Naval Postgraduate School Thesis - Recommendations for Countering Prison Radicalization
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS ESTABLISHING A DERADICALIZATION/DISENGAGEMENT MODEL FOR AMERICA’S CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COUNTERING PRISON RADICALIZATION by Tony C. Parker March 2013 Thesis Advisor: Second Reader: Nadav Morag Patrick Miller Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE March 2013 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS ESTABLISHING A DERADICALIZATION/DISENGAGEMENT MODEL FOR AMERICA’S CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COUNTERING PRISON RADICALIZATION 6. AUTHOR(S) Tony C. Parker 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943–5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A Prison radicalization has been identified as a potentially significant threat to America’s homeland security. When considering the inmate population currently housed within the Federal Bureau of Prisons with a terrorism nexus and the fact that 95 percent of our inmate population will return to our communities, the need for a proactive posture to prison radicalization becomes evident. Currently, the United States has no prison deradicalization program. This thesis provides a comparative analysis of two deradicalization/disengagement programs currently utilized in Singapore and Saudi Arabia. The analysis identifies externally valid data that provides the basis for recommendations for United States correctional policymakers in building a framework for a United States prison deradicalization model. This thesis also examines the current literature, relevant to prison radicalization and the prison environment that may promote prison radicalization. Through an analysis of these environmental elements, specific recommendations are made that attempt to counter the contributing factors, within the prison environment, that make the prison setting a fertile ground for radicalization. 14. SUBJECT TERMS prison, radicalization, deradicalization, disengagement, correctional, prisoner, extremism, corrections, incarcerated, counter terrorism, Tennessee Department of Correction 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified NSN 7540–01–280–5500 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 105 16. PRICE CODE 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT ABSTRACT Unclassified UU Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ESTABLISHING A DERADICALIZATION/DISENGAGEMENT MODEL FOR AMERICA’S CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COUNTERING PRISON RADICALIZATION Tony C. Parker Assistant Commissioner of Prisons, Tennessee Department of Correction BS, University of Tennessee, 1995 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL March 2013 Author: Tony C. Parker Approved by: Nadav Morag Thesis Advisor Patrick Miller Second Reader Harold A. Trinkunas Chair, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Prison radicalization has been identified as a potentially significant threat to America’s homeland security. When considering the inmate population currently housed within the Federal Bureau of Prisons with a terrorism nexus and the fact that 95 percent of our inmate population will return to our communities, the need for a proactive posture to prison radicalization becomes evident. Currently, the United States has no prison deradicalization program. This thesis provides a comparative analysis of two deradicalization/ disengagement programs currently utilized in Singapore and Saudi Arabia. The analysis identifies externally valid data that provides the basis for recommendations for United States correctional policymakers in building a framework for a United States prison deradicalization model. This thesis also examines the current literature, relevant to prison radicalization and the prison environment that may promote prison radicalization. Through an analysis of these environmental elements, specific recommendations are made that attempt to counter the contributing factors, within the prison environment, that make the prison setting a fertile ground for radicalization. . v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................4 1. Primary Research Question ................................................................4 2. Secondary Research Questions ...........................................................4 B. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................4 C. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS .........................................................................6 D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................6 1. Prison Radicalization: Contributing Factors ....................................7 2. Prison Radicalization: Counter-Radicalization Strategies ............10 3. De-radicalization Policies: Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and United States .......................................................................................11 E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................14 II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CORRECTIONAL ENVIRONMENT ........................15 A. GROUPS AND SECURITY THREAT GROUP INFLUENCES .............16 B. INADEQUATE VETTING OF PRISON CHAPLAINS/RELIGIOUS VOLUNTEERS ..............................................................................................18 C. LOSS OF LIBERTY AND FAMILY CONTACT ......................................21 D. ABSENCE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING .......................................................................................................22 E. EXISTING U.S STRATEGY FOR HOUSING/PROGRAMMING INCARCERATED TERRORIST IN U.S. PRISONS ................................24 F. DERADICALIZATION OR DISENGAGEMENT: WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?..............................................................................................27 III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SINGAPORE’S PRISON DERADICALIZATION MODEL ............................................................................29 A. RATIONALE FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SINGAPORE’S DERADICALIZATION MODEL ...................................29 B. SINGAPORE’S GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE ................................29 C. SINGAPORE’S DEFINITION OF TERRORIST AND ACTS OF TERRORISM .................................................................................................30 D. SINGAPORE’S REALIZATION OF THE NEED FOR A PRISON DERADICALIZATION MODEL ................................................................31 E. SINGAPORE’S RELIGIOUS REHABILITATION GROUP (RRG) STRUCTURE .................................................................................................33 1. RRG’s Counseling Program .............................................................33 2. RRG Enhancing Prisoner Deradicalization by Engaging the Community .........................................................................................35 3. Internal Security Department’s (Singapore Prison System) Collaboration with RRG ...................................................................36 F. INTERNAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT’S (PRISON SERVICES) ROLE IN PRISONER DERADICALIZATION.........................................37 vii G. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS .....................................................................................40 IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAUDI ARABIA’S PRISON DERADICALIZATION MODEL ............................................................................41 A. RATIONALE FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAUDI ARABIA’S DERADICALIZATION MODEL............................................41 B. SAUDI ARABIA’S GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE.................................41 C. SAUDI ARABIA’S LEGAL SYSTEM AND ATTEMPT TO CODIFY TERRORISM LAWS ....................................................................................42 D. SAUDI ARABIA’S REALIZATION OF THE NEED FOR A PRISON DE-RADICALIZATION PROGRAM.........................................................44 E. SAUDI ARABIA’S PRISON DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM ........45 1. Advisory Committee ..........................................................................47 2. Religious Subcommittee Framework ...............................................49 3. Saudi Arabia’s Counseling Process ..................................................50 4. Psychological and Social Subcommittee Framework/Social Support................................................................................................51 5. Security Subcommittee Framework .................................................52 6. Media Subcommittee Framework ....................................................53 7. Detainee Family Members Role in the Program .............................53 F. PROGRAM’S SUCCESS ..............................................................................54 V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION .....................................................57 A. RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH LIMITATIONS ................................57 B. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE USED TO FORM A BASIS FOR THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF PRISON RADICALIZATION......................................................................................57 1. Productive Rehabilitation and Effective Security: The Dual Strategy ...............................................................................................58 2. Effective Monitoring and Control of Prison Groups ......................59 3. Rigorous Vetting and Monitoring of Prison Chaplains and Religious Volunteers ..........................................................................60 4. Encourage Positive Inmate/Family Social Interaction and Communication ..................................................................................61 5. Correctional Policy Should Encourage Social Research within Prisons .................................................................................................61 6. Provide Adequate Staff Training and Develop Intelligence Sharing Networks with Criminal Justice Partners .........................62 C. ANALYSIS OF THE TWO DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND SINGAPORE ..........................................................63 1. Program Rehabilitative Efforts (Cognitive or Educational) Used to Counter Violent Ideological Beliefs/Rationalizations That Support the Use of Violence to Promote a Political or Religious Agenda................................................................................64 viii a. 2. 3. 4. 5. Recommendation 1: Establishment of Voluntary Cognitive-based Counseling Program....................................65 Program Characteristics: Voluntary or Involuntary Participation and Incentives for Participation and Successful Completion..........................................................................................66 a. Recommendation 2: Incentives for Inmates ..........................67 Reported Success of the Programs ...................................................68 Methods Used to Promote Legitimacy and Validity to the Program That in Theory Increases the Program’s Success ...........69 a. Recommendation 3: Invest in Volunteers, Chaplains, and Psychological Professionals and Partner with Family Members ..................................................................................70 Methods of Aftercare or Post-Release Supervision ........................72 a. Recommendation 4: Develop and Implement a Vigorous Aftercare Initiative ..................................................................73 APPENDIX. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A U.S. PRISON DERADICALIZATION MODEL ............................................................................77 LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................79 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................87 ix THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK x LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Figure 2. Figure 3. Group’s Influence in Promoting Prison Radicalization ...................................17 Environmental Factors Conducive to Prison Radicalization ...........................24 Saudi Arabia’s Prison Advisory Committee ....................................................46 xi THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK xii LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ACA American Correctional Association BOP Federal Bureau of Prison CMU Communication Management Unit DO Detention Order FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation HSPI Homeland Security Policy Institute ICPVTR International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research ICTR International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation ISA Internal Security Act ISD Internal Security Department ISD Internal Security Department JI Jemaah Islamiyah JIS Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (Assembly of Authentic Islam) JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force LCP Law of Criminal Procedure MHA Minister of Home Affairs MOI Minister of Interior NJTTF National Joint Terrorism Task Force NYPD New York Police Department OIG Office of Inspector General PD Preventive Detention RO Restriction Order RRG Religious Rehabilitation Group SPS Singapore Prison Service STG Security Threat Group TDOC Tennessee Department of Correction TLO Terrorism Liaison Officer U.K. United Kingdom U.S. United States xiii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK xiv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This thesis is dedicated to the men and women who tirelessly work inside America’s prisons and jails with great courage placing themselves in harm’s way on a daily basis in an effort to maintain public safety. I acknowledge the correctional employees’ family members who sacrifice so much in supporting those who help keep America safe. I would like to express my appreciation to Tennessee Department of Correction Commissioner Derrick Schofield for his vision, encouragement, and support that allowed me to participate in this program. His leadership and recognition of the importance of education has made the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) a leader in the correctional field. I would like to acknowledge the many TDOC employees who supported and encouraged me throughout this process. Without their support and dedication, I could not have participated in this program. Words cannot begin to express my appreciation to my thesis advisor, Dr. Nadav Morag. His encouragement and timely advice, on many occasions, has helped me refocus and remain consistent in my thesis work. Thank you, Dr. Christopher Bellavita, for helping me to remain focused early in this process and for your words of encouragement. The steadfast support and accommodating nature of the entire CHDS staff have made this journey most enjoyable. Most importantly, I want to thank God, my family and friends for their support and love. Without the unwavering support of my beautiful wife, Misty, and my loving daughter, Madison, completing this program would not have been possible. Thank you both for believing in me and being agreeable to sacrificing much of our time together over the last 18 months. xv THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK xvi I. INTRODUCTION Scattered across the American landscape, shrouded by razor wire and security watch towers, resembling air traffic control stations, are America’s correctional facilities. Within each correctional facility lives a restrictive, multifaceted community of individuals who collectively make up the inmate population of the United States. This unique population, prone to violence and antisocial behavior, has been identified as being vulnerable to a lethal phenomenon known as prison radicalization.1 For the purpose of this research, prison radicalization is defined as a cognitive process whereby inmates develop a violent, extremist mindset that legitimatizes the need and use of violence to promote a political or religious agenda. Prison radicalization has left its footprint on society through the actions of individuals such as Kevin James, Jose Padilla, and Michael Finton.2 Inmates, who were radicalized inside correctional facilities and set forth on a mission, within our neighborhoods, to kill and destroy to promote their ideology. Kevin James was 21 years old and a Crip gang member when he entered California State Prison for robbery.3 James founded the extremist group Jam’iyyat UlIslam Is-Saheeh (Assembly of Authentic Islam or JIS) while incarcerated in California’s New Folsom State Prison. James used his gang influence and charismatic personality to radicalize and recruit fellow gang members as well as encourage other members to recruit once released on parole.4 Outside of prison, members planned terrorist attacks on Los Angeles area synagogues, military facilities, and the Israeli consulate. Jose Padilla is currently serving a 17-year sentence for conspiracy to commit murder.5 Padilla converted to Islam in prison and associated himself with members of al1 Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation Understanding the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008); Frank J. Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization: A Special Report (Washington, DC: George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2006). 2 House Committee on Homeland Security, Background Information on Prominent Post-9/11 U.S. Prison Radicalization Cases (Washington, DC: Committee on Oversight and Government Affairs, 2011). 3 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 70. 4 Ibid. 5 Committee on Homeland Security, Background Information, 3. 1 Qaeda before becoming a member himself. He plotted multiple “dirty bomb” attacks on U. S. targets prior to being arrested on May 8, 2002.6 Michael Finton was radicalized in an Illinois prison and later conspired with an undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent to murder Representative Aaron Schock by setting off a bomb outside the congressman’s office.7 Although not every radicalized prisoner commits an act of terrorism, it is critical that we realize every radicalized prisoner poses a significant security threat that deserves proactive attention. Although the number of individuals under corrections supervision declined 1.3 percent in 2010, the United States continues to maintain the largest prison population in the world at just over 1.6 million inmates.8 Ninety-five percent of the inmate population in the United States will be returning to our communities.9 One of the most critical responsibilities all correctional systems share is providing inmates rehabilitation opportunities that enhance their chances of becoming law abiding citizens upon their return to society. Currently, the United States has no deradicalization/disengagement model to combat prison radicalization. The American prison system exemplifies many of the variables that have been identified as promoting radicalization. Prisons are described as isolated environments, full of socially isolated souls desperately searching for a sense of self identification.10 In such an environment, inmates become easy targets for radical extremists searching for individuals to join their cause. It is important to note that the majority of American inmates are incarcerated in state prisons and local jails.11 Considering the high volume of inmates incarcerated locally, the United States must focus on the potential for 6 Committee on Homeland Security, Background Information, 3. 7 Ibid. 8 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “U.S. Correctional Population Declined for Second Consecutive Year,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/p10cpus10pr.cfm (accessed May 3, 2012). 9 Timothy Hughes and Doris J. Wilson, Reentry Trends in the United States (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004). 10 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 38. 11 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “U.S. Correctional Population Declined,” 1. 2 radicalization within state and local correctional facilities and not just in federal prisons. We must recognize prison radicalization as a significant concern and threat to America’s homeland security. Prison radicalization is not exclusive to Islamic radicalization; although Islamic radicalization, based on prior incidents of prisoners being radicalized in prison and engaging in terrorist activity, seems to be most prevalent. Frank Cilluffo’s testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs identified the ever-present threat of right-wing radicals and terrorists. Although not sharing the same in-group with the Islamic Jihadist, these groups will join efforts in promoting their hatred of the United States government and Israel.12 In recognizing the importance of countering all forms of radicalization (Islamic, right wing, etc.), it is also important to recognize that prison radicalization and prison security threat group (STG) activity are entirely different components of destructive activity. Although prison gangs are one of the most destructive forces inside our correctional facilities today and, in some cases, STG activity has been used as a tool to help recruit and promote prison radicalization, most security threat groups (STG) are criminally oriented and their violent actions are not driven by a political or religious ideology.13 Currently, opportunities for prison radicalization permeates the perimeters of our correctional facilities unchecked and traveling in both directions. The radicalized message enters the correctional environment through numerous avenues. Radicalized inmates, unvetted radical chaplains, extremist propaganda labeled as religious material, illegal cell phones, and social media sites deliver the messages of intolerance and destruction that justify violence to support a particular political agenda or religious ideology. Just as the radicalized message enters our correctional facilities and finds fertile ground to multiply, the deadliest consequences are recognized when the radicalized inmate leaves the facility and enters society to carry out their final actions in a deadly act called terrorism. 12 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong. 2nd sess., 2006, 6. 13 National Drug Intelligence Center, 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging Trends, 2011, http://info.publicintelligence.net/NGIC-GTA-2011.pdf (accessed September 17, 2012). 3 Without an established deradicalization/disengagement model that offers inmates education, vocational, and treatment options to counter prison radicalization, the United States will maintain a reactive posture to inmates returning to society who may have been exposed to radicalization during their period of incarceration, not to mention the terrorist who completes his/her sentence and returns to society. Correctional policymakers must be cognizant of the contributing factors that promote radicalization within the prison and ensure procedures are designed to counter prison radicalization. The cost of this proactive approach pales in comparison to the consequences of maintaining the status quo. Failing to provide aggressive treatment and program options to counteract prison radicalization leaves the prison gates open to releasing potentially radicalized individuals back into our neighborhoods. What would an effective American deradicalization/disengagement program for American correctional facilities consist of? To address this question, this thesis will answer the following research questions: A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1. 1. B. Primary Research Question What are the most effective strategies to counter prison radicalization in the United States? 2. Secondary Research Questions 1. What are the contributing factors that promote prison radicalization? 2. What effect do prison gangs or security threat groups (STGs) have on prison radicalization? 3. What elements of the Singapore and Saudi Arabia’s prison deradicalization rehabilitation program could be applied to an American prison deradicalization program? METHODOLOGY This thesis will utilize a comparative analysis of two deradicalization/ disengagement programs; one currently being utilized in the Singapore prison system and one being the Saudi Arabia prison system. Through research, these two programs will be studied and analyzed to collect externally valid data that will be utilized to frame a 4 suggested best practice deradicalization/disengagement model for consideration by United States correctional policymakers. By utilizing a comparative analysis approach, the core program principles and policies can be investigated and analyzed to determine the most successful elements that may be adaptable to the United States. Given the fact there are currently no prison deradicalization programs in the United States, two programs from other countries were selected for the comparative analysis. Singapore was chosen primarily due to the reported success of its program, and the fact that Singapore, like the United States, has a minority Muslim population. Although the research will not focus exclusively on Islamic radicalization, the Singapore program will offer a unique picture of rehabilitation and aftercare of a minority Muslim population and, in turn, provide data that will be beneficial in developing a recommended United States deradicalization model. Saudi Arabia was chosen primarily due to the reported success of the program. The development of a United States prison deradicalization/disengagement model will require the identification of contributing factors, within the prison setting, that promote prison radicalization and suggested methods of countering and reducing the effects of prison radicalization. Existing research relevant to prison radicalization and the comparative analysis of Singapore and Saudi Arabia’s prison deradicalization programs will provide data relevant to reducing the vulnerability of prisoner radicalization inside the correctional domain as well as provide possible treatment and rehabilitative options for radicalized prisoners. Recognizing the limitations in comparing two countries with very different government structures and constitutional safeguards, not to mention the complexity of ideological motivated radicalization, an objective comparison of two existing deradicalization programs will provide useful data for consideration in recommending a best practice U.S. deradicalization model. Although all characteristics of the Singapore and Saudi programs will be compared, I will concentrate on the following elements of each program as determining factors deradicalization/disengagement efforts: 5 that suggest program success and C. 1. Program rehabilitative efforts (cognitive or educational) used to counter violent ideological beliefs/rationalizations that support the use of violence to promote a political or religious agenda. 2. Program characteristics: voluntary or involuntary participation and incentives for participation and successful completion. 3. Reported success of the program 4. Methods used to promote legitimacy and validity to the program which in theory increases the program’s success. 5. Methods of aftercare or post release supervision. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS The prison deradicalization programs of Singapore and Saudi Arabia were designed and implemented based on the governmental oversight for each particular country, applicable laws, and cultural considerations of both countries represented. Acknowledging the absence of a democratic governmental structure that supports full disclosure, the data presented in this thesis was derived from open source material as reported by the source and the two governments of Singapore and Saudi Arabia. I recognize and acknowledge the profound differences in both governmental structures as well as the significant variations related to the absence of civil liberties protections and due process protections as compared to the United States. Even so, the value of researching and studying best practices from what appears to be successful deradicalization programs from other countries should not be dismissed. Albeit the deradicalization programs of Singapore and Saudi Arabia were designed to counter radicalization within their respective borders, unique elements of these programs may offer possible solutions to prison radicalization in the United States that should be studied and evaluated through a filter that maintains the constitutional protections afforded to U.S. prisoners. D. LITERATURE REVIEW The literature related to prison radicalization and de-radicalization programs originates primarily from governmental reports, testimony during congressional hearings, university research reports, and studies conducted by law enforcement agencies. This 6 literature review focuses on prison radicalization, which is divided into two sub categories—literature that identifies contributing factors that promote prison radicalization and literature that identifies strategies to counter prison radicalization. The literature review briefly focuses on prison de-radicalization policies in Middle Eastern countries. The majority of the literature related to prison radicalization, as well as prison de-radicalization policies, targets radical Islamic extremism, and ignores other extremist groups. 1. Prison Radicalization: Contributing Factors In a 2008 RAND Europe governmental report, the contributing factors of prison radicalization of young European Muslims was researched. The report identifies perceived racism or discrimination as a potential catalyst to radicalization.14 The report studies the impact of incarceration on young Muslims based on “generalized principles” that the author uses to define the common prison experience. The report compares prisoner behavior traits for violent Jihadist with other extremist groups, such as Irish Republicans. Similar group traits are identified;15 yet more importantly, critical differences are recognized that may provide significant insights to identifying counterradicalization approaches. The report recognizes the prison experience as enhancing the possibility for radicalization, yet it fails to address the different types or levels of incarceration, such as maximum custody supervision versus minimum custody supervision. Without distinguishing between the different levels of prison supervision and the possible effects each could have on radicalization, a complete picture of the incarceration experience is not possible. A special report by the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, titled Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization, provided findings from a task force of subject matter experts who studied all facets of prison radicalization.16 The task force studied prison radicalization and solicited valuable 14 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 14. 15 Ibid. 16 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, i. 7 insight from correctional professionals at the federal, state, and local levels to analyze the complex phenomenon known as prison radicalization. The report provided several key findings and identified a common gap in the literature by reinforcing the point that social science research related to American prison radicalization is definitely insufficient to provide a clear understanding of the concept.17 Governments have shown an interest in identifying the contributing factors that promote radicalization. A Dutch government study in 2005 identified a factor of the radicalization process as being a crisis of self-identity.18 The Dutch study identifies an internal struggle that young Muslims experience by being incarcerated in a foreign country and how feelings of discrimination and racism may contribute to the radicalization process.19 A 2007 U.K. government study supported the Dutch research by identifying the self-identity conflict as being a significant factor in prison radicalization. During a 2006 Senate hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Frank Cilluffo, Director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University, testified that poor screening procedures and inadequate supervision of clergy and religious volunteers enhance the threat of religious radicalization among prisoners.20 Cilluffo’s testimony identified a common theme in the literature that most American correctional facilities are understaffed and employees are ill-trained to recognize and respond to prison radicalization. Furthermore, a 2004 survey of 193 state wardens provided evidence that half of the wardens permitted inmates to act as spiritual leaders and conduct religious services due to a shortage of correctional religious staff.21 In addition, the testimony provided during the 2006 hearing emphasized 17 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, i. 18 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 14. 19 Ibid. 20 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization, 159. 21 George W. Knox, The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups in American Prisons Today: Recent Research Findings from the 2004 Prison Gang Survey (Peotone, IL: National Gang Crime Research Center, 2005). http://www.ngcrc.com/corr2006.html (accessed August 15, 2012). 8 a common goal shared by other extremist groups such as Christian Identity and Aryan Nation groups with extremist Muslim groups in promoting hostility toward the United States government and Israel.22 On June 15, 2011, Peter King, Committee Chairman for the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, held hearings on the threat of Muslim-American radicalization in United States prisons. The testimony of Michael Downing, Commanding Officer of the Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau of the Los Angeles Police Department, identified the prison’s isolated environment a place where violence is the norm and the cultural discontent within make prisons susceptible to recruitment and radicalization by extremist groups.23 The literature recognizes 80 percent of prison converts as individuals converting to Islam and correlates this conversion with dozens of Americans, who after converting to Islam, traveled to Yemen to receive training from al-Qaeda.24 Research has labeled prisons as radicalization incubators. A New York Police Department (NYPD) report entitled, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, listed prisons along with cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, student associations, hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops, and book stores as “pit stops” or “meeting places” that serve as radicalizing agents.25 The report identified prisons as “a radicalizing cauldron,” playing a critical role in both triggering and reinforcing the radicalization process. The prison’s “isolated environment, ability to create a captive audience atmosphere, its absence of day to day distractions, and its large population of disaffected young men, has been identified as making it an excellent breeding ground for 22 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Prison Radicalization, 159. 23 House Committee on Homeland Security, The Threat of Muslim-American Radicalization in U.S. Prisons, 112th Cong. 1st sess. [Testimony of Michael Downing], 2, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=9102 (accessed September 12, 2012). 24 Ibid., 3. 25 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York: New York City Police Department, 2007). 9 radicalization.”26 This NYPD report and the testimony provided by Michael Downing promotes a common theme regarding correctional characteristics that make prisons susceptible to radicalization and extremism. 2. Prison Radicalization: Counter-Radicalization Strategies A common theme in the literature related to counter-radicalization strategies is the importance of controlling gang activity and its influence on extremist groups. In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center reported that when compared to other inmates, prison gang members were more susceptible to radicalization.27 The report stated gang members’ resentment toward authority and feelings of rejection from mainstream society were the catalysts that promoted the propensity for radicalization.28 In October 2008, Mark Hamm authored an article for the National Institute of Justice, “Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S. Correctional Institutions,” that emphasized the influence a charismatic gang leader, such as Kevin James, could have on individuals.29 The literature calls attention to the importance of monitoring such activity and extending counter-radicalization efforts once the inmates leave the correctional facility. Michael Downing’s testimony in June 2011 provided details of counter radicalization strategies between law enforcement and correctional agencies. Downing explained how the Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) program serves as a specialized point of contact for the community, providing terrorism information and intelligence.30 Downing explained how the TLO program had been extended into the California prison system.31 The report gives a rare example of law enforcement and correctional systems 26 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 39. 27 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threatassessment (accessed October 20, 2011). 28 Ibid. 29 Mark S. Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalizaton: Assessing the Threat in U.S. Correctional Facilities,” NIJ Journal 261 (October, 2008). 30 House Committee on Homeland Security. The Threat of Muslim-American, 2. 31 Ibid. 10 joining forces to share information related to prison radicalization and terrorism. What the testimony fails to provide is a recommendation or strategy to combat the factors that promote prison radicalization, which has been identified as a significant gap in the literature. Michael Brown’s thesis, “Freed: Ripples of the Convicted and Released Terrorist in America,” identified the fact that America’s prison system does not treat terrorist any differently than other convicted criminals.32 The thesis does a good job demonstrating the, “out of sight, out of mind” mentality that America seems to promote once we incarcerate a terrorist. This literature is relevant because it identifies a significant gap in the literature related to the absence of prison rehabilitation programs that target prison radicalization. Most of the literature mentioned in this review identifies the problem (prison radicalization) yet fails to recommend a policy that provides the inmate with an avenue to disengage from the radicalized mindset before returning to society. 3. De-radicalization Policies: Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and United States Literature related to prison deradicalization/disengagement programs predominately focus on Saudi Arabia and Singapore’s efforts to rehabilitate the radicalized mindset. In a February 2008 article for Perspectives on Terrorism, John Horgan, a leading figure in the study of deradicalization and disengagement efforts, provides a detailed analysis of the difference in the two terms, deradicalization and disengagement.33 Horgan stresses the importance in understanding the phases of radicalization and how understanding the disengagement of an individual from terroristic activity may provide valuable details to promote counterterrorism strategy. 34 Horgan points to the reality that not every individual who experiences disengagement from terrorist activity experiences deradicalization.35 32 Michael A. Brown, “Freed: Ripples of the Convicted and Released Terrorist in America” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 129. 33John Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement?” Perspectives on Terrorism 2, no. 4 (2010). 34 Ibid., 4. 35 Ibid. 11 In an April, 2011 article from the Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter Terrorism, titled “Terrorist Rehabilitation: A Global Imperative,” Rohan Gunaratna, makes the case for rehabilitating the “operational terrorist” and the “extremist supporters” prior to these individuals returning to society.36 Gunaratna provides a comprehensive summary of the different opportunities or areas for terrorist rehabilitation and provides the rationale and operational components of Singapore’s Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG).37 In addition, Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, a research analyst for the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyyang Technological University, Singapore, authored a 2006 article in Small Wars & Insurgencies, titled, “An Ideological Response to Combating Terrorism: The Singapore Perspective.” Hassan makes the case for utilizing an “ideological response” to combat terrorism.38 The paper uses the Singapore experience in fighting the radicalized mindset as an example of how to take a soft approach to prisoner radicalization and provides examples of utilizing the religious community as partners in the battle against the radicalized individual.39 The late Christopher Boucek, who served as an associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program, provided a great deal of the literature related to Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism efforts. In 2008, Boucek wrote a paper that was published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, titled, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare.40 Boucek provided a general overview of the early history of the program that was initiated after a series of lethal terrorist attacks that plagued Saudi Arabia in 2003. Boucek provides an overview of the various stages of the “soft” approach to fighting radicalization and 36 Rohan Gunaratna, “Terrorist Rehabilitation: A Global Imperative,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 6, no. 1 (2011): 65. 37 Ibid. 38 Mohamed Feisal Mohamed Hassan and Kenneth G. Pereire, “An Ideological Response to Combating Terrorism: The Singapore Perspective,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 17, no. 4 (December, 2006): 458–477. 39 Ibid. 40 Christopher Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008). 12 explains how the “war of the minds” can be fought by taking a re-education approach that teaches detainees and inmates, who have received a flawed ideological perspective of the Islamic faith, a true understanding of their religious doctrine.41 The three main focus areas of the Saudi plan, prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare, are examined to provide the reader a general idea of the specific goals for each phase of the program.42 Realizing the importance of an accurate assessment of the effectiveness of such programs, John Horgan and Kurt Braddock authored a March 2010 article, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of Deradicalization Programs,” published in Terrorism and Political Violence.43 The article reviewed Boucek’s summary of the Saudi program and provided a critical analysis of how the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs were measured.44 The article pointed to serious considerations when attempting to determine the success of any deradicalization program.45 Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan’s Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, uses case studies to provide an analysis of disengagement and de-radicalization initiatives in non-Western countries.46 In 2010, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence published a study of deradicalization programs in Middle Eastern countries.47 Although this literature is relevant to prison de-radicalization policy and provides details of Middle Eastern de- 41 Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy. 42 Ibid. 43John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs, “ Terrorism & Political Violence 22, no. 2 (April, 2010): 267–291. 44 Ibid., 276–277. 45 Ibid. 46 Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (New York: Routledge, 2009), 308. 47 Peter R. Neumann, Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation in 15 Countries (London, England: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2010), http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15 Countries.pdf (accessed June 15, 2012). 13 radicalization models, there is no literature related to U.S. prison de-radicalization models thus identifying a significant void in the research. E. CONCLUSION The literature related to prison radicalization and counter radicalization strategies recognizes the need for additional research.48 Some literature has identified social factors related to prison radicalization yet failed to identify strategies that might negate the environmental factors, found in prison, that contribute to radicalization. Very little attention has been given to distinguishing between possible effects of different security custody levels and if more restricted supervision has an effect on prisoner radicalization. Research has identified poor vetting procedures for religious leaders and correctional staff shortages as a contributing factor for radicalization. Close supervision and control of gang activity and aggressive information sharing has been mentioned in the literature as critical counter radicalization initiatives. The deradicalization/disengagement programs in Saudi Arabia and Singapore provide an example of “soft approaches” to fighting the radical ideology of violent extremist. Currently, these Middle Eastern programs are the only proactive examples of deradicalization efforts for the radicalized prisoner. The most obvious void in the literature is the absence of a counter radicalization program for America’s prison population. In the next chapter, we will examine the U.S. policies related to the confinement and management of convicted terrorist. A review of existing research related to the radicalization process inside correctional facilities will help identify contributing factors that promote radicalization inside this isolated and vulnerable society called prison. 48 Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalization,” 55. 14 II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CORRECTIONAL ENVIRONMENT My years of correctional experience have provided a unique insight related to the cold and secluded environment called prison. As a new correctional officer, I remember watching the metal gates of Lake County Regional Prison slowly close. These gates, resembling large gothic structures shrouded with razor wire and electrical sensors, separated the “free world”49 from the population of inmates housed within. As the steel locking mechanism engaged and the metal gate slammed shut, my eight-hour shift began with a strong awareness of being in a new environment where trust was fictional, group influence was evident, and self-preservation was a goal shared by all. It has been 29 years since my first experience as a correctional officer. After serving in every security position, eight years as warden of two maximum and close custody facilities, and currently employed as Assistant Commissioner of Prisons for the Tennessee Department of Correction, I am frequently reminded of the relief I felt in knowing I only had to experience the prison setting for eight hours each day. The inmates were not so lucky. I describe the correctional environment as dynamic, temperamental, and unforgiving. It is an environment that makes you question your identity and beliefs.50 Good policies and procedures implemented by professional staff can reduce violence and enhance security. Grievances and hostile attitudes directed toward the government, which is charged with enforcing the rules and regulations, are common. Educational and treatment programs will promote rehabilitation, but I suspect nothing negates the negative influences of experiencing life as a prisoner. This chapter will examine the research related to the prison environment as well as correctional procedures and their relation to prison radicalization. The current U.S. philosophy for incarcerating inmates convicted of terrorism in the United States will also be researched. 49 “Free world” refers to the free society—that environment to which inmates have no access. 50 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 14. 15 A. GROUPS AND SECURITY THREAT GROUP INFLUENCES In the correctional setting, it is not uncommon to witness the gravitation of like- minded individuals as they cluster into groups.51 Within such groups, commonalities form and a gradual separation of the in-group52 from the general population takes place. In a 2008 report by Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, this type of behavior was described as a “self segregation” of the group from the general population.53 Within such groups of individuals searching for a new identity, a charismatic leader finds fertile ground to promote an in-group ideology. As Hanna et al., point out in the above referenced article, such activity should not automatically be surmised as radicalization or extremism; yet, it does create a vulnerable atmosphere, ripe for radicalization and deserving of special attention of the prison’s administration.54 Groups provide the charismatic group leader the perfect opportunity to promote a radical “cut and paste” translation of religious doctrine to a group of vulnerable inmates, anxiously seeking acceptance in an extremely intimidating environment.55 Security threat groups continue to be a significant security concern inside correctional facilities as well as providing a model for radicalization.56 As Hamm reflected in a 2008 article, the radicalization process within the correctional setting often follows the gang model.57 Inmates join gangs for many reasons including protection, to promote and participate in illicit activity, or to promote a particular ideology or agenda. Inmates entering the correctional setting often find themselves without a support structure.58 In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center reported that, compared to 51 Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalization,” 4. 52 “In-group” is defined as a group of individual who share a common purpose. The group defines the individual and the members will discredit the out group to build in-group cohesion. The in-group helps establish a new social identity. 53 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 39. 54 Ibid. 55 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 2. 56 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 17. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., 6. 16 other inmates, prison gang members were much more susceptible to radicalization.59 Gangs or security threat groups, led by a charismatic leader, provide inmates the support structure and protection they desire as long as the inmate supports the agenda of the ingroup.60 Hamm’s research of the Florida and California prison system and a study of the Kevin James case, identified “inmate leadership as the most important factor in prisoner radicalization”61 •Experiences Identity Crisis •Self Segregation Develops •New Identity Established •In-Group Solitifies •Group's Idelodogy Forms •Promotes Idelodogy •Promotes/Enforces In-Group Cohesion Figure 1. 4. Setting Ripe for Radicalization 1. Individual Enters Prison 3. Power of Charasmatic Leader 2. Prison Groups/ Gangs •Inmates Join for Protection/Support/ New Identity •In-Group Cohesion Develops Group’s Influence in Promoting Prison Radicalization Security threat groups have crossed racial lines as well as joined forces with traditional enemies to unite under a common goal of destroying a mutual opponent.62 In a special report by the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, the author makes note of traditional rival gangs such as right wing extremist 59 National Drug Intelligence Center, 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment, 31. 60 Hamm, Prisoner Radicalizaton, 17. 61 Ibid., 15. 62 Ibid. 17 groups and Muslim extremist joining forces to target Israel. 63 It is important to make the point that Islamic radicalization is not the only extremist threat within the correctional facility. Many right wing extremist groups that adhere to Christian Identity spread the radical ideology and intolerance inside America’s prisons.64 The in-group influence inside the prison environment is a dominant force that deserves attention and provides a mechanism capable of fostering violent radicalization. Mark Hamm interviewed a veteran prison chaplain who reported the inmates’ resentment for the government, aggressiveness, as well as seeking a religious group nexus to support their hostility toward governmental authority as enhancements for prison radicalization.65 The influence of the in-group on its members, as well as the platform the group provides in promoting an ideology, is conducive to radicalization. Although gangs in prison predominantly focus their illicit efforts toward traditional criminal activity, prison gangs with a social or political nexus is more susceptible to violent radicalization.66 Correctional administrators must be aware of security threat groups and their potential influences on prison radicalization as well as the correctional procedures that may be conducive to radicalization. B. INADEQUATE VOLUNTEERS VETTING OF PRISON CHAPLAINS/RELIGIOUS The chaplain’s responsibilities within the prison environment are complex and multifaceted. Correctional chaplains have a unique insight into the ideologies and agendas of the various religious groups within the inmate population. Correctional chaplains are charged with the responsibility of monitoring and supervising religious activity to maintain the integrity of the religious programs. 67 The American Correctional Association (ACA), the agency that establishes and monitors nationally recognized best 63 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 38. 64 Ibid. 65 Hamm, Prisoner Radicalizaton, 18. 66 National Drug Intelligence Center, 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment, 33. 67 Office of Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0404/final.pdf (accessed July 18, 2012). 18 practices and correctional standards through correctional accreditation, requires chaplains to “plan, direct and coordinate all aspects of the religious program, including approval and training of both lay and clergy volunteers from faiths represented by the inmate population.”68 Providing qualified Islamic religious services that are supervised by qualified Islamic religious leaders or scholars is a significant challenge. 69 It is extremely difficult to employ and locate qualified Islamic volunteers to lead the Islamic religious services within many of America’s correctional facilities.70 A more difficult task is determining what qualifies as a qualified Islamic religious leader or scholar. The Inspector General’s investigation into the Federal Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) selection process of Muslim religious services providers identified a critical issue in that there is no ecclesiastical body to certify Islamic providers.71 The report makes the point that in Muslim countries, the government certifies the legitimacy of the religion. Without an independent body to certify Islamic religious providers, the BOP has been encouraged to consider other possible methods to certify Islamic clergy such as intensive screening, interviews, and background checks.72 Such recommendations seem appropriate to fill the void of a certifying body and to provide Islamic services to the inmate population; however, the result of this is yet to be seen. Faced with the void of a trusted Islamic religious leader and the pressure to ensure constitutionally protected religious freedoms, some correctional chaplains and wardens approve the Islamic services to be led by inmates who serve as the “prison Imams.”73 In 2004, 193 state prison wardens indicated only 50 percent of the religious services were supervised by staff and only half were monitored by audio or video surveillance. 74 With 68 American Correctional Association, Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, 4th ed. (Alexandria, VA: American Correctional Association, 2003), 160. 69 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 38. 70 Office of Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’, 11. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 38. 74 Knox, The Problem of Gangs, 24. 19 inmates leading the service, an opportunity for a distorted version of religious doctrine develops and the vulnerability to religious radicalization increases. Inadequate vetting of prison chaplains provides an open invitation for radicalized clergy to promote a radicalized message to the inmate population. The United States has experienced the consequences of poor vetting procedures for chaplains on more than one occasion. For example, the New York State correctional system failed to properly screen a prison chaplain supervisor who was later discovered to have exhibited ties to Al-Qaeda and actively engaged in anti-American extremist activity with the prisoners.75 Warith Deen Umar, an ex-inmate and former imam in charge of recruiting and training chaplains for New York’s prison system as well as providing religious instruction himself to inmates, provides an example of how a prison chaplain can directly introduce radical Whabhabism and intolerance to a captive audience. Imam Umar declared the 9/11 hijackers as “martyrs” and identified the African American inmates who practice Islam as being the “natural candidates” to lead further attacks in the spirit of spreading justice for the American oppression of Muslims.76 Imam Umar also provided inmate Islamic supervision, on a part-time basis, for the Federal Bureau of Prisons.77 After receiving questions from the Wall Street Journal, the BOP terminated Umar’s services and the U.S. Department of Justice Inspector General ordered an investigation related to the procedures for hiring Islamic clergy.78 The United States Military charged Captain James Yee, a Muslim chaplain who served at Guantanamo Bay, with charges related to terrorist activity.79 In each case, a captive audience was exposed to radicalized messages that could have produced a 75 Paul M. Barrett, “Captive Audience: How a Chaplain Spread Extremism to an Inmate Flock,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2003, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1044395093714681453.html (accessed August 15, 2012). 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 House Committee on Homeland Security. The Threat of Muslim-American, 3. 79 Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influences on Chaplaincy of the U.S. Military and Prisons, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 2003, S. HRG 108–443, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg93254/pdf/CHRG-108shrg93254.pdf (accessed September 21, 2012). 20 radicalized individual much like one of the three dozen Americans who previously converted to Islam while in prison and travelled to Yemen after release to train with AlQaeda.80 C. LOSS OF LIBERTY AND FAMILY CONTACT Prisoner personalities, employee personalities, and the conditions of confinement are just a few of the many elements that make up the complex prison environment but the restrictions on the inmate’s liberties are very dramatic. As Gresham Sykes articulated in his study of approximately 1,200 maximum custody inmates in the state of New Jersey, “We must see the prison as a society within a society.”81 In his research, Sykes reports the inmate’s describing their experience inside the maximum security facility as “depriving or frustrating in the extreme.”82 He also examined the inmate’s experience and labels the characteristics of imprisonment in a maximum custody setting as “the pains of imprisonment.”83 Moreover, Sykes identified the “loss of liberty” as being one of the most dramatic characteristics experienced by inmates. I would argue this loss of liberty and separation from support structures is relevant not only to prison radicalization but also to the United States current method of housing convicted terrorists. As reported by Hannah et al., the denial of liberty, a condition of confinement that is universal in prison, creates a significant void with supportive networks such as family and friends.84 As a prior warden of a maximum custody facility,85 I can testify to the positive effects related to inmates maintaining relationships with positive family support structures. It is my belief the support of family and friends provides motivation for inmates to engage in rehabilitative initiatives that contribute to a positive reentry into 80 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Al-Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb, 111th Cong. 2nd sess., 2010, S. PRT 111 4–5, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=30158 (accessed November 12, 2011). 81 Gresham Sykes, The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison (Princeton, NJ, United States: Princeton University Press, 1958), xii. 82 Ibid., 63. 83 Ibid., 64. 84 Hannah, Clutterbuck, and Rubin, Radicalization or Rehabilitation, 6. 85 Tennessee Department of Corrections, West Tennessee State Penitentiary, Henning Tennessee, Associate Warden from 1997–1999, Warden from 2006–2008. 21 society. Without these positive influences to promote disengagement from the negative influences that motivated their criminal behavior, the inmate becomes susceptible to the negative influences often found in the prison setting. D. ABSENCE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING The prison radicalization process is a phenomenon that will require intensive social research to help build an understanding of the radicalization process.86 Because social science research considers prisoners as a protective class and the reluctance of correctional administrators to allow researchers access, the fundamental elements of this complex process called prison radicalization are difficult to identify. In a special report by the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI), one of the key findings was a lack of “social science research” and the substantial absence of information related to prison radicalization.87 With 93 percent of America’s inmates serving their sentence inside a state or local prison,88 the intelligence sharing associated with extremist activity within our state and local prison systems and the federal government is critical.89 Prisons much like other governmental agencies are infamous for operating in silos. Until recently, the United States had failed to address this intelligence oversight. In December 2011, the United States issued the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.90 This plan tasked the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis to collaborate with the FBI and Federal Bureau of Prisons “to access the capacity of state correctional institutions to detect and share information regarding individuals who demonstrate behaviors associated with violent extremism while in the correctional system.” 86 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 38. 87 Ibid. 88 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “U.S. Correctional Population Declined.” 89 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 38. 90 White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2011), http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=694059 (accessed May 3, 2012). 22 In February 2003, the Correctional Intelligence Initiative was developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF). 91 The initiative originally established a collaborative partnership between the FBI and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to collect intelligence relevant to international terrorist activity within the BOP.92 Today, the initiative’s goal remains the same but also sets out to collect and share correctional intelligence, relevant to extremist activity or radicalization within the United States correctional environment.93 Federal Bureau of Investigation field office personnel coordinate with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) as well as state, local, territorial, tribal, and private corrections to collect and share intelligence. The coordinators in each field office provide training to correctional partners to enhance counter terrorism measures within the correctional systems. Although the plan’s concept is good, there is a significant training component that must be accomplished. 94 Correctional officers, chaplains, and other line staff should receive the appropriate training to recognize radicalization or violent extremism. Although intelligence initiatives and training is provided at the administrative level, unless adequate training is provided for strategic areas, such as line staff, radicalization and extremism could be mistaken for general disruptive inmate activity. This opinion is supported by the recommendations of the Office of Inspector General documented in the 2004 Review of The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers.95 Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) only recently implemented an in-service training component for correctional officers to help the officers recognize the elements and indicators of possible prison radicalization. 96 Without appropriate training, the signs and symptoms of violent extremism or prison 91 Joseph Billy to the Office of the Inspector General [review of the “Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring of Mail for High Risk Inmates”], 2006, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/BOP/e0609/app8.htm (accessed May 3, 2012). 92 Ibid. 93 Billy to the Office of the Inspector General. 94 Ian M. Cuthbertson, “Prisons and the Education of Terrorists,” World Policy Journal 21, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 20. 95 Office of Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’, 54. 96 Tennessee Correctional Academy, Prison Radicalization, Recognizing the Elements and Responding to the Threat (Nashville, TN: Tennessee Department of Correction, 2011). 23 radicalization could go undetected by correctional staff. Research has identified the need to train staff to recognize prison radicalization. 97 Figure 2. Environmental Factors Conducive to Prison Radicalization The prison environment is multifaceted and heavily influenced by the many factors. The research related to prison radicalization provides an insight into components that could facilitate prison radicalization. The negative effects of gangs in prison, inadequate vetting of chaplains and volunteers, loss of family support, and poor information sharing and staff training are target areas that must be addressed. The United States must also consider the existing strategy for housing the convicted terrorist currently incarcerated within our Federal Bureau of Prisons. E. EXISTING U.S STRATEGY FOR HOUSING/PROGRAMMING INCARCERATED TERRORIST IN U.S. PRISONS The Federal Bureau of Prisons currently houses 362 individuals convicted of terrorism or terrorism related violations.98 The United States government has identified 97 Hamm, Prisoner Radicalization, 18. 98 Scott Shane, “Beyond Guantanamo, A Web of Prisons for Terrorism Inmates,” The New York Times, sec. National News, December 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/us/beyondguantanamo-bay-a-web-of-federal-prisons.html?pagewanted=all (accessed September 12, 2012). 24 269 of these inmates as having international ties to terrorism.99 This number indicates a significant increase in international ties, which reflected only 50 inmates with international ties to terrorism in 2000.100 The United States has not escaped the domestic threat from terrorism. The Federal Bureau of Prisons currently houses 93 inmates with a domestic terrorism nexus. The current U.S. method of incarcerating terrorists can be described as restrictive, controlled, and not conducive to rehabilitation. Mark Hamm, in a research paper supported by the Indiana State University Institute of Criminology and the National Institute of Justice, described the U.S. model for housing inmates convicted of terrorism as a “Total Segregation Model.”101 Under this model, the inmates are segregated in high security units called “Communications Management Units” (CMU) located in Terra Haute, Indiana, and Marion, Illinois.102 The CMU concept was initiated in 2006 after the United States government discovered three terrorist, convicted of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, sent written communication to a Spanish terrorist cell.103 Today, these CMUs house some of the highest profile terrorist such as Kevin James, Jose Padilla, Richard Reid, Terry Nichols, and Ahmed Ressam (the millennium bomber). These units are designed for maximum security and control and restricted inmate contact with other individuals. All forms of inmate communications are monitored for intelligence purposes with the exception of attorney/client correspondence.104 Assistant Director for Correctional Programs Division of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, John Vanyur, testified before a house subcommittee in 2007 that the BOP’s model focused on 99 Shane, “Beyond Guantanamo.” 100 Ibid. 101 Mark S. Hamm, “Locking up Terrorists: Three Models for Controlling Prisoner Radicalization” (paper, Indiana State University, 2011), www.indstate.edu/ccj/crinst/Locking%20Up%20Terrorists.docx (accessed November 23, 2012). 102 Carrie Johnson and Margot Williams, “Guantanamo North: Inside Secretive U.S. Prisons,” All Things Considered, NPR, March 3, 2011. 103 Shane, “Beyond Guantanamo.” 104 House Committee on Homeland Security, Radicalization, Information Sharing and Community Outreach: Protecting the Homeland from Homegrown Terror [testimony of John M. Vanyur], 2007, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/283.pdf (accessed November 23, 2011). 25 the preventing recruitment and radicalization by incarcerated extremist.105 Vanyur testified that the BOP, in an effort to prevent inmate radicalization, has severed ties with most community organizations that support inmate activities and organizations within the prison.106 Personal contact with visitors and family visitation is extremely restrictive, noncontact design and continuously monitored.107 Designed and modeled for maximum security and labeled as overly restrictive on Muslim inmates,108 these units have been the recipient of criticism, scrutiny, and litigation from inmates, American Islamic Relations groups and the American Civil Liberties Union.109 Some Muslim inmates, who make up the majority of the Communication Management Units (CMU) population, allege that their religious rights have been violated by the restricted environment and what they perceive as a lack of due process by being placed in the CMU.110 The Communication Management Units utilized by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) as well as the operational philosophy used in managing incarcerated U.S. terrorist, represent a dominant security based philosophy. The current U.S. philosophy, designed to prevent the proliferation of the radicalized message by implementing the segregation model, only addresses one of the symptoms of a much larger issue. We must also consider the unintentional consequences of continued segregation for inmates incarcerated for terrorism without providing an opportunity for treatment options that counter their violent ideologies. I define prison radicalization as a cognitive process whereby inmates develop a violent extremist mindset that legitimatizes the need and use of violence to promote a political or religious agenda. Within the prison setting, there are multiple variables that make the inmate population vulnerable to radicalization. Without an established deradicalization/disengagement model that provides inmates rehabilitation options to 105 Committee on Homeland Security, Radicalization, 2. 106 Ibid. 107 Johnson and Williams, “Guantanamo North;” Committee on Homeland Security, Radicalization, 2. 108 Shane, “Beyond Guantanamo.” 109 Johnson and Williams, “Guantanamo North, 3. 110 Ibid. 26 counter prison radicalization, the United States will maintain a reactive posture to inmates returning to society who may have been exposed to radicalization during their period of incarceration or those who entered the correctional system indoctrinated with a radical ideology. As we prepare to compare other deradicalization / disengagement models, it is important to explain the difference between deradicalization and disengagement and their importance in disarming violent extremism and radicalization. F. DERADICALIZATION DIFFERENCE? OR DISENGAGEMENT: WHAT’S THE As we consider policy models that promote prison deradicalization, it is important to distinguish between two concepts: deradicalization and disengagement. For the purpose of this analysis, deradicalization can be defined as a cognitive process of rejecting and discrediting established ideological rationalizations that support violent extremism and terrorism. Deradicalization therefore implies a cognitive change that takes place resulting in a modification of the individual’s belief system. In other words, once a terrorist is deradicalized, he or she no longer believes in the ideology or justification for using violence to promote their political or religious agenda. Disengagement is a process that results in an individual being separated, voluntarily or involuntarily, from participating, directly or indirectly, in terrorist acts. As Bjorgo and Horgan stated in 2009, individual disengagement should not imply deradicalization.111 Bjorgo and Horgan make the point that individuals may walk away from terrorism without shedding their core beliefs that justify their lethal actions.112 Horgan identifies a possible key to developing effective deradicalization strategies as focusing on why individuals become disengaged and designing the strategy based on the analysis.113 I would argue that most would consider prison a form of physical disengagement although it is important to remember incarceration does not prevent inmates from 111 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 26. 112 Ibid. 113 Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement?”, 27. 27 participating in terrorist activities or support and thus does not result in physical disengagement. Consider the case of Kevin James and others who managed terrorist activity from within their cells inside some of the most secure facilities in the United States. Disengagement is the first step toward altering a violent mindset. Building an effective strategy that promotes continued disengagement and eventual deradicalization offers the best solution in fighting the lethal effects of violent radicalization. This chapter has described the prison’s setting as a multifaceted complex environment ripe for spreading the radicalized message. The influences of the in-groups as well as security threat groups cannot be ignored. These groups, under the leadership of a charismatic extremist, provide a powerful platform to motivate inmates seeking a new identity to engage in extremist activity. Without a dependable method to screen chaplains and religious volunteers, the prison chapel opens its doors to radical imams and clergy seeking a captive audience. Social science research provides the building blocks for possible solutions related to radicalization. Without more research within the prisons, we may never fully understand the negative effects of prison on the individual and as a result, fail in taking a proactive stance toward prison radicalization. The next chapter will shift the focus from the environmental factors within the correctional environment toward the individual treatment options for the radicalized inmate. In an effort to establish a recommendation for a prison deradicalization /disengagement model for United States correctional facilities, a comparative analysis methodology will be used to study Singapore’s prisoner radicalization rehabilitation program and approach to countering prisoner radicalization. 28 III. A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SINGAPORE’S PRISON DERADICALIZATION MODEL RATIONALE FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SINGAPORE’S DERADICALIZATION MODEL In considering other countries that operated prison deradicalization programs, all of which are predominately Middle Eastern countries, Singapore was identified as the one country with an established program that has a minority Muslim population. Like the United States, the most significant threats from terrorism in Singapore have developed from Islamic radicalization.114 Although Singapore does not offer its citizens the same civil liberty protections as the United States, Singapore does have a parliamentary government with an established constitution and a democratic form of government. A comparative analysis of this country’s deradicalization program will provide the best comparison for U.S. consideration. B. SINGAPORE’S GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE Singapore gained its independence from the Malaysian Federation on August 9, 1965 and is considered a republic with a parliamentary system of government consisting of three branches: the executive, legislative, and judicial. Singapore’s constitution establishes a representative democracy that forms its political system and supports its legal system which is modeled after English Common Law.115 The executive branch of Singapore’s government consists of the president, the cabinet, and the Attorney General.116 As with many other parliamentary governments, the president serves in primarily a ceremonial fashion. The cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, along with the various ministers who are appointed from the controlling political party, are the 114 Hassan and Pereire, “An Ideological Response,” 458. 115 Central Intelligence Agency, “East and Southeast Asia: Singapore,” The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html (accessed July 21, 2012). 116 “The Singapore Legal System,” Singapore Government Ministry of Law, http://app2.mlaw.gov.sg/UsefulInfo/TheSingaporeLegalSystem/tabid/259/Default.aspx (accessed July 20, 2012). 29 primary members that control government actions.117 The judicial branch of Singapore’s government consists of the Supreme Court and subordinate courts that rule with judicial oversight from the Supreme Court.118 Singapore’s Minister of Home Affairs supervises the Internal Security Department (ISD), Singapore Prison Service, Singapore Police Force as well as other security related functions.119 The Internal Security Department of Singapore utilizes the Internal Security Act (ISA) as a valuable tool to protect the safety and security of Singapore’s homeland.120 ISA is an act that provides government officials with wide discretion to enforce preventive detention (PD) without trial of individuals suspected of terrorist activity. The ISA also affords the government the authority to enforce curfews, control an individual’s movement, and mandate other restrictive measures such as mandatory religious counseling, as deemed necessary by the Minister of Home Affairs to ensure national security.121 C. SINGAPORE’S TERRORISM DEFINITION OF TERRORIST AND ACTS OF Singapore’s definition of “terrorist” and “acts of terrorism” can be located in one of Singapore’s resolutions titled “United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations.”122 117 Central Intelligence Agency, “East and Southeast Asia: Singapore.” 118 “The Singapore Legal System.” 119 “Minister of Home Affairs Home Page,” Government of Singapore, http://www.mha.gov.sg/overview.aspx?pageid=187&secid=28 (accessed July 19, 2012). 120 Eugene K. B. Tan, “Selling Singaporeans on the ISA,” Malaysian Business, October 1, 2011, 56. 121 “Parliamentary Speech on the Internal Security Act—Speech by Mr Teo Chee Hean, Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs, 19 October 2011,” Singapore Government, Minister of Home Affairs, http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_details.aspx?nid=MjEzMg%3D%3D-as%2B9gJeLXQ0%3D (accessed July 20, 2012). 122 “United Nations Act, Chapter 339, United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations” [rev ed.], Government of Singapore, Attorney General’s Chamber, January 31, 2003, http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=CompId%3A430ea160–2360–4847– 9348a9fdf134ec20%20ValidTime%3A20120712000000%20TransactionTime%3A20120712000000;rec=0 (accessed July 26, 2012). 30 ‘Terrorist’ means any person who commits, or attempts to commit, any terrorist act; or participates in or facilitates the commission of any terrorist act, and includes any person referred to in the schedule. ‘Terrorist act’ means the use or threat of action where the action involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person’s life; creates a serious risk to the health or the safety of the public or a section of the public; involves the use of firearms or explosives; involves releasing into the environment or any part thereof, or distributing or otherwise exposing the public or any part thereof to any dangerous, hazardous, radioactive or harmful substance; any toxic chemical; or any microbial or other biological agent, or toxin; is designed to disrupt any public computer system or the provision of services directly related to communications infrastructure, banking and financial services, public utilities, public transportation or public key infrastructure; is designed to disrupt the provision of essential emergency services such as the police, civil defence and medical services; or involves prejudice to public security or national defence; and where the use or threat is intended or reasonably regarded as intending to influence the Government or any other government; or intimidate the public or a section of the public.123 D. SINGAPORE’S REALIZATION OF THE NEED FOR A PRISON DERADICALIZATION MODEL Since 9/11, the Internal Security Department has utilized the ISA to incarcerate 124 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspects and other suspected terrorist supporters.125 Since 2002, 60 individuals have been detained by the Singaporean security forces acting under the authority of the Internal Security Act.126 As recently as February 2012, Singapore has utilized the ISA to detain suspected terrorists. Between January and February 2012, Sahrudin bin Mohd Sapian, Mohamed Rafee bin Abdul Rahman, and Abd Rahim bin Abdul Rahman, three JI members who had fled Singapore in December 2001, were arrested on foreign soil and returned to Singapore authorities.127 Under the auspice of protecting national security, the ISA allows immediate preventative detention with an 123 “United Nations Act, Chapter 339.” 124 Note: throughout this paper, the term detainee and inmate will have the same meaning. Incarceration and detention both will refer to the confinement of an individual in the penal system. 125 Tan, “Selling Singaporeans on the ISA,” 56. 126 “Parliamentary Speech on the Internal Security Act.” 127 “Ministry of Home Affairs: Update on Terrorism-Related Arrest/Detention/Release under the Internal Security Act,” Singapore Government News, March 16, 2012. 31 advisory board review by the third month of detention.128 Continued detention should not extend beyond two years without judicial review by an advisory board chaired by a Supreme Court judge and approval of the president.129 The president, as the senior government representative, has veto power over the advisory board and ultimate authority regarding the decision to enforce long-term preventative detention. The Internal Security Department (ISD), under the supervision of the Minister of Home Affairs (MHA), reviews detention and restriction orders annually to determine if the orders are still necessary.130 Undetected by the government of Singapore, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a militant Islamist group with strong ties to al Qaeda and dedicated to establishing a caliphate in Southeast Asia, infiltrated Singapore in early 2001. In December 2001 and August 2002, the Internal Security Department (ISD) of Singapore, utilizing the Internal Security Act (ISA), placed 31 individuals, identified as Jemaah Islamiyah members, under detention for planning terrorist activity inside Singapore’s borders.131 JI members had developed plans for bombing foreign embassies and mass transit systems within Singapore.132 Recognizing that Islamic radicalization had infiltrated segments of Singapore’s Muslim community, the government called on the Muslim community, especially the country’s Islamic leadership, to help develop an ideological response to counter the ill-advised ideological motivated extremist who plotted terrorism within the country. 133 The Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, leaders of the Khadijah Mosque, and the president of PERGAS (as association of religious teachers and Islamic scholars from Singapore) were contacted by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to evaluate the intelligence collected 128 Tan, “Selling Singaporeans on the ISA,” 56. 129 “Parliamentary Speech on the Internal Security Act.” 130 Report on a Conference Organized by the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation, of the S.Rajarathnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), Singapore: S. Rajarathnam School of International Studies, 2009, http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/RSIS_ICTR_Report_2009.pdf (accessed September 22, 2012). 131 Hassan and Pereire, “An Ideological Response,” 460. 132 Albert Chua, “Southeast Asia Challenges in Countering the Appeal of Terrorism,” presented at Seminar on Dialogue, Understanding and Countering the Appeal of Terrorism, New York, June 27, 2012. 133 Hassan and Pereire, “An Ideological Response.” 461. 32 from initial interviews of the JI detainees.134 In April 2003, the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), a group of Islamic leaders, scholars, and teachers who volunteer their time and resources, was developed to assist the government in establishing a holistic approach in countering the misguided ideology that had invaded the country of Singapore.135 E. SINGAPORE’S STRUCTURE RELIGIOUS REHABILITATION GROUP (RRG) The organizational structure of the RRG consists of three organizational divisions. The administrative oversight and leadership of the group consist of two co-chairmen. The co-chairmen are responsible for program implementation and nominating potential RRG members.136 The Resource Group of the RRG consist of a group of Islamic scholars, both in Islamic religion and law, that provides guidance and instruction related to the mission of the RRG.137 The Secretariat positions serve as coordinators of counseling schedules, conducts research and assist in administrative affairs among other duties. The largest component of the RRG is the religious counselors. This group directly engages the inmates, as well as the public, in strategic discourse to promote disengagement and deradicalization. 1. RRG’s Counseling Program The cornerstone of the Religious Rehabilitation Group’s philosophy of reeducating misguided Islamic extremist (JI members) is the RRG Counseling Program. The RRG counseling program, originally formed in January 2004, consists of 28 counselors,138 four of whom are Ustazaat (female religious teachers). The RRG volunteer their time to provide religious rehabilitation counseling to inmates as well as community members. This counseling cadre is made up of a multi-faceted group of 134 Mohamed Feisal Mohamed Hassan, “The Roles of Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in Singapore,” Religious Rehabilitation Group, 2008, http://rrg.sg/edisi/data/The_roles_of_RRG.pdf (accessed September 17, 2012). 135 Hassan and Pereire, “An Ideological Response,” 461. 136 Hassan, The Roles of Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in Singapore, 4. 137 Ibid. 138 “Religious Rehabilitation Group website,” http://www.rrg.sg/subindex.asp?id=A221_07 (accessed April 2, 2012). 33 Islamic scholars and educated leaders from the Islamic community. The Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) continually provides ongoing educational opportunities that focus on effective counseling techniques and counseling psychology that provides current strategy to fight the radical ideology forming the basis and rationalization of the terrorist mindset.139 Two religious counseling manuals have been developed to assist the counselors in performing their duties. In a June 4, 2009 article with the Straits Times, RRG Chairman, Ustaz Ali Mohamed indicated the latest 2009 manual, a three section, 220-page document based on more than 1000 detainee interviews, reflects the ongoing analysis and strategic planning designed to ensure current ideological counter measures are maintained and implemented in the deradicalization program.140 The latest manual that targets the radicalization process and motive of hate consists of three sections. Section one provides guidance related to detainees developing coping skills that help with “real-life” issues and the need to find a moderate approach in adjusting to modern society. The second examines often misunderstood concepts such as takfir (labeling someone a non-believer and the justification for killing the individual in the name of Islamic duty). The third section provides instruction for handling violent behavior and hatred that is often experienced after being exposed to a perverted interpretation of radical religious indoctrination.141 The RRG’s Counseling Program focuses on four specific stages in countering the radical extremist mindset of the detainees.142 The first stage consists of the counselor interviewing the inmate to recognize radical ideologies and incorrect interpretations of Islamic concepts. This stage provides the counselor the insight into what is the basis or justification for the inmate’s actions. Next, the counselor discredits all radical and extremist views. This stage of counseling provides the inmate with valid justifications 139 Hassan, “The Roles of Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) in Singapore,” 6. 140 Zakir Hussain, “New Manual to Counter Extremist Ideas; Second Guide Deals with Islamic Radicals’ Real-Life Issues and Beliefs,” The Straits Times [Singapore], June 4, 2009. 141 Ibid. 142 “Religious Rehabilitation Group website;” “About RRG,” Religious Rehabilitation Group, 2012, http://www.rrg.sg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3:about-rrg&catid=3:aboutus&Itemid=2 (accessed April 2, 2012). 34 why violent extremism must be avoided. In the third stage, incorrect interpretations of Islamic doctrine or radical ideologies are replaced by moderate, Islamic interpretations. Using his or her status as a trained religious scholar, the counselor helps establish a new interpretation of Islamic doctrine that contradicts the inmate’s previous violent, extremist mindset. The last stage of the counseling process includes an overview and emphasis on a moderate interpretation of the Holy Quran and how to live in a society that is filled with diversity and secularism.143 2. RRG Enhancing Prisoner Deradicalization Community by Engaging the Believing you can change the mindset of the prisoner without engaging the public and the family members of the prisoner would be a serious misconception. The RRG and the government of Singapore came to a realization early in this process that correcting the violent, extremist mindset of the JI members accomplished only half the goal of protecting Singapore from terrorism. There was a minority Muslim population, many of which were suffering from the detention of the family’s financial supporter, and a group of youth particularly vulnerable to socioeconomic factors and susceptible to Islamic radicalization that required the attention of the RRG.144 At the 2009 International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation, the Director of Internal Security for Singapore discussed the government’s response to the threat of community radicalization.145 In a brief taken from the meeting, the director acknowledged the Singapore government was very concerned about the JI family members.146 The government feared the JI family members would take up the fight once their family members became incarcerated, thus creating a “second generation” of JI terrorists. The government and the Muslim community realized providing a degree of social support would serve a twofold purpose. Social assistance from the Muslim 143 “Religious Rehabilitation Group Website.” 144 Hassan and Pereire, An Ideological Response,” 463. 145 Report on a Conference Organized by the International Centre, 30. 146 Ibid. 35 community, coordinated by the Aftercare Group of the RRG,147 provided detainee family members a support option other than relying on the JI extremist network for assistance. Secondly, by assisting family members with social assistance, in the detainees are instilled with a sense of obligation to the Muslim community and the RRG. This will develop a sense of loyalty and willingness to cooperate with rehabilitation and accept the error of their ways.148 The director acknowledged not everyone in the community believed the program would be productive. He acknowledged the fact that some terrorists would never accept a moderate, non-violent view of their ideology and some terrorist, even though they may accept and participate in rehabilitation programming, would never be released from custody. The director believed that by the public witnessing the seminars, social assistance, and community engagement carried out by the Muslim community instead of the government that public skepticism would be reduced, thus making the programs more appealing to the community.149 3. Internal Security Department’s Collaboration with RRG (Singapore Prison System) At the 2009 International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation, the Director for Internal Security explained the process of reviewing detainees prior to custodial release.150 A comprehensive review is completed regarding the inmate’s progress in the rehabilitation program prior to release. A review of the inmate’s initial indoctrination and level of involvement in the terrorist organization is a consideration. Multiple sources of information from “case officers, religious counselors, prison wardens, psychologists and research analysts” are provided to the (ISD) for consideration in determining the need for continued detention or restrictive orders after release. 147 Report on a Conference Organized by the International Centre, 30. 148 Hassan and Pereire, “An Ideological Response,” 463. 149 Report on a Conference Organized by the International Centre, 30. 150 Ibid. 36 After release from custody but while inmates are still under restrictive orders (RO) by the authority of the Internal Security Act, the ISD takes a very proactive role along with the RRG to ensure aftercare counseling. The aftercare group of the RRG serves may roles in providing social services to released inmates as well as the inmates’ families. Restrictive orders are usually issued to ensure continued monitoring of the exinmates by their respective religious counselor, ISA officers, and support group.151 This governmental power that requires inmates to obtain continued counseling and rehabilitation after release is similar to the United States use of probation and parole restrictions. U.S. inmates can be released from confinement to probation or parole supervision and required to attend specified treatment programs such as drug and alcohol treatment. One major difference would be that in Singapore, detention orders (DO) and restriction orders (RO) can be implemented and enforced with very little due process and without conviction or trial.152 F. INTERNAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT’S (PRISON SERVICES) ROLE IN PRISONER DERADICALIZATION Individuals being detained by detention orders or incarceration due to a conviction of a criminal offense are under the supervision of the Internal Security Department or more specifically the Singapore Prison Services (SPS). Singapore Prison Service reported in a February 1, 2012 on-line memorandum the total prison population on December 31, 2011 as 10,028 inmates.153 I was unable to determine how many of these individuals were incarcerated for terrorist-related crimes or whether any of the inmates were being held on detention orders. Singapore Prison Services reported that 215 inmates are incarcerated for “Crime against Public Order”;154 however, the document provided no verification that inmates who were convicted or being held in detention for terrorism related activity were included in this category. The SPS reported a recidivism 151 Report on a Conference Organized by the International Centre, 30. 152“Parliamentary Speech on the Internal Security Act.” 153 Singapore Prison Service, “2012 Singapore Prison Service Annual Statistics Release,” 2012, http://www.prisons.gov.sg/content/dam/sps/publication_latest/2012%20Prisons%20Annual%20Statistics% 20Release%201%20Feb%202012.pdf (accessed October 30, 2012). 154 Ibid. 37 rate of 26.7 percent for the release cohort of 2009, which reflected a decline from 27.3 percent for the year ending 2008.155 The SPS defined the recidivism rate as, “the percentage of local inmates detained, convicted and imprisoned again for a new offence within two years from their release.”156 Providing deradicalization services to inmates under detention orders and conviction offers another example of the collaborative effort from the RRG and the ISA. The attempt to reprogram the mindset of the detainees takes on a three part process consisting of psychological rehabilitation, religious rehabilitation, and social rehabilitation.157 During the psychological rehabilitation phase, psychologist routinely counsel with inmates in an attempt to assess the inmate’s progress in the cognitive process of reshaping their mindset to a non-violent ideology. One of the first changes experienced by the detainees and witnessed by the counselors is a reflection on the past actions as well as the consequences for those actions.158 The next observed change is the “re-evaluation of their environment when radicalized individuals realize that they have wrongly assumed their actions are supported by the community at large.”159 In the final stage of rehabilitation, the inmate realizes and recalls his path to radicalization and understands the misconceptions that led to his indoctrination into a radical mindset that promoted violence. The ISD officer who spoke at the international conference on terrorism rehabilitation stated, “In all these stages, there is cognitive restructuring, where the detainees are made to gradually learn—from psychologists—how to manage emotion and develop the capacity to objectively frame global events.”160 Another stage in the rehabilitation process involves the religious counseling program for the detainees. The religious counseling component of the program is 155 Singapore Prison Service, “2012 Singapore Prison Service.” 156 Ibid. 157 Report on a Conference Organized by the International Centre, 31. 158 Ibid. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid. 38 conducted primarily by the RRG’s religious counselors.161 Acting independent of the government and armed with the education and legitimacy that, in most cases, is recognized by the detainees, the counselors begin an intensive four-step process of intensive dialogue to reshape and change the violent mindset of the inmate.162 This religious counseling phase allows for mutual debate and dialogue in an attempt to rectify any and all ideological misconceptions that promote violence and extremism. The last stage of the rehabilitation program, social rehabilitation, extends beyond the perimeter of the prison by offering social support and integrating the non-violent message of Islam into the community. The ISD work hand-in-hand with the Aftercare Group of the RRG to provide financial support to families in an attempt to ensure a smooth transition from prison to the community.163 The ISD provide opportunities for detainee family members to visit with detainees to help maintain the family structure thus providing additional emotional support for the inmate once released. By providing financial and social support, the ISD believe inmates can be totally focused on rehabilitation and cooperating with investigations.164 Vocational training is provided to help ensure the inmate develops a means of financial stability once released.165 The ISD reports that not every case is a success for rehabilitation. Some JI members refuse to accept the Muslim community’s non-violent interpretation of Islam and see Muslims who believe in secularism and tolerance as infidels. These inmates who are non-compliant with rehabilitation take every opportunity to reiterate their position when meeting with counselors. In 2009, the RRG reported more than 1,200 counseling sessions with detainees, those under orders of restriction by the ISD, and more than 130 sessions provided for detainee’s family members.166 161 Report on a Conference Organized by the International Centre, 31. 162 “Religious Rehabilitation Group Website.” 163 Hassan, “The Roles of Religious Rehabilitation Group,” 10; Report on a Conference Organized by the International Centre, 31. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid., 32. 39 G. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ISSUES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY The implementation of a deradicalization model that officially challenges an individual’s ideological beliefs will inevitably result in First Amendment legal challenges. I am not qualified to provide a legal opinion regarding the legality of such a model or if volunteers providing such a program would be any different than the current religious volunteer programs that are in place in almost every correctional facility in the country. Currently, the BOP trains chaplains to monitor religious services and provides manuals that dictate “appropriate religious service procedures and behaviors.”167 I agree with this procedure as there is a vested interest in ensuring any religious interpretation is not used to justify a violent action. Providing incentives for program participation that affect the inmate’s sentence structure, program assignment, or living conditions will also inevitably face legal challenges. 167 Committee on Homeland Security, Radicalization, 5. 40 IV. A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAUDI ARABIA’S PRISON DERADICALIZATION MODEL RATIONALE FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SAUDI ARABIA’S DERADICALIZATION MODEL Although the government structure and laws of Saudi Arabia in no way represent or resemble that of the United States, Saudi Arabia has initiated one of the most intensive counter terrorism campaigns that includes a rigorous deradicalization initiative geared toward Islamic radicals. Recognizing the promise of engaging detainees with counter dialogue that discredits and neutralizes violent rationalizations, U.S. General Douglas Stone, in a June 2008 briefing to the Defense Department, provided details how he studied the Saudi deradicalization program to develop the detainee program employed by Task Force 134 in Iraq.168 General Stone referenced the program’s success by providing impressive recidivism rates of approximately six percent for Iraqi detainee releases.169 The Saudi program has been recognized by multiple international agencies as well as other governments that are dedicated to strong counter terrorism measures as being an effective program for countering violent Islamic radicalization.170 B. SAUDI ARABIA’S GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE Home to the two most revered shrines known in Islam, Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia is considered the birthplace of Islam.171 Saudi Arabia has a government ruled by a monarchy with its capital located in Riyadh. King Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz, Saudi’s current king and male descendent of Abd Al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman Al Saud who founded Saudi Arabia in 1932, rules the kingdom. The king’s official title, “Custodian of 168 “Defense Department Briefing with Major General Douglas Stone , U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Outgoing Commanding General, Task Force 134, Multinational Force Iraq; Subject: Detainee Operations; Location: The Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia,” Federal News Service, sec. Department Defense Briefing, June 9, 2008, 8. 169 Ibid. 10. 170 “Saudi Arabia: The World’s Finest in Counter-Terrorism,” Asharq Alawsat [English], May 2, 2012. 171 Central Intelligence Agency, “Middle East: Saudi Arabia,” The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html (accessed August 13, 2012). 41 the Two Holy Mosques,” provides insight related to the dominant role of the Islamic religion in the government structure of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, officially referred to as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is composed of 13 provinces. Saudi Arabia’s constitution, although written as an official constitution, is literally Islamic (Sharia) law and the Quran.172 The executive branch consists of the king who also serves as the Prime Minister rules the government. The heir to the king, Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, serves the king as Deputy Prime Minister as of June 2012.173 Saudi Arabia’s cabinet members consists of a council of 22 ministers, many are relatives of the king, and appointed every four years.174 The ministers assist the king with the policy development and oversight of the different areas of governmental affairs.175 In recognizing the relevance to radicalization as well as the factors that promote an individual to engage in deradicalization efforts, it is important to acknowledge the alliance between the al-Saud family, its allies, and the al-Sheikh family. Albeit within the House of Saud lies the complete establishment of Saudi rule, the establishment of religious legitimacy is found within the continued alliance with the al-Sheikh family, who are the descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab.176 Establishing and maintaining religious legitimacy, which is the rigorous Wahhabist interpretation of Sunni Islam, is essential to maintaining social control and political dominance. This ultra-conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam provides the framework for the Kingdom’s policies and provides the stage for inevitable conflict and Islamic radicalization.177 C. SAUDI ARABIA’S LEGAL SYSTEM AND ATTEMPT TO CODIFY TERRORISM LAWS The Kingdom’s legal system is based predominantly on Islamic law, although it has recently witnessed the introduction of secular codes and the use of committees to 172 Central Intelligence Agency, “East and Southeast Asia: Singapore.” 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid. 175 “Terrorism Bill Will Keep Tensions High,” Saudi Arabia Business Forecast Report, October 1, 2011. 176 Email discussions with Professor Nadav Morag, Naval Postgraduate School, August 21, 2012. 177 J. F. Seznec, “Stirrings in Saudi Arabia,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002), 33–34. 42 litigate commercial issues.178 In 2002, Saudi Arabia codified a “Law of Criminal Procedure” (LCP) that provided a guide for legal procedure and limited individual rights. The LCP, consisting of 225 articles, covers issues such as rights to legal counsel and privacy issues, legal justifications to search and seizure as well as specific regulations related to timelines for detention and subsequently issuing criminal charges. It is important to note that although this procedure provides limited legal rights, the judicial and governmental enforcement officers are given broad judgment related to the interpretation of Sharia law and their interpretation of individual actions that meet their own definition of a violated crime. In an attempt to define and codify the criminal violation and definition of terrorism, the Saudi government has received criticism from civil rights groups. The new security law has been criticized as being indistinct and expansive. Amnesty International received a leaked version of the proposed law in 2011 and called into question the intent and legitimacy of the proposed law. Amnesty reports the anti-terrorism law would place harsh penalties on anyone who questions the government’s actions or criticizes the government’s leadership.179 The proposed law, according to Amnesty International, permits indefinite detainment for suspects and provides the Minister of the Interior massive latitude in ordering warrantless wire taps on personal phones as well as warrantless searches of individual’s personal property and homes.180 The motives of this proposed law have also been called into question. Critics have alleged the new law as being used as a tool to “legally” crush any attempt to challenge the governments’ motives or express dissent.181 Malcolm Smart, Amnesty International 178 Central Intelligence Agency, “Middle East: Saudi Arabia.” 179 Amnesty International, “Annual Report 2012, Saudi Arabia,” 2012, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/saudi-arabia/report-2012 (accessed August 15, 2012). 180 Ibid. 181 “Amnesty Criticizes Draft Saudi Security Law,” BBC Monitoring Middle East—Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 1, 2011. 43 Middle East and North Africa Director, accuses the Saudi government of “adding insult to injury by curtailing freedoms in the name of countering terrorism.”182 D. SAUDI ARABIA’S REALIZATION OF THE NEED FOR A PRISON DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam and home to the two most holy mosques for Muslims, has experienced its share of Islamic terrorism. Al-Qaeda’s lethal actions of targeting visitors to Saudi Arabia and killing them, often in public venues, can be traced back to 1995.183 These terrorist attacks became more prevalent and aggressive by 2003, including attacks on the royal regime as well as indiscriminate attacks on the population, including bombings within the capital city of Riyadh.184 By 2004, 22 incidents of violent extremism had claimed the lives of 90 civilians and produced massive numbers of injured Saudis.185 The Kingdom was under siege, and it was evident that Islamic terrorists, fueled by violent Islamic ideologies, would continue their murderous acts pending some type of intervention. With a massive wave of public repugnance for the indiscriminate terrorist acts, the Kingdom embarked on a creative counter terror program that would target the foundation of Al Qaeda’s violent ideology and extend an offer of reprieve.186 The Saudi government initiated an aggressive detainment campaign to remove Al Qaeda terrorist from the Saudi population. An initial offer of amnesty was made accessible to any terrorist who would surrender, renounce their ideologies and accept the state sponsored version of Islam.187 According to Henry, the offer of amnesty produced a cadre of terrorist supporters—jihadists as well as al-Qaeda leaders who had in the past avoided 182 “Saudi Arabia Blocks Amnesty International website,” BBC Monitoring World Media Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring July 27, 2011. 183 Terrence Henry, “Get Out of Jihad Free,” The Atlantic Monthly, June 2007, 39. 184 Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 16 (2007). 185 Henry, “Get Out of Jihad Free,” 39–40. 186 Ibid. 187 Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation;” Henry, “Get Out of Jihad Free,” 39–40. 44 capture but now laid down their bombs and accepted the state’s offer.188 With a large prison population of Islamic terrorist who indiscriminately label other Muslims as apostates (takfir) or unbelievers and use this as a justification to kill in the name of Islam, the Kingdom embarked on a program designed to target this perverted ideology by challenging their interpretations of the Quran.189 E. SAUDI ARABIA’S PRISON DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM In response to the death and destruction at the hands of the Islamic terrorists, Saudi officials launched a non-publicized deradicalization effort dubbed the “Advisory Committee Counseling Program” in 2004.190 The program, originally designed to address only the needs of terrorist supporters while considering those with “blood on their hands” as being not appropriate for rehabilitation,191 has refocused its efforts to provide rehabilitative services to detainees returning from Iraq and Guantanamo. 192 In 2010, the “intensive program” reportedly conducted at nine of the 13 security prisons throughout Saudi Arabia had an operating budget of between 40 and 50 million dollars.193 In 2008, Christopher Boucek reported the Kingdom was opening five new prisons, each designed for the rehabilitation and counseling of Muslim extremist.194 These facilities built in Riyadh, Qassim, Abha, Dammam, and Jiddah were constructed to facilitate the design of the Saudi deradicalization program. Each prison, designed to house approximately 1,200 inmates, contains individual rooms that allow for the 188 Henry, “Get Out of Jihad Free,” 39–40. 189 Horgan and Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?” 276; Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation.” 190 Ibid. 191 Marisa L. Porges, The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/saudi-deradicalization-experiment/p21292 (accessed November 23, 2012); Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 213. 192 Sudarsan Raghavan and Peter Finn, “U.S. Sees Saudi Program as an Option for Detainees,” The Washington Post, October 14, 2009. 193 “EXCLUSIVE: Former Gitmo Prisoner, Rehabilitated in Saudi Arabia, May Soon be Released,” Fox News, sec. World News, February 18, 2010. 194 Christopher Boucek, “Jailing Jihadis: Saudi Arabia’s Special Terrorist Prisons,” Terrorism Monitor 6, no. 2 (2008). 45 segregation of radicals and the reduction of prisoner radicalization within the inmate population. Recognizing the possibility of an outside militant attack, the al-Ha’ir facility located south of Riyadh, has a refined security system to help prevent against terrorist attacks and intrusions. Sophisticated video technology is utilized to allow counseling sessions to be broadcast throughout parts of the facility and provide for direct observation from authorities as well as government officials who elect to monitor the activity within the facility. The facility is designed with multiple conference rooms to permit group counseling sessions and lectures as well as single rooms that allow for private session. Every aspect of the facility’s design is modeled toward the deradicalization efforts of the Kingdom. Oversight of the deradicalization program was placed under the supervision of the 3rd highest ranking government official in Saudi Arabia, the Minister of the Interior.195 The program’s structure (see Figure 3) is designed around an “Advisory Committee” structured from four subcommittees (Religious, Psychological and Social, Security, and Media) each with specific responsibilities that focus on removing the violent religious ideologies used to rationalize terrorist activity.196 Figure 3. Saudi Arabia’s Prison Advisory Committee 195 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 217. 196 Ibid., 217. 46 1. Advisory Committee Serving as the administrative arm of the Minister of Interior for matters related to the Saudi deradicalization program, the Advisory Committee coordinates the activities and personnel that perform the various functions of the deradicalization program. Based in Riyadh and with committee members maintaining permanent residents throughout the country, the advisory committee takes great care in vetting potential counselors, clerics, and religious leaders who play specific roles in different area of rehabilitation.197 Careful attention is given to selecting individuals who have the ability to engage detainees in spirited dialogue and introduce the government’s opinion that, because of a misinterpretation of Islamic text or law, the detainee wrongfully participated in acts of terrorism.198 As rumors of prisoner abuse grew within the Kingdom, the Minister of the Interior called on clerics, many of whom were skeptical of the governments’ intentions, to visit the prisons and to observe the living conditions and the efforts to rehabilitate the inmates being held as security risk.199 As evidence that rehabilitation was more important that retribution, in some instances, the government permitted high profile extremist to bypass incarceration and move directly into the program’s community treatment phase.200 These actions and by permitting the clerics to visit prisons and report their findings back to the communities, the program’s credibility began to establish itself with the community as well as the individuals who the program was targeted. The program is based on benevolence, not retribution, and has been referred to by many as a “soft approach”201 or “soft power”202 to fighting terrorism. The inmate or extremist is considered to have been “misled” or to have made an incorrect interpretation 197 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 218. 198 Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, International: Terrorists can be Rehabilitated (United Kingdom: Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2010). 199 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 215. 200 Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy. 55. 201 Porges, The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment. 2. 202 Susan Mohammad, “To Deprogram a Jihadist,” Maclean’s, February 9, 2009, 30. 47 of the religious text within the Quran. The inmate is considered a victim rather than a criminal. The Advisory Committee, much like the RRG in Singapore, realized to effectively engage the jihadists, an understanding of their mindset, religious education, and other social factors was necessary. According to Boucek, almost every security prisoner participating in the program did not have a religious education as a child.203 According to Boucek, the committee reported most of the detainees were young, lowerto middle-class and members of large families consisting of seven to 15 siblings.204 Boucek reported the committee found most of the youth “had been radicalized through extremist books, tapes, videos and more recently the Internet.”205 The committee’s report indicated that for the most part their parents were found to possess a low level of education and one-third of the detainees had participated in Jihad in Afghanistan, Somalia, or Chechnya.206 One of the most telling results from the research was the common theme that developed, which indicated that most of the participants had very little understanding of religious matters and a distorted understanding of Islam.207 These results somewhat correlate with the characteristics of other individuals held as security detainees in Iraq.208 The Advisory Committee serves as an important role in presenting the program as a positive and validated program to the public as well as the inmates that the program serves.209 Boucek explained how, “several former militant figures” helped facilitate portions of the program.210 By the former militant’s participation, a sense of legitimization is awarded to the program by the inmates.211 It is common for members of the committee or representatives from the Minister of Interior’s (MOI) office to attend 203 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 215. 204 Ibid., 215. 205 Ibid., 216. 206 Ibid., 215. 207 Ibid. 208 “Defense Department Briefing.” 4. 209 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 217. 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid., 216. 48 public meetings or social events to promote the message of the program, which is essentially the message of the Kingdom. As with the Singapore program, promoting the government’s message of peace and religious rehabilitation is not exclusive to the prison population. The Saudi program reaches out to the inmate’s family members and the Muslim community at large although the major focus on rehabilitation begins with the Religious Subcommittee’s interaction with the individual inmate. 2. Religious Subcommittee Framework The Religious Subcommittee collectively represents the largest of the four subcommittees that formulate the Advisory Committee Counseling Program.212 As reported by Christopher Boucek in 2007, the Religious Subcommittee is composed of approximately 150 Muslim clerics, Islamic scholars, and professors who are responsible for engaging the inmates in a non-intrusive manner to encourage the dialogue. Having the luxury of an abundance of religious scholars and clerics, Saudi Arabia has no trouble finding individuals to provide the counseling and religious education to the inmate population. It is important to mention that many of the Religious Subcommittee remains in contact with inmates and provides a support network once the inmate is released from custody.213 Some clerics choose to keep their participation in the program secret and shun the recognition that could be associated with the program. 214 As Boucek indicates, these clerics express a conviction of receiving the recognition of God for their service and to publicize such work would only destroy their deeds. There are also those who participate in the program yet choose to remain surreptitious out of fear of retaliation or exclusion from their own groups.215 Unlike the Singapore counseling program, the Advisory Committee does not publically disclose the names of counselors. 212 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 217. 213 Ibid., 218–219. 214 Ibid., 218. 215 Ibid. 49 3. Saudi Arabia’s Counseling Process As with the Singapore program, the counseling program is the crux of the Saudi prison deradicalization program. Officially referred to as “beneficiaries,”216 the inmates are approached in a non-authoritative manner by religious scholars and clerics who initiate a conversation with the inmates related to the inmate’s religious understandings and beliefs.217 During these initial conversations, one of the counselor’s goals is to ensure the inmate understands that the counselor is not an employee of the Minister of Interior nor does he work for the security forces but that he is a reputable cleric, psychologist, or trained religious scholar who is interested in helping the inmate.218 These initial counseling sessions, each designed to last approximately two hours, 219 are designed to build a sense of trust and hopefully ensure a more open and honest dialogue that will uncover the inmate’s rationale for his actions. In the initial phase of the counseling program, the government sponsored version of Islam is introduced along with references from the Quran that support the argument.220 To be considered successful in the program, the inmate must renounce their affiliations with terrorist groups.221 If the attempt to dialogue with the inmate fails or the inmate simply refuses to speak to the counselor, the inmate may request to speak to another counselor. In a 2008 Christian Science Monitor article, Khalid al-Hubayshi, an exGuantanamo prisoner describes his experience with the Saudi program as a “mix of forgiveness, theological reeducation, psychological counseling, prison time, and cash.”222 Hubayshi confirms the counseling sessions as being an opportunity to explain your beliefs and then receive an explanation that elucidates their misconceptions.223 In the 216 Porges, The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment. 3. 217 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 308. 218 Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation;” Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 221. 219 Ibid., 221. 220 Ibid. 221 Horgan and Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?” 278. 222 Caryle Murphy, “Saudis Use Cash and Counseling to Fight Terrorism,” Christian Science Monitor, sec. World, August 20, 2008. 223 Idid. 50 above referenced 2008 article, Cleric Abdel Aziz al-Hileyl, a counselor with the Saudi program, was quoted as saying, “Our Main goal is to open their minds and to correct their thoughts. We teach them to be in the middle of Islam.”224 The second part of the counseling program consists of group study sessions that are designed for a six-week program. Approximately 20 detainees participate in each class, which is built around the concept of spirited dialogue and debate. In a Terrorism Monitor article, Christopher Boucek described how two clerics and a social scientist lead the instructions on subjects such as “takfir, walaah (loyalty), and bayat (allegiance), terrorism, jihad and psychological courses on self-esteem.”225 The detainees are schooled on avoiding misleading teachings or literature that promotes violence or ideological misconceptions.226 It is important to recognize the concepts taught are those supported and approved by the Kingdom. Although the counselors present themselves as independent of the government, it seems unrealistic to believe that autonomous instructions would be possible in the program. At the end of the program’s second phase an exam is provided. The “beneficiaries” are required to pass the exam prior to graduating to the next phase where the inmates (if eligible for release) are relocated to community counseling centers. 4. Psychological and Social Subcommittee Framework/Social Support The Psychological and Social Subcommittee consists of more than four dozen psychologists, psychiatrists and social scientists.227 This subcommittee plays a dual role in assisting the inmates with the religious rehabilitation process. Psychologists and psychiatrists regularly observe counseling sessions, especially during the six-week program, to evaluate the inmate’s progress in the program and to make clinical observations regarding the mental status of the inmate. As Boucek points out, on some 224 Murphy, “Saudis Use Cash.” 225 Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation;” 24. 226 Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy, 17. 227 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 217. 51 occasions counselors may become too involved with a particular inmate’s situation to make an objective determination as to the inmate’s sincerity and genuine involvement in the program.228 Much like Singapore’s program, the Saudi program places great emphasis on providing social support not only for the inmate but also his family, who may experience extreme hardships due to the incarceration of the family’s primary supporter.229 As mentioned earlier, the government understands the integrity of the program is essential for its success. By providing social support to family members, the government extends a good will gesture and helps prevent the radicalization of family members. The message that the extremist groups have no personal interest in the welfare of its members or the member’s family is a strong motivator for the inmate participants. Khalid Al Hubayshi, a Guantanamo inmate who returned to Saudi and successfully completed the program, reported receiving $800 in monthly allowances along with a Toyota Corolla and $20,000 to pay for an upcoming marriage.230 The Saudi government encourages the inmates to marry as promoting a stable lifestyle and responsibility to the family structure which promotes disengagement.231 Many inmates who have graduated from the program praise the government’s effort and attribute their success to the assistance provided by the Saudi government and the counseling program.232 5. Security Subcommittee Framework I would describe the Security Subcommittee as similar to the classification committee found in most United States correctional systems. The primary goal of the Security Subcommittee is to determine the risk associated with each prisoner and make recommendations regarding release and supervision.233 Although much of their work 228 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 218. 229 Murphy, “Saudis Use Cash,” 1. 230 Ibid. 231 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 217. 232 Sonia Verma, “Terrorists ‘Cured’ with Cash, Cars and Counselling; Controversial Saudi Rehab Program Aims to Reform Jihadists Returning from U.S. Prisons,” The Globe and Mail [Canada], Sec. International News, September 11, 2008. 233 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 219. 52 remains a mystery, the Security Subcommittee members routinely communicate with other committee members as well as the public. This group works closely with inmates and provides advice on how to be successful once released. The security members inform the inmates of expectations and explain how the monitoring process will be utilized to ensure there is no contact with individuals who are considered a threat to the inmate’s new freedom or the security of the Kingdom.234 6. Media Subcommittee Framework As the terrorist networks have found the value of utilizing an effective media campaign for recruitment and propagating violent extremism, the Media Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee has also embarked on an intensive media initiative to reduce radicalization and promote the Kingdom’s message of avoiding terrorist networks like alQaeda. The primary target of this organized message is the most vulnerable, the young Saudi male.235 Recognizing its audience, the committee has created messages and examples that mirror the struggles of ex-terrorists who found themselves abandoned by the terrorist groups once they were no longer any value.236 Through research, the Media Subcommittee has determined the most effective method of delivering the program’s message is through Friday prayers (Jumu’ah prayer).237 The Media Subcommittee’s mission is a good example of a proactive approach to countering radicalization with a target group who has proven to be vulnerable to the Islamic extremist message. 7. Detainee Family Members Role in the Program As with the deradicalization program in Singapore, Saudi Arabia understands the value of utilizing the inmate’s family as a powerful partner and motivator to promote positive change. Inmate family members take an active role in engaging in counseling sessions and encouraging the inmate’s rehabilitation effort.238 As the inmates progress 234 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 219. 235 Ibid., 220. 236 Ibid. 237 Ibid. 238 Porges, The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment. 28. 53 through the program and approach possible release, the government expects the inmate’s family or tribe to provide supervision and guidance to prevent the inmate from going astray.239 The aftercare phase is conducted in a relaxed, non-regimented environment.240 Inmates have access to table tennis, video games, swimming, art therapy, fresh air, and other recreational activities on a regular basis.241 The rehabilitation center’s therapeutic atmospheres is conducive to individual counseling and designed to reintegrate the offender back into society and restore family bonds that have been broken during the inmate’s incarceration.242 The family provides a powerful influence for the inmate not to reoffend and accepts a significant degree of responsibility for the inmate’s success upon release. Boucek makes an interesting observation by pointing out that by holding the family responsible, both personally and financially, for the inmate’s success once released, the government is utilizing the strong cultural values of honor and obligation to the family.243 As part of the deradicalization program, inmates receive furloughs to attend family functions but only if three of the inmate’s family come forward and sign for his release and ensure his return.244 If they do not deliver the inmate back to the government’s custody, they take his place.245 The significance of the social support element in the program cannot be overstated. Not only does it serve as a smart investment for the Saudi government, it serves as a significant motivator for disengagement. F. PROGRAM’S SUCCESS The Advisory Committee Counseling Program of Saudi Arabia demonstrates the proactive efforts of a governing body in attempting to counter the radicalization of its 239 Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy, 20. 240 Horgan and Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?” 278. 241 Mohammad, To Deprogram a Jihadist, 30. 242 Horgan and Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?” 267–291. 243 Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy. 20. 244 Ibid. 245 Ibid. 54 inmate population as well as its general population. Realizing that locking individuals away without addressing the rehabilitation needs is like placing a Band-Aid on an infected wound without medication. You can expect future problems! In January 2010, Marisa Proges reported approximately 4000 inmates had participated in the Saudi program and reintegrated back into society.246 In a 2009 BBC article, Mansour Al-Turki, who serves as the Director of General Affairs for the Minister of Interior and Director of Saudi’s rehabilitation centers, states that the Prince Muhammad Bin Naif Centre for Care and Advice “had to date advised and guided over 5,500 individuals returning from troubled areas in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries.”247 A 2010, Country Report on Terrorism by the U.S. State Department, states the Minister of Interior of Saudi Arabia reports the Saudi deradicalization program has served as many as 3,200 inmates who have participated in approximately 5,000 counseling sessions.248 Doctor Abdurrahman al-Hadlaq, Director General of Ideological Security for the Saudi Minister of Interior, acknowledges not every case is a success. Hadlaq reported that during the month of June 2008, the Saudi government locked up 500 extremists.249 The point was made by Hadlaq that if the deradicalization program had not been in place, the numbers may have been much higher. Dr. al-Hadlaq advises about 10 percent of the extremists reject an offer to participate in the program.250 Hadlaq emphasizes the program is voluntary and that no one is forced to participate. In the 2010 Department of State report (referenced above), the report advises the Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia provided estimates of the recidivism rates to be at 10 percent for program participants and 20 percent for participants who have returned 246 Porges, The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment. 247 “Saudi Official Says Rehabilitation of 117 Ex-Gitmo Detainees Working Smoothly,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 18, 2009. 248 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorsim, United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/7195400/Saudi-Arabia-defends-alQaeda-rehabilitation-scheme.html (accessed November 12, 2012). 249 Murphy, “Saudis Use Cash,” 1. 250 Ibid. 55 from Guantanamo.251 An article in The Long War Journal, Saudi officials are quoted as reporting 25 of the 120 Guantanamo inmates who had graduated the rehabilitation program as “returning to terrorism.”252 It is important to note these figures are reported by the Saudi government, and, as mentioned, they are only estimates of recidivism rates. Many have questioned whether a program that has only been in operation less than 10 years can be judged as successful.253 One cannot deny the difficulty in knowing what actions a program graduate may be involved in once released and the issues with not maintaining accurate records to track individuals upon release. 251 Office of the Coordinator, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, 103–104. 252 Thomas Joscelyn, “Saudi Gitmo Recidivists,” The Long War Journal, June 21, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/06/saudi_gitmo_recidivi.php (accessed November 12, 2011). 253 Horgan and Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?” 267–291. 56 V. A. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH LIMITATIONS I would again acknowledge the limitations of this research. Because prisons are complex, fickle environments and deficient in intensive social research, it is difficult to determine a cause/effect relationship between the experiences of prison life and the negative effects, such experiences may have on the individual prisoner. In a 2009 Criminology and Public Policy article, Useem and Clayton acknowledged the complexities of the correctional environment and the many “unknowns” that surround the issue of prison radicalization.254 Although the comparative analysis of Singapore and Saudi Arabia’s deradicalization programs offer externally valid data, I acknowledge the fundamental differences in governmental structures, cultural standards and legal considerations as compared to the United States. This research is dependent upon the self-reported data of the countries represented and independent verification to confirm or deny the data is not possible. Consideration must also be given to the obvious difference in the definitions of relevant terms from Singapore and Saudi Arabia such as “radicalization” or “extremism” as compared to the United States. This researcher acknowledges what may be considered radicalization or extremist activity in America could be considered normal social behavior in another country. B. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE USED TO FORM A BASIS FOR THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF PRISON RADICALIZATION The goal of this thesis was to identify a strategy that offered possible solutions to counter prison radicalization within America’s correctional institutions. By identifying contributing factors that promote prison radicalization, proactive measures that mitigate these factors may reduce the prison’s vulnerability to extremism and radicalization. The negative influences of prison gangs and groups should not be underestimated, although understanding the concepts of social identity offer possible countermeasures to 254 Bert Useem and Obie Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” Criminology and Public Policy 8, no. 3 (August, 2009): 564. 57 combating the power of the charismatic group leader and their radicalized agenda. The following recommendations are based on my analysis of the literature and cite the relevant works that form the basis of the recommendations. The recommendations focus on reducing the vulnerability of prison radicalization by implementing policy and procedures that help mitigate environmental factors that research has shown promotes radicalization within the correctional setting: 1. Productive Rehabilitation and Effective Security: The Dual Strategy The most effective correctional system incorporates productive rehabilitative programs with sound security policies. In reading Strategy Safari, I realized a valuable truth as stated in the book, “eventually situations change—environments destabilize, niches disappear, opportunities open up. Then all that is constructive and effective about an established strategy becomes a liability [emphasis added].”255 This reference from Strategy Safari rings true in that the dominant strategy within corrections has been a security focused model. As demonstrated in this thesis, the current strategy related to the incarceration of convicted terrorist is predominately a security focused model. With such a focus, rehabilitative models may find limited support for implementation or funding. I would argue that in many cases, correctional policy has failed to adjust strategies that target the positive aspects of rehabilitative efforts. Correction’s long-term strategy (security), although it is the foundation of sound correctional policy, may have become a “liability” because we have failed to recognize the need to change and adjust the strategy to a model that includes both security and a robust rehabilitative initiative. According to the authors of Strategy Safari, “Strategy, as mental set, can blind the organization to its own outdatedness. Thus we conclude that strategies are to organizations what blinders are to horses: they keep them going in a straight line but hardly encourage peripheral vision.”256 Good “peripheral vision” will help us recognize the benefits of a strategy that 255 Bruce Ahlstrand, Henry Mintzberg, Joseph Lampel, Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour through the Wilds of Strategic Management (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2001), Kindle Edition 256–257. 256 Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, Strategy Safari, 261–263. 58 incorporates rehabilitative models with sound security policies and together offer an effective strategy to reducing the vulnerability for prison radicalization. 2. Effective Monitoring and Control of Prison Groups257 Group dynamics within American prisons should not be dismissed as insignificant by correctional administrators. As individual inmates enter the prison setting, an inmate searching for a new identity finds advantages to finding an in-group that provides support, security, and a possible new identity. As found in Hamm’s two-year study of prison radicalization, gangs in prison have a direct link to radicalization.258 Whether we refer to a security threat group (STG) or a group of inmates with no STG affiliation, the group provides a unique environment within the prison setting for a charismatic group leader to promote an extremist message. Correctional administrators should monitor and track prison groups to establish a proactive and informative position against any threats to the security of the facility. Gang intelligence officers, as well as correctional housing unit officers and correctional chaplains, provide an excellent resource to monitor group activity. The charismatic group leaders should be identified and appropriate monitoring of the inmate’s communication may provide actionable intelligence. Considering that Islam is the fastest growing religion in prison,259 Mark Hamm made an excellent observation in that correctional leaders may find advantages in hiring Muslim Americans.260 This practice has the potential of providing Islamic authority figures within the correctional environment to help detect and prevent Islamic radicalization, as well as provide a recognized Islamic staff presence inside the prison. 257 Prison groups in this section will refer to security threat groups as well as other groups that may promote a radical violent ideology. 258 Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalization,” 15. 259 House Committee on Homeland Security. The Threat of Muslim-American. 4. 260 Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalization,” 18. 59 3. Rigorous Vetting and Monitoring of Prison Chaplains and Religious Volunteers Whether you consider Islamic radicalization or right wing/Christian Identity radicalization in prisons, both have a religious nexus that attempts to justify violence by attaching an individual moral or religious obligation to each member. Considering the religious underpinning associated with radicalization, the prison’s religious authority plays a vital role in monitoring and supervising the message delivered to the prison population. Although America’s prison policies have advanced somewhat to prevent radicalized prison chaplains from entering the prison’s chapel and delivering a radicalized message, there remain incidents where current policies are not followed and therefore permit radical messages to be delivered to the inmate population.261 With no ecclesiastical body to certify Islamic providers, prison officials should utilize properly vetted Islamic leaders to assist in examining the provider’s specific religious beliefs and interpretations of religious doctrine. As mentioned in this research, Warith Deen Umar, an ex-inmate and imam, was responsible for recruiting and training chaplains for New York’s prison system provides an example of a failed vetting process. The absence of an effective vetting process for prison religious service providers and volunteers enhances the possibility of prison radicalization. As part of their policy compliance inspections, prison administrators should verify through personal observation, video monitoring, or intermediate visits that chaplains and religious volunteers are following established policy that prohibits inflammatory and obviously disrespectful messages aimed at other religious or groups. Many of the recommendations found in the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) report regarding the review of the BOP’s selection process for Muslim religious service providers262 offer relevant issues that should be addressed in prison policy. The practice of permitting inmates to lead prison religious services, although convenient and at times seemingly necessary, may not be the best practice. The placement of inmates in a leadership or authoritative role, sanctioned by the prison 261 Office of Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’, 54. 262 Ibid. 60 administration, establishes a sense of creditability that will enhance a charismatic inmate’s ability to promote an extremist message to the group. As discussed in this research, findings from a 2004 prison gang survey provided evidence that wardens indicated only half of the religious services in their prisons were supervised by staff.263 If prison administrators determine it necessary to permit the practice of allowing inmates to lead religious services, these services should be intensively monitored in an effort to reduce the vulnerability for prison radicalization. 4. Encourage Positive Communication264 Inmate/Family Social Interaction and When you consider the complexity of the prison environment and the unavoidable restrictions that directly affect an inmate’s liberty, providing the inmate opportunities to maintaining positive social interactions with family or significant others is very important. As Gresham Sykes’s research revealed, maximum custody inmates describe their experience as extremely “depriving” and “frustrating.”265 Although Americans may argue that convicted terrorists deserve nothing more than extremely frustrating and deprived living conditions within prison, I would argue conditions that prevent positive social interactions will have a chilling effect on rehabilitation efforts and increase the potential for radicalization. The positive influences that seem to be fostered through harnessing the motivational factors found in encouraging positive family and social interaction can be witnessed in both the Singapore and Saudi deradicalization programs. 5. Correctional Policy Should Encourage Social Research within Prisons I would argue understanding the complexities of a captive society like prison populations may never be truly achievable. I believe my 29-plus years of working inside prisons have helped me recognize how fragile this environment can be but to truly 263 Knox, The Problem of Gangs. 5. 264 For the purpose of this research, positive inmate/family social interaction and communication is defined as providing opportunities for inmates to maintain family and social relationships that may provide opportunities and incentives that may counter violent extremist ideologies. Interaction and communication with anyone who promotes violent extremist views would not be encouraged. 265 Sykes, The Society of Captives, 63. 61 understand how the prison environment affects prisoners will require social research. It has been reflected throughout this thesis the reluctance of correctional administrators in opening the prison doors to allow researchers access to incident reports, records, and, most importantly, the data that can only be retrieved from the prisoners themselves through interviews. The report, Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization, identified the importance of research in truly understanding the radicalization process inside prisons.266 As we move forward in this battle against prison radicalization, correctional administrators should recognize the benefits in approving social research projects that potentially may provide answers to the questions that help us better understand prison radicalization. 6. Provide Adequate Staff Training and Develop Intelligence Sharing Networks with Criminal Justice Partners The Correctional Intelligence Initiative, developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), provides a good framework that promotes intelligence gathering, related to terrorism and prisoner radicalization, from United States correctional agencies.267 I argue that although the plan is structurally sound, there remains a significant training element that must be accomplished. Correctional officers, counselors, chaplains, and other line staff must be properly trained to recognize the signs and symptoms of violent extremism and radicalization as well as understanding the procedure for reporting this activity to the appropriate prison personnel. The Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers also recognized the importance of training correctional staff to recognize and report signs of radicalization.268 The Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) serves as a good example of a state correctional agency proactively implementing policy that mandates intelligence sharing and training that supports intelligence gathering. TDOC has implemented an 266 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows. 4. 267 Joseph to the Office of the Inspector General. 268 Office of Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’. 62 administrative policy “index # 506.27 Correctional Intelligence Initiative”269 that mandates the collaborative effort to share intelligence from within the department to the fusion center, JTTF as well as other law enforcement agencies. The TDOC training academy has developed a training curriculum that provides line staff the annual training necessary to recognize elements of prisoner radicalization and how to respond to and report such activity.270 Correctional administrators at the federal, state, and local levels should ensure collaborative strategies are in place to promote intelligence sharing as well as ensuring that adequate staff training has been accomplished to help line staff recognize prison radicalization. C. ANALYSIS OF THE TWO DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND SINGAPORE The existing U.S. philosophy related to countering prison radicalization and ideologically motivated violent extremism within the Bureau of Prisons demonstrates an intensive security approach focused on controlling inmate communication and the propagation of inmate radicalization. Throughout this research, I have failed to find any U.S. prison deradicalization initiative. Although the United States’ “total segregation model” may reduce the opportunity for incarcerated inmates with a terrorism nexus to preach their violent message to the inmate population, we should ask ourselves, “what are we doing to prepare these inmates to return to society and what effect is long-term maximum security housing having on the inmates”? I would argue that although prisons—due to their punitive nature and restricted environments—may be fertile ground for radicalization, they also provide unique opportunities for influencing this captive audience to reevaluate their violent extremist mindsets. I believe the following elements of the two deradicalization models currently used in Singapore and Saudi Arabia offer U.S. correctional policymakers innovative strategies for countering prison radicalization. Through a comparative analysis of Singapore and Saudi Arabia’s prison deradicalization programs, this research set out to 269 Department of Correction, Administrative Policy and Procedure 506.27, Correctional Intelligence Initiative, (Nashville, TN: Department of Correction, 2008). 270 Tennessee Correctional Academy, Prison Radicalization. 63 provide useful data that would provide a basis for a recommendation for a U.S. prison deradicalization model. The following elements of each program were collectively examined and used as determining factors to suggest program success. These elements, taken collectively, will now be summarized to include recommendations for consideration in developing a U.S. prison deradicalization model. 1. Program Rehabilitative Efforts (Cognitive or Educational) Used to Counter Violent Ideological Beliefs/Rationalizations That Support the Use of Violence to Promote a Political or Religious Agenda The crux of Singapore’s and Saudi Arabia’s deradicalization programs is the counseling components that challenge the radical religious ideologies that terrorist use in rationalizing violence to promote a religious agenda. Singapore’s RRG four-stage counseling program, as well as Saudi Arabia’s Advisory Committee Counseling Program, specifically targets what both countries have labeled a misinterpretation of Islamic doctrine. Both programs utilize reputable clerics, psychologists, and trained religious scholars to engage the inmates in focused discourse designed to stimulate a cognitive self-evaluation of the inmate’s radical justifications for violence. Another commonality found in these two programs is the gradual progression of the counseling encounters. Just as the initial counseling session in the Singapore model, Saudi Arabia initiates the first counseling session as a private conversation between the inmate and a counselor.271 As stated in Chapters III and IV, these initial counseling sessions are designed to establish a beginning point for future discourse and ideally provide the counselor some insight as to the specific ideological beliefs of the inmate. In both programs, these sessions are critical in establishing the counselor as a creditable religious authority. As indicated in the research, both programs utilize volunteers who have been vetted by the appropriate authority to deliver the program inside the correctional environments. As mentioned in Chapters III and IV, a heavy emphasis is placed on the government’s interpretation of Islamic doctrine (Quran) to discredit radical extremism. 271 Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation.” 3. 64 As the counseling sessions continue, the focus of the conversation shifts toward explanations that discredit the inmate’s “incorrect interpretations” of religious doctrine or ideology. Again, in both programs, these early sessions do not involve group activity or conversations, although, as the counseling sessions advance, both programs incorporate these same justifications for discrediting violent ideological mindsets into a venue that includes, as mentioned in Chapter IV, up to 20 inmates. Within the group setting, both programs encourage spirited debate and discourse among participants. In Chapter IV, I made reference to Boucek’s explanation of the Advisory Committee recognizing the importance of utilizing “former militant figures” to help facilitate portions of these sessions. By incorporating a voice the inmates could relate too and recognize as “one of us” would hopefully help solidify the inmate’s commitment to change and add creditability to the programs message. It is also important to mention that both programs, to promote a cognitive change in the inmate, recognize the need for a psychological and social service presence. Boucek was referenced in Chapter IV as describing the use of social scientist along with religious clerics in the debate of subjects such as “takfir,” walaah (loyalty). The use of psychological courses offered inmates opportunities to reevaluate their self esteem and provided instruction on how to avoid misleading teachings that could result in violent confrontations. Chapter III provided information related to Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) being briefed from psychologists and case officers related to an inmate’s progress in making a positive cognitive shift from violent extremism.272 a. Recommendation 1: Establishment of Voluntary Cognitive-based Counseling Program My first recommendation is the establishment of a voluntary cognitive based counseling program for inmates who are incarcerated for terrorism related crimes or inmates who exhibit violent ideological expressions. Throughout this thesis, the point that 95 percent of the inmate population will be returning to our communities has been alluded to on multiple occasions. I believe 272 Report on a Conference Organized by the International Centre. 65 by focusing predominantly on the security aspects necessary for the secure incarceration of the 362 individuals in the U.S. for crimes related to terrorism, we overlook a unique opportunity to provide meaningful rehabilitation whereby inmates could possibly make a cognitive change in the mindset that justified violent radicalization and in some cases terrorism. As stated in Chapter II, Communications Management Units (CMU) have been referred to as a “total segregation model.” The model, as referenced in Chapter II, provides little opportunity for rehabilitation. The counseling programs, as described in Chapters III and IV, find their strength and effectiveness in discourse and challenging individuals on their personal and religious views. This same process could possibly pay benefits in the U.S. prison system. Although I acknowledge the governmental pressures of Saudi Arabia that demand compliance with religious views are much different than in America, I remain convinced that by engaging inmates in discourse that challenges their rationalizations for terrorist activity and radicalization, we provide an opportunity for a cognitive change that will reduce recidivism. The reported success of both the Saudi and Singapore programs should not be dismissed. Chapters III and IV provide examples of trained psychologists, religious scholars, and properly vetted religious volunteers, being utilized to deliver focused discourse designed to provide the foundation in changing the mindset of a terrorist. I would argue that most state and federal correctional facilities currently have anger management programs that mirror some of the foundational cognitive principles that have been described in Chapters III and IV. 2. Program Characteristics: Voluntary or Involuntary Participation and Incentives for Participation and Successful Completion Both the Saudi and Singapore program were reported as voluntary, although the incentives for successful participation may have been considered an offer only a few could refuse. Singapore and Saudi alike have legal authority to detain individuals suspected of terrorist participation. In both cases, participation in the state’s program may offer the only avenue to freedom. As referenced in Chapter III, Singapore utilizes the 66 Internal Security Act (ISA) that authorizes long-term detention upon approval of the president. Saudi Arabia, a monarchy, permits the detention by the order of the Minister of the Interior or the king, as described in Chapter IV. In both of these programs, some detainees’ only option for release may be to actively participate in the deradicalization programs. The additional incentives for successful participation in both programs are very lucrative and rewarding. Both programs recognize the stressors placed on family members, who often suffer from the incarceration of their primary financial provider. Realizing the need and the strategic benefit in assisting the family members of incarcerated inmates, monetary support is provided. In both cases, this social support fills a need that otherwise might have been filled by an extremist group, therefore compounding the radicalization issue. Secondly, the support instills a sense of loyalty and willingness to cooperate with rehabilitation, which are positive investments for both governments. Additionally, in the case of Saudi Arabia, social support, including financial assistance, is provided for marriages as well as transportation. Both of these incentives have been reported as investments in the individual’s future to provide stability and reduce the chances of reengaging in violent extremism or terrorist activity.273 a. Recommendation 2: Incentives for Inmates My second recommendation is that inmates who participate in voluntary deradicalization programs should be afforded the same incentives related to sentence credit reductions,274 vocational/educational opportunities as well as aftercare programs that support their chances for successful reentry and reduce the chances of further extremist activity as offered to the inmates in general prison population. Correctional policymakers should consider participation in this program part of an inmate’s rehabilitative program and therefore award the same credits as would be appropriate for any other program or job as approved by their policy. Providing these 273 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 217. 274 Sentence credit reductions would be considered the reduction of days from the offender’s total sentence for satisfactorily participating in a program or job as well as the reduction of days from the sentence for good behavior. 67 incentives, as demonstrated in this research, affords many of the similar benefits as found in Saudi Arabia and Singapore. As in both the Singapore and Saudi model, the inmates family will benefit by the inmate returning home sooner after serving a shorter sentence. Parole boards will have the opportunity of recognizing the inmate’s participation in the program as a genuine rehabilitative effort and will have the authorization to award early release if appropriate based on the inmate’s charge and behavior while in prison. One of the primary missions of any correctional system is to help the inmate correct his/her behavior. Providing meaningful incentives will encourage participation in a program that potentially could remove a terrorist threat from the homeland. 3. Reported Success of the Programs As acknowledged in the limitations of research section, the research data related to the reported success of Religious Rehabilitation Program (RRG) of Singapore and the Advisory Committee Counseling Program of Saudi Arabia is totally dependent on the reported data from open source information as well as the reports from the two governments represented in this thesis. In a December 31, 2011 memorandum, the Singapore Prison Service reported a total population of 10,028 inmates.275 This researcher was unable to determine how many of these individuals were incarcerated for terrorist-related crimes or whether any were being held on orders of detention. As reported in Chapter III, the SPS reported a recidivism rate of 26.7 percent for the release cohort of 2009, which reflected a decline from 27.3 percent for the year ending 2008. In 2009, the RRG reported more than 1,200 counseling sessions with detainees and those under orders of restriction by the ISD and more than 130 sessions provided for family members of detainees. This researcher was unable to find additional data to reflect specific reported numbers of inmates who had successfully completed the deradicalization program and returned to society. As reported in Chapter IV, a 2009 BBC article quoted Mansour Al-Turki, who serves as Director of General Affairs for the Minister of Interior and Director of Saudi’s rehabilitation centers, as saying that the Prince Muhammad Bin Naif Centre for Care and 275 Singapore Prison Service, “2012 Singapore Prison Service.” 68 Advice had provided rehabilitative services to more than 5,500 individuals returning from Afghanistan, Iraq as well as other countries. Although the Saudi government acknowledges that not every individual will accept the voluntarily program and not all successfully graduate the program, it still reports recidivism rates to be approximately 10 percent for the program participants and 20 percent for the participants who have completed the program after returning from Guantanamo.276 One relevant note regarding the Saudi program would be the reported success of the detainee program employed by Task Force 134 in Iraq. As mentioned in Chapter IV, U.S. General Douglas Stone reported in a 2008 briefing to the Department of Defense that the recidivism rates of Iraqi detainees released from the “134’s” program to be at approximately six percent. General Stone modeled the 134’s deradicalization program after the Saudi program.277 4. Methods Used to Promote Legitimacy and Validity to the Program That in Theory Increases the Program’s Success Singapore and Saudi Arabia both recognized the need for the program material as well as the program facilitators to be considered legitimate in the eyes of the inmates. Without a recognized religious authority, no interpretation of religious doctrine or Islamic law would have been recognized as valid by the inmates. As referenced in Chapter IV of this thesis, Saudi Arabia’s government is a monarchy with an established constitution based on Islamic law and the Quran. By establishing the Saudi program under the authority of the third ranking governmental official in Saudi Arabia, the Minister of the Interior, the king sent a clear message regarding the legitimacy of the program. The government of Saudi Arabia has opened its doors to recognized Islamic clerics and religious leaders after rumors of prisoner abuse were detected in a proactive effort to promote the validity of the program and to provide proof that the program’s theme was rehabilitation not retribution.278 The Saudi’s Advisory Committee provides legitimacy for the program as it serves as the administrative arm of the government and is made up of recognized religious 276 Office of the Coordinator, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010. 277 “Defense Department Briefing,” 8. 278 Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy. 21. 69 authority throughout the kingdom. In Chapter IV, Boucek described how the Saudi program utilized “several former militant figures” to help facilitate the program. Again, this technique provides significant legitimacy to the program’s claim that the inmates have based their violent actions on a misinterpretation of Islamic law. To witness a former terrorist validate this claim provides a strong validation. Singapore also established validity by creating an administrative element of the RRG that authenticates volunteer credentials as well as material used in the counseling sessions.279 Religious scholars, both in Islamic law and religion, provide support to the Singapore program. The RRG program provided updated training manuals to counselors that ensure modern information is utilized during the counseling programs. As with the Saudi program, the RRG group promotes an intensive aftercare phase that assist detainee family members with financial and social support needs during the inmate’s incarceration. As reported in Chapters III and IV, such actions not only reduce the vulnerability of radicalization with inmate’s family members, but they also provides a powerful motivator for the inmates to see the government’s program as legitimate in focusing on rehabilitation and not retribution. a. Recommendation 3: Invest in Volunteers, Chaplains, and Psychological Professionals and Partner with Family Members My third recommendation had two parts. First, I recommend that U.S. Corrections should invest in an intensive effort to recruit properly vetted and trained volunteers, chaplains, and psychological professionals that would be utilized in an established counseling program as recommended in recommendation 1. The second part of the recommendation is to partner with inmate family members to promote a positive social relationship that can be utilized as a motivating factor to encourage productive inmate participation in the counseling program. As referenced in Chapters III and IV, both deradicalization programs utilized religious volunteers, recognized religious scholars, and mental health professionals to ensure the quality and legitimacy of the deradicalization programs were 279 Hassan, “The Roles of Religious Rehabilitation Group.” 3. 70 maintained. Both programs also provided valid subject matter experts that engaged the inmates in intensive discourse that challenged a particular extremist religious based ideology. I would argue that most correctional departments have a limited supply of religious volunteers and finding qualified Islamic scholars who have been properly vetted will be a challenge.280 Throughout the research, the point was made that only qualified Islamic scholars or clerics, with the appropriate credentials, could provide the recognized legitimacy needed to make the program successful. To meet this challenge, a modification in U.S. strategy may be required by turning to advances in technology that would allow videoconferencing with recognized clerics or religious scholars in other regions or even other countries. To ensure the validity of the counseling program, developing a cadre of qualified volunteers and mental health professionals will be a critical component to success. It is important to note that a “one size fits all” strategy will not meet the demands of a prison deradicalization program. Correctional administrators will need to adjust the resources to meet the program requirements depending on the ideology targeted. By utilizing the family members of inmates as partners to promote positive social relationships for the inmates and to encourage inmate participation in the rehabilitation program, the positive influences mentioned in section B. 4 (p. 61) of this chapter, as well as Chapters IV and V, will be recognized. My experience as a correctional administrator has demonstrated a positive correlation between inmates maintaining family bonds and their positive adjustments to the correctional setting as well as their willingness to actively engage in rehabilitation. As demonstrated in Chapter IV, family members play a vital role in the success of the deradicalization program.281 The family participation may also promote a sense of obligation for the inmate to avoid any situation that could result in reoffending. 280 Cilluffo, Out of the Shadows, 38 281 Porges, The Saudi Deradicalization Experiment. 28. 71 5. Methods of Aftercare or Post-Release Supervision The aftercare initiatives and post-release supervision in Singapore and Saudi Arabia are very generous and serve as an extension of the supervision arm of the government once the inmate returns to society. The RRG’s aftercare group provides aftercare and social assistance to inmates directly by providing post incarceration counseling.282 As inmates leave the confines of prison, the government of Singapore utilizes detention orders, as described in Chapter III, that require continued counseling and community supervision.283 The RRG recognized the pressures inmates would face once leaving the confines of the correctional setting and returning home. Providing this continued counseling helps not only to continue a support structure for the inmate after leaving prison, it also allows monitoring of the inmate to track his behavior and compliance with avoiding extremist activity. Indirectly, the aftercare group supports the inmates while still incarcerated by providing social support to inmate family members. The support is found in monetary benefits, as well as providing social programs that help family members adjust to the incarceration of their loved one.284 By providing this support, the RRG and the Muslim community attempt to prevent the extremist from stepping in to offer assistance to the inmate’s family and regaining a foothold that could result in reoffending or radicalization of family members.285 Realizing you cannot force rehabilitation and considering the constitutional rights that protect religion, participation in the program would be voluntary. Both programs researched in this thesis have been reported as voluntary programs. The integrity of any counseling program that sought a cognitive change in the individual would be dependent on the voluntary nature of the program. This issue was addressed in recommending a totally voluntary program. 282 Report on a Conference Organized by the International Centre, 30. 283 Ibid. 284 Ibid. 285 Ibid. 72 Saudi Arabia’s Psychological and Social Subcommittees play an important role in providing aftercare and social support to the program participants. As with the RRG, the Saudi program recognizes that the inmate’s success upon release from incarceration is dependent on reentry rehabilitation and intensive aftercare and monitoring. Inmates who have completed the program report that they have received up to $800 in monthly allowances along with a new car and thousands of dollars to pay for a marriage. 286 The Security Subcommittee provides a method of enforcement monitoring after the inmate is released,287 much like parole supervision in America. This type of monitoring helps to ensure compliance with post release mandates that were established prior to release. The last phase of Saudi Arabia’s program takes place in a rehabilitation center that allows for family bonding and adjusting to a new lifestyle without extremist involvement.288 Set in a therapeutic atmosphere, a time of reflection, counseling, and family bonding take center stage. As mentioned in Chapter IV, while in the center, inmates are granted furloughs that help reestablish family ties. As family ties are reestablished, the government makes it clear the responsibility for the inmate’s success after returning home is a dual responsibility shared by the inmate as well as the family.289 a. Recommendation 4: Develop and Implement a Vigorous Aftercare Initiative My fourth recommendation is to develop and implement a vigorous aftercare initiative that ensures post-incarceration monitoring/supervision, counseling and social service assistance upon successful completion of the deradicalization program. As with Singapore and Saudi Arabia, an aggressive aftercare initiative for inmates who complete a deradicalization program would extend the rehabilitation components from the prison program into our communities once the inmates are released from incarceration. Although providing financial support, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, 286 Murphy, “Saudis Use Cash.” 10. 287 Bjorgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind, 219. 288 Mohammad, “To Deprogram a Jihadist, 30.” 289 Boucek, Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy. 23. 73 would not be feasible in America, the U.S. should consider a partnership with properly vetted volunteer groups that could assist with job placement and social support. Providing these inmates the opportunity to enhance their ability to function and support their family with meaningful employment upon their release is vital to their successful reintegration into society and reduces their vulnerability to radicalization. As explored in Chapters III and IV, this community network of volunteers could serve as an extension of the volunteer groups that assist with the counseling program inside the prison. Much like the Singapore and Saudi model, the aftercare program would be an extension of the rehabilitative effort that takes place inside the prison. The Singapore and Saudi programs both detail how an aftercare program provided the government a method for monitoring the inmate once they left the correctional setting. As Michael Brown identified in his Naval Postgraduate School thesis, inmates who leave prison soon vanish into the communities and social fabric of America.290 The challenge of tracking radicalized inmates once they leave custody has proven to be almost impossible. By judicial orders or probation/parole supervision, inmates could be required to continue cognitive behavior modification programs such as counseling or pro-social life skills as a condition of their release. I realize this concept may face legal challenges, but it would provide a dual service by providing a level of monitoring once the inmate is released from custody as well as assisting the inmate with behavior management issues. It is not uncommon for many state correctional systems today to mandate that inmates on parole participate in programs such as drug and alcohol treatment or anger management programs. Post-incarceration monitoring of inmates who serve 100 percent of their sentence would create a significant challenge without legal authority to authorize the action and require the inmate’s compliance. A strategy to assist in providing some degree of monitoring inmates without judicial order would be to collaborate with family members as partners in the aftercare of the inmate. As discussed in Chapters III and IV, both Singapore and Saudi Arabia partner with the inmate’s family not only to provide the 290 Brown, “Freed.” 55. 74 family support but also to encourage the family to hold the inmate accountable for not participating in actions that could lead to reoffending. The recommendations in this chapter target the environmental and policy issues that potentially increase the vulnerability of radicalization within the prison environment as well as the individual rehabilitative needs of a radicalized inmate. These recommendations provide a framework to develop a proactive deradicalization model for U.S. prisons. Specific elements of Singapore and Saudi Arabia’s deradicalization initiatives that incorporate community volunteers, religious scholars and clerics, inmate’s family members as well as prison staff provide new possibilities for consideration in developing a United States prison deradicalization program. This researcher acknowledges a “one size fits all” approach would be ineffective; yet, these recommendations provide systematic solutions that can be modified to meet the specific issues germane to the radicalization. The current United States model of segregating terrorist in communication management units may offer a false sense of security and provides limited opportunity to change the mindset of a radicalized prisoner. The effects of segregation on the individual should be considered as they relate to the possibility of further radicalization and very limited opportunity for rehabilitation. The recommendations in this thesis offer multiple rehabilitative opportunities such as social, psychological and vocational rehabilitation. They also provide possible solutions to reduce the negative effects of the prison environment that may lead to a higher level of vulnerability for prison radicalization. Taken collectively, all increase the inmate’s chances of successful reintegration into society as well as enhance the security of the United States homeland. The Appendix contains recommendations for a viable U.S. prison deradicalization model. 75 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 76 APPENDIX. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A U.S. PRISON DERADICALIZATION MODEL Recommendations for a U.S. Prison Deradicalization Model Suggested Proactive Measures for the Correctional Environment Aimed at Reducing the Vulnerability of Prison Radicalization 1. Productive Rehabilitation and Effective Security: The Dual Strategy (effective rehabilitation enhances security) 2. Effective Monitoring and Control of Prison Groups 3. Rigorous Vetting and Monitoring of Prison Chaplains and Religious Volunteers 4. Encourage Positive Inmate / Family Social Interaction and Communication Suggested Proactive Measures That Provide Individual Treatment Options for the Radicalized Inmate 1. The establishment of a voluntary cognitive based counseling program for inmates who are incarcerated for terrorism related crimes or inmates who exhibit violent ideological expressions. 2. Inmates who participate in voluntary deradicalization programs should be afforded the same incentives related to sentence credit reductions,291 vocational/educational opportunities as well as aftercare programs that support their chances for successful reentry and reduce the chances of further extremist activity. 3. U.S. Corrections should invest in an intensive effort to recruit properly vetted and trained volunteers, chaplains, and psychological professionals that would be utilized in an established counseling program as recommended in recommendation 1. 4. Develop and implement a vigorous aftercare initiative that ensures post incarceration monitoring/supervision, counseling and social service assistance upon successful completion of the deradicalization program. 5. Correctional Policy Should Encourage Social Research within Prisons 6 Provide Adequate Staff Training and Develop Intelligence Sharing Networks with Criminal Justice Partners 291 Sentence credit reductions would be considered the reduction of days from the offender’s total sentence for satisfactorily participating in a program or job as well as the reduction of days from the sentence for good behavior. 77 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 78 LIST OF REFERENCES “About RRG.” Religious Rehabilitation Group. 2012. http://www.rrg.sg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3:aboutrrg&catid=3:about-us&Itemid=2. Accessed April 2, 2012. Ahlstrand, Bruce, Henry Mintzberg, Joseph Lampel. Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour through the Wilds of Strategic Management. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2001. Kindle Edition. American Correctional Association. Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions. 4th ed. 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