
4.5.2 a threat of committing an act of "domestic TERRORISM" (as defined in 18 U.S.C.
2331 (5)) with respect to the homeland 72 ; or,
4.5.3 a threat of committing an act of "international TERRORISM" (as defined in 18 U.S.C.
2331(1)) against any U.S. Government facility abroad and associated or supporting
personnel, including U.S. embassies, consulates and missions, military installations (as
defined by 10 U.S.C. 280l(c)(4)), U.S. ships, U.S . aircraft, or other auxiliary craft
owned or leased by the U.S. Government; or,
4.5.4 a threat of engaging in or conducting a violent act of TERRORISM and who is
73
OPERATTONALLYCAPABLE of doing so.

4.6

IV.

Detainees at the Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Any individual who was a
"detainee" held at the Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, unless the President certifies in
writing to Congress that the detainee poses no threat to the United States, its citizens, or its
allies. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "detainee" means an individual in the
74
custody or under the physical control of the United States as a result of armed conflict.

FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE NO FLY CRITERIA
4.7

Third No Fly List Criterion. Prior to the addition of the third No Fly List criterion (see
Paragraph 4.5.3), a concern over the breadth of the No Fly List arose when KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS who posed a threat to a U.S. military base overseas did not meet the
criteria for inclusion on the No Fly List. Despite national interests, the threat to the overseas
military base did not involve either civil aviation (as set forth in the first No Fly List criterion)
or an act of domestic TERRORISM to the homeland (as set forth in the second No Fly List
criterion). "Domestic Terrorism" requires that a subject's TERRORIST ACTIVITIES occur
primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. " Homeland" does not include
bases and embassies located abroad. Even in those instances when the JC had identified a
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST'S specific target, KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
maintained the advantage of operational flexibility. The third No Fly List criterion addresses

72

Domestic acts ofTERRORISM are those that primarily occur "within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
See 18 U.S.C. 2331 (5)(C).
73
See Paragraph 4.8.2, infra, that defines "OPER/\TIONALL Y CAPABLE."
74
See 49 U.S.C. 44903U)(2)(C)(v).

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this specific vulnerability and counters the ability of KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS to
target U.S. Government facilities outside of the "homeland" (e.g., the October 12, 2000 attack
upon the U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer USS Cole while it was harbored in the Yemeni
pott of Aden).
4.8

Fourth No Fly List Criterion.
4.8.1 Enable Flexibility. The fourth No Fly List criterion (see Paragraph 4.5.4) is intended to
enable flexibility for nominations to the No Fly List of OPERA Tl ON ALLY CAPABLE
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS who pose a threat of committing an act of
international TERRORISM abroad, but who do not meet the first, second or third No Fly
List criterion because they do not pose a threat to civil aviation, a threat to the homeland,
or a threat to U.S. facilities and their associated or supporting personnel. Previously, the
No Fly List criteria did not prevent KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS from traveling
aboard aircraft, even though they may have had the intent and OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
to commit a TERRORIST act against U.S. nationals abroad (outside of the "homeland") or
against a target with no nexus to the United States or its nationals. The fourth No Fly
List criterion now addresses these two vulnerabilities.
4.8.2 OPERATIONALLY CAPABLE Defined. An individual is "OPERATIONALLY CAPABLE" if,
based on credible intelligence, he or she, acting individually or in concert with others,
reasonably appears to have the ability, knowledge, opportunity, and intent or is actively
seeking the opportunity to engage in a violent act of TERRORISM consistent with 18
U.S.C. 2331 or 18 U.S.C. 2332b. For example, attempting to obtain an TED would
indicate an individual is OPERATIONALLY CAPABLE of committing an act ofTERROIUSM.
However, simply conducting internet research concerning IEDs would not be sufficient
without additional activity. Depending on the circumstances, and in combination with
other facts, scouting potential targets or traveling for no legitimate purpose to places that
have TERRORIST training grounds, regardless of whether the person is presently capable
of using an lED, might also indicate an individual is OPERATlONALL Y CAPABLE of
committing an act of TERRORISM.
4.8.3 Possible Indicators of Being OPERATIONALLY CAPABLE. In determining whether an
individual is OPERATIONALLY CAPABLE, consideration should be given to the following
indicators regarding ability, knowledge, opportunity, and/or intent:
4.8.3.1
Subject has undergone TERRORIST training or been provided some instruction,
to include receiving military training by a designated terrorist group;
4.8.3.2

Subject has indicated intent to participate in planning/conducting an attack;

4.8.3.3

Subject has expressed desire to martyr him/herself;

4.8.3.4
Subject is in repeated contact with a KNOWN TERR0RfST facilitator who
recruits or facilitates travel of operatives;
4.8.3 .5

Subject is planning an attack either alone or as part of a group; or,

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4.8.3.6
Subject is associated with a TERRORIST group/cell and the subject is
accumulating weapons/explosives.
4.9

OPERATIONALLY CAPABLE Scenarios. The three scenarios set forth below serve as some
examples of No Fly List nominations that would fall under the fourth No Fly L ist criterion:

4.9.1 There is credible information that the planning or preparation for a TERRORIST attack
against the interests of the United States or a foreign government is ongoing and there is
an indication that an individual is OPERATIONALLY CAPABLE;
4.9.2 There is credible information that an individual is linked with an organization known to
target U.S. interests. The actual target may be unknown but indicated to be a
commercial facility frequented by U.S. citizens abroad. Intelligence identifies an
operational or pre-operational capability of this individual whose cell is planning a nearterm attack on a target (e.g., a plot to kill U.S. nationals residing in a foreign hotel or
frequenting a foreign nightclub); or,
4.9.3 There is credible information that an individual is linked with an organization known to
target foreign governments. The actual target may be unknown but indicated to be a
foreign government facility such as an embassy, consulate, mission or military
installation. Intelligence identifies an operational or pre-operational capability of this
individual whose cell is planning a near-term attack on a target (e.g., a plot to bomb the
British Parliament or the March 11 , 2004, Madrid bombing).
4.10 One-Time Waiver Policy.
4.10.1
TSA regulations prohibit U.S. flagged air carriers and foreign flagged air carriers
from transporting individuals, who pose the level of threat required for No Fly status, on
regulated commercial flights, including all flights operated by U.S. air carriers
regardless of the location, and flights operated by foreign air carriers to, from , or over
the United States. This prohibition applies regardless of the individual's status as a U.S.
PERSON.

4.10.2 When necessary, the U.S. Government may authorize and grant a One Time Waiver
(OTW) to an air carrier permitting the carrier to transport an individual on a specified
itinerary under controlled conditions. OTWs are coordinated with DRS (including CBP
and TSA), FBI, DOS and DOJ as appropriate, prior to being authorized by TSC. Once
authorized by TSC, TSA will review the conditions of transport and may grant the
waiver, permitting the air carrier to transport the individual. If the itinerary changes, or
the conditions of transport of the individual change, TSA will deny boarding to the
individual until such time as satisfactory conditions are present.
4.10.3

u.s. PERSONS Encountered Overseas.

4.10.3.1

While placement on the No Fly List does not legally bar a U.S . PERSON from

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returning to the United States, the U.S. Government has adopted a policy to review
all cases in which a U.S. PERSON on the No Fly List is denied boarding on a
commercial flight bound for the United States to determine whether an OTW may
be appropriate. TSC will initiate this assessment immediately, and may approve an
OTW in advance. TSA will not review or authorize an OTW until such time as an
acceptable itinerary is available.
4.10.3.2 In order to facilitate communication with such an individual, the U.S. Government
has determined, as a matter of policy, that U.S. Citizens denied boarding on a
commercial flight returning to the United States should be referred to the consular
section of the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate, which will facilitate communication
with the individual, including providing the individual with instructions in the event an
OTW is authorized. In keeping with the U.S. Government's traditional policy of neither
confirming nor denying whether an individual is on the Terrorist Watchlist, the
individual is not informed of his or her watchlist status or that he or she would be
traveling under a waiver.

V.

SELECTEE LIST CRITERIA
4.1 I Sclcctee List Criteria. Any person regardless of citizenship, who does not meet the criteria
for inclusion on the No Fly List and who:
is a member of a foreign or domestic TERRORIST organization75 (including a "foreign
TERRORIST organization" designated pursuant to Statute or Executive Order, as described
in Paragraph 3.11.2); and ,

4.11.1

4.11.2 is associated with "TERRORIST ACTIVITY" (as such term is defined in section
212(a)(3)(B) of the INA [8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)]); unless information exists that
demonstrates that the application of secondary screening to such person is not necessary,
in which case such persons may be excluded from the Selectee List.

VI.

EXPANDED SELECTEE LIST CRITERIA
4.12 The Expanded Selectee List (ESEL) includes records in the TSDB that contain a full name
and full date of birth, regardless of the citizenship of the subject, who do not meet the criteria
to be placed on either the No Fly or Selectee Lists, excluding exceptions to the REASONABLE
SUSPICION standard.

VII.

ACTIONS BASED UPON POSITIVE MATCHES TO THE NO FLY,
SELECTEE, OR EXPANDED SELECTEE LISTS

75

Members of a defunct terrorist group are included in this criterion if the person was a member of the group when it
participated in TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

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4.13 The actions resulting from inclusion on the No Fly, Selectee, or Expanded Selectee List are
generally as follows:
4.13 .1
Individuals that are POSITIVE MATCHES to the No Fly List are prohibited from
boarding an aircraft;
4.13.2 Individuals that are POSITIVE MATCHES to the Selectee List undergo enhanced
screening prior to boarding an aircraft;
4.13.3 Individuals that are POSITIVE MATCHES to the Expanded Selectee List undergo
enhanced screening prior to boarding an aircraft.
4.14 Selectee, Expanded Selectee, and random screening all result in the same operational response
of receiving enhanced screening by Transportation Security Officers prior to boarding an
aircraft. TSA will notify the TSC of all No Fly, Selectee, and Expanded Selectee
ENCOUNTERS.

VIII.

IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES
4.J 5 General Guidelines. The watchlisting community has developed six general guidelines
regarding the No Fly and Selectee Lists that should be reemphasized in order to effectively
implement the No Fly List and Selectee List criteria. The six general guidelines are:
4.15.1
When evaluating the significance, relevance and validity of a threat, careful
consideration should be given to the extent to which the threat is current, specific and
credible.
4.15 .2 The Selectee List is not a default position for those who do not qua Iify for inclusion
on the No Fly List and has distinct elements that must be met before an individual may
be included.
4.15.3 The purpose of the No Fly List is to protect against acts of TERRORISM; inclusion on
the No Fly List has consequences that are operational, legal, economic, and diplomatic.
4.15.4 Except for expedited nominations made pursuant to Paragraph 1.58 of the
Watchlisting Guidance, the decision to include a person on the No Fly List or Selectee
List must include substantive DEROGATORY INFORMATlON that satisfies the
aforementioned criteria and thus justifies inclusion on either list. In cases where
nominations contain no substantive DEROGATORY INFORMATION, or contain insufficient
substantive DEROGATORY INFORMATION, the individual will not be included on either the
No Fly List or Selectee List.
4. J5.5 In accordance with determinations made pursuant to Paragraph 1.59 of the
Watch listing Guidance, the White House may direct the TSC to place categories of
individuals on the No Fly List or the Selectee List on a temporary basis based on current

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and credible intelligence information or a particular threat stream that indicates a certain
. category of individuals may conduct an act of domestic or international TERRORISM.
4.15.6 Under exigent operational circumstances, when DEROGATORY INFORMATION may not
be widely disseminated or stored in TIDE, individual watchlist status determinations can
be made by the Director of the TSC, in accordance with the relevant criteria 76 contained
in the Watchlisting Guidance. Coordination should occur with relevant NOMINATING
AGENCIES and SCREENERS.
4.16 Totality of the Information. The foregoing guidance is neither intended to be determinative
nor intended to serve as a checklist. Rather, it is intended to guide the watchlisting
community in assessing whether the established criteria are satisfied for a specific record,
based on the totality of available information, a current threat stream, and/or the current threat
environment.

SPECIAL SITUATIONS 77

lX.

4.17 Requirement for Full Names and Complete Dates of Birth. Generally, TERRORIST
identities nominated to either the No Fly or the Selectee List must have both a full name and a
complete date of birth. Identities without both will usually not be included on either list.
Dates of birth shall not be fabricated. 78
4.17 .1 There is, however, a narrow exception to the requirement for full names and
complete dates of birth for individuals from non-Visa Waiver Program countries for
international TERRORIST nominations. If a non-Visa Waiver Program country 79 has
issued a travel document with only a year of birth, or a verified government-issued
identification document with only a year of birth, then it is permissible to use only that
year of birth. The NOMINATING AGENCY, however, should, whenever possible, specify
the type of document containing the year of birth, and the passport number (if the
document is a passport). Otherwise, a year of birth alone will not be accepted for
nominations to the No Fly or Selectee Lists. The NOMINATING AGENCY has a continuing
obligation to attempt to determine the complete date of birth.
4.18 Expedited Waiver of "Full Date of Birth" Requirement for No Fly or Selectee
Nominations. When necessitated by exigent circumstances, a NOMINATOR may nominate an
individual or individuals to the No Fly or Selectee List with only a partial date of birth, but for
whom there is additional identifying information. This provision is intended to enable
nominations based on current and credible intelligence information or a particular threat
76

Determinations made under this section apply to the No Fly, Selectee and Expanded Selectee List criteria.
See Paragraph 1.59 for a complete discussion of expedited nomination procedures for temporary, threat-based
categories.
78
The dates of birth of January I (01/01/xxxx), July 1 (07/01/xxxx), November 11 (11/11/xxxx), and December 31
( 12/3 1/xxxx) are examples of dates that may be fabricated and as such, should receive additional scrutiny at all stages of
the reporting, nomination, and watchlisting process.
79
Visa Waiver Program countries include a complete date of birth in their passports.

11

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stream that indicates the subject(s) may be used to conduct an act of domestic or international
terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2331 (1 ), or as a Federal crime of terrorism as defined in 18
U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5). The goal of this provision is to fashion a watch listing response that is
appropriate to the nature, specificity, and severity of the threat. To achieve this goal, in
addition to the credibility of the threat intelligence, due consideration should be given to:
4.18.1

The harm to public safety posed by the threat;

4.18.2 The clarity and specificity of the information giving rise to the threat as to time,
place, method, and identity of the suspected perpetrator(s);
4.18.3 The anticipated impact on international and domestic travel, civil liberties,
and foreign relations; and,
4.18.4 The best available screening tools, other than the No Fly or Selectee Lists, given the
type and specificity of identifiers and travel data.
4.19 This waiver should be utilized in limited circumstances when extreme DEROGATORY
INFORMATION has been identified demonstrating the threat. The waiver should be valid as
long as the threat remains.

X.

NOMINATIONS THAT ARE INELIGIBLE/NOT SUITABLE FOR EITHER
THE NO FLY OR THE SELECTEE LIST 86
4.20 Nominations based on exceptions to the minimum substantive derogatory criteria contained in
Paragraph 3.14, including immediate family members of TERRORISTS (i.e ., spouses or children
of a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORTST) 81 are ineligible/not suitable for inclusion on either the
No Fly or Selectee List,absent independent DEROGATORY INFORMATION;
4.21 Subjects of lost or stolen passports or travel documents are ineligible/not suitable for inclusion
on either the No Fly or Selectee List, absent independent DEROGATORY INFORMATION ;
4.22 Deceased individuals are ineligible for inclusion on either the No Fly or Selectee List unless
they meet the exceptions set forth in Paragraph 3 .17, Identities of Deceased Individuals.

80

This section can be overridden in the event of an expedited, threat-based categorical nomination procedures, pursuant
to Paragraph 1.59.
81
See INA § 212(a)(3XB)(i)(lX)[8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX)).

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CHAPTER 5: ENCOUNTER MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

I.

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
5.1

This guidance addresses the collection, processing, and analysis of TERRORISM lNFORMATION
collected by the SCREEN ERS during an ENCOUNTER with a watch listed subject. As described
below, all information gathered during an ENCOUNTER with a KNOWN or SUSPECTED
82
TERRORlST is referred to as an ENCOUNTER PACKAG E. This guidance does not create any
new authorities for the collection of any information during ENCOUNTERS with KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORI STS. Rather, it identifies the types of information that a Department or
Agency should consider collecting during an ENCOUNTER with a KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST if it possesses the authority to collect such information, and should share with the
interagency community consistent with their legal authorities and executive policy. 83

5 .2

Definitions.

5.2.1 ENCOUNTER. An ENCOUNTER is defined as an event in which an individual is identified
during a screening process to be a " POSITIVE MATCH," " POTENT IAL MATCH," or
"INCONCLUSIVE MATCH," to an individual who has been designated in the TSDB as a
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. An ENCOUNTER can be a face-to-face meeting with a
KNOW N or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, electronic or a paper-based ENCOUNTER (e.g. , the
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST has submitted an application for a benefit liked a visa,
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) application, or information is
provided to the United States by a foreign government, aircraft operator, or other private
entity). Chapter 5 is only concerned with POSITIVE MATCHES, which occur when the
TSC determines that information about a subject encountered by a SCREENER matches a
TSDB record.
5.2.2

in this chapter includes purely
domestic terrorism as defined in the TSC MOU and incorporates the definition found in
in section 1016 of the IRTPA (6 U.S.C 485), as amended. The term " TERRORISM
INFORMATION" means -

TERRORISM INFORMATION . TE RRORISM INFORMATION

5.2.2.1
all information, whether collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence,
law enforcement, military, homeland security, or other activities relating t
5.2.2.1.1
the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions,
vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign
or international terrorist groups or individuals, or of domestic groups or
82

Sharing infonnation fo r reasons not related to KNOWN or SUS PECTED TERRORIST categories should be limited to
updating biographi c identifiers, and the sharing of relevant information that may assist in making deci sions re lated to a
change in a person' s status in the TSDB and/or TE RROR1SM INFORMATION .
83
Obligations include those imposed by TRTPA section 102 1 or by interagency agreement (e.g., the Information
Sharing MOU (Appendix 5), the TSC MOU (Appendix 3) and Addendum B to the TSC MOU (Appendix 4)).

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individuals involved in transnational TERRORISM ;
threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, U.S.
PERSONS, or U.S. interests, or to those of other nations;

5.2.2.1.2
5.2.2.1.3

communications of or by such groups or individuals; or,

5.2.2.1.4
groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or associated
with such groups or individuals; and

5.2.2.2

includes weapons of mass destruction information.

5 .2.2.2.1 Weapons of Mass Destruction Information. Tnformation that could
reasonably be expected to assist in the development, proliferation, or use of a
weapon of mass destruction (including a chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear weapon) that could be used by a TERRORIST or a terrorist organization
against the United States, including information about the location of any stockpile
of nuclear materials that could be exploited for use in such a weapon that could be
used by a TERRORIST or a terrorist organization against the United States.

II.

PROCESSING TERRORISM INFORMATION FROM ENCOUNTERS
WITH POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED KNOWN OR SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS
5.3

This section describes the major types of ENCOUNTERS by various Departments and Agencies.
ENCOUNTER PACKAGES obtained from a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST ENCOUNTER will be
processed as follows:

5.4

Department of Homeland Security ENCOUNTERS. DHS has more ENCOUNTERS with
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORI STS than any other U.S. Government component. The
descriptions below provide information for the majority of DHS ENCOUNTERS, although it is
not an exhaustive list of ENCOUNTER opportunities or the types of TERRORISM lNFORMATlON
available for collection. When lawful and available, both biographic and biometric
information will be collected as part of the ENCOUNTER PACKAGE.
5.4.1 U.S. Customs and Border Protection. CBP ENCOUNTERS occur at ports of entry
(POE), between POEs, or at the last point of departure to the United States at foreign
airports through CBP programs like Pre-Clearance and the Immigration Advisory
Program (IAP). Information available for collection from these ENCOUNTERS may
include, but is not limited to, pocket litter, travel information, identification documents,
travel companions, legal documents, and other information gathered during interviews
and the examination process. CBP receives international travel reservation information
of KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERROlUSTS for commercial air travel to and from the United
States (which may include travel companion information) and international private and

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commercial flight manifests, as well as, commercial vessel manifest for travel to and
from the United States. With the exception of passenger information required by law to
be transmitted to OHS prior to a passenger's arrival, most information is generally
collected by CBP when the person is interviewed or apprehended. The National
Targeting Center - Passenger (NTC-P) and NTC-Cargo (NTC-C) are CBP entities
responsible for communicating with the TSC regarding ENCOUNTERS with KNOWN or
84
SUSPECTED TERRORJSTS, to include providing relevant ENCOUNTER information.
NTCp and NTC-C also provide a copy of the examination results to the TSOU for
dissemination to the appropriate investigating Agencies.
5.4.2 Transportation Security Administration. TSA generally encounters KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORJSTS through screening commercial aircraft passengers against
subsets of the TSDB and during the application process for a credential or benefit in the
transportation or critical infrastructure environment (e.g., Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC)). When an airline encounters subjects who are
possible matches to the No Fly or Selectee List, the air carriers are required to supply the
passenger' s name and one piece of identifying data (in the form of a government-issued
photo identification that contains a date of birth) to the TSA' s Office oflntelligence and
Analysis (OIA). TSA OJA submits that information, along with information regarding
the carrier, flight number, time of departure, and destination to the TSC.
5.4.2.1

Absent an arrest warrant, or unless probable cause arises during the
are reminded that placement on the No Fly or Selectee
List is not a legal basis to detain a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. To the
extent legal authority exists to question a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST,
encounters with No Fly subjects at the airport may provide an additional
opportunity to lawfully obtain ENCOUNTER PACKAGE information. For No Fly
subjects who have made a domestic reservation, DHS will notify TSC in advance
as well as when the No Fly subject presents at the airport ticket counter. TSC will
then notify the TSOU who will notify both the FBI case agent and the airport
liaison agent to coordinate the appropriate operational response.
ENCOUNTE R, SCREENERS

5.4.2.2
For KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORJST ENCOUNTERS as a result of an
individual applying for a TSA benefit or credential, ENCOUNTER PACKAGE
information can include any supporting documents or information collected as a
part of the application process. The ENCOUNTER, and any corresponding
information, is communicated to the TSC and other Government Agencies, as
appropriate through TSA OIA.
5.4.3 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USC[S) interact with millions of individuals every year and
84

CBP may al so encounter such individuals in the course of processing an application and/or conducting an interview
of an applicant for a trusted traveler program (e.g., NEXUS , Free and Secure Trade (FAST), Global Entry, SENTR[,
etc.).

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or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS who file petitions or applications for
immigration benefits internationally and domestically.85 The USCIS official contacts
the TSC to report an ENCOUNTER with a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. Before
making a decision on the immigration application or benefit, USCfS contacts the
ORIGINATOR/NOMINATOR to obtain additional information that may help determine
whether the individual is eligible or ineligible to receive the immigration benefit. In
such cases, USCIS seeks further information from the record owner or case agent and
may seek de-classification of information relating to the application. fn addition, USCIS
contacts the ORIGINATOR/NOMINATOR to discuss whether the USCIS decision to grant or
deny the application or benefit would interrupt or negatively affect any ongoing
investigation.

ENCOUNTERS KNOWN

5.4.3.l
USCIS maintains a presence at law enforcement and intelligence Agency
entities to further information sharing regarding KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS. USCIS maintains information, including the subject's Alien File (AFile) and other records. The type of information that may be contained in USCIS
files, including the A-File, could be biometric data (fingerprints and photographs);
identity documents; information relating to the application; addresses, as well as
family and work history information; immigration benefit application information ;
and records of previous ENCOUNTERS that OHS has had with the subject. Other
SC REENERS - as well as other appropriate organizations who are considering
nominating a potential KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST or who have ENCOIB\TERS
with a person who is a POSITJVE MATCH to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST- are
advised that they can request, on a case-by-case basis, a copy of the KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORJST'S A-File from USCIS if the KNOWN or SUSPECTED
86
TERRORIST has applied for immigration or citizenship benefits.
5.4.4 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) is the principal investigative arm of OHS. ICE is also the federal
law enforcement organization responsible for immigration and customs-related
investigations and detention within the interior and at the borders of the United States.
ICE frequently ENCOUNTERS potential KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS during
enforcement activities under its purview. Such ENCOUNTERS are documented within ICE
Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) via the Known Suspected Terrorist
Encounter Protocol and reported to the TSC and ICE's Homeland Security
lnvestigations (HSI). ICE HSI Special Agents frequently encounter KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS internationally, domestically, at U.S. POEs, and when KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS are the subjects of an ICE investigation. These ENCOUNTERS are
85

For example, a U.S. PERSON who is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST may file a petition for a foreign national or a
U.S. PERSON who is not a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORJST may file a petition for a foreign national who is a KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORIST.
86

Because USCIS is the custodian of information acquired through the immigration process relating to an individual
and because the A-File is not routinely attached to the TSDB or TIDE, a specific request to USCIS is necessary in order
to obtain information from the A-File.

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documented by HSI Special Agents in Reports of Investigation (ROI). All RO Is
documenting ENCOUNTERS/interviews with a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST are
shared with the JC.
5.4.4.1
In addition, under section 428 of the Homeland Security Act, the Secretary of
Homeland Security has the authority to refuse visas in accordance with the law and
to assign employees of DHS to diplomatic and consular posts to review visa
applications and conduct investigations. 87 ICE, through the Visa Security
Program, exercises this authority. Reviews of visa applications and interviews
with applicants can result in the encounter of KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS,
facilitators, and associates as well as reveal previously unknown information
relating to KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. HSI personnel assigned to the Visa
Security Program, and to U.S. Embassies and Consulates abroad, work closely
with their DOS counterparts to identify KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS and
report findings through established processes. Finally, ICE may encounter KNOWN
or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS awaiting immigration hearings who are housed in
service processing/detention centers. These detention facilities can document
interactions with the al.icns while they are detained in the facility, as well as
document materials found on the individual at the time of processing. For all
immigration and enforcement activities, ICE will communicate with the TSC
regarding encounters with watchlisted individuals, and will submit relevant
ENCOUNTER information to the TSC.
5.4.5 United States Coast Guard. The U.S. Coast Guard's Coastwatch branch screens crew
and passenger information on vessel manifests, which are required by regulation to be
transmitted to the National Vessel Movement Center (NVMC) prior to a vessel's arrival
in a U.S. port. Coastwatch communicates with the NTC-P and TSC regarding any
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST ENCOUNTERS during this process. The Coast Guard
physically encounters few KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, and such ENCOUNTERS
could occur from random and regular inspections of vessels and port facilities, ship
boardings, investigations, or Coast Guard licensing activities. The type of information
available for collection is dependent on the type of ENCOUNTER. The ENCOUNTER, and
any corresponding information, is communicated to the TSC through Coast Guard
Office of Intelligence and Criminal Investigations. Based on the encountering situation,
intelligence reporting will be written to provide situational awareness to the JC.
5.4.6 United States Secret Service. Although United States Secret Service (USSS) does not
encounter many KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, such ENCOUNTERS usually involve
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS with a domestic nexus to TERRORISM. Such
encounters can be the result of investigations or for event screening (e.g. , National
Security Special Events, political events, large scale sporting events). These
87

Consistent with section 428 of the Homeland Security Act and the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Secretaries of State and Homeland Security Concerning Implementation of Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, the Secretary of Homeland Security may direct a consular officer to refuse or revoke a visa.

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ENCOUNTERS will be coordinated with the FBI, who will
FBI KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST ENCOUNTERS.

handle them as they do alJ other

5.4.7 Department of Homeland Security Intelligence & Analysis. OHS I&A provides end
products and analytical reports, which are generally available to the NCTC and the
broader counterterrorism analytic community, including fusion centers. DHS I&A
works closely with OHS components to ensure non-traditional streams of information
are fused with traditional sources of information from other members of the TC to give a
complete picture of potential threats to the nation. OHS I&A "connects the dots" for
intelligence reporting and ENCOUNTERS of the OHS components, and as such, has
limited opportunity for ENCOUNTERS with KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS .
5.5

Department of State ENCOUNTERS. For DOS
MATCH

ENCOUNTERS with a person who is a POSITTVE
to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, the DOS unit at the TSC will do the following:

5.5.1 Visa Applications. DOS/TSC will upload the electronic visa application from the CCD
to the individual ' s EMA record. DOS/TSC will coordinate with the overseas posts to
scan in CCD all other available DOS documents associated with the individual. DOS
information about whether a visa is issued is currently available in individual case
records in the CCD; DOS is currently investigating upgrades to the CCD's report
function that will make the visa decision data more easily accessible to TSC and other
users .
5.5 .2 Visa Revocations. DOS/TSC will upload the electronic visa application from the CCD
to the individual ' s EMA record.
5.5.3 Passports. After encounters with KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS possessing
passports issued by the United States, the TSOC will upload the Passport Information
Electronic Records System (PIERS) application forms from the CCD to the individual's
EMA record. DOS/TSC will coordinate with the overseas posts to scan in CCD all other
available DOS documents associated with the individual.
5.6

United States Agency for International Development ENCOUNTERS. United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) works in agriculture, democracy and governance,
economic growth, the environment, education, health, global partnerships, and humanitarian
assistance in more than l 00 countries. When USAID receives an application seeking financial
assistance, prior to granting, these applications are subject to vetting by USATD intelligence
analysts at the TSC. If USAIDffSC finds that an application relates to a person who is a
POSITIVE MATCH to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST in the TSDB, USAID/TSC will provide
any TERRORISM INFORMATION concerning the application and follow standard TSC procedures
for processing TERRORISM INFORMATION , to include logging the ENCOUNTER in EMA.

5.7

Foreign Partner ENCOUNTERS. After each ENCOUNTER by a foreign partner, DOS/TSC will
ask the respective country for the subject's photo, additional biographic data and any

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TERRORISM INFORMATION on the ENCOUNTER Information List gathered during the
ENCOUNTER. Provision of any material collected by the foreign partner depends on

the
arrangement with, and legal authorities of, the particular foreign partner involved. Therefore,
gathering and sharing this TERRORISM INFORMATION will be done on a case-by-case, countryby-country basis.

5.8

Federal Bureau of Investigation/Law Enforcement
be subdivided into three categories:

ENCOUNTERS.

These

ENCOUNTERS

can

5.8.1 Name-Based Queries. Name-based transaction queries by law enforcement personnel
(e .g., traffic stops) made to the FBI's National Crime Information Center at the Criminal
Justice Jnformation Services (CJJS) Division that match a name in the KSTF (a sub-file
ofNCIC) are deemed to be POTENTIAL MATCHES. They are routed electronically to TSC
for confirmation and subsequent processing as an ENCOUNTER.
5.8.2 Fingerprint-Based Queries. Fingerprint-based queries submitted for criminal
identification purposes (e.g., an arrest/booking) or for civil identification purposes (e.g.,
an employment background check) are made to the Integrated Automatic Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS). For POSITIVE MATCHES to records flagged as KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORIST records, the CJIS Division's Special Identities Unit notifies the
TSC and the FBI case agent (or the Agency that identified the subject as a possible
TERRORJST). In similar fashion, CJIS Division's Global Initiatives Unit coordinates
positive fingerprint hits from its foreign submissions with the Legal Attache. lt should
be noted that IA FIS and NCIC are separate systems that are not fully synchronized at the
present time.
5.8.3 National Instant Criminal Background Check System. All background checks
resulting from attempts to buy firearms or to obtain explosive permits submitted to the
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) at CJIS are run against the
KSTF. The TSC is immediately notified of all KSTF "hits." NICS consults with TSC
to confirm the POSITIVE MATCH ES and the FBI case agent to determine whether there is
available information about the prospective purchaser to disqualify him or her from
possessing a firearm or explosive as a matter of law. Regardless of whether the
purchase is denied or permitted to proceed, all available information is obtained and
provided to the TSC and, in turn, CTD, as TERRORISM INFORMATION and processed as an
ENCOUNTER.

5.9

Department of Defense ENCOUNTERS. The Department of Defense (DoD) has force
protection, operational capture/apprehend, and intelligence responsibilities and on occasion
encounters KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. To the extent DoD knowingly encounters a
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORlST, DoD will repo1t the ENCOUNTER in intelligence channels or
to the FBI in cases described in the MOU between the FBI and DoD Governing Information
Sharing, Operational Coordination and Investigative Responsibilities signed August 2, 2011
where the FBI is the lead. In cases where the FBI is not the lead for the ENCOUNTE R, the

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Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will be responsible for providing extracted information
from the ENCOUNTER to NCTC via standard DIA national T ·RRORIST watchlisting procedures,
which utilize community accepted standards. DoD law enforcement ENCOUNTER will be
handled in accordance with established law enforcement standards that provide notification to
the FBl.
5.10 All other Departments or Agencies. Any other Department or Agency that has TERRORISM
INFORMATION from an ENCOUNTER will contact the TSC/TSOC at 866to arrange a
mutually acceptable transmission method.

III.

CATEGORIES OF TERRORISM INFORMATION FROM ENCOUNTERS
WITH POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED KNOWN OR SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS OF POTENTIAL INTEREST
5. 11

ENCOUNTER Information List. The fo llowing ENCOUNTER Information List identifies
categories ofT RRORI SM INFORMATION from EN OUNT ·RS with positively identified KNOWN
or SUSPECTED TERRORIST that are of potential interest to NOMINATOR , other counterterrori sm
ana lysts, or the watch listing community. The items identified are not intended to be an
exclusive or exhaustive list of what constitutes TERRORISM INFORMATION.

5.11.1 E OUNT R information identified for collection in Addendum B to the TSC MOU 88
when there is a PO ITIVE MATCI I to a KNOWN or u PECTED TERROR IST:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Photographs
Fingerprints
Pocket litter
Written data
Reports of TERRORISM INFORMATION

5.11.2 Additional items of potential interest when lawfully collected during an ENCOUNTER
with a KNOWN or SPE TED TERRORIST:

I.

Contemporaneous reports including the impressions or observations recorded by an
official involved in the ENCOUNTER:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Reason/circumstances of ENCOUNTER
ICE Intel Reports
FB I Reports ofinvestigations
CBP Incident Reports
CBP Secondary Exam Report
f) USCIS app lications or petitions
g) Non-immigrant Vi sa (NIV) Applications (including CCD notes)

88

ee Appendix 3, TSC MOU.

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h) State, Local, Tribal, Territorial Police Report
i) TSA OTA No Fly and Selectee Reports
j) TSA OlA ENCOUNTER Reports (Vetting Match Reports) on transportation workers
and other popu lations vetted by TSA against the TSDB
k) Spot Reports
I) Suspicious Activity Reports
m) Impounded vehicle inventory
n) Any inventory record
o) Any pictures, video or recording of or from the actual ENCOUNTER
p) Biometric or biographic identifiers of traveling associates
2.

Surveillance-related documents:
a) Maps
b) Pictures
c) Visitor or site information
d) Plans or diagrams (e.g. , architectural drawings, blueprints, schemas)

3. Context regarding areas of potential interest or possible targets of KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORIST interest:
a) Information regarding any high profile events taking place in geographic area of
ENCOUNTER

b) Any critical infrastructure sites near the geographic area of ENCOUNTER
c) Unique characteristics or facts about your domain/area of responsibility/geographic
area of ENCOUNTER
d) Event tickets (e.g., sporting events, concerts, designated National Security Special
events)
e) Building access passes, electronic cards, fobs, keys
4. Mode of transportation used by the person who is a POSITIVE MATCH to a KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORIST, along with identifying information:
a) Vehicle information (e.g., Vehicle registration, Vehicle identification number
(VIN), Title, Driver's license, Car insurance cards or information)
b)
Pilot medical license
c)
Pilot certificates
d)
Aircraft registration
e)
Marine registration
f)
EZ Pass or electronic vehicle payment system
5.

Travel-related information:
a) Passpo1t exit/entry stamps indicating places of travel
b) Any visa application or denial information from other countries

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c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)
j)
k)
l)
m)
n)
o)
p)

Travel itineraries
Tickets (e.g., plane, train, boat)
Hotels (e.g., reservation confirmation, receipts)
Rental cars (e.g., reservation confirmation, agreement, receipts)
Reservation method (e.g., via travel agency or travel website)
PNR data
Travel manifests
Luggage or baggage tags (e.g., airport check-in tags, identification tags,
lost bag bar code tags)
Claim checks
Storage locker keys
Shipping documents and receipts
Automated Identification System (AIS) information for maritime shipping
Foreign airport security check stickers or labels
Conference/seminar materials (e.g., invitation, brochure, schedule)

6. Information about gold and jewelry worn by person at time of ENCOUNTER (e.g.,
receipts)
7.

General items information :
a) Business cards
b) Phone numbers
c) Address books
d) Email addresses
e) Any cards with an electronic strip on it (hotel cards, grocery cards, gift cards,
frequent flyer cards)
f) Pre-paid phone cards
g) Insurance cards
h) Medical/Health insurance information
i) Prescription information (e.g., doctor, pharmacy information)
j) Sales receipts
k) Any additional biographic or biometric identifiers to enhance
identity matching of associates or family members with a person who is a POSITIV E
MATCH to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST (as well as associates or family
members referenced in interviews or documents carried by a person who is a
POSITIVE MATCH to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORlST)
I) Copies of identification documents obtained during the ENCOUNTER with a person
who is a POSITIVE MATCH to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST (e.g., passports,
Seaman's Papers, Airman Certificates, driver's licenses, state identification cards,
and similar government identification documents)
m) Any computer, uniform resource locator (URL), or Internet protocol (IP) address
information
n) Calendars/schedulers

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8.

Licenses, permits, membership cards, and application information:
a) Membership cards (including library cards)
b) Gun show applications, firearms license, concealed weapons permit, shooting club
memberships
c) HAZMAT license
d) Explosives permit

9.

Tools or equipment information:
a) Scuba gear
b) Multiple cell phones
c) Binoculars
d) Peroxide
e) Ammunition
f) Camping fuel tabs
g) Any dual use material that could be used for TERRORIST ACTJVITY

10.

Financial information:
a) Check book/individual or loose checks, including cashier's checks
b) Bank account numbers
c) Credit cards, especially those issued by U.S. banks and carried by non- U.S.
PERSONS

d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)
j)
k)

Tax records
Business financial records
Bank statements
Credit card or billing statements
Utility bills
Anything with an account number
Wire transfer information, including receipts from Money Service Businesses
Denominations of money being carried (i.e., what country(ies) currency(ies) are
they carrying), including, if possible, the serial numbers of currency carried
I) Automated teller machine (A TM) receipts
m) Ledgers

11.

Electronic media/devices observed or copied:
a) Cell phone li st and speed dial numbers
b) Laptop images
c) GPS
d) Thumb drives
e) Disks
f) iPod or MP3
g) PDAs (e.g., Palm Pilots, Trios)
h) Kindle or iPad (electronic books)
i) Cameras
j) Video and/or voice recorders

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k) Pagers
I) Any electronic storage media

IV.

12.

E mployment information:
a) Pay stubs
b) Employment applications
c) Want ads
d) Employer correspondence
e) Access cards, badges

13 .

Professional papers/Academic information:
a) Resumes
b) Academic transcripts

14.

Legal document information:
a) Birth certificates
b) Immigration and naturalization documents
c) Marriage licenses
d) Divorce decrees
e) Adoption papers
t) Living Wills
g) Last Will and Testament
h) Parking tickets
i) Speeding tickets
j) Property records (deeds)
k) Summons
I) Criminal documents or civil lawsuit information

15.

Miscellaneous item information:
a) Long term storage facilities (e.g., access keys, codes)
b) Social networking accounts (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, LinkedTn, ICQ)
c) Titles of books, DVD/CD, brochures being carried and their condition (e.g. , new,
dog-eared, annotated, unopened, professional journals)
d) Letters, envelopes
e) Letters oflntroduction
f) Animal information (e.g. , vet or chip information)

ENCOUNTER MANAGEMENT ACTIONS
5.12 Handling of ENCOUNTER PACKAGES. This section outlines the processes for handling and
sharing ENCOUNTERPACKAGEs by SCREENERS, the TSC and NCTC .
5.13 FBI/Law Enforcement ENCOUNTERS. TSOU coordinates the U.S. Government's response to
an ENCOUNTER with a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. All collection of TERRORISM

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INPORMATION during law enforcement ENCOUNTERS (e.g., traffic violations, investigations,
arrests) are coordinated between the NOMINATING AGENCY and the ENCOUNTERING AGENCY via
TSOU.

5. J3 .1 For domestic and international ENCOUNTERS with a person who is a POSITIVE MATCH
to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, TSOU will do the following: After receiving
notification of an ENCOUNTER from the TSC, TSOU will disseminate and coordinate
information to FBI operational entities and federal, state, and local law enforcement
Agencies. TSOU simultaneously coordinates with the appropriate FBI Field Division(s)
and Case Agent(s); Joint Terrorist Task Forces (JTTFs); Airport Liaison Agents and
Attaches (ALAs); ;Legal Attaches (LEGATs); U.S. Embassies and/or other appropriate
law enforcement officials, including ICE and CBP (specifically, NTC-P and NTC-C as
appropriate); and appropriate members of the IC. For outbound ENCOUNTERS, or
ENCOUNTERS involving subjects who have certain DEROGATORY INFORMATION, TSOU
contacts (via phone and electronic notification) the appropriate counterterrorism
element(s). Especially sensitive ENCOUNTERS often require coordination and situational
updates with the White House, Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and FBI's
Counterterrorism-Watch.
5.14 TSC Actions. TSC will update existing KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST records with new
TERR.ORI.ST IDENTIFIERS and TERRORISM INFORMATION and will provide the broader
counterterrorism analytic community with as much new information as possible stemming
from an ENCOUNTER with a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. TSC's primary methods for
sharing TERRORISM INFORMATION with the broader counterterrorism analytic community will
be through its EMA application and the use of Intelligence Information Repo1is (llRs), as
described further in Section V, infra. TSC will also coordinate with Fusion Centers on law
enforcement and other ENCOUNTERS impacting their Area of Responsibility. This
coordination will include a request for record enhancing information from the Fusion Center,
which if received, will be added to the subject's KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST record.
5.14. l Any new TERRORISM INFORMATION recorded in, or attached to an EMA record by
TSC will be provided to NCTC via an automated ingest process. 89 Such daily ingests of
EMA records update NCTC's TIDE to reflect the fact of the ENCOUNTER, any new
identifiers used to confirm the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST POSlTIYEMATCHES, or
those identified in an TIR. Once TIDE has been updated, an automated ingest from
TIDE to TSDB is used to update the various TSDB subsets (e.g., No Fly or Selectee
Lists). At this point, the process is complete and the watchlisting, screening and law
89

An "automated ingest" is one where the contents ofTSC's EMA records are incorporated into NCTC's TIDE
database via a system-to-system transfer of in formation that identifies new or changed information. This process allows
NCTC to spot KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST records that have been amended or updated. This process also
accommodates the transfer of attached ENCOUNTER PACKAGES received from SCREENERS. In those instances, the
ENCOUNTER PACKAGES appear as attachments to the KNOWN or SUSPECTEDTERRORlST record. ENCOUNTER PACKAGE
attachments must be moved to another system in order to give the broader counterterrorism community access to the
TERRORISM INFORMATION. That process is described in Section V, infra.

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enforcement communities have the most current and thorough TERRORISM INFORMATION
available about a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. Most- but not all-of that
TERRORJSM INFORMATION is available in a structured format as part of the KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORIST record (e .g., discrete elements such as a date of birth, country of
origin). The unstructured TERRORISM INFORMATION , while also in digitized format (e.g. ,
a computer disk, a scanned image of a business card, an encountering officer's report), is
handled by NCTC.

5. l 5 NCTC Actions. NCTC will post to TIDE Online any digitized ENCOUNTER PACKAGE it
receives from TSC or directly from a SCREENER. ENCOUNTER PACKAG ES can be found under
the subject's main page.

V.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR UPDATING EXISTING KNOWN
OR SUSPECTED TERRORIST RECORDS AND NOMINATING NEW
KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS BASED ON INFORMATION
FROM POSITIVE ENCOUNTERS
5.16 This section describes the roles and responsibilities of the watchlisting, screening, and
counterterrorism communities for exploitation and analysis of the TERRORISM INFORMATION
lawfully collected and shared when there is a POSITIVE MATCH to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST. In this context the following definitions apply:
5.16.1 " INITIAL REVfEW" means a quick review of the ENCOUNTER PACKAGE to identify
obvious, new TERROR[ST IDENTIFIERS about the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST.
5.16.2 " ADVANCED ANALYSIS" means a thorough review of the TERRORISM INFORMATION
contained in an ENCOUNTER PACKAGE obtained as a result of the ENCOUNTER with the
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. ADVANCED ANALYSIS includes the adding of
TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS to existing KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST records and
identifying new KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS who should be nominated through
the existing nomination process. In this context, ADVANCED ANALYSIS is being done on
a tactical matter related to the specific KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORTST to identify
information useful in "connecting the dots" between and among that KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORIST and other KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS or potential KNOWN
or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. It is also when the need for foreign language translation
services will be identified.
5.16.3

means further exploitation of a targeted set of ENCOUNTER
and ADVANCED ANALYSIS products to assist in identifying TERRORIST trends
and changes to methods, tactics, and practices. ENCOUNTERS for TARGETED ANALYS IS
are selected using contemporaneous threat criteria and research in additional
repositories. Contemporaneous threat criteria includes association with a priority
terrorist group (e.g., NIPF Tier I or II); ENCOUNTERS with KNOWN or SUSPECTED
"TARGETED ANALYSIS"

PACKAGES

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designated as No Fly or associated with violent activity; or at the request of
any Department or Agency that identifies a need .

TERRORI STS

5.17 Results of INITIAL REVIEW, ADVANCED ANALYSIS, and TARGETED ANALYSIS efforts
(collectively, "Exploitation") by Departments or Agencies wiJI be reported to the watchlisting,
screening and counterterrorism communities using standard templates when available.
5.17.1

TSC Actions .

5.17.1. l

First Stage Review. TSC actions with KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST
occur in two stages. The first stage occurs when the ENCOUNTERING
AGENCY and TSC exchange TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS to determine whether the
individual is watchlisted (i.e., a POSITIVE MATCH to a TSDB record). TSC records
any new TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS provided during this stage in TSC's EMA
application.
ENCOUNTERS

5.17.1.2 Second Stage Review. The second stage occurs after TSC has confirmed
there is a POSITIVE MATCH to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. For each
POSITIVE MATCH to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, the TSC's Office of
Intelligence (TSC/O1) will generate an HR for dissemination to the
counterterrorism community that provides a summary about the KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORIST ENCOUNTER (e.g. , basic facts about the ENCOUNTER such as
date, time, and place). If available at the time the initial IIR is prepared, TSC/OI
will conduct an INITIAL REVIEW of the ENCOUNTE R PACKAGE and provide a
thumbnail summary of the TERRORISM INFORMATION. For example, a summary
might highlight the existence of a new KNOWN or SUSPECTED TE RRORIST ("KNOWN
or SUSPECTED TERRORIST was traveling with three other associates not previously
identified in the car where the explosives were found in a hidden compartment") or
the possibility that new TERRORIST IDENTI FIERS are available ("approximately 80
pages carried by the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST were converted to electronic
documents ranging from the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST'S calendar/address
book to bank account and credit card numbers").
5.17.2

National Media Exploitation Center Actions. Much of the TERRORISM
generated by ENCOUNTERS from a person who is a POSITIVE MATCH to a
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST is expected to be in a foreign language that may hinder
prompt exploitation. The National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC) has the
capability to translate foreign language information and the experience necessary to
understand the efforts used to hide their activities. When TSC receives ENCOUNTER
PACKAGES with information in a foreign language, or when NCTC receives them
directly from an F.NCOUNTERING AGENCY, TSC or NCTC will forward/notify NMEC that
it has the action to translate the ENCOUNTER PACKAGE. Once the ENCOUNTER PACKAGE
has been translated and returned to TSC and NCTC, the assigned roles and responsibility
for exploitation will apply.
INFORMATION

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FBI Actions. The majority of the FBI's ENCOUNTERS with KNOWN or SUSPECTED
occur in the United States. The FBI has ADVANCED ANALYSIS responsibility
for ENCOUNTER PACKAGES on KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS for whom the FBI has
an open investigation, no matter where the individual is encountered. If the FBI does
not have an open investigation on a KNOWN or SUSPECTED T ERRORIST encountered in the
United States, or if the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST is a U.S. PERSON, then TSOU
will send a lead directing the appropriate FBI field office to conduct an assessment of
the individual and the ENCOUNTER circumstances to determine whether to open a
preliminary or full investigation. 90 This assessment includes ADVANCED ANALYSIS
packages when provided by ENCOUNTERING AGENCLES. If no investigation is opened, an
HR will be sent to the NOMINATING AGENCY and NCTC which will be used to enhance
the TIDE record with additional FBI-derived information.

5.17.3

TERRORISTS

DHS I&A Actions. DHS l&A has ADVANC ED ANALYSIS responsibility for
ENCOUNTER PACKAGES where the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST is denied entry,
denied ESTA, denied boarding, or is subject to a no board recommendation at a foreign
location, or identified through JCE' s visa security processes.

5.17.4

5.17.5

NCTC Actions. On occasion, DOS, USAID, and foreign governments have

ENCOUNTERS with KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, usually in the form of a record
ENCOUNTER (e.g., the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST has submitted an application for

a benefit like a visa or grant or information is provided to the United States by a foreign
government). NCTC has ADVANCED ANALYSIS responsibility for ENCOUNTER PACKAGES
in these instances.
5.17.5 . l

For TARGETED ANALYSIS, NCTC offers this capability for a
ENCOUNTER PACKAGES based on internal or interagency tasking.

select set of
Since all
ADVANCED ANALYSIS products created by FBI, OHS, orNCTC will be
disseminated to the U.S. Government via an HR, these materials are available to
any organization seeking to further exploit specific ENCOUNTERS. NCTC will
leverage these ADVANCED ANALYSIS products as part of its typical intelligence
analytic process to highlight emerging threats, issues or concerns.

5.17.6 A chart depicting the roles and responsibilities by Department or Agency may be
found at the end of this Chapter.

VI.

RESPONSIBILITY TO COORDINATE ANY ACTIONS
CONTEMPLATED BASED ON INFORMATION FROM ENCOUNTERS
WITH A KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORIST
90

Under governing authorities, the FBI can conduct "assessments" for an authorized purpose, such as obtaining
information about a threat to national security, without a particular factual predication. To open an investigation whether a "preliminary" or "full" investigation - there must be a specific factual predication.

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5.18 Information Sharing MOU Requirements. Departments and Agencies are reminded of
their agreement to provide transparency between and among them with regard to their
"activities to preempt, prevent, and disrupt TERRORIST attacks against U.S. PERSONS and
interests. 91 " As a practical matter, that type of transparency demands, to the greatest extent
possible, prior coordination with affected Departments or Agencies before action within a
Department or Agency's authorities is taken based on TERRORISM INFORMATION from a person
who is a POSITIVE MATCH to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. For example, FBI, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) or DOD, as lead counterterrorism Agencies in their respective
domains, must be consulted prior to taking any action based on ENCOUNTERS with a person
who is a POSITIVE MATCH with KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. This guidance is subject to
existing policies and coordination procedures when action against or pertaining to the KNOWN
or SUSPECTED TERRORIST is contemplated.
5.19 Requests for Withholding of Action. ln certain circumstances, law enforcement or the IC
may request that a SCREENER not take action (e.g., not to refuse the visa, to allow individual to
enter the United States, to not deny an individual to obtain an immigration benefit or access to
the secure area of an airport) although action may be taken under the law. This request, to the
extent practicable, shall be in writing, by a senior official, and include a statement of
justification and risk mitigation. Departments and Agencies will establish mutually
acceptable processes and procedures to implement a detailed plan.

VII.

EXAMPLES OF TERRORISM INFORMATION TYPICALLY
AVAILABLE FROM ENCOUNTERS
5 .20 The following examples of various types of ENCOUNTERS and the type of information typically
generated from those ENCOUNTERS is offered to assist Departments and Agencies in
understanding what additional or new information may become available as a result of
following the guidance provided in this document.
5.20.l

Ports of Entry. Types of documents that could be included in the ENCOUNTER
typical1y include:
1. Business cards
2. Copies of passport and visa entries

PACKAGE

91

See Paragraph 3(b) of the Information Sharing MOU (Appendix 5): "Reciprocity and Transparency. All infonnation
collected by any entity relevant to the missions and responsibilities of any other covered entities should be shared, to the
greatest extent possible, between and among all covered entities. Likewise, the parties agree that, to the greatest extent
possible, there should be transparency between and among the covered entities with regard to their activities to preempt,
prevent, and disrupt TERRORIST attacks against U.S. PERSONS and interests. Except as otherwise specified in this
Agreement, or mandated by relevant Federal statutes or Presidential Directives, procedures and mechanisms for
information sharing, use, and handling shall be interpreted and implemented consistently and reciprocally regardless of
the role a particular covered entity plays as a provider or recipient of covered information. In other words, for example,
international TERRORTSM TNFORMJ\TION collected by the Border Patrol should be shared by DHS with the IC to the same
extent foreign intelligence information on TERRORlSM is shared by the lC with DHS."

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
3.
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Driver's license
Resumes
Conference literature
Correspondence not in possession of the U.S. Postal Service.
Letters of introduction
Checks, bank deposit slips
,
Calendar/schedule
Address book
Notepad entries
Mariner's certificates
Telephone data
Location and duration of previous travel stops on current or past travel
itinerary

Law Enforcement ENCOUNTERS. Information collected from law enforcement
ENCOUNTERS with a person who is a POSITIVE MATCH to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST can include any information that would be collected when a law enforcement
officer speaks with a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. Typically information that

5.20.2

could be included in the ENCOUNTER PACKAGE can include, but is not limited to:
1. Associates
2. Telephone numbers (home, business, ceH, pager, or fax)
3. Other forms of identification
4. Physical descriptors
5. Family members
6. Occupation and work history
7. Travel plans or history
8. Vehicle information

Visa Applications. A typical DOS ENCOUNTER PACKAGE with a person who is a
to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST will be a visa application for
entry to the United States, which identifies basic information about the encountered
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST and the ENCOUNTER. Types of documents that could
be included in the ENCOUNTER PACKAGE typically include:
1. Home and work address
2. Copies of passport and visa entries
3. National Identification Number (if applicable to the country)
4. Phone numbers (home, business, cell, pager, or fax)
5. Sponsorship information (when available, to include individual 's
name/Company/Government, address and contact information)
6. Family member names (e.g., spouse, parents, children)
7. Police Certificates (if applicable)
8. Biometrics (Photos and Fingerprint Identification Number (FIN))
9. Resumes (when applying for business visas)
10. Letters of introduction

5.20.3

POSITIVE MATCH

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
11.
12.
I 3.
14.
15.

J 6.
17.

Military related documents
Education
Prior travel
Occupation and work history
Financial information used to support visa application including bank
statements, salary slips/letters, property records
Photos
Email addresses

5.20.4 Applications or Petitions for Immigration Benefits. USCIS may receive an
application from an alien for immigration benefits or petitions. Depending on the
completed form, USCIS may have information from the following non-exhaustive
categories :
I. Residences domestic and foreign
2. Family Members (often extended family)
3. Occupation
4. Bank account information
5. Biometrics
6. Gender
7. Identity documents
8. Travel document information (and 1-94)
9. Civil documents- POB , COC data
10. Employer/Prospective Employer
11. Religious Affiliations
12. Resumes
13. Educational Background
14. Past marriages or divorces
I 5. Biographical Information

5.20.5 ENCOUNTERS by HSPD-6 Foreign Partners. On some occasions, and based on the
arrangement with and legal authorities of the particular foreign partner involved, an
ENCOUNTER PACKAGE may include the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST'S visa
application to a foreign partner. One such student visa/permit application to a foreign
partner could include information provided from the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST in
the following categories:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Name as shown in passport
Other names known by or ever known by
Name in ethnic script
Gender
Date of birth
Town/city of birth
Country of birth

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
8.
9.
l 0.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

VIII.

Passpo1t number, country, expiration date
Country of citizenship
Other citizenships held
Residential address and telephone number in home country
Local residential address and telephone number (if a lready in country)
Name and address for communication about this application
Name and address of friends, relatives, or contacts you have in the country (if
applicable)
All periods of employment, including self-employment (to/from dates, name of
employer, location, type of work/occupation/job title)
Financial information used to support visa application including bank
statements, salary slips/letters, and property records
Length of planned stay in country
Questions concerning the person's character (e.g., whether the person has ever
been convicted, charged, or under investigation for any offense(s) against the
law in any country; ever deported, excluded or refused a visa by/removed from
any country; and police certificates (as evidence of character) from home
country or countries of citizenship and from all countries where the person has
lived for five or more years since age 17)
Whether the application is for a student visa, a student permit, or a limited
purpose visa
Whether the application is for a variation of conditions to work
Course of study and details of the course(s) enrolled
Arrangements for outward travel from host country
Name of legal guardian, other names legal guardian is known by, and
relationship (e.g., mother, father, legal guardian)
Any national identity number or other unique identifier issued by a government
Any completed military service (e.g., from/to dates, rank, unit name or number,
role)
Whether presently subject to military service obligation in any country
Any association with any intelligence agency or group, or law enforcement
agency
Any association with any group or organization that has used or promoted
violence to further their aims
Any involvement in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or human rights
abuses
Payment method for application fee (e.g., bank check/draft, credit card, or
personal check)

OBTAINING ENCOUNTER INFORMATION THROUGH TSC'S DAILY
ENCOUNTER REPORTS
5.21 In addition to the aforementioned TSC/01 IIRs following an ENCOUNTER with a person who is
a POSITIVE MATCH to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, Agencies can obtain the Daily

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
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UNCLAS IFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
Summary Report (DSR) to assist them in identifying NCOUNTERS of interest to their
organizational missions. DSRs will contain as much information as legally permissible.
DSRs are available from the following locations:
5.21 . l On the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), www.fbi.sgov.gov/,
click on the "TS Intel Daily Summary Reports" link on the right side.
5.21.2

On Law Enforcement Online (LEO) via www.leo .gov

5.21.3

On Regional Information Sharing Systems via www.ri ss.net

5.21.4

On HS SLIC (for access contact state or local fusion center) or email:

~

5.21.5 Two sources on BINet:
5.21.5.1
TSC's homepage at http://home.fbinet.fbi/nsb/t c/Pages/Default.aspx
5.21.5.2

Current Intelligence Report at http://di.tbinet.fbi/ims/ciu/ciro/

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
Encounter Roles and Responsibilities
:i~,

--

~

-,

-,

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Enc.ount•r
Entity

Type

Rec ipients

Data ForM•t

Re$ pons lble Entity

lnform• tlon and

new Identifiers
entered Into EMA

Aes ponsJb .. 11:ntltv

A•spo n s lbl•
E ntity

Apprehension
Detention
APIS Query

ESTA
Pre-Flight In spection

DHS/CBP/NTC

L•nd Bord • r Crossing

Encounter
Packaae

v e,._1 Manlfe:n
Car go S hipme nt.

.:1.. NCTC (post.s to

.J.. TSOU• Operatfono l

NOL# NOL •J, NOL - SJ Notlflcarlon
2. TSC~OI (IIRJ-Comrnunlty
3. DHS
Notification

2. FBI

FDI (Open cos~s. VSPER •
or the KSTls
TSC/TSTOC
(A•c.alves Elect ronic odrnltt•d/ls In th,r U .S. )
Referral)
DHS/1&./\ (Is responslbl t!!!
for d#Jtnled ~nules)

NCTC

FBI (Opt!!n COSt'!S., USPER,
or the KST Is
ad,nltied/ls. In the U .S. )
DHS/l &A (/$ responsible
for dt11t1led cntrlC$)

NCTC

Flight: M a nifest s {Inbound a nd

Outbound lntern~tlon•f,

Remov a l
lnvestlg aUon
E xtradition (In coordln•tlon
with DOS and OOJ)
SE VIS A ecurr-ent Vet.ti ng
OHS National Security

OHS/ICE

Encounter
Package

.t.

NCTC (1'0StS to
l. , TSOU-Opt11rotlonol
NOL, NOL- J. N OL- SJ Not(flcatlon

2 . FOf

2. TSC- 01 (IIR)-COrnrnunlty
Norl/lcarlon

3 . D IIS

TSC/TSTOC
(Aevle w s Ele.ctronlc
Referral)

Overat ■ y lnlt f ■ t.lv•

Secure Flla ht
C n tde ntl a Una (OIA)
Pra- Fllght. In s pecti on
Flight M a nifesu•
Oth er

DHS/TSA

Appllc■ nt

Appllcat1on/
Previous Visa
Appl Icat.Ions

DHS/USCIS

Pet.ft.toner
B e neficiary

OHS/US Coast

APIS Qu•rv
Vessel Manifest
Maritime Credent1 a lln e
Vessel & Port Ins p ections
lnve5tlga tlon s
law E nf'orcem*nL

Gui,rd

Encounter
Packaaa

OHS/US Secret

lnvenlgAt l on s

Service

P o llt lco,t .iind S pec.l;, I E v e nts

Encovnter

Package

Encounter
Packaa:e

l.. NCTC (posts to
.l. TSOU- Operationa l
NOi . NOl...J, NOL - SJ NOrl/lt:arlon
Notification

~;,_~~~;,s:::,~-S)

Notifkotlon
2. TSC- 01 ( ORJ-COmmunlty
Notification

1 . NCTC (posts to

.t. TSOU- Operational

NOi , NOI...J, NOL- SJ Notlflcorlon
2 . FBI
2. TSC• OI (IJR) Comrnunlly
3 . OHS
Notification

1 . NCTC (posts to
:J. . 'fSOU- Operotlonal
NOL.,
NOl •S) Notlflcarlon
2. FBI
2, TSC- 01 (IIR) - Comrnunl ty
.3. OHS
Notification

NOL-.J,

NCTC (posts ro

Current/Previous ;~~INOL-.J, NOL-SJ
Appllcatlons

3

, OOS

4 . TSC
.I, NCTC (po•t•

DOS

Vls,i A.evocat ion s

Current/P rovlous
Appl1catlons

;.a;o,NOI-.J~

to

NOi -SJ

!I.. ODS
4 . TSC

Passport App1tc111 1.lon

t":1 1f'r,:.nf/Pf'.,_ul,-.,1~

Appnc.a\lons

l . NCTC (posu to
N OL, NOL •.J, NOL -SJ
2 . FOi
3 , 00S
4 . 1SC

l , NCTC (poS t s to
Appllcatlon

USAID

;:;u

Foreign
Government PO C .I . N CTC (po!ll's to

Ro rerral/
A!)pllcatlon

NOL, NOL ..J, NOL -SJ

2. TSC

(When Available)

Foreign
Gover-nment

.1 . TSOU-Operotlonol
Notification
2 . TSC- OI (IIR)-Communlty
Notification

.1. TSOU- Op,ttrotlonal
Notification

2 . TSC- 01 (IIR)- Cornmunlty
Notification
.I . TSOU- Op#rrotlonol
No,-/fl~o ,-/on
2 . TSC- 01 (JJR)- COmrnunlry
Notl/Jcatlon

FBI (O~n coses, USPER,

TSC/TSTOC
or the KST Is
(R eceives Etectronlc admitted/is In the U .S. )
Referral)
DHS/l&A (l!l responslblt11
for denied entrltts)
TSC/ C IS
(Reviews
Appllc.atlon)

I tJI (OfH!n Ca$~S, USPEH,
ortM KSTls
odrnlt:ted/ls In the U .S.)
DHS/J&A (/$ r,u;ponslble
for dcnl.:d entries)

NcrC

NCTC

FBI (Opttn C0$11S, USPER,

TSC/TSTOC

or the KSTls
admlttod/ls In rh e U .S. )

NC1"C

DH~l/t;A (Is rt1sponslblc

for denied entries)

TSC/TSTOC

TSC/DOS
(Reviews Vi sa
Appllca ,lon)

TSC/DOS
(Rovlews Vi sa
Appllcallon)

TSC/TSTOC
(Reviews Passport
Appllcetlon}

FBI {Open coses, USPER,
or the KST/s
admitted/ls In the U .S. )

Ncrc
FOi

Ncrc
FBI

NCTC
FBI

NCTC

Ncrc

NCTC

NCTC

l. TSOU-Operotlonol

NOL,. NOL P.J, NOL ~S) Notification

(When Av.&llable) : :

Remot e Qu•rv lnt•rn a tlonal

.I. TSOU·OPt11rotlonol

2 _ FB,
3 . DHS
4 . TSC

:z..
Visa Appllcat. lon

2. TSC-01 (IIR)- Cornrnunlty

2 . FBI
!J. OHS

rsc-01

2.
(IIR) - Communlty
Not{flcotlon

.l, TSOU-Operatlonol

Notlflcotlon
2. TSC- OI (IIR)- Communlty
Natl/lcot/or,

TSC/USA ID
(Receives El•ctronlc
Referra l)

TSC/TSTOC
(Aeviewt: Electronic

Aeforro l)

TSC/OO5 ( Reviews
E lec tron ic Referral)

Legacy &. Other COuntrle.s

NCTC

FBI (Open C0S*S, USPER,
ortlie KST/s
admitted/ls In the U .S. )

Ncrc

NCTC

Ncrc

FBI (Opt11n cases~ USPER.
or the KST/s
odmltttuJ/ls In the U .S.)
N CTC

NcrC

NatJo nal Ins tant Background
Checks / Traffic Vfol.t1t.lon /
DoO Law Enforc•ment

...,..,
Enforcement

Investigation
Ja11 Related
Domestic D ispute
Arres t
l!wtradltlon
.... Sect:lon
lnh1r•s t Lo

11 ,

FBI C A/JTff

forwards

.1 , FBI
0lornelric•.
2. NCTC
Poll ce Report
(When Available)

J . TSOU-O~ratlonol
Notification
2. TSC- 01 {IIR)-Comrnunlty

Notification

TSC/TSTOC
(Via Telephon•
Ca ll)

FBI (Open coses, USPEU,
or the l<STI•
odrnlru:d/ls In l'hfl U .S. )

NcrC

NCTC

Infra, ld•ntifles cat.rgorhtlli or Tlll'tRORISM I Nl' OAMATION from •ocounters with po,;;ltlve lv Identified l(NOWN or 5U5P([CTl:OTCl'UIOAIST5 that art, o f polentlal
olhe f' couJ'1tertorrh:rn analysts , or the \Natchlltalna commvnhy, Cncou,it.•r'lng •ntltlu• •hovld collect and shaf'e wht,n it. ls wllhln thul r lutJ.o l

NOM I NATOHS,

aulhorllles to ,.~lain and llh&re "Tt!RAOfllSM INl'O KMAYION.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
Page 179

.

/·'

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
A.

B.

is a thorough review of the TERRORISM INFORMATlON contained in an
ENCOUNTER PACKAGE obtained as a result of the ENCOUNTER with the KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST. ADVANCED ANALYSIS includes the adding of TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS to existing
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST records and identifying new KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS who should be nominated through the existing nomination process. In this context,
ADVANCED ANAL vsrs is being done on a tactical matter related to the specific KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORIST to identify information useful in "connecting the dots" between and
among that KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST and other KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS or
potential KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. It is also when the need for foreign language
translation services will be identified.

ADVANCED ANALYSIS:

are those who receive and hold TERRORISM INFORMATION and certain other
non-TERRORISM INFORMATION they are authorized to receive and retain.

AGGREGATORS:

C. DEROGATORY INFORMATION: is intelligence or information that demonstrates the nature of an
individual's or group's association with TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

D. ENCOUNTER: is an event in which an individual is identified during a screening process to be a
"POSITIVE MATCH," "POTENTIAL MATCH," or "INCONCLUSIVE MATCH," to an ind ividual who has
been desi gnated in the TSDB as a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. An ENCOUNTER can be a
face-to-face meeting with a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST, electronic or a paper-based
ENCOUNTER (e.g., the KNUWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST has submitted an appli cation for a
benefit liked a visa, ETSA grant, or information is provided to the United States by a foreign
government, aircraft operator, or other private entity).
E.

ENCOUNTERING AGENCY: is a Department or Agency of the U.S. Government with TERRORIST
screening or law enforcement responsibilities that comes into contact with a KNOWN or
SUSPECTED TERRORIST (whether in a face-to-face situation or via an electronic or written
submission such as an application for a benefit) that the TSC determines is a POSITIVE MATCH to
a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST.

F.

ENCOUNTER PACKAGE:

is all information gathered during an ENCOUNTER with a KNOWN or

SUSPECTED TERRORIST.
G. ENHANCEMENT: is the addition of new TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS or DEROGATORY INFORMATION
on a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST.

H.

are nationals of one country who travel or attempt to travel to another
country to participate in TERRORISM and/or TERRORISTACTIVlTlES.

I.

is information that suggests an individual may have a nexus to
TERRORISM and/ or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES but the information available to the NOMINATOR does
not meet either or both the minimum identifying criteria that will facilitate identification of
these individuals or the substantive DEROGATORY INFORMAT10N to meet the REASONABLE
SUSPICION standard but does qualify as information that should be provided to NCTC pursuant
to HSPD-6.

FOREIGN FIGHTERS:

FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION:

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

►

-0
-0

~

::s

.....

0.

X

......

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

J.

is the final determination by TSC that limited information in the subject
data set matches TSDB data in a TSDB record and no additional identifiers are available to
verify the match.

K.

INITIAL REVIEW: is a quick primary review of the ENCOUNTER PACKAGE to identify obvious,
new TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS about the KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST.

L.

KNOWN TERRORlST: is an individual whom the U.S. Government knows is engaged, has been
engaged, or who intends to engage in TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVI TY, including an
individual (a) who has been, charged, arrested, indicted, or convicted for a crime related to
TERRORISM by U.S. Government or foreign government authorities; or (b) identified as a
terrorist or member of a designated foreign terrorist organization pursuant to statute, Executive
Order or international legal obligation pursuant to a United Nations Security Council
Resolution .

INCONCLUSIVE MATCH:

M. LONE WOLF: an individual motivated by one or more extremists ideologies, who operates alone
and supports, or engages in acts of violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that
may involve direction, assistance, or influence from a larger terrorist organization of a foreign
actor.
N. NOMINATOR or NOMINATING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: is a Federal Department or Agency
that has information to indicate that an individual meets the criteria for a KNOWN or SUSPECTED
TERRORIST and nominates that individual to TlDE and the TSDB based on information that
originated with that Department or Agency and/or a third Department or Agency.
0. OPERATIONALLY CAPABLE: as described in Chapter 4, an individual is "OPERATrONALLY
CAPABLE" if, based on credible intelligence, he or she, acting individually or in concert with
others, reasonably appears to have the ability, knowledge, opportunity, and intent or is actively
seeking the opp01tunity to engage in a violent act of TERRORISM consistent with 18 U.S.C. 2331
or 18 U.S.C. 2332b. For example, attempting to obtain an IED would indicate an individual is
OPERAT10NALLY CAPABLE of committing an act of TERRORISM. However, simply conducting
internet research concerning IEDs would not be sufficient without additional activity.
Depending on circumstances, and in combination with other facts, scouting potential targets or
traveling for no legitimate purpose to places that have TERRORIST training grounds, regardless of
whether the person is presently capable of using an IED, might also indicate an individual is
OPERATIONALLY CAPABLE of committing an act of TERRORISM.

P.

ORIGINATOR: is the Department or Agency that has appropriate subject matter interest and

classification authority and collects TERRORISM INFORMATrON (i.e., raw information) and
disseminates it or TERRORIST IDENTJFIERS to other U.S. Government entities in an intelligence
report (i.e., finished intelligence) or other mechanism .
Q.

PARTICULARIZED DlmOGATORY INFORMATION: is the type of information relied on to
determine whether REASONABLE SUSPICION is met. This is information that demonstrates the
nature of an individual 's or group's association with TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
that is descriptive and specific to an event or activity, and is more than a label. For example,
"Subject X provides false travel documentation for AI-Qaida operatives" is PARTICULARIZED
DEROGATORY lNFORMATION, whereas "Subject Y is a supporter," standing alone, is not
considered PARTICULARIZED DEROGATORY INFORMATION.
R.

POSITIVE MATCH: occurs when the TSC determines that information about a subject
encountered by a SCREENER exactly or reasonably matches a record in the TSDB.

S.

occurs when an ENCOUNTERING AGENCY believes it has a match with a
or SUSPECTED TERRORIST record in the TSDB. An ENCOUNTERING AGENCY may attempt
to resolve POTENTIAL MATCHES first through its review process. If an ENCOUNTERING AGENCY'S
review process cannot resolve the individual's status as not a match to a TSDB record, the
ENCOUNTERING AGENCY will refer the POTENTIAL MATCH to TSC for final adjudication.
POTENTIAL MATCH:

KNOWN

T.

PURELY DOMESTIC TERRORISM INFORMATION: is defined in the TSC MOU as information
about U.S. PERSONS that has been determined to be PUil.ELY DOMESTIC TERRORISM INFORMATION
with "no link to foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or international TERRORISM."

U.

REASONABLE SUSPICION: is the standard that must be met in order to include an individual in
the TSDB, absent an exception provided for in the Watchlisting Guidance. To meet the
REASONABLE SUSPICION standard, the NOMINATOR, based on the totality of the circumstances,
must rely upon articulable intelligence or information which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants a determination that an individual is known or
suspected to be or has been knowingly engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid
of, or related to TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. There must be an objective factual
basis for the NOMINATOR to believe that the individual is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST.
Mere guesses or hunches are not enough to constitute a IIBASONABLE SUSPlCION that an
individual is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. Reporting of suspicious activity alone that
does not meet the IIBASONABLE SUSPICION standard set forth herein is not a sufficient basis to
watch list an individual. The facts, however, given fair consideration, should sensibly lead to the
conclusion that an individual is, or has, engaged in TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

V. SCREENER: a Department or Agency that is authorized to conduct TERRORISM screening to
determine if an individual is a possible match to a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORlST in the
TSDB. SCREENERS can include Federal Departments or Agencies, state, local, tribal, territorial,
or foreign governments and certain private entities. The term 'SCREENER' is used throughout
this document as a general reference to a government official who compares an individual's
information with information in the TSDB to determine if an individual is in the TSDB. Law
enforcement officials who engage in such activities may normally describe their targeting or
other actions in this context as other than "screening." For ease of reference, government
officials who compare an individual's information with information in the TSDB will be
referred to in the Watchlisting Guidance as a "SCREENER."

w. SUSPECTED TERRORIST: is an

individual who is REASONAl:lLY SUSPECTED to be, or has been
engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to TERRORlSM and/or
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES based on an articulable and REASONABLE SUSPICION.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

X. TARGETED ANALYSIS: is further exploitation of a targeted set of ENCOUNTER PACKAGES and
ADVANCED ANALYSJS products to assist in identifying TERRORIST trends and changes to methods,
tactics, and practices. ENCOUNTERS for TARGETED ANALYSTS are selected using
contemporaneous threat criteria, and research in additional repositories. Contemporaneous
threat criteria include association with a priority terrorist group (e.g., NJPF Tier [ or JI);
ENCOUNTERS with KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORISTS designated as No F ly or associated with
violent activity; or at the request of any Department or Agency that identifies a need.

Y.

is a combination of definitions because none of
the federal law definitions of "terrorism" or "terrorist activities" were directly applicable to the
consolidated approach to watch listing. For terrorist watchlisting purposes under this
Watch listing Guidance, "terrorism and/or terrorist activities" combine elements from various
federal definitions and are considered to: (a) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human
life, property, or infrastructure that may be a violation of U.S. law, or may have been, if those
acts were committed in the United States; and, (b) appear intended to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect
the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.
This includes activities that facilitate or support TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, such
as providing a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other
material benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological,
or radiological weapons), explosives, or training for the commission of act of terrorism and/or
TERRORISM AND/OR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES:

TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

Z. TERRORISM INFORMATION: applies, where appropriate, to purely domestic terrorism as defined
in the TSC MOU and incorporates the definition found in in section 1016 of the [RTPA (6
U.S.C. 485), as amended . The term "TERRORISM INFORMATION" means 1. all information, whether collected, produced, or distributed by intelligence, law

enforcement, military, homeland security, or other activities relating t
a) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities,
means of finance or material support, or activities of foreign or
international terrorist groups or individuals, or of domestic groups or
individuals involved in transnational TERRORISM;
b) threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, U.S.
PERSONS, or United States interests, or to those of other nations;
c) communications of or by such groups or individuals; or
d) groups or individuals reasonably beli.eved to be assisting or associated with
such groups or individuals; and
2. includes weapons of mass destruction information.
a) Weapons of Mass Destruction Information: information that could
reasonably be expected to assist in the development, proliferation, or use of
a weapon of mass destruction (including a chemical, biological,

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

radiological, or nuclear weapon) that could be used by a TERRORIST or a
terrorist organization against the United States, including information about
the location of any stockpile of nuclear materials that could be exploited for
use in such a weapon that could be used by a TERRORIST or a terrorist
organization against the United States.
AA. TERRORISM SCREENING INFORMATION: is defined in the standard HSPD-6 agreement to
mean unclass ified identifying information about KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORI STS.
BB.

TERRORIST:

please see KN OWN TERRORIST or SUSPECTED TERRORIST.

CC. TERRORIST JDENTIFIERS: are referred to in the TSC MOU as U//FOUO data for inclusion
into the TSDB. TERRORIST IDENTIFIER S are data points about a particular identity that include
names and aliases, dates of birth, places of birth, unique identifying numbers, passport
information, country of origin and nationality, physical identifiers, addresses, photographs or
renderings of the individual, fingerprints or other biometric data, employment data, license plate
numbers, and any other TERRORJSM IN FORMATION that ORIGINATORS specifically provide for
passage to the TSC.
DD. TERRORlST INFORMATION: as defined in HSPD-6 is "information about individuals known
or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation
for, in aid of, or related to TERRORISM. "
EE.
U.S. PERSON: is defined in Executive Order 12333 (as amended) as "a United States citizen,
an alien known by the intelligence element concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an
unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent
resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation
directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments." The Watchlisting Guidance
contains certain exceptions to the minimum substantive derogatory standards for TERRORIST
watchlisting that support immigration and visa screening activities by the DHS and DOS to
determine whether ineligibilities exist for admission to the United States or visa adjudication
pursuant to the INA. Because the INA defines "aliens" as any person not a citizen or national of
the United States, the INA admissibility provisions also apply to LPRs, in certain circumstances,
who are considered as U.S. PERSONS under Executive Order 12333. Consequently, NCTC
developed a mechanism in TIDE to identify and distinguish U.S . citizens from non-U.S. citizens
in order to further distinguish between "aliens" under the INA and U.S. PERSONS under
Executive Order 12333. See INA§ 10l(a)(3) [8 U.S.C. 110l(a)(3)].

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

►

'O

'"Cl

fl>

::3
0-

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
September 16. 2003

Homeland Se urtty Pre ,df_ntial Direc iv~JHspd-6
Subject: Integration and Use of Screening Information
To protect against ter orism i is the policy of the United States to ( 1) develop, integrate, and maintain
thorough. accurate, a d current information about individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or
have been engaged in conduct constituting. in preparation for. in aid of. or related to terrorism (Terronst
Information); and (2) use that information as appropriate and to the full extent permitted by law to support
(a) Federal. State. local, territorial. tnbal, foreign -government. and private-sector screening processes.
and (b) diplomatic. military. intelligence, law enforcement. immigration, visa, and protective processes.
This directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the provlsions of the Constitution and
applicable laws, including those protecting the rights of all Americans.
To further strengthen the ability of the United States Government to protect the people, property, and
territory of the United States against acts of terrorism, and to the full extent permitted by law and
consistent with the policy set forth above:
( 1) The Attorney Ge eral shall establish an organization to consolidate the Government's approach to
terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use of Terrorist Information in screening
processes.
(2J The heads of executive departments and agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law. provide to the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC} on an ongoing basis all appropriate Terrorist Information in their
possession, custody. or control. The Attorney General , in coordination with the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall implement appropriate
procedures and safeguards with respect to all such information about United States persons. The TTIC
will provide the organization referenced in paragraph (1) with access to all appropriate information or
intelligence in the TTIC's custody, possession , or control that the organization requires to perform its
functions .
(3) The heads of executive departments and agencies shall conduct screening using such information at
all appropriate opportunities, and shall report to the Attorney General not later than 90 days from the date
of this directive, as to the opportunities at which such screening shall and shall not be conducted.
(4) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop guidelines to govern the use of such information to
support State, local, territorial, and tribal screening processes. and private sector screening processes
that have a substantial bearing on homeland security .
(5) The Secretary of State shall develop a proposal for my approval for enhancing cooperation with
certain foreign governments, beginning with those countries for which the United States has waived visa
requiremen ts, to establish appropriate access to terrorism screening information of the participating
governments.
This directive does not alter existing authorities or responsibilities of department and agency heads to
carry out operational activities or provide or receive information This directive is intended only to improve
the internal management of the executive branch and rs not intended to, and does not, create any right or

Pagel of2

~N

benefit enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States. its departments, agencies.
entities. officers. employees or agents, or any other person.
The Attorney General. in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Director of Central Intelligence, shall report to me through the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security not later than October 31 . 2003. on progress made to implement this directive and
shall thereafter report to rne on such progress or any recommended changes from time to time as
appropriate.

GEORGE W . BUSH

###

Page 2 of 2

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THEATTORNEYGENER~L
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
TUE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
ON THE lNTEGRATION AND USE OF SCREENING INFORMATION
TO PROTECT AGAINST TERRORISM

(1) This memorandum represents the consensus view of the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence-regarding
the implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6), dated
September 16. 2003. entitled "Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against
Terrorism ." (U)
(2) Consistent with the President's direction, the Parties to this Memorandum will develop and
maintain, to the extent pennitted by law, the most thorough, accurate, and current information
possible about individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been involved in
3ctivities constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism ("Terrorist
Information"), and will, as described in this Memorandum:
(a) use that ~nformation to support screening processes at all appropriate opportunities;
(b) make accessible appropriate information to State, local, territorial, and tribal authorit;es to
support their screening processes and otherwise enable them to identify, or assist in identifying,
such individuals;
(c) host mechanisms, to the extent permined by law, to support appropriate private sector
screening processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland security;
(d) host mechanisms, to the extent pennitted by law, to support appropriate foreign government
screening processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland security;
(e) provide or make accessible appropriate infonnation to foreign governments cooperating with
the United States in the war on terrorists of global reach; and

(f) ensure that these activities are carried out in a manner consistent with the Constitution and
applicable laws. (U)

Page \ of &

Terrorist Screening Center
i,

P) To implement the President's directive, the Attorney General, acting through the Director of
rhe FBI, and in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and
the Director of Central lncelligence, will establish the Terrorist Screening Center to consolidate
the Government's approach to terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use
of Terrorist Information, in screening processes. (U)

(4) The Terrorist Screening Center will:
(a) maintain a consolidated terrorist screening database that is a continuousry updated, sensitive
but unclassified subset of the Terrorist Information possessed by the TIIC, and the Purely
Domestic Terrorism Information (i.e,, infonnation about U.S. persons that has been determined
to be purely domestic terrorism information with no link to foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, or international terrorism) possessed by the FBI:
(b) determine, for each entry in the consolidated terrorist screening database. which supported
screening processes shall query that entry, as described in paragraphs (15) through (24);

·· (c) ensure, consistent with applicable law, that appropriate information possessed by State, local,
territorial, and tribal governments, which is available to the Federal government, is considered in
determinations made by the Terrorist Screening Center~
(d) host mechar.isrns to support appropriate screening processes; and

(e) provide continual operational support to assist in the identification of persons screened and,
when an individual known or appropriately suspected to be involved in activities constituting, in
preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism, has been identified through a screening process,
facilitate, to the extent pem1ined by law, appropriate and lawful actions to be taken by
appropriate departments and agencies. (U)
(5) The Terrorist Screening Center will be headed by a senior U.S . Government official (the
Director of the Terrorist Screening Center), who will report to the Attorney General through the
Director of the FBI. The Director of the Terrorist Screening Center will be appointed by the
Anomey General, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of
State, the Director of the FBJ, and the Director of Central lotelligence. The Principal Deputy
Director of the Terrorist Screening Center will be a senior official from the Department of
Homeland Security. (U)
(6) The Terrorist Screening Center will be staffed with assignees and other officials from the
Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Depar1ment of Homeland Security, and other
Federal departments and agencies that the Terrorist Screening Center supports. The Director of
Central Intelligence, acting in his capacity as statutory head of the Intelligence Community, may

Page 2 of 8

also cieterrnine that assignees of other appropriate agencies. within the Intelligence Community,
will be made available to perform appropriate duties at the Terrorist Screening Center. (U)
(7) Personnel assigned to the Terrorist Screening Center will have appropriate access to the TTJC
database and any relcvanl intelligence information necessary to perform the Terrorist Screening
Center's functions. To the extent required by law, the Panics to this Memorandum may jointly
determine the circumstnnces under which personnel from the Intelligence Community, assigned
to the Terrorist Screening Center in accordance with paragraph (6), may participate in the
functions of the Terrorist Screening Center relating to U.S. persons. (U)
(8) The Director of the Terrorist Screening Center will establish necessary procedures and
safeguards to ensure the Terrorist Screening Center's functions are carried out in a manner
consistent with the Constitution and applicable laws, including, but not limited to, procedures to :
(a) address the repeated misidentification of persons in any U.S. Government screening process;
(b) regularly review information, and to promptly adjust or delete erroneous or outdated
information; and
(c) protect personal privacy, (U)
(9) Consistent with the President's directive, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence,
and working with the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center, not later than 180 days from
today, will recommend to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, a proposal for
cooperating with certain foreign governments (beginning with those countries for which the
United States has waived visa requirements) to establish appropriate access to terrorist screening
infom1ation of the participating governments, in a manner consistent with each government's
laws, and to provide operational support to the participating governments. (U)

Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TfIC) Identities Database
(10) The TTIC database will include, to the extent permitted by law, all information the U.S .
government possesses reloted ro the identities of individuals known or appropriately suspected to
be or have been involved in activities constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to
terrorism, with the exception of Purely Domestic Terrorism Information. (U)
( 11) As directed by the President. and to the extent permitted by law, Federal departments and
agencies wilt provide to the TTIC on an ongoing basis all relevant Terrorist Information in their
possession, custody, or control, with the exception of Purely Domestic Terrorism Information,
which will instead be provided directly to the FBI. Departments and agencies will continue to

Page 3 of 8

provide new or updated information, and adjust or retract mformation as needed, in as near to
real -time as possible. To this end, the Parties to this Memorandum will automate, to the
maximum extent possible while providing for necessary review, their processes and mechanisms
for securely sharing this information, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the St::cretary of Homeland Security, and the
Director of Central [nlelligence, in coordination with other relevant department and agency
heads, not later than I 80 days from today, will jointly recommend to the President through the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, in consultation with the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, improvements, if any, to the existing cable-based system
of sharing terrorism-related information with other depar1ments and agencies.

(b) The Attorney General will ensure that the FBI's information technology modernization
programs incorporate automated means of sharing appropriate information with the l71C and
other departments and agenc ies, while providing for necessary review, in near real=-time. (U)
(12) The TTJC identities database, and the FBI's database containing Purely Domestic Terrorism
Information, will incorporate, to the extent permitted by law, available biometric data, including
data on persons who even if otherwise unidentified are known or appropriately suspected to be or
have been involved in activities constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.
The databases will have the capability of periodically incorporating advancements in biometric
technology. (U)

Relationship of the TTIC and FBI Databases to the Terrorist Screening Center Terrorist
Screening Dara base
(13) The ITIC identities database will serve, with the exception described in paragraph (10), as
the s ingle source for the Terrorist Screening Center terrorist screening database. The Director of
the FBI will serve as the source for the Terrorist Screening Center terrorist screening database
with regard to Purely Domestic Terrorism Information. The Terrorist Screening Center terrorist
screening database will be a continuously updated, sensitive but unclassified subset of the
Terrorist Information possessed by the TTIC, and the Purely Domestic Terrorism lnfonnation
possessed by the FBI. (U)

Terrorist Screening Center Terrorist Screening Database
(14) The Director of the TTIC, the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center, and the heads of
Federal departments and agencies, or their designees, may nominate persons for inclusion in the
terrorist screening database, with notification, as appropriate, to the Director of the TTIC and/or
the Director of the FBL (U)

Page 4 of8

(15) The Terrorist Screening Center will determine, according to criteria established jointly with
the entity responsible for each supported screening process, which supported screening processes
will query that entry in the consolidated terrorist screening database. The Terrorist Screening
Center will make these determinations bnsed on criteria and procedures developed in
coordination with the Parties to this Memorandum 3nd in consultation with the heads of
appropriate Federal departments and agencies, based on factors including, but not limited to, the

following:
(a) the nature of the person's association with terrorism~
(b) the qua! ity of the data, including credibility, reliability, and extent of corroboration;
( c) the extent of uniquely identifying data;

(d) the authority or authorities under which the data was obtained, and any restrictions on how it
may be shared or used;
( e) the authority or authorities of the screening entity;
(f) the circumstances, including changes in the Homeland Security Alert Level, under which
screening will occur; and
(g) the action the screening entity will take if a person is identified as a person in the terrorist
screening database. (U)
( l 6) The Director of the Terrorist Screening Center, in coordination with the Parties to this
~emorandum and in consultation with the heads of appropriate Federal departments and
agencies, will establish procedures to review the continued inclusion of a person in the terrorist
screening database, and to review the inclusion of that person in particular screening processes as
described in paragraph (15) above, whenever new infonnation about that person is developed .
(U)
(17) Except upon written direction from the President, determinations to include U.S. persons in
the terrorist screening database based solely on information concerning the domestic activities of
such persons will be made as appropriate by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, or their designees. (U)
(18) The Attorney General, acting through the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center, will
review each nomination and determine whether to include that person in those records that can
be queried by law enforcement authorities through the NCJC database; for aliens. the Attorney
General will do so in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through Lhc
Secretary of Homeland Security's representative assigned to the Terrorist Screening Center. (U)

Page 5 of 8

( 19) The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through his representative assigned to the
Terrorist Screening Center, will review each nomination and dclcnninc whether to include that
person in those records that can be queried by. or made accessible by appropriate means, to other
State, local , territorial, and tribal officials for homeland security purposes, including, but nol
limited to, screening persons when they apply for driver's licenses or other forms of
identification . (U)
(20) The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through his representative assigned to the
Terrorist Screening Center, will review each nomination and determine whether to include that
person in those records that will be subject to queries submitted by appropriate private sector
critical infrastructure operators or organizers of large events. The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the other Parties to this Memorandum, and working with the
Director of the Terrorist Screening Center, will establish necessary guidelines and criteria to:

(a) govern the mechanisms by which private sector entities can submit such queries; and
(b) initiate appropriate law enforcement or other governmental action, if any, when a person
submitted for query by a private sector entity is identified as a person in the terrorist screening
database. (U)
(21) The Secretary of State in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence, acting through their representatives assigned to
the Terrorist Screening Center, will review each nomination and determine whether to include
that person in those records that can be queried by, or made accessible by appropriate means to,
foreign governments cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorists of global reach.
(lf)
[Paragraphs (22) - (24) are classified and therefore redactedl
(25) The terrorist screening database will be accessible to screening processes on a real -time
basis . Screening processes will only be able to access those records that have been identified and
approved for such screening, as described in paragraphs (15) through (24) above. The Director
of the Terrorist Screening Center will strictly Ii mil, to the maximum extent possible, the need to
provide U.S. Government terrorist screening data in list form to supported entities. (U)

Additionnl Implementation Provisions
(26) Per the President's direction, and consistent with guidelines developed by the Anorney
General in coordination with the other Parties to this Memorandum, the heads of Federal
departments and agencies will conduct screening using the Terrorist Screening Center database
at all appropriate opportunities, and shall report to the Attorney General not later than 90 days

Page 6 of8

from today the screening opportunities at which such screening shall and shall not be conducted .
(U)
(27) The Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security wi-ll conduct a review of the
erganization, structure and progress of the Terrorist Screening Center at an appropriate time, and
report to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. The report
will include a recommendation on whether any modifications to the Terrorist Screening Center
should be made. (U)

(28) To the extent permitted by law, the Director of the TfiC will promptly assume
responsibil.i ty for the functions and personnel of the Department of State's TIPOFF .
counterteri;orist program, less those components devoted to providing operational support to
T IPOFF users and will ensure that all terrorist identity infonnation contained within the TIPOFF
database is fully integrated into the TTIC database. The functionality of the TIPOFF program,
whereby consular officials receive near real-time feedback to hits to TIPOFF entries, will be
maintained or !mproved upon .. A ~enanir,- AnrieY to this Memnranrlum will be promntlv a11reerl
to regarding the modalities of TIPOFF relocation to the ·rr1c, ana me spectt1c responsibilities of
each r-arty. t U)
·

(29) Beginning with the standup of the Terrorist Screening Center, Federal departments and
agencies will discontinue or transfer to the Terrorist Screening Center, to the extent permitted by
law and with appropriate consultation with the Congress. those operations that are duplicative of
the Terrorist Screening Center's mission to provide continuous operational support to users of
the terrorist screening database, including but not limited to :
(a) those components of the Department of State's TIPOFF counterterrorist program devoted to
providing operational support to TIPOFF users (with the exception of a small element that will
remain at the Department of State to facilitate intelligence support to the Bureau of Consular
Affairs);

(b) the FBl's Watchlist Unit; and
(c) the Transportation Security Agency's No-Fly and Se}ectee list program . (U}
(30) Consister.t with HSPD-6 and other presidential directives, this Memorandum does not alter
existing authorities or responsibilities of the heads of Federal departments and agencies to carry
out operational activities or provide or receive information. (U)
(31) To the extent that existing notices are not sufficient, the Panies to this Memorandum. which
will provide information to the TTlC. the FBl, and/or the Terrorist Screening Center under
HSPD-6 and this Memorandum, will publish in the Federal Register, prior to the standup of the
Terrorist Screening Center, "routine use•· notices under the Privacy Act sufficient to indicate that
such information will be provided . (U)

Page 7 of 8

(~ ~) Th, s M e rnor.:!ndum of Understanding i!; effective from the date of signatu;-e by al l Parties.
An~ Party may submit, through the Assistant to the Presice:,t for Homeland Security, ""Titten
requests for revisions . amendments, modifications, annexes and supplementary understanding to
thi s Memornm.lurr. at any lime. Such changes sh;:!11 become ef:'ecrive upon the date of approva l
bv
~ a il Parties. Tne Parties shall review this Me;-norandum not late:- than one ,vcar from -its
effective date . (U)

Colin L. Powell

~-•.-TV nf State:

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Septtmber 16,2003

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S:gnatures are consolidated from classified version of the original TSC MOU.
Page 8 of 8

2 . ;, ·.

.
_. ·

. : · ..:··· , .,

THE SECRKTAR.V OP STATE

T8E SECRETARY OF THE TIUtASUR.Y
111EmcllETARY OF DEl'ENSE

TIIEATTOltNEY GENERAL
111ESFCRE'l'ARY OFHOMEUNOSECmllTY
TBEDIIEC'l'Oll OP NATIONAL INTEI.UGENCE
THE DDlF..Cl'OR 01' THE Cl?.NTRAL IN'TRLLIGDlCE AGENCY

TBEDIRECTOlt OF 'IIIENA.TIONAL COUN'l'BRTERROUSM CENTER
TD D!RECTOR 01' THE TER.RORISTSCREENING CENrER
ADDENDUMB

TOTHB
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDlNGON11mINTBGRATION AND use OF
saumNJN'G INPORMATION TO PROTP.Cr AGAINST Tt?.R.R0RISM
Badqr-4

(l) "Ibis Addeadmn. ("Addendum B•) sapptemenu bMtmcrudumo!Uzsdcnran4ini on the
Inrqracion and Use of ScreeainglaformaUoa to Pro~Apinlt Tem,aun. ~ Septe:mbec 16,
2003, ("'lbe TSC MOU") and ~ Addendum A. ef&cti¥e Alll'Ut 21 2004. T<> cbe cxteot
that Adkndzrm B il incortsl£wit with tbc TSC MOU, Addc:aadm.DB supen:icdcs the TSCMOU.
ln lddldm.Addcedma B ~ lhe TIPOW-T.!R.R.OR~of~,
dated Juoe 4, 2002. bc(wuii the ~ t of State. die Deft.aSe loteJJt..c,,Jw: Agency, ~
NatioMI Secmiiy Agt::DJ;y. !ht Federal Barean of l . D ~ IDd lhoCcntnl~
At,cn,t:y or my other imcriJn agreemait iatended t.c &ddtw the me of dincmtnlle4S Tettorism
InftvD~
(2) AddeadamB ~ b!f rotereace an provfsiocu of tbe Mcmcnndozn of Undemanding
between~ ~Ovrnuut)', Federal Law Enfarcemeaat.Apncies. and lhe J:>eparcmeat
of Homt.land Secmity ~ IDfomwion Shadnc. dad Mm:h 4, 2003 ~ l.aformllion
Sbanog MOU'') .md the TSC MOU. By tbt.ir iigtwuros on ~ddendum A. ! h e ~ of Swe.,
die Set.retM)' of dlt. Treuury, and die ~wy of Dcfeose becaml! sfpatories Gf ~
Infonurion ShadnJMOU IDd die TSCMOU a!Ml agrcc thatatl pnm.dans of thoseMOUs apply
to Ill entitie& that are. cc become, 'fr'holly or mpert. pan ct. lC:Sp0Cdvely, 1he ~ of swe.,
t h e ~ of !he Tn:aswy and che Depanmeni of Defeue. To lbt. exunt dwtbe TSC

MOU and AMendum B pro\id8 f« pcaterW'omation sbaringtbm tbal ~ t e d by1hc
.fntomation Sltadag MOU, the ptovisuw a!cht TSC MOU and Mdtodam B shall eonuol the
P~' actioaa. In all other ~peccs. to die exit.at diu promioDs of lho TSC MOU atJJJ/or
Add=dam B are inconsistt.at with the Information Shariftr MOU.~ provisioas of the
Infocmation Sha.ring MOU shall conttol the actions of 11\e Parties to chis Addendum.
Purpose

(3) The purposes of Addendum B am~
(a) to ensure 1be full impl~tazion of subparapaph Cl} of HomtJIDd Se.eurity Presldendal
Direetive~ {HSP~. ~ Sepiember 16. 2003. entitled ''Jntegranon and U.se <,f Scmcning
Infomwion to Pr0Ceet AJai&t Terrorism:11 and

(b) tQ ~alize the Parties• agreement tbatthey will. to~ mwnmm ennt permitted by
lAw and consi.sc.ent with 1he Pr=deat•a direction for t h e ~ of dJc Tarorltt Threat
Integration Cent«, now dsc Nation,! ~ m ~ (NCI'C) and me IJlformatian
Sbarint MOU. provide to me NCTC on an ongoing bws all Terrorism lnfoonatiOll {IS defined in

the Intelligence Rcfonn and Temxism Prcvcnlicm kt (DlTPA) of 2004. Socdon I 016(~)(4)) in
their possetSion. eustody. or coottol

ProcedllttS
(4) The hniet will. LO the tnlXml1U2l ex1=t pmni~ by law and COMlite'Dt with the
egtahlisbineat of !Ile NC1'C. me lllformatioa Sbarin& MOU. IJ\d ia funherurc.e of the information
dlaMf mmdales in lRTP.A. provick to the NCI"C, OD ID ooiamz basis. all T«rarian
Infomsatiall. iD lbcir poq;essioo, c:unody. or control. lf additicrw proc:edma u,d mcchani AN

are Deeded b6yond dlOSe directed iii 1be lnfoaDfltioll Sbadng MOU and IR'IPA to accomplish .
this inclucfq. bot Dot Jimmd to. ~ ptQ&:l'IIDS. 1bc NCJ'C. in ooordinlSioc. with the
Putit:5 diasCTQnu1ting the Tcrmrism lnformation r'Originar.on;"). $hall ~tish p-ooedures 10
guide lbe s,rovilloo of such iDfcxmltiaa.. and the. Panies shlU establish procedwe! and
mec:h31lis!M 10 provide socb information.
{S) A. wcb.ba&ed-.eaioo o! tbeNCIC Idenaties Database. tbe Tenodst Identities Dar.ama.n

& ~ t (TIDE-OaliDe). IS man~ In cbe TSC MOU, will be aYlilable to all individuals
who h a ~ ~ tnIC ~ for a,;«.ii k> NCIC OaliDe CNoi). fomwly known as
~ whidi is a O>n:mmnicy of lDtete.at ~ JNTELINIC.. 1'he NCTC lril1 ma\:.e available to
~ Pai1ies upon rcqncst. dJC aames ud ~ of ptaOIIDel with 1cce&1 to T.IDE-Onlinc:. Ail
USCl1 will be respansible. foe c:omp!yinc wi1h me C04ditioaa set for aacct$ t.p nt>S-Onllne.
(6) 'Whcb the Partie.J provide disseminated Tmorism Joi'o«m#ic,p co lhc NCfC. no spccffic
DOlfficadOG will OCc:tlf between the NCTC and cb.c Orlgim.tor Jdeaeifying the hcl: tbat Temxism
Inlormarln11 ~ e d in chose eommmlcationt were placed ill TID,E:(7) The Parties authorire the NCTC Cud d>eFBl for Putely~ Tcnorismlntormation., as
ddined .in Gle TSC MOU) to provide 10 the TSC du~ fullov.>ing d a t a ( ~ to u, --Z-errorist
Ideatifiers"). in lmxdanoc with 1be provisions of parqraph (I} below. forinclusioo in. the

TSCs ccmsolidaUd tmorist scruning databue (TSDB):
(a} NllmeS an4 'Illas~:
(b}

~tes of bh1h;

(~) PIIA:es o(bmh;
(d) Unique idcndfylng WDbers Heb u alien registration~ wa nnmbcn. •ocial sc.cority
ICCOQIU

numbers:

(~) Pwport i n f ~ includiftB puspon numbers, c::ountms of ismmce. datts and locations
or issuance, expiration dates. JWSPOff pbor.os, and other rdevant ~
(f) Com)tries of origin and nltion•li~

2

(g) Phys1cal identifit.rS, such as sex, race. height, wei~ eye color, hair color; s ~ IIlJ.rb,. or
tattoos;

(h) Kilown locations, i.e. addre&ses:
(i} Photo~ph& or rmdcrings of the individual;
(i) Finaexprints or other biomeuie data:

(le) Employi:nc:nt data;
(l) License plate numbcr:I;

(m) Any o1her Terroiura ~ that Origjnatocs ;pt.cifie&lly provide for passage to lhc
TSC.

(8) ~ providt:d to the NCTC (or the FBI for Pmdy Domesde Tetrorism Infoanation.). the
Parties agree tbAt ~ NCTC (or tbe FBI for Purely Domestic Tenodsm Infomia.rioo) will deem
the 'terrorist ldenrlfim liltod in. pa.ng:raph (7) For Officitl U~ ODly (FOUO) for 1bc pwposes of
providing the &,.ta to the TSC for lnolusian in TSDB. ~ Terrorist Idcatiftcn passed to the
TSC andrcuined in lSDB will be dem)M POUO.
(9) The Originator mlY prohibit the NCI'C !roPi passing the Tcaorist f.dc:mfia(s.) ide:iufiod in
{a) - (m) above 10 the TSC as FOOO 6ata for inclusiM in 1'SDB if an apprc,priatc official w
tUtb.om:es. '&ch O r i ~ .U idt.ctifyits Tcrrcrist ldennfia(s) wt are to be prahibucd tram
bcingpa.ued 10 tbe TSC fer inclmion in TSl)1l bymarlcing those items, "'TIDB .re,trictcd."
'Restrictions ou me shall be imposed only to the e.7!U:Dt strid1y nccemty to provcmt the
unauthorized disclosure cf imormition that clcaiy idcorifi~ or 'IIOuld rcuon&hly petmlt ready
identiflOation oi; intellieenoe or ~tive law enforcemcDt ~ md.hods. ~ or
cxyptology that are pardcularly l\lSCept1l,lb to ~ tut would nwlify oc mcasun.bly
reduce their effectiveness.
(10) The Putlcs agree that aubject to en Origjnatar's ability to prohibit q,eclfi.e Tett'Offlt
ldeDtitien; from being included in TSDB, all Tett41ist Idmtifia:s listed lA (7) JQ!ly be passed to
UlC TSC. r~gardlcss ofthe data or classification of th.a di,wminatod TCSTOrism lnfommion.

(11) Nothing in Addtlidum B w1l mlu'bit or delay the provision ofTarori&m lnformation to the
NCTC.

(li) Absent prior approval by tbe Origml\Or. tnfro:matjoo (inolu~ all information ~
classified or FOUO in TIDE and lnformatian in TSDB) may JlOt be UJed in any lepl or
administrative proceeding or proce:s$, incluclinc ltlYjudieitl or quasi-judicial prows,
prc&entation to p.D.d or potitju:rles. f\lbmiwoil u part o! m application w subpoenas, orders
for electronic surve,1Janu, ~cb or amst wlr1'6Dt5. prcscnw:ion a.s cvidc:nu, or any use that
oould result mpublic disclosure. fufolmadou from PISA collection. or derived w:tfrom Jllay
~nly be used in lepl or admulistratiw:prooudll\C «~with the advanc.e amhom.mon of
the Attorney General. Jmy recipient of infonnation from TSDB intC?CISted in obtaining
authoriza1ion ~ use that infmmation iii. a legal or ldministrative proceeding or process snus.t
contact the TSC to obtain the approval of the Qrisimtor. 1f TSDB ioformalion ~ fmm FlSA
collection, er derived there!rom.1he TSC duoogh FBI Headquartm, will t>btam the n~sary
l

Attotney Gmtnl a».thorizwon. Any rcprod~ di,u:znjaation. or commm:dc.arion (mcluding.
but not limit~ to, orAl briefings) of tny information funn TSDB 1!JIUt be acmmpanied by a
&tateme:ot of these restrictions. Noihina in this para,nsph shall inhibit the sb.uing of1. limhed set
of l'cm)M Jdentifil'.t's; name; dale ofbinh; pas;pon number: pa.sspon co\Ul%Xy of
orlgin/~p. \llilh state, local ml tribal authoritie$., or foreign govrmmc:nta for ten"Orism
~ , pa?})OSC.S. u permitted by law, tegu!Uion, Of agreement tlf the Parties.
(13) Whtl1 im indrvidual in TSDB ~ been. positively idci:ni1ied during a screc:o:ing QC01Jnler,
the :hrties will provide tht. NCTC with TCffQl'Wll lnfotmation Ci)[loded during lh.e r.DCO'Ollta,
such as photographs. fingezprims, copies ot'pocb:t liaer. copia ofwritten data. any rcpo.ns of
Terrorism Im'armaticm pro~ded by Chit mdMdual. or OflltZ item1 of pot=tfal in~ for
in.clusion in TIDE. The NCTC '-ENor the TSC will, in partntt'ship trith departmeats aDd
agCDCits wb!cl\ a1"e not Parties to Addendmn B. but whicb ~ct~~ TS:OB,
cstahlishprocedures to cmure-that. wbmu individual in Ts.DB bu been po~identified
during a saunmi ttlOOUllter, t h o s e ~ and a,=dcs will provide the NCtC and all
appropriate agencies that have a
mmio.n, with Tettnrism Information

countetterramm

dcscnbed above.

as

(14} The Director of the TSC &hall establhb proeedura1 &at~. ineludin& but DOC lmwd to,
tra.in1nJ. lt&ndani operating pro¢edurcs. &Dd caller autbtntication ~ . ed. wl1
impltmem ~JoJjc.al safquar~, i D ~ but not limiled to1 tht use of firewalls c4 public
k e y ~ 1n mirnize t h e ~ disclosure of" in.fonnuion.. ~ f.o ~ me
wlncrahility ofTSOB to unmtboriied ww or cxploimion. ~ estahlisbmem i)f fbeso
s a f ~ shJ.11 in no way iDbibit C1f delly th~ prowion otinfonnation 10 the NCTC or the TSC.
(lS) Addmdum.B amen& Direciorof Cetitral ~ DirectiYb l/4 (DClD 214) by
replacing the 1etm '"lcfforist threat-related~.. whcteverit ~ in DCID 214. with
the teem Tenorism Jnfomwian. BA defined in the lRTPA.

Implementation

Mdt.:Ddum B is e:ffedive from the date of sianaturc by all 'Parties and awlles to all
disseminated Tcaarirm !Dfotmation,, recvdle,is of the daU of t h e ~ mlfl\idl it is
cowmed ~ B may be s i ~ in coumcipm,.

(16)

(17) The NCTC. the TSc,. wl the Parties, in coordinatioa with~~ Originator&. shall
n:pon to the Homeland Soc:mity Advuor- from time f.O time~ appropriar.e. on the proircss I?Ulde
to impl~ Adda,dum B.
(18) Nothing in Addendum B alten, or jmpedts the ability or authority of f.eder&l depL~
and agencies to pafonn thciT- rcspOtlSl"bilities undt: law. consistent with applicable legal
1\Xthcritics wt Presidential guidanu. Spedtical!y. nothing iD AddtndumB alten the
info~on SnJ.rUllrequirrmcma of'thc HomdHl4 SCC\Jrity Act or'lhc r ~ of the
IR.TPA.

MAY
Date

Sectetary of the Treasury

Date

Secretary of Defense

Date

Attorney General

Secretary of Homeland Security

Date

Director of National lntellige.nce

Dire.ctor",_Central Intelligence A3encY

Date

Date

4 2006

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.. APR. 28 . 2006 ....• 4: 55PM-- -· . ... ... .

Se.crewy of Stare

Sec:rcaary of the Trcasnry

Semetaly of Defense

Date

A.Uorney Gciu:tal

Seactaty ofFronrland Scanity

Date

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Secrecary of State

Secidaiyoflhe'I'lasury

Secretary of Defense

AuomeyGeaera.l

Secretary of Homeland Security

Date

Date

Dimctor._Central .lnte.lligeace Aaeacy

Date

5

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Seon:aryofState

Date

Sea.eamyof tll& 1msmy

Dea,

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CiNC!.ASSicE:li/FO?. OF:IC!>.l. US, ONT-Y
1HE DIR.ECTOR OF CE."-IRAL li'r!'ELL~GENCE
WASHlNc:'ON. O.C. ~

·-··

DAC-nJSS-Ol

I

MEJ«)RANDUM FOR:

·4 M.. rch 2003

National Foreign I.ete.llig-~ce

Program Principals
SUBJECT:

l.

(U//FOUOJ Homeland Security :!nformation
Sharing Memorandum Qf Understanding

(U//FOUO)

The Ac:orney Genex:-al , s.acreta.ry of

Homeland Security, a.::id I have j:i.st signed the .ate.ached
Me.morandu.'11 of U:iderstanding on !nformation Sh~i:cg (MOO)
imple!lleI?'ting information. sha.rin!.' requirer.er.ts o"! t:.be
Eomeland SeC'..iricy Act: (Act) . It is effec.:ive imn:ediat:ely.
As you )en.ow, che Depa::;;ment of Homeland Se=ri t.y
(Depa.rt.me::-.t.> 1'...as tlOW reached critical mass . cr.u:
corresponcin~ i!!~elligence su~port function t..as also
ir.a ::.u.red .
2.
(U/ /FOUO)
AS wit;h nn:c.li recent hc:me!and sec-.;=-ity=el~ted work, the ~---afti.ag process on t:.!::is high priority
w'"hit:e F.ouse i~iciative .moved quickly. suc=essive dra:.:s
were
to each ot. your agencies, with ~J.l comment..s
forwarded directly to Che White House draf::ill!. t:eam . The
resul ti.:1g MOO is a fair expression of whac t:he >.ct: requires.
I expect each oi you to hold those you s~--vise a.ccowita.l:>le
£0::- gi.vi.::lg full effect: to each of the MOU's provisians.

sen~

Note t:ha.t the MOO makes Associate Di=ector of Central
I~telli~enee fo::- Homeland Security, Winston P . Wiley my
:representa.ti ve for in£o=ination sharing under t:he MOO. Re

ba.s my proxy and full suppqr'C .

3.
(0//FOUO) Full and efficient i~lementation of the
MOO will l:lene.!it: not only t:.he Depa.rt:ment, l:>~t al.so
i..:lcelligence and law enforcement: agencies . As wi t::!l the
Terrorist Threat Integra~ion Cencer, we w~l~ e."1\brace the
opportuoities anc challenc;es it :;::esents .

q~~
cc :

I.OCI/H:S, W:.ns::.,m P. Wi!ey

;.1:1;.achrneLt: ;

~u en :.:n=orc.a:.ion S:!:liifing

f

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTAl'\JOTNG BETWEEN THE rNTELUGENCE
COMMUNITY. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGBICJES. AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURlTY CONCERNING INFORMATION SHARING
This Agreement provides a framework and guidance to govern infonnation sharing, use.
and handling between; the Secretary of Homeland Security, on behalf of the Department of
Homeland Security (OHS), including all entities that arc or become, wholly or in part. elements
of OHS; the Director of Central Intelligence (DCl), on behalf of all entities that are, or become,
wholJy or in part, elements of the Uruted States Intelligence Community (JC), other than those
that are to become part of OHS; and the Attorney General, on behalf of the Department of Justice
(DOJ). including the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, and all entities that are, or become, wholly
or in part, elements of 001, and any other department, agency, or entity having federal law
enforcement responsibilities, other than those that are to become part of OHS.

l.
Scope of Application. This Agreement shall be binding on all such departments.
agencies, and entities on whose behalf the Secretary of Homeland Security, the DC(, and the
Attorney General agree herein. This Agreement is intended to mandate minimum requirements
and procedures for infonnation sharing, use~ and handling. and for coordination and deconfliction
of anal}1ic judgmenL-.. Departments and agencies are encouraged to devt:lop additional
procedures and mechanisms to provide for greater infonnation sharing and coordination than
required herein, consistent with lhe OHS Legislation and other relevant statutory authorities,
Presidential Directives, the President's announced policies for protecting ag-dinst terrorist threats
to the homeland, and 1his Agreement, including, but not limited to:

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

•

the Homeland Security Acl of2002;
the National Security Act of 1947, as amended;
the: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Jntcrcept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001;
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended;
Executive Order 12333, as amended, and any subsequent Executive Orders on
Intelligence Activities;
Executive Order 1323 l . as amended, and any subsequeot Executive Orders on
Homeland Security,
Guidelines Regarding Disclosure to the Director of Central intelligence and
Homeland Security Officials of Foreign Intelligence Acquired in the Course of a
Criminal Investigation, dated September 23. 2002; and
Guidelines for Disclosure of Grand Jury and Electronic. Wire. and Oral
Interception Information Identifying United States Persons, dated September 23 ,
2002 .

To the extent thar this Agreement provides for more expansive infonnation sharing than
othc:r authorities or agreements, with dtc exception of statules. or Presidential Directives
including, but not limited to. Executive Orders, ("Presidential Directives"), the more expansive
provisions of this Agreemenr shall be foUowed .

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2.

Definitiogs..~or purposes of this Agreement:

(a)
"Analytic conclusion" m~ns the product of an~ysis of one or rttore pieces
· of information in which inferences are drawn from the 1riformation ~ing analyzed to
arrive at a determination about a fact - such as, for example, a potential threat'"" that is
not explicit or apparent from the face of the original information itself. It does not
include, for example, a swnmary of the factual content of a piece of intelligence
information, a report of an interview, or a report or other document that merely collects
and summarizes information from multiple sources abQut the same or related topics, or
other types of communication which do not include analytic conclusions as describ(!()
above.
·
(b) "Attorney General" means the Attorney General of the United StatcS or the
Attom~y General's designcc, except ns otherwise provided herein.

(c) "Classified infonnation" means information that has been deterrnin~d pursuant
to Executive Order No. 12958,.or a_ny successor order, Executive: Order NQ. ·
12951, or any successor order, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 {42 U.S.C.
201 I), to require protection against unauthorized disclosure.

•

(d}
"Covered entity" means~ any department, agency, bureau, office.or other
entity lhal is, or becomes, wholly or in par1, an element of the Depanmenl of tt:omeland
Security (including the Department itself); any department, agency, bureau, office or
other entity that is, or becomes, wholly or in part, an el~ent of lhe United Sta~es
Intemgence Community or the Departmcnl of Justice; ~d any other depamnent, agency,
or entity having federal law.enforcement responsibilities.
(c)
"Covered information" means terrorism infonnation, weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) infonnation, vulnerabilities infonnation. and other information
relevant lo the duties of the Department of Homeland Security, as well as analy~es based
wholly or i_n part on such covered information.

(f)
"Department" or ..OHS" shall mean the Department of Homeland Security
and any entity that is, or becomes, an element of that Department.
·
(g)
"DHS Legislntion" means the Homeland Security Act of2002 (H.R. 5005 ,
l 07th Congress, 2d Session) (November 26, 2002), as it may be amended from'. time to

time:.
(h)
"OCI" means lhe Director of Central Intelligence, or, except as 9therwise
provided herein, the Del's designee, in his or her capaeily as bead of the lntelligence
Community, and as head of the Central Intelligence Ag!!ncy.

•

(i.)
"Foreign intelligence" has the meaning given to that tenn in sec~ion 3 of
the Nacional Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 40 I a), as that statutory term
m3y be amended from time to time.
'
2

(j)

"Homeland" means the United States as defined in the OHS Legislation.

(k)
\'Infrastructure'' means the basic systems, assets, facilities, services, and
installations needed for the functioning of our society. The tenn includes, but is not
limited to, critical infrastructure, meaning systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on United States national security. economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of these. Critical infrastructure
includes, but is not limited to, agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services,
government, defense industrial base, infonnation and telecommunications, energy,
transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry and hazardous materials, postal
and shipping, and national monuments and icons. ··
(I)
"'Infrastructure information" means all information related to the
identification. status, security, criticality, risk assessment, vulnerability to all means of
attack, interdependency, and attack consequences (including potential impact on public
health or safely, the economy, national ~curity, govemance and public confidence) of the

infrastructure of the United States.
(m)

"Jntelligence Community" has the meaning given it in section 3(4) of the

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))~as it may be amended from time lo
time.
(n)
"Need-to-know" means a detennination made by an authorized holder of
classified infonnation, or sensitive law enforcement information, that a prospective

recipient requires access to a specific piece, or category of information in order to
perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function .

•

(o)
"Parties" means the signatories to this Agreement and their successors, on
behalf of all covCTcd entities they head, supervise or represent.
(p)
"PATRIOT Act" means the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Req\lired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act of 2001 , Pub. L. 107~56, 115 Stat. 272, 278-81.
(q)

"Secretary" means the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary's
·

dcsigncc. except as otherwise provided herein.
(r)

"Terrorism information" means all information relating to the existence,

organizaLion, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabiJities, means of finance or material
support, or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals, domestic
groups or individuals involved in terrorism , to threats posed by such groups or individuals
to the United States, United Stares persons, or United Stales interests, or to those of other
nations, or to communications between such groups or individuals, and to

3

•

I

•

information relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or
associated with them.
(s)
..Vulnerabilities information" means all information relating to ~he
susceptibility- actual, perceived, or conceptual - of the United States, including any
portion, sector~population, geographic area, or industry, to terrorist attack.

(t)
"Weapons of Mass Destruction infonnation" or "WMD information"
means terrorism information or wlncrabiHties infonnation relating to conventi~nal
explosive w~pons and non-conventional weapons capable of causing mass casualties and
damage, including chemical or biological agents, radioactive or nuclear materials, and the
means to deliver them.
3.
Policies and Procedures for Information Sharing, Handling and Use. Consistent
with the DHS Legislation, and except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, the
following agreed-upon policies and procedures shall apply to the provision of covered
information by any covered entity to any other covered entity, to the interpretation of aJI
provisions of this Agreement, and to the resolution of all issues related to informatioo sharing,
handling and use, and the coordination and deconfliction of operations and analytic ·c onclusions:

•

••

(a)
Priority on Preemption. Prevention. a,rd Disruption. All procedures,
guidelines, and mechanisms under this Agreement shall be designed and implemented,
· and a11 detenninations with [egard to sharing infonnation covered by this Agreement shall
be made, with the understood, overriding priority of preventing, preempting, arid
disrupting terrorist threats to our homeland. The partic:'s recognize and agree that, in some
cases, this priority shall dictate infonnation sharing even where doing so may affect
criminal prosecutions or ongoing law enforcement or intellige11ce operations. ·
· . Nonetheless, the covered entities shal1 act under this Agreement in a manner to·protect, to
the greatest extent possible, these other significant interests, including the protection of
intelligence and sensitive law enforcement sources and methods, other classified
information, and sensitive operational and prosecutorial infonnation.

(b)
Reciprocity and Transparency. All information collected by any covered
entity relevant to the missions and responsibilities of any other covered entities,should be
shared, to the greatest extent possible. b~ween and among all covered entities. Likewise.
the parties agree that, to the greatest extent possible, there should be transparen~y
between and among the covered entities with regard to their activities to preempt,
prevent, and disrupt terrorist attacks against .U.S. persons and interests. Except as
otherwise specified in this Agreement, or mandated by relevant Federal statutes or
Presidential Directives, procedures and mechanisms for infonnation sharing, use, and
handling shall be interpreted and implemented consistently and reciprocally regardless of
the role a particular covered entity plays as a provider or recipient of covered information.
Jn other words, for example, international terrorism information collected by the Border
Patrol should be shared by DHS with the IC to the same extent foreign intelligence
information on terrorism is shared by the IC with DRS.
·

4

(c)
Scope of "Covered Information." Consistent with the priority established
in Section 3(a}, information relating to terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction,
vulnerabilities, or other functions of the Department of Homeland Security shall be
presumed to be ..covered information" under this Agreement. If, after applying this
presumption, disagreement remains between covered entities about whether particular
infonnation is "covered infonnation," such disagreement shall be resolved pursuant to
Section 4(d).

(d)
Effective date ofinformation sharing obligations. Notwithstanding
provisions of this Agreement mandating further agreement on mechanisms, procedures,
or other issues, the parties recognize that the obligation to promptly begin the full 'range
of information sharing mandated by the DHS Legislation came into force on January 24,
2003, and that obligations under this Agreement will be in force upon the signature of all

parties.
(e)
Sharing Requiremems Based on Substance Only. Consistent with the
DHS Legislation and other relevant statutory authorities, Presidential Directives, the
President's announced policies for protecting against terrorist threats to the homeland,
anti this Agreement, the parties agree that this Agreement requires that covered
information, including, but not limited to, terrorism infonnation, WMD infonnation,
infrastructure, and vu[nerabilities information, be provided by any covered entity that
collects or anelyzes that infonnation to any other covered entity that has a necd-to•know
that infonnation (or information relating to that subject matter), based on a broad
interpretation of the mission of the other covered entity, regardless of:

•

(i) The tyPe of communication in which the infonnation is incorporated.
Covered information must be provided as required in this Agreement regardless of
the type of communication in which it is originally reported by the providing
agency. The fact that particular covered information may he contained originally
in a particular type of communication shall not, under any circumstances, be
grounds either to withhold or delay the sharing of any covered information. As
illustrative examples only, covered information must be provided by CIA, within
the time frames agreed to, whether such information is contained originally in
communications referred to as "TDs." ..intel cables," ''ops cables," or any other
t)'pe of communication. Likewise, covered infonnation must be provided by the
FBl, within the time frames agreed to, whether such -infonnation is contained
originally in communications referred to as "302s," "ECs," .. LHMs." or any other
type of communication;
(ii) The manner in which the information is or may be conv~yed to the
intended agency or individual recipients. Covered entities shall continually
endeavor to improve technological means of access to afford maximum
flexibility, speed, and volume of information shared. consistent with the strictly
necessary protection of intelligence or sensitive law enforcement sources and
methods, and with section 3(.i} and other relevant provisions of this Agreement.

5

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•

(f)
Terrorist Threar Integration Center. The parties agJ"ee ~)t.at. when fully
operational, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TflC) shall be the preferr~, though
not the exclusive, method fQr sharing covered. information at the national level: TflC

information-sharing mechanisms and procedures shall be consistent with the DHS
Legislation and other relevant statutory authorities, Presidential Directives, the
President's annoW1ccd policies for protecting against terrorise threats to the homeland,
and this Agreement. As soon as practicable, the parties shall determine the extent to
which provision of information to one or more covered entities via the ITIC inay
constitute the only required method for providing such infonnation to such entities,
provided however, that any_decision to share covered information among the parties
solely by means of the TflC shall be memorialized in a separate written agreement
executed by the parties, including by designees of the officials signing this A gr.cement.
Analytic conciusions contained in TflC products sliall 'not be altered by agencles prior to
dissemination.
(g) . Policies for Sharing Particular Types ofInfonnation With DHS.
Consistent with the OHS Legislation and other relevant statutory authorities, Presidential
Directives, the President's announced policies for protecting against terrorist threats to
the homeland, and ttais Agreement, the Secretary shall be provided access to·au
infonnation necessary for him to carry out the mission of the Department. Ex.c,ept as
otherwise directed by the President, the parties agree that the amount of info~ation and
depth of detail of infonnation provided to the Secretary, which will vary by the type of
information at issue, will be governed by the following policies:

(i)
lnfpnnation Related IO Threats of Terrorism Against the United
States. As required by the OHS Legislation, OHS shall be provided, without
request, all ..reports (including infonnation reports containing intelligence which
has not been fully evaluated), assessments, and analytical infonnation." The
parties understand lh.nt, in this category, excepl upon further request by .OHS, and
agreement by the originating entity. provided information will not routinely
include infoJmation, collected through intelligence sources or methods, or
sensitive law enforcement sources or methods, which has not been processed in
any way to reduce the amount of substantive content or synthesize the material.
Thus, for example, a recording of a conversation intercepted under the foreign
lntelJigence Surveillance Act (FJSA) or an intelligence officer's or FBI agent's
hand-written notes of a discussion with a source would not be routinely provided
in this category. By contrast, a report forwarding the substance of a FISA~
recorded conversation, or an FBl "Electronic Communication" (EC), including the
substance of a discussion with a source, even if.these include verbatim quotes
from the underlying notes, would be provided. ECs containing substantive
information, along with "302s," "TDs," "URs,'' and all other similar dobuments
including substantive information, fall into the category of infonnation to be
provided. The parties agree, as soon as practicable, to identify and/or put into
place necessal)' and reasonable mechanisms, including, when operational, the
TflC, along with the Joint Terrorism Task For<;es (JTIFs), and procedures, to
ensure that DHS receives all such information automatically. under the .policies
6

and procedures agreed to in this Agreement, without further request.

.,

(ii)
Vulnerabiljtjes lnfonnation. As required by the OHS Legislation,
DHS shaJI be provided, without request, all infonnation of any kind concerning
"the vulnerability of the infrastruchlre of the United States; or other vulnerabilities
of the United States, to terrorism, whether or not such infonnation has been
analyzed." The parties Wlderstand that, in this category, without further request
by OHS, provided information will routinely include information, collected
through intelligence sources or methods, or sensitive law enforcement sources or
methods, which has not been processed in any way to reduce the amount of
substantive content or synthesize the material. Provided information will include
all types of infonnation, without regard to the distinctions drawn by way of . .
example in Section 3(gXi), except as further agreed to by the parties or their
designees. The parties agree, as soon as practicable, to identify and/or put into
place necessary and reasonable mechanisms, including, when operational, the
TT[C, along with the JTIFs, and procedures, to ensure that OHS receives all such
information, under the principles agreed to in this Agreement, without further
request.
(iii)
lnfonnation Relating to Significant and Credible Threats Qf
Terrorism. As required by the DHS Legislation, OHS shall be provided, without
request, all information of any kind concerning ..significant ~nd credible threats of
terrorism against the United States, whether or not such infonnation has been
analyzed ." The parties wtderstand that, in this category, without further request
by DHS, provided infonnation will routinely include infonnation, collected
through intelligence sources or methods, or sensitive law enforcement sources or
methods, which has not been processed in any way to reduce the amount of
substantive content or synthesize the material. Provided information will include
all types of info1111ation, without regard to the distinctions drawn by way of
example in Section J(g)(i), except as further agreed to by the parties or their
designees. The parties agree, as soon as practicable, to identify and/or put into
place necessary and reasonable mechanisms, including. when operational, the
TTJC, along with the JlTFs, and procedures, to ensure that DHS receives al I such
infonnation, under the principles agreed to in this Agreement, without further
request.
(iv)
Other Information Requested hy the Secretary. The Secretary shall
be provided, upon request, with such other information relating to threats of
terrorism against the United States or to other areas of OHS' responsibility,
whether or not such information has been analyzed. The parties understand that
DHS will be provided infonnation in this category upon request including, if so
requested, infonnation which hns not been processed in any way to reduce the
amount of substantive content or synthesize the material. If so requested,
provided infonnalion will include all types of infonnation, without regard to the
distinctions drawn by way of exl\mple in Section 3(g)(i), except as otherwise
directed by the President. The parties agree, as soon as practicable, to set up

7

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IA
..

•

ne~ry and reasonable mechanisms, including, when operational, th~ TTlC,
atong with the JITFs, and procedures, to ensure that OHS, when requested,
receives all such infonnation, under the principles agreed lo in this Ag;eement. .
(h)·
Timely Sharing oflnfomtation. Covered infonnation must be provided to
those with a need-to-know that information (or infonnation relating to that subject
matter), based on a broad interpretation of the mission of the other covered entity, as
quickJy as possible. Providing sll timely and relevant covered infonnation to those who
have a need-to-know it in order to assist them in meeting their homeland secm;ity-related
responsibilities is fundamental to the success of the Department and all other efforts to
ensure the security of the homeland from terrorisr attack. Delay in pi:-oviding sµch
infonnation risks frustrating efforts to meet these critical responsibilities and could result
in preventable attacks against U.S . persons or interests failing to be preempted; prevented,
or disrupted. Accordingly, except as otherwise directed by the President or agfeed to by
all parties, the parties agree that:

{i)
lnfonnation that a covered entity reasonably believes relates to a
potential terrorism or WMD threat. to the United States homeland, its
infrastructure, or to United States persons or interests, shall be provided
immediately to other covered entities;

•

(ii)
Other covered information, including, but not limited to,
vulnerabilities infonnation, but which a covered entity does not reasonably
believe relates to a potential terrorism or WMD threat to the United States
homeland. its infrastf'\lcture, or to United St~es persons or interests, shall be
provided as expeditiously as possible;

(iii)
Under no circumsrances may covered information be withheld
from a covered entity with a need-to-know that information (or information
relating to that subject mattc:r), based on a broad imerpretation of the ~ission of
the other covered entity, or may the sharing of such infQrmarion be delayed
beyond the time frames agreed to in this Agreement, except as consiste_n t with the
Section 4{d), or other relevant provisions of this Agreement;
(iv)
When a question arises as to whether covered informati'on must be
provided to the Department or any other covered entity pursuant 10 this[
Agreement, the parties will resolve the question pursuant to Section 4( ~);
(v)
Covered entities agree to use, to the greatest extent possible, the
most rapid methods ofinfonnation sharing, consistent with the strictly necessary
protection of intelligence or sensitive law enforct!!ment sources and methods, and
with Section 3(a) and other relevant provisions of this Agreement; and

•

(vi)

Consistent with Section 3, and olher relevant provisions of this

Agreement, the parties agree that they shall work dilig~tly to ensure th'i'it all
covered entities receive the SM'le information within the same time frame,

8

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•

Agreement, to withhold in its cntirety ·a commwucation containing covered
information. such indication shall occur immediately.
(v)
The parties agree that the provisi·o ns of this section shalJ;nol apply
to established source protection procedures utilized by C[A's Directorate of
Operations. or equivalent procedures developed and used by other covered
entities, provided that such procedures do not result in the failure to provide DHS
with substantive information as required under the OHS Legislation and this
Agreement, and that the Secretary may personally request revisions in such
procedures ifhe detennines that they restrict DHS' access to information in a way
that jeopardizes DHS' mission. For information described in Section 3(i)(i), such
procedures shall be revised, as ~on as is practicable, and without request from the
Secretary. to ensure that those procedures·only remove such intelligence that
clearly identifies, or would reasonably pcnnit ready identification of, intelligence
or sensitive law enforcement sources or methods that are particularly susceptible
to countenneasures that would nullify or measurably reduce their effectiveness.

(j)
Requesr.s for Additional Information . In addition to the participation of
DBS in the "requirements" processes, as discussed further herein, the OHS Legislation
provides for DHS to request additional or follow-up information upon receipt of
individual items of information. As soon as practicable, the parties shall agree .'to
mechanisms and procedures, including the lTlC, JITFs, and, if appropriate, focal points,
for DHS to make, and covcrc:d entities to respond to, such requests. These mechanisms
and procedures shall be designed to facilitate the greatest amowit of additional
infonnation sharing consistent with strictly necessary protection of intelligenc~or
sensitive law enforcement sources and methods, with Section 3(a) and other refevant
provisions of this Agreement, and with the timeliest possible responses to requests for
additional information.
(k)
Information Use Restrictions. In general, parties shall disclose covered
information free of any originator controls or information use restrictions. Several
categories of covered information that must be disclosed to covered entities pursuant to
the OHS Legislation, this Agreement, and other authorities, remain subject to special
labeling, handling, storage, use and access auditing requirements imposed by stiitute or, to
the extent consistent with the OHS Legislation, Presidential Directives, the President's
announced policies for protecting against terrorist threats lo the homeland, and this
Agreement, pursuant to applicable regulations. The scope and duration of such
restrictions, including caveats restricting use of the disclosed information to a particular
level or element of a covered entity. will be tailored to address the particular situation or
subject matter involved. \\'hen imposed, use restrictions shall b~ no more restrictive than
strictly necessary to accomplish the desired effect.
(I)
Secondary J11formation Sharing. To the e:>ttenl consistent with this
Agreement, covered entities may share infonnation provided by other covered entities
with additional covered entities. Such secondary sharing shall be carried out, to the
greatest extent possible, in manner that pennits the originating agency to know to

a

10

·whom the information has been provided. The parties shall agree, as soon as is
practicable, upon recommendations, if any, for changes co Executive Order 12958,
Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/6 (and complementary or successor directives
dealing with Originator Controls, 1he so-called "third agency rule,"' and other policies or
procedures governing the sharing of received information with additional recipients) in
order to comply with the DHS Legislation, and to carry out the President's announced
policies for protecting against terrorist threats to the homeland, and the provisions of this
Agreement.
(m)
Other Obligarious to Share Information. A covered entity's voluntary or
obligatory provision of covered information to another covered entity does not in itself
discharge or diminish any other obligation the -providing entity may have to provide that
information, or any part of it, to any other department, agency or other public or private
organization or individual uoder aoy statute, Presidential Directive, or other agreement.
Although all covered entities will attempt to identify and call attention to infonnation
relevant to the.mission of other covered entities, the responsibility to share infonnation
relevant lo the mission or responsibilities of any covered entity in addition to DHS
remains the responsibility of the originator or initial federal recipient of the information
and does not shift to DHS by virtue of DHS • receipt of the infonnation. The parties
agree, however, that, to the greatest extent possible, other sharing obligations shall be
harmonized and coordinated with those covered by this Agreement, including the agreed
preference for using the TTIC and JITFs as information-sharing mechanisms, in order to
reduce duplication, facilitate dcconfliction, and increase efficiency.
(n)
PATRIOT Act Information. Law enforcement-related infonnation related
to OHS mission, _permitted or required to be provided to intelligence agencies under the
PA TRI OT Act and its implementing guidelines shall also be considered covered
information under this Agreement and shall. therefore. be provided to the Department and
other covered entities, in accordance with the OHS Legislation and other relevant
s tatutory provisions 1 and this Agreement.

•

(o)
Other Intelligence Information. Nothing in this Agreement shall be read
to restrict the access of the Secretary or his designee to information the Secretary
ordinarily would receive as a member of the Intelligence Community. including national
security and foreign intelligence information.
(p)
Information Sharing Mechanisms . As soon as practicable, the parties shall
agree µpon specific mechanisms, consistent with Section 3 and other relevant provisions
of this Agreement, for how different types of cover~ infom1ation will be shared,
including technical and administrative arrangements, and, as appropriate, designation of
focal points, to maximize the effectiveness and coordination for providing covered
information. Subsequent arrangements for infonnation sharing may he reached upon the
approval of the parties or their designees. The parties shall work to develop, as pa11 of
this process, effective mechanisms for covered entities to identify covered information
held by them and to ensure, to the greatest degree feasible, the provision of such
information, without specific request, to othi,r covered entities. The parties further agree

11

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'O

•

that, notwithsWlding their agreement to develop further mechanisms and pro~dures for
information sharing, covered entities shall promptly build on mechanisms and procedures
already-in place to identify and provide to DHS c(ivered infonnation chat is generated or
received by them in the course of carrying out their missions.

•

(r)
Responsible Officials for Information Sharing. t:nfil such lime as
modified by rhe parties, the responsible otlicials for infonnation sharing under this
Agreement are as follows:

( q)
Methods ofProviding information. The parties rc:cognize and agree that
there arc many possible methods for "providing.. infonnation, including. but not limited
to, hand-delivery, oral briefings, transmission by secure data-link, and affording routine
and unrestricted access to computmzed databases, including the ability to tr~fcr such
information to a recipient entity as necessary, and by fuJJ and complete co-location of
analysts or other pe{'S()nnel and full integration of, and access to, information, as well as.
for example, ensuring that the Secretary receives all daily threat briefing materials
(including threat matrices and overnight rcpons). The parties further agree that
requirements lo ..provide'' infonnation under this Agreement may be satisfied, depending
on the type of information at issue, by the use of a single mechanism, such as via the
TTIC, consistent with scclion 3{t) of this Agreement, or a combmation of mechanisms
already in place and/or cceated under this Agreement. The parties shall agree, as part of
the development of these mechanisms and procedures, as to which method, or
combination of methods, of providing infonnation will be sufficient for panicular types
or categories of information.

(i)
For the Secretary of Homeland S<!curity, the Undcrsccreiary for
Information Analysis and lnfrastructure Protection, or another individual
designated by the Secretary to act in this capacity;

(ii)
For the Attorney General, Executive Assistant Director for
Countertcrrorism and Counterintelligence; and
(iii)
For the Director of Central Intelligence, the Associate Director of
Central lntelJigencc for Homeland Security.
(s)
ProJ.•ision of Covered h,formalio11 to the DHS Direcrorate of Information
Analysis and lnfrastruch,re Protection. Until furtht:r a·g reement by the parties, or their
designees, a11 covered information provided, including infoimation provided, under
current procedures, to existing elements transferred to OHS, e.g., the United Stales Coast
Guard and the lJ.S. Customs Service, shall also be separately provided to the Directorate
of lnfonnation Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, including, if agreed by the
Secretary, via the ITIC. The Undersecretary for lnfom1ation Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection, or another individual designated by the Secretary to act in this capacity, shall
work with entities nor within the Directorall: to ensure effective coordination of
information.

I:?

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0..

$<.
Vi

Classified Information. The head of each covered entity shall put
procedures in place to ensure that each individual recipient of classified infonnation has,
and maintains. appropriate security clearances, training, and need-to-know to receive
classified infonnation at the level at which the recipient will receive such information.
Individuals shall be designated at each covered entity at several Jevels of seniority to
receive classified information judged by the originating agency to be sufficiently
sensitive to require limited distribmion. In rare cases, the parties expect that extremely
s~nsitive infonnation may be provided only to the Secretary or, as appropriate. the head
of another covered entity. The head of each covered entity also shall ensure that all
mechanisms and procedures for receiving, storing. and handling classified infonnation
meet established legal and regulatory standards. The policies and procedures governing
access to covered information under this Agreement, including such infonnation that is
classified, shall apply without regard to whether that information is made availabJe in
written, oral, or electronic form, OT to the means or mechanism by which it is
communicated to the recipient.
{t)

(u)
Thresholds. In order to ensure that the Department is provided with all
information necessary to carry out its responsibilities, but is not inundated with
unmanageable volumes of information below thresholds reasonable to perfonn its
mission, as soon as practicable, the Secretary shall advise the other parties, individually
or collectively, as to establishing additional thresholds for information sharing, consistent
with the DHS Legislation. For example, the Secretary may determine that low-level
information concerning purely indigenous foreign terrorist groups with no apparent
capability to mount operations against the United States is not relevant to OHS' mission.
Such further agreement sha11 be consistent with the DHS Legislation and other relevant
statutory authorities, Presidential Directives, the President's announced policies for
protecting against terrorist threats to the homeland, and this Agreement. At any time
following such initial agreement, the parties may agree to additional information sharing,
or to more or less restrictive thresholds, as the volume of information involved and the
needs of OHS become clearer, so long as such agreements are consistent with lhe OHS
Legislation and this Agreement. Such agreements may be made by designees of the
parties.

•

(v)
Privacy. All infonnation sharing pursuant to this Agreement shall be
consistent with applicable privacy laws.

4.

Coordination, Dcconfliction, and Dispute Resolution.

Coordination and Deconflicliorr Policy. Consistent with the President's
direction that our highest priority is the protection of the American people from
potentially devastating terrorist attacks. covered entities shall take all necessary measures
to ensure that terrorist threats to our homeland are addressed cooperatively, efficiently,
and with the understood overriding purpose of preventing, preempting, and disrupting
those threats. To that end, the parties agree that no homeland security-related prevention,
preemption, or disruption activity of any covered entity shall be presumed to be the best
optjon in any given case, or otherwise deemed of higher precedence, impo1tance, or
{a)

13

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priority than any other such activi_ty. The covered entiti_e s shall work together, io the
greatest extent possible, to achieve, in each case, the maximum preventative, preemptive,
and disruptive effect on potential threats, including coordinating simultaneous and ·
complementary activities of multiple covered entities when appropriate. Because the
failure to coordinate operational activities to preempt, prevent, and disrupt terrorist
threats can (.."J'eate_confusion, inefficiency and, in extreme cases, dangerous silu~tions
resulting from conflicting operational activities, the parties agree to coordinate.
operational activities to the greatest possible c:dcnt. Specifically, each party shall take all
reasonable steps to ensure coordination and decontliction of homeland security-related
law enforcement, intelligence or national security-related activities of covered entities
under that party's.authority with such activities of other covered entities.

(b)
Ana(vtic Conclusions and Supporling Information. Terrorism c.Jld other
homeland-security related analytic efforts of all covered entities must be informed by the
most comprehensive, accurate, and timely information available, regardless of ils nature
and source, including. but not limited to, terrorism, WMD, vulnerabilities, and .other
pertinent information available to any covered entity. Analytic conclusions relating to
terrorist or WMD threats to the homeland, or other issues within the responsibility of
OHS, including information updating and amplifying previous conclusions, must be
· shared with all covered entities as soon as they are produced. Preemptive, preventative,
a11d disruptive actions by all covered entities must be infom:ied lo the greatest ~xtent
possible by all available information and by alJ analytic conclusions, including.competing
e<>nclusions, of all entities with relevant analytic responsibilities. At the same ~imc, the
Federal government must, to the greatest extent possible, speak with one voice to state
and local officials, private industry, and the public, in order to prevent confusion, mixed
signals, and, potentially, dangerous operational conflicts. In furtherance of th~e goals,
the parties agree as follows:
·
(i)
The parties shall ensure that covered entities disseminate thear
terrorism or other homeland security-related analytic products without aetay to
other covered entities that hav~ related interests and responsibjlities;
(ii)
Except as otherwise provided in Sections 4(bXiii) or (h_r). no
analytic conclusions, as defined in Section 2(a) of this Agreement, of any covered
entity shall be disseminated to stat~, local, or private sector officials. or lo the
public, without the prior approval of the Secretary of Homeland Security, his
designee, or in accordance with approval mechanisms, potentially including the
TIIC or the JTTFs, established by the Secretary after the date of this Agreemeni.
(iii)
Analytic conclusions may be provided directly to such officials or
to the public where the head of a covered entity or his or her designcc reasonably
detennines lhal exigent circumstances exist such that providing an analytic
conclusion prior to required approval is necessary to prevent, preempt, or disrupt
an irnmim:nt threat of death or serious bodily injury or significant damage to U.S .
infrastructure or other interests. In the event an analytic conclusion is ·
disseminated pursuant to the exige_nt circumstances exception in this paragraph,

14

the Setretary and other covered entities shall be notified immediately of the
dissemination.
(iv)
Analytic conclusions may be shared with federal, slate, and local
law enforcement officials without the prior approval of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, provided, however, that it is the intention of the parties that
OHS be provided with the earliest possible advance notice of the potential of such
communications and, where possible, DHS will be included in the development of
the communications through the OHS liaisons at FBI Headquarters. The
Secretary of Homeland Security, or his designce (including a DHS representative
to a JTTF if designated by the Secretary to do so}, must approve further
dissemination of such analytic conclusions to other non-law enforcement state and
local officials or to the public.
(v)
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent covered entities from
coordinating on analytic conclusions with, or seeking the views of, other Federal
Government entities in evaluating terrorism or other homeland-security-related
infonnation.
( c)
Establishment ofMechanisms for Operational Coordinalio11 011d
Deconjliction. As soon as practkable, the parties shall agree upon specific mechanisms,
including technical, administrative, and, as appropriate, designation of focal points, to
maximize the effectiveness of operational coordination and deconfiiction. These will
cover both averse~ and domestic operations related to homeland security. Subsequent
agreements for operational coordination and deconfliction may be reached upon the
approval of the parties or their designces.

•

(d)
Information Sharing Dispute Resolution. Consistent with the DHS
Legislation and other relevant statutory authorities, Presidential Directives, the
President's announced policies for protecting against terrorist threats to the homeland, the
obligation to protect intelHgence or sensitive law enforcement sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure, and with Section 3(a}, and other relevant sections of this
Agreement, issues concerning the application of the_terms of this Agreement in any
speci fie contexl with respect to whether particular covered information should be
provided to the Department or to any other covered entity shall be handled under the
following procedures:

(i)
A holder of particular covered information at issue, whether within
or outside the entity originating that infonnation, shall refer the matter by the most
expeditious means to the head of the entity originating the infonnation (or
that official 's designee) for expeditious review.
(ii)
The revi~wing official shall, without exception, render a definitive
decision on the requc.o;t within 24 hours of receiving the referral and , in light of
the access provisions in the OHS Legislation, shall resolve any doubl in favor of

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providing the requested information .
(iii)
If the originating agency's reviewing official declines to provide
the covered information requested, that official shall, within the 24 houi-s alloUed
for response, provide the Department or other covered with (A)
the fact that the specific infonnatioo is being withheld;
(B)
a succinct and specific statement of the reasons for the
withholding: and
(C)
as much of the information requested as the head of the
originating agency (or that official's designec) reasonably concludes can
be provided given the Pr~ident's announced policies for protecting
against terrorist threats to the homeland. the DHS Legislation aml other
relevant statutory authorities, and relevant Presidential Directiv~.

(iv)
If, at that point, a compromise is not reached expeditiously, the
dispute will be resolved either by the Secretary, Attorney General, and DCI by
mutual decision or through referral to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs and Assistant to the Prc:sident for Homeland Security Affairs, or
their designees, for resolution. Notwi1hstanding any other provision of tl1is
Agreement, the Attorney General, Secretary, or OCI, or their deputies may,
whenever any of them deems it necessary or advisable (particularly when a
fundamental matter of policy is implicated or time is of the ~ssence), intervene to
raise and resolve any issue of access to covered infom1ation by mutual decision or
through the National Security Council and/or Homeland Security Council system.
(e) NSPD-8. Nothing in this Agreement in any way affects the
responsibilities and authorities for coordination of United States counter-terrori'sm
activities established in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 8.
5.
Protection of Intelligence and Sensitive Law Enforcement Sources and Methods.
The parties intend that all provisions of this Agreement be interpreted consistently with the DCI's
statutory responsibility to protect intclligen~ sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure
and with similar responsihilities of the Attorney General and the Secretary to protect sensitive
law enforcement sources and methods, with the OHS Legislation and other relevant statutory
authoritie.,;, Presidential Directives, the President's announced policies for protecting against
terrorist threats to the homeland, and with Section 3(a), and other relevant provisions of this
Agreement. Consistent with this agreed-upon interpretation:

( a)
The DCI shall ~arry out his responsibilities for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, and the Secretary and Attorney General shall carry out
analogous responsibilities for sensitive law enforcement sources and methods, in a
manner, and through mechanisms, that ensure that all covered infonnation is ma.d e
available promptly to the Department, and to other covered entities with a need-to-know
and prop~r security clearances and handling procedures in place, subje.;t only to such
handling and use restrictions as are strictly and unavoidably necessary to protect

16

intelligence and sensitive law enforcement sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure.

(i)
The DCl shalt ensure that the substance of all covered information
relevant to the responsibilities of all covered entities is provided to those entities
in a fonn suited to their effective use of that infonnation, consistent with lhe
DCl's obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure and Section 3(a) of this Agreement. The Secretary and the Attorney
General shall similarly ensure that the substance of covered information is
provided in a suitable form .
(ii)
The DCI shall ensure that dissemination of classified reporting
based, who11y or in part. on covered information, is accompllnied by dissemination
of as much of that reporting and covered information as is possible at an
unclassified (which may, when necessary, be marked "Sensitive-but-Unclassified"
or ''SBU") or reduced classification level, in order to ensure the broadest possible
· availability and use of covered information by those with a need-to-know that
information (or infonnation relating 10 that subject matter}, based on a broad
interpcetation of the mission of the other covered entity.: The Secretary and the
Attorney General shall similarly ensure that dissemination is done in a manner
that ensures the broadest possible availability.
(b}
information may be redacted or put into a tailored product to lhe extent
consistent with Section 3(i) of this Agreement.

(c)
Nothing in this section relieves any member of the Intelligence
Community that originates covered information from its obligation to provide that
information to DHS and other covered entities, as appropriate, in a form consistent with
this Agreement, the OHS LcgislaJion. and other relevant statutes and authorities
regarding the protection of sources and methods.
6 . ''Sanitization" and Modification of Classificatjon Levels for Further Sharing by DHS.
(a) Consistent with the President's announced policies, our national priorities,

including this section, Section 3(a), and other relevant provisions of this Agreement, the
OHS Legislation and other relevant statutes and Presidential Directives, covered entities
that originate covered information that is classified shall retain the authority to detennine
whether that information, or any portions thereof, must remain classified in the interest of
national security.

( i)
Covered entities shall ensure that covered information that is
classified or otherwise subject to restricted dissemination, but which reasonably
appears likely to require onward passage to state, local, or private sector officials,
the public, or other I.aw enforcement officials for use in a criminal investigation,
reaches DHS promptly with accompanying high-content "tear lines" suitable for
onward passage at an unclassified level. Until this can be achieved
17

•.

•

simultaneously to the transmission of covered information, the development of
such h:arJincs shall not delay the provision of covered information.
!

(ii)
The parties shall ensure, to the greatest extent possible. that
covert:d entities utilize agreed-upon standardized formatting for preparation of
tear-line material for passage 10 stale, local, or private sector officials, including
state and local Jaw enforcement ofticials for use in a law enforcement
investigation, or to the public, with the goal of providint necessary substantive
infonnation, but not enabling recipients to determine the originator, within the
Federal government, of the information.

DHS may, on its own initiative or at the n::que.st of a homeland security
official 10 whom covered information is disseminated, ask that the originating agency
(b)

declassify or reduce the classification level attached to that information in order to pcnnit
dissc:mination to additional officials who have a need-to-know the information, to
promote case of handling by those authorfaed lo review it. to pmnit its incorporation into
a document that is unclassified or classified at a lower level, or for other purposes
consistent with the need promptly to provide homeland security offo;ials with all relevant
covered infonnatiun ,hat the)' have a need-to-know in the conduct of their official duties.
Whene,·cr it receives such a request, the ong.inating agency shall respond to DHS, wi1hin
24 hours (or such longer period as is agreed to by all parties). unl~ss cvmpclling
circurm,tances exist to require: a longer response time. Such response will t:ithc;r (i)
agree to declassify or reduce the classification level of the covc:n:d
information in question as reque.o;tcd; or

(ii)
provide an alternative formulation responsive to the requester's
nc:ed for additional information sharing, but without declassifying or reducing the
classification of the original document or covered information where that cannot
be done consistent with assuring the national security.
(c)
Where the need by DHS for further dissemination of classified
infonnation rt:cei\:ed from other covered entities, including Uuough declassification or
the preparation of unclassified tear-lines, i~ urgent because that information contains or
may contain terrorist threat indications critical to the ability of homeland security
officials to prevent, prcempl, or disrupt a possible terrorist attack, lhnl information may
be passed directly to the entity or official that has a need•to-know that information,
provided that the covere<l entity passing the information first notifies the origin.ating
agency and takt:S steps reasonable under the ex.igeot circwnstances to protect whatever
classified informatiou 1s not essential tu initiating the urgent h0mc:lam.l sc::curity assurance
measures that may be required.
(d)
The parties agree to develop together, as soon as practicable. mechanisms
and procedures, including lhrough the use of d~tailees and assignees to the IT[C and
JlTFs, as :.ippropriate, to carry out the provisions of Section 6 . The parti~ agTee to work

together to ensure that the administrative, financial. and personnel burdens of rhis secrion
are shared to the greatest extent possible among covered entities.
7.
Detail or Assignment of Personnel. To fac ilitate the informatmn sharing,
coordination, and deconfliclion policies covered in this Agreement, covered entities shall detail ,
and/or assign, to the greatest extent possible. including to the TTIC and/or JTTFs, personnel who
have the authority either to make classificatton review and redaction decisions themsel ves, or,
consistent with the time frames established in this Agreernenl, to refer those decisions to the
appropriate officials at the originating agency for prompt action.
8.
OHS Participation in Requirements Processes. As soon as practicable, the parties
shall modify existing mechanisms and processes for prioritization of terrorism, WMD and other
relevant foreign intelligence collection (including within the United States) and requirements
processes to ensure that OHS has meaningful participation at each stage and level of each such
mechanism or process, including through participation in the rnc. The parties also shall work
together to provide recommendations as co whether, and how, processes or mechanisms for
purely "domestic'' terrorism (e.g., concerning the capabilities. plans and intentions of exclusively
domestic white supremacist or militia groups), and other relevant intelligence: collection should
be cre-ated or, alternatively. how to ensure meaningful participation by OHS in the prioriti2ation
for gathering such information. This st:ction does not refer to operational activ ities.

9.
Databases. The parties agree to establish procedures and mechanisms tO pro\·idc
OHS. and . as appropriate and practicable, other covered entities. with access :o databases
containing covered information. To this end, the parties shall establish a working group, with in
30 days of the date of this Agreement. Developed procedures and mechanisms, including
through the use of the TTIC and/or JlTFs, should be consistent with the OHS Legislation and
other relevant statutory authorities. Presidential Directives, the President's announced policies
for protecting against terrorist threats to the homeland, and the appropriate needs for access by
DHS 10 appropriate databases, as well as with the protection of intelligence or sl!nsiiive law
enforcement sources and methods, and with Section 3(a) and other provisions of this Agreement .
Such procedures and mechanisms should facilitate, to the greatest possible extent : case and
speed of infonnation exchange; differentiated access, to allow individuals with different levels of
security clearance and need-to-know to have different levels of access to databases; and
compatibility with other databases of covered entities.
I0 .
Statement of Jntent Concerning lnfonnation Tes;hnojogy. 11 is the intent of the
parties to build and modemi:.:e all relevant databases and other infonnation t~t::hnology systems
in order to moximrzc compatibility with other systems w11h which they must interact. Such
procedures and mechanisms also must comply with existing statutory and President ial
Directives, including with regard to the protection of classifi~d infonna1ion and applicable
pri vacy protections.
I l.
Handling and Storage. The parties shall ensure that covered entities within their
jurisdiction observe the esrablished handling and storage standards appropriate to the
classification and access restrictions indicated on covered infonnation they receive, use, and

19

•

•

disseminate, subject only to the provisions of this Agreement pertaining to e;,tigcmt
circumstances .

12.

(nfonnalion coll~led and shared b~foreign government~. This Agreement

contemplates a separate Memorandum ofUndcrstnnding, consistent wi th this Agreement. being
agreed to by the parties, th:it addresse..c; concerns related to information collected and shared by
foreign governments.

13.

Implcmcotation.
(a)

Each of the parties shall implm1ent their responsibilities under this
Agreement as to the covered entities under their jurisdiction through such binding
regulations, orders, directives, and guidance as necessary or prudent from time to time.
(b)
Any authority or du~y assigned herein to the Attorney General. the
Secretary. or the DC[, may be delegated to one or more subordinate officials at the
dis1.-retion of th~ official to ,,:horn the authority or duty is 11ssigned. except as otherwise
provided in this A~eement. Each such delegation shall be promptly communicated to all

01hc:r parties.
14.
No Private Rights Created. These procedures 2.re not intended to and do not
create any rights, privileges, or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any individual
or organization against the United States, its departments. agencies. or other entiues, its officers
or c:mploy~. or any other person.
15.
Counterpart Signatures. This Agreement may he signed io counterparts, each of
which shall be considered to be an original .

s/s
Attorney General

Date

sis
MAR04 2003
Date

Director of Central Intelligence

Feb. 2S,2003
Secretary of Homeland Security

Date

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(1)

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0\

ExecutiYe Order 13388 of October 25 2005
Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans

or

By the authority \'csted in me as President hy the Constitution and the laws
the l nited States
ur the lntdligcucc Rcforn1 ,ind Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (l'uhlic Law 10R--i -s). and in order to further <;trengthcn th\! cflccth·c conduct urt fnitl·d
.'tatcs countertcrrorism acti\'itic. and protect the lt.!rritory. pl!Oplc. and interest
th\! L" nitt:!tl
·1atc~ of America. including against terr )rist anach. it is hereby ordered us follows:
Section I. Policy. Tl\ the maximum extent consistent" ith applicable law. agencies shall. in the
<lc:ign and use
in t<mnation systems and in the dissc:mination of information among agencies:
(a) givc the highest priority t<) (i) the dctcction. prevention. di~ruption.
preemption. and mitigation of the effects
terrorist acti\'itics against the
territory. people. and interests of the United States of merica: (ii) the
interchange of terrorism infonnation among agencies: (iii) the intcrchang of
Lc:rro, ism information bc t,,cen agcncic!> and appropriate authorities of. ate. loca .
and tribal go\'ernml!nLc;. and hctwccn agcncic~ and approprintc pri \ ah.: st'ctor
en1itks: and (i\') the protecti n of the ability of agencies to acquire additional
such information: and
(b) protect the frce<lom. information privacy. and other legal rights uf' 1\merican s
in the conduct t1factivitics implementing subsection (a).
Sce. 2. Duties of He tis of Agcnek: Po:-scssing or Acquiring Terrorism lnfonnatio11 . To
imp) mcnt the p licy l!t forth in ·ccti n I of thi · rJer. the: head o caeh agency that pn ·:cssl.!s
or acquircs 1:rroris1~ infonnati< n:
(a) shall promptly gin! aeces~ to the !t.:rrorism infom1ation to the: hcud of each
other agency that has countertcJTorism fum:tions. and pro,·itle the terrorism
information to each such ngcncy. unless otherwise directc<l by the President. and
cons istent with (i) the statutory responsibilities of the agencies pro\'i<ling and
n.:cci1. ing the information: (ii) any guidance issued by the Attorney General to
fulfi l. th:: policy ·ct forth in subsection l(b) of this ordt:r: and {iii) ,thcr applicable
la\,. including sccti ns 102. ~g) anJ (i) of tht: )iational. ccurity. ct of I
section IO 6 of the lntclli~encc Rcfnn11 and Terrorism Pre\'clllion :\ct of 2004
(incl ding any pl,licies. pnicc<lun::,,. guidelines. rules. an<l standards issued
pursuant thereto). sections 202 and lN1
the Homdand Security /\ct r ~002 .
Executive Order J2()58
April 17. 199 . as amended. and l:xccutivc <)rtlc:r
13311 of .July 19. 2003: and
b} shall cooperate in and facilitnte production or reports based on terrorism
inlonnation with ·ontents and forn1at: that permit db,scmination that ma x·mi:,c ·
the utilit~ of the information in pwtccting the lt!rritory. pet\plc. and int ·rests of the
l lnitcd . ·1atc ·.
Sec. 3. Preparing Terrorism lnformotion for Maximum Distribution. To assist in cxpc<litious and
effcctiYc implementation by agencies of the policy set forth in section I or this or<l 'r. the

or America. includinl!

or

or

or

-n.

or

or

P;igc I of J

common standards : nr the sharing of terrorism information established pursuant to section 3 ot'
of August 27. 2004. shall hc used. as appropriate. in carrying out ·. , ,
ot· the lntdligcm:e Reform and Terrorism Pren:ntion .'\ct nf 2004.
Sec -L Rcquircmcms for Collecti(,n ofTerrorism Infonnation Inside the United States. l o assist
in "'xpcditious and 1:ffccti\'e implcmcnlalion hy agcm:ics of the policy set forth in section I of
this order. the rccon-.mcndations regarding the establishment
cxccuti,·c hranclH,·idc collection
and sharin~ requirements. procedures. and guidelines for terrorism infonnation collected ,vithin
the Unikd Statt:s made pursuant to section -1 of ExeeutiYc Order 13356 shall be used. as
appropriate. in carrying out . ·
' · . ,,
the ln telligencc Reform ami Terrorism Prevention
/\ct of 200-t.
Sec 5. Establishment and Functions oflnfom1ation Sharing Council.
{a) C\ 1nsistcnt with section 1016(g) of the lntclligcncc Rcfom1 and Terrorism
Pn.-:,\:ntion Act or 2004. 1herc is hcn:by established an lnfommtion Sharing
Council (Council). chaired by the Program Manager to whom section 1016 of
such Act retcrs. and composed exclusively or dcsignecs of: the Secretaries of
State. the Treasury. Defense. Commerce, Energy. und Homeland Security: the
Attorney General : the Director of:t\ational Intelligence: the Director or the
Central Intelligence Agency: the Din!ctor of the Ofiice of Management and
Budget: the Director of the Federal Bureau of lnn:stigation: the Director or the
:\a1ic11al Counlcrterrorism Center: an<l such other heads of <kpanmems or
agcm:i ~s as the Director orl\:ational lnt<.!lligencc may designate .
(b) Th~ mission of the Council is to ( i) provide advice and inti.mnation concerning
the establishment of an interoperable terrorism information 5haring environment
to f~1cilitatc automated sharing or terrorism information among appropriate
agcm:ics to implement the policy set forth in section I of this order: and (ii)
perform lhe dutic:s sd forth in section lO I 6(g) of th!! Intelligence Rd<.mn and
l'crrnrism PrcYcmion Act of ~004.
(cl To as5ist in expeditious and cffccti,·c implementation by agencies of the polky
set (<.mh in section l of this order, the plan for establishment of a proposed
interoperable terrorism information sharing en\'iromnent rt.:pllrted undl.!r Sl:!ctitin
5(c) Executi\'c Order 13356 shall hi.: used. a:,; appropriate. in carrying out
of'thc lntclligem:e Reform and Terrorism Pn.:vention /\ct of 2004 .
St:c. (1. Ddinitions . .-\s used in this order:
I a) the 11:rm "agency" has the meaning set forth for the term '\:-xccutivc ngcncy" in
sccti(m 105 of title 5. Un ited States C'ndc. together with the Department of
Homeland Security. but includes the Postal Rate Commission and the L'nitcd
States Postal Sen·ice and excludes the GoYcmmcnt :\ccountability Office; and
(b) the term ''terrorism information" hns the meaning set fot1h for such t~rm in
section 1016(a){4) of the fnlclligcncc Rcfom1 and Tc1Torism Preven tion /\ct of
~00.:t .
Sci.'. . 7. Gl.:"t!cral Prtn ision5.
( al This order:
(i l s hall ht! impkn11.:ntcd in a manner con~istent with applicabk la\\'.
including Federal la" protecting the infonnution privacy and other legal
rights or Americans. and subject tn the availahility nfappropriations:

or

or

or

Page 2 of 3

:g►
(1)

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O'\

(ii) shall he implemented in a manner consistent with the authority or thi.:
principal officers of agencies as heads of their rcspccti\·c agencies.
including under section 199 1)f the Rc\·iscd Statutes (::!2 U .S .C. 2651 l.
section 101 of the lkpartmem of Energy Organization Act (-+2 t.:.s.c.
7131 ). section 103 of the t\ational Security Act or 1947 (50 t:.s .c. 403-1).
section 102(a) oflhc Homeland Security Act of2002 (6 L.S .C. I 12(a)).
and sections :rn1 of title 5. 113(bl and 162(b) of title 10. iS0l of title I:- .
503 of title 28. and >0l(b) of title> 1. llnitcd States Code:
(iii) shall he implcmcnlcd consistent with the ·'· ·. ,;_ .. :
. , ,. •. 1•.·.1 1•
· -: . nn "Strengthening lnfonnation Sharing. Access. and
I11tcgrati0n Organizational. \ ·lanagement. and Policy De\·doptm:nt
Structures for Creating the Terrorism lnfonnation Sharing Environment :''
(i\· 1 shall not be construed to impair or otherwise affect the functions of
the Director of the Office of ).fanagement and Budget relating lo budgct.
administrative, an<l legislative proposals; and
(v) shall be implemcntt!<l in a mi:11mer cousistenl with section I 02/\ or the
National Security Act of 1947.
(bl This order is intended only to improw the internal management
the Federal
Gt)\'crnmcnt and is not inkndc<l to. and does not. create any rights or bcnclits.
suhsuntiYc or procedural. cnforccahlc at law or in equity by a pany against the
L'nitcd States. its departments. agencies. instrumentalities. or entities. its officers.
cmplnyccs. or agents. or any other person.
Sec. 8. Amendments and Revocation.
(a) E:,ccutivc Ortkr I 3311 or July 29. 2003. is amended:
( i) by striking ''Director of Central intelligence" each place it appears and
inserting in lieu thcn:of in each such place "Dircctor of Natinnal
lntdligcncc" : and
(ii) by striking "I (I~( c )( 7)" and inscrting in lic::u thcrcnf "I 02.'\( i I( l }".
\h l
of August 27. 2004. is h~rchy n:Yokcd .

Pr

lsigncd: I ticorgc W. Bush

THE WIIITE HO{ TSE.
October ~5. ~005 .

Pal,!C 3 of J

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Dcpurtment of ,Justice Protocol Regarding Terrorist Nominntious

-...J

<!Dfftrc of ttic 1Bcputi, ~tlorncp ®rncrnl
WnslJinnton, :aut. 20:150
O1:lubcr 3, 2U0H

Ml;:MORANUUM FOH HEADS OF l>l~PARTMENT COMPONRNTS
From :
S ubject:

The Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice Prolocol llcgunling Terrorist Wa!chlisl Nominations

The allachccl prulm:ol reflects a new policy for the Department's internal process fiir
nominating individuals !ix the Terrorist Screening Ontubasc (TSDB) .
The TSIJ£3 commlidatcs the U.~ . Government's lerrorism screening and lookout databuses
inlo ..\ single integrated identities database . The TSDB is nlso k1wwn as 1hc "watch list. ''
Thi s protocol is designed to ensure con:;isten\ and appropriate handling of watch Iisl
in f'nrmation . The protocol responds to issues raised by the report orthc Inspector
General , elated March 14, 2008, entitled "/\udiL orthc U.S. Ocportmeul or Just ice
Terrorist Watchlisl Nomination Processes.'' Spceilicnlly. tlrnt report rceornmcndctl !hat
thc Dcpartmen ; ad<Jpt a gtme::ral policy for submissi11n of watch list nominations.
lmpkrncntnti on of the allached protocol will accomplish that task .

t\11 comp,mcnts nrc directed Lo comply with this protocol clfoctivc immediately .
DEPARTMENT OF .I\JS'l lCE PROTOCOL
REG AR DING TERRORIST W t\TCI !UST NOM lN/\TIONS

A. Bacl,;ground

I. On September 16, 2003 , the President directed the /\tlurncy General in I lomcland
Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-<i) lo "establish an organi1.atiu11 to co11solida1c
the Govcrnmc nt's approm:h lo terrorism serccning nncl provide for the appropriate and
law!i.tl use nf' Tcrroris1 Information in screening pniccsses. " Terrorist Information was
specifically defined lo mean "individuals known or appropriutcly suspected to be or have
been engaged in conduct consliluling, in preparation for. in aid or, or related In
terroris m ."
2. Con current with the signing of HS PD-(,, the Me111or<md11111 of Undcr.vlc111cli11g 011 the'
I11teg rotio11 and Use 11/ Scn'. ellillJ.!, lt!{ur111ario11 to l'rotC'ct ,-f>;ni11st Terrorism (TSC MC >LI),
was s igned by the Secretaries or Stale and I fomcland Security, !he 1\ltorncy Uencrnl and

Pagel of 5

tht Dirc<:tur of Central Intelligence (DCI) tun behalf of the entire U.S . lnlclligcm:c
c·o111munity) . The T~C MOli established the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) lo
Cl'l1St>litlatc lhc (iovcrnmcnl's approach to terrorism screening and provide for the
:ipprl'prialc ;ud lawful use of"Tcrrorist Information. a term cl:lriticd by tile irn: lusmn

t il'

Tcmlrisl ldcntiliL~rs in a subsequent agreement nf'the panics. \ lnckr HSPD -<,. the TSC
•.•,• :,~ t ;1 ckvclop and m:1i11tain a database, lt' the extent pl:rmittcd by law, L
'. Onlainini; lhl·
1110,;t tho rough. accurate, :md current information possible about known •.lr suspct.:tc<.l
ll;rro1 i~t'.; . I ISP!).(, 1cquin.:~ that its implcmcnlatit•n be .;onsi!>ll;nt -..vith thl~ ( '. 1•mti1utio11
am! appl icabh.: luws. including those protect in!! the righL,:; of all /\111criL·,111!'t. The TSC
cn:atcd the Tc:T;lr;s\ Screening Database (TSDB) w meet these g1):lls. f"llc TSDB
-: unst,lidatcs th;; C.S . Government's terrorism scn:cnmg anti lt1t)ko111 dalalmscs intn a
!;ingh.: i ntegraL·cl itlentitic!- database. The TSOB is aiso known as the ·•watd1lis1. '·
:; _T he l'~C !\·10 \ l al s u inc<Jrporatctl :ill pnwision:,; \•flhc .\./c' 111<11·mu/11111 ,.f f I11dt·rsr,mdi11g
;.,., ..._.,.,, rite: /t11ellig1:11n! Co111m1111ity, Ft!d, •1·11I /,a11• E.,,fi,r<<·111c11t A 1:,•1wr, -.,·. ,11ul tit, ·
l),•1•w·1111c11t 11.f llomdand 5,'t•curil_',' C:11nccr11ing ill/im1111tru11 ,\'l111rmg. dated /\·larch -l, 20113
1the '' lnti.,rmati ~' ll ~!wr ing iv!Ol.;").

-1. [n 200-1. the Secretaries of State. Treasury. and ))dense h1;(;11ne signatt>rics l(>the
:nti,r:natiCln Sharing MOU by signing Addendum /\ to the TSC Mot :. By d11 i11g so. they
ap·..:l'd tl:at all pruvisions oflhe TSC MOU and the lnf'otmatinn Sharing MUI ; apply tu
all cntitit:s th a t an: N hcl.'.omc a part of their respective 1Jcpar1111c111s.
:- . .-\ !;n :ond acl<.kmlurn (Addendum B), whid1 supplements and incorporates by rctcrcncc
rvtou, superseded .-\udcndum A and was finalized llll J.tnu.iry
t 8. 2007. The Dircclors orNationul lntelligcncl', NCTC, and lhc TSC _joim:d as
signall_oril·s i11. \ddemlum n. Under paragraph()) (h)
/\ddc11du111 I.I tin: Parties agreed.
IP the maximuu: extent pcrlllittcd by law, to "provide lo lhc NLTC l111 ,m ongoing basis
,ill Terrorism l11rormati1rn (as defined in
the lntt:llit~cnc : Reform and Tcm>rism l'rcvcntil)n /\ct (IRTl'A) uf'20lM, Section IO!ci(a)
l<I) las amended lo irw.ludc homeland security informatillll and wcupl.lns ,,fmass
dcstn,c.tion information] in their possession, custody, or contn> I. Pnra~raph 7 of
t\ddcndu111 H intrmluccs the term Tcrrori.~t ldc111ilicrs .to mnrc dcady tkst:ril.H: 1111.: l)'pt' of
lc1-rrirism in ti,nn.itio11 lhal NCTC (and the Federal Bureau llf Invest igati1111 ( 1-'H I) for
l'urcl _y D1 1111cstit: Terrorism Information, as defined in till' TSC MOU) receives from
inlcragt:ncy partners nn<l suhscqucntly shares with TSC for inchrsicm m 1hc TSl>B .

.111 pr;,visi{IIIS ,·.f'thc TSC

or

(1 . Excn rlivc Order 13 . 54 (August 27, 2004) created the Notional Countcr1crrorism
C.-nlc1 (NC"f'C) lo serve as the primnry orgm1izalio11 in the United Sl.rtes Ciln·cnum:111 for
a1wlp:ing ancl .ntcgraling all intelligence possessed M acl1t1ircd by the t l11itctl Slates
Cion:rnml:nl pertaining to terrorism and t:lmntcrtcm1ris111. l'•Xl·cpting purel y domestic
i:111111l t'. llcrrr,ris:11 inl<1rmation. That same provisitin, however. pn•vidcs lhat NCTC may
l'Cccivc. r~·tain. :mtl disseminate informatit,n fnim any h:dcral. Stat(·. t1 r lm:al l!ll\'crnmrnl.
1· 1 1J11lc1 , .. ur.:c 111!ccssnry 1( 1 fulfill its rcsponsibil itic!'>. giv ing NC' l l ' authority-to rct:civc,
r-·la i1:. :md di-;-;uninnk domcsti(". tcrrurism infonnatit•n .

...

7. Sci.:tion I 021 or the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act or 2004
( IRTPA) n111cnd1.~d the National Security Act of 194 7 to cndily the creatinn or NCTC.
Pursuant lo lRTPA, NCTC serves "as the ccnlrnl and shared knowledge hank on known
and suspected terrorists and international terror groups." NCTC's centralized knowledge
bank is known ,is the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDl~). Section 11121 (c)
\Jll Dorm:sti;; Counlertcrrorism lnlclligcnec states NCTC "may, 1;onsistcnl with applicable
law, the direction
the Prc!;idcnt, and guidelines rcferrcu lo in section l02A(b), rc.ccivc
intelligence pertaining c1-clusivcly to domestic countcrtcrrorism from any Federal, Slate.
nr local govcrn:ncnt or other source nccessury to fulfill its responsibilities unJ n.:lain and
diss{'.minatc such intelligencc."

or

8. To enhance information sharing, the President issued r.xccu1ivc Orucr 13388, Further
Srrcn.~fhenin,v, f/,c: SIwring of Tcrronxm ft1jiJ1·111afio11 ro l'mlcc:I A111crica11s (October 25,

200'.i), which requires the head of' each agency Lhnl possesses or acquires terrorism
inli.irnialion to promptly give access to that information to the head or each 0thcr agL~ney
that has counl<::rtcrrnrism functions.
9 . Pursuant to ,)nragrnph (2) of HSPD-6, NCTC is nwndatcd lo "provide [TSCj with
,:cccss lo nil appropriate information or intelligence in the [NCl'C's I custody, possess inn,
or control that TSC I requires lo perform its funcLiuns ."

I 0. TIDE serves as the single source for the TSDB, except for Purdy Domestic TL'. rroris111
lnfunnation, \'vhich is providcu directly lo lhc TSC (i·om the Fill vin a li1rinulizcd
procedure. Purely l)omcslic Terrorism Information is defined in the TSC MOU a.~ "i.C' .,
inliinnalion about U.S. persons Iha! has been determined to be purely domestic terrorism
inrormation with no link to foreign i11Lclligcncc, cuuntcrinlclligence, or intcrna1ional
terrorism."

11 . Ti DI : conlains the identifying n11d derogatory information on known or appropriately
suspected international wrrorists and the PnI's Aulomntcd Case Support system wntains
suppmting infornrntion regarding purely dorm:stic terrorists. The TSDB contains the
idcnlilicrs exported li'om TIDE and the idcntilicrs ol'domcstic terrorists l'.Xported hy the
f-BI. As a rc:rnlt, the TSDn contains the U.S . (jovcrn11K'. nl's c11mpn.:he11siVt'. database of'
b\ll11 internatio nal and domestic Terrorist Identifiers.
H. Nominntin~ Components

I. The Depar1111cnl of Justice contains n number of cumpt111cn1~ thal may acquire
inlr,rmalion regarding domestic or international terrorists. These componcnls inclmk the
FBI, the TSC, the National Security Division, the Criminal Division, the Civil Ri~ht:.
Division, the Dnig Enforcement Administration, lhe Uniti;<l Slates Marshals Service, the
Hmcau ul' Ah.:L1 hol, Tnhacco, Firearms, and Explosives, The h:dcrnl Uurcau or l'risnn~,
the E~:c1:utive Offici; ol'lhc United Stale:; /\ltnrncy.~. the United Stales /\ttomcys, and thr:
Uni led States National Cc11tral nurc[IU ,

J
Page J of 5

2. The policy oflhc l)cpa11rncnt of Justice is for all compuncnts to provide the FBI wilh
all dt1111cstic: or in1crnalional Terrorism In formal ion or Terrorist Iden ti ficrs s0 lhal the ~-~ I
..:an make ::ipproprialc 11omi11a1ions hi the cons\•lidatc<l terrorist watchlisl. Willi one
cx..:cption relating to TSC's autlwrity in exigent circumstnnees, only the FBI is authorized
tl> nom in ale domestic {>r international terrorist::. for inclusion in the TSD!l on behal I' thc
Dcpartmcnt l1f Juslicc. The FBI has implemented policies governing the submis:;inn nr
such 1H1111i11atkms. including procedures to follow when uddin!,\. modifying, or deleting a
TSDIJ record . in making any proposc<l rccummcndation fnr watchlisLing, each DO.I
1.:~1111po11cnt slv:-uld ensure thnl the undcrlyin!! inli.1rm.1lion is reasonably accur::itc. relevant
and ti nwly. In additil•n. tht> TSC has implemented its Pmto,·r,/ l?cganli11g Ji:rron.,·r
Yr111:111orirms These polil:ics mus! be l<1llnwcd regarding all nominations from the
")cparlmcnt or Just.ice .

or

.:- . ·!'hi; TSC. which is .idministcrcd by 1h1.· FBI and rcpr1rt~ lt1 the All11rney (i\:t1L"ral, i~
;,t,rmiucd lo m:.tkc cntrit·s into the TSDB when cxig1.~nl circumstnnc.:cs ex isl. Such
c:-.pcdi1ccl 11111nina1ions 11111.,·r be made in c.:1Hnplinncc with the FBI nnmin:ition ptilicics :tnd
th\: TSC's flro:o< :ol R,·~:arding 'Jermri.,·1 N1>111i11,1tions.

•I. "l'lw Joint ·1-.morism Task Forces (J'ITF\ al'e :i mulli-agcncy clfott led by thl'
I kp:1rtn11.:111 of .I usth.:c and the Fl3 I 111 comhinc :md leverage low en fon;cmcnt and
i11lclligc11t:c ct:111mun1ty n:sources Ill prulct:t the United St;tlcs from terrorist :illa~k. JITF~
arc comprised or highly tr:iincd, locally basc<l. invcstigalurs. analy.-..ts. linguists. ,111d ollll:r
spcci.1lisls frnm h:dcral . slate. lc1cal, 1rilx1I, 1crritnrial law cnl~,n:cment and intclli!,!CrtL:c
.:,•111nw11ity ag~ncics. The Niltional JTfF was c.5tablished in July 2002 to servL: .1~ the
,:l11•rc:i nati11g mcdianism r,,r lhc .rJTFs.
:--. Dcpartmt·nt .:ir Jw,tkc t:limponcnls. other than the FBI nr the TSC. Jrc 1w1 pcrmillt·d I\)
make direct nr:11i11ati 011s 111 the TSDB . /\ Dcpar\mcnl
Justice component shuuld
inform lhc appruprialc JITF through disse111i11,,tcd in1clligcncc reports. ckc1rnni1·.
c~11111111111icatio:-., or other 111cthud appropriate to the circumstances when it becomes aware
nl"'l\•rrNist lr11"".;)r111:iti~111, Terrorist ldcntilicrs. tir Purely Domestic Tcrn•rism lnfr,rmntit111
(e(1llcc1ivcly, Intelligence Information). The originating DOJ componc11t should !;tale
whdhcr it reccm1mcnds watch listing Lin; i11dividual, thc basis for ihat rccnmmc11dali\1 11 ,
an I the invt:sligativc skrs. irany, it has u11dcrt.ikcn regarding the individtrnl. lt'thc JITI ·
clr..:tL·rn1i11cs lhat :he in limnation rcc..:ivcd rrorn ;mother u1111rl111cr1t !,t,mc.Jing ah11n: ur i11
..:,mj un ...:tion with otlwr inli.,nnati on know:1 to the FBI meets the s-tandards set forth in the
1\llurm:y (jcnernl's Guidelines f, :r optning a prcli111innry 1errr•ris111 invL"stigatir,n 111· a fu ll
t~m1ris111 i1H·c~.1igatiun ,111d one has not been orcncd. the I t I F sh:1J; iniliolr an
1nv~5!i~atic 11 a:1d shall nominate case suhjcds !i>r indusion in Tll)l ·. aml.'nr lht> I SDII in
:.:..:.:,,r~l,mcc, ith FBI pulicy, by forw.irding ,ti! lntclligenct' l11lc1rmatin11. ;is apprnpriall' . IP
::n; H3l's Tcrrrr:st R\:,·i1.·w nnd Examinution \ 111it (TIU:XJ using the !'I >-<130 fnrlll and
procc,;s.

or

1

t', .

The n·ll·v,1111 JITF will 1"1l1li(Y the Departmc111 L>l'Justice compont:nl !hill lnlclligcnn·

In li,rmatio11 prnvidcd h)1 thnl component. has been used. in who It.; nr in part. as lht· basis
E1r a nomitwtic,n lo Lli1.· TS Im 1)r the l'.rcatiun 111"a rcrnnl i11 TIDI:. To the extent p11ssihlt>.

►

'O
'O

(1)

the relevant JTl'F will assign a rcprcscntolivc rrom the nominating l)cpartmcnl of .lust ice
cumponent \o participate in the preliminary or full investigation tlmt <1ris~'.S out ul'
nmninalions from Department or J\lsticc components. Once notified, the Dcpartrm:111
l',limponcnt will promptly provide FBl's TREX with udditions. rnoclilic:11ions, or u<.:lctio ns
'. o a particular record as appropriate rcgmding lhnt lntclligcncc Information vin the
componcnl's .ITTF rcprcscntalivc .
7 . Tn prevent possible duplicate or partial reporting, the NCTC shnll be informed that th1:
Fl3 I and the 'l'SC arc the sole TIDE ,rnd/or TSDU 11umi11ati11g agc111.:ics l'or tl11:
Dcpanmc;nt u r .I ustice.

8. The provisions l1fthis Protocol arc nut intended lo prejudice, restrict, or intcrf'crt: wi th
any 01l1cr agreement or nrrangcmcnt or Dcpartmcnl or Justice compuncnts, including
arrang.cmc11ls related tn law c111i1rccmcn1, exchange of information or co11n1crtcrrorism
~rro r::; as appropriate .

/\II l)eparlmcnl or Justii;c components should continue to share lnlelligcncc l11Ji.innalion
as appmprialc within the U.S. Intelligence Community.

;:l

Cl.

X
--..)

~

t\lEI\IORANDU!\I Of ll:\DERSTA:\Dl :'IG
(Y\ TERROR I ST \\'.-\TCHLIST REDRESS PROCEDL'.RES

'O
~

;:l

0..

X

l'lll' I kpanmcnl pf .lustil'L' ( I)( l.l ). thL' h:dL'ral Bureau 111' Ill\ l.'~I igatinn i !"Bl I. lhL' Tcrrurist
ScTL'l"lling t ·.:111cr cTSC'I. the fkpanmcnl ,11" l lumdand ScL'urit~ ( OI I<.;). the I kpartllll'lll pf St:ik
( f)<JS ). thl.' ()ffil"l' 11r th1.: Uirc1.:tur pf \:atit1nal lntclligl'IKL' ( UlJ .. , ). thl'. \:at 11111:il
< 11u111l'1'll:rn1ri~m Cl·nter I Nt 'TC ). thl' <..'L'nlr:il 11111:lligcncl· :\gl·ncy (l ' 1.-\ J. till· lkparlmcnt Ill°
I kll'nse ( D< Jl) ). and thL' Ikp;trtm..:nt 1h1.: Trl·asury Ihcrcinalkr rcll!rn:·d to a~ 1hc Parties l:

or

or

Rccugni1.i11)! that 1hc United States (im-..:rn111c111 has dc\'clnpl'll a c111i:-.11lida1cd database
k111.1"·11 and suspCl'lcd tcrrnri:-ls that supp11rls many dirt~rl'lll scrcl:ning prm.!l'illlls O)K'ratc<l umk r
di st inct swtulory and rcgulatnry authorities:

Rl'l.'11i;i1i1.i11g that agcrn:ic!> that contribute lo. l'.1ll11pik. distribute. and llSL' the con:-:olidated
da1ahase mus! 11se hL·st l'llorts 111 111ai111ai11 l'lll'l'•.:nt. aL'L'lll':IIL'. anJ 1h11r11ugh i11li1rn1atit111:
ReLog11i/i11g 1hal lhl' i111pkml."ntatiu11111'1lte :-,l•reening program:-, 11u11ethck:-s may. at
1i1111.:-.. still eau,e itll"t111\ L'nil:11cc. dday. tir tlth1:r ad,·l'rse l'XperiL'llt.:l':- for indi\·iduah dur ing the
llTl'nrism screening pwce:-,:-. :
I-kl' 1g.11i/.i11g that t.:t1111plai111~ rl't:1."i, ed 1-..:g;inling the terrori:-m scrt.:e11i11g I rt1L'ess sh, 1uld
hl· L':-.pcJititiusl~ ,._:, ie\\'l'd aml aJJr..: ssed "ith dignit: and re:-pl."l't :
R.:ci1g_11i/..ill l:! th:11 the L':-.peril."nC:L' Pl°lra,L·krs and ,11her inJi, iduab 11111.:ral.'tlllg "ith
~'" crnmi:nl :-ncc11ing IK'r,nnnd is p()te111ially :1ffi.'l'll'd hy factors ,,u1s idl..' thl' rnn,rbm Sl'.reL'ning
:-L'npt.: ,1t'this \kmnra11du111 t1f l. !mkrst anding. i11l'luding. li1rt:-.:a111ph.:. randPm Sl'l'l'.l'ning.
:--l-rcening t"nr im·nln:llll'lll \\ ith illicit dntgs ,w OlhL'r illegal L'onduct. hd1,I\ ioral .'>l'l\.'l."ning
crill·ria. as\\ ell as thL' bask prnk:-.:-it111alis111 and l'Ptll'lesy 01· gm·cmmcnt Sl:l'L'l'lli11g J)L'rsnnncl.
and th,11 at1c111i1m to 1hcsl' l:,ctms 1m1s1 be prn111PIL'tl lhrnugh r1lhcr appn1priate means \\'ilhin the
l'l'SJK'L'tiVL· _j11risdic1iu11:- or thl' P:irti1:s:
Rel'.O):!llil.ill):! that on .lanunry 17. 200(,, tile I kpar1111c111s 111' Slalc and I lrnnela11d Sl'l'uri ty
:11111uunccd an initiati\l' 1111 "Sl'l'Url' BorJcrs and ( llll'll 1)11ors in the l11ltll'111:11i1111 Age:· tllhern isv
k1111,,n a s the Rrl·e-Clli:rl(lff lnitiati\·c. in ·ludin!,! lhe estahlishmi.:nt t1!'a redress pl'lll'l'SS 11, addres~
pt·rcci, ed pn,hkms in i11tanati1111;rl ;md dnmc stil' tra, dcr :-.l.'l'l.'l'llin:;!: :111d
I la, ing c11ns1rllL'd \\ ith th1: PriYacy and t •j, ii l.ihertil' :-- < h cr-.i:!ht Board ;111d the pri, .it· ~
and ci, ii lib1.:ni1.:s nl'licials nf DI IS. [)( )J. and ( )()'.\I. in de,doping tlil' prn1.."nlt1rl·s L'l111taineu in
thi-. agn:.·l.'mc111:

00

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l(Jl.;!JIIJ.1,"\J Ill l(;)l!I 1.1dd1: s. 111,"\lllll.l.;l \\\~) .1111 :'Ill![)! fl 1"llll:1 I )j UO! ll!/!lll!i'i.11) lll! l( S!l\( l!}~;'I Pl fll.1:1lf,ll )
\;lll.llll!V ;llJI p:i.qnh:i.1 "f()O~ ·91 J:11.jlll,,,d:is p:,1cp ,_'lllS!.lllJJ:1.1. !Sll!l!i°i\ 1.,;'l)\Ucl Ill ll\llll!UUll.JllJ
~UJ U:1,..,.1::is.1•' .... s, 1 puc 1111!11:.1;;:inq .. '(1)•(ldSI 119 ... ,!P:lJ~(I Jl!!llf."\jll";'\.ld ,1!m.,.,s p1m1;1u11., 1J
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DEFINITIONS

1\s usl'd in lhis l'vl( HJ. these terms nr phrases arl' defined as rnlhnvs:
A.

B.

C.

IJ.

E.

r.
Ci.

H.

( ·0111plui111 or RL'dress Cu111/llai11t : An individual':-, stalL"llH!nt. about an allL-gcdly
advcrs<.: experience or outcnrnc during" terrori sm st.:n:cning process. which
usually includes a request fnr assistam:e tir a n.:111ctly.
Demga/1JJT !n/im11atin11 : The inlimnatinn n:lied upon or gcnl'ralcd by a
nominating/orig inating. age111.:y to support the nominalion or an individual tn 1hr
TSDB .
A·11011 •11 or Su.,·pectec/ Tl:'rrorisr: As de lined hy HSPD-6. an individual known nr
apprnpriatcly suspected to be or to have been engaged in conduct conslituli11g. in
preparation for. in ai<l or, nr relat ed tn terrorism. Pursuam to I ISPD-6. the TSDB
shall i111.:lucle idenli(),i ng inltmnalion about all known or suspected terrorists.
Mishle11ti/i1..•d Person: An individual who has haJ an ad\'erse experience nr
outcome during. terrorism screening because the individual is a near match 10 a
k11<.1wn or suspected terrori st in the TSDB . Misidentilied persons arc 1101 actually
listed in the TSDB but usually share an idcnlical nr very similar name and date or
birth with a pcr~wn in th t' TSDB. which cnuscs them tn be dclay-:d or otherwise
i111.:nnvcniencctl during screening.
.Vo111i11ati1w .- lge11c r: A Fctkral agency that lws dctenninecl 1lwl :rn individual is~,
kno,,·n or suspected terrorist anti nominates that individual 1l1 the TSDR based on
information that origi nated with that agency and/or a third .igcncy.
Orif!i11ati11';! .·lgl'nc r : A Fe<.krnl agcm:y that generates derogatory or identifying
information ah(HII .i kno\\"n or suspcctetl lcrwrist.
l'er.w1wlh· lclc11tifiohle l11/<>r111utio11 : Any representation 01· information 1ha1
permits the identity nr an individual Lo whom the inf'orm:1ti11n applics 1u he
reasonably inli!rred by either direct or indirl'l'I means induding any other
inft)flllalinn, which is linked to st11.·h individual.
RL'dress: Thr process whereby an indivi<.lual may seck Lhc help 111' :1 screening
agency in addressing the causl' or an adverse cxpericncc or outcnnH.: rclatcd to th1.:'
use orTSDB data by tiling a complaint with the screening ag.cncy . Thl' screening
ag.em:y or its dcsigncc, in cnupcra1i11n \\'ith TSC and lhL· 1wminating/Pril:!ina1ing
agency, provides assist;mct: by determining lhl.! cause that adverse c:xperiem:c.
vcrif')•ing that all n:le vn nl information relied up1,n in the screening pniccss is
thorough, accurate. and t:UITcnt. and making any warranted L'.orrcctit)llS tu
pertinent records. The redress pmccss as dl!li11cll in this paragraph docs not apply
10 complaints rdatcd lo the visa application process.
Scrue11i11g Age11c1•: Any agency that conducts terrorism screening. A screening.
agency acquires information for thL· purpose determining whether ;rn individual
is a known ur suspected terrorist in the TSDB, anJ c\'aluatcs and/or uses 1hat
information in ordcr tn take a particular gowrnmcntal aclitm with rcspecl tn an
individual. such as requiring additional physical security screening al an airport
sccurity chl'ckpninl. dctcnnining admissibility intu th-: Llnitcll Stales. m similar

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govcrnmcnlal action. The DOS anJ DHS shall not he i.:onsidcrcd scn:L'ni11g
agcm:ics with respect 10 the visa application process.
Tamris111 Sat'e11i11g: The evnluation of an individual In tktcrminc whether he nr
she is a knmYn or suspected terrorist ith:ntif1ecl in the TSDL3 in order to taken
particular governmental aclil)ll with n::spcct lo an indiYidual. such as requiring
addititH1al physic.ii scrnrity screening. at an airport scrnrity checkpoint.
ddcrmining admissibility into the United Stntc:-. nr similar governmc111al nctiun.
Tt!r/'/lrisl Scret!11i111; Dutahu.H' or 1:~'DB: The reucral government's consolidated
databasL' that contains i<lentil)'ing infi-,rnrntion abnut known or suspected
terrorists. It is also crnnmonly knO\\'ll as the consoliJulcd terrorist walchlist. The
TSDB is a sensitive hut um:lassilicd database and docs 1101 ,.:nntnin any (krogatnry
information .
TIDE: NCH '' s Terrorist Identities Datamart En\'ironmcnt (TIDE). which is n
i.:l;1ssi lied tblahase containing the derogatory informatinn that supports the
nnminatinns or known 1lr sus1k·cted inll:rnalional terrorists lo the TSDB .

RESPUNSll31LJTIES OF Tl IE PARTIES
i\.

Responsibilities or All Panics:
1.
Dcsi!.!.natinn or Responsible Official. Each Party \\'ill iclentil)' a senitu·
oflicial who will he responsible for ensuring the Party's full purtiL·ipation
in lhc rcdl'l::ss prnccs~ and o\'crall co1nplin11cl'. with this l'vlOU . ;\ Pany
may also designate redress 1)l'li\:ials for componl.!nts (il'that Party that
perform screl.!ning or nominating./nriginaling agency li.mctions . The
Part ks agree to identity these olfo:ials and exdrnngc the nanH!s or these
nffil:ials no later thun 30 cakndar days alter this MOU becomes clfrctivc
and update Lht! inliw111,1titm ns neetkd therl.!:tlkr.
11.
Resourct:s. Subject to the availability nf runJs, each Party will itknlilY
and commit appropriate staff and nthcr n:snurccs 111 carry out
responsibilities under this MOU . This includes idcntil~•ing the ollice(s)
responsible fi1r carrying out the Parly·s n:spl>nsibilities pL·rlaining to the
processing of"inuividual redress complnints as scl forth in this MOU. The
Parties agrl'e In exchange the names ant.I cnnlacl inli1rnrntion fi.ir till'
responsible offices no later than 30 cakndur dnys a 11cr this MOU bcenmc!>
..:rfcctive, and update the infonnalitm as needed thercalkr.
111.
lnl<wmation Sharing. Ead1 PaJ'ly will share all inlcmnatinn rckvant lll the
resolution nf n com pin int with other Parties Lo the extent necessary 10
ca1Ty nut this t\.·IOU or to ddcnd ,my judicial chnlkngc to the rl'.solution or
a complaint. consistent with legal requirements and dassilication and
handling controls. A Party may provide the relevant inli.>r111atit1n in a
summ~irizi.:Lf or suhstilutcd format tu protect s~11si1ive SOLll'Cl'.:-. ;1nd
n11.:thods .
1v .
Proleclion or Personal Iv Identifiable lnlimnation. Ead1 Party will take
apprnpriah.: action 10 protccl personally idcntiliahk information (Pill in ii::,
own n.:cord systc:ms n:laled lo a rcdn:ss mailer against unauthorized access
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and to ensure that Pl I is lwndled in a way thal pnwidcs scnirity and
acrnun!ability. Whl'n Parties transmit PII related lo a redress malll:r , ·i;i
11011-elcelronic or L'kctrnnic 111cans. such as email. facsimilt:. pnnabk
media or othcr\\'isc. the Partit.:s will prnpt.:rly mttrk the data amlillr
communications/mctliahkvicc In pnwide appropriate nnlit:L' nf' the
existence nf" PII and will ensure the means nr lr:tnsmission arc sceun.:d by
encryption or equivalent prnlcetinns.
Adminislrati,·c R,.:cord . Each Party will be rcsponsibk for mainwining thi:
administrative records llL'Ccssary lo document it s parlicipatinn in th e
redress process.
Updatin!:! /\L:cm:y Rcconls. Each Party that maimain s data rcl:HL'd tn till'
terrorist watchlisl in its pnper and/nr clei..:trnnie rc:eon.lkceping system ~ \\'ill
update its records (i .e .. correct, modify. or delete) expeditiously llllCL'
m,Lilii.:tl ora drnnge to an individual 's watch list status as th..: resulr or the
displ1sition llf a redress ma lier. This pn1visilm appl ics lu data in
gowrnment in fi1rn1atilm systems (c .g. , Tl l)E, Treasury E:11 li1rccrnent
l'ornmunicalions Sys1e111/ln1cragcncy Bnrdcr l11spcc1in11 System
(T ECS /IBIS). No-fly List, Consular l.oukoul And Support System) used
l'or watchlist ere.it inn or screening purposes. It is not intended to n.:quin:
the Parties to change records that rclkct acti\lns already taken basL·d Lll1
watdilist status. unless and only to the extent that the record \\'ill ha,·e au
unwarranted adn?rse impact Llll the individual seeking rcdress.
Litigali\111. Suhjcet to paragraph 4.1\.iii abovc. each Party agn:cs lo
conpcrnti:: wilh DO.I 10 assist in del~nding any judicial ch:ilkngc tn the
resolution of a n:drcss complaint prrn.:essed undcr this rvlOU or a
dclerminatinn by a screening agency that rdicd in \\'hl1lc 11r in part un
rec(1rds ur inli.mnatinn in th.:: TSDB . This pnwision shall 1101 he cnnstn1l·d
tn limit nos·s discrctin11 under section 2221 I") nfthe l111111i gra1ion and
Natiunality Act (IN/\), 8 U.S.C. 1202( f'l. com:crning. the disclosure of
visa rccnrds in litigation .
Privacy Act Cnmpli:1m:e. In carrying out this ~vlOU , eaL:h Party is
n;spun.sihle ltir its mrn Cl)lllpliam.:c with the Privacy 1\ct of' 197-L 5
U.S.C.
552a et setf.. in the collection. main1cna11ce, use. anJ
dissemination of perso nally idcnti liable information. Wi1hin 30 cakndar
days aftt:r the effective date of thi s ~,IOU, each P~1rty agree:- lll rc,·icw its
applicable Privacy ;\et system or records notices and any rcle\'anl l'orrns
used to culled information li·nm the p11hlic where such infr1rmation may
ultimatel y be used during the rcdres~ pniccss. Each Party agrce.-. lLl make
appropriate changes to those dncumcnts. ii' m:L·essary. including lhe
publication of'nc\\' or modified rnutinc uses lo permit thc sharing \Ir
information to 1\:solvc nxln:ss malters and n.:latcu litigation .
Record Retention . Each Party agrees to retain its redress recnrds for al
lcnsl si:s- year-. from the date 1,r final ;igcnL"y disposition . /\gcncil.'.s may

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1.:kc1 IP establish a 1011;;1..·r r.:11..·ntion pl.Tit id 111 llll'l'I ~1.11111<1r~. r-:b'.ulatur). llr
,,p1.:ra1 i, ,nal n~quin:m.:lll:-..
Hcqu.:,h tiw Dis1..·losun: ,1f TSl)B l)a1a . l 'nk~:-. and until !"SC ad, i:--1..·~ 1111:
Partii:s 11f an alternate prni.:l.·dun:. cath Pany agrec:- that it \\ ill comact
TSC :- kgal C(llltlSd i r it n:ct:i, l..'S ;i l'<..'l[LICSt Ii ,r inti ,nnat itlll 1.ir l'C(llr<ls that
it kn,,,\ s would re, cal an indh idual" s :-tat us ( pus it i, 1..· nr 111..·gatiH·l in tl11..·
rst )13 tll' \\'llllld othcrn isl' n:, cal the LlllltCtllS ,1r TSDB d,lla . lSC h:gul
cuun:-.el will prn,·idl..' timdy 1:,!t1idanct: on hP\\ In l'l..'Spund 111 these n:qucst s.
This pnwisiun also p1.•rtains tn rcqu~sts rnr TSl>I~ data rcsitll'nt in
supp11r1ed !--acl.'ning. systl'lll:-. such as th\.' Nt1- Fly List. TFCS! IBJS . lhc
N,1tio11al Crime lnformalion l ·i:1111.:r' s Violent tiang and Terrorist
<hg:111i1.atio11 1:ik (\l(iT<Wl. and the I)( >s·s Consular l .m,kmll and
Supp11r1 System (l'I./\SS) .

!~spnnsihilitks ol'Sereeninu Al!1..'11ci1..•s:
,.
I ksi~11atin111_1f R1:s1H111sihilitic:-. . .- \n) Party Iha! is" scr1:e11i11g agl.'.ncy 111ay
<ksignati.: anl,thcr Pany. " ·1th the othi.:r Part y':-- t:onscrll if111.·c ..kd. t<•
111.·1-i"nnn thL' rcsp,m sihilitil·.., ,1utli111:d in sc1..·ti(lll -LB. \ll. thi:-- \l( >l'. In
aJdit ion. "hl.'rt> a ~crc:ening agi:11cy is. a t:omp1111l.'11l of ;i Pan:,. the Part:,
ma:, dct1.·nnint: at it, di st:rt:1i1Hl that :111y n~s p111i-;ibili1:, n!'1ha1 Sl.'. rl..'.:ning
agt:111..·y m,1y ht> pcrli.1r111i:d in "lh)k ,ir in p:111 h:, thl..' P,1ny .
11
Ri.::-11u1\:l..':-. Subjet:I 10 lht' :I\ ail.ihility t1t° fund .... l.'.a.:h -..l·r1..·cning agl..'nl..':,
,, ill Ji.:'.'>i gnate tlr ,:rcale an uf'licl.' 111 1:arry l'lll ih npl.'ra1i,111al
r1..·:-ponsihili1ics fur ri:Jrcs!'-. \\'here ;1 Part) has Sl·n:ral l.'ompnncnts that
pl·rronn ti:rrorbm !--L'rt:i:nini;.. thl' rcsp,111sihlc 11Jfo:ial ror that Party (s,·t•
Sl.'ctil'll -I.Ai abnn; l \\ ill de1cnni111: \\'ht:thcr a :-.int!k cl..'ntr;_ili/.i.:u ol'lic-: nr
-;t•parall.· 11fficcs in the apprnprialc c11111poncn1s. ur -..11111\.' .:omhinalion 111'
th\.'. t\\·o. will perl'nrm 1his runl'linn. Subject to the availahilily ur li.mds.
1..•:id1 screening :igcnL·y will cnmmit sufficient and apprnpriall.: siaff :111J
res11un:. cs to that ortke lll' 111lic1:.·s to cnsurl.' rcdrcs:-; complaints arc
prni.:cssed in a timely .ind ef'licienl. lll,llllll.'r. Till.' scrl.'c11ing agcncie:- agn:c
to nntil~· the lllh~r PartiL·s 11f 1l11..· id..:mily of':md cunt,11..'t information ll1r tht:
dcsig.natcu olfo:cs under 1his p.1r:1graph mi latl.'r than 30 i.:akmlar lla):,
alh:r thi s \\,IOU bcl.'nmescrti..·c1i\e and update 1ha1 inli1r111a1io11 as nl.'.cded .
Ill.
Rl..'l.'.l..'ipt and Initial Proces:-.ill!.! nr l'omplai111s. 1:,11.:h SLTecning agl.'.tKy \\ ill
h:1\1.· .i pn1ccdurc lilr rc1.:ei, i11 g ..:rnnplain1s from 111.:mh1.:r:, ,11'1!11.· public. tr
thl.' s..:n.:1.:ning age ncy rl.'\.'t•i, l.'S ,l C\1mplaint rrnm .in illlli, idu.il \\·hu app-:ar:-.
10 hi..' in the TSDB and the complaint relates h1 a11 ad\ e1,I.'. ...-Jfrt.:t in !ht:
-..crl..'l..'lling rmiccss ari!--in g 0111 111" his her pla1:e111clll i11 the TSDl.3. thl..'
al,!l.'.lll.'.: \\ ill (11marJ a i.:1111: ,it'thl.' complaint and rdat\.:d informatillll ll•
rsc \\ilhin a rcas,,nahk 1i1111..·. Tl11.· SLTl.'.L'lli11g ag1.·11i.:: \\ ill bl..' l'l.'.:,puns ihk
t~,r \ cril~·mg thl.'. idenlil: llf the complainant in acl..'unlance \\ i1h the
:-.cr\.·1..·ning agc111.:y ·:, appli1.·:1hle r1..·g ulatinns and p11li1.:ie:--. \\ 'hl.'.11 ti,rnardi11:;;.
" t:\llnplaint to TSC. the Sl..'t\:i:nin!:,! ,tg.l.'.ncy mu:-.t pn" idi.: : I I l all rde, ant
..:orrcs11\111dcn1:e lh1111 th1..· i11dividual. 1.2/ copi\.-!-, ul'any rde,·:1111 internal

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agcney records. and ( ~) inrorrnation identifying lhe L'Omplainant includinJ:!.
at a minimum, the complain::mt's full name. date or birth. and place or
cilizcnship. Arter consultation wilh alTcctccl Parties, TSC may rL·visc
these requirements in the future as needed for c:,.,:pcditious pnicessi ng 11 1"
redress complaints. No amendment tn the MOU \\'Ould bc required 1t1
effectuate such a change .
1-"ollo\\'-llJ) with the Complainant. I I' rcqucstcd hy TSC, lhc screening
agency will contact the cumplainant tf1 request additional inrnrmatinn to
assist TSC m the nominating/originating agency in \'CrilYing the
cnn1plai11ant's identity and prtll:essing the complaint. Nolhing in this
s ubsection pn.:du<lcs a screening agem:y l'rom cnntacling the t:nmplainanl
in ,h:cnrdam:c with thc screening agency 's prrn:cdures or discretion .
RcspLlnsc to the Cnmplainanl. Screening ngcncics arc responsible l\)r
provi ding a written rcspnnse 10 compbints they rcccin:- b~iscd (1n
inl<.mnation provided by TS(.' and lhc 1w111inaling/nrig ina1ing agency.
Ikea use nr the scnsitivity nr the TSDB and derogatory information. lhL'
cu11tcnl or any r'-~sponse 10 a L'omplni11111111s1 he coordina1cd wilh TSC and
the nominating/originating agency through TSC. Screening agc11cics may
use st:mdarclized rcspnnsc lctlcrs lhal have been L'lH>rdinnlL'd i11 adY:tl1\.' L' hy
the scn::cning agcncy. TSC, and DO.I.
l{edrcss lor tvlisidcntilied Persons. On January 17. 2006. DHS and DOS
anrn.1unL'cd an initiative on ··sl~cure Borders and Opt:n Doors in the
lnfonnatinn !\g.e:' othc.nvisc known as the Ri1:c -C hertoff lni1ia1i,·e. whil:h
im:ludcs the establishment or a redress process to address pcn:c ivcd
problems in inll:rnatiunal and Jomeslic travclcr sc n:cning. The Dl ·IS
Screening l'Mrdin::ition Oflicc is leading the inter-agency cl'fon 10 l"l1lfil l
the goa ls (11' the Rice-Cheri off lnitia1ive. which is intcmkd lo i111prnvc th c
redress process li1r persons who are misidenlilicd during lra vc lcr
sncc11ing prnccsses. among 11ther improvements.
/\tlministrativc Appeals. If the scrcl'ning. agency has establishcd an
adminislrntin: appl·als prm:css tiw redress determinations nr othl:r agency
dctenninatinns in which the TSDR \\'as used, the scn:l.'ning. agency \\"ill
notit~, TSC alicr receiving any such administrati\'L' app1.:al and \\"OJ"K " ·i1h
TSC. as needed. to prot:l.'ss the appeal. and cnordinatc the linal ag'-·ncy
rcspo11sc with TSC. Thc scrt:cning agency ,,·ill provkk all rclcva111
papernwk 10 TSC ( including a copy nl'tlw appeal lctll'r and 1111y
i11li1rmation suhrnittL·d hy thi: individu.il on lheir own behall). When thc
scrcL:ning. agency lias the kg.al autllllrit y tll make thi: final Lkt.:ision tlll th('
appL:al. ii will promptly nntify TSC nl'that dct:is ion .
Lilirwtioq . When the screening agem:y hcct111ws :n\'arc (Ir li1ig.,1tio11 arising
out 0J'1crroris111 scn:.•cning, the screening agency will notil)' TSC and D( >.I
as soon as pnssihlc ancr idc111irying the nc-"us In the TSDB. Notilica1in11
should uccur as soon as Lhc Party learns or :,n individuars intent to SUL' (1r
immediately alkr being saved with legal process.

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1 1 f tlH: TL'rrori~l Screen in!.! l"t'nlcr:
Recl..'iPI anJ Cnimlination llf Complaims. TSC "ill rel.'.ci, i: i:nmplaint s
lhm1 Sl.'l"el.'.11ing agL'lll:ies and rcscan.:h 1he111 to Jetenni111: the nature and
i.:ause of the indi\·idual's adn·rsi: cxpi:ril'ncc. TSC will Lr:id. all
complaints am.I will be n.:sponsibk liir f;1L·ilitaling any inter-agl.'JK)'
1:nnrdinatinn ncct"ssary Ill properly n:sean:h thc complaint and respond tn
the sl:'fl..'L'lling agL'm.:y l"l.'g:mling the nutl.·rn111.· ( l.'.g .. any l:11rn.:1.·ti1111s madt' or
n:..:(lJ1l lllL't1JcJ ).
Rl.'\ ic\\ or lfas i~ for lndu:.i1l11 in tht.' TSDB . In L'aSL'S \\ hl'rL' thL·
i:11111plainant is 11r appL'ars t\"> he in th1.: TSDH. TSC \\ ill pn,, id1.• l:'1lpic~ nf
tho: L'1 implaim kt11.•1· and other rclc\ ant i11 I~ ln11al il>ll t\1 ~ l .. IC a11J.. or the
1111rninating originating agency 111 ass ist 111 thL' rcs()futinn ,1l"thc l:'1>mph11111.
·1SC,, ill thcn w,1rk ,, ith Nc·1C and ur thc 1w111inati11g ,mginming
;1~l.'11e~. as appnipria11.·. IP lktenninc \\hl.'.lhL'r thc Cl)tnpl:1i11a111·s l:'urrcnt
:-talus in thc TS DB is appropriate based nn the most L'llrrl'nt. accurate. and
thorough infon11.itio11 ava iliJbh.:. TS(.." may ask NCTl. aml,or the
no111ina1i11giorigi11ating. .igi:m:y tn provi<.k upJated information or :111:ilysis
to assist in this ck1L'rn1i11atio11 as n-c-11 as for a n:cnrnml.:'ndati(ln un
:tddrl.:'s~ing the l:'mnplaint.
lkll.: nnination. A lh...- l"l:'\ i..:\\'ing the availahk inlt)n11a1in11 and cun:.idl.'ring
an) r...:c\1m1111~nda1ion l"ro111 thL' nn111i11ati11g l1riginati11 g ag_L'lll'~. TSC "ill
m.il-e a J..:h:r111inatio11 whctha the rt.'l:'md should rc111ai11 i11 till.'. TSDB.
Ii.I\ i.: it:- TSDR stallls 111ndilit"LI. ur bl.· n:nw,·l:'J. unkss th..: kg:d auth,1ri1:
11, 111akc ::. uch a Jct...:rmi11atil1n resit!...:~. in" hnk l'r in pan. with another
,l,:!Cll() . In StH:h cases. rsc ,,ill lllll~ prcp:m: a rCCPJlllllt.'lldation lilr thl'
d...:ci~ion-making agcnl.·y ;111d ,, ill impkm..:111 any Je1..:rmina1iun i.:.lnc..:
mad...:. rsc \\ ill tak1.· any 111.!L'l.'Ssary acli1lJI hi impkn11.•tll tho.: dc1i.:r111inati1111.
such a:. removing thl' rL'i.:onJ frnm the TSUH or nwditYin!! tht.' n:...:11rd 's
slatu:. in the TSt>B (e .g. .. downgralk fro111 Nn-Fly to Sch:ctL'l' ). lklim:
taking action that is i111.•onsistent with :1rc:co1nm1::ndalio11111"thl:'
110111in;i1ing/nrigi11ating :1gct1l:')', TSC \\'ill noti ry NC.TC. whid1 wi II eu11\ L'Y
th,11 dc11.•rmination hack tn the nrnni11:1ti11g/origin,1tinl! agcm:y. unkss th.:
11omi11ati11g,origi11ating agi.:nL·y i:- the l·l31. in,, hid1 c1s1.· TSC will l..'.11ntal"t
the I· Bl dirl.:'ctly. Th..: 1wmina1ing."origi11~11i11g agency \\ ill then he
r1.:spo11sibk fi)r addrc~sing the n1111lit.·1 "ith TSC or 1h1.· 1.kcisi1m-makin:!
agency either din:ctly 11r 1!m1ug h :\CTC. Thi: Panics \\ ill tl11.·n 1.·uprdina11.·
1111 an agrcl.'d-1~1 rcs1.1lu11un.
l pdall.: (1fthc TSDB . TSC will ..:n:-uri.: that TSDB rcl:'11rds arL'
appropri;1tdy ddcti.:d m 1111nlifii.>d in ac..:ordan...:L' "ith a determination (111 ;i
1nlrL·:-.s 111:itll.:r. TSl · will also, cri(,· that :-.uch renw, als or n11Hlilirn1it>11 ,
,.:arry o,·l.:'r 111 otlll·r :-1.:ri:1.•ning sy:;;1.:111~ that r1.•eci,-L' TSl)B dat.1 (e.g.,
TH 'Sil BIS. No-Fly 1.ist ).
I >cconlliction. In thl.:' evcnt nf a multi-a!!cncy nomination whl.:'rc the
1111111 i11;iti11g amlt1.1r orig inal i11g agcn..:il':-; dn not agree 1)11 ,, hal
n:cu11um:11datin11 sl111uld h..: mat.le 1)11 a :-.pc1.:ilic n:-drcs:-. maucr. TSC ,, ill

l{L'srnnsihilitiL'~

,.

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111.

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"O
request that lhc agcn<.:ics <.:onsuh with one another and share appropri:111::
i11funna1ion about the watchlistcd individual in an altcmpt 10 provide a
joint rcco111111cnda1io11 10 TS('. Ir the nominating/original ing agt·1H:ics
cannot agree t<1 a joint n:cornmcndation. TSC ( nr other agency with the
legal authority tt, make the dcdsion) will make the linal determination
considering the informnlinn provided by each agency .
Review Rclatt·<l to tvlisickntilkd Persons. Ir a complainant ·s ath crsc
c:--pcricnct· nr rnllcomc during terrorism screening is a rcsuh 111' hei11g :1
near match (.. misitkntificd··) to a record in the TSOB. and that t:lllnplain1
is n:krred t<, TSl' by tile screening agcncy. TS(.' \\·ill rC\"ie\\' the rccun.l in
the TSOl3, as tlcscribcd in thl'.' paragraphs abnve. 10 ensure the TSDH
record is valid and salislics the <.:rill'ria for inclusinn in the TSnn and
determine il'additinnal information can be added to TIDI ·:. the TSDH . or
1.:tthcr agency syslcms tl, reduce the likelihond or a l"u1 urc m isidcnt i lieal ion .
If the record does not mcl!l the criteria, it \,·ill be removed from the
TSIJB.

v11.

,·iii .

D.

AclministratiYc Appeals. TS( · will work with a scrt.:rni11g agency to ~1ssist
it in prm:essing any :1dministrali\'C appi:al ol"a redn:ss di:tenni11a1io11 lll'
other th:termination in which the TSDl3 was used . When TSC rt.:..:cin:s
notice rifan appeal, TS(' will notil)' NCTC and/or thi:
nominnling.inriginnting agcncy as S1)i)ll :1s pl1ssiblc. TSC \\'ill focilit:11('
1x11111m111icalio11s between the nominating/originating am! screening
agcn<.:ics on the following. issues: I I) determining \\'hat ma1eri:1l may hi::
rdcasable tn the individual during appc;tl ( if applicabk). and (2) updating
the analysis nl' :111y inl'ormation 1ha1 may have dcvclopetl sint.:c lhe original
tletcrtninati<1n and/or any information that \\'as pnwidcd hy lhc individual
on his or her bd1alr during the appeals process itself. .'\lh:r n:,·il.'.wi11g the
available inform:1lion ant! considi::ring any rceommenclntinn from the
nominating/originating .igcney. 1 SC will nwke a dctenninatinn whether
the record should remain in the TSDB. han: its TSDB stmus modified, or
be n:nl<\Vl.'d. unless the legal authority tn make such a dctcnni11a1ion
rcsidt·s. in whole or in pa,1. with another agency. In sud1 cases. TSC will
l111ly pn:parl.'. a n::c,1111mcnd,1tion for the decision- making agency and \\'ill
irnplc111cnt any tlcter111inati1\ll unct' made.
Litigation . When TS(.' becomes aware nl'li.tigation arisi11 g 11ut or terrorism
screening. TSC will notily NCT<..', tht: nnminating./nrigi1wting at!Cllcy. ,rnd
DO.I as snon ;1s possible.

Responsibilities or the National l'uuntcrterr(lrism l'enlcr:
Revie\\', Conrdination, and Resl'arch nf l'omclrunts. Upon receipt nl" a
eomplaim from TSC NCTC will revie\\' its holdings. notify the
nominating/originating agency nl"thc complaint. and prnvid<.: the
ll1)tnina1ing/originating agency \\'ith a copy nr the complaim f'or n:vic\\ .

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NCTC will then request that the nominating/orig inating. agcm:y and. as
apprnprintc, any nther agency with rclt:rnnL inlimnutinn, revic\\· their
holdings and prnvide NCTC inli)r111ation rL·kvant to the complaint. This
ma y include updah.•d information or analys is reg.arding. the complainant' s
current status in the TSDl3, derogatory i11li.1rmatit1n. identil:ying
information that might he relevant ln n mi:·iiden·tilii..:ation, 1>r other
potentially rekv:1111 inlimnation or analysi s ( i11dudi11g that which tends lll
sh11w that the individual is nut a k1H1wn or suspected terrorist. or " ·hich
otherwise tends lo cast doubt on 1hi: derogatory inli1r111a1ion). N('TC will
alsn request that the 11u111i11a1ing/nriginating ag.c111:y provide its
n:eommcndation regarding rL·solution of the complain 1. \Vith the
co!ll:urrem:e
the 11omi11a1ing/nrigi11a1i11g agency, NCTC will provide
that agency·s n:eommendation and any other relevant inltmnation ln TSC.
Should TSC or another ngcncy di sag ree with the n:cn1111ne11dn1ion, NCTC
will assist in lhc dcconffa:tiun process ns sci forth abnvc. NCTC ge nerally
\\'ill not rccdve or process co mplaints or appeal s for indi\'iduals
nominated only by lhl! FBI.
Re\'il'\\' Rdated ln rvlisidenl ilied Persl1 ns . Ir a cllmplainanl ·s acl\·crsc
c:xpcrienee or null.:omc during terrorism screening. was the ri:sult. nf being a
near match (.. misidentified") lu a reconl in th e TSDl3 . .ind thal cnmph1i111
is relerrcd to TSC by the sc reening agency. NCTC \\'ill work with TSC
and thl· n11minating/1irigi11ating agency lo cnsurc the TSDB record is valid
,11HI satisfies the..: critt:ria for inelusi1l11 in thc TSDB, and detcnninc ii'
additional information can be added to Tl DE, the TSDB, or other agency
sys tems lo reduce the likelihnnu nr a futun.: misidenlilication .
Update of TID E. NCTC will promptl y update TIDE records with any 11ew
derogatory or other relevant inft,rmation iincluLling. thm which ll·ncls tu
show that the individual is not a known m suspcctcd terrnri!',I, or which
otherwise tends 111 cast doubt un the J en·,gatnry information) pertaining lt1
individuals in the TSDB. NCTl' will also modity TIDE in a timely
foshion to rdkct modifications lo TSDl3 nominations resulting from a
redress complaint and will make npprnprialt' l'11angcs to a gi wn Tl DI :
record whL'll it is ncc.:cssury In Iri gge r ekdroniL·,illy eonlilrming changes Iii
the TSDU record .
Adminislrative i\ppcals. Nl'Tl' will work with TSC. as necclcJ, lo a~sist
it in processing. any administrative .ippeal ofa redress dc1crminatin11 nr
lllher tletcrmination in which tile TSDB was used. including coordinating
communicatinn bl.:!twccn TSC. the snccning agt'ncy. and the relevant
numinatingturiginating agency. as necessary. NCTCs primary rok will
be to coordinate administrative appeal requests by TSC with the
appropriate nrnninalingtnriginating agency in the lntdligc m:c ( ·ommunit y
utlu~r than th e Fl1I.

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R\.':sp1111:-ihili1ic:-. tl1°:,,-.:,,mi11ati11i2 Uri!.!ina1in!.! .\!!'-·ncil.':<
RI."\ ic\\. l'nnnlinatinn, and Rcscan.:h or t'limplaint:--. <>1K'-' n,,1ilicd 111' a
rcdrcs, '-·,1111plaint hy TSC 11r NCT( ·. thl.' 110111ina1ing,11rigi11a1in!:,! ag'-·nc:
\\'ill n:vil'W 1hc dCrn!,!atory inlimna1ion 1hat is 1hc h;1si:--. 1i1r i1H:ludi11g th'-·
complain.mt in thl' TSl)IL In Cullnlinati1111 with ;\J( ' IC. \\'hL'll apprnpriatL·.
the nu111i11atin~/1)J'igi11a1ing agency will naluatc \\'hcth'-'" the L'nmplain:1111
cn11ti1HIL'S 111 satisJ~· lhl.' niti:ria li1r im:lusi,111 in till' TSDl3. a, \,ell :t'.-- any
11thcr rck\'mll t:ritcria. su\.'11 as those liir the Nt'1-FI~ and S1:lcL·t1:I.' l.isb . Thi.'
1111111i11a1ing originaling ag'-·11cy \\ ill determine wllcthcr updated
inJi1nna1i1111 ,1r analysi~ c:\i~1~. in..:l11di11g inl'i1rmatinn fr,1111 other a~i:.·ru:ir.::,.
iln<l i11c,1rp11ra1c an: such inl<.1rmati(1n in i1.s l'L'Spnnsc. The
1H1111i11a1ing l1rigina1in~ ag..:ncy ,, ill :ii"'' L·nnsiJcr any inli•rrn.111,,11
prm ilkJ thniugh the r..:dn:ss pr,,<.:ess hy !hi.' inJi, idual. tlK· sl..'rcening.
a;,!L'lll..'y . N( 'T(. . nr I'S(· The 1111rnin:1ting-~•rigina1i11g :1g.L·t1c: s hall 1akl.·
;rppmpriate ~kps 111 modi I)'. L'OITl.'CI. <11' tkktc its IH1ldings to n:11.:cl any
changl..'s mack to Tl I)fas a result t1f' till· rt:dress pn.11:c~s. or that other\\ i,l..'
ha,·L· hl..''-'11 dctenninl..'d 10 he in crrc,r a~ a rc~ull orthc rL·drl..'sS prnc1.:ss.
ii .
lh:!;tllnmcn<lation. The nominating/originating agenL·y may 111akc a
n::co111111cndali<111 to TSC as Ill thl..' n:s11lu1inn (1r any cornplai111. ( ·n11tim1ed
i11cl11siu11 in the TSI )B m11s1 ht: s11ppnrtL'd hy tkr11ga1nry inli1nna1io11 in
TII )I·:. \\'hL·n thr.: 110minatillg'ori~_!in:11inl,'. agl..'lll.'.: has :1dditi,111al den,gatl1r~
"" ,11hl..'r rdc\ant i11!"11r111ati1111 that i:-. 11111 in l'll)E. lhl..'
1H1minati11g ·origi11a1i11g a~enc: ,, ill l..'nsurl..' 1ll:11 '.\:CT<. · aml ·1 Sl · :1rr.:
nPt itil.'tl. and \\ ii I \\lirl- ,, ith ;-(Cll · :111d TSl · 11, ~nsurc 1h.11 s111.:l1
int'11nnation is at.kkd In ·1 II >E in a 111a1111L'I' 1ha1 pnn ilks m..::iningt'ul
i11ll1nnatiun ,, hi!..: proh:t:ting st1t11\.:l..':--. .iml llh:tht,tb. I.:\ l.'ry dfort sh()tdd h1:
111ad1:. h,m'-'' er. 111 share thL· dl..'wgatory i111i,r111atinn "1th r:-;1 · \\ hl..'111:, l..' r
p,,ssihk.
lkl'\)llllidinn . l11 lhl..' L'\'L'llt ora 111ulti-a~c11cy nomi11alion \\'hl'l'L' lllL'
111.
110111i11:11i11g und/or nri~inating agencies do 1111! :ign!L' nn \\'h:tl
ri:L·11111111l..'11dalio11 should h1.: madi.: 011 ~1 sp..:cilic reJrL·ss 111a1tL·r. thl.' agl..'11ciL'!-,, i II \.·\msull \\'ith I lllL' am1t hL'r at TS( .. s r.:qu1.:s1 and sh:m: appr11pri;11..:
i111"11n11a1i1.111 ab1Hll lilt.: \\atchlistcd imli, idual in an allL'lllpt 111 pn,\ iJ.: :1
j,1i111 rl..'i:11mmc1Hlalil,n tn TSC. I I' the 11nminati11g.-'t1ri;;in~t1 inµ aµcncks
t:a1111ut ;ign.:t: 111 a ,i11in1 rr.:l.'.1111\111t:nda1i,111, T"'l' "ill mah...: thL' final
dctern1in,Hil,n L'nnsidering all nl' thr.: a, ailahk inli1nnatill11.
1,.
Re, il..'\\ RL'lated 11, \lisidcntiliL'd Pcr:-.P1b . If ,, c11mpla111:m1 ·s a,hL'r:--.L'
..:, pl·rit.:lll.'l..' durin g 1crrnri-;m ~acening \\ as the r'-·~ult Pt' bl..'in ~ a near mat rh
1"111isidc111ilicd··1111 a r..:corJ in 1h,: TSl>lL lhl..' nominating.,,rig.i11ati11g
agency 111"1ha1 rcc11rd will "ork "i1h TS( · and Nert ·. as appropri:11c. Ill
L"llsurc th'-· T~DB l'\.'L'11nl is ,·alid and sati:-.lics the crilL'ria fiir inclus inn in
the TS Im. and ii' additi(lnal i11li1rnwtin11 can he adtkd to I'll )I ·.. the TSl>IL
11r otli'-·r agcru.:y sysl\.'ms 11, reduce the likclihoml or a ru111rL'
111 isitknti lkation.
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Adminis1ratin: Appeals. Each m1mina1ingtoriginaling agcncy will wnrk
with TSC and NC'TC. as nct:dl·d , lo assist them in 1m1ccssing an appeal or
a redress determination or other detcrminatinn in whid1 the TSDl3 \\ib
used. The nominatingiorigin.iting agcnt:y will be responsible for advising
the sen:t:ning agcm:y on thc rdeasability or any materials requested by an
appellant during an appeal. An updntcd analy:iis all rckvant
information will be co11rdi11i1tl.!<l hel\\'\:'t:11 Nl'TC and tht:
nrnnina1inglorigina1ing. agl'lll'Y, and will hr.: forwarded to TSC which in
turn will providr.: it 10 the sL:recning ugc.:ney. The analysis will consider
any nc,v inl'ormalion ckvclopcd sinec Ille initial determination, as well a:,
any information proviucd by the individual on his or her own bchalr
during !ht: appeals process itsclC

ur

or

l{cs wnsibilities
the Department llr .lustit:e:
1.
DO.I will coordinate with the rclcvanl Panics during. the defense nf uny

11.

judicial dialknge 10 the rc:,olution ora l'Omplaint processed un<ler 1his
\tlOU 11r a tkh:nninalion by a screening. agency that relied in whnle or i11
part on n.:cords or i11formatio11 in the TSDL3.
DO.I \\•ill •con:mll with the Parties, as necessary, lo provide continuing
kgal advice .ind support un matters rdated 111 watdilisting redn::ss and this
:vlOLJ.

( j'

Visa Application Process; DOS and OJ IS Resnunsihilitics at lhl' Time nl' Visa
Rcl'usal :
1.
DOS and DHS will continue to rnmply \\'ilh npplicabk- visn procedurl?s,
which may include an at-post internal n:vicw by n supervisory consular
ti nicer or anolhcr appropriate onkial. While a consular tiffker's tknial of
a visa appli..:ation may not he nverrukd. that <lett::rmination is informed hy
an internal 111anag~·rncnt review :m<l, in appnipriate t:ases. by input from an
interage111:y n:\·ie\\·.
11.
Ir a visa application is refust:<l. applicams are advised that they may reapply li1r a \'isa. A suhscqu..::nt applicalion is consitkn:d ,is a new case.
DOS agrees lo conlim1c 10 review the underlying Jala and foc1s in such
suhscqw:nl applications . \Vhcncvcr appropriate, DOS consults with TSC.
NCTC. and other agencies regarding dat.1 that appears it1c(1mplctc (II'
inac1.:ura1c. nr otherwise conllicts with infornrntion ,.1h1ained in the Yisa
application prucess.

Sl:TTI.H.·11•: NT OF DISPUTES
1::-.L·cpl as set li.1rth in paragraphs 4.l'.\' and 4.F.iii t:1mcerni11g the deconllictinn ur waLchlist
nominati,111s. disagreements between the Parties .irising under or related to this MOU will he
resolved only hy t:on:,;ullation bdween the Parties.

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1111: R PR< )\"ISi< >\:S

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This f\11 H. i:-- 1111L intcntkd lo i:ontlict with i:ilhcr tht: l"onstitulinn ur current kd1..'ral :--1a1u1cs.
rcg11l,111011 s. or the din.:d i,-i.:s of thc Part k s. Ir any term or prov is inn nf this :\ I< ll ; is incnnsi s1t::111
with such authorit y, 1hc11 the krm or pro,·ision shall be inapplicahk to tha1 Pany and any otllcr
Party that is deprndcnt upon Lhc rirsl P,1r1y·s action tu pcrliinn i1s rcsponsihilitics. hut the
rcmainitt t! tcnm, and L'ondiLi1111s 111' this \HH l shall continue 111 apply .

·1hi:-- \I( H ' may he amended at an: time h: till: mutual \Hi Iten L'llll:.-L'nt uf tlh: P,irti c:--· aut}H)fi /.L'd
1\:prl.':--cntati, c:-.. \h1d ilic:1tiun within tllL' scnpc 111' 1h1s \l< n · shall he mat.IL' h: thL· is:--11 :11h:L' ,11' a
full : L'\cc uh:d add.::ndum pri11r lo an:, l.'h;1n~c :-- i11 ri.:spons ihilit1i.:s bt.:in:c1 pcrli1r111cd .

s.

rt·. R\II N .-\TION

The terms nr thi!'. l'Vl(.)l 1. as ii 111ay be :11llL'1tded. will remain in L·l"!i.:ct indelinitt::ly . T11 h:rminatc
its participatillll in this Ml>l 1• a Party must g iVL' at kasl 30 days prim writh:1111,11ii.:t.:. 111 thl' L'H•nl
11f ll'r111ina1in11. i.:ach ParLy \\ ill l'ontinuc wi1h lirll pan1cipa1i1111 up 1n thi: cffi.:c1i, l' dale 1if'
lt:nn i11:11 i1 lll .
,1

\: ( > OHLICi:\TI<

):\ l >F FL~ DS

rl1i s /\I< ll : dnc...; 1w1 l'.l\llstitutl' an obligation w i.::--..pl'nd rund:-- hy :rn;- Part) . l 'nkss othL'I"\\ is1.·
:1grt:l'd in" riling. l'ad1 Part~ shall bear an~ ct1s1 s. ii inl'urs in rl'lati1in to thi-. \ I( ll . F,pl'nd itmL·:-,, ill ht: suhjl'ct tt1 k1.kral hudgctary prPccssl's and a\'ailahilit~ nl' fund s purs uant t, 1 :1pplicahk
la\\ s :111d reg ulations. ·1he Parlil.'s l'Xprcssly ad~11tndcdge that thi:-- \JUL: in nn ,, ay implies tha1
l'nngrcss will appro pri,11t.: funds li.w sut:h l':Xp1.·11di1un:s.

I<>.

~ !]_J!._I_s_lV ATE Rll ii ITS

Thi s t'vl( H : is an inh:rnal arra11ge1111:nt het,wl'n the Panit.:s and is 11()1 inte nded. and sh11trld 1H1t hl'
-:rni:-trul'd. 111 crl':rtl.' an~ right 1lf bl.'nL'lil. suhs1a111i, l' ur prni.:l'dural. enli1r1.·1.·ahk at
ur
ntht.·n, i<;l' h: an:, third part~ a~ ains1 the Parlit.:s. th .:: ir p:m:nt nr L·11mpnnl.'nt agt:111.: il.':-.. th..- L 111t1: d
~ta11.·s. 1•r thl' nlfo.:i:r:--. t:mph1_yt:L's. agent ~ nr 111hi.:r associated pcr:..(11111c l Lhcrcn l".

ta,,

11 .

1-.l·FHTl\'I-: l).\TI :

l'hc t(·mis n r thi s \ !Ol · \\ iII hL·cnm e c t'fix:Ii, ·i:
fhL· \ J( H · 111:1y hL· signed in L·1111ntcrp.ir1S.

1\11

thl' date

1111 ,,

hkh it is s1g_nl'd hy :ii I P:irtii:s

·r hL· RL·sp1111 s ihk Olfo.: ials dc:-.i gnatc.:d by the.: l'artic:-. purs uant tu

annual has is tir at Lile rt.·q11cs1 or any P:irt~

11 1 discuss

and

1\~\ ·icl\

SL'l'lil111 ---l . .-\ .i \\ ill mcc.:t \lll ,111
the i111pklllL't1tali(111 l,r thi s
I;

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"O

iv!( )LI . Failun: or the parties Lo conduct annual reviews will nnt result in the tennin:1lit)n nr
acti\-ities provided for under this i\ IOU .
1

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POINTS OF CONT t\CT

Pl1ints of contact ( POC's) 1hr the Parties. identi fled belt)\\', arc responsible for idcnti fying the
respnn~iblc officials and redress resources pursuant tn sections 4.A.i and ii. and 4 .B.ii and
providing that inforrnatio11 to the other POC's.
i\.

B.

('
D.

I:.
F.
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The POC f<.H· the Depnrtment ol'Justicc will he the ChidPrivacy and Ci,·il
Liberties Ulfo:cr.
The P< )(' for the Federal Bureau 111' Investigation will he the Scl'.linn l'hicf' or the
Natilmal Threat Center Sectinn. l'ounterlerrorism Division .
Thl· f>OC for the Terrorist Screening. Center will be th1:: Privacy Ofliccr.
The PUC for the National Cnu11tcrtcrroris111 Center will be the Chier of thl"
Terrnrist Identities Ciroup.
The POC for the l)eparlmi::nt ol' Homeland Security will be the Director ol'thc
Scn:cning Co1>rJination Olfo.:c.
The POC for the Dcpartim~nt or State will be the Dir~ctor or Information
l1vlanagL'11lt'llt and Li.iison Slal{ Vis.i Uffa:t:.
The PO(' for 1hc Offo:e or thi: Director of"Natitinal l111clligence " ·ill be the Civil
Lihcrties Prntcctinn Officer.
The POC for the Ce111ral lt1tclliuencc /\gem:y \\'ill he the Chief or Policy and
Co111111u11ity Action Staff ( PCAS ).
The POC for the Department of Defense \\'ill h1..· the Dircctllr. Joint lntclligcnL·e
Task Fon.:c ror Combating Terrorism. lkknsc lnh!lligcncc 1\gcncy .
The PO(' for the Dcpart111ent or the Treasury will be the Assistant General
Counsel ( Enforcement and Intelligence).

The foregoing represents the understanding rc:ichcd by the Parties.

APPROVED BY:

- - - -- - ·· - -

Condolcezza Rice
Secretary
Swtc

or

- - -··- - -

Henry M. Paulson, Jr.
Secretary of the Treasury

Date

Oate

f. ~ls±,~
;:y
General

Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense

- ··· - - -

- - -- - --

Date

Michael ChcrtolT
Secretary of Homeland Security

Date

John D. l'-:cgropontc

Date

Director of l\ational l ntclligcncc

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Robc'i-is. Mucllcr7 Jtr

Director, Federal 43urcau of Investigation

-·- - -

John Scott H.cdd

Date

Director, National Countcrterrorism Center

ayden
·

·,

Date

c:ncy

rrorisl Screening Center

16

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The foregoing represents the understanding reached by the Parties.
APPROVED BY:

Condolecu.a Rice
Secretary of State

Date

Henry M . Poulson, Jr.
Secretary of the Treasury

Date

Alberto R. Gonzales
Attorney General

Date

Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense

Date

Michael Chertoff
Secretary of Homeland Security

Date

Johnk.!t1~
Director of National Intelligence

15

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Robert S. Mueller, m
Di.rector, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Date

National Counterterrorism Center

Gen. Michael V. Hayden
Diroctor, Central Intelligence Agency

Date

Richard S. Kopel
Acting Director, Terrorist Screening Center

Date

16

.-\PPH.O VED B\' :

--- ■

Con<lolecz;,a Rice
Sccn:tary or Slak

Date

I lt:nry \1. f>,·1uls0n. Jr.
SL:crctary c,f the lrl'asu~·

Datt'

----

- --

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:\lbertu R. ( i(.\nzalcs

:\ttorn~y ( icneral

Rohen 1' 1. Gales
Scm;tary of (kfcnsc

Dare

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__- -··

Dale
ary of I ll)meland Securil~

John D. Negropontc
Director of National I ntdligcnct!

Date

15

The foregoing represents the understanding reached by the Parties.

APPROVED BY:

05/lJ/WO]
Date

Henry M. Paulson, Jr.
Secretary of the Treasury

Date

Alberto R. Gonzales
Attorney General

Date

Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense

Date

Michael Chcrtoff
Secretary of Homeland Security

Date

John D. Negroponte
Director of National Intelligence

Date

15

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APPROVED BY :

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Co11dolcc2za Rice
Secretary of State

/;]~ _/;/1 , -.~.~;
H'

M. Paulson, Jr.

Date

febroorv

Date

Secretary of the Treasury

Alberto R. Gonzales
Attomcy General

Dale

9-1
Date

Michael Chcrtoff
Secretary of Homeland Security

John D. 1':egropontu
Director of National Intelligence

Date

,

?

2007-

January 7. 2010

\fE\IORA~Dl 'tvl FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENER.A L
THF. SF.CRETARY ENERGY

THF. SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAi. INTELLIGENCE
THE DIRECTOR OF THE CE:'!TRAL INTELLIGENCE r\GE;--;cv
THE DIRECTOR OF TllE FEDERAL Bl'. REAl ' OF
INVESTIGA Tl< >N
THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY Alil~NCY
THE DIRECTOR OF TIIE NATIONAi . COUNTERTERRORISM

CE~TER
Sl}l-\JECT:

Anemptct.l Terrorist Allack on December 25 . 2009: Intelligence.
Screcnine. ant.I Watchlisting System Corrective Actions

After rccei\'ing the wnclusion ~ of the White House-led review of the U.S. '"'atchlisting system
an<l the perfonnancc of the intelligem:e. homeland security.. an<l law enforcement communities as
related 10 the attempt tll bring down a Ddroit-hound flight on December 25 by detonating an
explosi\'e device. and a Department of Homeland Security-led rc\'icw on A \'iation Screening.
Technology and Procedures; l ha\'c concluded that immediate actions must be taken lo enhanci:
the security of the American people. These actions are necessary given inherent systemic
weaknesses and human errors revealed hy the review of e\'cnts leading up 10 Oecember 25°'.
They also arc required 10 ensure that the standards. practices . and husiness pn,ccsscs that have
been in place since th\! aftcm1ath of 9/J I are appropriately robust to aJJress the C\'OI\- ing tt:rrnrist
threat facing. nur Kat ion in the coming years.

Department of State
•

Rc\'icw visa issuance and revocation criteria and processes. with special emphasis on
counterterrorism concerns: detennine how technology enhancements can facilitate and
strengthen visa-related husiness processes.

Dcp:•rtmcnt of Homeland Security
•

Aggrc.ssi,·ely pursue enhanced scri:-cning tt!chnology. protocols. ::md proce<lurcs.
t!Spt:..:ially in regard to aviation anJ other 1r,msportatiun sectors. consistent with pri\'acy

rights and civil liberties: strengthen international partnerships aml coordination on
aviation security issul.!s.
•

Develop recommendations on long- Lenn law i:nforcement requirements for aviation
security in coordination with the Department of Justice.

Director of National Intelligence
•

lmmcJiately rcallim1 and clarili· roles and responsibilities of the coumerterrorism
analytic components of the Intelllgence Communjty in synchronizing. correlating. and
analyzing all sources
intelligence related to terrorism.

or

•

Accelerate information lcchnology enhancements. to include knowledge discovery.
database integration. cross-database searches. and the ability to correlate hiographic
infom1ation v,:ith terrorism-related intelligence.

•

Take rurther steps to enhance the rigor am1 raise the stanJanl of tratlecr::.ift of intellig<.!m:c
analysis. especially analysis designed to uncover and prevent terrorist plots.

•

Ensurc resources are properly aligned wiih issues highlighted in strategic \\aming
analysis.

The Central Jntelligc11cc Agency
•

Issue guidance aimed at ensuring the timely distrihution of intelligence reports .

•

Strengthen procedure:; related ll> how wati.:hlisting infom1ation is entered. reviewed.
searchcd. analyzed. and acted upon.

Federal Bureau of lnvcstigationffcrrorist Screening Center

or

•

Conduct a thorough review
Terrorist Screening Database holdings and ascertain
current \"isa status of all ··known and suspected terrorists:· hcginning with thc No Fly list.

•

Dc\"clop recommendations on whether adjustments are ncetlcd to the watchlisting
Nominations Guidance, including biographic and derogatory criteria for inclusion in the
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment and Terrorist Screening Database. as well as
the subset Sdectcc and i\o Fly lists.

National Counterterrorism Center
•

Establish and rl!sourcc appropriately a process to prioritize and to pursue thoroughly and
exhaustiwly terrorism threat threads. to include the identification of appropriate followup aclion by th-.: intelligc-nl!e. law enforccmenl. and homeland security communities.

•

Establish a dedicated capahili1y rcsponsihlc for enhancing record infom,atinn on possible
ccrrnrists in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Em·ironment for \vatd1listing purposes.

National Security Agenc)"
•

Develop and begin implementation of a training course lo enhance analysts' awareness of
watchlisting processes and procedures in partnership with National Countcrtcrrorism
Terrorist Center and the Terrorist Screening Center.

:'.'Jational Security Staff
•

Initiate an intcragency policy process to review the systemic failures leading to the
ancmptcd terror al1ack on December 25. 2009, in order to make needed policy
adjustm ents an<l to clarit~· roles and rc!sponsibilities \\ithin the countcrterrorism
conununit;, .

•

Initiate an intcrag.cncy rcvic,v of the watch listing process. including business processes.
procedures. ru1d criteria for watchlisting, and the interoperability and sufficie.ncy
supporting infom1ation technology systems.

or

I ha,·c designated my Assistant for Homdand Security and Count1..:rtcrrorism John Brc:nnan to bt:
rhc rcsponsihlc and accountahk \Vhitc H0use official t0 ensure rapiJ progre ss is made in all
areas ...;.\ monthly status report o n actions und1::rway should be submitted tll m1: through Mr.
I3n.:nnan. fn addition. I am directing Mr. 11rennan to work with departments and agencies and
the Office
ivl:magemcnt and Budget on resource requirements th.n are necessary to address the
shortcomings uncovered by our reYiew. Finally. I will ask my Intdligencc :\d\'isory BoarJ to
tonk at hroader analytic and intelligence issues associated with this incident, including how to
meet the challenge associated wi.th cxpll1iting the en:r-incrcasing nilume 0f infonnation
available to the Intelligence Community . As we gn forward . it is impcrath·e that we \\'L1rk
together to correct pn.ibkms highlighted hy this incident. 1i.11.: using on concrete :mlutions. We arc
all responsible for the safety anJ security of the American people and must redouble our eff011.
to be d'foctivc in carrying out this solemn responsihility .

or

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
Acronym

Addendum B

A-File
AIS
ALA
APT
ATM
ATS
CBP
CBRN
CCD
CIA
CJIS
CLASS
CTD
DC
DCI
DHS
DlA
DoD
DOJ
DOM EX
DOS
DSR
OTO
EFPs
EMA
ERO
ESEL
ESTA
FBI
FlN
FISA
FGI
FTO
FTTTF
HAZMAT
HSPD-11

Description

Addendum B to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Integration
and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism, Signed
by The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary
of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central
lntelligence Agency, the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center, the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center
Alien Registration File (DHS)
Automated Identification System
Airport Liaison Agents and Attaches (FBI)
Advanced Passenger Information
Automated Teller Machine
Automated Targeting System (DHS)
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (DHS)
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear
Consular Consolidated Database (DOS)
Central Intelligence Agency
Criminal Justice Information Services Division (FBI)
Consular Lookout And Support System (DOS)
Counterterrorism Division (FBl)
Deputies Committee
Director of Central Intelligence (now the DNI)
Department of Homeland Security
Defense Intelligence Agency (DoD)
Department of Defense
Department of Justice
Document and Media Exploitation
Department of State
Daily Summary Reports (TSC)
Designated Terrorist Organization
Explosively Formed Projectiles/Penetrators
Encounter Management Application (TSC)
Enforcement and Removal Operations (DHS/ICE)
Expanded Selectee List
Electronic System for Travel Authorization
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Fingerprint Identification Number (DHS)
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Foreign Government Information
Foreign Terrorist Organization
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FBI)
Hazardous Materials
Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 11 , Comprehensive
Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

0

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
Acronym
HSPD-24
HSPO-6
l&A
IAFIS
lAP
ICE
IED
!IR
lNA
Information
Sharing MOU
IP

JPC
IRTPA
ISA
!SE
JTTF
JWlCS
KSTF
LEGAT
LEO
LPR
MOU
NCIC
NCTC
NDIU
NICS
NIPF
NIPF-CT
NlV
NMEC
NORTHCOM
NTC-C
NTC-P
NVMC

Description

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-24, Biometrics for
Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, Integration and Use of
Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism
Office of Intelligence & Analysis (OHS)
Integrated Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (FBI/CJIS)
f mmigration Advisory Program
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (OHS)
Improvised Explosive Device
Intelligence Information Report
Immigration and Nationality Act
Memorandum of Understanding between the f ntelligence Community,
Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland
Security Concerning Information Sharing, dated March 4, 2003
Internet Protocol
lnteragency Policy Committee (IPC) is an interagency group led by the
White House National Security Staff to establish Administration
policies
Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act
The Information Sharing and Access Jnteragency Policy Committee
(ISA IPC) is the While House led group that specifically addresses
watch listing policies for the U.S. Government
Information Sharing Environment
Joint Terrorist Task Force
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
Known or Suspected Terrorist File (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
National Crime Information Center,formerly Violent Gang and
Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF))
Legal Attaches (FBI)
Law Enforcement Online
Lawful Permanent Resident
Memorandum of Understanding
National Crime Information Center (FBI)
Nati.onal Counterterrorism Center
Nominations and Data Integrity Unit (TSC)
National Instant Criminal Background Check System
National Intelligence Priorities Framework
National Intelligence Priorities Framework - Counterterrorism
Non-Immigrant Visa
National Media Exploitation Center
Northern Command (DoD)
National Targeting Center - Cargo (DHS/CBP)
National Targeting Center - Passenger (DHS/CBP)
National Vessel Movement Center (OHS)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
Acron~·m

Descripti on

OTA
OTW
PI ERS
PNR
POE
ROD

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/TSA)
One Time Waiver
Passport Information El ectronic Records System
Passenger Name Records
Port of Entry
Radioactive/Radiation Dispersal Device
Memorandum of Understanding on Terrorist Watch list Redress
Procedures
Specially Designated Global Terrorist
Specially Designated Terrorist
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
Subject Matter Expert
Specially Designated Nationals List
Single Review Queue (TSC)
Tipoff Australia Counterterrorism information Control System
Threat-based expedited upgrade
No longer an acronym. Previously Treasury Enforcement
Communications System.
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment
Not an acronym. Also seen as Tipoff
Terrorist Review and Examination Unit (TSC)
Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS)
Transportation Security Administration (OHS)
Terrorist Screening Center
Memorandum of Understanding on the Integration and Use of
Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism
Terrorist Screening Database
Terrorist Screening Operations Center (formerly Terrorist Screening
Tactical Operations Center (ISTOC))(TSC)
Terrorist Screening Operations Unit (fSC)
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (now NCTC)
Tipoff United States Canada
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (DHS/TSA)
United States
Unclassified, for official use only
United Nations Security Council Resolution
Uniform Resource Locator
United States Agency for International Development
United States Coast Guard (DHS)
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS)
United States Secret Service (OHS)
Vehicle Identification Number
Watchlist Service (DHS)

Redress MOU
SDGT
SOT
SIPRNET
SME
SDNL
SRQ
TACTICS
TBU
TECS
TIDE
TIPOFF
TREX
TRIP
TSA
TSC

TSC MO U
TSDB
TSOC
TSOU
TTIC
TUSCAN
TWIC
U.S.
U//FOUO
UNSCR
URL
USAID
USCG
USCIS

usss
VIN
WLS

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

0

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/ SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Summary of Changes and Updates from the
2010 Watchlisting Guidance

/ ,.,.0Ut
..-• ..'"i·,.'
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...
. ...... ...~
~

*..-..(!1~.fOUO)

The Watchlisting Guidance is a comprehensive document detailing the U.S.
Government' s terrorist watchlisting policies and procedures. It was originally developed to help
standardize the watchlisting community' s nomination and screening processes. Since approval of
the Watchlisting Guidance in July of 20 I 0, the guidance and its related appendices have
undergone a thorough interagency review as a result of a May 2010 Deputy' s Committee tasking
to the White House National Security Staff Information Sharing and Access lnteragency Policy
Committee ((PC) that any significant issues or required changes be brought back to the Deputies
for discussion. The Information Sharing and Access IPC identified a number of changes in
Department and Agency watchlisting practices that had evolved since dissemination of the
guidance in 2010. In order to reflect these changes, the 2013 Watch listing Guidance was
developed over a period of several months by an IPC under the auspices of the Presidential Policy
Directive - One (PPD 1) process with representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury,
Defense, Justice and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Counterterrorism Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Terrorist
Screening Center. The Deputies Committee adopted the recommendation of the JPC to approve
the 2013 Watchlisting Guidance on March 12, 2013 .
(U//FOUO) The 2013 Watchlisting Guidance has a new structure and is organized in a way that
mirrors the watchlisting cycle. It is now a single document divided as follows into fives chapters,
with significant watchlisting foundational documents for reference, and a list of definitions,
acronyms, and abbreviations:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Chapter I : Watchlisting Process and Procedures;
Chapter 2: Minimum Identifying Criteria;
Chapter 3: Minimum Substantive Derogatory Criteria;
Chapter 4: No Fly>Selectee and Expanded Selectee Lists Implementation Guidance;
Chapter 5: Encounter Management and Analysis ;
Appendix l: Definitions;
Appendix 2: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6;
Appendix 3: Memorandum of Understanding on the Integration and Use of Screening
Information to Protect Against Terrorism (TSC MOU) ;
Appendix 4: Addendum B to the TSC MOU;

UNCLASSIFIED// FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/ SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.
No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520,
except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the
Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. Government
Agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/ SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORM ATTON

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Appendix 5: Memorandum of Understanding between the Intelligence Community,
Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security
Concerning Information Sharing (Information Sharing MOU) ;
Appendix 6: Executive Order 13388, Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism
Information to Protect Americans;
Appendix 7: Department of Justice Protocol on Terrorist Nominations;
Appendix 8: Memorandum of Understanding on Terrorist Redress Procedures (TSC
Redress MOU) ;
Appendix 9: Presidential Memorandum Regarding 12/25/2009 Terrorist Attack;
Appendix 10: Acronyms and Abbreviations;
Appendix 11: Summary of Changes and Updates from the 2012 Watchlisting Guidance.

(U//FOUO) The 2013 Watchlisting Guidance includes the following substantive policy changes
and updates:
•

New, amended, or clarified definitions are included for the terms "aggregator,"
''derogatory information," "encounter," "enhancement," "foreign fighters," "fragmentary
information," " known terrorist," " lone wolf," "operationally capable," " particularized
derogatory information," " reasonable suspicion," ''terrorism screening information,"
"terrorism and/or terrorist activities," and "U.S. Person" (Appendix 1);

•

Nominators are instructed to send available information to the National Counte1terrorism
Center for consideration and additional review where reasonable minds could disagree on
a record (Chapter 1);

•

Nominating Departments and Agencies are instructed to prioritize the identification of
new Known or Suspected Terrorists who meet the reasonable suspicion standard, along
with the identifying and derogatory information most useful to the watchlisting and
screening effort (Chapter 1);

•

Nominating Agencies are to conduct periodic reviews of their nominations of U.S.
Persons, at minimum on an annual basis (Chapter l);

•

Detailed instructions are described for handling U.S. Person information and ensuring that
proper coordination processes are implemented (Chapters l and 3);

•

The guidance regarding minimum identifying criteria has been revamped and exceptions
clarified (Chapter 2);

•

The guidance has been revised to provide Nominators with more flexibility regarding
nominations of individuals based on fragmentary information (Chapter 2);

•

The minimum substantive derogatory criteria guidance has been restructured to elaborate
on instances of where particularized derogatory information is required to meet the
reasonable suspicion standard, and when reasonable suspicion is established by other
authority (Chapter 3);
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/ SENSlTIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSlFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/ SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

•

The minimum substantive derogatory criteria has been restructured to enable the
watchlisting community to more clearly distinguish between watchlisting based on
substantive derogatory criteria that meets the reasonable suspicion standard from
watchlisting for purposes that support immigration and visa screening activities of the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State (Chapter 3);

•

Revised guidance is provided regarding the watchlisting of individuals based on
information provided by a foreign government (Chapter 3);

•

The guidance contains two additional categories of alien non-terrorists in the databases
maintained by the National Counterterrorism Center and the Terrorist Screening Center to
support immigration and visa screening activities of the Department of Homeland Security
and the Department of State (e.g. , individuals who have a defined relationship with the
Known or Suspected Terrorist, but whose involvement with the Known or Suspected
Terrorist's activities is unknown (TIDE Category Code 50) and aliens for whom
additional intelligence is required (TIDE Category Code 99)) (Chapter 3);

•

The Implementing Guidelines regarding the No Fly and Selectee List criteria have been
updated and clarified (e.g. , Guantanamo Bay detainees are now included on the No Fly
List, as required by 49 U.S.C. Section 44903U)(2)(C)(v)) (Chapter 4);

•

Use of the One Time Waiver Policy is addressed to facilitate travel under controlled
conditions of certain U.S. Citizen Known or Suspected Terrorists (Chapter 4);

•

The guidance reflects the creation of the Expanded Selectee List, an export to the
Transportation Security Administration of Known and Suspected Terrorist records within
the Terrorist Screening Database that contain a full name and complete date of birth to
support airline passenger screening (Chapter 4); and

•

The guidance reflects the authority of the Terrorist Screening Center Director to make
individual watchlist determinations (i.e., placement on the No Fly, Selectee and Expanded
Selectee Lists) during exigent circumstances (Chapter 4).

(U//FOUO) These changes to the Watchlisting Guidance are intended to make the watchlisting
process more flexible, agile, and inclusive in order to respond to additional terrorism threats whi le
providing the watchlisting community detailed guidance concerning the watchlisting policy of the
U.S. Government.
(U//FOUO) The 2013 Watchlisting Guidance describes the U.S. Government's comprehensive
watchlisting policies and process and includes Sensitive Security Information. Accordingly,
Departments and Agencies who received copies of the 2013 Watch Iisting Guidance are instructed
to carefully control and share the guidance with only those individuals who are directly involved
in the terrorist watchlisting and screening process.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/ SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFlCIAL USE ONLY/ SENSITIVE SECURITY TNFORMATTON

(U) Nothing in the 2013 Watchlisting Guidance is intended to restrict the authority of any
Department or Agency to act as provided by law, statute, or regulation, or to restrict any Agency
from enforcing any laws within its authority or jurisdiction.

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/ SENSlTlVE SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASS lr-lED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMAITON

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMAJTON
WARN ING: This record contains Sensit ive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR
parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to
know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation.
Unauthorized release may result in civi l penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies,
public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.