Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture

• Nov. 1, 2015 • Locations: United States of America • Topics: Money/Property

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Policing for Profit:

The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture
2nd Edition

By Dick M. Carpenter II, Ph.D.
Lisa Knepper
Angela C. Erickson
Jennifer McDonald
with contributions from
Wesley Hottot and Keith Diggs

Table of Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Grading State & Federal Civil Forfeiture Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Federal Equitable Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Civil Forfeiture & Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Following the Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
State Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Appendix A: State Law Grading Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Appendix B: Civil Forfeiture Law Citations
and Other References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
About the Authors and Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

Foreword
Civil forfeiture threatens the constitutional rights of all Americans. Using civil forfeiture,
the government can take your home, business, cash, car or other property on the mere
suspicion that it is somehow connected to criminal activity—and without ever convicting or
even charging you with a crime. Most people unfamiliar with this process would find it hard
to believe that such a power exists in a country that is supposed to recognize and hold dear
rights to private property and due process of law.
Civil forfeiture has all the hallmarks of an inviting
target for public-interest litigation and advocacy: a cutting-edge legal controversy, sympathetic property owners
who have little or no involvement in criminal activity,
and simple, outrageous facts that show ordinary Americans facing the loss of their property.
The Institute for Justice has made combatting civil
forfeiture a top priority in our work to restore constitutional protections for private property rights. And with
the publication of this new edition of Policing for Profit:
The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture, we document in the
greatest detail possible the sweep of the forfeiture power.
The seeds of forfeiture abuse were sown in 1984
when Congress expanded federal civil forfeiture laws and
created a financial incentive for law enforcement to forfeit
property. Before then, all forfeited cash and proceeds
from forfeited property had gone to the general fund of
the U.S. Treasury. But starting in the mid-1980s, forfeiture
revenue instead went to a newly created fund controlled
by federal law enforcement. As a result, all federal forfeiture revenue can go back to the very agencies charged
with enforcing the law, giving them a financial stake in
forfeiture efforts. State and local agencies can also participate in forfeiture with the feds and receive a cut of the
revenue through the benign-sounding “equitable sharing”
program. Around the same time, many states followed
Congress’ lead and broadened their own state forfeiture
laws while also adding incentives to police for profit.
Not surprisingly, the use of forfeiture at the federal
and state levels exploded once profit incentives kicked
in. And tales of abuse began to pour in. Throughout the
early 1990s, newspapers such as the Pittsburgh Press and
Orlando Sentinel and news programs like 20/20 featured
investigative series and exposés highlighting the confiscation of property from owners never convicted of or even
charged with a crime.
IJ’s involvement with civil forfeiture began only two
years after our founding when we filed an amicus brief
with the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. James Daniel Good, critiquing civil forfeiture from a property rights
perspective. In 1993, the Court issued an important ruling
protecting the due process rights of certain property own-

ers caught up in civil forfeiture. And the majority opinion
contained this stirring language: “Individual freedom
finds tangible expression in property rights.”
But just three years later, the Court chipped away at
those rights. In Bennis v. Michigan, another case in which
IJ participated as amicus, the Court ruled that the government could use civil forfeiture to take property from
wholly innocent third-party owners without violating
constitutional guarantees of due process or property
rights protections. The ruling shocked Americans and led
to increased pressure for better protections for property
owners in civil forfeiture cases.
IJ, along with other groups from across the political
spectrum, responded by advocating for forfeiture reform.
These calls, combined with outrage over such terrible decisions as Bennis, led Congress to pass the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act in 2000. Among other things, CAFRA
eliminated the requirement that owners post a bond before
being able to contest a civil forfeiture action in court, and it
provided for attorney’s fees for successful defenses against
forfeiture, though only under limited circumstances.
But CAFRA did little to counter the Supreme Court’s
Bennis ruling and, most tellingly, did nothing to change
how forfeiture proceeds are distributed or to reduce law
enforcement agencies’ pecuniary interest in civil forfeiture. Nor did it change any state laws, most of which
also give law enforcement a direct and perverse financial
incentive to seize property for forfeiture.
What happened in the wake of CAFRA’s passage is
a familiar Washington, D.C., tale. Believing the forfeiture problem was fixed, many in the Capitol and the
media turned their attention elsewhere.
But forfeiture continued apace. In the wake of
9/11, with the new powers afforded law enforcement,
forfeiture activity and the revenue it generated skyrocketed. And when the recession hit in the late 2000s, and
governments at all levels faced significant budgetary
shortfalls, law enforcement agencies had even more of an
incentive to raise revenue through forfeiture.
Meanwhile, IJ launched a major property rights initiative whose lessons would bear fruit in the fight against civil forfeiture. In challenging eminent domain abuse—where

local governments use their condemnation power not for
a traditional public use, like a road or public park, but for
private economic development—IJ took a vitally important but relatively obscure issue that affected the property
rights of tens of thousands of Americans and brought it
to national prominence using all the components of our
program: litigation, strategic research, communications,
grassroots activism and legislative advocacy.
One of our most effective tools was Public Power, Private Gain, a path-breaking report that documented over
10,000 instances of governments taking or threatening to
take homes, small businesses, churches and other private
property in order to give them to other, wealthier private
owners. The report demonstrated that eminent domain
abuse was a nationwide problem that demanded attention and action.
We knew a similar report on civil forfeiture could
raise the profile of the issue and document the extent of
the problem. So in 2010, after several years of research,
IJ published another trailblazing national report: Policing
for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture. Publication of
the report coincided with the launch of IJ’s initiative to
challenge civil forfeiture using all aspects of public-interest litigation and advocacy.
The report demonstrated just how widespread forfeiture had become—and how deplorable most states’ laws
were at protecting property rights. The report also found
that when laws make civil forfeiture easier and more
profitable, law enforcement engages in more of it.
Policing for Profit received significant attention at the
outset, and media interest in the issue has since grown
exponentially. In 2013, The New Yorker published a searing
piece on forfeiture that drew national attention. The
following year, a Washington Post investigative series
exposed abusive cash seizures on highways and drew on
IJ’s forfeiture research. Later in 2014, HBO’s John Oliver
ranted against civil forfeiture in a scathingly funny yet
substantive segment, which at the time of this publication
had received over six million views on YouTube.
In the meantime, IJ pursued cutting-edge litigation
aimed at fundamentally changing forfeiture law while

also demonstrating its real-world consequences for property owners. We also developed model legislation to help
lawmakers seeking to bring an end to forfeiture abuse.
Thankfully, lawmakers are once again taking note. In
the past year alone, New Mexico and Washington, D.C.,
passed very strong reforms, other states passed modest
reforms, and Congress has taken a renewed interest in
federal reform. Opposition from law enforcement, however, is fierce, especially in the face of efforts to stem the
flow of forfeiture money into agency coffers. In 2015, 13
bills were introduced to reform civil forfeiture in Texas—
one of the worst states in the country on this issue—but
massive pushback from state and local law enforcement
killed every one of them. Such opposition to change will
likely intensify in the coming years.
This second edition of Policing for Profit highlights the
continued need for forfeiture reform. Updated grades for
state and federal civil forfeiture laws find that protections
against unjust forfeitures still range from bad to worse,
and too many laws incentivize revenue generation over
the impartial administration of justice. This edition also
shows—with far more extensive data than previously
available—that law enforcement’s use of forfeiture continues to grow. Furthermore, this second edition shines
a spotlight on the appalling lack of transparency in the
use of forfeiture and its proceeds. Despite the risks to
democratic decision-making in allowing law enforcement
agencies to self-fund, most civil forfeiture laws lack basic
transparency requirements, keeping the public and lawmakers in the dark about forfeiture activity and spending
from forfeiture funds.
We hope this updated and expanded edition of
Policing for Profit will continue to raise awareness of the
injustices of civil forfeiture and further the drive for
reform. We will not rest until civil forfeiture is either
radically reformed or—even better—abolished.

—Scott Bullock, Institute for Justice senior attorney

This second edition of Policing for Profit highlights the
continued need for forfeiture reform. Protections against
unjust forfeitures still range from bad to worse, and
too many laws incentivize revenue generation over the
impartial administration of justice.
3

The IRS cleaned out the bank
account of Carole Hinders’
Mexican restaurant in Spirit Lake,
Iowa, seizing $33,000 without
charging her with a crime.

Executive Summary
Every year, police and prosecutors across the United States take hundreds of millions of
dollars in cash, cars, homes and other property—regardless of the owners’ guilt or innocence.
Under civil forfeiture laws, the government can seize this property on the mere suspicion that
it is connected to criminal activity. No charges or convictions are required. And once property
is seized, owners must navigate a confusing, complex and often expensive legal process to try
to win it back. Worst of all, most civil forfeiture laws give law enforcement agencies a powerful
incentive to take property: a cut, or even all, of forfeiture proceeds.
This second edition of Policing for Profit examines civil forfeiture laws and activity
nationwide, demonstrating how financial incentives to seize property, in combination
with weak protections for property owners, put people’s property at risk. The report
grades the civil forfeiture laws of each state and the federal government, documents
remarkable growth in forfeiture activity across the country, and highlights a worrisome
lack of transparency surrounding forfeiture activity and expenditures from forfeiture
funds. Key findings include:

Forfeiture activity has exploded, particularly in
the new millennium.
Forfeited cash and proceeds from the sale of forfeited property generate revenue
for the government—and provide an important measure of law enforcement’s forfeiture activity.
•

In 1986, the Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund took in $93.7 million
in revenue from federal forfeitures. By 2014, annual deposits had reached $4.5
billion—a 4,667 percent increase.

•

The forfeiture funds of the DOJ and Treasury Department together took in nearly
$29 billion from 2001 to 2014, and combined annual revenue grew 1,000 percent
over the period.

•

Total annual forfeiture revenue across 14 states more than doubled from 2002 to
2013. Those 14 states were the only states for which the Institute for Justice could
obtain forfeiture revenues for an extended period.

Civil forfeiture far outpaces criminal forfeiture.
Criminal forfeiture requires a criminal conviction to deprive people of their property. By contrast, civil forfeiture allows law enforcement to take property from innocent people never convicted of or even charged with a crime, making it easier for the
government to forfeit property and harder for property owners to fight back.
•

Just 13 percent of Department of Justice forfeitures from 1997 to 2013 were criminal forfeitures; 87 percent were civil forfeitures.

•

Among DOJ civil forfeitures, 88 percent took place “administratively.” Administrative forfeitures happen automatically when a property owner fails to challenge
a seizure in court for any reason, including the inability to afford a lawyer or a
missed deadline to file a claim. The seized property is simply presumed “guilty”
without a neutral arbiter such as a judge determining whether it should be permanently taken from its owner.

Federal and most state civil forfeiture laws put innocent property
owners at risk.
This report’s grades for state and federal civil forfeiture laws indicate the threat
they pose to innocent property owners. Laws that earn poor grades provide law enforcement with lucrative incentives to pursue forfeitures and afford weak protections
to property owners. High grades signify laws that limit or ban forfeiture proceeds
directed to law enforcement and offer stronger protections against unjust forfeitures.
•

35 states earn grades of D+ or worse.

•

Federal civil forfeiture laws are among the nation’s worst, earning a D-.

•

New Mexico and the District of Columbia earn the highest grades, thanks to 2015
reforms that eliminated financial incentives for civil forfeiture and improved property rights protections.

State and local law enforcement’s participation in federal
“equitable sharing” has soared, and 2015 policy changes are
unlikely to reverse the trend.
Equitable sharing allows state and local law enforcement to team with the federal
government to forfeit property under federal law instead of state law. Participating agencies receive up to 80 percent of proceeds, creating a strong incentive to use
equitable sharing to circumvent more restrictive state laws. The Department of Justice announced new policies in January 2015 intended to curb one type of equitable
sharing—federal “adoptions” of locally seized assets. But the changes and subsequent
clarifications largely left intact another vehicle for equitable sharing—joint task forces
and investigations involving federal law enforcement.

•

Between 2000 and 2013, annual DOJ equitable sharing payments to state and local
law enforcement more than tripled, growing from $198 million to $643 million. In
all, the DOJ paid state and local agencies $4.7 billion in forfeiture proceeds from
2000 to 2013.

•

Only 18 percent of those proceeds resulted from federal adoptions of locally seized
assets. The lion’s share—82 percent—resulted from joint task forces and investigations, procedures largely unaffected by new DOJ rules.

•

In a nationwide ranking, Rhode Island, California, New York and Florida rank
worst for equitable sharing participation, even after accounting for the rate of drug
arrests by state. South Dakota, North Dakota and Wyoming rank at the top for
their less frequent use of equitable sharing.

•

New Mexico’s 2015 reform effectively ends equitable sharing participation in the
state, and the District of Columbia’s reform will do the same in the nation’s capital by 2018.

Most state and federal civil forfeiture laws lack even basic
transparency requirements, leaving the public in the dark about
most forfeiture activity.
Poor public reporting about law enforcement’s use of civil forfeiture makes it difficult, if not impossible, for lawmakers and the public to hold agencies accountable.
•

Only 11 states and the federal government make any kind of forfeiture information
publicly accessible online. Another three states and the District of Columbia will
put forfeiture records online in 2016. Obtaining information elsewhere requires
public records requests, which are often arduous and ineffective.

•

The limited information available is plagued by missing data and typically lacks
key details, such as whether a forfeiture was civil or criminal or, in some cases, the
type of property seized.

•

Although the Department of Justice’s forfeiture database tracks more than 1,300
variables about cash and property seizures, not one indicates whether a criminal charge or conviction accompanied a forfeiture. The DOJ carefully tracks and
reports forfeiture revenue, but fails to publicly report whether forfeitures target
proven criminals.

Nearly all expenditures of forfeiture proceeds are hidden from
public view.
Forfeiture laws typically place few limits on law enforcement spending of forfeiture proceeds and impose even fewer checks to ensure that expenditures are proper
or legal. Scant reporting requirements heighten the risk of abuse by shielding expenditures from public scrutiny.
•

The few data available for the federal government and a handful of states indicate
only broad categories of spending, making it impossible to evaluate individual
expenditures.

•

When expenditures were provided by category, most known spending by state
and local agencies was listed under equipment, “other,” and salaries and overtime.
Only tiny fractions went toward substance abuse or crime prevention programs.

•

In 2007, law enforcement agencies in eight states spent more than $42 million in
equitable sharing payments on “other” items. In 2012, agencies in four states spent
$13.7 million in state forfeiture money on “other.”

Civil forfeiture laws pose one of the greatest threats to property rights in the
nation today. They encourage law enforcement to favor the pursuit of property over
the pursuit of justice, and they typically give the innocent little recourse for recovering
seized property. And without meaningful transparency, law enforcement faces little
public accountability for its forfeiture activity or expenditures from forfeiture funds.
The best solution would be to simply abolish civil forfeiture. Short of that, lawmakers should eliminate financial incentives to take property, bolster property rights and
due process protections, and demand transparency for forfeiture activity and spending.
No one should lose property without being convicted of a crime, and law enforcement
agencies should not profit from taking people’s property.

Introduction
In February 2014, 24-year-old Charles Clarke lost his entire life savings—not to identity
theft or a bad investment, but to law enforcement officials in the Cincinnati/Northern
Kentucky International Airport.1 After visiting relatives in Cincinnati, Clarke was preparing to
board a flight home to Florida. He carried with him $11,000 in cash. Over five years, Clarke had
saved this money from financial aid, various jobs, gifts from family, and educational benefits
based on his mother’s status as a disabled veteran. His bank had no physical branches in his
area, so Clarke kept his money at home. He had taken it with him to Ohio because he and his
mother were moving to a new apartment, and he did not want to risk its getting lost in the move.
Just as Clarke was about to board the plane, law enforcement officials seized his money, claiming his checked
bag smelled of marijuana. Although Clarke was a recreational smoker at the time, the officers found no drugs or
anything else illegal on him or in his carry-on or checked
bag. In other words, the officers found no evidence that he
was guilty of any crime before seizing his money. In the
upside-down world of civil forfeiture, they did not have to.
It has been called “one of the most controversial
practices in the American criminal justice system.”2 But
civil forfeiture was, until the 2010s, largely unknown
to the public, to pundits and even to elected officials,
despite hundreds of millions of dollars in property being
seized and forfeited every year across the United States.
Civil forfeiture is a mechanism by which law enforcement agencies can seize and keep property on the mere
suspicion that it is connected to a crime.3 In contrast to
criminal forfeiture, where property is taken only after a
criminal conviction, civil forfeiture allows law enforcement to take property from innocent people who have
never been formally accused of a crime, let alone convicted of one. This evasion of the criminal justice system
is based on a legal fiction in which property thought to
be connected to an alleged crime is considered “guilty”
of having somehow assisted in the commission of that
crime. In criminal forfeiture, the government proceeds
against a person charged with a crime; in civil forfeiture,
the government proceeds against property.
The civil forfeiture process generally includes two
distinct actions: seizure and forfeiture. Seizure occurs

when law enforcement officials—police officers, sheriff’s deputies, federal agents—confiscate property they
suspect is related to criminal activity. Practically anything can be seized by law enforcement—cash, vehicles,
airplanes, jewelry, homes, musical instruments, farm
implements, home furnishings, electronics and more.
Once property has been seized, prosecutors file civil actions against it in order to forfeit, or keep, it. This process
that often produces odd-sounding case names like State
of Texas v. One 2004 Chevrolet Silverado4 or United States v.
One Solid Gold Object in Form of a Rooster.5
Because such actions are against property, not
people, and because they are civil actions, not criminal,
owners caught up in civil forfeiture proceedings lack
rights afforded the criminally accused, such as the right
to counsel. And under civil forfeiture, the government
usually faces a lower evidentiary threshold to forfeit
property than it does to convict a person of a crime. Even
people who had nothing to do with an alleged crime can
lose their property through civil forfeiture unless they
can prove their innocence—flipping the American legal
tradition of innocent until proven guilty on its head. Most
troublingly, civil forfeiture laws in most states and at the
federal level give law enforcement agencies a financial
stake in forfeitures by awarding them some, if not all, of
the proceeds. This financial incentive creates a conflict of
interest and encourages the pursuit of property instead of
the pursuit of justice.

Officers at the Cincinnati airport seized
Charles Clarke’s life savings—$11,000—without
any evidence it was connected to a crime.

A Brief History of Forfeiture
The origins of forfeiture laws date back to medieval
times, but America’s civil forfeiture laws can be traced
to 17th-century English maritime law, which allowed
violations to be punished by the seizure and forfeiture
of ships and cargo without regard to the guilt or innocence of the owners.6 Based on this concept, the first U.S.
Congress adopted similar forfeiture laws.7 Although the
laws were upheld in early Supreme Court cases, their use
was limited to the maritime contexts of admiralty, piracy
and customs—circumstances where commencing criminal proceedings was difficult, if not impossible, because
property owners were overseas or otherwise outside of
U.S. jurisdiction.8 The 19th century saw some expansion
of the forfeiture power during the Civil War, but its use
remained comparatively limited.9
Except for a brief expansion during Prohibition, civil
forfeiture was largely moribund in the 20th century—that
is, until 1984, when Congress amended the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. Among
other things, the 1984 amendments created the Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund for depositing
forfeiture proceeds for federal agency use.10 The AFF
represented a sea change in the administration of civil
forfeiture. For the first time, agencies could obtain a
financial benefit from the proceeds of forfeited properties,
using funds to do everything from purchase vehicles to
pay overtime. Lawmakers in many states followed the
federal government’s lead and amended their states’ civil
forfeiture laws to give local and state agencies a direct
financial stake in the forfeiture process.
In 2000, Congress modestly reformed federal forfeiture law11 through the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act,12 but it left unchanged one of the most troublesome
elements—law enforcement’s ability to benefit financially from civil forfeiture. Moreover, other amendments to
civil forfeiture laws at the federal and state levels have
expanded their reach to cover alleged violations beyond
drug crimes. Consequently, today’s civil forfeiture laws
are far greater in scope than their 18th-century progenitors. And decoupled from the practical necessities that
justified their use when enforcing maritime law, they
are an increasingly popular and profitable tool for law
enforcement agencies.13

At the federal level, the departments of Justice15 and
the Treasury16 have seen an astonishing increase in forfeiture activity. In 1986, the year after the Department of
Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund was established, it took
in just $93.7 million in deposits. By 2014, deposits had
increased 4,667 percent to $4.5 billion.17 Much of that increase came during the past decade and a half. From 2001
to 2014, deposits to the DOJ and Treasury forfeiture funds
exploded by more than 1,000 percent (see Figure 1).18
Total deposits across those years approached $29 billion.

Figure 1: Total Annual Deposits to DOJ and Treasury
Forfeiture Funds, Fiscal Years 2001–2014
$6,000,000,000
$5,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$3,000,000,000
$2,000,000,000
$1,000,000,000
$0

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Sources: DOJ Assets Forfeiture Fund Annual Financial Statements; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports.

As a measure of federal forfeiture activity, deposits
can sometimes be unstable. In a given year, one or two
high-dollar cases may produce unusually large amounts
of money—with a portion going back to victims—thereby
telling a noisy story of year-to-year activity levels. Net assets, the amount of money federal forfeiture funds retain
after paying various obligations, represent a more stable
metric. From 2001 to 2014, net assets in the DOJ and Treasury forfeiture funds increased 485 percent.19 Combined
assets topped $1 billion for the first time in 2007 and
ballooned to nearly $4.5 billion by 2014 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Total DOJ and Treasury Forfeiture Funds
Net Assets, Fiscal Years 2001–2014
$5,000,000,000
$4,500,000,000
$4,000,000,000
$3,500,000,000

Forfeiture Use Explodes
One of the most basic of economic principles is that
incentives matter,14 and they matter not just to individuals but also to groups. In allowing agencies to keep some
or all of what they forfeit, civil forfeiture laws permit, if
not encourage, law enforcement to police for profit. And
agencies have responded with zeal.

$3,000,000,000
$2,500,000,000
$2,000,000,000
$1,500,000,000
$1,000,000,000
$500,000,000
$0

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Sources: DOJ Assets Forfeiture Fund Annual Financial Statements; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports.

Unfortunately, deriving similar totals at the state level is impossible because
most states require little to no public reporting of forfeiture activity. However, of
the states from which the Institute for Justice was able to obtain usable data, the
totals are also significant.20 In 2012 alone, the latest year for which the most consistent data were available, state and local agencies in 26 states21 and the District
of Columbia took in more than $254 million through forfeiture.22 Texas led the
way, with $46 million, followed closely by Arizona with $43 million. Illinois was
third with almost $20 million.
Like the federal government, states have had great success increasing
forfeiture revenues under state law in the new millennium. For example,
Figure 3 illustrates the growth in forfeiture revenue for 14 states from 2002
to 2013.23 From the first to the final year presented, total revenue increased
136 percent.24 Among the states, the two whose revenues were most consistent over the years, and which also tended to represent the greatest revenue
shares, were Texas and California. However, Arizona’s revenue grew significantly over the period, eventually eclipsing California’s.

Figure 3: Annual State Forfeiture Revenues, 14 States, 2002–2013
$300,000,000

Arizona
California
Hawaii
Louisiana
Massachussetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
New York
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Texas
Virginia
Washington

$250,000,000
$200,000,000
$150,000,000
$100,000,000
$50,000,000
$0

2002 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Source: Institute for Justice analysis of civil and criminal forfeiture data from online reports and
public records requests.

The Trouble with Civil Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture poses serious risks to property and due process rights.
First and foremost among these risks, federal law and most states’ laws permit
law enforcement officials to reap financial rewards from civil forfeiture. Defenders of the practice view this as a benefit, as it enables law enforcement to
expand crime-fighting activities.25 But through civil forfeiture, police and prosecutors can self-fund, financing operations entirely beyond the democratic
controls embodied by city councils, county commissions and state legislatures.
Just as troubling, giving law enforcement a financial stake in civil forfeiture
distorts law enforcement priorities. Allowing law enforcement agencies to reap
financial benefits from forfeitures encourages the pursuit of property over the
impartial administration of justice.26
Providing a financial incentive is problem enough, but most civil forfeiture laws also make seizing and forfeiting property disconcertingly easy. Civil
forfeiture stacks the deck against property owners from the outset: In most
jurisdictions and for most types of property, all police need to seize is “probable cause” to believe that the cash, car or other property is connected to a
crime that permits civil forfeiture. And once property is seized, the onus is on
owners to file a legal claim to get it back.

If they do, they will likely face long and costly litigation in which the government has the upper
hand. A 2015 Institute for Justice report, for example,
found some civil forfeiture proceedings took a year or
more to navigate.27 And to traverse the complex legal
landscape of civil forfeiture, owners will have to find
and pay for an attorney. In civil forfeiture cases, unlike
criminal prosecutions, there is no right to counsel. For
most Americans, retaining a defense lawyer skilled
in civil forfeiture litigation is not a familiar task. But
going without legal representation is not much of an
option: Challenging a seizure often
involves filing court
documents and
paying various fees
according to a strict
timetable, not to
mention at least one
court appearance.28
Illinois offers a particularly
egregious example
of how civil forfeiture laws discourage people from
even trying to get their property back. In Illinois, to
challenge a seizure in court, property owners must
first pay a bond of $100 or 10 percent of the property’s
value, whichever is greater. The only exceptions are for
personal property worth more than $150,000 and for real
property. If owners challenge and lose, they must pay
the full cost of the civil forfeiture proceedings, including
the government’s legal costs, and give up the full value
of the bond. Even if they win, they lose 10 percent of the
bond on top of whatever attorney costs they accrued.
Faced with such daunting hurdles, many owners
never make it to court. These owners’ cases are generally
decided in the government’s favor by default, resulting
in forfeiture of the property. In contrast, when a person
is accused of a crime, the government cannot simply
win by default. The defendant either takes a plea or the
government must prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. In civil forfeiture cases, some owners give up on
their property because they cannot find or afford a lawyer,
miss one of the often tight deadlines to file a claim or are
otherwise stymied by a confusing legal process. Other
owners opt not to fight because they conclude that the
costs in time, money and aggravation outweigh the value
of their property.
Giving up may often be the rational choice, given the
low value frequently at stake. For example, the Institute
for Justice was able to obtain property-level forfeiture
data for 2012 from 10 states, allowing median property
values to be calculated. In those states, the median value
of forfeited property ranged from $451 in Minnesota
to $2,048 in Utah,29 not much more than an American’s

average annual cell phone bill.30 It is little wonder, then,
that owners of seized property rarely pursue its return.
In Minnesota, for instance, law enforcement took 34,000
pieces of property, including vehicles, cash and homes,
between 2003 and 2010—the equivalent of one piece of
property from every other family in St. Paul, the state
capital. Yet over one six-month period, 66 percent of forfeitures went unchallenged by property owners. Overall,
from 2003 to 2010, Minnesotans saw the return of their
property in just 10 percent of cases.31
Data from Philadelphia tell a similar story. In 2015,
the American Civil
Liberties Union of
Pennsylvania released an analysis of
cash-only forfeiture
cases in the City of
Brotherly Love. It
revealed that between 2011 and 2013
half of the cases
involved less than
$192.32 Contrary
to proponents’ claims that civil forfeiture is essential
to thwarting drug cartels and kingpins,33 this is hardly
the stuff of large criminal enterprises. The relationship
between the value of seized property and the likelihood
of owners contesting its forfeiture is clear. For property
worth less than $200, just 3 percent of owners fight to
retrieve their goods, and as the value of seized property
increases, so too does the percentage of owners willing
to contest.34
If property owners choose to pursue their property in
court, they face a byzantine process in which the government has all the advantages. Specifically, prosecutors
often need only meet very low standards of evidence. And
if a property owner entirely unconnected to an alleged
crime files a claim to prevent her property from being
forfeited, she usually must prove her own innocence—the
opposite of what happens in criminal proceedings, where
defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty.
This feature of most civil forfeiture laws risks punishing
completely innocent people, such as the mother whose car
is seized when her child is arrested on a drug crime while
driving it.
Because it is easier to forfeit property through civil
procedures, it is not surprising that law enforcement
prefers civil forfeiture to criminal forfeiture. As Figure
4 indicates, 87 percent of U.S. Department of Justice
forfeitures are pursued as civil rather than criminal
actions. When the civil cases are further broken down, yet
another troubling element is revealed: 88 percent of DOJ
civil forfeitures are processed administratively rather
than judicially, meaning the cases never see a judge and
the property owners never have their day in court. An

Through civil forfeiture, police and
prosecutors can self-fund, financing
operations entirely beyond the
democratic controls embodied by
city councils, county commissions
and state legislatures.

administrative forfeiture occurs when a property owner opts not to contest
a seizure. With no claims on the property, the forfeiture is generally accomplished through a simple paperwork shuffle, with no judicial involvement. It
is only when a forfeiture is contested that a judge might review the case, if it
is not settled first. Absent judicial review, the sole determination of whether a
forfeiture is warranted is made by the seizing agency, which usually stands to
gain from the proceeds.

Figure 4: DOJ Forfeitures, Civil vs. Criminal and Judicial vs.
Administrative, 1997–2013
All Forfeitures

13%

All Civil Forfeitures

12%

Criminal

Judicial

87%

Civil

88%

Administrative

Source: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ civil and criminal forfeiture data obtained by FOIA.

The same general distinction between civil and criminal forfeitures
applies under state law. Unfortunately, however, the majority of states do
not keep data on whether forfeitures proceed under the civil or criminal law:
Only two states’ forfeiture records distinguish between civil and criminal
forfeitures. Activity in those states mirrors that at the federal level: Almost 60
percent of cash forfeited in Oregon and more than two-thirds of that forfeited
in Connecticut were forfeited civilly (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Value of Cash Forfeitures, Civil vs. Criminal, in Connecticut
and Oregon
Connecticut: 2009–2013

31%

Criminal

69%

Civil

Oregon: 2010–2011, 2013

43%

Criminal

57%

Civil

Source: Institute for Justice analysis of civil and criminal forfeiture data from online reports and
public records requests.

Grading State & Federal Civil Forfeiture Laws
Nearly every state, the District of Columbia and the federal government have civil
forfeiture laws, but they differ in their financial incentives and their procedures. This report
grades state and federal civil forfeiture laws based on the incentives they create for law
enforcement agencies to police for profit and the protections they afford to property owners.
Columbia and the federal government the percentage of
forfeiture proceeds allowed to flow to law enforcement.
Only seven states and D.C. block law enforcement access
to forfeiture proceeds. The remaining jurisdictions allow
at least 45 percent—and in many cases, including the
federal government’s, 100 percent—of the value of forfeited property to be directed to law enforcement. Property
may also be retained for official use. These allowances
represent a significant opportunity for agencies to selffund through civil forfeiture, and evidence suggests that
agencies are taking full advantage.

Three fundamental elements of civil forfeiture laws
were examined when calculating grades: the financial
incentive, the standard of proof the government must
meet to forfeit property, and whether the burden to prove
innocence or guilt is on innocent third-party owners or
the government.

Financial Incentive
Put simply, civil forfeiture laws present law enforcement with significant incentives to seize property for financial gain. Figure 6 shows for each state, the District of

Figure 6: Financial Incentives in Civil Forfeiture Laws
VT
45%

WA
90%
OR
62.5%

NV*
100%
CA
66.25%

MT*
100%
ID*
100%

WY*
100%

ND*
100%
MN
90%

SD
100%

AZ
100%

CO
50%

KS
100%
OK*
100%

NM
0%

TX*
70%

NH 90%
MA* 100%
RI 90%
CT 69.5%

NY
60%
MI*
100%

IA
100%

NE
50%
UT
100%

WI
0%

ME
0%

PA
100%

OH*
100%
IL
IN
90% 0%
WV VA
100% 100%
KY
100%
MO
NC
0%
0%
TN*
100%
SC
95%
AR
100%
GA*
100%
MS
AL
80% 100%
LA
80%

NJ 100%
DE* 100%
MD 0%
DC
0%

100%

Federal Government

FL*
85%

AK*
75%

HI
100%

Law Enforcement
Share of Proceeds

*Agencies may keep or be awarded up to the stated percentages by a court, but a lesser amount may instead be awarded.
Note: See Appendix B for sources and greater detail.

100%

Civil Forfeiture and the
Temptation to Seize
Critics of civil forfeiture argue that giving law enforcement a financial stake in seizures encourages agencies to
put revenue generation ahead of public safety or justice. Chapman University economist Bart J. Wilson and co-author
Michael Preciado designed a cutting-edge experiment to see whether the financial incentives baked into many civil
forfeiture laws influence behavior.1 Results were clear: Civil forfeiture creates a strong temptation for law enforcement
agencies to seize property to enhance their budgets, even at the expense of other priorities.
Thus the problem with civil forfeiture is less “bad apples” among officers than it is the laws themselves. Indeed,
some law enforcement officials have openly acknowledged the powerful temptations civil forfeiture creates:

Civil Forfeiture Is a “Gold Mine”
“Now think about this, this is a gold mine, a gold mine. You
can seize a house, not a vehicle. They seize the house, and it
goes on to say that there’s no judiciary involved.”

—Harry S. “Pete” Connelly, Jr.,

former Las Cruces, N.M., city attorney2

“Toys” for Police
“It’s usually based on a need—well, I take that back. There’s
some limitations on it. … Actually, there’s not really on the
forfeiture stuff. We just usually base it on something that
would be nice to have that we can’t get in the budget, for instance. We try not to use it for things that we need to depend
on because we need to have those purchased. It’s kind of like
pennies from heaven—it gets you a toy or something that
you need is the way that we typically look at it to be perfectly
honest.”

—Kenneth M. Burton, Columbia, Mo., police chief3

“Don’t Ruin Forfeitures For All Of Us”
An Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys Advisory Council training
presentation cautioned against succumbing to the temptation
to “just start seizing everything in sight.” Such behavior could
“screw things up” and “ruin forfeitures for all of us.”4

1
2
3
4

Wilson, B. J., & Preciado, M. (2014). Bad apples or bad laws? Testing the incentives of civil forfeiture. Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice.
Sibilla, N. (2014, November 10). “IF IN DOUBT…TAKE IT!” Behind closed doors, government officials make shocking comments about civil forfeiture. Buzzfeed. Retrieved
from http://www.buzzfeed.com/nicks29/aif-in-doubtatake-ita-behind-closed-doors-4y3w.
Rose. L. (2012, November 27). Police Chief Ken Burton calls forfeiture funds “pennies from heaven.” The Maneater. Retrieved from http://www.themaneater.com/
stories/2012/11/27/police-chief-ken-burton-calls-forfeiture-funds-pen/.
Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys Advisory Council. (n.d.). Forfeiture ethics training [Presentation slides]. https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/ex_11.pdf.

Philadelphia, for example, operates a forfeiture machine. Pennsylvania state law enables agencies to retain
100 percent of the value of forfeited property, and law
enforcement in Philadelphia took in more than $69 million between 2002 and 2013.35 That total comprises more
than 1,200 houses, 3,400 vehicles, $47 million in cash, and
various other items, such as electronics and jewelry.36 The
total also represents almost one-fifth of the district attorney’s general, appropriated budget. With those funds,
Philadelphia has paid for equipment, maintenance,
education and training, and salaries of personnel, this last
of which represents the most direct conflict of interest for
the unbiased administration of justice. Conspicuously,
Philadelphia spent none of its forfeiture funds on proactive, community-based anti-drug and crime prevention
programs,37 despite proponents’ claims that forfeiture
funds are essential to supporting such efforts.
Law enforcement’s response to forfeiture incentives
has been on even starker display in Tennessee. As part of a
multiyear investigation,38 a television news team followed
police officers as they patrolled Interstate 40. The news
team found that rather than working eastbound lanes,
where smugglers transport drugs to the East Coast, officers
focused on westbound lanes, where smugglers haul cash
back to Mexico. A subsequent review of drug task force records indicated that officers made 10 times as many stops
on the westbound side of the highway as they did on the
eastbound side.
And in 2009, the
tiny East Texas town
of Tenaha (pop. 1,100)
drew national attention
when a lawsuit exposed a civil forfeiture
scheme in which law
enforcement netted
millions of dollars
through highway traffic
stops.39 In what became
a case study of forfeiture abuse, police officers stopped out-of-state drivers for
insubstantial reasons in order to search the vehicles. Upon
discovering cash or other items of value, officers seized the
properties and threatened owners with bogus charges—
even state removal of their children—if they refused to
waive their rights to the properties. Forfeiture proceeds
were used to buy, among other things, a $500 popcorn
machine, candy for a poultry festival and $400 worth of
catering. Money also went to a local chamber of commerce,
a youth baseball league, a local Baptist church and the
pocket of a Tenaha police officer whose name appeared in
complaints from stopped motorists.40
The financial incentive is so compelling that some
Indiana law enforcement agencies have retained large
shares of forfeiture funds despite a clear state consti-

tutional mandate directing them elsewhere. Article 8,
Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution requires that all
forfeiture proceeds go to the state school fund. However,
some officials have taken full advantage of a state statute
permitting law enforcement agencies to first deduct related investigative costs.41 In Marion County—the largest
county in the state—officials have used the provision to
keep all of the proceeds of forfeiture42 by dividing forfeited property among a range of law enforcement agencies
rather than according to a case-specific cost determination.43 Some agencies manage to keep nearly all of the
bounty, even though Indiana is, on paper, a state where
they should retain zero proceeds.44

Standard of Proof
People who manage to make it to court to fight a
seizure often face a major disadvantage: the low standards of proof required to forfeit property under most
civil forfeiture laws. The standard of proof is the hurdle
the government must clear to win a civil forfeiture case.
It dictates how convincing the government’s evidence
must be to a judge or jury. The most familiar standard of
proof in the American legal system is “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the requirement for convicting a person of a
crime. American law sets such a high standard in criminal
cases to avoid punishing the innocent. Yet
federal and most state
civil forfeiture laws
set substantially lower
standards for depriving
people of their property,
as the map in Figure 7
shows.
Thirty-one states
and the federal government set “preponderance of the evidence”
as the standard of proof for all civil forfeitures, making it
the most common standard nationally. A preponderance of
the evidence standard means that property is more likely
than not connected to a crime. It is often thought of as a 51
percent standard, meaning the evidence must be a bit more
than 50–50—or slightly better than a coin flip—in favor
of the government, a much lower hurdle than beyond a
reasonable doubt.45 Remarkably, Massachusetts and North
Dakota set a lower standard still, requiring only probable
cause for civil forfeiture. Probable cause is the same low
evidentiary standard that police must meet in order to
make an arrest, carry out a search or seize property in the
first place.
A growing number of states demand a higher
standard of proof for civil forfeitures. Nebraska requires

Philadelphia spent none of its
forfeiture funds on proactive,
community-based anti-drug and
crime prevention programs,
despite proponents’ claims that
forfeiture funds are essential to
supporting such efforts.

and convincing evidence. Missouri requires a criminal
conviction and proof by a preponderance of the evidence
that seized property is connected to the crime; Oregon
law is similar for forfeitures of personal property (which
account for most forfeitures) but sets a higher standard of
clear and convincing evidence to forfeit real property.
Six states—Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Michigan,
New York and Utah—demand that the government provide clear and convincing evidence of a property’s connection to criminal activity for most or all civil forfeitures.
The remaining states and the District of Columbia apply
different standards to different types of property or under
different circumstances. The State Profiles and Appendix
B provide greater detail.

proof beyond a reasonable doubt for most civil forfeitures, and North Carolina requires criminal convictions
in most cases. California sets a standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt to forfeit most kinds of property, with a
conviction required (though not necessarily the owner’s
conviction). In 2015, New Mexico abolished civil forfeiture. It now requires a criminal conviction with proof
beyond a reasonable doubt for all forfeitures; after securing a conviction, the government must prove in the same
criminal proceeding that seized property is connected to
the crime by “clear and convincing evidence,” a standard
lower than reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of the evidence. Minnesota, Montana, Nevada and
Vermont now also demand criminal convictions, followed
by civil trials linking seized property to the crime by clear

Figure 7: Standards of Proof for Civil Forfeiture

VT*

WA
MT*

OR*

MN*
ID

WY
NV*
CA*

NE
CO

MO*

PA
OH

WV
KY

NM*

AR
MS

NJ
DE
MD
DC

NC*

NH
MA
RI
CT

SC
GA
Federal Government

LA
FL

Beyond a
reasonable doubt

Clear and convincing/
preponderance of the
evidence

Beyond a reasonable
doubt/clear and convincing

Clear and convincing/
probable cause

Beyond a reasonable
doubt/preponderance
of the evidence

Preponderance of the
evidence

Clear and convincing

Probable cause

*Conviction required for most or all forfeitures.
Notes: States with multiple standards apply different standards of proof to different types of property or under certain circumstances. Oregon requires a
conviction and clear and convincing evidence to forfeit real property. See Appendix B for sources.

Low standards of proof mean that, in most jurisdictions, civil forfeiture cases are fairly easy for the government to win and difficult for property owners to fight.
In particular, winning a civil forfeiture case is often
much easier for the government than securing a criminal conviction. In a stark illustration of the difference,
a property owner in Arizona was acquitted of criminal
charges yet still lost her house to civil forfeiture.46
Prosecutors are well aware of the advantages such
lower hurdles afford them. For example, when asked by
a radio host why Philadelphia would not return seized
property in a case where the owner was found innocent
of any crime, then-Assistant District Attorney Beth
Grossman made clear that
a property owner’s guilt or
innocence, as traditionally
established in American
law by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, is irrelevant when it comes to civil
forfeiture:

Innocent Owner Burden
With civil forfeiture, not only can people lose their
property without ever being charged with or convicted of
a crime, they can also lose their property when someone
else allegedly uses it in the commission of a crime. For
example, police in Arizona arrested a man for stealing auto
parts and seized the truck he had put them on. The truck
was forfeited, even though it belonged to the man’s mother, who had done nothing wrong.49 A New Jersey woman
lost her car after her son used it—without her knowledge
or consent—while selling marijuana. It took two years of
litigation to win it back.50
And a Michigan woman
saw the car she co-owned
with her husband forfeited
after he was caught soliciting a prostitute in it—a
crime she neither knew
about nor consented to.51
To avoid punishing
such innocent third parties, civil forfeiture laws
generally create a carve-out: Property owners (or partial
owners) who had nothing to do with the alleged crime
that prompted a seizure can petition to get the property (or
their share of it) back.52 In theory, such “innocent owner”
claims provide protection against unjust civil forfeitures.
In practice, however, most innocent owner provisions put
property owners at a disadvantage, making it easy for the
government to hold on to seized property.
For starters, making an innocent owner claim is no
easy task. Rhonda Cox, the Arizona mother whose son
was arrested for theft, learned this the hard way. After her
truck was seized, she told two police officers that it was
hers and that she had nothing to do with her son’s crime.
Both told her that she would never get her property back.
Cox then provided proof of ownership to the county attorney’s office and explained that she had no knowledge
of the truck’s involvement with any illegal activity. The
prosecutor rejected her plea and started legal actions to
forfeit her truck.
On her own and without a lawyer, Cox filed the paperwork required to challenge the forfeiture as an innocent
owner—paying a $304 filing fee for the privilege. But eventually she gave up. The legal process was too convoluted,
and—as the prosecutor had warned her—if she lost, not
only would she lose the truck, but under Arizona law she
would also have to pay the government’s legal costs.53

A property owner’s guilt or
innocence, as traditionally
established in American law
by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, is irrelevant when it
comes to civil forfeiture.

[F]irst of all, our standard, our burden of proof, is
lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is a
civil action as opposed to a criminal one, so because
the Commonwealth in a criminal case could not
reach the burden of beyond a reasonable doubt does
not prohibit us to continue to proceed against the
property, which is our named defendant. So with the
preponderance of the evidence, yes, we can continue
to still proceed against it.
Pressed by the host on why the city did not wait until a
person’s innocence or guilt was established before seizing
property, Grossman replied, “Because I am not required
to do so.” And asked if she thought it was a good law,
Grossman answered, “I think it’s a fabulous law.”47
Federal prosecutors likewise prefer civil forfeiture
to criminal proceedings. Assistant U.S. Attorney Craig
Gaumer, who has described civil forfeiture as “a prosecutor’s secret weapon,” wrote: “Civil forfeiture laws make
it easier to seize potentially forfeitable personal property
than their criminal forfeiture counterparts.” Among their
advantages, he noted that “[c]ivil forfeiture cases do not
require the criminal conviction of the owner (or anyone
else) as a prerequisite to forfeiture.”48

Philadelphia’s Civil Forfeiture Machine
Grinds Property Owners Down
The most terrifying place in Philadelphia is Courtroom 478 in City Hall. This is where property owners
enter the city’s civil forfeiture machine, which chews up
their rights while churning out revenue for Philadelphia
police and prosecutors.
Owners wishing to contest the seizure of their cash,
cars and homes must go to Courtroom 478. For years,
prosecutors alone—not judges or juries—have run this
“courtroom,” often telling property owners they do not
need a lawyer before handing them a stack of complicated legal documents to complete.1 Prosecutors have also
“relisted” cases, forcing owners to return to Courtroom
478 multiple times. Missing even one court date could
mean losing property forever through default.2
When homes have been taken under “seize-and-seal”
orders, prosecutors have pressured owners to agree to
unreasonable and unconstitutional conditions in order
to regain access to their homes pending a final determination in their cases. Conditions have included waiving
their constitutional rights in future civil forfeiture actions
or even barring loved ones from their homes.3
Philadelphia’s civil forfeiture machine is notable for
its scope and efficiency. Up to 80 cases of all types have
been listed for “hearing” in Courtroom 478 in a single
day.4 The district attorney’s office won over 90 percent
of its 8,284 cash-forfeiture cases in 2010.5 Philadelphia
homeowners face even worse odds: Owners won in only
30 of the nearly 2,000 real-property cases filed from 2008
to 2012.6
Altogether, civil forfeiture generated more than $69
million in revenue for the district attorney’s office between 2002 and 2013—an annual average of almost $5.8
million.7 The office spent about 40 percent of these funds
on salaries, including those of the very prosecutors who
have been running Courtroom 478.8 This financial stake,
and the conflict of interest it engenders, is the engine of
the Philadelphia civil forfeiture machine.

Philadelphia is thus the quintessential example of
what happens when state actors face bad incentives and
few restrictions, something Chris Sourovelis discovered
in March 2014 when his son was arrested for selling $40
worth of drugs outside the family home.9 Although Sourovelis had committed no crime, he was thrown out of his
home and into Philadelphia’s civil forfeiture machine.
To regain access to their home, Sourovelis and his
wife agreed, without legal representation, to ban their
son from the premises and change the locks, among other
things.10 After seven days, the Sourovelises—minus their
son—were back in their home, but they still were not in
the clear. They had to appear in Courtroom 478 no fewer
than nine times.11
In August 2014, Sourovelis filed a class-action lawsuit
brought by the Institute for Justice against the city and
the district attorney’s office for violating his and others’
constitutional rights. Under pressure from the federal
lawsuit and public opinion, the district attorney’s office
dropped the forfeiture case against Sourovelis’ home in
late 2014.12 In a partial class-wide settlement, the office
also agreed, in mid-2015, to stop seizing homes without
giving owners warning and a chance to make their case
before a judge, unless it could show such actions were
necessary to prevent crimes. The office will no longer
order homes sealed, absent exigent circumstances, before
owners have had their day in court, nor will it demand
that family members be banned from the premises.13
These changes should prevent other homeowners
from suffering the same ordeal the Sourovelises did. But
more must be done to dismantle Philadelphia’s forfeiture
machine once and for all, and so the litigation continues.
Most significantly, law enforcement in the city still enjoys
the financial fruits of forfeiture, and as long as this financial incentive persists, it is doubtful that Philadelphians
and their property will be safe from the civil forfeiture
machine.

Compl. at 19–21, Sourovelis v. City of Phila., No. 14-4687 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Sourovelis Compl.], available at https://ij.org/images/pdf_folder/
private_property/philadelphia-forfeiture/philadelphia-forfeiture-complaint-8-11-14.pdf.
2 Sibilla, N. (2014, August 26). Philadelphia earns millions by seizing cash and homes from people never charged with a crime. Forbes.
3 Sourovelis Compl. at 21.
4 Thompson, I. (2012, November 28). The cash machine. Philadelphia CityPaper.
5 Thompson, 2012.
6 Thompson, I. (2013, August 5). Law to clean up “nuisances” costs innocent people their homes. ProPublica.
7 IJ analysis of Pennsylvania annual asset forfeiture reports. See also Sourovelis Compl. at 2–3, 11.
8 IJ analysis of Pennsylvania annual asset forfeiture reports. See also Sourovelis Compl. at 12–13.
9 Sibilla, 2014.
10 Order at 1, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. 12011 Ferndale Street, No. CP-51-MD-0003952-2014 (Ct. Com. Pl. May 16, 2014).
11 Docket, In Re: Street 12011 Ferndale, No. CP-51-MD-0003952-2014 (Ct. Com. Pl. May 7, 2014).
12 Newhouse, S. (2014, December 18). D.A. drops two civil forfeiture actions under controversial law. Metro.
13 Dirty money. (2015, July 7). The Philadelphia Inquirer [Editorial].

in criminal trials, where the accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty by the government. It also often involves
a practical impossibility, as it requires people to prove a negative—that they did not know about or consent to the illegal
use of their property.
Only 10 states and the District of Columbia demand
that the government prove owners did something wrong before forfeiting their property. In the remaining states, whether the burden of proof falls on the owner or the government
generally depends on the type of property involved. The
State Profiles and Appendix B provide greater detail.

Cox lost her truck without ever having been accused
of a crime and without ever having gotten her day in court.
Innocent third-party owners who do make it to court will often face a bizarre and almost impossible task: proving their
own innocence.
As shown in Figure 8, innocent owner provisions in federal law and 35 states place the burden of proof on owners,
meaning that owners must prove they had nothing to do
with the alleged crime. In essence, most civil forfeiture laws
presume that people are connected to any criminal activity
involving their property and force them to prove otherwise
to recover it. This is precisely the opposite of what happens

Figure 8: Innocent Owner Burdens in Civil Forfeiture Laws

WA
MT

MN
ID

NV
CO

PA
OH

WV
KY

AR
MS

NJ
DE
MD
DC

NH
MA
RI
CT

SC
GA
Federal Government

LA
FL

Government’s
burden

Depends on
property
Owner’s
burden

Note: See Appendix B for sources.

With Civil Forfeiture,
IRS Cleans Out Bank Accounts

Lyndon McLellan runs a convenience store in
Fairmont, N.C., and has done so without incident for
more than a decade. All that changed in 2014, when the
Internal Revenue Service used civil forfeiture to seize McLellan’s entire $107,000 bank account. He did not stand
accused of selling drugs or even of cheating on his taxes;
in fact, he was not charged with any crime at all. Rather,
the IRS claimed that he had been “structuring” his deposits—that is, breaking them into amounts of less than
$10,000 to evade federal reporting requirements for large
transactions. McLellan, like most people, did not even
know what “structuring” was, let alone that it was illegal.
His niece, who handles the deposits, had been advised by
a bank teller that smaller deposits meant less paperwork
for the bank, so she kept deposits small.1
Unfortunately, McLellan ’s case is not unusual. From
2005 to 2012, the IRS seized more than $242 million in
over 2,500 structuring cases. In theory, the IRS keeps an
eye out for structuring to catch criminals laundering
money or committing financial crimes. Yet more than a
third of those structuring cases were civil actions where
only structuring, and no other crime, was suspected.2
In Iowa, Carole Hinders had $33,000 seized after
making frequent small cash deposits, even though all of
the money had been legitimately earned at her cash-only
Mexican restaurant.3 In Michigan, Terry Dehko and Sandy
Thomas lost more than $35,000 from their family grocery
store’s bank account just a few months after a routine IRS
audit had found the business clean as a whistle.4

1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9

In each case, civil forfeiture made it possible for
the IRS to raid bank accounts without any evidence of
criminal wrongdoing. Had the IRS been forced to prove
crimes had occurred—or even just to perform any kind
of investigation—it would have discovered that each of
these small-business owners had legitimate reasons for
making small deposits. Instead, McLellan, Hinders, and
Dehko and Thomas had to go to court and fight to get
their money back.
After these cases gained publicity, in the fall of 2014,
the IRS announced that it would no longer pursue bank
accounts unless it believed the money came from illegal
activity.5 Yet a federal prosecutor continued pursuing
forfeiture of McLellan’s money, even accusing him of
“ratchet[ing] up feelings in the agency” by going public
with his plight.6 Only in the face of public criticism did the
government back down and return the funds—though it
has refused to pay legal fees, costs and interest to which
McLellan is entitled.7
Additionally, victims of the old policy have yet to
be made whole. The IRS forfeited money belonging to
Randy Sowers and Ken Quran, small-business owners
in Maryland and North Carolina, without any evidence
that they had done anything wrong. Now that the IRS
has admitted its old practices were flawed, Sowers and
Quran are petitioning for their money back.8 Meanwhile,
legislation has been proposed in Congress that would
make the IRS’ policy change permanent.9

Dewan, S. (2015, May 1). Rule changes on IRS seizures, too late for some. The New York Times, p. A22; Sibilla, N. (2015, May 5). IRS seizes over $100,000 from
innocent small business owner, despite promise to end raids. Forbes.
Carpenter, D. M., & Salzman, L. (2015). Seize first, question later: The IRS and civil forfeiture. Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice.
Dewan, S. (2014, October 26). Law lets IRS seize accounts on suspicion, no crime required. The New York Times, p. A1.
Hotts, M. (2013, September 24). Fraser grocer challenges federal forfeiture law. Macomb Daily News.
Statement of Richard Weber, chief of IRS Criminal Investigation. (2014, October 25). The New York Times. In March 2015, the Department of Justice adopted
a similar policy limiting structuring seizures (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs. (2015). Attorney general restricts use of asset forfeiture in
structuring offenses [Press release]).
Dewan, 2015.
Quinn, M. (2015, May 14). Federal government to return $107,702 seized from North Carolina convenience store owner. The Daily Signal.
The IRS’s ill-gotten gains. (2015, July 15). The Wall Street Journal [Editorial].
Sullum, J. (2015, January 27). Here is how Rand Paul’s bill would curtail civil forfeiture. Reason; FAIR Act, H.R. 540, 114th Cong. (2015), available at https://
www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/540/text; FAIR Act, S. 255, 114th Cong. (2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114thcongress/senate-bill/255/text.

Civil Forfeiture Law Grades
Using these three elements—the financial incentive
for law enforcement to seize, the government’s standard
of proof to forfeit, and who bears the burden in innocent
owner claims—this report grades each state on the extent
to which its civil forfeiture laws protect property rights or
encourage policing for profit. Grades were assigned for
each of the three key elements, as indicated in Appendix
A, and then combined to create the grades. High grades
denote laws that contain strong property rights protections
and a smaller (or no) financial incentive to seize, while low
grades indicate laws that encourage seizures of property
by making civil forfeiture both easy and rewarding for law
enforcement.

Table 1 provides the grades for all states, the District
of Columbia and the federal government, ranked from
best to worst. Figure 9 provides the grades in map form.
New Mexico, D.C., North Carolina, Missouri, Indiana and
Maine earn the highest grades. The laws of all six prohibit
agencies from keeping forfeiture proceeds, and the top
four provide some of the best protections for property
owners in the country. At the bottom of the list are Massachusetts and North Dakota, both of which earn F grades.
Citizens in both states get the worst of everything when it
comes to civil forfeiture—laws that provide few property
rights protections and allow law enforcement agencies to
enjoy lucrative incentives to engage in forfeiture activity.

Table 1: Civil Forfeiture Law Grades Ranked
New Mexico
D.C.

North Carolina
Missouri
Indiana
Maine

Maryland

Wisconsin
California
Oregon

Colorado

Connecticut
New York
Nebraska
Vermont

Mississippi
Alaska

Louisiana
Texas

Florida

Minnesota
Illinois

New Hampshire
Rhode Island

South Carolina
Washington

A-

B+
B+
B+
B+
B+
B
B

C+
C+
C
C
C
C
C

C-

D+
D+
D+
D+
D+
DDDDD-

Montana

D-

Nevada

D-

Utah

Kentucky
Michigan
Alabama

Tennessee
Arizona

Arkansas

Delaware
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa

Kansas

New Jersey
Ohio

Oklahoma

Pennsylvania

South Dakota
Virginia

West Virginia
Wyoming

Federal Government
Massachusetts
North Dakota

DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDF
F

Figure 9: Civil Forfeiture Law Grades

WA
DOR
C+

MT
DID
D-

NV
DCA
C+

ND
F

AZ
D-

MN
D+

SD
D-

WY
DUT
D-

VT
C

IA
D-

NE
C
CO
C

IL
D-

OK
D-

TX
D+

OH
DKY
D-

PA
DWV
D-

MS
C-

GA
D-

AL
D-

VA
D-

NC
B+

TN
D-

AR
DLA
D+

IN
B+

NH: DMA: F
RI: DCT: C

NY
C

MI
D-

MO
B+

KS
D-

NM
A-

WI
B

ME
B+

NJ: DDE: DMD: B
DC:
B+

SC
DFederal Government
D-

FL
D+

AK
D+
HI
D-

A scan down the list in Table 1 reveals the poor state
of affairs in civil forfeiture across the United States. Only
14 states and the District of Columbia earned grades of C
or better, and 35 states earned grades of D+ or worse. The
federal government earned a D-, putting its civil forfeiture
laws among the nation’s worst and exposing all Americans
to yet another threat to their property rights. These results
make it clear that significant reform is needed.
Yet, thus far, reform has been slow in coming. When
the first edition of Policing for Profit was released in 2010,
civil forfeiture was little known among members of the
public and even elected officials. As awareness grew, calls
for reform increased, resulting in efforts in 2013, 2014 and
2015 in at least 14 states and in Congress. To date, however, only five states—New Mexico,54 Nevada,55 Montana,56
Minnesota57 and Michigan—and the District of Columbia58
have substantively reformed their laws to increase protections for property owners. A sixth state, Vermont,59 also
reformed its laws but offset improvements by giving law
enforcement a new financial incentive to seize.
Of these changes, New Mexico’s were the most sweeping. The reform was supported by a bipartisan group of
legislators and reluctantly signed into law by Gov. Susana
Martinez, a former district attorney. The new law ended

Grades

civil forfeiture and replaced it with criminal forfeiture.
Previously, forfeiture entailed civil litigation independent
of criminal prosecution; now the government must first
convict a suspect in criminal court. Then the same judge
and jury determine if the property in question was linked
to that crime. As for innocent owner claims, now the
government must also prove that the person claiming to
be an innocent owner had actual knowledge of the crime
giving rise to the forfeiture—a significant change from the
previous law, which, in most instances, placed the burden
on property owners to prove their own innocence. The
new law of the Land of Enchantment also eliminated law
enforcement’s financial incentive to pursue forfeitures.
Now all forfeiture monies must be deposited in the state’s
general fund rather than in agency accounts, where 100
percent of forfeiture funds had gone previously. Due to
these changes, the state’s grade jumped from a D- to an A-.
New Mexico’s reforms set a clear example for other states
to follow in protecting people from unjust forfeitures.
Nevada’s and Montana’s new laws now require a
conviction in criminal court as a prerequisite to forfeiture of property in civil court, increasing protections for
property owners. Reforms in Montana also shifted the
burden of proof in innocent owner claims to the govern-

ment. Although these reforms are praiseworthy, both states
could further improve protections for property owners by
addressing the elephant in the room: the financial incentive
to seize created by directing as much as 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds to law enforcement. Indeed, the persistence
of the profit motive in the states’ laws kept their grades
from improving much: Nevada’s D- stayed the same and
Montana’s grade budged, but barely, from an F to a D-.
Minnesota’s new law as of 2014, like those of Nevada
and Montana, requires a conviction in criminal court prior
to forfeiture of property in civil court. The new law also
changed the burden of proof for a suspect whose property
was seized as part of a drug investigation. The old law required a suspect to prove that his property was unrelated to
drugs found in the investigation. For example, the suspect
would have had to prove that the television in his bedroom
was unrelated to marijuana in
the pocket of a coat hanging in
his closet. The new law requires
the government to prove the
connection between the seized
property and the drugs.60 These
are substantial improvements,
but, as in Nevada and Montana,
leaders in the North Star State
could significantly increase
protections for property owners—and raise the state’s grade
significantly—by dropping the financial incentive from
its current 90 percent to zero. Because the profit incentive
remains, Minnesota’s reforms only raised its grade from a D
to a D+.
In 2015, the Vermont Legislature, in what began as an
animal fighting bill,61 amended the state’s forfeiture laws to
require a conviction in criminal court prior to a forfeiture
proceeding in civil court.62 Unfortunately, this improvement was offset by another change that created, for the first
time, a financial incentive to seize. Previously, 100 percent
of forfeiture proceeds were deposited in the state treasury,
but now law enforcement agencies get to keep 45 percent.63
This explains why Vermont’s grade dropped from a very
respectable B+ to a C. In October 2015—after this report
had gone to print—Gov. Rick Snyder of Michigan signed
a package of modest forfeiture reform bills, improving the
state’s standard of proof to clear and convincing evidence in
all cases.
The District of Columbia also adopted civil forfeiture
reform that increased protections for property owners.64
The government now must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence for most properties and by clear
and convincing evidence for cars and real property. The
law also shifted the burden of proof to the government
in innocent owner claims. Best of all, the reform directs
all forfeiture funds to the city’s general fund rather than
law enforcement coffers, making D.C. and New Mexico
the only jurisdictions with recent reforms eliminating the

profit incentive. Taken together, these reforms earn the
District a well-deserved B+ grade.
Wyoming65 and Maryland66 also saw reform bills pass
their respective legislatures, only to be vetoed by their
governors, and the Texas67 and Virginia68 legislatures saw
the introduction of reform bills but failed to adopt them.
A common refrain in the states where reform efforts have been unsuccessful is that resistance from law
enforcement leaders killed the bills. In Texas, for example,
13 civil forfeiture reform bills were introduced during
the 2015 legislative session. None of them passed, due in
large part to law enforcement opposition.69 Five70 of the
13 that made it out of the House Criminal Jurisprudence
Committee—only to die in the Calendars Committee—
would have significantly reformed the state’s laws by increasing the standard of proof from preponderance of the
evidence to clear and convincing evidence, shifting the burden in innocent owner claims
to the government, increasing
transparency through stronger reporting requirements,
and granting attorney’s fees
to owners if the government
failed to forfeit successfully.71
Another bill in Texas that
would have required the government to convict a property owner of a crime before forfeiting property72 died
in the State Affairs Committee after the chairman, under
pressure from law enforcement, refused to allow the bill
to move forward.73 The bill’s sponsor, Rep. David Simpson of Longview, in Gregg County, also felt the heat from
law enforcement when he appeared on a public panel
in Austin to discuss forfeiture reform. A coterie of law
enforcement officers and a judge from Simpson’s district
flew to the panel on a donated private plane to express
their opposition to reform.74
Similarly, Virginia’s H.B. 1287 would have required
a criminal conviction prior to forfeiture, but law enforcement agencies, including the Virginia State Police,
opposed the bill at committee hearings.75 As one observer
noted, “Anytime law enforcement opposes a bill in Virginia, it’s an uphill battle.”76
Finally, at the federal level, in January 2015, Sen.
Rand Paul and Rep. Tim Walberg reintroduced the
Fifth Amendment Integrity Restoration (FAIR) Act.77 If
passed, the bill would, among other things, compel the
Department of Justice to deposit forfeited funds in the
Treasury Department’s general fund, thereby reducing
the financial incentive to seize; require the government
to prove property is forfeitable with clear and convincing
evidence; force the government to prove that an individual making an innocent owner claim was aware of the
criminal use of his or her property; and provide counsel
to indigent owners in civil forfeiture cases.78

A common refrain in the
states where reform efforts
have been unsuccessful is
that resistance from law
enforcement leaders killed
the bills.

Federal Equitable Sharing
State civil forfeiture laws vary in terms of how easy—and how rewarding—they make
forfeiture for law enforcement, but state and local law enforcement agencies have another means
of forfeiting property and getting a cut: the federal government’s equitable sharing program.
Through equitable sharing, property seized locally
can be forfeited federally. Equitable sharing can happen
in one of two ways. First, state and local agencies can
turn property they seize over to a federal agency, which
can elect to “adopt” it for federal forfeiture if the “conduct giving rise to the seizure is in violation of federal
law and where federal law provides for forfeiture.”79 Federal rules announced in 2015 limit adoptive forfeitures,
though exceptions remain. Alternatively, state and local
officers working as part of a joint task force or investigation with the federal government can make seizures that
are eligible for equitable sharing.
Either way, cash and property seized by state and
local law enforcement becomes subject to federal civil forfeiture law—not state law. Through equitable sharing, up
to 80 percent of proceeds can be returned to, or “shared”
with, state and local agencies, with the federal government retaining the remainder. As with civil forfeiture
under the laws of most states, no charges or convictions
are required.
The same 1984 amendments that created the Assets
Forfeiture Fund, introducing a financial incentive to federal forfeiture law, also gave rise to equitable sharing,80
and its use has exploded. In 2014, more than 3,000 state
and local law enforcement agencies received forfeiture
proceeds through the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program, a 17 percent increase from 2004.81
Between 2000 and 2013, annual payments to state and
local law enforcement through the DOJ’s program more
than tripled,82 growing from $199 million to $643 million,
as shown in Table 2 and Figure 10. The Treasury Department maintains a smaller equitable sharing program;
its payments rose about 45 percent over the same time
period, from $85 million to $124 million.83 In all, the Justice Department’s equitable sharing program generated
$4.7 billion for state and local agencies from 2000 to 2013,
while the Treasury Department’s program accounted for
$1.1 billion in payments.

Table 2: DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing
Payments, 2000–2013
Year

DOJ
(calendar years)

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$198,739,307

$85,129,000

2001

$220,353,479

$60,277,000

2002

$161,287,179

$50,844,000

2003

$221,984,964

$41,962,000

2004

$230,703,987

$48,123,000

2005

$269,262,768

$72,731,000

2006

$325,669,954

$66,558,000

2007

$443,802,375

$60,192,000

2008

$401,878,933

$90,198,000

2009

$380,865,399

$89,756,000

2010

$416,862,701

$129,102,000

2011

$437,096,583

$79,533,000

2012

$381,504,806

$137,627,000

2013

$643,317,075

$123,765,000

Total

$4,733,329,509

$1,135,797,000

$338,094,965

$81,128,357

Average
per year

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by
FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil
and criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and
Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Figure 10: DOJ Equitable Sharing Payments, 2000–2013
$700,000,000
$600,000,000
$500,000,000
$400,000,000
$300,000,000
$200,000,000
$100,000,000
$0

2000

2001

Adoptions

2002 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Source: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ civil and criminal forfeiture
data obtained by FOIA.

Stricter State Law,
More Equitable Sharing
Scholarly research finds a link between state civil forfeiture laws and federal equitable sharing: The tougher it
is to generate forfeiture revenue under state law, the more
equitable sharing payments state and local law enforcement
agencies receive.
In a 2011 study published in the Journal of Criminal
Justice, criminologists Jefferson Holcomb, Tomislav Kovandzic and Marian Williams found that a lower share of
state forfeiture proceeds allowed to flow to law enforcement
is associated with higher annual equitable sharing payments
from the Department of Justice.1 The first figure to the right
illustrates the implications for a hypothetical law enforcement agency of average size: With each 25 percent reduction
in law enforcement’s cut of state forfeiture proceeds, annual
equitable sharing payments increase $6,000.2 So if an agency
receives $120,000 in equitable sharing proceeds when there
is a 100 percent state-law profit incentive, it can be expected
to receive $144,000—or $24,000 more—if the profit incentive
is eliminated.
The authors also found that making it harder to forfeit property under state law by improving protections for
property owners is linked to more equitable sharing. As the
second figure illustrates, a hypothetical agency that receives
$120,000 in equitable sharing when the state standard of
proof to forfeit property is mere probable cause will receive
$152,220 when forfeiture requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt—a boost of $32,220. Likewise, shifting the burden of
proof in state innocent owner claims from the owner to the
government yields an increase of $12,840, as illustrated in the
third figure.
In short, when civil forfeiture is more difficult and less
financially rewarding under state law, law enforcement
agencies turn to federal equitable sharing instead. Not only
do these results indicate that law enforcement uses equitable
sharing to circumvent state law, but they also provide compelling evidence that pursuit of revenue is a key motivator in
forfeiture proceedings.
Other researchers have reached similar conclusions.3 And
a 2015 Drug Policy Alliance report documented California
law enforcement’s striking preference for federal forfeiture
over the state’s somewhat more restrictive and less rewarding
procedures: From 2005 to 2013, California agencies’ equitable
sharing take more than tripled, while state forfeiture revenues
remained flat.4

1
2
3

Illustration for an Average-Sized Agency:
Equitable Sharing Rises as...
...Share of Proceeds Declines
$144,000
$138,000
$132,000
$126,000
$120,000

100%

75%

50%

25%

...Standard of Proof Increases

$152,220

$141,480
$130,740
$120,000

Probable Cause Preponderance
of the Evidence

Clear and
Convincing

Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt

...Innocent Owner Burden Shifts to Government
$132,840

$120,000

Owner Must
Prove Innocence

Government
Must Prove Guilt

Holcomb, J. E., Kovandzic, T. V., & Williams, M. R. (2011). Civil asset forfeiture, equitable sharing, and policing for profit in the United States. Journal of
Criminal Justice, 39(3), 273–285.
An average-sized law enforcement agency is one that serves about 300,000 people. During the study period, such agencies received, on average, $120,000 in
equitable sharing proceeds from the Department of Justice.
Worrall, J., & Kovandzic, T. (2008). Is policing for profit? Answers from asset forfeiture. Criminology and Public Policy, 7, 219–244; Kucher, C. (2005). Asset
forfeiture: State restrictions and equitable sharing. Master’s Thesis, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH.
Drug Policy Alliance. (2015). Above the law: An investigation of civil asset forfeiture in California. Los Angeles, CA: Drug Policy Alliance.

Equitable Sharing Rankings
Table 3 ranks states and the District of Columbia according to their law
enforcement agencies’ use of the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing
program. Rankings reflect average annual equitable sharing payments from
the DOJ from 2011 to 2013. The averages are adjusted to account for drug
arrest rates, since states with more drug crimes will presumably participate
more extensively in equitable sharing. South Dakota, North Dakota and
Wyoming top the list as the states with the lowest levels of equitable sharing
payments. Agencies in California and Rhode Island, ranked 50th and 51st,
take advantage of equitable sharing far more frequently than do agencies
elsewhere.

Table 3: State Equitable Sharing Rankings
1

South Dakota

North Dakota

Wyoming

D.C.*

Maine

Delaware

Hawaii

Idaho

Arkansas

Alaska

Montana

Utah

West Virginia

Oregon

Vermont

New Hampshire

Nebraska

Oklahoma

Minnesota

Mississippi

Maryland

Connecticut

Nevada

Louisiana

New Mexico**

Tennessee

Iowa

Wisconsin

South Carolina

Virginia

Alabama

Arizona

Kentucky

Missouri

Colorado

New Jersey

Washington

Kansas

Indiana

Illinois

Pennsylvania

North Carolina

Ohio

Michigan

Georgia

Massachusetts

Texas

Florida

New York

California

Rhode Island

*Effective October 2018, adoptions will be banned in the District of Columbia and proceeds
from joint task force and investigative seizures will be directed to the city’s general fund.
**As of July 2015, law enforcement agencies in New Mexico are prohibited from transferring property worth less than $50,000 to the federal government for forfeiture and all proceeds are directed to the state’s general fund.
Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ civil and criminal forfeiture data (average annual
DOJ equitable sharing payments, 2011–2013); FBI Uniform Crime Reports (state drug arrest
rates, 2011–2013).

Circumventing State Laws
The Department of Justice claims that equitable sharing, like civil forfeiture more generally, helps deter crime
and provides “valuable additional resources to state
and local law enforcement agencies.”84 Equitable sharing is also said to promote cooperation among federal,
state and local law enforcement.85 With joint task forces
and investigations, equitable sharing allows the federal
government to act as a central processor for potentially
complicated seizures involving multiple agencies across
different jurisdictions and then distribute proceeds according to each agency’s contribution.
Critics warn, however, that the conflict of interest created by civil forfeiture—giving law enforcement agencies
a financial stake in seizures—is also present with equitable
sharing.86 Moreover, equitable sharing enables state and
local agencies to receive a cut of forfeiture proceeds they
might not be able to get under their own states’ laws.87
Once cash or property comes under an equitable
sharing program, federal, and not state, forfeiture law applies—even if state law prohibits or limits law enforcement
access to forfeiture funds. And not only does federal law
allow forfeiture proceeds to be spent by law enforcement,
but equitable sharing rules actually mandate that funds
go to law enforcement. With few exceptions, DOJ rules
require equitable sharing payments to be spent by law
enforcement agencies on law enforcement purposes only.88
If state law directs proceeds elsewhere, the Justice Department will cut off the flow of funds.89
Equitable sharing offers other advantages for state
and local law enforcement. While some states demand a
relatively high standard of proof that seized property is
connected to a crime—with a growing number now requiring a criminal conviction—federal law requires only a
preponderance of the evidence.90 Likewise, while a handful
of states put the burden on the government in innocent
owner claims, the federal government forces owners to
prove that they neither knew about nor consented to a
suspected illegal use of their property.91 Such procedural
differences can make forfeiting property under federal law
substantially easier than forfeiting it under state law.
Equitable sharing thus provides a convenient workaround for state and local law enforcement agencies
operating under relatively restrictive state civil forfeiture
laws. Forfeitures that may not be successful or provide a
financial return under state law can be conducted federally with a higher chance of success. Indeed, until recently,
the DOJ forms state and local officials used to request
federal adoption of seized property listed the inadequacy
of state forfeiture law as an acceptable justification for
equitable sharing.92
The attempted forfeiture of Tony Jalali’s commercial
property in Anaheim, Calif., shows how local agencies
can use equitable sharing to circumvent state law. Jalali

rented space in his small office building to various tenants, including a dental office, an insurance company and
two medical marijuana dispensaries. The dispensaries
were entirely legal under California state law. Anaheim
authorities nevertheless sought to rid the city of medical marijuana businesses and targeted Jalali’s property.
The authorities faced two hurdles, however: Not only is
medical marijuana legal in California, but state law also
prohibits the civil forfeiture of real property, such as a
home, business or land, without a conviction. In other
words, under state law, Anaheim could neither charge
Jalali with a crime nor take his property. But local officials
had a trump card: federal equitable sharing.93
In August 2012, Anaheim police teamed up with
federal prosecutors and used equitable sharing to seize
Jalali’s building under federal civil forfeiture law. The
Institute for Justice took up Jalali’s case, and, after more
than a year of fighting in federal court, the government finally agreed to drop the forfeiture.94 But had it succeeded,
Anaheim police could have received up to 80 percent of
the proceeds of Jalali’s property, valued at $1.5 million95—
funds they could never have received under state law.
Scholarly research indicates that Jalali’s case is not
an isolated incident. Relatively lax federal standards and
generous financial returns encourage state and local law
enforcement to use equitable sharing to circumvent state
law. Agencies in states with stricter or less generous civil
forfeiture laws participate more heavily in equitable sharing (see page 26).96
Given California’s relatively restrictive civil forfeiture
laws, the state’s poor ranking on equitable sharing—50th
out of the 50 states and the District of Columbia—underscores the circumvention risks the practice poses. Likewise, North Carolina requires a conviction for most civil
forfeitures and directs proceeds to public schools, earning
the state a B+ for its laws, yet it ranks 42nd for equitable
sharing. New York, Indiana and Missouri all receive higher marks than most states for their civil forfeiture laws
but rank poorly for equitable sharing, at 49th, 39th and
34th, respectively.

Encouraging Abuse
In addition to encouraging circumvention of state
laws, equitable sharing engenders the same concerns about
conflicts of interest and revenue generation as civil forfeiture more generally. Criminal justice scholars have called
equitable sharing “a virtual cash cow” for state and local
law enforcement agencies.97 According to a 2014 investigation by The Washington Post, 298 state and local agencies
and 210 task forces nationwide have used the Department
of Justice’s equitable sharing program to seize funds equal
to 20 percent or more of their annual budgets since 2008.98
An April 2015 report by the Drug Policy Alliance found

that some of California’s smallest cities were among the
largest recipients of DOJ equitable sharing payments on
a per capita basis—and several of those cities’ equitable
sharing payments had increased dramatically following
cuts to police budgets.99
In written testimony before a U.S. Senate committee,
the national president of the Fraternal Order of Police
identified the possible elimination of equitable sharing as
his organization’s “chief point of contention” with proposed forfeiture reform legislation: “[I]n our view, ending
the equitable sharing program will result in yet another
net reduction in Federal assistance to State and local law
enforcement.”100
The Washington Post’s 2014 investigation vividly illustrated how the pursuit of equitable sharing funds and lax
federal standards promote forfeiture abuses by state and
local law enforcement.101 The Post calculated that, since
September 11, 2001, the DOJ’s equitable sharing program
was responsible for nearly 62,000 seizures of cash without warrants or criminal indictments filed against the
owners. Of the $2.5 billion forfeited as a result, state and
local agencies received $1.7 billion and federal agencies
$800 million.102
From court and police records and interviews with
seizure victims, the Post identified a pattern to warrantless cash seizures on the nation’s highways: State troopers or local police stop motorists for minor violations,
such as speeding or failure to signal a lane change, and
issue a warning or ticket. Officers then extend the stop
through conversation, looking for signs of nervousness or
other alleged indicators of criminal activity. Eventually,
they ask to search the car. If the owner refuses, officers
may call in a drug-sniffing dog to try to establish probable cause for a search. If cash turns up—even in the
absence of drugs or other evidence of criminal activity—it
is presumed to be drug money, seized and handed over
to the federal government for forfeiture. Owners must
hire an attorney and fight federal prosecutors to prove
their money was legitimately earned and not part of the
drug trade.103
Mandrel Stuart’s case is typical. The Staunton, Va.,
resident was pulled over by Fairfax County police for a
minor traffic infraction. Upon discovering $17,550 in cash
in Stuart’s car, officers seized it as drug money, though
no drugs were found.104 Stuart said he earned the money
from his barbecue restaurant and planned to spend it on
equipment and supplies. Within weeks, the funds were
turned over to the federal government for forfeiture.105
Stuart found a local attorney willing to take his case, and,
after 14 months, a jury unanimously ordered his money
returned. But in the meantime, without needed operating
funds, he lost his restaurant.106
Warrantless highway seizures follow a similar script
from state to state, the Post found, because a cottage industry of private companies trains state and local officers
in the techniques of so-called highway interdiction, and

this training is often paid for with forfeiture funds.107 The
leading company, Desert Snow, claims that its trainees
seized more than $427 million in one five-year period, and
the Post reported that the Kansas Highway Patrol and Wisconsin State Patrol doubled their seizures following Desert
Snow trainings.108

Further Reform Needed
In January 2015, following The Washington Post investigation and amid mounting criticism of civil forfeiture,
then-Attorney General Eric Holder announced a new
Department of Justice policy intended to curb equitable
sharing, and the Treasury Department followed suit.109
The policy generally prohibits federal agencies from
“adopting” cash and property seized by state and local
law enforcement for federal forfeiture. However, it created several exceptions.
First, the new policy exempts “property that directly
relates to public safety concerns, including firearms, ammunition, explosives, and property associated with child
pornography.”110 Second, it permits adoptions pursuant to
a seizure warrant from a federal magistrate judge. Seizure
warrants are easy for the government to secure because they
are obtained in ex parte proceedings, meaning the owner
receives no notice, there is no hearing, and the only evidence
presented to the judge comes from the government.111
Third, and most important, the DOJ policy specifically exempts seizures by task forces or as part of joint investigations, severely limiting its reach. By the DOJ’s own
calculations, over a six-year period, adoptions accounted for just 3 percent of the value of all forfeitures in its
system, including those initiated by federal law enforcement.112 Within the equitable sharing program, joint task
forces and investigations are responsible for the lion’s
share of seizures and revenue. The Institute for Justice
found that 73 percent of DOJ equitable sharing seizures
from 2000 to 2013 came from joint task forces and investigations, as did 82 percent of equitable sharing payments,
as shown in Figure 11. Figure 10 on page 25 provides an
annual breakdown of payments.

Figure 11: DOJ Equitable Sharing, Adoptive vs. Joint,
2000–2013
Assets Seized

Proceeds Shared

27%
73%

18%
82%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Source: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ civil and criminal forfeiture
data obtained by FOIA.

Among the seizures that would have fallen into the
joint exemption was Mandrel Stuart’s. Even though his
cash was seized during a roadside stop by Fairfax County
officers, the seizure was labeled as joint in federal records.
A Drug Enforcement Administrative agent later claimed
to be the “Seizing Agent” in court papers, though police
records showed no federal involvement with the seizure.
Eighteen of 24 federal forfeiture cases described as joint
seizures and examined by the Post likewise appeared to
have had no federal involvement until after the seizure.113
Following criticism that the policy changes did
not go far enough,114 the DOJ in February 2015 offered
additional guidance that attempts to limit joint task force
and investigative seizures eligible for equitable sharing to those with “federal law enforcement oversight
or participation at the time of seizure by state and local
law enforcement”(emphasis in original).115 The guidance
adds layers of review and offers “factors to consider”
in deciding whether a seizure qualifies. However, as
Institute for Justice attorney Darpana Sheth has noted,
the factors are not requirements, nor are they ranked in
order of importance.116 And discretion about whether to
accept the seized property for federal forfeiture still “rests
with line prosecutors and agency attorneys who stand to
benefit from any seizure.”117 Furthermore, the policy does
not operate retroactively and does not seem to apply to
pending cases.
Even if the DOJ’s new policy and guidelines are
followed faithfully and maintained by future attorneys
general, the potential for abuse remains. Joint task force
and investigative seizures are not immune to financial
conflicts of interest, as the plight of Charles Clarke illustrates. One of the officers who seized the college student’s
cash at the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky airport was an
airport police detective, and the other was an officer of
the Covington Police Department serving as a deputized
DEA agent.118 Because these officials were part of a joint
DEA task force, the new DOJ policy would not apply, even
if the seizure had taken place after it was announced.
Under equitable sharing, both the airport police and
the Covington police stand to gain a cut of Clarke’s cash
if it is successfully forfeited. Equally troubling, so do 11
other law enforcement agencies that had no involvement
in the seizure. DOJ records indicate that airport police
requested 40 percent of the proceeds through equitable
sharing, and the Covington Police 3.07 percent.119 The 11
other agencies, including the Cincinnati Police Department, the Kentucky State Police and the Ohio Highway
Patrol, requested shares ranging from 3.07 to 6.14 percent.
The shares requested by all 13 agencies totaled just under
80 percent, the maximum that can be paid to state and
local agencies under equitable sharing.
The requesting agencies that had nothing to do with
the seizure of Clarke’s cash all participate in the same

DEA task force that houses the Covington officer, and the
member agencies likely have an agreement in place dictating how they will share forfeiture proceeds.120 Long-standing DOJ guidelines ask agencies involved in joint task
force and investigative seizures to justify the size of their
share requests by listing work hours, equipment and other
contributions to investigations that result in a seizure.121
But the same guidelines also allow agencies participating
in a task force to enter into agreements that determine, in
advance, how any equitable sharing proceeds resulting
from task force activities will be distributed.122
That 11 law enforcement agencies are seeking a few
hundred dollars each from a seizure they had nothing
to do with suggests that financial motives are as present
with task force seizures as they are with adoptive ones.
Indeed, pre-arranged agreements automate the process:
Simply filling out a form can bring in revenue. DOJ
guidelines further incentivize task force participation by
allowing agencies to assign an officer to a task force and
pay his replacement using equitable sharing monies—an
exception to rules that normally bar paying salaries out of
forfeiture funds.123
As long as task force seizures are eligible for equitable
sharing, regardless of federal involvement or oversight,
the risk remains that task force priorities will be skewed
toward generating revenue for member agencies instead
of enforcing the law. And participation on a task force or a
joint investigation with federal agents remains a way for
agencies in states with restrictive civil forfeiture laws to
generate forfeiture revenue they otherwise could not.
Federal and state policymakers have started seeking
broader and more lasting reform. In Congress, the FAIR
Act would simply abolish equitable sharing.124 Leaders
of the U.S. House and Senate Judiciary committees have
encouraged the Justice Department to discontinue the
equitable sharing program.125 And as part of reforms adopted in 2015, the District of Columbia and New Mexico
effectively opted out of the equitable sharing program.
Starting October 1, 2018, D.C. law will prohibit law enforcement from seeking federal adoption of locally seized
property and direct proceeds from task force or other
multijurisdictional seizures to the city’s general fund.126
Similarly, New Mexico now prohibits law enforcement
from transferring property worth less than $50,000 to the
federal government for forfeiture and directs all proceeds
to the state’s general fund.127 Because DOJ guidelines
require equitable sharing funds to be spent by law enforcement agencies on law enforcement purposes, these
reforms will likely halt equitable sharing with D.C. and
New Mexico.

Civil Forfeiture & Transparency
Civil forfeiture laws put the property of innocent citizens at risk—all the more so
because most forfeiture activity is hidden from public view. Across the states and the federal
government, public reporting on forfeiture activity ranges from poor to nonexistent, and most
civil forfeiture laws lack even basic transparency requirements. Such poor public reporting
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for lawmakers and the public to hold law enforcement
agencies accountable for their forfeiture activity.
As the map in Figure 12 shows, only 11 states and the federal government make any kind of forfeiture information
publicly accessible online. Another three states and the District of Columbia will put forfeiture records online starting
in 2016. Thus, in the vast majority of states, learning anything about the scope of forfeiture activity is, at best, a challenge. And the little information that is available is plagued by inadequate, missing and inconsistent data.

Figure 12: Online Forfeiture Reporting

MN
ID

MI
IA

NV
UT

AR
MS

NJ
DE
MD

NH
MA
RI
CT

SD
WY

SC
GA*
Federal Government

LA
FL

Online
HI

Online in 2016

*Since 2010, Georgia law enforcement agencies have been required to file forfeiture reports with the Carl Vinson Institute of Government at the University
of Georgia for online distribution, but reporting has been infrequent and inconsistent. It remains to be seen whether agencies will respond to 2015 legislative reform and report as required.
Note: See Appendix B for sources.

Despite Freedom-of-Information Laws,
Forfeiture Records Are Often Neither Free
Nor Informative
People interested in learning about the scope of
forfeiture activity have their work cut out for them. Only
11 states and the federal government publish forfeiture
reports online.1 To obtain unreported data and unpublished reports, members of the public must turn to public
records requests under federal and state freedom-of-information laws. Unfortunately, obtaining forfeiture data
via public records requests is frequently neither free nor
informative. The process can be arduous and expensive and is seeded with pitfalls. Worse, it may not even
produce anything useful, making it a poor means for
providing transparency.
To file a public records request, members of the
public first have to know whom to contact and what—
specifically—they are looking for. This is rarely straightforward. Agencies may deny requests that they deem
too broad, and some pertinent materials may be exempt
from disclosure. Further, public records requests may cost
money—in some cases hundreds or even thousands of
dollars—and can take months or years to fulfill. And even
after forfeiture data are received, requesters’ work may
not be finished. Depending on what shape the data are in,
they may have to complete data entry for thousands of
forfeitures and perform their own analysis.
This was certainly the Institute for Justice’s experience. Obtaining the data for this report took months of
research, more than 200 public records requests, over 600
hours of data entry and lots of persistence. And IJ did not
even request records held by local agencies, which would
have added years to the project. As it was, Ohio took sev-

1
2
3

en months to provide the forfeiture data IJ requested. The
Department of Justice took four months to turn over its
forfeiture database, and the Department of the Treasury
still had not fulfilled IJ’s March 2015 request for its forfeiture database by press time, eight months later. Massachusetts charged IJ—a nonprofit—$300 for its request;
Mississippi charged $100. Delaware refused IJ’s initial request about its Special Law Enforcement Assistance Fund
because it had not been submitted by a state citizen.2
After IJ found a Delaware-based sponsor for the request,
the state still refused to provide information about the
SLEAF because the fund’s advisory committee—a body
composed solely of public officials—is not considered a
public entity under state law, making SLEAF data exempt
from disclosure.3
Much of the information IJ received through public
records requests required additional steps to find totals
for a given jurisdiction. For example, to derive statewide
totals for Colorado, Louisiana and Ohio, IJ had to input
data from all of the states’ individual agency reports.
A few other states provided scanned lists of forfeitures,
which also required manual data entry.
Based on the difficulties IJ had collecting forfeiture
data using public records requests, even with a team of
professional researchers, two things seem clear. First,
it is unreasonable and unrealistic to expect ordinary
citizens to navigate the process successfully. And second,
although freedom-of-information laws serve a laudable
goal in theory, they are deeply insufficient to ensure
transparency and freedom of forfeiture information.

In 2016, three states and the District of Columbia will join this group. At the federal level, the departments of Justice and the Treasury also publish forfeiture
reports online.
Masood, O. (2014, October 23). Re: FOIA request: Special Law Enforcement Assistance Fund [Email to the Institute for Justice].
Masood, O. (2015, January 26). Re: FOIA request [Email to S. Friedman]; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4113(e).

State and Federal Forfeiture Reporting
Requirements
Table 4 provides the forfeiture reporting and
record-keeping requirements for all states, the District
of Columbia and the federal government. In 17 states,
agencies need not even keep records of seizures and
forfeitures. Two states require only that law enforcement
agencies report their forfeiture activity to their budgetary
authority, such as a county commission or city council.
Seven states merely require agencies engaging in forfeiture to maintain property inventory records. None of
these states are required to post forfeiture information
publicly.128
In 15 states and D.C., law enforcement agencies must
collect information about forfeitures and send it to a state
agency that compiles an aggregate report on forfeiture
activity statewide. This responsibility falls to the attorney general in some states, while in others it belongs to
a legislative committee, state auditor or law enforcement
unit, such as the state police or a prosecutors’ council. In
each state, the aggregate report is sent to the legislature.
Most states with aggregate statewide reports make them
available online, though Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
do not. (The Institute for Justice obtained their reports
through public records requests.) New reporting laws in
Nevada,129 New Mexico,130 Texas131 and D.C.132 will require
reports to be posted online starting in 2016. Indiana’s new
reporting law does not require online distribution.133
Aggregate reports like these give a snapshot of
forfeiture activity statewide, but they vary widely in the
level of detail provided, as Table 4 indicates. A handful
of states, such as California, produce an itemized list of
every forfeiture. Others, like Arizona, only report forfeiture data by agency. Some compile forfeiture data at the
county or judicial district level.

Local police and the federal government tried
to take Russ Caswell’s family-owned motel
in Tewksbury, Mass. After years of litigation,
a federal judge halted the forfeiture.

In eight states, law enforcement agencies must collect
forfeiture records and send them to a state agency, such
as the attorney general, the state treasurer or the state
police, but no aggregate statewide report is produced,
and no information is publicly released online. (Georgia
agencies are supposed to submit records for online distribution, but they rarely comply.) Because the records are
centralized in a single location, they can be obtained with
a single public records request. But, depending on the
state, deriving any kind of statewide picture of forfeiture
activity requires compiling and analyzing tens, hundreds
or even thousands of documents—a task beyond the
ability or resources of the average citizen or lawmaker.
As with aggregate statewide reports, these centralized
records vary in level of detail available. Some states, such
as Virginia, maintain records on every seizure, while
others, like Louisiana, only provide forfeiture data for
agencies or judicial districts.
Arkansas maintains centralized records and produces an aggregate report. The state’s drug director keeps
a database of all forfeitures, known as the Asset Seizure
Tracking System. Based on that database, the Legislative
Auditing Committee produces an annual report and
makes it available online; however, the report tracks only
seizures, not completed forfeitures or resulting proceeds.
At the federal level, the departments of Justice and
the Treasury both must provide annual audited reports
to Congress regarding their forfeiture funds. They are
required to provide basic accounting information—total
deposits, total expenses, property retained, and cash and
property transferred to state and local officials, including the estimated total value of physical property. They
must also report the type and estimated value of property seized but not yet forfeited, as well as itemize such
properties if they are worth more than $1 million. Both
the departments of Justice and the Treasury make their
reports available on their websites.

Table 4: Forfeiture Record-Keeping and Reporting
Reporting Requirement
(Agency with records)

Level of Detail
Provided

Online

Alabama

None

Alaska

None

Arizona

Aggregate report
(Criminal Justice Commission)

Agency

Yes*

Arkansas

Centralized records
(Drug Director)
Aggregate report (seizures only)
(Legislative Joint Auditing Committee)

Seizure

Judicial district

Yes

California

Aggregate report
(Attorney General)

Forfeiture

Yes*

Colorado

Centralized records
(Department of Local Affairs)

Seizure

Connecticut

Inventory

Delaware

None

District of Columbia

Aggregate report
(Metropolitan Police Department & Attorney General)

Florida

None

Georgia

Centralized records
(Carl Vinson Institute of Government at the University of
Georgia)

Forfeiture

Yes

Hawaii

Aggregate report
(Attorney General)

Agency

Yes*

Idaho

None

Illinois

Centralized records
(State Police)

Seizure

Indiana

Aggregate report
(Prosecuting Attorneys Council)

Iowa

None

Kansas

Report to budgetary authority

Kentucky

Centralized records
(Justice and Public Safety Cabinet)

Forfeiture

Louisiana

Centralized records
(State Legislature)

Judicial district

Maine

Inventory

Maryland

None

Massachusetts

Inventory

Michigan

Aggregate report
(State Police)

Minnesota

Aggregate report
(State Auditor)

Seizure

Yes*

Mississippi

None

State

Jan. 1,
2016

No
No

Yes

Reporting Requirement
(Agency with records)

Level of Detail
Provided

Online

Missouri

Aggregate report
(State Auditor)

County

Yes*

Montana

None

Nebraska

None

Nevada

Aggregate report
(Attorney General)

New Hampshire

Aggregate report
(Attorney General)

None134

Yes*

New Jersey

None

New Mexico

Aggregate report
(Department of Public Safety)

New York

Aggregate report
(Division of Criminal Justice Services)

Forfeiture

Yes*

North Carolina

None

North Dakota

None

Ohio

Inventory

Oklahoma

Inventory

Oregon

Aggregate report
(Asset Forfeiture Oversight Committee)

Agency

Yes*

Pennsylvania

Aggregate report
(Attorney General)

County

Rhode Island

Aggregate report
(Attorney General)

Forfeiture

South Carolina

Inventory

South Dakota

None

Tennessee

None

Texas

Aggregate report
(Attorney General)

Utah

Inventory

Vermont

Centralized records
(State Treasurer)

Forfeiture

Virginia

Centralized records
(Department of Criminal Justice Services)

Seizure

Washington

Centralized records
(State Treasurer)

Forfeiture

West Virginia

Report to budgetary authority

Wisconsin

None

Wyoming

None

Federal Government

Aggregate reports
(DOJ & Treasury)

Yes*

State

April 1,
2016

April 30,
2016

Notes: See Appendix B for sources. Since 2010, Georgia law enforcement agencies have been required to file forfeiture reports with the Carl Vinson Institute of Government at the University of Georgia for online distribution, but reporting has been infrequent and inconsistent. It remains to be seen whether
agencies will respond to 2015 legislative reform and report as required.
* Online reporting not required by statute, but is regular practice.

Inadequate Information

Failure to Report and Missing Data

Unfortunately, even where some kind of public
accounting or record-keeping of forfeiture activity is
required, it suffers from serious flaws. First, most reports
and records fail to provide information essential to evaluating law enforcement’s use of forfeiture. For example,
only two states, Oregon and Connecticut, distinguish
between civil and criminal forfeitures—a key question
given the substantial procedural differences between
them. Nor do most states indicate how many people
with property seized were charged with or convicted of
a crime.135 Forfeiture reports rarely disclose how many
assets are forfeited absent judicial review. Often, they
fail to reveal such basic information as what type of and
how much property was seized or forfeited, the size of
the average forfeiture, or the estimated value of property
retained for law enforcement use.
The annual accounting summaries of the forfeiture
funds of the departments of Justice and the Treasury
suffer from similar problems. In fact, most of the DOJ
data for this report comes not from information reported
to Congress or made public by the DOJ but rather from
information the Institute for Justice obtained through a
Freedom of Information Act request. IJ secured a copy of
the DOJ’s forfeiture database, known as the Consolidated
Asset Tracking System, or CATS.136 With CATS data, IJ
was able to determine how much equitable sharing activity resulted from adoptions instead of joint task forces
or investigations—information the DOJ does not publicly
report. IJ was also able to compare civil, criminal and
administrative forfeitures, another important question
publicly available DOJ data do not answer.
Yet CATS has its own serious limitations. Most telling is that of the more than 1,300 variables the database
tracks about cash and property seizures, not one indicates whether the owner of seized property was ever
charged with or convicted of a crime. The DOJ tracks
very carefully and publicly reports the proceeds generated by its forfeiture activity, but fails to report whether
that activity is targeted toward actual criminals or is
effective at stopping crime.

The second major problem with forfeiture reports and
records is that they are often missing data. In an effort to
obtain forfeiture information from as many states as possible, the Institute for Justice filed at least one public records
request in each of 43 states and the District of Columbia.
For the year 2012, 19 states and D.C. provided usable data
and an additional seven states published data online.
However, at least nine states’ forfeiture records were missing data—often quite a bit, as detailed in Table 5.
Minnesota’s state auditor report acknowledged missing records from 66 law enforcement agencies,137 and California’s attorney general reported missing data from nine
counties. 138 Aggregate reports from Michigan, Missouri
and Pennsylvania likewise admitted that law enforcement
agencies had failed to report as required.139 IJ found that
Kentucky’s centralized records maintained by the state’s
Office of Drug Control Policy, part of the Justice and Public
Safety Cabinet, were missing information from 178 law
enforcement agencies. Another four states that required
centralized record-keeping in 2012 were also missing records. Though required to do so under state law, Oregon’s
Asset Forfeiture Oversight Advisory Committee did not
produce a report or even collect agency data in 2012 “[d]ue
to budget cuts and downsizing of personnel at the time.”140
Other states’ records may also be missing data, but based
on information provided, it is impossible to tell.
Even when agencies file required reports, important
data may be missing. For example, the Missouri state
auditor’s 2014 report found that more than 60 percent of
forfeiture reports from law enforcement agencies were
missing information.141 Moreover, the agencies that failed
to report and the information missing varies from year to
year, making it difficult to compare state data over time.
Georgia provides a case study of law enforcement’s
failure to report forfeiture activity. Prior to a new reporting regime adopted in 2015, law enforcement agencies
faced only a limited requirement to keep itemized lists of
property received through forfeiture and expenditures
made from forfeiture funds. Until 2010, agencies only had
to provide these lists to their local budgetary authority.

The Department of Justice tracks very carefully
and publicly reports the proceeds generated by its
forfeiture activity, but fails to report whether that
activity is targeted toward actual criminals or is
effective at stopping crime.
36

Table 5: Reported Forfeitures Under State Law, 26 States and D.C., 2012

State

Arizona

Number*

California

2,092

Colorado

Value

Missing

Information obtained

$43,036,040

None

Quarterly reports of RICO funds accounting

$15,046,570

9 counties

Annual attorney general forfeiture reports

$533,111c

Most

Annual individual agency reports submitted to the
Department of Local Affairs

Connecticut

810

$2,264,680b

n/a

Itemized list of civil and criminal forfeitures from
the attorney general

District of
Columbia

1,942

$1,648,599d

n/a

Yearly administrative civil forfeiture totals from the
Metropolitan Police Department

None

Annual attorney general reports

Unknown

Itemized list of forfeitures from the state police

Hawaiia

$535,811d

Illinois

6,764

$19,551,517

Iowa

960

$2,904,915e

n/a

Extrapolated from 10% of annual forfeiture
proceeds received by the Iowa County Attorneys
Association145

Kentuckya

$2,038,918d

178 agencies

Office of Drug Control Policy’s summary and
database of forfeitures

Louisiana

$8,396,656b

None

Annual standardized judicial district reports of total
forfeitures

Massachusettsa

$8,843,408b

n/a

Annual deposits in the forfeiture trust fund accounts
from the state comptroller

Michigan

$13,777,858d

56 agencies

Annual state police reports

66 agencies

Annual state auditor reports

1 county

Annual state auditor reports

Unknown

Annual Division of Criminal Justice Services reports

Minnesota

6,851

$8,393,164

Missouri

$83,868

New York

$16,928,315

Ohio

$9,091,965d

10 agencies

Annual agency reports submitted to the attorney
general

Oklahomaa

$4,310,089b

n/a

Annual judicial district fund accounting from the
District Attorneys Council

Pennsylvaniaa

$11,694,221b

4 counties

Annual attorney general reports

$1,941,421

Unknown

Itemized list of forfeitures from the attorney general

$2,763,891d

n/a

Extrapolated from annual general fund deposits of
5% of forfeiture proceeds from the treasurer146

$15,127,022c

n/a

Itemized list of forfeitures from the Department of
Safety and Homeland Security

$46,821,446b

Unknown

Itemized list of forfeitures from the attorney general

Rhode Island

290

South Carolinaa
Tennessee

10,424

Texasa

Utaha

144

$1,362,786b

n/a

Itemized list of forfeiture fund deposits from the
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice

Vermont

Unknown

General fund accounting of forfeiture deposits from
the state treasurer147

Virginiaa

1,425

$6,951,900d

Unknown

Itemized list of forfeitures from the Department of
Criminal Justice Services

$9,862,644b

43 agencies

Itemized remittances to the treasurer for each
agency

$116,084d

Unknown

Itemized list of forfeitures from the attorney general

Washington
Wyoming

Notes: New Hampshire is not represented because data provided cover a two-year period and cannot be separated into individual years. State agencies
in Connecticut, Tennessee and Wyoming provided itemized reports even though state law does not require centralized data collection. Ohio law enforcement agencies were required to provide annual reports to the attorney general until a 2012 change in the law. Data from Iowa, Massachusetts, Oklahoma,
South Carolina and Utah come from forfeiture fund accounts, not forfeiture reports, which are not required in those states.
* Numbers include non-valued property
a – Data represent fiscal-year forfeitures
b – Cash and sold property; c – Cash only; d – Total estimated value; e – Cash and real estate
Source: Institute for Justice analysis of civil and criminal forfeiture data from online reports and public records requests.

Yet a 2002 state audit surveyed 26 Georgia agencies
and found that 85 percent of them failed to comply with
even this limited reporting requirement.142 A 2011 IJ
report similarly found widespread failures to report: Of a
random sample of 20 law enforcement agencies contacted, only two were reporting as required by law. And of
the 15 major law enforcement agencies in Georgia’s five
most populous cities and counties, only one had produced the required report.143
Following a 2010 legislative mandate to publish
reports online and a 2011 lawsuit that forced some
agencies to begin reporting, IJ again examined forfeiture
reporting by Georgia law enforcement. The second study
found agencies still failing to report—and when they did,
the data provided often lacked even basic details, such
as type of property or dollar value of forfeitures.144 The
reporting reforms adopted in 2015 address this problem
by requiring standardized reports, though it remains to
be seen whether agencies will start filing them.

Inconsistencies Across States
A third problem with state forfeiture reporting is the
considerable inconsistencies in what states record and
publicly report about their forfeiture activity. As Table 5
indicates, some states’ forfeiture totals represent cash and
proceeds from property sold, some represent cash only,
some represent cash and the value of forfeited real estate,
and some provide an estimated total value of forfeitures.
In five states, values do not represent reports of forfeitures—which are not required—but rather accounting
records of deposits into forfeiture or other funds. Moreover, some states report forfeitures in calendar years
while others report in fiscal years. All of these differences
make reliable apples-to-apples comparisons across states
virtually impossible.

A clean audit did not stop
the IRS from seizing $35,000
from Terry Dehko’s family
grocery store in Fraser, Mich.

Following the Funds
Public reporting on forfeiture activity is poor, but transparency regarding expenditures
from forfeiture funds is far worse. Most jurisdictions lack any reporting requirements for
forfeiture expenditures, and the limited data the Institute for Justice was able to obtain
provide very little insight into what law enforcement does with forfeiture funds.
What little reporting exists only indicates
expenditures across broad categories, such as equipment,
salaries and “other.” No jurisdictions require agencies
to itemize expenditures from forfeiture accounts, so
the public and lawmakers have no way of determining
whether spending is proper or within legal limits.
At the federal level, reports from the departments
of Justice and the Treasury provide the bare minimum,
amounting to little more than a basic accounting of monies going into and out of the Assets Forfeiture Fund and
the Treasury Forfeiture Fund. Expenditures are reported
across a few general categories, such as payments to third
parties, equitable sharing payments to states, salaries,
joint law enforcement operations, equipment and investigative costs.148 These reports provide only the broadest
sense of how federal forfeiture money is spent, failing to
provide any details about individual agency spending.
DOJ and Treasury reports also provide no information
about how state and local law enforcement agencies spend
equitable sharing money. However, information IJ obtained through public records requests provides a limited
window into expenditures from equitable sharing funds.
Until August 2014, state and local law enforcement agencies requesting equitable sharing proceeds from the DOJ
were required to indicate on a form known as the DAG-71
whether they intended to use the funds for equipment,
vehicles, salaries or “other,” and agencies could check multiple categories. Responses were maintained in the DOJ’s
CATS database. As shown in Figure 13, from 2000 to 2013,
the most popular anticipated uses of equitable sharing
money were for equipment—checked on roughly 70 percent of DAG-71 forms each year—and “other”—checked
on about 50 percent of DAG-71s annually.
Of course, the DAG-71s indicated only the intended
use of equitable sharing funds. Once state and local

agencies receive the money, they are free to spend it as they
please within federal guidelines. Equitable sharing records
maintained by the DOJ contain agency reports of how
funds were actually spent across several categories, but
these data are not publicly reported and can be obtained
only by Freedom of Information Act requests.
IJ obtained the 2007 equitable sharing records for all
participating law enforcement agencies in eight states,
as shown in Figure 14. The records IJ obtained are called
Equitable Sharing Agreement and Certification forms,
and agencies must submit them annually if they wish to
continue participating in equitable sharing. The forms require state and local agencies to certify that their equitable
sharing accounts have been audited, and they ask agencies
how much was spent from the accounts on various general
categories during the previous fiscal year. These records
provide a better picture of spending than DAG-71s, but obtaining them and compiling them into usable information
is prohibitively time-consuming: IJ’s records requests for
just eight states produced thousands of forms that required
manual data entry before any analysis could be completed.
Results indicate that equipment and “other,” the same
popular categories from the DAG-71 forms, accounted
for a majority of equitable sharing expenditures by law
enforcement in the eight states. Between 15 (Michigan)
and 34 (Texas) percent of forfeiture expenditures went to
equipment, and between 23 (Michigan) and 40 (Massachusetts) percent went to “other law enforcement expenses.”149
The other large expenditure areas included transfers to
other law enforcement agencies, salaries and overtime,
investigations and facilities. Just 1.7 percent of forfeiture
expenditures were for community programs, such as drug
education, drug abuse treatment, crime prevention and job
skills programs—despite the importance civil forfeiture’s
defenders often place on such spending.150

Figure 13: Agencies’ Intended Usages of DOJ Equitable Sharing Funds, 2000–2013
80%

Percentage of Requests for Funds
That Checked Each Category

70%

Equipment

60%

Other

50%
40%

Vehicles

30%

Salaries

20%
10%
0%

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Source: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ civil and criminal forfeiture data obtained by FOIA.

2013

Figure 14: State and Local Law Enforcement’s DOJ Equitable Sharing
Expenditures by Category, Eight States, Fiscal Year 2007

100%

Matching
grants

90%

Transfers

80%
70%

Community
programs

60%

Training

50%

Investigations

40%

Facilities

30%

Other

20%

Equipment

10%
0%

Salaries

Source: Institute for Justice analysis of Equitable Sharing Agreement and Certification forms obtained
from DOJ via public records requests.

Although these data are likely the best available for equitable sharing expenditures,
they probably have errors. The federal government rarely audits agencies receiving
equitable sharing funds to verify compliance with DOJ guidelines and proper accounting practices, and when it does, it usually turns up problems. The DOJ’s Office of the
Inspector General conducts only three or four audits each year across thousands of
participating agencies. In 2011, the DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section conducted 11 audits and found that a majority of agencies were not in compliance.
Agencies failed to “properly account for equitable sharing receipts and expenditures[,]
… comply with the allowable uses of equitable sharing funds” and complete required
audits of their equitable sharing accounts.151 A 2015 review by the Drug Policy Alliance of
nine cities in Los Angeles County found similar results: Most agencies failed to properly
comply with federal forfeiture regulations.152
At the state level, only 11 states require the reporting of forfeiture expenditures to
either a local or state agency.153 Of those states, IJ obtained 2012 state forfeiture expenditure information from just seven,154 five of which provided data so limited as to be
unusable.155 Data from Arizona and Texas provided enough detail to understand how
forfeiture funds were used, as did data provided by Oklahoma and Pennsylvania, even
though they do not require expenditure reporting (see Figure 15).156
Salaries consumed a larger portion of spending from these states’ forfeiture funds
than from equitable sharing funds, likely because these states do not have the same restrictions on forfeiture expenditures as the federal government.157 Texas law enforcement
agencies, for instance, spent 14 percent ($5.9 million) of 2012 forfeiture expenditures on
salaries, a significant proportion that nevertheless pales in comparison to the 23 percent
($4.8 million) spent in Arizona, the nearly 30 percent ($4.2 million) spent in Pennsylvania
and the remarkable 70 percent ($2 million) spent in Oklahoma. As with equitable sharing
spending, only a small fraction—between 0.7 and 4 percent—of state forfeiture funds
went toward substance abuse and crime prevention programs.
Beyond salaries, Arizona spent 35 percent ($7.5 million) of state forfeiture funds on
“other” and 23 percent ($4.9 million) on equipment. After salaries, the bulk of Pennsylvania law enforcement’s state forfeiture expenditures were for equipment—nearly 43
percent, or $6 million. Law enforcement agencies in Texas spent their state forfeiture proceeds much like their federal proceeds: In fiscal year 2012, Texas law enforcement used
37 percent ($15.7 million) of state forfeiture expenditures for equipment and 13 percent
($5.5 million) for “other.”

Figure 15: State Forfeiture Expenditures by Category, Four States, Fiscal Year 2012

100%

Matching
grants

90%

Transfers

80%

Community
programs

70%
60%

Training

50%

Investigations

40%

Facilities

30%

Other

20%

Equipment

10%
0%

Salaries

Source: Institute for Justice analysis of civil and criminal forfeiture data from online reports and public
records requests.

This latter category—“other”—is particularly problematic. It is used frequently, with
the result that the public has no indication of how tens of millions of dollars are being
spent. Indeed, in fiscal year 2012, Arizona, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Texas spent a
total of nearly $13.7 million of state forfeiture money on “other,” and, in fiscal year 2007,
eight states spent more than $42 million in equitable sharing payments on “other.”
In the rare event that the public catches a glimpse of what “other” means, the impression they might get is one of off-the-books slush funds for toys, travel and salaries.
Both federal and state forfeiture monies have been spent on luxurious travel,158 highend dining,159 fancy equipment,160 salaries161 and a host of questionable purchases. A
former district attorney in Brooklyn, for example, was accused of spending more than
$1 million on a political consultant.162 In Romulus, Mich., police officers were charged
for using forfeiture proceeds on alcohol, marijuana, prostitutes and a tanning salon.163
A former Dallas County district attorney used forfeiture funds to pay a $50,000 settlement following a car wreck he was involved in while looking at his phone.164
Perhaps the most egregious example comes from Bal Harbour, Fla., a small village
of 2,500 that in 2012 had an estimated $30 million in equitable sharing forfeiture funds
frozen after a routine inquiry by the Office of the Inspector General uncovered misuse
of funds and missing records. The hamlet, it turned out, had a vice unit that had been
crisscrossing the country, seizing money—without making a single arrest—and using
it to pay for expensive equipment, like a $100,000 35-foot boat and a $108,000 mobile
command truck; festivities, including a $7,000 banquet for the police chief and a $21,000
anti-drug beach party; and salaries. Even worse, three years into the investigation, the
DOJ uncovered a money laundering scheme that ran from 2009 to 2012 and was worth
well over $70 million, with upwards of $28 million not accounted for in agency reports.165

Best Practices: Forfeiture Reporting
All law enforcement agencies with forfeiture power
should be required to track and report forfeiture activity, revenues and expenditures. Agency reports should
be forwarded annually to a state agency, made publicly
available online and compiled by the state agency into
aggregate reports for legislators and the public. At a
minimum, an ideal agency report would contain detailed
information about each seizure and forfeiture, such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Date the property was seized
Type of property seized, including make, model and
serial number (if relevant)
Estimated value of the property
The offense alleged when making the seizure
Whether there were related criminal actions and the
outcome of any such actions
Whether the seizure was conducted under state or
federal law
Whether the forfeiture was conducted under state or
federal law
Type of forfeiture: civil, criminal or administrative
Whether the forfeiture was contested
Whether an innocent owner made a claim to the
property
Final disposition of the property: returned, destroyed, forfeited, retained, distributed by settlement
Date of the final disposition
Total expenses from the forfeiture
Total net proceeds of the forfeiture

All agencies should also be required to report each
purchase made with forfeiture revenue. In addition,
they should report total expenditures for standardized
categories:
•
•

Substance abuse and crime prevention programs
Investigation costs, such as witness protection and
controlled buys
• Victim reparations
• Court costs and attorney fees
• Salaries, overtime and benefits
• Third-party services
• Training and travel
• Operating expenses: supplies, postage and advertising
• Equipment
• Capital expenditures
Even agencies with no forfeitures or expenditures to
report in a given year should be required to file a report
so that it is clear which agencies failed to comply with
the reporting law. Detailed forfeiture information should
be readily available to the public through searchable
databases on public websites. Many databases already
exist and should be made public.1 Audited reports should
be submitted to the relevant legislative body and made
available to the public, and a routine auditing process
should be established to discourage abuse.

1 U.S. Department of Justice, Consolidated Asset Tracking System (CATS); U.S. Department of Treasury, Seized Assets and Case Tracking System (SEACATS);
U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Asset Forfeiture and Retrieval System (AFTRAK); U.S. Secret Service, Forfeited Asset and Seized Property Tracking System
(FASTRAK); Arkansas Drug Director, Asset Seizure Tracking System (ASTS); Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, Excel spreadsheets received
through Virginia FOIA; Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security, Excel spreadsheet provided to the Beacon Center of Tennessee through a
Tennessee Public Records Act request.

Conclusion
The widespread failure of civil forfeiture laws to protect property owners from unjust
forfeitures—or to provide the barest essentials of transparency regarding law enforcement’s
forfeiture activity or spending—makes plain the pressing need for reform.
The cost and difficulty of navigating a complex legal
process to fight a forfeiture, plus the often low values
of property seized, deter many from seeking their day
in court. But making it to court unlocks a whole new
set of challenges: Low legal standards of proof prevail
throughout the country, with fewer than a dozen states
requiring law enforcement to meet anything approaching
the standard required in criminal proceedings. Indeed,
federal and most state civil forfeiture laws merely require
the government to show that property is slightly more
likely than not related to a criminal violation—a far cry
from proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Most jurisdictions also force innocent property owners to prove their innocence in order to recover property.
These owners are third parties—a parent, a spouse, even
a landlord or motel owner—entirely disconnected from
any crime who nonetheless must prove that they did not
consent to or know about the alleged criminal activity
involving their property. Between low standards of proof
and poor protections for innocent owners, most civil
forfeiture laws create an unlevel playing field, where it
is easy for the government to take property, but hard for
people to fight for it back.
Adding fuel to the fire are the financial incentives
built into federal and most state civil forfeiture laws that
encourage police and prosecutors to pursue property,
even at the expense of other law enforcement priorities.
Forty-three states direct at least 45 percent of forfeiture
proceeds to law enforcement funds, typically those of the
very agencies that seized the property. Twenty-five states
and the federal government direct up to 100 percent to
law enforcement funds. These funds may be spent largely
at law enforcement’s discretion, subject only to loose
controls and little to no oversight. From the little that is
publicly reported, these funds are sometimes even spent
on salaries, overtime and benefits, creating a still more
troubling conflict of interest.
All of that would be bad enough, but the federal government’s equitable sharing program makes the country’s
civil forfeiture landscape even worse. Even when states
raise the bar and lower incentives for civil forfeiture, law
enforcement can use equitable sharing to continue gener-

ating forfeiture revenue. Indeed, research shows that when
faced with stricter and less generous state civil forfeiture
laws, police and prosecutors circumvent them by turning
to the federal government.
Such research offers compelling evidence not only
that federal equitable sharing is used to evade more
protective state laws but also that incentives matter to
law enforcement—that when decisions are made about
civil forfeiture, the ease of the process and, especially, the
possibility of a financial reward are key factors. This is a
dangerous reality given that allowing law enforcement to
self-generate revenue undermines democratic controls,
distorts law enforcement priorities and puts property
owners at risk.
To protect the innocent and ensure the impartial
administration of justice, civil forfeiture reform is desperately needed at the federal and state levels. The most
substantive reform would be to abolish civil forfeiture
outside certain narrow and strictly defined parameters,
such as customs law. In all other cases, governments
should have to tie forfeiture of property to the criminal convictions of specific owners. New Mexico’s 2015
reforms demonstrate how this can be accomplished.
Short of ending civil forfeiture altogether, at least five
reforms can increase protections for property owners and
improve transparency. First, lawmakers should eliminate any financial incentive for law enforcement to seize
property. Civil forfeiture revenue should flow into a city,
county or state’s general revenue fund or another neutral
fund, such as one for education. Recent reforms in New
Mexico and the District of Columbia show that this is
eminently possible.
Second, lawmakers should adopt a high standard of
proof for law enforcement to forfeit property in civil proceedings. Ideally, standards should be raised to beyond
a reasonable doubt, bringing them in line with the rest of
the American criminal justice system. States that already
meet that standard or that come close to it include Nebraska, North Carolina, California, Minnesota, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico and Vermont.
Third, consistent with recent changes in Montana
and D.C., lawmakers should introduce meaningful pro-

tections for people making innocent owner claims. The
government should have to prove that owners consented
to or possessed knowledge of the crime that led to the
seizure of their property. Such reform would restore
the presumption of innocence that prevails in criminal
proceedings.
Fourth, lawmakers should adopt strong, standardized
forfeiture reporting requirements in line with the best
practices described on page 42. Though some states have
recognized the need for greater transparency,166 shoddy
reporting and inadequate detail remain the rule, and the
public and lawmakers remain in the dark about most forfeiture activity and spending. States without robust reporting requirements should institute them, and they should
ensure that requirements are followed with consequences
such as financial sanctions for noncompliance.
Finally, Congress should abolish the federal equitable sharing program. And until it does, state lawmakers
should prohibit agencies from receiving equitable sharing

funds. In states that disallow policing for profit under their
own laws, agencies should not be able to thwart the will of
their citizens by conspiring with the federal government
to keep the money flowing. In 2015, New Mexico and D.C.
took important steps toward this type of reform.
Taken together, such reforms would contribute significantly to protecting one of the most important rights
enshrined in the Constitution. As James Madison famously wrote in 1792, “Government is instituted to protect
property of every sort…. This being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which impartially
secures to every man, whatever is his own” (emphasis in
original).167 To the extent that governments, through their
laws, fail in their duty to protect the property rights of
citizens, their leaders are obliged to reform the laws to
accord with the protections guaranteed in the Constitution. Elected representatives who take an oath to protect
and defend the state and federal constitutions could do
no better.

Philadelphia prosecutors kicked Chris and Markela
Sourovelis out of their own home and tried to take it
permanently, even though they had done nothing wrong.

State Profiles

Alabama earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Limited protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Alabama’s civil forfeiture laws are among the worst
in the nation, earning a D- grade. To forfeit property, the
government need only demonstrate to the court’s “reasonable satisfaction”—essentially, by a preponderance of the
evidence—that the property is related to criminal activity.
Owners who object that they are innocent—and therefore
that the property should not be forfeited—bear the burden
of proving their innocence, unless the property at issue is
real property, such as a home; in real property cases, the

government bears the burden. In Alabama, law enforcement keeps 100 percent of the proceeds from forfeited property, creating a strong incentive to seize.
Unfortunately, there is no way to measure the extent
to which Alabama’s law enforcement agencies use civil
forfeiture: Alabama law does not require law enforcement
agencies to track or publicly report forfeitures or expenditures from forfeiture funds, thus providing no transparency or public accountability.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. Agencies are not required to track or publicly report.

Alabama ranks 31st for federal forfeiture,

with over $75 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Alabama law enforcement’s use of the Department of
Justice’s equitable sharing program ranks 31st in the nation.
State and local agencies received more than $75 million in
equitable sharing proceeds from the DOJ between 2000 and
2013, averaging about $5.4 million each calendar year. Most
of the assets seized—79 percent—were seized through joint
task forces and investigations with the federal government.
Just 21 percent of assets seized and 23 percent of proceeds
received resulted from adoptions, the procedure curbed
by former Attorney General Holder. In fiscal years 2000 to
2013, Alabama agencies also obtained $5.6 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the Treasury Department.
A seizure on I-10 in Alabama illustrates how equitable
sharing gives local and federal officials a financial stake in
forfeiture. A Mobile County sheriff’s deputy stopped Georgia resident Ming Tong Liu for speeding and found more
than $75,000 in cash—money Liu planned to use to buy a
restaurant in Louisiana. The officer did not buy Liu’s story,
seized the cash and called in U.S. Customs and Border Protection to share the money. Finally, after 10 months—and after Liu hired an attorney—customs officials agreed to return
his money, but by then he had lost out on the restaurant deal.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

21%
79%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$2,066,233

$250,000

2001

$2,350,234

$123,000

2002

$2,276,557

$269,000

2003

$3,999,273

$764,000

2004

$6,932,255

$91,000

2005

$5,145,432

$373,000

2006

$8,167,361

$4,000

2007

$6,891,654

$185,000

2008

$6,139,296

$19,000

2009

$9,798,597

$295,000

2010

$7,395,316

$1,816,000

2011

$5,454,326

$950,000

2012

$6,421,122

$216,000

2013

$2,010,824

$252,000

Total

$75,048,479

$5,607,000

Average
per year

$5,360,606

$400,500

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$12
$10
$8
$6
$4

23%
77%

Proceeds

Adoptions

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Alaska earns a D+ for its civil forfeiture laws:

• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 75% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement in most cases

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Alaska’s civil forfeiture laws leave much to be desired,
earning a D+. In Alaska, as in all other states, the government only needs probable cause to seize property. Owners
of seized property must then show by a preponderance of
the evidence that their property is not related to criminal activity in order to get it back. Further, an individual making
an innocent owner claim bears the burden of proving that
she did not know about or consent to the alleged criminal
activity giving rise to the property’s seizure. In most cas-

es, law enforcement retains up to 75 percent of forfeiture
revenues. Where forfeited property is something other than
cash and worth $5,000 or less, law enforcement keeps 100
percent of the sale proceeds.
The Department of Public Safety is required to keep an
inventory of items seized, but other state and local law enforcement agencies are not required to track or report their
forfeitures, severely limiting transparency and accountability.

State Forfeiture Data
No statewide data available. Agencies are not required to track or publicly report.

Alaska is the 10th best state for federal forfeiture,

with over $9 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Alaska law enforcement’s participation in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program is relatively restrained, ranking 10th. Between calendar years 2000 and 2013,
Alaska law enforcement agencies received more than $9 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the DOJ. However,
more than three-quarters of the assets seized were confiscated through joint task forces and investigations, equitable
sharing practices that will continue after the policy change
announced by former Attorney General Holder. In fiscal
years 2000 to 2013, Alaska law enforcement also received $3.5
million in Treasury Department equitable sharing proceeds.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$526,853

$26,000

2001

$498,980

2002

$483,440

$3,000

2003

$910,534

$51,000

2004

$277,117

2005

$389,951

$5,000

2006

$1,136,263

$136,000

2007

$625,837

$401,000

2008

$987,068

$27,000

2009

$717,641

$180,000

2010

$855,767

2011

$859,125

$4,000

2012

$717,587

$141,000

2013

$485,111

$2,572,000

$676,520

$253,286

Total

$9,471,274

Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

24%
76%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$3,546,000

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$1.2
$1.0
$0.8
$0.6
$0.4

21%
79%

Proceeds

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

$0.2
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Arizona earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Arizona’s terrible civil forfeiture laws earn a D- grade as
some of the worst in the country. The standard of proof for
forfeiting property in Arizona is preponderance of the evidence, meaning that the government just has to show that it
is more likely than not that seized property is tied to criminal
activity. Worse, when an owner wishes to make an innocent
owner claim in order to retrieve seized property, that person
bears the burden of proving her own innocence. Arizona law
also gives law enforcement a considerable incentive to seize
property, allowing law enforcement agencies to keep 100
percent of the funds raised through civil forfeiture.
The Arizona Criminal Justice Commission publishes
quarterly reports of forfeiture revenues and expenditures on
its website. Although useful for examining overall trends,

key details are lacking, such as the number of forfeitures,
whether forfeitures accompanied criminal convictions and
specifics about expenditures.
According to the reports, from 2000 to 2014, Arizona law
enforcement collected a whopping $412 million in forfeiture
revenue, which equates to more than $27 million each fiscal year. Making matters worse, Arizona agencies spend a
considerable proportion of forfeiture funds on salaries and
overtime for law enforcement officers: Data published by the
ACJC indicate that between 2000 and 2014 law enforcement
spent over $62 million in forfeiture money—28 percent of all
expenditures from forfeiture funds—on “administrative expenses,” which include benefits, salaries and overtime.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Reported
Forfeiture Proceeds

2000

$9,367,316

2001

$9,649,223

2002

$11,362,722

2003

$12,414,334

2004

$13,807,821

2005

$21,989,986

2006

$20,606,951

2007

$45,345,606

2008

$19,836,898

2009

$27,491,832

2010

$55,904,233

2011

$42,712,374

2012

$43,036,040

2013

$42,118,485

2014

$36,281,212

Total

$411,925,033

Average
per year

$27,461,669

Source: Quarterly reports of state and local forfeiture monies compiled by the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission and made publicly
available on its website. These numbers are reported for fiscal years and represent the value of
cash and property sold.

Arizona ranks 32nd for federal forfeiture,

with nearly $70 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Arizona law enforcement’s use of the Department of
Justice’s equitable sharing program results in a ranking of
32nd nationally. In calendar years 2000 to 2013, Arizona law
enforcement agencies received nearly $70 million in DOJ
equitable sharing proceeds, averaging just under $5 million per year. Most of these proceeds—93 percent—came
from joint task forces and investigations, the kind of equitable sharing forfeitures largely unaffected by the DOJ’s
recent policy change. State and local agencies also netted
$23 million in equitable sharing proceeds—around $1.7
million annually—from the Treasury Department over fiscal years 2000 to 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
8%
Adoptions

92%

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$1,820,617

$1,090,000

2001

$3,439,388

$1,160,000

2002

$2,069,734

$59,000

2003

$2,645,960

$2,672,000

2004

$2,013,948

$2,621,000

2005

$5,317,722

$6,259,000

2006

$7,388,489

$326,000

2007

$5,893,152

$613,000

2008

$6,361,529

$2,991,000

2009

$3,990,219

$1,004,000

2010

$11,111,859

$298,000

2011

$7,815,345

$667,000

2012

$3,573,703

$2,454,000

2013

$6,552,577

$1,017,000

Total

$69,994,240

$23,231,000

Average
per year

$4,999,589

$1,659,357

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$12
$10
$8
$6
$4

93%

Proceeds

Adoptions

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Arkansas earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Arkansas has awful civil forfeiture laws. Earning a Dgrade, Arkansas law only requires the government to show
that it is more likely than not that seized property is related
to criminal activity—a standard of proof known as preponderance of the evidence. Innocent owners wishing to recover seized property bear the burden of proving their own
innocence. Worst of all, Arkansas law enforcement agencies
receive 100 percent of the funds generated through civil forfeiture—in most cases, 80 percent of proceeds go to police
and prosecutors and 20 percent go to the state Crime Lab
Equipment Fund. If a forfeiture exceeds $250,000, any proceeds in excess of that figure are deposited into the Special
State Assets Forfeiture Fund.

Forfeiture practice in Arkansas also suffers from a lack
of public transparency. The Arkansas Drug Director has a
database of all forfeitures—the Asset Seizure Tracking System. However, the only aggregate reports of this information are annual reports from the Legislative Joint Auditing
Committee, which provide only the value of currency and
the number of other assets that were seized; it is impossible
to determine from this information the total amount of assets that went on to be forfeited. The data that are available
indicate that Arkansas law enforcement seized almost $81
million in currency and more than 9,500 cars between 2000
and 2014.

State Forfeiture Data
Number of Incidents in Which the Following
Personal Property Was Reported Seized:
Year

Vehicles

Weapons

Other

2000

$5,544,742

534

249

201

2001

$3,494,483

514

241

165

2002

$2,805,948

522

232

141

2003

$3,816,823

683

282

208

2004

$4,299,354

779

245

180

2005

$7,003,838

771

223

172

2006

$5,556,583

655

162

141

2007

$4,301,003

688

187

132

2008

$5,160,593

585

147

130

2009

$970,416

693

171

170

2010

$6,300,505

803

357

148

2011

$8,371,795

674

444

124

2012

$3,677,546

516

364

125

2013

$8,688,150

584

732

137

2014

$10,774,104
$80,765,883

536

9,537

359

4,395

122

2,296

Average
per year

$5,384,392

636

293

153

Total

Reported Value of
Seized Currency

Source: Legislative Joint Auditing Committee’s online calendar-year reports of seizures made under the state’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act. These annual reports are based on the Asset Seizure Tracking System database maintained by the Arkansas Drug Director, where law enforcement agencies and the attorney general report all seizures.
Forfeitures can also occur under the Tobacco Products Tax Act. Minimal forfeiture revenues were reported by Arkansas
Tobacco Control between 2007 and 2013: $10,300 in fiscal year 2011 and $65,000 in fiscal year 2012. This revenue is not
accounted for in the seizures reported in the above table.

Arkansas is the 9th best state for federal forfeiture,

with over $27 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Arkansas law enforcement’s participation in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program is ranked 9th
nationally. Arkansas law enforcement received $27 million
in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds between 2000 and 2013,
which equates to roughly $1.9 million each calendar year.
And these proceeds have been increasing steadily over the
years, from a few hundred thousand dollars a year in the
early 2000s to over $3 million in 2013. Joint task forces and
investigations accounted for less than half of these proceeds,
though they made up the lion’s share—87 percent—of assets
seized. These types of forfeitures were largely unaffected by
former Attorney General Holder’s policy change aimed at
restricting equitable sharing. State and local agencies also received about $3.2 million in Treasury Department equitable
sharing funds across fiscal years 2000 through 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
13%
87%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$589,134

$30,000

2001

$849,898

$4,000

2002

$678,593

$605,000

2003

$687,242

$116,000

2004

$2,104,354

2005

$2,525,433

2006

$2,442,848

2007

$1,800,522

$182,000

2008

$2,599,741

$45,000

2009

$2,299,549

$61,000

2010

$1,480,106

$455,000

2011

$3,522,050

$484,000

2012

$2,135,685

$532,000

2013

$3,312,173

$640,000

Total

$27,027,327

$3,154,000

Average
per year

$1,930,523

$225,286

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$4.0
$3.5

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$3.0
$2.5
$2.0
$1.5
$1.0

47%

53%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$0.5
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

California earns a C+ for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Higher bar to forfeit property and conviction required
• Stronger protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 66.25% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Earning a C+, California’s civil forfeiture laws are above
average, but law enforcement circumvents their intent
through participation in the federal government’s equitable
sharing program so aggressive that it ranks 50th—second
worst—in the country. In California, to forfeit most kinds of
property, the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt,
and a conviction is required (though not necessarily the owner’s conviction). Only in drug cases where more than $25,000
is seized is the standard lower: clear and convincing evidence. When an innocent person asserts an interest in seized
property, the government bears the burden of proving that

the owner was aware of the property’s illegal use. California
law lets law enforcement keep 66.25 percent of forfeiture revenue—less of an incentive than in many other states but still
an incentive to seize property for financial gain.
The California Office of the Attorney General publishes
annual reports of counties’ forfeiture income on its website,
though it excludes important details, such as an accounting
of expenditures from forfeiture funds. According to these
reports, California law enforcement forfeited almost $280
million over the period of 2002 to 2013—an annual average
of more than $23 million.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Reported Forfeiture
Proceeds

2002

$25,565,686

2003

$26,589,893

2004

$22,459,346

2005

$19,866,810

2006

$25,582,483

2007

$27,603,822

2008

$25,548,228

2009

$28,789,945

2010

$16,490,185

2011

$17,958,201

2012

$15,046,570

2013

$28,130,455

Total

$279,631,624

Average
per year

$23,302,635

Source: California Office of the Attorney General’s online calendar-year reports of all forfeitures made by county district attorneys and the
attorney general. Forfeiture proceeds do not
include the value of property retained for law
enforcement use.

California ranks 50th for federal forfeiture,

with over $696 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Unfortunately, California law enforcement has found a
lucrative way to evade the state’s better-than-average laws:
the federal government’s equitable sharing program. Its
heavy participation in the program earns the state a rank of
50th. Indeed, a recent report by the Drug Policy Alliance noted that while state forfeiture revenue has remained flat, equitable sharing revenue has skyrocketed. Between 2000 and
2013, California agencies collected an eye-popping $696 million, or nearly $50 million each calendar year, through equitable sharing with the Department of Justice. A large majority of both assets seized and proceeds received resulted not
from adoptions but from joint task forces and investigations
with the federal government. This vehicle for equitable sharing will continue despite DOJ policy changes announced in
January 2015. California law enforcement also hauled in almost $108 million from the Treasury Department’s equitable
sharing program during fiscal years 2000 to 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$27,063,749

$17,368,000

2001

$29,138,488

$6,818,000

2002

$23,544,801

$4,573,000

2003

$25,953,184

$2,224,000

2004

$30,237,257

$2,247,000

2005

$33,281,599

$4,846,000

2006

$39,922,885

$1,080,000

2007

$46,296,566

$5,817,000

2008

$52,310,424

$9,482,000

2009

$64,093,182

$3,440,000

2010

$83,559,012

$9,660,000

2011

$81,176,283

$10,561,000

2012

$74,115,816

$17,264,000

2013

$85,536,782

$12,347,000

Total

$696,230,027

$107,727,000

Average
per year

$49,730,716

$7,694,786

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$90
$80

23%
77%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$70
$60
$50
$40
$30

17%
83%

Proceeds

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

$20
$10
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Colorado earns a C for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Higher bar to forfeit property, but no conviction required
• Stronger protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 50% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

The Centennial State reformed its civil forfeiture laws
in 2002, but the laws’ C grade demonstrates that the state
should do more to protect Coloradans from abuse. The
standard of proof the government must meet in order to
forfeit property in Colorado is clear and convincing evidence. In cases where an innocent owner objects to a seizure, the government bears the burden of showing that
the owner participated in, condoned or knew about the
criminal activity associated with the property. Colorado
law enforcement keeps 50 percent of all funds generated
through civil forfeiture—one of the weaker financial incentives nationally but an incentive to seize nonetheless.
Colorado requires limited reporting on forfeitures, but
the requirements are not consistently followed, nor are

reports made readily available for public or legislative review. District attorneys must file annual forfeiture reports
with the Department of Local Affairs and, unusually, must
indicate whether the person from whom the property was
seized was charged with or convicted of a crime. Unfortunately, reviewing these reports requires filing a Colorado
Open Records Act request. When the Institute for Justice
did so, it found that many reports were missing. Further,
report data are not reviewed and aggregated, making it impossible to get an at-a-glance sense of the scope of forfeiture
in Colorado. Data from agencies that did report, compiled
by IJ, indicate forfeitures totaling almost $13 million between 2000 and 2013.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Reported Forfeiture
Proceeds

2000

$623,651

2001

$2,210,837

2002

$1,454,868

2003

$1,193,626

2004

$249,180

2005

$609,355

2006

$1,106,608

2007

$783,888

2008

$761,082

2009

$1,553,586

2010

$351,442

2011

$739,151

2012

$533,111

2013

$628,238

Total
Average
per year

$12,798,623
$914,187

Source: Reports of forfeitures from law enforcement agencies and district attorneys made to the Colorado
Department of Local Affairs presented in calendar-year format. Not all agencies reported every year, but the
Institute for Justice was unable to determine how many agency reports were missing or whether agencies
failed to report in a given year because they had no forfeiture activity. IJ found several instances of forfeited
property (primarily vehicles) for which a value was not reported. It is possible that some of these numbers
overlap with federal equitable sharing or include seizures rather than forfeitures due to reporting errors on
the part of the local agencies.

Colorado ranks 35th for federal forfeiture,

with over $47 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Colorado law enforcement’s use of the Department of
Justice’s equitable sharing program, with proceeds totaling
$47.7 million over the 2000 to 2013 calendar years, earns the
state an equitable sharing ranking of 35th place. Seventy-six
percent of assets seized and 82 percent of proceeds received
through the DOJ’s equitable sharing program came from joint
task forces and investigations. This equitable sharing procedure was largely unaffected by DOJ policy changes adopted
in 2015. Treasury Department forfeiture proceeds totaled $4.5
million across the 2000 to 2013 fiscal years, averaging almost
$325,000 a year.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

24%
76%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$1,044,193

$17,000

2001

$4,763,608

$69,000

2002

$1,402,713

$48,000

2003

$1,104,719

$111,000

2004

$2,138,863

$28,000

2005

$4,360,068

$215,000

2006

$2,743,514

$83,000

2007

$4,967,980

$336,000

2008

$4,183,364

$22,000

2009

$4,613,904

$496,000

2010

$3,799,326

$330,000

2011

$2,793,638

$261,000

2012

$5,660,177

$643,000

2013

Total

$4,080,681

$47,656,750

$1,885,000

Average
per year

$3,404,054

$324,571

$4,544,000

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$6
$5
$4
$3
$2

18%
82%

Proceeds

Adoptions

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Connecticut earns a C for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Higher bar to forfeit property, but no conviction required
• Stronger protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 69.5% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

The Constitution State’s forfeiture laws earn a C because they provide some degree of property rights protection, though this protection should be stronger. In Connecticut, the standard of proof for forfeiture requires the
government to offer clear and convincing evidence that the
property is related to criminal activity and therefore forfeitable. The burden is on the government to disprove an innocent owner’s claim of innocence regarding an alleged illegal
use of seized property. However, law enforcement agencies
are permitted to keep 69.5 percent of the proceeds of civil
forfeiture (59.5 percent for police, 10 percent for prosecutors), providing a substantial incentive to seize.
Although Connecticut has no statutory reporting requirement—it only requires that agencies maintain a seized

property inventory—the Institute for Justice was able to obtain reports of forfeitures from the Connecticut Office of the
Attorney General. Connecticut is one of only two states—
Oregon being the other—to provide reports that distinguish
between civil and criminal forfeitures. State forfeiture data
show that civil forfeiture cases constituted an astounding 77
percent of all Connecticut forfeiture cases between 2009 and
2013, meaning that less than one-quarter of all forfeitures in
the state were achieved using procedures that required the
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
property owner had committed a crime.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Forfeiture Cases and Proceeds
Civil
Year

Proceeds

Criminal
Cases

Proceeds

Total
Cases

Proceeds

Cases

2009

$1,325,293

1,040

$579,116

199

$1,904,409

1,239

2010

$1,732,822

1,026

$299,570

138

$2,032,392

1,164

2011

$2,266,271

923

$505,701

107

$2,771,972

1,030

2012

$992,381

604

$1,272,299

206

$2,264,680

810

2013

$724,599

157

$824,709

462

$1,549,309

619

Total

$7,041,366

3,750

$3,481,395

1,112

$10,522,761

4,862

Average
per year

$1,408,273

750

$696,279

222

$2,104,552

972

Source: Calendar-year reports of forfeitures carried out by state and local law enforcement. These data were obtained from the state Office of the Attorney
General through a Connecticut Freedom of Information Act request made by the Institute for Justice. The state provided a value only for forfeitures of cash
and property sold, not property retained for official law enforcement use.

Connecticut ranks 22nd for federal forfeiture,

with over $24 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Connecticut law enforcement’s use of the Department of
Justice’s equitable sharing program results in a 22nd place national ranking. Between 2000 and 2013, Connecticut law enforcement received over $24 million in DOJ equitable sharing
proceeds, or an average of $1.7 million per calendar year. A
colossal 93 percent of proceeds resulted from joint task forces
and investigations—the type of practice largely unaffected
by the DOJ’s recent equitable sharing policy change. Connecticut law enforcement also received $1.8 million from the
Treasury Forfeiture Fund during the fiscal years 2000 to 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
9%

91%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$1,170,123

$94,000

2001

$727,051

$292,000

2002

$323,163

$85,000

2003

$1,645,321

$31,000

2004

$1,385,505

$66,000

2005

$2,265,211

$9,000

2006

$1,933,600

$284,000

2007

$1,938,407

$203,000

2008

$3,490,829

$471,000

2009

$1,750,561

$23,000

2010

$1,973,711

$11,000

2011

$1,910,586

$29,000

2012

$2,235,644

$67,000

2013

$1,468,788

$158,000

Total

$24,218,501

$1,823,000

Average
per year

$1,729,893

$130,214

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$4.0
$3.5

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$3.0
$2.5
$2.0
$1.5

93%

Proceeds

$1.0
Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

$0.5
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Delaware earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

The First State has some of the worst civil forfeiture
laws in the country. Scoring a D-, Delaware’s forfeiture laws
automatically assume that seized property is forfeitable—
unless an owner can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is not. Innocent owners also bear the burden of
demonstrating that they had nothing to do with the criminal
activity with which their property is alleged to be associated.
In addition, Delaware law enforcement has an enormous incentive to seize property: Up to 100 percent of revenues deriving from forfeiture go into the Special Law Enforcement

Assistance Fund. From there, they are distributed to the
agencies that forfeited them.
Making the situation even more dangerous for Delawareans, law enforcement has no statutory obligation to
publicly account for its forfeiture activity. The Institute
for Justice was unable to acquire the SLEAF accounting
records because the fund’s special advisory committee—
made up of state and local law enforcement officers—is,
by statute, not a public entity and therefore not subject to
the Delaware Freedom of Information Act.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. Agencies are not required to track or publicly report.

Delaware is the 6th best state for federal forfeiture,
with over $7 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Perhaps because Delaware’s laws are already so generous to law enforcement, state and local agencies make fairly
limited use of the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing
program, ranking sixth nationally. Delaware law enforcement collected $7.8 million between 2000 and 2013 through
the DOJ program. More than two-thirds of assets seized and
forfeiture proceeds received derived from joint task forces
and investigations with the federal government. This type of
equitable sharing was largely left intact when the DOJ announced policy changes in early 2015. Between fiscal years
2000 to 2013, Delaware law enforcement also garnered about
$1.3 million—nearly $90,000 a year—from the Treasury Department’s equitable sharing program.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$321,646

$61,000

2001

$444,573

$9,000

2002

$455,912

2003

$136,668

2004

$599,011

2005

$806,227

$11,000

2006

$268,857

$4,000

2007

$389,585

$55,000

2008

$804,649

$70,000

2009

$664,530

$62,000

2010

$552,965

$218,000

2011

$1,021,882

$315,000

2012

$1,043,154

$84,000

2013

$330,615

$365,000

Total
Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

31%
69%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$7,840,273

$1,254,000

$560,020

$89,571

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$1.2
$1.0
$0.8
$0.6
$0.4

34%
66%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$0.2
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

The District

of Columbia earns a B+ for its civil forfeiture laws:

• Higher bar to forfeit some property, but low bar for other property; no conviction required
• Stronger protections for innocent third-party property owners
• No forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

District
Civil
Forfeiture
Laws
State Civil
Forfeiture
Laws

Following reforms adopted in 2015, the District of Columbia’s civil forfeiture laws are now some of the best in the
nation, earning a B+. In the District, the general standardof-proof rule is still too low: The government need only
show by a preponderance of the evidence that property is
forfeitable. But in order to forfeit vehicles, real property or
cash amounts less than $1,000, the government must meet a
higher standard, presenting clear and convincing evidence
that the property is associated with a crime. And if a property owner faces the forfeiture of her primary residence,
at least one owner must be convicted of the offense giving
rise to the seizure. The government also bears the burden
of proof when an innocent owner makes a claim to regain
seized property. Best of all, D.C.’s forfeiture laws no longer
provide law enforcement with a financial incentive to for-

feit property, as all proceeds must now be deposited into
the District’s general fund.
In addition, the District’s reforms entitle property owners to contest seizures in court shortly after they happen,
giving them an opportunity to get their car, money or other
property back while awaiting a forfeiture trial rather than
letting the government hold on to the property. The reform
legislation will also substantially improve forfeiture reporting. The data obtained by the Institute for Justice reflect only
administrative civil forfeitures reported by the Metropolitan
Police Department rather than all types of forfeitures conducted in Washington, D.C. Beginning in 2016, the MPD and
the Office of the Attorney General will be required to report
their forfeiture activity to the City Council and publish that
information on their websites.

District
Forfeiture
Data
State Forfeiture
Data
Metropolitan Police Department Forfeiture Cases and Proceeds
Currency

Vehicles

Proceeds

2010

$1,072,593

4,121

$821,685

108

$1,894,278

4,229

2011

$695,864

2,665

$576,025

$1,271,889

2,748

2012

$524,729

1,789

$1,123,870

148

$1,648,599

1,942

Average
per year

Proceeds

Cases

Proceeds

Total

Year

Total

Cases

Other
Cases

Proceeds

Cases

$2,293,187

8,575

$2,521,580

339

$4,814,767

8,919

$764,396

2,858

$840,527

113

$1,604,922

2,973

Source: Reports of administrative civil forfeitures submitted by the Asset Forfeiture Unit to the Evidence Control Branch of the Metropolitan Police Department,
obtained by the Institute for Justice through the District of Columbia Freedom of Information Act.

The District of Columbia ranks 4th best for federal forfeiture,
with over $8 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
The District ranks fourth on equitable sharing, and
the 2015 reforms will end D.C.’s participation in federal
equitable sharing programs altogether, effective October
2018. Adoptions will be banned and proceeds from joint
task force and investigation forfeitures will be directed to
the city’s general fund, effectively making D.C. ineligible
for equitable sharing funds. From 2000 to 2013, D.C. law
enforcement took in, on average, over $592,000 each calendar year from the Department of Justice and approximately
$134,000 each fiscal year from the Treasury Department.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$573,345

$228,000

2001

$1,147,239

$27,000

2002

$303,387

$70,000

2003

$356,190

$152,000

2004

$573,195

$204,000

2005

$714,395

$124,000

2006

$449,535

$321,000

2007

$746,401

$187,000

2008

$650,181

$171,000

2009

$418,892

$206,000

2010

$707,939

$28,000

2011

$476,539

$63,000

2012

$792,296

$83,000

2013

$384,344

$11,000

Total
Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$8,293,878

$1,875,000

$592,420

$133,929

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$1.4
$1.2

44%

56%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$1.0
$0.8
$0.6
$0.4

37%
63%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$0.2
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Florida earns a D+ for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Higher bar to forfeit property, but no conviction required
• Stronger protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 85% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Meriting a D+, Florida’s civil forfeiture laws are subpar
and need reform, but state and local law enforcement’s use
of equitable sharing is even worse—it ranks 48th in the country. The standard of proof for forfeiture in Florida is clear
and convincing evidence that the property is connected
with criminal activity—a higher standard than that of most
states but still lower than the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt required for criminal convictions. In addition, the
government bears the burden of disproving any innocent
owner claim. But these protections are somewhat overshadowed by a strong incentive to seize: Florida law enforcement
agencies get to keep up to 85 percent of forfeited funds.

Making matters worse, Florida law enforcement agencies are not required to report forfeitures. The Institute for
Justice obtained some records of forfeiture proceeds through
a Florida Public Records Act request. However, these data
only reflect forfeitures conducted by the state policing agency; forfeitures occurring at the local or county level are unreported and unknown. The data, which may double count
income from participation in the federal equitable sharing
program, show that state law enforcement forfeited more
than $117 million in currency, real property and vehicles between 2009 and 2014, or about $19.5 million a year.

State Forfeiture Data
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

Currency

Real Property

Vehicles

Total

2009

$33,558

2010

$110,132,229

$189,500

$35,000

$110,356,729

2011

$111,744

$84,000

$195,744

2012

$1,482,335

$2,800

$1,485,135

2013

$1,369,559

$66,100

$1,435,659

2014

$3,554,535

$9,066

$3,563,600

Total

$116,683,960

$189,500

$196,966

$117,070,425

Average
per year

$19,447,327

$31,583

$32,828

$19,511,738

Source: Reports of forfeitures conducted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Other state
and local law enforcement agencies are not required to report. It is possible that FDLE proceeds also
include income from participation in equitable sharing programs—the data provided were unclear.

Florida ranks 48th for federal forfeiture,

with over $412 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Ranking 48th nationally, Florida law enforcement agencies also generate substantial revenue through the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program. Between 2000
and 2013, Florida agencies received a staggering $412 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds, averaging more than
$29 million each calendar year. Almost all of these proceeds
resulted from joint task forces and investigations. Given the
small share of revenue—just 4 percent—accruing to agencies
from adoptions, it seems unlikely that Florida law enforcement’s equitable sharing behavior will change significantly
in light of the DOJ’s recent policy change curbing adoptions.
Finally, Florida agencies also brought in more than $100 million between fiscal years 2000 and 2013, or nearly $7.2 million annually, from the Treasury Department.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
5%

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

2000

$19,707,238

$9,027,000

2001

$46,666,632

$8,765,000

2002

$12,423,163

$14,350,000

2003

$14,027,532

$5,080,000

2004

$14,371,191

$4,648,000

2005

$16,978,255

$6,054,000

2006

$20,483,263

$10,477,000

2007

$37,249,820

$5,878,000

2008

$59,440,310

$5,289,000

2009

$35,906,737

$5,148,000

2010

$28,328,804

$11,853,000

2011

$33,929,000

$5,114,000

2012

$49,017,452

$8,369,000

2013

$24,092,897

$365,000

Total

$412,622,293

$100,417,000

Average
per year

$29,473,021

$7,172,643

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$70

$50
$40
$30
$20

Adoptions

96%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$60
Adoptions

95%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

$10
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Georgia earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Under Georgia law, which earns a grade of D-, the government need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that seized property is connected to a crime or that
there is no other likely source for the property other than
criminal activity. Property owners who file an innocent
owner claim bear the burden of proving that they neither
knew about nor consented to any illegal uses of their property. Worse, joint owners of vehicles are not even permitted to bring innocent owner claims in Georgia. State law
provides no way for them to petition for their vehicle or to
get a share of it back. And Georgia law provides a strong
incentive to seize: Up to 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds
go to law enforcement.

Historically, Georgia has had very little oversight of
forfeiture activity. Although state law required agencies to
report forfeiture proceeds and expenditures, reports provided online by the Carl Vinson Institute for Government
at the University of Georgia were unusable. Too few agencies reported, and the reports on file were inconsistent. A
2015 law will require all law enforcement agencies to use
standardized forfeiture reports when filing reports with the
Vinson Institute. It remains to be seen whether this reform
will improve forfeiture transparency in the Peach State.

State Forfeiture Data
No reliable data yet available. Agencies are required to collect, but actual reporting rates have been inconsistent and
data provided were unusable. A 2015 reform will require standardized reporting by all agencies starting January 31, 2016.

Georgia ranks 45th for federal forfeiture,

with over $243 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Georgia law enforcement agencies also seek equitable
sharing proceeds at an alarming rate: The state ranks 45th
for equitable sharing. From 2000 to 2013, Georgia law enforcement received more than $243 million from the Department of Justice’s program, an average of more than $17
million each calendar year. Nearly three-quarters of these
proceeds came from joint task forces and investigations—
the type of equitable sharing forfeitures largely unaffected
by the DOJ’s new policy. Georgia agencies also brought in
$44 million in Treasury Department equitable sharing proceeds between fiscal years 2000 and 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$11,632,866

$523,000

2001

$11,214,476

$417,000

2002

$10,451,949

$3,364,000

2003

$10,628,074

$637,000

2004

$12,396,492

$141,000

2005

$12,313,910

$1,070,000

2006

$23,806,628

$1,963,000

2007

$19,351,132

$662,000

2008

$27,316,724

$2,798,000

2009

$18,489,542

$3,984,000

2010

$28,683,810

$17,740,000

2011

$29,909,178

$2,683,000

2012

$12,591,597

$5,279,000

2013

$14,224,702

$2,754,000

Total

$243,011,078

$44,015,000

Average
per year

$17,357,934

$3,143,929

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$35
$30

55%

45%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$25
$20
$15
$10

27%
73%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$5
$0

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Hawaii earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Hawaii’s civil forfeiture laws are among the nation’s
worst, earning a D-. State law has a low standard of proof, requiring only that the government show by a preponderance
of the evidence that property is tied to a crime. Furthermore,
innocent owners bear the burden of proving that they had
nothing to do with the alleged crime giving rise to the forfeiture. Most troubling, law enforcement has a large financial
stake in forfeiture, receiving 100 percent of civil forfeiture
proceeds: 25 percent goes to police, 25 percent to prosecuting
attorneys and 50 percent to the attorney general.
Reporting on forfeiture activity in Hawaii is better than
elsewhere but still incomplete. Hawaii’s Office of the Attor-

ney General must submit annual forfeiture reports to the
Legislature. The reports, which are also published online,
include the seizure and forfeiture activity of police departments, the types of property seized and forfeited, and the
attorney general’s expenditures of forfeited funds—but not
expenditures by other agencies nor other key details, such as
whether forfeitures were civil or criminal or whether related
charges were filed. The attorney general reports show that
Hawaii’s state forfeiture income remained relatively constant
between fiscal years 2000 and 2010 but dropped significantly
between fiscal years 2011 and 2013.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

Currency

Vehicles

Other

Total

2000

$555,715

$343,550

$224,071

$1,123,336

2001

$450,945

$536,040

$207,033

$1,194,018

2002

$503,762

$564,173

$547,110

$1,615,045

2003

$561,015

$194,600

$194,262

$949,877

2004

$737,668

$457,792

$461,625

$1,657,085

2005

$414,395

$332,230

$316,627

$1,063,252

2006

$698,035

$460,855

$334,709

$1,493,599

2007

$636,598

$468,290

$300,396

$1,405,284

2008

$492,398

$353,907

$627,362

$1,473,667

2009

$636,598

$468,290

$300,396

$1,405,284

2010

$622,497

$441,865

$733,513

$1,797,875

2011

$309,095

$331,375

$21,150

$661,620

2012

$131,127

$273,555

$131,129

$535,811

2013

$368,889

$356,176

$143,311

$868,376

Total
Average
per year

$7,118,737

$5,582,698

$4,542,694

$17,244,129

$508,481

$398,764

$324,478

$1,231,724

Source: Fiscal-year reports of police departments’ forfeiture proceeds, presented in annual reports available on the website of the Hawaii Office of the Attorney General.

Hawaii is the 7th best state for federal forfeiture,

with over $20 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
The Aloha State ranked seventh on equitable sharing,
indicating that its law enforcement agencies do not participate in the Department of Justice’s program as heavily as
do those in most other states. Between 2000 and 2013, Hawaii agencies brought in $20 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds, averaging $1.4 million each calendar year.
Almost all of these proceeds—93 percent—were the result
of joint task forces and investigations, equitable sharing activity left mostly untouched by former Attorney General
Holder’s 2015 policy change. Finally, Hawaii law enforcement agencies also brought in $169,000 in annual Treasury
Department equitable sharing proceeds, for a total of about
$2.4 million during fiscal years 2000 to 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
7%
Adoptions

93%

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$897,972

2001

$851,441

$187,000

2002

$1,104,026

$75,000

2003

$2,301,702

$5,000

2004

$2,293,845

$4,000

2005

$1,976,669

$188,000

2006

$2,925,536

$496,000

2007

$2,230,865

$184,000

2008

$1,919,738

$67,000

2009

$640,898

$22,000

2010

$648,346

$798,000

2011

$565,622

$237,000

2012

$564,161

$12,000

2013

$1,337,168

$92,000

Total

$20,257,989

$2,367,000

Average
per year

$1,446,999

$169,071

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$3.0
$2.5
$2.0
$1.5
$1.0

7%
93%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$0.5
$0

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Idaho earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:

• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Idaho’s civil forfeiture laws earn a D- for putting property owners at risk. Law enforcement agents need only tie
property to a crime by a preponderance of the evidence—a
low bar to forfeit. Under Idaho law, innocent owners wishing to retrieve seized property bear the burden of proving
their innocence of any crimes to which their property has
been linked. Idaho law enforcement agencies also enjoy a
strong incentive to forfeit property because they are able to
retain up to 100 percent of the proceeds.

Because the Gem State has no statutory reporting requirements, law enforcement’s forfeiture activity is far from
transparent. The limited data the Institute for Justice was
able to track down from state police suggest that Idaho’s
law enforcement agencies probably only modestly pursue
civil forfeitures, but there are no records providing a comprehensive picture of forfeiture activity in the state.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. Agencies are not required to track or report their forfeitures.

Idaho is the 8th best state for federal forfeiture,

with over $5 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Idaho law enforcement performs better than most in
terms of its equitable sharing behavior, ranking eighth nationally. Idaho’s law enforcement agencies brought in over
$5 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds between 2000 and 2013, averaging nearly $384,000
per calendar year. The majority—80 percent—of Idaho
agencies’ equitable sharing income comes from joint task
forces and investigations, the procedures largely unaffected
by the DOJ’s 2015 policy change. Indeed, just 26 assets, or
11 percent of DOJ equitable sharing seizures, were adopted between 2000 and 2013—an average of fewer than two
assets per calendar year. The DOJ reform mainly targets
adoptions, not joint task forces and investigations. Idaho
law enforcement also brought in $2.5 million in Treasury
Department funds between fiscal years 2000 and 2013, averaging almost $180,000 annually.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$23,965

2001

$86,499

$25,000

2002

$2,000

2003

$210,174

$1,000

2004

$1,526,064

2005

$497,411

$746,000

2006

$249,734

$31,000

2007

$321,353

$132,000

2008

$190,800

$28,000

2009

$302,182

$440,000

2010

$144,973

$170,000

2011

$216,946

$563,000

2012

$524,071

$152,000

2013

$1,080,693

$229,000

Total
Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
11%
89%

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$5,374,865

$2,519,000

$383,919

$179,929

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$1.8
$1.6

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$1.4
$1.2
$1.0
$0.8
$0.6

20%
80%

Proceeds

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

$0.4
$0.2
$0

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Illinois earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 90% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Illinois’ civil forfeiture laws offer property owners very
little protection, earning a D-. In general, the standard of proof
required to forfeit property in Illinois is preponderance of the
evidence, and Illinois has been graded on that basis. However, the Prairie State also has terrible forfeiture procedures unlike those of any other state. Unless the property seized is real
property—a house or a piece of land, for example—worth
more than $150,000, property owners must pay a bond worth
$100 or 10 percent of the value of the property, whichever
is greater, just for the opportunity to challenge a seizure in
court. If they lose their case, owners must give up their entire
bond and pay the full cost of the forfeiture proceedings; but
even if they win, they must relinquish 10 percent of the bond.
To make matters worse, innocent owners bear the burden of

proving that they were in no way involved with the criminal
activity associated with their property, and law enforcement
retains 90 percent of all forfeiture revenue—a strong incentive to seize.
Seizing agencies in Illinois are required to report only
very basic information about each incident to the state’s attorney: An inventory of the seized property and an estimate
of the property’s value. Although this requirement creates
some internal accountability for law enforcement, the data
are not aggregated or made publicly available, meaning taxpayers must file a request under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act for any information about forfeiture activity. Data
obtained for this report indicate that law enforcement agencies forfeited more than $113 million between 2009 and 2013.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

Currency

Vehicles

Real Property

Other

Total

2009

$17,396,274

$1,362,085

$1,279,090

$123,557

$20,161,006

2010

$18,278,337

$1,235,066

$14,705

$376,005

$19,904,113

2011

$23,494,749

$2,232,821

$413,063

$203,633

$26,344,266

2012

$17,652,206

$1,442,077

$328,501

$128,734

$19,551,517

2013

Total

$24,052,013

$100,873,578

$2,048,724

$8,320,773

$494,161

$2,529,520

$500,553

$1,332,482

$27,095,451

$113,056,353

Average
per year

$20,174,716

$1,664,155

$505,904

$266,496

$22,611,271

Reported Number of Forfeited Assets
Year

Currency

Vehicles

Real Property

Other

Total

2009

8,753

1,013

584

10,353

2010

7,603

1,018

907

9,529

2011

8,469

1,270

974

10,727

2012

5,390

851

519

6,764

Total

2013

36,300

6,085

1,209

5,361

3,909

925

45,600

8,227

Average
per year

7,260

1,072

782

9,120

Source: A file from an internal database maintained by the Illinois State Police of forfeitures conducted by all Illinois law
enforcement agencies. These data were provided by the Illinois State Police in response to an Illinois Freedom of Information Act request filed by the Institute for Justice.

Illinois ranks 40th for federal forfeiture,

with over $186 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Illinois ranks 40th on equitable sharing, with law enforcement agencies bringing in $186.8 million in Department of
Justice equitable sharing proceeds between the 2000 and 2013
calendar years. The vast majority of equitable sharing proceeds—91 percent—were from joint task forces and investigations. This vehicle for equitable sharing was left largely
intact by policy changes announced in 2015 intended to curb
the practice. Illinois law enforcement agencies also netted
$36.7 million in Treasury Department forfeiture funds during
fiscal years 2000 to 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
7%
Adoptions

93%

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$10,459,357

$259,000

2001

$7,871,659

$3,513,000

2002

$4,593,596

$1,322,000

2003

$8,919,475

$1,511,000

2004

$6,883,366

$2,620,000

2005

$9,075,774

$999,000

2006

$13,611,463

$2,408,000

2007

$14,486,447

$873,000

2008

$11,252,419

$3,622,000

2009

$16,416,401

$5,112,000

2010

$21,339,048

$7,249,000

2011

$21,694,200

$2,406,000

2012

$19,806,175

$3,245,000

2013

$20,393,352

$1,537,000

Total

$186,802,730

$36,676,000

Average
per year

$13,343,052

$2,619,714

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$25

$20

$15

$10

Adoptions

91%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Indiana earns a B+ for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Limited protections for innocent third-party property owners
• By law, no forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

On paper, Indiana has some of the country’s better civil
forfeiture laws, earning a B+, primarily because of a strong
prohibition on the use of forfeiture funds by law enforcement; instead, the Indiana Constitution directs forfeiture
proceeds to the state school fund. However, it appears that
this prohibition is often undermined in practice. By statute,
law enforcement agencies can deduct the “law enforcement
costs” of a forfeiture case before depositing the remaining
proceeds in the school fund. Exploiting this provision, several large agencies have reportedly begun classifying most—or
even all—forfeiture proceeds as deductible law enforcement
costs. Other features of Indiana’s civil forfeiture laws fail to
protect property owners and need reform: Law enforcement
need only connect property to a crime by a preponderance
of the evidence in order to forfeit it, and, to win an innocent
owner claim, owners bear the burden of proving their inno-

State Forfeiture Data

cence for nearly all types of property. The only exceptions
are vehicles and recording equipment allegedly used in the
commission of a sex crime; in these cases, the government
bears the burden. Although Indiana receives a high grade for
its laws, property owners are likely at risk due to poor procedural protections and a strong incentive to seize, as law
enforcement agencies are often able to stretch state law and
violate the state Constitution with impunity.
In 2015, the Hoosier State adopted a new law that requires judicial districts to report their forfeiture activity to the
Indiana Prosecuting Attorneys Council, which is required to
produce an aggregate report. The IPAC’s aggregate reports
should provide more information about forfeiture activity,
although they may require an Indiana Access to Public Records Act request to obtain and the level of detail that will be
included is not yet known.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. Law enforcement agencies were not required to track or report their forfeitures prior to 2015. The
Indiana Prosecuting Attorneys Council will be required to provide aggregate reports starting July 15, 2016.

Indiana ranks 39th for federal forfeiture,

with over $55 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Indiana is ranked 39th in the country on equitable
sharing. During the 2000 to 2013 calendar years, Indiana
law enforcement received more than $55 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds. Most of these proceeds—79 percent—were the result of joint task forces and
investigations, procedures largely unaffected by the DOJ’s
new policy intended to curb equitable sharing. Further, Indiana agencies collected close to $6.9 million in equitable
sharing proceeds from the Treasury Department between the
2000 and 2013 fiscal years.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$2,515,075

$14,000

2001

$2,466,493

$210,000

2002

$3,777,263

$235,000

2003

$2,474,070

$265,000

2004

$1,778,229

$283,000

2005

$3,206,333

$870,000

2006

$2,508,652

$373,000

2007

$3,132,961

$291,000

2008

$6,218,137

$579,000

2009

$3,621,188

$1,240,000

2010

$3,471,980

$705,000

2011

$7,085,337

$334,000

2012

$8,481,825

$1,327,000

2013

$4,662,651

$135,000

Total

$55,400,194

$6,861,000

Average
per year

$3,957,157

$490,071

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$9
$8

33%
67%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$7
$6
$5
$4
$3

21%
79%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$2
$1
$0

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Iowa earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:

• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Iowa has terrible civil forfeiture laws, earning a D-. State
law only requires that the government demonstrate a property’s guilt by a preponderance of the evidence to forfeit it.
When individuals bring innocent owner claims, they bear
the burden of proving they had no knowledge of, or involvement in, the alleged illegal use of their property. Aggravating
the situation, Iowa law enforcement agencies retain 100 percent of all proceeds from forfeited property and thus enjoy a
strong incentive to seize property whenever possible.
Not only does Iowa have some of the worst civil forfeiture laws in the country, but state and local law enforcement
agencies face virtually no public accountability for their for-

feiture actions. State law contains no provision for maintaining records of assets forfeited or for making reports of
forfeitures to a centralized agency. However, state law does
require that 10 percent of all forfeiture proceeds be directed
to the Iowa County Attorneys Association. The Institute for
Justice filed an Iowa Open Records Law request and was
able to use records of proceeds received by the ICAA to
estimate the value of forfeited assets. The records indicate
that Iowa law enforcement agencies forfeited an average of
more than $3 million per calendar year between 2009 and
2013, or almost $16 million in total.

State Forfeiture Data
Estimated Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

Currency

Real Property

Total

Number of
Forfeited Vehicles

2009

$2,262,420

$28,000

$2,290,420

194

2010

$1,929,236

$16,500

$1,945,736

132

2011

$5,640,969

$2,000

$5,642,969

169

2012

$2,864,915

$40,000

$2,904,915

173

2013

$3,035,221

$8,100

$3,043,321

140

Total

$15,732,761

$94,600

$15,827,361

808

Average
per year

$3,146,552

$18,920

$3,165,472

162

Source: Accounting of forfeiture proceeds received by the Iowa County Attorneys Association and obtained by the Institute for
Justice through an Iowa Open Records Law request. Pursuant to Iowa Code § 809A.17.5.e, the ICAA receives 10 percent of all
forfeiture proceeds. The Institute for Justice obtained figures for forfeiture proceeds received by the ICAA and multiplied those
numbers by 10 to arrive at a 100 percent picture of Iowa forfeitures. These data are presented in calendar years.

Iowa ranks 27th for federal forfeiture,

with over $36 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
The Hawkeye State ranks 27th for equitable sharing.
Between 2000 and 2013, law enforcement received over
$36 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds, or roughly $2.6 million per calendar year. Nearly half
of these proceeds came from joint task forces and investigations, the type of procedures allowed to continue with few
limits by the DOJ’s policy change aimed at reining in equitable sharing. Iowa agencies also brought in $2.5 million in
forfeiture proceeds from the Treasury Department between
the 2000 and 2013 fiscal years.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$793,520

$2,000

2001

$575,284

$2,000

2002

$500,572

$4,000

2003

$4,623,620

$161,000

2004

$2,643,657

$5,000

2005

$2,287,631

$91,000

2006

$1,400,976

$111,000

2007

$1,246,584

2008

$3,417,109

$20,000

2009

$6,382,194

$4,000

2010

$4,341,782

$118,000

2011

$3,790,540

$232,000

2012

$1,650,927

$1,220,000

2013

$2,415,217

$543,000

Total

$36,069,612

$2,513,000

Average
per year

$2,576,401

$179,500

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$7
$6

70%

30%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$5
$4
$3
$2

Adoptions

47%

53%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$1
$0

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Kansas earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Kansas has some of the worst civil forfeiture laws in the
country, earning a D-. State law requires only a preponderance of the evidence in order to establish a connection between property and a crime, thus making the property forfeitable. Individuals bringing an innocent owner claim bear
the burden of proving that they were not involved in any
criminal activity to have their seized property returned. Furthermore, Kansas law enforcement agencies keep 100 percent
of forfeiture proceeds. Although the Kansas attorney general
has ruled that forfeiture funds may only be used for special
law enforcement projects and not to meet normal operating
expenses, this still provides considerable incentive to seize.
Each Kansas law enforcement agency must deposit its
forfeiture proceeds into a special law enforcement trust fund

maintained by its budgetary authority—such as a city council or the state Legislature—and make annual reports to that
authority. Unfortunately, state law does not require that these
reports be standardized or filed with a central entity, meaning that obtaining an accurate picture of all forfeiture activity
in the Sunflower State would require submitting a Kansas
Open Records Act request to every law enforcement agency
or budgetary authority in the state and then compiling those
records. This process does not hold law enforcement agencies accountable, nor does it provide the public with any understanding of forfeiture activity in the state.

State Forfeiture Data
No data readily available. While law enforcement agencies are required to make reports to their budgetary authorities,
there is no requirement that those reports be centralized or made easily accessible to the public.

Kansas ranks 38th for federal forfeiture,

with nearly $52 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Having received nearly $52 million in Department of
Justice equitable sharing proceeds between calendar years
2000 and 2013, Kansas law enforcement agencies earn their
state a ranking of 38th. Fifty-eight percent of DOJ equitable
sharing proceeds came from adoptions—the forfeiture procedure curtailed by former Attorney General Holder. The
remainder came from joint task forces and investigations,
the type of equitable sharing largely unaffected by the 2015
policy change. Kansas agencies also received $1.4 million
from the Treasury Department’s equitable sharing program
between fiscal years 2000 and 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$1,784,838

$49,000

2001

$3,320,756

2002

$1,124,709

$12,000

2003

$2,641,185

2004

$4,824,653

2005

$2,993,941

$26,000

2006

$1,756,466

$9,000

2007

$2,219,680

$17,000

2008

$3,195,155

$192,000

2009

$4,764,920

$21,000

2010

$5,523,251

$293,000

2011

$5,800,667

$88,000

2012

$7,254,484

$357,000

2013

$4,769,390

$375,000

Total

$51,974,095

$1,439,000

Average
per year

$3,712,435

$102,786

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$8
$7

55%

45%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$6
$5
$4
$3
$2

Adoptions

42%

58%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$1
$0

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Kentucky earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:

• Higher bar to forfeit real property, but low bar for other property; no conviction required
• Limited protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Kentucky’s civil forfeiture laws are in dire need of reform, earning a D-. While the government must show clear
and convincing evidence to forfeit real property, such as
a family home or tract of land, it need only demonstrate
“slight evidence of traceability” to a crime—a standard akin
to probable cause—to forfeit all other types of property.
Owners can challenge this finding, but they must provide
clear and convincing evidence of the property’s innocence.
And innocent owners bear the burden of proving that they
were not involved in any criminal activity in order to recoup their property. However, in innocent owner claims
involving real property, the onus shifts to the government.
Finally, Kentucky law enforcement agencies enjoy virtually

unbridled access to forfeiture funds—they receive 100 percent of the proceeds from forfeiture.
Law enforcement agencies must report to the state a detailed listing of all property seized and forfeited under controlled substances laws. The Office of Drug Control Policy
compiles this data at the state level; however, of the more
than 400 agencies with the authority to forfeit property,
only 14 percent reported forfeitures. The Institute for Justice obtained these data with a Kentucky Open Records Act
request. Between fiscal years 2007 and 2014, reporting law
enforcement agencies forfeited more than $15 million worth
of cash, cars, weapons and real property, but these figures
likely severely undercount the true amount forfeited.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

Currency

Vehicles

Weapons

Real Property

Total

2007

$926,627

$53,362

$979,989

2008

$678,796

$112,520

$14,270

$325

$805,910

2009

$1,650,632

$249,154

$196,445

$20,372

$2,116,603

2010

$1,386,464

$171,693

$150,861

$141,869

$1,850,887

2011

$1,690,994

$193,434

$129,064

$26,308

$2,039,801

2012

$1,715,091

$163,823

$138,618

$21,385

$2,038,918

2013

$1,925,161

$146,696

$172,739

$25,707

$2,270,303

2014

$2,725,297

$268,054

$184,140

$986,138

$39,607

$275,574

$3,217,098

$15,319,509

$123,267

$34,447

$1,914,939

Total

$12,699,062

$1,358,735

Average
per year

$1,587,383

$169,842

Source: Reports of forfeitures from law enforcement agencies compiled by the Office of Drug Control Policy and obtained through a
Kentucky Open Records Act request. Of the more than 400 agencies with the authority to forfeit property, only 14 percent reported data.
These figures represent the fiscal-year forfeitures for the reporting agencies.

Kentucky ranks 33rd for federal forfeiture,

with over $66 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Kentucky law enforcement agencies received over $66
million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
between the 2000 and 2013 calendar years, earning their
state a 33rd-place ranking. The lion’s share—83 percent—of
these proceeds came from joint task forces and investigations, the equitable sharing procedures largely unaffected
by the DOJ’s 2015 policy change. Kentucky law enforcement also gained $6.8 million in equitable sharing proceeds
from the Treasury Department.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$3,186,484

$431,000

2001

$4,491,608

$94,000

2002

$1,438,037

$355,000

2003

$2,588,263

$156,000

2004

$3,290,088

$211,000

2005

$4,148,799

$1,460,000

2006

$7,103,210

$254,000

2007

$5,432,780

$311,000

2008

$5,449,909

$783,000

2009

$4,125,411

$697,000

2010

$4,641,615

$460,000

2011

$8,454,461

$439,000

2012

$4,878,114

$846,000

2013

$7,021,809

$308,000

Total

$66,250,589

$6,805,000

Average
per year

$4,732,185

$486,071

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$9
$8

22%
78%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$7
$6
$5
$4
$3

17%

Adoptions

83%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$2
$1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Louisiana earns a D+ for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 80% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Earning a D+, Louisiana civil forfeiture law fails to protect property owners. The law requires only that the government show by a preponderance of the evidence that property
is associated with criminal activity in order to forfeit it. Further, to make an innocent owner claim successfully, individuals must find a way to prove that they did not know about or
consent to the criminal activity in which their property was
implicated. Law enforcement retains 80 percent of forfeiture
revenue—a large incentive to seize. The remaining 20 percent goes to the criminal court fund. This system creates a
serious conflict of interest in allowing the court that orders
the forfeiture of property to receive a portion of the proceeds.

Louisiana’s forfeiture reporting requirements also leave
much to be desired. Every district attorney must file an annual report with the Legislature detailing the amount and value
of property seized and distributed after forfeiture, though reports lack key details, such as whether any criminal charges
accompanied the forfeiture or how forfeiture funds were
spent. These reports also are not compiled into an aggregate
report or made available online, forcing interested parties to
file a Louisiana Public Records Law request to access the information. Reports indicate that Louisiana district attorneys
forfeited more than $99 million between 2000 and 2014, over
88 percent of which resulted from cash forfeitures.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

Currency

Property

Total

2000

$4,165,829

$317,718

$4,483,547

2001

$2,672,317

$437,988

$3,110,305

2002

$3,137,589

$1,662,860

$4,800,448

2003

$4,009,327

$626,537

$4,635,863

2004

$6,968,061

$960,531

$7,928,592

2005

$4,530,248

$462,166

$4,992,414

2006

$7,363,078

$879,630

$8,242,709

2007

$6,691,976

$747,161

$7,439,137

2008

$5,870,955

$794,173

$6,665,129

2009

$7,895,871

$1,029,334

$8,925,206

2010

$5,539,756

$848,109

$6,387,866

2011

$7,261,609

$640,626

$7,902,235

2012

$7,801,039

$595,617

$8,396,656

2013

$7,352,431

$1,004,253

$8,356,684

2014

$6,496,495

$552,493

$7,048,988

Total

$87,756,581

$11,559,196

$99,315,778

Average
per year

$5,850,439

$770,613

$6,621,052

Source: Judicial district reports obtained by the Institute for Justice through a Louisiana Public Records Law request to the state Office of the Attorney General. Data are presented in calendar years
and only represent cash and property sold, not property retained for official use.

Louisiana ranks 24th for federal forfeiture,

with over $36 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Louisiana law enforcement’s regular participation in the
Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program puts the
state in 24th place on equitable sharing nationwide. Between
2000 and 2013, Louisiana law enforcement brought in $2.6
million per calendar year, or more than $36 million total, in
DOJ equitable sharing proceeds. Almost all—95 percent—of
these proceeds came from joint task forces and investigations, equitable sharing practices left largely intact under a
DOJ policy change intended to rein in the program. Finally,
Louisiana law enforcement also received $11 million in Treasury Department equitable sharing proceeds between 2000
and 2013—an average of just under $800,000 per fiscal year.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$1,976,260

$1,746,000

2001

$1,028,422

$172,000

2002

$1,007,816

$4,513,000

2003

$2,023,684

$81,000

2004

$1,665,119

2005

$2,470,030

$188,000

2006

$1,532,528

$1,398,000

2007

$3,191,793

$160,000

2008

$3,244,194

$560,000

2009

$2,594,124

$657,000

2010

$2,696,934

$545,000

2011

$7,878,356

$331,000

2012

$3,124,013

$188,000

2013

$2,028,621

$522,000

Total

$36,461,893

$11,061,000

Average
per year

$2,604,421

$790,071

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$9
$8

5%
Adoptions

95%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$7
$6
$5
$4
$3

Adoptions

95%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$2
$1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Maine earns a B+ for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Limited protections for innocent third-party property owners
• No forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Maine’s civil forfeiture laws earn a B+. The state’s high
law grade stems from the lack of an incentive to police for
profit: With few exceptions, all forfeiture proceeds go directly into the state general fund. Maine’s law grade could be
even higher if not for the state’s low standard of proof. Law
enforcement may forfeit property by showing by a mere preponderance of the evidence that it is tied to a crime. In most
cases, Maine law also puts the burden on innocent owners
to prove that they had nothing to do with the alleged criminal activity with which their property has been associated.
However, in cases involving a family’s primary residence,
the burden is on the government to prove that a spouse or

child knew about the owner’s illegal activity before it may
forfeit the home.
Maine law requires law enforcement agencies to maintain an inventory of the property they seize and forfeit. However, reports need not be filed with a centralized agency or
published online, making it difficult for the public to hold
law enforcement accountable for forfeiture actions. Between
calendar years 2009 and 2013, the Maine Drug Enforcement
Agency forfeited almost $1.5 million in cash, as well as additional non-cash assets for which no value is given in the
MDEA’s inventory.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Maine Drug Enforcement Agency
Currency Forfeitures

2009

$200,503

2010

$276,353

2011

$315,698

2012

$192,235

2013

$350,372

2014

$149,209

Total
Average
per year

$1,484,371
$247,395

Source: Inventory of currency forfeitures conducted by the Maine Drug
Enforcement Agency. The Institute for Justice obtained these data through
a Maine Freedom of Access Act request made to the Maine Department of
Public Safety. The inventory is organized by calendar year and includes
vehicles and other forfeited property, though no value is provided for
non-currency items. While MDEA forfeitures do not offer a complete picture of forfeiture in Maine, they likely capture a large portion of the state
forfeiture revenues, given that drug-related cases are probably the most
common type of forfeiture.

Maine is the 5th best state for federal forfeiture,

with over $5 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Maine law enforcement participates sparingly in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program, earning the
state a fifth-place ranking. Between 2000 and 2013, law enforcement agencies received nearly $5.8 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds—about $400,000 per calendar year.
The vast majority of Maine law enforcement’s DOJ equitable
sharing proceeds came from joint task forces and investigations, indicating that proceeds are likely to hold steady in
the face of the 2015 policy change curbing adoptive forfeitures. Over fiscal years 2000 to 2013, Maine law enforcement
agencies also received almost $4.4 million in Treasury Department equitable sharing funds.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$134,147

2001

$250,101

2002

$198,281

2003

$448,554

2004

$520,694

2005

$352,412

$41,000

2006

$934,795

$70,000

2007

$324,085

$658,000

2008

$364,989

$49,000

2009

$470,897

$511,000

2010

$363,336

$1,605,000

2011

$723,251

$26,000

2012

$353,497

$47,000

2013

$322,702

$1,370,000

$411,553

$312,643

Total

$5,761,741

Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$4,377,000

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$1.0
$0.9

18%
82%

Adoptions

$0.8
$0.7

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$0.6
$0.5
$0.4
$0.3

11%

Adoptions

89%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$0.2
$0.1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Maryland earns a B for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• No forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Earning a B grade, Maryland’s civil forfeiture laws are
better than those of most other states, thanks largely to their
lack of a profit incentive. However, the state should provide
stronger protections to property owners. In order to forfeit
property, law enforcement generally only has to tie the
property to a crime by a preponderance of the evidence. An
innocent owner typically bears the burden of proving that
she had nothing to do with the alleged criminal activity giving rise to the seizure, but a primary family residence cannot
be forfeited unless both spousal co-owners are convicted of
a crime. Finally, Maryland law enforcement agencies have
no financial incentive to seize property under state law—all
forfeiture proceeds must be deposited into the general fund
of the state or local governing body.

The Maryland General Assembly voted in 2015 to modestly reform the state’s civil forfeiture laws, but Gov. Larry
Hogan vetoed the bill. The bill would have shifted the innocent owner burden, requiring the government to prove that
property owners had actual knowledge of the alleged crime
that prompted the seizure or consented to the use of their
property in that crime’s commission.
Even though Maryland’s civil forfeiture laws are better
than those of most states, they still suffer from a troubling
lack of transparency: Agencies are not required to track or
report their forfeitures.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. Agencies are not required to track or report their forfeitures.

Maryland ranks 21st for federal forfeiture,

with over $80 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
In a ranking of states’ participation in the Department
of Justice’s equitable sharing program, Maryland places 21st.
Between 2000 and 2013, Maryland law enforcement agencies
received $80.8 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the
DOJ, or almost $5.8 million per calendar year. Joint task forces and investigations accounted for about half of equitable
sharing seizures and nearly two-thirds of proceeds. These
kinds of seizures were generally unaffected by new DOJ
rules intended to curb equitable sharing. Maryland agencies
also received more than $26 million in Treasury Department
equitable sharing proceeds between 2000 and 2013, which
equates to close to $1.9 million each fiscal year.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$4,403,627

$61,000

2001

$3,492,572

$191,000

2002

$4,434,798

$8,000

2003

$7,140,208

$2,099,000

2004

$5,505,727

$513,000

2005

$6,752,896

$1,886,000

2006

$6,172,518

$1,777,000

2007

$8,315,814

$1,570,000

2008

$8,248,758

$5,942,000

2009

$4,657,945

$1,406,000

2010

$7,220,677

$1,846,000

2011

$6,506,505

$2,658,000

2012

$4,249,535

$2,876,000

2013

$3,724,533

$3,206,000

Total

$80,826,113

$26,039,000

Average
per year

$5,773,294

$1,859,929

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$9
$8

49%

51%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$7
$6
$5
$4
$3

65%

35%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$2
$1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Massachusetts earns an F for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Lowest bar to forfeit property and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Along with North Dakota, the only other state to earn
an F for its law grade, Massachusetts has the worst civil forfeiture laws in the country. Massachusetts law enforcement
agents just need probable cause—the lowest possible standard of proof—to believe that property was involved in a
crime in order to forfeit it. State law also places the burden
on innocent owners to demonstrate their innocence or ignorance of any criminal activity associated with their seized
property in order to recover it. Finally, Bay State law enforcement agencies get to keep up to 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds, giving them considerable incentive to seize property.
Forfeiture reporting requirements in Massachusetts are
also very poor. Law enforcement agencies are only required
to keep an inventory of property seized for controlled sub-

stances violations; they are not required to produce comprehensive annual forfeiture reports. By filing a Massachusetts Public Records Law request, the Institute for Justice
received accounting records that allowed statewide forfeiture proceeds to be estimated. This onerous process and the
lack of any detailed information about individual forfeiture
cases or even agency-level forfeiture proceeds make it impossible for the average citizen or lawmaker to hold state
and local law enforcement agencies accountable for their
forfeiture activity. According to IJ’s calculations, Massachusetts law enforcement forfeited almost $139 million between 2000 and 2014, an average of about $9.3 million each
fiscal year.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Estimated Forfeiture
Proceeds

2000

$5,614,705

2001

$7,322,901

2002

$7,300,236

2003

$7,592,214

2004

$10,092,662

2005

$8,803,362

2006

$8,399,550

2007

$9,294,064

2008

$11,093,076

2009

$13,178,878

2010

$11,303,308

2011

$10,410,558

2012

$8,843,408

2013

$9,808,804

2014

$9,766,698

Total
Average
per year

$138,824,424
$9,254,962

Source: Data were obtained by the Institute for Justice through a Massachusetts Public Records Law request made to the Comptroller of the Commonwealth. These data
are based on fiscal-year deposits to the special forfeiture trust funds for the attorney
general and each district attorney. Under state law, the attorney general and district
attorneys receive half of all forfeiture proceeds, while state and local law enforcement
agencies receive the other half. To arrive at the totals represented in the above table,
IJ took the sum of the proceeds sent to the attorney general and district attorneys and
doubled it to account for proceeds distributed to state and local law enforcement that
were not represented in the data obtained.

Massachusetts ranks 46th for federal forfeiture,

with over $63 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Massachusetts law enforcement’s extensive participation in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program—earning the state a ranking of 46th nationally—compounds the problems with the state’s forfeiture laws. Law
enforcement agencies received $63.5 million in equitable
sharing proceeds between 2000 and 2013, or $4.5 million
per calendar year. Only 7 percent of those proceeds came
from adoptive forfeitures, while the rest came from joint
task forces and investigations, equitable sharing procedures
left largely intact by the DOJ’s 2015 policy change intended
to limit equitable sharing. This means that use of equitable
sharing in Massachusetts is likely to continue on much the
same scale. Finally, Massachusetts agencies also received
more than $13 million in Treasury Department forfeiture
proceeds from 2000 to 2013, averaging nearly $1 million per
fiscal year.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$3,194,714

$512,000

2001

$1,425,567

$603,000

2002

$2,073,417

$234,000

2003

$2,424,388

$850,000

2004

$4,514,645

$1,223,000

2005

$4,099,432

$663,000

2006

$3,719,291

$241,000

2007

$4,589,227

$814,000

2008

$3,790,929

$1,166,000

2009

$2,423,516

$832,000

2010

$4,102,981

$3,059,000

2011

$16,334,522

$981,000

2012

$6,042,698

$882,000

2013

$4,780,083

$1,193,000

Total

$63,515,410

$13,253,000

Average
per year

$4,536,815

$946,643

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$18
$16

8%
Adoptions

92%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$14
$12
$10
$8
$6

Adoptions

93%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$4
$2
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Michigan earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Higher bar to forfeit, but no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Despite modest reforms approved in October 2015 that
raised the standard of proof required to forfeit property,
Michigan’s laws still earn a D-, largely because the state’s
large profit incentive remains intact. The standard of proof
in forfeiture cases is now clear and convincing evidence—
higher than preponderance of the evidence but still far from
the gold standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For
seizures where drug activity is alleged—as it is for most seizures—innocent owners bear the initial burden of proving
their innocence or ignorance of the activity to recover seized
property. But in innocent owner claims where no drug activity is alleged, the government bears the burden of proof.
Finally, Michigan law enforcement agencies may retain up
to 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds.
Law enforcement agencies in the state must file annual

forfeiture reports with the Michigan State Police, which then
compiles and submits them to the state Legislature. In October 2015, the reporting requirements were strengthened to
include forfeitures under more statutes. The improvements
also included more detailed agency reporting requirements,
such as whether someone was charged with a crime and
the alleged violation that led to the seizure. Starting July 1,
2017, the State Police will be required to publish the aggregate reports online; part of the 2015 reform package, this
statutory requirement codifies current practice. The reports
provide some transparency, but they could be improved by
including details about forfeiture expenditures. Between
2001 and 2013, Michigan law enforcement agencies reported more than $244 million in gross forfeiture proceeds—an
average of almost $19 million per calendar year.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

Currency

Vehicles

Personal
Property

Real Property

Total

2001

$18,811,343

$2,243,151

$1,863,773

$1,185,229

$24,103,496

2002

$10,830,841

$1,616,571

$1,488,995

$1,087,136

$15,023,543

2003

$15,552,632

$1,823,974

$1,447,460

$1,663,423

$20,487,489

2004

$13,452,202

$2,038,834

$809,730

$1,472,376

$17,773,142

2005

$16,470,668

$2,400,526

$584,176

$723,407

$20,178,777

2006

$13,307,677

$2,808,412

$1,010,544

$911,889

$18,038,522

2007

$17,526,192

$2,717,738

$1,023,081

$777,833

$22,044,844

2008

$14,592,874

$2,927,416

$867,111

$652,003

$19,039,404

2009

$21,425,900

$2,883,794

$685,027

$293,029

$25,287,750

2010

$13,132,330

$2,728,406

$592,064

$244,203

$16,697,003

2011

$15,189,280

$2,447,388

$565,356

$134,508

$18,336,532

2012

$9,844,672

$3,034,895

$722,416

$175,875

$13,777,858

2013

$10,436,894

$2,453,658

$513,572

$254,807

$13,658,931

Total

$190,573,505

$32,124,763

$12,173,305

$9,575,718

$244,447,291

Average
per year

$14,659,500

$2,471,136

$936,408

$736,594

$18,803,638

Source: Annual Michigan State Police reports of all reporting law enforcement agencies’ forfeitures submitted to the Legislature and published
online. Values represent the total value of forfeited property. Several agencies’ reports are missing for any given year, indicating that these
figures likely severely underreport the full value of forfeitures in Michigan.

Michigan ranks 44th for federal forfeiture,

with over $127 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Michigan’s law enforcement agencies have made extensive use of the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program over the years, earning the Great Lakes State 44th place
in a nationwide ranking. Between 2000 and 2013, Michigan
law enforcement agencies received $127.6 million in equitable
sharing proceeds from the DOJ, averaging $9.1 million per
calendar year. Nearly all equitable sharing proceeds—97 percent—resulted from joint task forces and investigations, the
equitable sharing activity left largely unaffected by new DOJ
rules. It appears those rules will have little effect on equitable sharing participation in Michigan. Agencies also received
more than $19 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the
Treasury Department over the 2000 to 2013 fiscal years.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$4,601,434

$26,000

2001

$7,712,687

$1,271,000

2002

$3,978,755

$1,060,000

2003

$5,540,692

$565,000

2004

$6,164,006

$1,004,000

2005

$13,243,130

$1,251,000

2006

$11,676,994

$2,530,000

2007

$7,117,338

$899,000

2008

$13,453,873

$1,234,000

2009

$9,355,633

$4,926,000

2010

$6,847,816

$1,660,000

2011

$13,562,944

$1,569,000

2012

$17,204,705

$451,000

2013

$7,174,227

$687,000

Total
Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

$127,634,232

$19,133,000

$9,116,731

$1,366,643

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$20
$18

2%
Adoptions

98%

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$16
$14

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$10
$8
$6

Adoptions

97%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$12

$4
$2
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Minnesota earns a D+ for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Higher bar to forfeit property and conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 90% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Minnesota has taken several steps to improve its civil forfeiture laws, but the laws still present law enforcement with a
dangerous financial incentive to seize property and thus earn
a D+ grade. Most promising among recent reforms, all forfeitures in Minnesota now require that the property owner be
convicted in criminal court. A guilty owner’s property may
then be forfeited in civil court if the government can tie it to
the crime by clear and convincing evidence. Unfortunately,
in innocent owner cases, the burden remains on property
owners to prove that they had nothing to do with the alleged
criminal activity involving their property. And in drunken-driving cases, a joint owner of a seized vehicle who is not
charged with a crime cannot raise an innocent owner defense
at all if the other owner is convicted of drunken driving. Most
troubling of all, Minnesota law continues to give law enforce-

ment agencies a compelling reason to seize: In all but a few
cases, they get to keep 90 percent of all forfeiture proceeds.
Minnesota agencies must report their forfeitures to the
state auditor each month. These monthly reports are aggregated into an annual forfeiture report published on the auditor’s
website. State law could improve transparency by requiring
reporting on how forfeiture funds are spent and ensuring that
agencies report as required. As it stands, dozens of agencies
fail to report each year. Between 2000 and 2013, Minnesota
agencies reported forfeiting more than $62 million. Prior to
2010, the auditor’s reports did not include vehicles forfeited
in relation to drunken-driving offenses. It is therefore impossible to tell how much of the increase in forfeiture proceeds
after 2010 was due to additional reporting requirements versus an increase in forfeiture activity.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Reported Forfeiture
Proceeds

2000

$1,448,462

2001

$1,433,278

2002

$1,697,945

2003

$2,806,891

2004

$3,130,577

2005

$3,709,487

2006

$3,918,321

2007

$4,866,485

2008

$3,823,464

2009

$4,778,457

2010

$5,367,197

2011

$8,348,910

2012

$8,393,164

2013

$8,777,183

Total

$62,499,821

Average
per year

$4,464,273

Source: Annual state auditor reports of forfeitures reported by law enforcement agencies
published online each calendar year. Each year,
some agencies failed to file reports or to report
having conducted no forfeitures, as required.

Minnesota ranks 19th for federal forfeiture,

with nearly $26 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Minnesota ranks 19th on equitable sharing. Between
2000 and 2013, law enforcement agencies received $25.9
million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds, averaging nearly $1.9 million per calendar year. The
vast majority of those proceeds—71 percent—came via joint
task forces and investigations, suggesting that 2015 DOJ reforms that left such equitable sharing activity largely intact
will have little effect in Minnesota. Minnesota agencies also
took in over $1.6 million in Treasury Department equitable
sharing proceeds between the 2000 and 2013 fiscal years.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

73%

27%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$965,139

$71,000

2001

$1,467,249

$19,000

2002

$1,714,825

$2,000

2003

$1,188,553

$24,000

2004

$1,308,685

$7,000

2005

$1,361,625

2006

$2,286,719

$434,000

2007

$2,215,532

$46,000

2008

$2,276,567

$7,000

2009

$2,827,271

$71,000

2010

$2,644,155

$235,000

2011

$1,885,715

$192,000

2012

$1,854,540

$81,000

2013

$1,905,826

$457,000

Total

$25,902,398

$1,646,000

Average
per year

$1,850,171

$117,571

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$3.0
$2.5
$2.0
$1.5
$1.0

71%

29%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$0.5
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Mississippi earns a C- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Stronger protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 80% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement in most cases

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Under Mississippi’s civil forfeiture laws, which earn a
C- grade, the government just has to connect property to a
crime by a preponderance of the evidence in order to forfeit it. However, the government bears the burden of disproving an innocent owner claim—an improvement over
most states where owners must, in effect, prove their own
innocence to win back seized property. Law enforcement
agencies may retain 80 percent of forfeiture proceeds when
only one agency investigated the case and a full 100 percent
if more than one agency was involved, creating a troubling
conflict of interest and a strong incentive to seize.
That conflict is on full display in Richland, Miss., where
construction of a new $4.1 million law enforcement training

facility was funded entirely by forfeiture proceeds garnered
by police in Richland—a town of just 7,000 people. A sign
in the building’s window boasts: “Richland Police Station
tearfully donated by drug dealers.” The controversial facility illustrates the conflict of interest created when law
enforcement can directly benefit from the proceeds of forfeiture. Such self-funding is especially worrisome in states
like Mississippi where agencies are not required to track or
publicly report forfeitures or expenditures from forfeiture
funds, leaving the public and lawmakers in the dark.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. Agencies are not required to track or report their forfeitures.

Mississippi ranks 20th for federal forfeiture,

with over $47 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
On equitable sharing, the Magnolia State places 20th in
the nation. Between 2000 and 2013, Mississippi law enforcement agencies received an average of almost $3.4 million
per calendar year in equitable sharing proceeds from the
Department of Justice, totaling more than $47 million over
that period. Ninety percent of those proceeds came through
joint task forces and investigations, the type of equitable
sharing generally exempt from new DOJ rules. Mississippi
agencies also received almost $3 million in equitable sharing
proceeds from the Treasury Department between 2000 and
2013, or approximately $208,000 per fiscal year.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
7%

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

10%

2000

$1,702,015

$145,000

2001

$1,075,526

$291,000

2002

$1,081,900

$226,000

2003

$1,457,573

$107,000

2004

$4,781,097

$271,000

2005

$3,583,051

$462,000

2006

$6,341,369

$650,000

2007

$3,585,895

$40,000

2008

$3,783,495

$249,000

2009

$4,066,018

$25,000

2010

$4,478,419

$3,000

2011

$4,235,566

$195,000

2012

$2,979,259

$217,000

2013

$3,915,863

$25,000

Total

$47,067,047

$2,906,000

Average
per year

$3,361,932

$207,571

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$7

$5
$4
$3
$2

Adoptions

90%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$6
Adoptions

93%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

$1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Missouri earns a B+ for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Conviction required, but low bar to connect property to the crime
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• No forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Missouri’s civil forfeiture laws are better than most,
scoring a B+. Unlike most states, Missouri requires a criminal conviction or a guilty plea before property can be forfeited civilly. However, from there, the government need only
connect the property to the crime only by a preponderance
of the evidence. And an innocent owner wishing to have
property returned must intervene and prove that she had
no knowledge of the criminal activity of which her property
is accused in order to recover it. Finally, Missouri provides
no incentive to police for profit: All forfeiture money must
be used to fund schools.
Missouri’s forfeiture reporting requirements look good
on paper, but they do little to provide transparency in actuality. Law enforcement officers must report seizures and
forfeitures to their prosecuting attorneys or the attorney

general, who then provide annual reports to the state auditor. These reports are presented to the Legislature and
published on the state auditor’s website. Prosecuting attorneys and the attorney general are also required to detail any criminal charges that were filed and the final disposition of the property—an unusually high level of detail.
However, reports only cover assets seized in that calendar
year, so assets not fully forfeited by year’s end are simply
reported as “pending” and will not appear again in future
reports. Thus, these reports may never account for millions
of dollars’ worth of forfeitures. In addition, several Missouri agencies failed to report their forfeitures on a yearly basis.
The data available show that agencies reportedly forfeited
approximately $1.6 million between 2000 and 2014, but this
figure likely severely undercounts forfeitures.

State Forfeiture Data
Year
2000

$115,156

2001

$224,721

2002

$231,255

2003

$210,340

2004

$45,273

2005

$71,225

2006

$74,223

2007

$74,461

2008

$58,532

2009

$30,673

2010

$25,974

2011

$158,589

2012

$83,868

2013

$116,220

2014

$127,856

Total
Average
per year

Reported Forfeiture
Proceeds

$1,648,366
$109,891

Source: Annual state auditor reports provided online that compile reports submitted by
the state Office of the Attorney General and
prosecuting attorneys. Proceeds represent forfeitures completed and transferred to the state
during the calendar year in which they were
seized. Millions of dollars still pending at the
end of a calendar year are not accounted for in
the reports, and many counties failed to file reports each year.

Missouri ranks 34th for federal forfeiture,

with over $126 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Missouri law enforcement’s participation in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program earns the
state 34th place when compared to other states. Missouri
agencies received $126.7 million in DOJ equitable sharing
proceeds between 2000 and 2013—more than $9 million per
calendar year. The 2015 DOJ policy change intended to curb
the practice is unlikely to affect much equitable sharing activity in Missouri: 82 percent of payments to state and local
law enforcement came from joint task forces and investigations, seizures largely unaffected by the new policy. The
Show-Me State also received over $11 million in forfeiture
funds from the Treasury Department between fiscal years
2000 and 2013.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$7,348,177

$323,000

2001

$5,161,911

$464,000

2002

$3,105,749

$219,000

2003

$5,600,012

$207,000

2004

$6,462,518

$32,000

2005

$8,483,669

$32,000

2006

$9,165,824

$229,000

2007

$11,952,962

$118,000

2008

$10,459,559

$55,000

2009

$20,135,700

$224,000

2010

$12,871,134

$1,459,000

2011

$10,848,192

$1,677,000

2012

$8,855,773

$748,000

2013

$6,271,159

$5,255,000

Total
Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
15%
85%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

18%

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$126,722,340

$11,042,000

$9,051,596

$788,714

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$25

$20

$15

$10

Adoptions

82%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Montana earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Higher bar to forfeit property and conviction required
• Stronger protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Despite positive reform in 2015, Montana’s civil forfeiture laws earn a D- due to the hefty profit incentive they
create for law enforcement agencies to seize property.
Montana law now requires a criminal conviction to forfeit
property. Then, the government must prove the property is
tied to that crime in civil court by clear and convincing evidence. Further, the 2015 reform shifted the innocent owner burden to the government. Innocent owners no longer
have to prove their own innocence to win their property
back. However, Montana’s law grade takes a major hit because of the substantial incentive given to law enforcement

to seize. Local law enforcement retains up to 100 percent
of forfeiture proceeds. State law enforcement agencies also
retain up to 100 percent of proceeds, but when the value of
property seized and forfeited exceeds $125,000, any excess
proceeds must be divided equally between a state forfeiture
fund and the state general fund.
There is no way of knowing the scope of forfeitures
conducted under Montana state law because law enforcement agencies are not required to track or report on their
forfeiture activity.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. Agencies are not required to track or report their forfeitures.

Montana ranks 11th for federal forfeiture,

with over $5.5 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Montana law enforcement agencies do not extensively
participate in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing
program, earning the state 11th place in a nationwide ranking. Between 2000 and 2013, Montana agencies received
more than $5.5 million in equitable sharing proceeds, an
annual average of nearly $400,000 per calendar year. The
vast majority of those proceeds—85 percent—resulted from
joint task forces and investigations, the type of equitable
sharing activity 2015 DOJ rules did little to reform. During
this period, adoptions have accounted for as much as 47
percent and as little as zero percent of proceeds; on average,
they account for 15 percent of equitable sharing proceeds.
It is therefore unlikely that the DOJ policy change will have
a major impact on Montana agencies’ participation in the
program. From 2000 to 2013, Montana law enforcement
agencies also received more than $1 million in Treasury
Department equitable sharing proceeds, averaging over
$78,000 per fiscal year.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$410,389

$126,000

2001

$506,133

$37,000

2002

$107,396

$27,000

2003

$188,263

$88,000

2004

$328,520

$337,000

2005

$429,801

$80,000

2006

$911,197

2007

$641,131

$10,000

2008

$355,716

$73,000

2009

$77,366

$67,000

2010

$170,963

$53,000

2011

$393,947

$28,000

2012

$668,177

$129,000

2013

$359,101

$41,000

Total
Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
12%
88%

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$5,548,099

$1,096,000

$396,293

$78,286

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$1.0
$0.9

Adoptions

$0.8
$0.7

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$0.6
$0.5
$0.4
$0.3

15%

Adoptions

85%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$0.2
$0.1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

Nebraska earns a C for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Highest bar to forfeit property
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 50% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Nebraska’s civil forfeiture laws—earning a C—have
both good and bad components. Nebraska has the best possible standard of proof, requiring the government to tie property to a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. If the seizure was
related to gambling, however, that standard drops to preponderance of the evidence. Unfortunately, where owners are innocent of the criminal activity to which their property has

been tied, they bear the burden of demonstrating their innocence in order to recover it. And Nebraska law enforcement
agencies get to keep 50 percent of forfeiture proceeds—a
lower percentage than in other states but still an opportunity
to generate revenue.
Nebraska law enforcement agencies are not required to
track or report their forfeitures.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. Agencies are not required to track or report their forfeitures.

100

Nebraska ranks 17th for federal forfeiture,

with over $48 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Ranking 17th on equitable sharing, Nebraska law enforcement agencies received $48 million in Department of
Justice equitable sharing proceeds between calendar years
2000 and 2013. Unusually, the bulk of equitable sharing cases in the state were adoptions, accounting for 84 percent of
proceeds received. These are the type of equitable sharing
cases most impacted by recent DOJ policy changes aimed
at reining in the program. Nebraska agencies’ use of equitable sharing may therefore dwindle—or shift to joint task
forces and investigations, procedures largely untouched by
the new rules. Nebraska agencies also brought in over $2.6
million in Treasury Department equitable sharing proceeds
between fiscal years 2000 and 2013.
Belying its middling ranking, Nebraska has been the
scene of some of the country’s worst equitable sharing
cases. In 2011, Mark Brewer was pulled over while changing lanes without signaling on Interstate 80. Although the
sheriff’s deputy found no evidence of criminality, he seized
$63,500 that Brewer planned to use as a down payment on a
house. The sheriff’s office asked the federal government to
adopt the seizure and Brewer lost his savings despite never
having been charged with a crime—indeed, he did not even
get a ticket.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$1,586,185

$37,000

2001

$1,585,501

$22,000

2002

$961,029

2003

$4,168,515

$687,000

2004

$3,572,684

$43,000

2005

$3,735,336

$20,000

2006

$4,190,021

$12,000

2007

$3,240,650

$55,000

2008

$6,618,301

2009

$5,083,002

$17,000

2010

$4,307,533

2011

$4,119,109

$56,000

2012

$2,539,274

$1,548,000

2013

$2,676,761

$150,000

Total

$48,383,901

$2,647,000

Average
per year

$3,455,993

$189,071

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$7
$6

40%

60%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$5
$4
$3
$2

16%

Adoptions

84%
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

101

Nevada earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Higher bar to forfeit property and conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Nevada adopted positive reforms to its civil forfeiture
laws in 2015, but its law grade is pulled down to a D- by
weak protections for innocent owners and a strong financial incentive to seize. Nevada took a step in the right direction by amending state law to require a criminal conviction
as a prerequisite to forfeit property seized in connection to
a crime. After securing a conviction, prosecutors must tie
property to that crime with clear and convincing evidence.
However, innocent owners continue to bear the burden of
proving that they had no involvement in or knowledge of the
crime associated with their property. The Silver State’s grade
is further tarnished by a large incentive to seize: Law enforcement agencies retain up to 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds.
However, if a given forfeiture account exceeds $100,000 at
the end of the fiscal year, 70 percent of the excess funds must

be given to the school district in the judicial district where
the property was seized. This stipulation creates a “use it or
lose it” situation, whereby law enforcement is encouraged to
spend forfeiture proceeds as quickly as possible.
In 2015, Nevada adopted a new reporting regime that
will require law enforcement agencies to file annual forfeiture reports with the attorney general. Starting April 1,
2016, the Nevada Office of the Attorney General must post
each agency’s report, as well as an aggregate report of forfeitures statewide, online. Unfortunately, at the time this
report went to print, law enforcement agencies were only
required to file quarterly forfeiture reports with their budgetary authorities. These quarterly reports were not aggregated or made available online.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. The Office of the Attorney General is required to begin publishing forfeiture reports online on April
1, 2016, but no aggregate reports were available at the time this report went to print.

102

Nevada ranks 23rd for federal forfeiture,

with over $37 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Nevada law enforcement’s use of the Department of
Justice’s equitable sharing program earns the state a ranking of 23rd place. Between 2000 and 2013, agencies received
more than $37 million in equitable sharing proceeds, for a
calendar-year average of roughly $2.7 million. Nearly twothirds of those proceeds came from joint task forces and investigations, the kind of procedure generally exempt from
2015 DOJ reforms. Finally, law enforcement agencies also
brought in almost $13 million in proceeds from the Treasury
Department’s equitable sharing fund between fiscal years
2000 and 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

27%
73%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$1,171,302

$5,717,000

2001

$696,573

$128,000

2002

$936,361

$87,000

2003

$2,221,647

$338,000

2004

$1,419,342

$153,000

2005

$2,487,376

$103,000

2006

$3,780,762

2007

$3,845,255

$155,000

2008

$3,287,808

$1,124,000

2009

$2,667,871

$338,000

2010

$4,101,216

$859,000

2011

$2,769,505

$124,000

2012

$5,074,625

$3,392,000

2013

$2,862,224

$229,000

Total

$37,321,868

$12,747,000

Average
per year

$2,665,848

$910,500

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$6
$5
$4
$3
$2

37%
63%

Adoptions

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

103

New Hampshire earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 90% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

New Hampshire’s civil forfeiture laws are a threat to
property owners. Earning a D-, state law only requires the
government to link property to a crime by a preponderance
of the evidence in order to forfeit it. But state drug law also
prohibits the forfeiture of property when the owner has been
found not guilty of the underlying criminal charge. And innocent owners bear the burden of proving they were not
involved in the criminal use of their property. Furthermore,
90 percent of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement: 45
percent to local law enforcement and 45 percent to a state
drug forfeiture fund. Local law enforcement may keep no
more than $225,000 from a single forfeiture, and amounts in
the state drug forfeiture fund in excess of $1 million must be
turned over to the state general fund, encouraging agencies to
spend the money while they can.

The state attorney general is required to submit biennial
reports to the Legislature detailing all items seized and forfeited. However, reports simply summarize the total value of
cash and other property forfeited during the biennium; the
data are not disaggregated to allow further analysis, such as
estimating the average value of a seized asset or the percentage of forfeiture cases that are civil as opposed to criminal.
The Institute for Justice obtained more recent reports from
the attorney general’s website and the rest through a New
Hampshire Right-to-Know Law request. Reports indicate
that the Office of the Attorney General’s Drug Unit, which
serves as a clearing house for all drug-related seizures in the
state, reportedly forfeited nearly $1.2 million between 1999
and 2013, or approximately $164,000 every two fiscal years.

State Forfeiture Data
Biennium

Reported Forfeiture
Proceeds

1999–2001

$63,237

2001–2003

$250,507

2003–2005

$281,636

2005–2007

$142,000

2007–2009

$97,000

2009–2011

$131,800

2011–2013

$184,853

Total

Average per
biennium

$1,151,033
$164,433

Source: Reports of total value of all cash, vehicles
and other property forfeited by the New Hampshire
Office of the Attorney General’s Drug Unit, which
prosecutes all drug-related forfeitures in the state.
Reports are made each fiscal biennium (e.g., from
July 1, 1999, to June 30, 2001) and are available on
the attorney general’s website going back through
2005. Earlier reports were obtained by the Institute
for Justice via a New Hampshire Right-to-Know
Law request.

104

New Hampshire ranks 16th for federal forfeiture,

with over $15 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
New Hampshire law enforcement’s participation in the
Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program earns the
Granite State a 16th-place ranking. Between 2000 and 2013,
New Hampshire agencies received over $15 million in equitable sharing funds from the DOJ, averaging more than $1
million per calendar year. The lion’s share—78 percent—of
proceeds came through joint task forces and investigations,
the kind of equitable sharing generally exempt from new
DOJ limits on the practice. Agencies also brought in almost
$2.6 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the Treasury
Forfeiture Fund between 2000 and 2013, averaging $184,000
per fiscal year.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

56%

44%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

22%
78%

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$377,702

$544,000

2001

$583,327

2002

$760,911

$854,000

2003

$778,112

2004

$965,239

2005

$1,074,514

2006

$1,578,231

$55,000

2007

$1,063,132

$14,000

2008

$1,123,649

$119,000

2009

$516,531

$282,000

2010

$1,294,439

$481,000

2011

$1,537,310

$159,000

2012

$1,939,529

$64,000

2013

$1,642,408

$1,000

Total

$15,235,033

$2,573,000

Average
per year

$1,088,217

$183,786

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$2.5

$2.0

$1.5

$1.0

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

$0.5

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

105

New Jersey earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

New Jersey’s civil forfeiture laws are some of the worst
in the country, earning a D-. In order to forfeit property, the
government need only show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was used in a crime. Innocent owners bear the burden of proving that they had nothing to do
with the alleged criminal use of their property. Even worse,
Garden State law enforcement enjoys a hefty financial incentive to seize: Local law enforcement agencies retain 100
percent of forfeiture proceeds. And when the state attorney
general’s office brings a forfeiture case, it retains 95 percent
of proceeds; the remaining five percent it deposits into the
Hepatitis Inoculation Fund.

New Jersey agencies have no statutory requirement to
track or report their forfeitures. However, it is the official
policy of the Division of Criminal Justice that county district
attorneys and local agencies report all forfeitures to the attorney general on a quarterly basis. The Institute for Justice
submitted New Jersey Open Public Records Act requests to
each of the state’s 21 counties and learned that New Jersey
district attorneys forfeited roughly $72.6 million between calendar years 2009 and 2013, 79 percent of which came from
cash forfeitures. These totals represent forfeitures conducted
just at the county level, however—they do not reflect forfeitures conducted at the municipal or state level.

State Forfeiture Data
County District Attorney Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

Currency

Vehicles

Real Property

Other

Total

2009

$17,356,606

$2,409,726

$3,395,000

$1,129,687

$24,291,019

2010

$11,748,931

$2,468,033

$236,500

$702,251

$15,155,716

2011

$9,631,874

$1,486,604

$101,018

$11,219,495

2012

$8,504,849

$1,640,893

$126,628

$10,272,370

2013

$10,181,872

$1,145,853

$9,151,109

$3,631,500

$293,117

$2,352,702

$11,620,842

$72,559,443

Average
per year

$11,484,826

$1,830,222

$726,300

$470,540

$14,511,889

Total

$57,424,132

Source: Reports of forfeitures supplied by county district attorneys in response to requests made under the New Jersey Open Public Records Act. These
data are presented in calendar-year format and do not include the proceeds from several vehicles that were retained for official use and for which no
value was given. The Institute for Justice also requested forfeiture reports from the Office of the Attorney General, which provided an incomplete set of
reports. Requests for missing reports went unanswered. The Division of Criminal Justice also requires municipalities to report their forfeitures, but IJ did
not request reports from each of these agencies.

106

New Jersey ranks 36th for federal forfeiture,

with over $70 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Ranking 36th in the nation on equitable sharing, New
Jersey law enforcement agencies made more use of the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program than did
agencies in most other states. Between 2000 and 2013, agencies received $70.6 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds, averaging more than $5 million per calendar year.
Almost all assets seized and proceeds received—97 percent
in both cases—came from joint task forces and investigations, activity largely unaffected by the DOJ’s 2015 policy
change. New Jersey law enforcement agencies also received
over $38 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the
Treasury Department, averaging more than $2.7 million per
fiscal year.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$3,626,894

2001

$2,029,842

$1,830,000

2002

$1,353,809

$172,000

2003

$1,939,229

$2,161,000

2004

$2,596,303

$2,615,000

2005

$4,502,998

$3,021,000

2006

$4,644,547

$2,453,000

2007

$3,622,276

$997,000

2008

$7,532,310

$2,371,000

2009

$6,770,763

$1,822,000

2010

$8,035,130

$7,893,000

2011

$6,439,456

$5,924,000

2012

$9,083,767

$3,843,000

2013

$8,457,766

$3,187,000

Total

$70,635,090

$38,289,000

Average
per year

$5,045,364

$2,734,929

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$10
$9

3%
Adoptions

97%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

$8
$7

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

3%
97%

$5
$4
$3

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$2
$1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

107

New Mexico earns an A- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Higher bar to forfeit property and conviction required
• Stronger protections for innocent third-party property owners
• No forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

In 2015, New Mexico enacted sweeping reforms that
abolished civil forfeiture and replaced it with criminal forfeiture. New Mexico’s forfeiture laws are now the best in the
country, earning the state an A- law grade. In order to forfeit
property now, the government must first convict its owner
of a crime. It must then tie the property to that crime with
clear and convincing evidence in criminal court. New Mexico’s reforms also shift the innocent owner burden to the government, which must disprove an innocent owner claim by
providing clear and convincing evidence that the person had
knowledge of the crime giving rise to the forfeiture. Finally,

a full 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds must be deposited
into the state’s general fund, eliminating law enforcement’s
motive to police for profit.
New Mexico’s new forfeiture laws require law enforcement agencies to file annual forfeiture reports with the Department of Public Safety, which will have to publish them
on its website starting in 2016. However, without a statutory reporting requirement prior to 2015, no state forfeiture
data were available for this report.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. New Mexico’s new forfeiture laws require agencies to provide the Department of Public Safety with
annual forfeiture reports, which will be published online beginning April 1, 2016.

108

New Mexico ranks 25th for federal forfeiture,

with over $41 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
New Mexico law enforcement’s use of the Department of
Justice’s equitable sharing program earns the state 25th place
in a national ranking, with agencies having received more
than $41 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds between
the 2000 and 2013 calendar years. The state’s rank is likely to
improve in the future, however: New Mexico’s 2015 reforms
prohibit law enforcement from transferring property worth
less than $50,000 to the federal government for forfeiture and
require that all proceeds be deposited in the state’s general fund. This rule effectively disqualifies New Mexico from
participating in federal equitable sharing since DOJ guidelines require that equitable sharing funds be spent solely by
law enforcement on law enforcement purposes. Finally, New
Mexico law enforcement agencies also received more than
$29 million in Treasury Department equitable sharing proceeds between the 2000 and 2013 fiscal years.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

20%
80%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$632,621

$27,449,000

2001

$2,113,046

$41,000

2002

$2,159,321

$108,000

2003

$3,427,170

$136,000

2004

$2,296,066

$253,000

2005

$2,751,648

$117,000

2006

$2,835,259

$3,000

2007

$3,237,591

$8,000

2008

$3,344,397

$178,000

2009

$4,157,954

$3,000

2010

$4,646,825

$20,000

2011

$2,423,660

$220,000

2012

$1,444,546

$432,000

2013

$5,769,752

$202,000

Total

$41,239,856

$29,170,000

Average
per year

$2,945,704

$2,083,571

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$7
$6

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$5
$4
$3
$2

31%
69%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

109

New York earns a C for its civil forfeiture laws:

• Higher bar to forfeit property and conviction required for some forfeitures
• Stronger protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 60% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

New York’s civil forfeiture laws are not the nation’s
worst, earning a C, but law enforcement is able to bypass
them through equitable sharing activity so extensive it is
surpassed by that of only two states. For drug crimes, which
typically draw the greatest amount of forfeiture activity,
the government must prove that an individual committed
a crime by clear and convincing evidence. Then the government must connect seized property to that crime by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to forfeit it. Most
other non-drug crimes generally require a criminal conviction. And in innocent owner claims the government bears
the burden of proving that a claimant had knowledge of or
involvement in the crime giving rise to the forfeiture. New

York law enforcement keeps 60 percent of all forfeiture proceeds—one of the lower incentives nationally but still a significant reason to seize.
New York law enforcement agencies are required to report “the disposal of property and collection of assets” to the
Division of Criminal Justice Services, which makes annual
reports to the Legislature and publishes them online. Reports could be improved with the addition of itemized lists
of forfeited assets, detailed breakdowns of forfeiture fund
expenditures, and other key details. Between 1997 and 2013,
New York agencies reported forfeiting an astounding $367
million, averaging $21.6 million per calendar year.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

District Attorneys

Task Forces
& State Agencies

Total

1997

$6,017,036

$1,995,320

$8,012,356

1998

$5,863,458

$2,579,656

$8,443,114

1999

$10,347,820

$2,163,736

$12,511,556

2000

$10,971,543

$3,113,189

$14,084,732

2001

$5,269,566

2002

$9,231,936

$3,426,377

$12,658,313

2003

$11,504,813

$2,234,839

$13,739,652

2004

$10,852,869

$3,691,085

$14,543,954

2005

$13,784,406

$1,975,790

$15,760,196

2006

$15,187,011

$4,846,924

$20,033,935

2007

$22,015,787

$53,129,385

$75,145,172

2008

$17,528,212

$372,858

$17,901,070

2009

$20,893,136

$1,057,203

$21,950,339

2010

$12,944,287

$770,502

$13,714,789

2011

$20,882,521

$29,101,000

$49,983,521

2012

$16,088,304

$840,011

$16,928,315

2013

$46,313,714

$504,013

$46,817,727

Total

$255,696,419

$111,801,888

$367,498,307

Average
per year

$15,040,966

$6,576,582

$21,617,547

Source: Calendar-year forfeiture reports obtained online from the Division of Criminal Justice Services. Reports include data submitted to the division by all law enforcement agencies. Data represent the value of all cash forfeitures
and the sale value of forfeited property; they do not represent the value of property that is forfeited but not sold.

110

New York ranks 49th for federal forfeiture,

with over $437 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
New York agencies apparently work around the Empire
State’s lower profit incentive and better-than-average property rights protections through the Department of Justice’s
equitable sharing program, which allows agencies to retain
up to 80 percent of forfeiture proceeds. New York agencies’
participation in the program ranks 49th out of the 50 states
and the District of Columbia. Agencies received a whopping
$437.5 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds between
2000 and 2013—more than $31 million each calendar year.
Eighty-five percent of proceeds stemmed from joint task
forces and investigations, equitable sharing practices largely
unaffected by former Attorney General Holder’s 2015 policy change. Moreover, proceeds have displayed an upward
trend over the years, starting at $24 million in 2000 and exceeding $67 million in 2013. New York agencies also brought
in $174.6 million from the Treasury Department’s equitable
sharing program between fiscal years 2000 and 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$24,271,882

$980,000

2001

$18,003,629

$22,266,000

2002

$14,153,690

$8,427,000

2003

$25,138,936

$9,466,000

2004

$24,676,590

$9,820,000

2005

$28,181,250

$15,303,000

2006

$20,776,571

$9,605,000

2007

$41,330,522

$9,064,000

2008

$30,495,247

$8,613,000

2009

$42,575,559

$11,959,000

2010

$28,668,646

$16,598,000

2011

$45,562,000

$12,863,000

2012

$26,545,255

$28,437,000

2013

$67,134,340

$11,192,000

Total

$437,514,116

$174,593,000

Average
per year

$31,251,008

$12,470,929

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$80
$70

42%
58%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$60
$50
$40
$30

15%
85%

$20
Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$10
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

111

North Carolina earns a B+ for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Highest bar to forfeit property and conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• No forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

North Carolina has some of the best forfeiture laws in
the country, earning a B+. State law requires the highest
possible standard of proof in most cases: a criminal conviction and therefore proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, in racketeering cases—those involving organized
crime—property can be forfeited in civil court by a preponderance of the evidence. Also in racketeering cases, innocent
owners bear the burden of demonstrating that they were in
no way involved in the criminal activity associated with their
property. North Carolina law provides no incentive for law
enforcement agencies to police for profit, as all forfeiture proceeds must go to fund public schools.

North Carolina suffers from a severe lack of transparency
and accountability on forfeiture: Law enforcement agencies
are not required to report on their forfeitures. The Institute
for Justice obtained records of forfeited property sold at auction by filing a North Carolina Public Records Law request
with the North Carolina Department of Revenue. Those data
indicate that law enforcement agencies forfeited more than
$4.6 million worth of property—including a “cowboy lamp,”
an Xbox 360 and a “red blanket”—between 2009 and 2013.
However, that figure underreports total forfeiture proceeds
because it does not include forfeited cash.

State Forfeiture Data
Proceeds from Sale of Forfeited Property
Year

Vehicles

Other Property

Total

2009

$532,934

$509,971

$1,042,904

2010

$563,901

$400,789

$964,690

2011

$589,671

$393,043

$982,714

2012

$486,585

$311,982

$798,568

2013

$595,063

$248,259

$843,322

Total
Average
per year

$2,768,154

$1,864,045

$4,632,199

$553,631

$372,809

$926,440

Source: Inventory of the sale value of forfeited property obtained through a North Carolina Public Records Law
request made to the North Carolina Department of Revenue. These figures are organized by calendar year and do
not include cash forfeitures.

112

North Carolina ranks 42nd for federal forfeiture,
with over $162 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
North Carolina law enforcement agencies may not
be able to profit from civil forfeiture under state law, but
they have found another way to supplement their budgets
through forfeiture: the Department of Justice’s equitable
sharing program. Ranking 42nd in the nation on equitable
sharing, law enforcement agencies in the Tar Heel State received more than $162 million in DOJ proceeds between
the 2000 and 2013 calendar years. Over half of these proceeds—and 69 percent of all assets seized—were the result
of adoptions, the equitable sharing procedure curbed by former Attorney General Holder. The remainder stemmed from
joint task forces and investigations, the vehicle for equitable
sharing that will continue largely unencumbered following
the DOJ policy change. Finally, agencies received over $42
million from the Treasury Department’s equitable sharing
program between 2000 and 2013, averaging more than $3
million per fiscal year.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

31%

Adoptions

69%

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

56%

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$7,054,017

$46,000

2001

$6,181,517

$754,000

2002

$4,976,389

$1,632,000

2003

$10,273,438

$899,000

2004

$8,686,128

$720,000

2005

$10,601,098

$3,802,000

2006

$16,012,628

$2,675,000

2007

$19,812,152

$2,734,000

2008

$14,386,700

$6,888,000

2009

$15,826,136

$7,081,000

2010

$10,275,267

$3,276,000

2011

$9,996,968

$2,761,000

2012

$15,278,506

$4,108,000

2013

$12,821,362

$5,002,000

Total

$162,182,307

$42,378,000

Average
per year

$11,584,450

$3,027,000

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$25

$20

$15

$10

Adoptions

44%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

113

North Dakota earns an F for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Lowest bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Along with Massachusetts, North Dakota has the worst
civil forfeiture laws in the country, scoring an F. In North
Dakota, law enforcement only needs to meet the lowest
possible standard of proof—probable cause—to forfeit
property. And when property has been used for illegal activity without the owner’s knowledge, the burden is on the
owner to prove her innocence in order to recover it. Finally, North Dakota law enforcement agents operate under a
particularly dangerous financial incentive: Agencies receive
up to 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds up to $200,000. If
the government’s forfeiture fund exceeds $200,000 over any
two-year budget period, the excess must be deposited in

the general fund—encouraging law enforcement agencies
to adopt a use-it-or-lose-it mentality.
The story of Adam Bush illustrates the hazards these
laws pose to property owners. In August 2013, Bush was
charged with stealing a safe full of cash. A jury later found
him innocent of any wrongdoing, and the state’s attorney
even admitted the evidence against Bush was “highly circumstantial.” Nonetheless, county sheriffs were able to forfeit Bush’s alleged getaway car. Unfortunately, it is impossible to get a good picture of the extent of forfeitures in North
Dakota because law enforcement agencies are not required
to track or report their forfeitures.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. Law enforcement agencies are not required to track or report their forfeitures.

114

North Dakota is the 2nd best state for federal forfeiture,
with $550,000 in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
North Dakota has made such little use of the Department
of Justice’s equitable sharing program that the only state with
a better track record is its neighbor South Dakota. Between
2000 and 2013, North Dakota law enforcement agencies received $550,000 in equitable sharing proceeds, averaging
nearly $40,000 per calendar year. Just 75 assets were seized
during this period, which averages out to five equitable sharing assets seized each calendar year. Eighty-seven percent of
assets seized and 94 percent of proceeds received resulted
from joint task forces and investigations, equitable sharing
practices largely untouched by the DOJ policy intended to
curb equitable sharing. North Dakota agencies also received
almost $1.4 million in Treasury Department forfeiture funds
between 2000 and 2013, averaging out to over $97,000 each
fiscal year.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
13%
87%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$50,660

$711,000

2001

$15,705

$2,000

2002

$34,384

2003

$7,353

2004

$19,167

$296,000

2005

$40,874

2006

$49,348

2007

$78,824

2008

$12,568

$349,000

2009

$91,410

2010

$8,524

2011

$26,582

2012

$96,481

$2,000

2013

$18,604

Total

$550,483

$1,360,000

Average
per year

$39,320

$97,143

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$0.12
$0.10
$0.08
$0.06
$0.04

94%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$0.02
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

115

Ohio earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:

• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Ohio has terrible civil forfeiture laws, earning the state
a D-. The government need only show by a preponderance
of the evidence that seized property was used in or is the
proceeds of a crime in order to forfeit it. Ohio law also places
the burden on innocent owners to prove that they did not
consent to, or have any knowledge of, the crime to which
their property is allegedly tied. Compounding these problems, Ohio law enforcement agencies retain up to 100 percent
of forfeiture proceeds in most cases and up to 90 percent in
juvenile cases.
The Buckeye State’s forfeiture reporting requirements
are also lacking. Agencies were previously required to provide the state attorney general with reports of their annual

forfeitures, but this requirement was done away with in 2012.
Agencies are now only required to keep an inventory of seized
and forfeited property. Through an Ohio Public Records Act
request made to the state Office of the Attorney General, the
Institute for Justice was able to obtain some forfeiture records
for the period of 2010 to 2012. However, several counties
and law enforcement agencies failed to provide the attorney
general with their forfeiture records, so the data included in
this report are incomplete. Between 2010 and 2012, Ohio law
enforcement acquired at least $25.7 million—likely much
more—in forfeiture proceeds. Ohio could greatly improve
law enforcement accountability and forfeiture program transparency with comprehensive reporting requirements.

State Forfeiture Data
State Forfeiture Data

Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Currency

Vehicles

Real Property

Other

Total

2010
Police

$2,617,510

$144,119

$35,494

$110,446

$2,907,570

Sheriff

$953,616

$27,738

$15,545

$235,368

$1,232,267

$1,797,349

$28,753

$15,212

$81,299

$1,922,613

$770

$293

$1,063

$204,356

$37,171

$2,976

$244,503

Prosecutor
State Agencies
Task Forces
Total

$5,573,601

$237,781

$66,251

$430,383

$6,308,016

Police

$4,807,982

$231,591

$231,928

$5,271,502

Sheriff

$1,369,994

$122,913

$90,701

$116,646

$1,700,254

Prosecutor

$2,435,681

$37,237

$127,023

$82,124

$2,682,065

$232,691

$75,675

$308,366

2011

State Agencies
Task Forces
Total

$335,355

$28,237

$2,039

$365,631

$9,181,703

$419,979

$217,724

$508,412

$10,327,818

Police

$2,892,867

$167,454

$9,308

$63,284

$3,132,914

Sheriff

$1,985,042

$119,615

$119,515

$2,224,172

Prosecutor

$2,153,093

$8,428

$11,699

$104,134

$2,277,354

State Agencies

$315,647

$48,850

$364,497

Task Forces

$929,141

$47,403

$54,964

$75,971

$61,521

$397,304

$1,093,029

2012

116

Total

$8,275,790

$342,900

$9,091,965

Grand Total

$23,031,094

$1,000,660

$359,945

$1,336,100

$25,727,799

Average
per year

$7,677,031

$333,553

$119,982

$445,367

$8,575,933

Source: Reports of calendar-year forfeitures from state and local law enforcement agencies provided to the Ohio attorney general and obtained by the Institute for
Justice through an Ohio Public Records Act request. Several agencies did not report to the attorney general, and several reports contained forfeited vehicles for which
no value or proceeds were listed. In 2012, the requirement for agencies to report to the attorney general was eliminated.

Ohio ranks 43rd for federal forfeiture,
with nearly $139
from 2000 to 2013.

million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Ohio law enforcement agencies are also some of the
worst offenders when it comes to participation in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program, ranking 43rd
nationally. Between 2000 and 2013, Ohio agencies received
$138.9 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds, averaging
almost $10 million per calendar year. More than three-quarters of these proceeds were the result of joint task forces and
investigations—practices left mostly untouched by former
Attorney General Holder’s policy change attempting to
curb equitable sharing. Ohio agencies also received $14.7
million in equitable sharing proceeds from the Treasury Department between 2000 and 2013, averaging over $1 million
per fiscal year.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$4,810,268

$7,000

2001

$6,816,723

$1,009,000

2002

$8,914,533

$254,000

2003

$10,672,377

$78,000

2004

$7,693,145

$1,212,000

2005

$7,251,515

$574,000

2006

$13,542,369

$117,000

2007

$14,695,725

$2,533,000

2008

$9,949,982

$2,021,000

2009

$8,041,896

$430,000

2010

$13,562,934

$970,000

2011

$10,017,794

$3,068,000

2012

$10,362,789

$1,673,000

2013

$12,525,943

$768,000

Total
Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$138,857,992

$14,714,000

$9,918,428

$1,051,000

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$16
$14

28%
72%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$12
$10
$8
$6
$4

24%
76%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$2
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

117

Oklahoma earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Oklahoma’s civil forfeiture laws are in dire need of reform. Earning a D-, Oklahoma state law only requires the
government to prove a property’s connection to a crime by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to forfeit it. Individuals wishing to bring an innocent owner claim bear the burden of proving that they had nothing to do with the illegal
use of their property. Oklahoma law enforcement agencies
also get to keep up to 100 percent of the spoils of forfeiture.
Law enforcement agencies in the Sooner State are only
required to maintain an inventory of seized and forfeited

property, providing little to no transparency. However, the
Institute for Justice submitted an Oklahoma Open Records
Act request to the Oklahoma District Attorneys Council and
obtained the judicial district fund accounting of cash forfeitures and proceeds from the sale of forfeited property for fiscal years 2000 to 2014. These data indicate that Oklahoma
law enforcement agencies forfeited nearly $99 million during
this period, the vast majority of which—72 percent—derived
from cash forfeitures.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

Currency

Non-Currency

Total

2000

$3,428,322

$932,007

$4,360,329

2001

$3,807,605

$1,287,544

$5,095,149

2002

$3,924,541

$1,109,558

$5,034,099

2003

$6,520,748

$1,836,377

$8,357,125

2004

$5,887,904

$3,151,573

$9,039,477

2005

$5,236,443

$2,628,347

$7,864,790

2006

$5,378,123

$2,508,176

$7,886,299

2007

$5,648,549

$2,406,032

$8,054,581

2008

$6,131,372

$1,775,205

$7,906,577

2009

$4,229,714

$1,345,651

$5,575,365

2010

$5,746,450

$1,217,681

$6,964,130

2011

$4,337,087

$1,910,194

$6,247,282

2012

$3,028,379

$1,281,709

$4,310,089

2013

$4,330,733

$2,249,982

$6,580,715

2014

$4,114,801

$1,595,682

$5,710,483

Total

$71,750,771

$27,235,719

$98,986,490

Average
per year

$4,783,385

$1,815,715

$6,599,099

Source: Proceeds from cash forfeitures and forfeited property sold at auction, displayed in fiscal-year format. The Institute for Justice obtained these data from the Oklahoma District Attorneys
Council through an Oklahoma Open Records Act request.

118

Oklahoma ranks 18th for federal forfeiture,

with over $59 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Oklahoma law enforcement agencies’ participation in
the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program earns
the state 18th place in the national rankings. Between the
2000 and 2013 calendar years, agencies received more than
$59 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds. While just 28
percent of assets seized through the program resulted from
adoptions—the type of equitable sharing severely limited by
former Attorney General Holder—these accounted for almost three-quarters of Oklahoma agencies’ equitable sharing
proceeds received. Data indicate that the average value of an
adopted asset was approximately $134,000—more than six
times the average value of an asset seized through a joint task
force or investigation. It is possible that Oklahoma agencies
requested federal adoptions primarily for high-dollar cases
that would have been more complicated to process at the
state or local level. Law enforcement agencies also received
over $2.7 million in Treasury Department equitable sharing
proceeds between fiscal years 2000 and 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$1,149,992

$45,000

2001

$893,449

2002

$6,551,075

$8,000

2003

$7,515,027

$6,000

2004

$4,256,057

$179,000

2005

$7,414,118

$142,000

2006

$6,875,791

$21,000

2007

$5,175,668

$5,000

2008

$2,667,450

$63,000

2009

$5,265,364

$249,000

2010

$3,821,659

$114,000

2011

$3,281,106

$739,000

2012

$2,302,774

$1,000,000

2013

$2,006,956

$155,000

Total

$59,176,486

$2,726,000

Average
per year

$4,226,892

$194,714

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$8
$7

28%
72%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$6
$5
$4
$3
$2

28%

Adoptions

72%

Proceeds

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

$1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

119

Oregon earns a C+ for its civil forfeiture laws:

• Conviction required, but low bar to connect most property to the crime
• Stronger protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 62.5% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Oregon’s civil forfeiture laws provide property owners
with some protections, earning the state a C+ law grade. Oregon law requires a criminal conviction for civil forfeiture.
Once the government wins a conviction, it must then link
property to the crime in civil court to justify its forfeiture. In
the civil proceeding, the standard of proof for most types of
property is just preponderance of the evidence, though the
standard is slightly higher for real property, such as a home
or piece of land. In most cases, the government bears the burden of disproving an innocent owner claim, unless money
or weapons are found in close proximity to drugs; in such
cases, owners bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the property neither derived from
nor played a part in a drug crime. Finally, Oregon agencies
get to keep 62.5 percent of forfeiture proceeds when a case
is brought by local law enforcement, and 57 percent when a
case
brought by aData
state agency. These percentages are lowStateisForfeiture

er than those of most other states, but they still represent a
sizable incentive to seize.
Oregon law enforcement agencies are required to report
details of seized and forfeited property to the Asset Forfeiture Oversight Advisory Committee, which aggregates the
data and publishes annual reports online. However, data are
missing for 2009 and 2012 because the AFOAC did not have
adequate funding to collect and compile reports during those
years—even though forfeiture proceeds may have averaged
more than $1 million annually between 2009 and 2013. Available data indicate that Oregon law enforcement agencies reportedly forfeited $5.2 million over the years 2010, 2011 and
2013. Unlike every other state except for Connecticut, Oregon reports civil and criminal forfeiture proceeds separately;
civil forfeitures accounted for 58 percent of proceeds.

State Forfeiture Data

Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Year
2010

Case Type

2013

Other Property

Total

$488,689

$41,933

$530,622

Criminal

$212,796

$33,093

$245,888

$1,192,532

$70,481

$1,263,013

$479,530

$49,573

$529,103

Total
Civil

2011

Currency

Civil

Criminal

$701,484

$75,026

$776,510

Total

$1,672,062

$120,053

$1,792,116

Civil

$1,033,807

$208,105

$1,241,912

Criminal

$1,316,736

$2,350,543

$71,868

$279,973

$1,388,604

Grand Total

$4,724,090

$475,052

$5,199,142

Average
per year

$1,574,697

$158,351

$1,733,047

Total

$2,630,516

Source: Reports of calendar-year civil and criminal forfeiture revenue obtained from the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, either through its website for newer reports or through an Oregon Public Records Law request for older ones. The Asset
Forfeiture Oversight Advisory Committee compiles data received from law enforcement agencies into aggregate reports, but
it reportedly lacked funding to compile reports in 2009 and 2012.

120

Oregon ranks 14th for federal forfeiture,

with over $16 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Ranking 14th in the nation on equitable sharing, law
enforcement agencies in Oregon made less use of the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program than did
agencies in most other states. Between 2000 and 2013, agencies received over $16 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds, averaging almost $1.2 million per calendar year. Over
80 percent of assets seized and more than three-quarters of
proceeds received resulted from joint task forces and investigations—the type of equitable sharing generally exempt
from the DOJ’s new limits on the practice. Finally, Oregon
law enforcement agencies also received $10.6 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the Treasury Department between the 2000 and 2013 fiscal years.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

17%
83%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

23%
77%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$1,165,931

$607,000

2001

$128,834

$46,000

2002

$729,363

$826,000

2003

$336,960

$1,322,000

2004

$441,062

$449,000

2005

$1,037,933

$920,000

2006

$585,642

$528,000

2007

$1,913,000

$727,000

2008

$821,585

$896,000

2009

$2,063,316

$1,486,000

2010

$1,211,101

$974,000

2011

$1,918,465

$656,000

2012

$1,755,165

$730,000

2013

$2,231,360

$436,000

Total

$16,339,718

$10,603,000

Average
per year

$1,167,123

$757,357

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$2.5

$2.0

$1.5

$1.0

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

Year

$0.5

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

121

Pennsylvania earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Pennsylvania has some of the worst civil forfeiture laws
in the country. Earning a D-, Pennsylvania law only requires
law enforcement to tie property to a crime by a preponderance of the evidence in order to forfeit it. Innocent owners
are required to prove that they did not participate in, give
consent to or have knowledge of the criminal activity with
which their property is associated. Worst of all, law enforcement agencies have every incentive to seize: They retain 100
percent of all forfeiture proceeds.
Law enforcement agencies in Philadelphia have taken
full advantage of the money-making opportunity afforded
by Pennsylvania law. Between 2002 and 2013, forfeiture revenues were equivalent to nearly one-fifth of the Philadelphia
district attorney’s budget.

The Keystone State’s forfeiture reporting requirements
provide limited transparency. Each county is required to
make annual reports of its forfeitures and forfeiture fund
expenditures to the attorney general, who aggregates the reports and sends them to the Legislature. However, these reports would be more helpful if they included such features as
itemized lists of forfeited assets or breakdowns of civil versus criminal forfeitures. The reports are not available online,
forcing interested parties to file a request under the Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Law. Data obtained by the Institute for
Justice using a RTKL request indicate that Pennsylvania law
enforcement agencies reportedly forfeited more than $152
million between 2000 and 2013, averaging about $10.9 million per fiscal year.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

Currency

Vehicles

Real Property

Other

Total

2000

$5,521,524

$656,273

$362,518

$103,134

$6,643,449

2001

$5,052,475

$440,521

$460,349

$44,958

$5,998,303

2002

$6,353,097

$818,455

$350,433

$93,250

$7,615,235

2003

$8,016,870

$609,507

$2,178,054

$45,321

$10,849,751

2004

$7,117,420

$901,419

$2,051,150

$224,456

$10,294,444

2005

$9,953,843

$744,491

$1,770,187

$35,587

$12,504,108

2006

$9,987,015

$1,089,929

$2,183,496

$95,689

$13,356,129

2007

$7,757,828

$1,202,026

$2,716,312

$64,046

$11,740,212

2008

$9,393,068

$1,207,816

$1,196,849

$205,040

$12,002,774

2009

$11,965,015

$831,473

$1,999,110

$151,472

$14,947,070

2010

$8,955,802

$887,842

$1,297,060

$145,239

$11,285,943

2011

$10,102,475

$1,108,395

$975,014

$83,871

$12,269,755

2012

$9,508,357

$974,925

$1,099,026

$111,912

$11,694,221

2013

Total
Average
per year

$8,381,972

$832,639

$1,677,598

$82,727

$10,974,936

$118,066,759

$12,305,711

$20,317,156

$1,486,703

$152,176,329

$8,433,340

$878,979

$1,451,225

$106,193

$10,869,738

Source: The Institute for Justice obtained the Office of the Attorney General’s forfeiture reports by filing a Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Law request. The
data represent fiscal-year forfeitures, including both forfeited cash and proceeds from the sale of forfeited property.

122

Pennsylvania ranks 41st for federal forfeiture,

with nearly $105 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Ranking 41st in the nation on equitable sharing, Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies participated in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program to a much
greater extent than did most other states’ agencies. Between
2000 and 2013, Pennsylvania agencies received $104.9 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the DOJ, a calendar-year average of almost $7.5 million. The overwhelming
majority of both assets seized and proceeds received—96
percent of both—came from joint task forces and investigations, which former Attorney General Holder’s policy
change did little to restrain. Agencies also received nearly $15.5 million in proceeds from the Treasury Forfeiture
Fund, averaging over $1.1 million per fiscal year.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$4,524,767

$444,000

2001

$3,407,270

$786,000

2002

$3,098,388

$587,000

2003

$5,586,394

$445,000

2004

$5,115,294

$112,000

2005

$6,402,002

$710,000

2006

$6,952,958

$3,238,000

2007

$9,970,265

$578,000

2008

$9,604,562

$2,217,000

2009

$9,349,668

$214,000

2010

$9,333,625

$3,803,000

2011

$9,955,269

$699,000

2012

$8,130,351

$1,138,000

2013

$13,425,422

$485,000

Total
Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

$104,856,235

$15,456,000

$7,489,731

$1,104,000

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$16
$14

4%
Adoptions

96%

Treasury
(fiscal years)

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$12
$10
$8
$6

96%

$4
Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$2
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

123

Rhode Island earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 90% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Rhode Island has awful civil forfeiture laws, earning
a D- grade. As in every state, law enforcement need only
show probable cause to seize property. But for property to
be returned in Rhode Island, it is up to owners to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that their property is not
forfeitable. Individuals making innocent owner claims also
bear the burden of proving that they had no involvement in
the illegal use of their property in order to recover it. Finally, Rhode Island law enforcement agencies retain 90 percent

of all forfeiture proceeds, a generous incentive to wield their
forfeiture powers.
Law enforcement agencies in Rhode Island are required
to report their forfeitures to the state treasurer and attorney
general, who then aggregate the data and provide annual
reports to the Legislature. Disappointingly, these reports are
not available online. Law enforcement agencies reportedly
forfeited more than $8.3 million between 2009 and 2014, averaging almost $1.4 million per calendar year.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Year
2009

2010

2011

Property Type

2014

Other Agencies

Total

$861,770

$138,389

$1,409

$1,001,567

All Other Property

$546,588

$15,214

$561,802

Total

$1,408,358

$153,603

$1,409

$1,563,370

Currency

$388,261

$49,751

$2,073

$440,085

All Other Property

$496,234

$37,125

$86,876

$2,073

$533,359

Currency

$530,706

$70,339

$1,693

$602,738

All Other Property

$472,184

$250,702

$321,042

$1,693

$722,887

$1,325,625

$513,626

$246,161

$1,818

$761,605

$1,135,429

$44,387

$1,179,816

$626,995

Total

All Other Property
Total

Currency
2013

State Police

Currency

Currency
2012

Local Police

All Other Property
Total

$884,495

$1,002,890

$1,649,055

$290,548

$1,818

$491,665

$133,850

$1,480

$540,396

$84,368

$973,444

$1,941,421
$624,764

$1,032,061

$218,218

$1,480

$1,251,759

Currency

$631,533

$134,184

$8,375

$774,092

All Other Property

$407,390

$69,881

$477,271

Total

$1,038,923

$204,065

$8,375

$1,251,363

Grand Total

$7,015,782

$1,274,351

$16,848

$8,306,981

Average per year

$1,169,297

$212,392

$2,808

$1,384,497

Source: Reports of calendar-year forfeitures obtained from the Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General via an Access to Public Records Act request. The
data reflect the total value of forfeited property.

124

Rhode Island is the worst state for federal forfeiture,
with over $248 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Rhode Island ranks 51st—dead last—on equitable sharing, thanks in no small part to a large 2013 payout from the
Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program. Between
the 2000 and 2013 calendar years, agencies in the Ocean State
received more than $248 million in DOJ equitable sharing
proceeds, but most of that came in a single year. In 2013, five
Rhode Island agencies split a $229 million payout from the
DOJ—the spoils of participating in a task force whose investigation resulted in a $500 million settlement agreement between Google and the federal government. Former Attorney
General Holder also took the unusual step of allowing the
East Providence and North Providence police departments
to use $49.2 million and $20.6 million, respectively, of the
proceeds to backfill police pension funds—a practice generally prohibited by the DOJ. Finally, Rhode Island agencies received almost $5.2 million in Treasury Department equitable
sharing proceeds over the 2000 to 2013 fiscal years.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$572,149

$8,000

2001

$406,444

$673,000

2002

$163,988

$45,000

2003

$897,074

$12,000

2004

$1,605,107

$3,458,000

2005

$880,906

$584,000

2006

$1,871,089

$6,000

2007

$984,973

$6,000

2008

$1,766,691

$63,000

2009

$1,242,657

2010

$1,399,315

$98,000

2011

$4,339,622

2012

$547,548

$89,000

2013

$231,417,276

$248,094,838

$132,000

$5,174,000

Average
per year

$17,721,060

$369,571

Total

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

22%
78%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

1%
99%

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$250

$200

$150

$100

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$50

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

125

South Carolina earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 95% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

South Carolina’s civil forfeiture laws offer very little
protection for property owners, earning a D- grade. As in
all states, law enforcement need only have probable cause
to seize property. But to get seized property back in South
Carolina, an owner must show that it is not forfeitable by a
preponderance of the evidence. Innocent owners also bear
the burden of proving that they did not consent to the illegal use of their property. Making matters worse, South
Carolina law enforcement agencies have a powerful incentive to seize property: They retain 95 percent of forfeiture
proceeds, with 75 percent going to police agencies and 20
percent to prosecutors. The remaining 5 percent is deposited into the state’s general fund.

Not only do South Carolina’s laws fail to protect property owners, but they also fail to provide much transparency: Law enforcement agencies are not required to track or
report their forfeitures. Instead, they only have to maintain
an inventory of seized property and share that information
with the appropriate prosecution agency. The Institute for
Justice was able to obtain records of the 5 percent of forfeiture proceeds deposited into the state general fund by filing
a South Carolina Freedom of Information Act request with
the state treasurer. IJ used these records to estimate that law
enforcement agencies obtained $22.7 million in forfeiture
proceeds between 2009 and 2014, averaging $3.8 million
per fiscal year.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Estimated Forfeiture
Proceeds

2009

$3,355,238

2010

$5,350,240

2011

$4,838,507

2012

$2,763,891

2013

$2,633,693

2014

$3,735,480

Total

$22,677,048

Average
per year

$3,779,508

Source: Estimated forfeiture proceeds based on
data obtained from a South Carolina Freedom
of Information Act request made to the Office
of the State Treasurer. By law, 5 percent of all
forfeiture proceeds must be deposited into the
state general fund. The Institute for Justice obtained records of these deposits and multiplied
fiscal-year totals by 20 in order to estimate the
total value of forfeitures in South Carolina.
These totals do not include the proceeds of
“chop shop” (stolen vehicles or auto parts) forfeitures, which are sent directly to the relevant
county general fund.

126

South Carolina ranks 29th for federal forfeiture,
with over $56 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
South Carolina law enforcement’s participation in the
Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program earns the
Palmetto State 29th place in the national rankings. Between
2000 and 2013, South Carolina agencies received over $56
million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds, averaging more
than $4 million each calendar year. Almost 80 percent of assets seized and 62 percent of proceeds received came from
joint task forces and investigations, equitable sharing practices largely unaffected by the DOJ’s new policy intended to
rein in equitable sharing. Further, South Carolina agencies
received more than $18 million in equitable sharing proceeds
from the Treasury Department, averaging $1.3 million each
fiscal year between 2000 and 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$779,698

$182,000

2001

$1,553,493

$156,000

2002

$3,773,898

$179,000

2003

$3,873,238

$909,000

2004

$4,049,345

$1,286,000

2005

$3,490,372

$1,012,000

2006

$3,955,589

$186,000

2007

$3,454,685

$491,000

2008

$4,041,224

$828,000

2009

$6,506,996

$4,410,000

2010

$4,786,969

$2,014,000

2011

$6,800,641

$397,000

2012

$2,928,667

$3,618,000

2013

$6,212,660

$2,457,000

Total

$56,207,475

$18,125,000

Average
per year

$4,014,820

$1,294,643

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$8
$7

21%
79%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$6
$5
$4
$3
$2

38%
62%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

127

South Dakota earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

South Dakota has some of the worst civil forfeiture
laws in the country, earning a D-. In order to forfeit property, law enforcement need only tie it to a crime by a preponderance of the evidence. An individual wishing to bring an
innocent owner claim in the Mount Rushmore State faces
the burden of proving that she had nothing to do with the
criminal activity in which her property has been implicated. Law enforcement also retains 100 percent of forfeiture
proceeds, which are first deposited into the attorney general’s Drug Control Fund and then distributed to law enforcement agencies for drug enforcement efforts. For example,
in 2013, South Dakota Attorney General Marty Jackley pro-

vided the South Dakota Highway Patrol with a particularly large forfeiture award—$240,936—for the purchase of a
single SWAT vehicle.
Compounding those problems, South Dakota law does
not require law enforcement agencies to track or report
their forfeitures. By filing a South Dakota Open Records
Law request, the Institute for Justice was able to obtain records of forfeiture proceeds from the South Dakota Office of
the Attorney General, which prosecuted almost $4.1 million
in forfeitures between 2010 and 2013, or over $1 million per
fiscal year. These figures represent all drug-related civil forfeitures conducted in South Dakota during this time.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Drug-Related Civil Forfeiture Proceeds
Year

Currency

Vehicles

Other

Total

2010

$288,776

$165,841

$4,805

$459,423

2011

$499,596

$160,487

$3,300

$663,382

2012

$1,183,938

$176,600

$4,258

$1,364,796

2013

$1,281,194

$301,048
$803,976

$7,900

$20,263

$1,590,142

$813,376

$200,994

$5,066

$1,019,436

Total
Average
per year

$3,253,504

$4,077,743

Source: Proceeds from drug-related civil forfeitures conducted by the South Dakota Office of the Attorney General. These data are presented in fiscal-year format and were obtained via a South Dakota Open
Records Law request.

128

South Dakota is the best state for federal forfeiture,
with just over $1 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Law enforcement agencies in South Dakota make less
use of the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program
than do agencies in any other state, perhaps because state
law makes it relatively easy for agencies to benefit handsomely from civil forfeiture. Ranking first in the nation on
equitable sharing, South Dakota agencies received over $1
million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds between the 2000
and 2013 calendar years. More than 99 percent of those proceeds resulted from joint task forces and investigations, however, meaning that agencies’ rate of participation in the DOJ
program is unlikely to drop following former Attorney General Holder’s policy change, which primarily affects adoptions. Finally, agencies received $52,000 in equitable sharing
proceeds from the Treasury Department between 2000 and
2013—or about $3,700 per fiscal year.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$23,520

2001

$101,424

2002

$53,711

2003

$133,472

2004

$14,837

$39,000

2005

$49,048

$1,000

2006

$51,649

2007

$23,056

2008

$8,395

2009

$203,961

2010

$193,756

2011

$69,608

2012

$102,994

2013

$15,592

$12,000

$74,645

$3,714

Total

$1,045,023

Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
1%

99%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

100%

Proceeds

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$52,000

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$0.25

$0.20

$0.15

$0.10

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

$0.05

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

129

Tennessee earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Limited protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Tennessee has appalling civil forfeiture laws, earning a
D-. Law enforcement only needs to tie property to a crime by
a preponderance of the evidence in order to forfeit it. In cases where property has been used in illegal activity without
the owner’s knowledge, the government generally bears the
burden of disproving an innocent owner claim. However, if
the property in question is a vehicle, an innocent owner bears
the burden of demonstrating that she had no knowledge of
the criminal use of her car. Law enforcement agencies in the
Volunteer State also retain up to 100 percent of the proceeds
from forfeiture.
Although Tennessee has no statutory forfeiture reporting requirement, the state’s Department of Safety and Home-

land Security maintains records of the value of calendar-year
forfeitures. However, this practice provides little transparency as interested parties must file a request under the Tennessee Open Records Act in order to access the records. Data
shared with the Institute for Justice indicate that Tennessee
law enforcement agencies forfeited nearly $86 million in cash
between 2009 and 2014; this figure does not include the value
of any physical property forfeited, such as cars or electronics, suggesting that the total value of forfeitures in Tennessee
over the period was much higher.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Reported Currency
Forfeiture Proceeds

2009

$14,244,407

2010

$18,861,974

2011

$11,639,516

2012

$15,127,022

2013

$13,126,402

2014

$12,973,137

Average
per year

$14,328,743

Total

$85,972,458

Source: Value of calendar-year cash forfeitures
obtained from the Tennessee Department of
Safety and Homeland Security via a Tennessee Open Records Act request made by a state
citizen working for the Beacon Center of Tennessee. Figures do not include the value of any
physical property that was forfeited.

130

Tennessee ranks 26th for federal forfeiture,

with over $69 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Tennessee law enforcement agencies’ participation
in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program
earns the state 26th place in the national rankings. Agencies
received more than $69 million in DOJ equitable sharing
proceeds between 2000 and 2013, averaging almost $5 million per calendar year. The overwhelming majority of both
assets seized and proceeds received—95 and 92 percent,
respectively—stemmed from joint task forces and investigations, the type of equitable sharing largely untouched by
former Attorney General Holder’s policy change. Finally,
Tennessee law enforcement agencies received more than
$11 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the Treasury
Department between 2000 and 2013—a fiscal-year average
of nearly $800,000.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
5%
95%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$5,076,408

$476,000

2001

$3,991,668

$2,220,000

2002

$4,295,220

$1,309,000

2003

$3,354,244

$107,000

2004

$3,382,851

$268,000

2005

$5,427,348

$479,000

2006

$5,605,520

$2,197,000

2007

$6,009,737

$55,000

2008

$5,107,079

$1,303,000

2009

$4,473,733

$1,885,000

2010

$5,767,881

$440,000

2011

$6,693,475

$214,000

2012

$4,644,197

$180,000

2013

$5,172,256

$48,000

Total

$69,001,617

$11,181,000

Average
per year

$4,928,687

$798,643

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$8
$7

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$6
$5
$4
$3

92%

$2
Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$1
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

131

Texas earns a D+ for its civil forfeiture laws:

• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 70% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement in most cases

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Texas has terrible civil forfeiture laws, earning a D+.
The standard of proof required to forfeit property in Texas
is just preponderance of the evidence, and an innocent owner bears the burden of proving that she was not involved
in any crimes associated with her property before she can
get it back. In addition, law enforcement agencies enjoy a
strong incentive to seize property. In cases where a default
judgment is entered—as is the case in the majority of forfeiture actions—agencies retain up to 70 percent of forfeiture
proceeds. In contested cases—those in which the property
owner challenges the basis for the seizure—agencies retain
up to 100 percent of proceeds.
Texas law enforcement agencies are required by law to
submit annual forfeiture reports to the Office of the Attorney
General of Texas, but these reports are far from comprehen-

sive. Additional information—such as itemized lists of assets forfeited, whether an arrest or conviction occurred and
breakdowns of civil versus criminal forfeiture cases—would
make the reports more useful. The attorney general’s office
is required to compile the reports and make them publicly
available starting April 30, 2016. Unfortunately, this new requirement was not in place during the data collection for this
report. The Institute for Justice was therefore forced to file
a Texas Public Information Act request to obtain the reports
and then manually comb through them to arrive at a complete picture of forfeiture statewide. Data obtained and aggregated by IJ reveal that agencies reported forfeiting more
than half a billion dollars—almost $541 million—between
2001 and 2013, a fiscal-year average of nearly $41.6 million.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Reported
Forfeiture Proceeds

2001

$18,983,273

2002

$7,294,323

2003

$43,416,158

2004

$40,798,353

2005

$29,491,437

2006

$37,588,776

2007

$49,414,291

2008

$56,615,941

2009

$56,100,475

2010

$40,713,990

2011

$50,524,997

2012

$46,821,446

2013

$62,926,512

Total

$540,689,972

Average
per year

$41,591,536

Source: Fiscal-year forfeiture reports filed by
law enforcement agencies and district attorneys
with the Office of the Attorney General of Texas.
The Institute for Justice obtained copies of these
reports by filing a Texas Public Information Act
request with the attorney general’s office. Values represent cash and sold property and do
not include the value of property retained for
official use.

132

Texas ranks 47th for federal forfeiture,

with over $349 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Texas law enforcement agencies are some of the nation’s
most aggressive participants in the Department of Justice’s
equitable sharing program, earning the Lone Star State 47th
place in the national rankings. Between 2000 and 2013, Texas agencies received a staggering $349.7 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds, averaging almost $25 million per
calendar year. As 82 percent of those proceeds came from
joint task forces and investigations, Texas agencies are unlikely to be seriously impacted by the DOJ’s policy change
intended to curtail equitable sharing; the new policy has little effect on such joint activity. Law enforcement agencies in
Texas also received nearly $170 million in equitable sharing
proceeds from the Treasury Department between the 2000
and 2013 fiscal years.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
13%
87%

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$20,488,438

$8,944,000

2001

$20,477,030

$2,769,000

2002

$12,514,424

$2,184,000

2003

$16,831,494

$5,524,000

2004

$17,323,278

$10,239,000

2005

$19,260,566

$11,114,000

2006

$31,991,647

$11,290,000

2007

$30,833,881

$14,434,000

2008

$30,415,342

$12,376,000

2009

$22,856,539

$12,903,000

2010

$42,176,737

$23,201,000

2011

$27,809,359

$14,518,000

2012

$23,002,298

$35,193,000

2013

$33,738,553

$5,084,000

Total

$349,719,587

$169,773,000

Average
per year

$24,979,970

$12,126,643

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$45
$40

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$35
$30
$25
$20
$15

18%
82%

Proceeds

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

$10
$5
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

133

Utah earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:

• Higher bar to forfeit property, but no conviction required
• Stronger protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Utah’s civil forfeiture laws have some good points, but
they still earn a D- due to the outrageous incentive they provide law enforcement to police for profit. Utah’s standard of
proof is better than most, requiring law enforcement agencies to tie property to a crime by clear and convincing evidence, but this standard still falls short of the standard applied in criminal proceedings—proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. The government also bears the burden of disproving
an innocent owner claim. However, these above-average
provisions are undercut by the tempting incentive Utah
gives law enforcement to seize property: Agencies may retain 100 percent of all forfeiture proceeds.

Utah’s laws also contain no reporting requirements,
only mandating that agencies maintain an inventory of
seized and forfeited property. The Utah Commission on
Criminal and Juvenile Justice has a policy requiring agencies to liquidate forfeited assets and deposit them into a
state Criminal Forfeiture Restricted Account to be spent on
various law enforcement projects. The Institute for Justice
obtained reports of forfeiture proceeds from the CCJJ by filing a request under the Utah Government Records Access
and Management Act. Data show that Utah agencies reportedly forfeited more than $10 million between 2009 and
2014, averaging nearly $1.7 million per fiscal year.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Reported
Forfeiture Proceeds

2009

$661,301

2010

$1,233,709

2011

$1,578,427

2012

$1,362,786

2013

$2,609,383

2014

$2,649,593

Total

$10,095,199

Average
per year

$1,682,533

Source: Reports of fiscal-year forfeiture proceeds obtained from the Utah Commission on
Criminal and Juvenile Justice via a Utah Government Records Access and Management Act
request.

134

Utah ranks 12th for federal forfeiture,

with over $11 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Law enforcement agencies in Utah made less use of the
Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program than
did agencies in most other states, ranking 12th nationally.
Between the 2000 and 2013 calendar years, Utah agencies
received more than $11 million in DOJ equitable sharing
proceeds. A large majority of assets seized and proceeds
received—94 and 82 percent, respectively—derived from
joint task forces and investigations, procedures largely unaffected by the DOJ’s new policy intended to rein in equitable sharing. Utah agencies also received more than $1.7
million in Treasury Department equitable sharing proceeds
between the 2000 and 2013 fiscal years.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$328,831

2001

$56,597

$1,000

2002

$38,000

2003

2004

$777,303

2005

$619,796

$36,000

2006

$1,040,810

$268,000

2007

$654,481

$202,000

2008

$1,601,988

$10,000

2009

$979,711

2010

$1,539,393

2011

$1,151,273

$934,000

2012

$1,720,958

$88,000

2013

$791,343

$135,000

Total
Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$11,262,484

$1,712,000

$804,463

$122,286

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$2.0
$1.8

6%
Adoptions

$1.6
$1.4

94%

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$1.2
$1.0
$0.8
$0.6

18%
82%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$0.4
$0.2
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

135

Vermont earns a C for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Higher bar to forfeit property and conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 45% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

In 2015, Vermont took one step forward and two steps
back with its civil forfeiture laws, raising the government’s
standard of proof to forfeit property while also creating a
new incentive for law enforcement agencies to police for
profit. Vermont’s laws, which earn a C grade, now require
the government to provide clear and convincing evidence
tying property to an owner’s conviction in criminal court
before the property may be forfeited. Unfortunately, the
General Assembly did not reform Vermont’s innocent owner burden—a third-party owner must still prove that she
was not involved in the illegal use of her property in order
to recover it. Last but not least, law enforcement can now
retain 45 percent of forfeiture proceeds. Although this incentive is much lower than those in most other states, it is

considerably worse than what Vermont had before: a statute mandating that all forfeiture proceeds be delivered to
the state treasurer rather than to law enforcement coffers.
Vermont law requires law enforcement agencies to file
reports of their controlled substances forfeitures with the
state treasurer. When the Institute for Justice submitted a
Vermont Public Records Law request to the Office of the
State Treasurer in order to obtain forfeiture reports from
2009 to 2014, the treasurer’s office replied: “No such records, reports, or funds were sent to the Office of the State
Treasurer during those years.” It was unclear at press time
whether agencies failed to report because no forfeitures had
occurred under state law or because agencies were out of
compliance with reporting requirements.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. Agencies are required to track and report their controlled substances forfeitures to the Office of the
State Treasurer, but no such reports were received by that office between 2009 and 2014.

136

Vermont ranks 15th for federal forfeiture,

with over $13 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Vermont ranks 15th in a nationwide comparison of law
enforcement agencies’ participation in the Department of
Justice’s equitable sharing program. Between 2000 and
2013, agencies received more than $13 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds, averaging nearly $929,000 per
calendar year. Although 57 percent of assets seized were
taken through adoptive forfeitures, 70 percent of proceeds
received resulted from joint task forces and investigations—
equitable sharing practices left largely intact by the 2015
DOJ policy change. Vermont agencies also received more
than $4.2 million from the Treasury Department’s equitable
sharing program, an average of over $302,000 per fiscal year.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$501,223

$68,000

2001

$884,229

2002

$786,808

2003

$945,358

2004

$1,024,029

$3,302,000

2005

$1,289,909

$90,000

2006

$1,099,626

$34,000

2007

$927,044

$36,000

2008

$1,030,892

$123,000

2009

$724,628

$225,000

2010

$1,110,274

$209,000

2011

$973,688

$18,000

2012

$472,794

$33,000

2013

$1,231,963

$95,000

Total
Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

57%
43%

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$13,002,463

$4,233,000

$928,747

$302,357

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$1.4
$1.2

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$1.0
$0.8
$0.6
$0.4

30%
70%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$0.2
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

137

Virginia earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Virginia has some of the worst civil forfeiture laws in
the nation, earning a D-. In order to forfeit property in Virginia, the government need only show by a preponderance
of the evidence that property is related to criminal activity. Innocent owners also bear the burden of proving that
they had nothing to do with the alleged criminal activity in
which their property has been implicated. Worst of all, Virginia law provides a tempting incentive to seize property
as it allows law enforcement to retain 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds: Participating agencies keep 90 percent of the
bounty, while the balance goes to the state’s Department of
Criminal Justice Services.
In 2015, the Virginia House of Delegates overwhelmingly approved a bill that would have required a criminal
conviction before property could be forfeited under state

law. However, the Virginia Senate killed the bill, opting instead to refer the proposal to the Virginia State Crime Commission for further study.
Virginia law requires law enforcement agencies to report the type of property seized and the property’s final
disposition to the DCJS. It does not require reporting on other important details, such as whether any criminal charges
were filed in a case. Moreover, there is no requirement that
the DCJS aggregate those reports or publish them online,
providing little transparency. The Institute for Justice filed a
request with the DCJS under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act and learned that Virginia law enforcement agencies reportedly forfeited more than $34 million between 2000
and 2014, 80 percent of which came from cash forfeitures.

State Forfeiture Data
Reported Forfeiture Proceeds
Year
2000

Currency
$4,514

Vehicles
$0

Real
Property

Reported Number of Assets Forfeited

Other

Total

Year

Currency

Vehicles

Real
Property

Other

Total

$350

$4,864

2000

2001

$1,697

$25,300

$2,110

$29,107

2001

2002

$3,282

$25,300

$28,582

2002

2003

$9,888

$21,550

$31,438

2003

2004

$16,279

$44,525

$300

$61,104

2004

2005

$19,296

$7,000

$5,700

$31,996

2005

2006

$64,288

$65,500

$109,000

$9,729

$248,517

2006

2007

$248,664

$130,080

$167,600

$500

$546,844

2007

2008

$187,620

$149,535

$10,193

$347,348

2008

116

2009

$641,335

$272,403

$397,600

$26,398

$1,337,736

2009

147

260

2010

$5,079,344

$1,374,702

$109,202

$201,890

$6,765,138

2010

1,139

298

155

1,595

2011

$5,378,117

$1,238,682

$110,000

$122,335

$6,849,134

2011

1,085

262

122

1,473

2012

$5,886,958

$939,962

$26,000

$98,980

$6,951,900

2012

1,033

284

104

1,425

2013

$5,614,249

$854,472

$59,300

$48,941

$6,576,962

2013

947

169

1,159

2014

$3,928,669

$400,743

$30,973

$4,360,385

2014

844

960

Total

$27,084,201

$5,549,754

$978,702

$558,399

$34,171,056

Total

5,355

1,288

531

7,194

Average
per year

$1,805,613

$369,984

$65,247

$37,227

$2,278,070

Average
per year

357

480

Source: Data represent the total value of forfeitures organized by the fiscal year in which assets were seized. The Institute for Justice obtained these data in a spreadsheet from Virginia’s Department of Criminal Justice Services by filing a Virginia Freedom of Information Act request.

138

Virginia ranks 30th for federal forfeiture,

with nearly $111 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Virginia law enforcement agencies’ use of the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program earns the state
a rank of 30th. Between 2000 and 2013, agencies received
nearly $111 million in DOJ equitable sharing proceeds,
though much of that came in just one year, 2007, when law
enforcement hauled in over $46 million. An astonishing 96
percent of these proceeds came from joint task forces and
investigations, practices mostly unaffected by former Attorney General Holder’s policy change, indicating that Virginia agencies’ equitable sharing behavior is likely to continue
on much the same scale. Finally, law enforcement agencies
also received over $75 million in equitable sharing proceeds
from the Treasury Department between 2000 and 2013, averaging close to $5.4 million per fiscal year.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

Year

DOJ
(calendar years)

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$3,204,727

$1,203,000

2001

$2,140,180

$1,731,000

2002

$2,977,011

$523,000

2003

$3,380,939

$1,084,000

2004

$4,709,337

$434,000

2005

$3,726,431

$3,877,000

2006

$5,407,170

$2,954,000

2007

$46,113,588

$1,880,000

2008

$12,546,214

$10,827,000

2009

$4,030,424

$1,794,000

2010

$5,763,384

$1,386,000

2011

$4,019,777

$994,000

2012

$6,836,413

$628,000

2013

Total

$6,077,868

$110,933,461

$45,838,000

Average
per year

$7,923,819

$5,368,071

$75,153,000

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$50
$45

7%
Adoptions

$40
$35

93%

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

96%

$25
$20
$15

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$30

$10
$5
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

139

Washington earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 90% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Washington’s civil forfeiture laws are among the nation’s
worst, earning a D-. State law only requires the government
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that property
is associated with criminal activity in order to forfeit it. Furthermore, innocent owners bear the burden of demonstrating
that they had nothing to do with the criminal activity associated with their property in order to recover it. Washington
law enforcement agencies retain 90 percent of forfeiture proceeds—a considerable incentive to police for profit.
Washington law contains only vague forfeiture reporting
requirements: Law enforcement agencies must submit quarterly “records of forfeited property” to the Office of the State

Treasurer. This leaves important details—such as whether
a case was criminal or civil or what type of property was
forfeited—unaccounted for. Further, there is no requirement
that even these limited reports be published online, requiring interested parties to file Washington Public Records Act
requests in order to understand the scope of forfeiture in the
state. The Institute for Justice filed such a request with the
state treasurer and obtained records of the 10 percent of all
forfeiture proceeds that law enforcement agencies pay to that
office. These records enabled IJ to estimate the total value of
forfeiture proceeds in Washington—more than $108 million
between 2001 and 2013.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Estimated
Forfeiture Proceeds

2001

$7,050,840

2002

$6,806,450

2003

$9,864,000

2004

$8,243,900

2005

$13,299,350

2006

$8,664,060

2007

$1,043,408

2008

$9,458,470

2009

$8,872,587

2010

$8,179,924

2011

$10,688,738

2012

$9,862,644

2013

$6,354,510

Total
Average
per year

$108,388,882
$8,337,606

Source: The Institute for Justice filed a Washington Public Records Act request with the
Office of the State Treasurer, and obtained calendar-year records of forfeiture proceeds transferred from law enforcement agencies to the
treasurer. These transfers represented 10 percent of all forfeiture proceeds in Washington,
so IJ multiplied the figures by 10 in order to
estimate the total value of forfeiture proceeds
in the state.

140

Washington ranks 37th for federal forfeiture,

with over $38 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Washington law enforcement agencies participate in
the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program
more often than most other states’ agencies, earning 37th
place in the rankings. Between 2000 and 2013, Washington
law enforcement agencies received over $38 million in equitable sharing proceeds, averaging more than $2.7 million
per calendar year. Nearly all of these proceeds resulted
from joint task forces and investigations—one of the federal procedures mostly left alone by the 2015 DOJ policy
change—suggesting that equitable sharing will remain a
problem in the Evergreen State. Washington agencies also
received over $25.6 million from the Treasury Department’s
equitable sharing program between 2000 and 2013, averaging more than $1.8 million per fiscal year.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013
2%
Adoptions

98%

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$1,174,744

$180,000

2001

$1,955,291

$804,000

2002

$831,932

$745,000

2003

$1,558,070

$310,000

2004

$2,617,737

$292,000

2005

$2,724,235

$575,000

2006

$2,128,441

$711,000

2007

$3,713,673

$4,249,000

2008

$1,455,282

$2,107,000

2009

$5,051,539

$8,910,000

2010

$3,997,841

$1,526,000

2011

$2,082,927

$997,000

2012

$3,798,990

$1,340,000

2013

$5,071,076

$2,871,000

Total

$38,161,778

$25,617,000

Average
per year

$2,725,841

$1,829,786

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$6
$5
$4
$3
$2

97%

Proceeds

Adoptions

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

141

West Virginia earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

West Virginia has some of the worst civil forfeiture laws
in the country, earning a D-. In order to forfeit property, the
government need only tie it to a crime by a preponderance
of the evidence. Further, in order to have their property
returned, innocent owners must prove their innocence of
the criminal activity in which their property was allegedly
involved. Finally, West Virginia law enforcement agencies
have every reason to police for profit—they retain 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds.
Forfeiture reporting requirements in the Mountain State
provide little to no internal accountability or public trans-

parency. Law enforcement agencies are required to report
the type, value and sale proceeds of all forfeited property
to their respective budgetary authorities. However, these
reports are not centralized at the state level, meaning that
obtaining statewide forfeiture figures would require submitting West Virginia Freedom of Information Act requests
to every local budgetary authority in the state. Even if one
were to go to all that effort, the reports lack key details, such
as breakdowns of civil versus criminal cases and accounting of forfeiture fund expenditures.

142

West Virginia ranks 13th for federal forfeiture,

with over $56 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
West Virginia ranks 13 for law enforcement agencies’
participation in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program. Between 2000 and 2013, West Virginia agencies received $56.8 million in equitable sharing proceeds,
though most of that came in a single year, 2007, when law
enforcement in the state took in $39 million. Nearly all—97
percent—of those proceeds came from joint task forces and
investigations, the type of equitable sharing that former Attorney General Holder’s new policy did little to change. West
Virginia agencies also received nearly $2.5 million in Treasury Department equitable sharing proceeds between 2000
and 2013, averaging almost $178,000 per fiscal year.
th

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$599,080

$21,000

2001

$307,451

$210,000

2002

$647,929

$7,000

2003

$767,293

$66,000

2004

$439,283

2005

$489,826

$373,000

2006

$574,704

$58,000

2007

$39,036,787

$24,000

2008

$6,424,002

$67,000

2009

$944,550

$284,000

2010

$1,869,484

2011

$1,078,692

$43,000

2012

$1,456,658

2013

Total

$2,160,783

$56,796,521

$1,336,000

Average
per year

$4,056,894

$177,786

$2,489,000

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$45
$40

81%

19%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$35
$30
$25
$20
$15

3%
97%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$10
$5
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

143

Wisconsin earns a B for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• No forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Wisconsin’s civil forfeiture laws lack important protections for property rights, but they are tempered by the lack
of a financial incentive to seize, earning the state a B grade.
State law only requires the government to have “reasonable
certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence”
that property is tied to a crime in order to forfeit it—a standard of proof akin to preponderance of the evidence. Innocent owners also bear the burden of demonstrating that
they had nothing to do with the illegal use of their property
in order to get it back. On the plus side, forfeiture proceeds
in Wisconsin must be transferred to schools, providing law
enforcement agencies with no incentive to police for profit.
Wisconsin law enforcement agencies are not required to
track or report their forfeitures. Despite a lack of state-level

data, there is anecdotal evidence of forfeiture abuse. For example, in 2011, Beverly Greer called the Brown County jail
to find out how to post bail for her son. Police instructed her
to bring the $7,500 bail to the jail in cash. When she arrived,
police brought out a drug-sniffing dog, which alerted to the
smell of drugs on the money. Claiming this as evidence that
the cash was implicated in illegal activity, police seized it—
even though most currency in circulation in the U.S. bears
traces of narcotics and Greer had documentation proving
the money had come from legal sources. It took four months
and the help of an attorney to recover the money.

State Forfeiture Data
No data available. Law enforcement agencies are not required to track or report their forfeitures.

144

Wisconsin ranks 28th for federal forfeiture,

with over $51 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
Wisconsin ranks 28th for its law enforcement agencies’
use of the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program.
Agencies received more than $51 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the DOJ between calendar years 2000 and
2013. Over 70 percent of assets seized resulted from adoptions—the procedure curtailed by the DOJ in 2015—but over
half of proceeds received stemmed from joint task forces and
investigations, procedures largely unaffected by the policy
change. Wisconsin agencies also received nearly $6.7 million
in equitable sharing proceeds from the Treasury Department
between fiscal years 2000 and 2013.

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

29%

Adoptions

71%

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year

Treasury
(fiscal years)

2000

$2,016,412

$108,000

2001

$2,122,265

$31,000

2002

$1,732,909

$821,000

2003

$2,993,749

2004

$4,341,389

$38,000

2005

$3,848,951

$90,000

2006

$4,678,932

$99,000

2007

$5,326,058

$837,000

2008

$2,706,203

$852,000

2009

$4,345,815

$3,070,000

2010

$5,537,999

$182,000

2011

$3,401,564

$89,000

2012

$4,178,782

$319,000

2013

$4,027,616

$121,000

Total

$51,258,644

$6,657,000

Average
per year

$3,661,332

$475,500

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$6
$5
$4
$3
$2

48%
52%

Adoptions

Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

145

Wyoming earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• As much as 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement

State Civil Forfeiture Laws

Wyoming’s civil forfeiture laws are in serious need of reform. Earning a D-, state law only requires the government to
tie property to a crime by a preponderance of the evidence in
order to forfeit it. Innocent owners bear the burden of proving that they had nothing to do with the criminal activity
associated with their property in order to have it returned
to them. Wyoming law enforcement agencies also have a tremendous incentive to police for profit—they may retain up
to 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds.
Even the Wyoming Legislature has recognized that the
state’s laws need fixing. In 2015, both houses approved a bill

that would have required a felony drug conviction and a sentence of at least one year in prison before property could be
forfeited. But Gov. Matt Mead vetoed the bill, arguing that
civil forfeiture “is important and it is a right.”
Unfortunately, Wyoming law enforcement agencies are
not required to report forfeitures. However, the Institute for
Justice did receive data from the Office of the Attorney General in response to a Wyoming Public Records Act request.
Data report a total of more than $1 million in state forfeiture proceeds between 2008 and 2013, averaging close to
$172,000 per year.

State Forfeiture Data
Year

Reported Forfeiture
Proceeds

2008

$184,704

2009

$299,621

2010

$145,130

2011

$237,279

2012

$116,084

2013

$47,974

Total
Average
per year

$1,030,792
$171,799

Source: The Office of the Attorney General’s
calendar-year reports of forfeitures reported
by Wyoming law enforcement agencies. The
Institute for Justice obtained these data via a
Wyoming Public Records Act request.

146

Wyoming is the 3rd best state for federal forfeiture,

with nearly $1.9 million in Department of Justice equitable sharing proceeds
from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing
DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds
When it comes to equitable sharing, Wyoming is one of
the better states in the country, ranking 3rd nationally. Wyoming agencies received nearly $1.9 million in equitable
sharing proceeds from the Department of Justice between
2000 and 2013, averaging slightly more than $133,000 per
year. More than two-thirds of these proceeds came from joint
task forces and investigations, procedures that remain mostly intact following the DOJ’s 2015 equitable sharing policy
change. Wyoming agencies also received $652,000 in equitable sharing proceeds from the Treasury Department between
2000 and 2013, averaging close to $47,000 per fiscal year.

DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$196,909

2001

$34,190

$8,000

2002

$30,494

$228,000

2003

$214,840

$6,000

2004

$127,874

$43,000

2005

$76,572

2006

$240,308

2007

$137,887

2008

$32,632

2009

$209,339

$17,000

2010

$241,867

$270,000

2011

$231,888

$68,000

2012

$58,597

2013

$31,983

$12,000

Total
Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

23%
77%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

Treasury
(fiscal years)

$1,865,381

$652,000

$133,241

$46,571

DOJ Equitable Sharing Proceeds, 2000–2013 (in millions)
$0.30
$0.25
$0.20
$0.15
$0.10

31%
69%

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Proceeds

$0.05
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

2005

Adoptions

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

147

The Federal Government earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws:
• Low bar to forfeit and no conviction required
• Poor protections for innocent third-party property owners
• 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to federal law enforcement

Federal
State Civil
Civil
Forfeiture
Forfeiture
Laws
Laws

The federal government’s civil forfeiture laws earn a D-,
setting a terrible example that, unfortunately, many states
have followed. Regardless of any protections afforded under states’ laws, federal law poses serious risks to property
owners nationwide. In order to forfeit property, the government need only tie it to a crime by a preponderance of the
evidence—a low standard. Making matters worse, innocent
third-party property owners bear the burden of proving
that they had nothing to do with the alleged criminal activity that led to the seizure of their property. Worst of all,
federal law enforcement agencies have a considerable incentive to seize property: 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds
go to federal law enforcement.
The departments of Justice and the Treasury are required to submit annual audited accounting reports of their
forfeiture funds to Congress. These reports are published
online,
but they provide
State Forfeiture
Data only basic accounting details of
the funds and do not disaggregate the data in a way that
would allow for a more detailed analysis of federal forfeiture. The Department of Justice tracks its forfeitures more
comprehensively through an internal database called the
Consolidated Assets Tracking System. The Institute for Jus-

tice obtained CATS data by filing a federal Freedom of Information Act request with the DOJ. While this system provides more detailed records than do those in many states,
it is not publicly available online and its thousands of variables and hundreds of tables make it extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for the average citizen to navigate. Requests
made to the Treasury Department for its forfeiture tracking database, the Seized Assets and Case Tracking System,
or SEACATS, had not been fulfilled by the time this report
went to print.
The federal government’s use of forfeiture has exploded in recent years, increasing by more than 1,000 percent between fiscal years 2001 and 2014. During that period, deposits into the forfeiture funds of the DOJ and Treasury totaled
nearly $29 billion. Measuring the funds’ net assets provides
a more stable picture of the volume of federal forfeiture accounts from year to year, accounting for proceeds carried
over from previous years as well as for obligations paid out
from the funds, such as equitable sharing payments made to
states. Net assets in the DOJ and Treasury forfeiture funds increased by 485 percent, from $763 million in fiscal year 2001
to almost $4.5 billion in fiscal year 2014.

Federal Forfeiture Data
Deposits to Federal Forfeiture Funds
Fiscal Year

DOJ

Treasury

Total

2001

$406,800,000

$65,745,000

$472,545,000

2002

$423,600,000

$113,072,000

$536,672,000

2003

$486,000,000

$194,854,000

$680,854,000

2004

$543,100,000

$271,565,000

$814,665,000

2005

$595,500,000

$258,636,000

$854,136,000

2006

$1,124,900,000

$214,651,000

$1,339,551,000

2007

$1,515,700,000

$252,192,000

$1,767,892,000

2008

$1,286,000,000

$464,762,000

$1,750,762,000

2009

$1,444,568,000

$516,736,000

$1,961,304,000

2010

$1,573,330,000

$959,767,000

$2,533,097,000

2011

$1,737,965,000

$817,154,000

$2,555,119,000

2012

$4,314,710,000

$397,002,000

$4,711,712,000

2013

$2,012,249,000

$1,612,361,000

$3,624,610,000

2014

$4,467,127,000

$736,531,000

$5,203,658,000

Total

$21,931,549,000

$6,875,028,000

$28,806,577,000

Federal Forfeiture Funds Net Assets
Fiscal Year

DOJ

Treasury

2000

$536,500,000

2001

$525,800,000

$237,300,000

$763,100,000

2002

$485,200,000

$173,000,000

$658,200,000

2003

$528,400,000

$177,231,000

$705,600,000

2004

$427,900,000

$194,103,000

$622,000,000

2005

$448,000,000

$255,307,000

$703,300,000

2006

$651,100,000

$236,757,000

$887,900,000

2007

$734,200,000

$361,387,000

$1,095,600,000

2008

$1,000,700,000

$426,779,000

$1,427,500,000

2009

$1,425,883,000

$594,513,000

$2,020,396,000

2010

$1,687,400,000

$986,071,000

$2,673,471,000

2011

$1,760,544,000

$1,452,922,000

$3,213,466,000

2012

$1,620,387,000

$1,555,895,000

$3,176,282,000

2013

$1,855,767,000

$2,486,628,000

$4,342,395,000

2014

$2,560,848,000

$1,903,622,000

$4,464,470,000

Sources: DOJ Assets Forfeiture Fund Annual Financial Statements; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports.

148

Total

The Federal

Government paid out over $4.7 billion

to state and local law enforcement agencies through the
Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program from 2000 to 2013.

Federal Equitable Sharing

Forfeitures conducted under federal equitable sharing
programs have also escalated considerably in recent years.
Between the 2000 and 2013 calendar years, the Department
of Justice paid out more than $4.7 billion in equitable sharing proceeds to state and local law enforcement agencies,
including those in U.S. territories. DOJ rules require that
these funds be spent by law enforcement agencies for law
enforcement purposes—even if state law directs forfeiture
proceeds to a neutral fund, such as a state’s general fund or
school fund. Annual DOJ equitable sharing payments have
grown from approximately $199 million in 2000 to over $643
million in 2013—an increase of 224 percent. The large majority of these payments—82 percent—were the proceeds of
joint task forces and investigations. These types of forfeitures were left largely untouched by former Attorney General Holder’s policy change intended to reduce equitable
sharing, suggesting that the equitable sharing program is
likely to continue relatively unhindered. Finally, from 2000
to 2013, the Treasury Department paid out over $1.1 billion
in equitable sharing proceeds.

DOJ and Treasury Equitable Sharing
DOJ
and Treasury
Proceeds
Payments
Made toEquitable
State andSharing
Local Agencies
DOJ
(calendar years)

Year
2000

$198,739,307

$85,129,000

2001

$220,353,479

$60,277,000

2002

$161,287,179

$50,844,000

2003

$221,984,964

$41,962,000

2004

$230,703,987

$48,123,000

2005

$269,262,768

$72,731,000

2006

$325,669,954

$66,558,000

2007

$443,802,375

$60,192,000

2008

$401,878,933

$90,198,000

2009

$380,865,399

$89,756,000

2010

$416,862,701

$129,102,000

2011

$437,096,583

$79,533,000

2012

$381,504,806

$137,627,000

2013

$643,317,075

$123,765,000

Total

$4,733,329,509

$1,135,797,000

$338,094,965

$81,128,357

Average
per year

DOJ Equitable Sharing,
Adoptive vs. Joint, 2000–2013

27%
73%

Treasury
(fiscal years)

DOJ Equitable Sharing Payments,
Proceeds, 2000–2013
2000–2013(in
(inmillions)
millions)
$700,000,000
$600,000,000

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

Seizures

$500,000,000
$400,000,000
$300,000,000
$200,000,000

18%
82%

Proceeds

Adoptions
Joint Task Forces

and Investigations

$100,000,000
$0

2000

2001

2002 2003

2004

Adoptions

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Joint Task Forces and Investigations

Sources: Institute for Justice analysis of DOJ forfeiture data obtained by FOIA; Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports. Data include civil and
criminal forfeitures. Because DOJ figures represent calendar years and Treasury figures cover fiscal years, they cannot be added.

149

Appendix A: State Law Grading Methods
The tables below include the grades each state earned on the three elements that
make up the civil forfeiture law grades. Table A.1 shows the grades related to standards

of proof. Only two states earned an A grade with standards equivalent to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the property was part of a criminal act. Most states—31 of them—and
the federal government earned a D grade with standards of preponderance of the evi-

dence. Under such standards, the government need only show that it is more likely than
not that the property was related to criminal conduct. Two states earned an F grade for
requiring mere probable cause.
Table A.1: Standard of Proof Grades
Grade Standard of Proof

A
B+

States

Beyond a reasonable doubt

Nebraska, North Carolina

Beyond a reasonable doubt/
clear and convincing

California, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Vermont

Beyond a reasonable doubt/
preponderance of the evidence

Missouri, Oregon*

C+

Clear and convincing

Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Michigan,
New York, Utah

Clear and convincing/
preponderance of the evidence

D.C.

D+

Clear and convincing/
probable cause

Kentucky

Preponderance of the evidence

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming, Federal Government

Probable cause

Massachusetts, North Dakota

* Oregon requires a conviction and clear and convincing evidence to forfeit real property.

With respect to innocent owner claims, the federal government and most states reverse
the traditional burden of proof by forcing owners to prove that they are innocent of and had
no knowledge of a crime in order to regain seized property. As Table A.2 illustrates, only 10
states and the District of Columbia require the government to prove guilt in order to forfeit
any type of property, thereby earning an A grade for their innocent owner burdens. Thirty-five states and the federal government earned F grades for requiring owners to establish
their innocence. The other five states earned C grades, with the burden generally depending
on the type of property.

150

Table A.2: Innocent Owner Burden Grades
Innocent Owner
Burden

States

Government’s
burden

California, Colorado, Connecticut, D.C., Florida,
Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
Utah

Depends on
property

Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Tennessee

Owner’s burden

Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming, Federal Government

Grade

Turning to the financial incentive grade, the federal government and most states
allow law enforcement to keep some or all forfeiture proceeds. As shown in Table A.3,
25 states and the federal government earned F grades for enabling law enforcement
agencies to keep up to 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds. Another seven states earned
D grades for allowing police and prosecutors to keep between 85 and 95 percent. Only
seven states and the District of Columbia earned A grades for barring forfeiture proceeds from flowing into law enforcement accounts.
Table A.3: Financial Incentive Grades
Grade

Proceeds
Retained

States

0% to 5%

D.C., Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Wisconsin

5.1% to 20%

20.1% to 80%

Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Texas, Vermont

80.1% to 95%

Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Washington

95.1% to 100%

Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wyoming, Federal Government

After states were assigned their respective grades, the standard of proof and innocent
owner burden grades were combined into a single “burden” grade by creating a weighted
average, where standard of proof accounted for 66 percent of the grade and innocent owner
burden for 33 percent. These weights reflect the relative difficulty each process represents
for law enforcement agencies in keeping seized properties. The burden grades were then
combined with financial incentive grades into a single weighted grade by assigning a weight
of one to the burden grades and a weight of three to the financial incentive grades, based on
the premise that law enforcement agencies are more encouraged to pursue asset forfeiture
by the percentage of forfeited assets they are allowed to keep than by the relative ease of the
forfeiture process.

151

Appendix B: Civil Forfeiture Law Citations and Other References

The table below provides further detail on the key elements of civil forfeiture laws discussed in this report, including
forfeiture reporting requirements, as well as supporting citations. Where applicable, it also lists other sources relied upon for
state profiles.

Alabama

Reasonable satisfaction, which is akin to preponderance of the evidence.
Standard of
proof

Ex parte McConathy, 911 So. 2d 677, 681, 687–88 (Ala. 2005) (overturning forfeiture on grounds that mere
suspicion property was involved in a crime does not meet the “reasonable satisfaction” standard); see
also Alabama Evidence § 3:29 (3d ed. 2014) (explaining that “reasonable satisfaction” is equivalent to the
preponderance standard).

The government bears the burden of proof when an owner claims an interest in real property (for example,
Innocent owner a home). An owner bears the burden in all other cases.
burden
Ala. Code § 20-2-93(h).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Other sources

100 percent.
Ala. Code § 20-2-93(e).
None.
Sallah, M., O’Harrow, R., Jr., Rich, S., Silverman, G., Chow, E., & Mellnik, T. (2014, September
6). Stop and seize. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/
investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/.

Alaska

Standard of
proof

Government must show probable cause for seizure, and the owner must show that the property is not
forfeitable by a preponderance of the evidence.
Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288, 290–91 (Alaska 1985); see also Alaska Stat. §§ 17.30.110, .114(a).

Owner.
Innocent owner
Resek v. State, 706 P.2d 288, 291 (Alaska 1985); see also Alaska Stat. § 17.30.110(4)(A)–(B) (placing burden on
burden
owner with respect to any conveyance, like an airplane or car).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Standard of
proof

100 percent if the property is worth $5,000 or less and something other than money, and up to 75 percent in
all other cases.
Alaska Stat. § 17.30.112(c); see also id. § 17.30.122.
None.

Arizona
Preponderance of the evidence.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4311(M).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-4304(4)–(5), 13-4311(M).
Profit incentive

Reporting
requirements

100 percent.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-4315, 13-2314.01.
Law enforcement agencies are required to file quarterly forfeiture reports with the Criminal Justice
Commission, which must aggregate those reports and submit them to the Legislature.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2314.01(F)–(H).
http://www.azcjc.gov/ACJC.Web/finance/ricomain.aspx

Other sources

152

Keller, T., Simpson, D., & Carpenter, D. M. (2012). Arizona’s profit incentive in civil forfeiture: Dangerous for law
enforcement; dangerous for Arizonans. Tempe, AZ: Institute for Justice. Retrieved from http://www.ij.org/
images/pdf_folder/private_property/forfeiture/az-forfeiture-report.pdf.

Arkansas
Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-505(g)(5)(B)(i), (h)(1).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-505(a)(4)(B), (a)(6)(B), (a)(8)(A).
Profit incentive

80 percent of the first $250,000 of each forfeiture goes to police and prosecutors and the remaining 20
percent goes to the state Crime Lab Equipment Fund. For forfeitures of more than $250,000, the balance in
excess of that figure goes to the Special State Assets Forfeiture Fund.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-505(h)–(i); see also Ark. Op. Att’y. Gen. No. 99-282.
Law enforcement agencies and prosecuting attorneys must submit reports of seizures and final disposition
to the Arkansas Drug Director, which maintains the Asset Seizure Tracking System database.

Reporting
requirements

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-505(f)(2–4), (i)(2)(B).
These reports are subject to audit by the Legislative Joint Auditing Committee, which produces an annual
report of seizures.
Ark. Code Ann. § 10-4-417.
http://www.legaudit.state.ar.us/#search

California

Standard of
proof

Clear and convincing evidence for cash or cash equivalents of $25,000 or more; beyond a reasonable
doubt—and a criminal conviction—for all other property, including real property.
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11488.4(i); see also People v. $9,632.50 U.S. Currency, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125, 128
n.4 (Ct. App. 1998) (saying the standard of proof “in this case” for cash worth less than $25,000 is beyond a
reasonable doubt).

Innocent owner Government.
burden
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11488.5(d).
Profit incentive

66.25 percent (55.25 percent to police, 10 percent to prosecutors, 1 percent to a fund controlled by
prosecutors).
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11489(b)(2).

Reporting
requirements

The Attorney General is required to compile annual aggregate forfeiture reports using data provided by
counties.
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11495(c)–(e).
http://oag.ca.gov/publications

Other sources

Drug Policy Alliance. (2015). Above the law: An investigation of civil asset forfeiture in California. Los Angeles,
CA: Drug Policy Alliance. Retrieved from http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Drug_Policy_
Alliance_Above_the_Law_Civil_Asset_Forfeiture_in_California.pdf.

153

Standard of
proof

Clear and convincing evidence.

Colorado

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-13-307(1.7)(c) (public nuisance), 16-13-505(1.7)(c) (contraband), 16-13-509 (currency),
18-17-106(11) (racketeering).

Innocent owner Government.
burden
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-13-303(5.1)(a), (5.2)(c), 16-13-504(2.1)(a), (2.2)(c).
50 percent.
Profit incentive

Reporting
requirements

Standard of
proof

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-13-311(3)(a)(VII), 16-13-506(1), 18-17-106(2)(d).
NB: This restriction does not apply to funds received through federal equitable sharing.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-13-601.
District attorneys are required to file annual forfeiture reports with the Department of Local Affairs.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-13-701.
Clear and convincing evidence.

Connecticut

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-36h(b), 54-36p(b).
Government.

Innocent owner Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-36h(b)–(c); see, e.g., State v. One 2002 Chevrolet Coupe, No. CV2200243, 2003 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 458, at *8–9, 2003 WL 824266 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2003) (holding innocent owner could recover
burden
her property because state failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she knew about her son’s
illegal activities).
Profit incentive

69.5 percent (59.5 percent to police, 10 percent to prosecutors), except in cases of sexual exploitation,
prostitution and human trafficking, when 100 percent of proceeds go to a victims’ compensation fund.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-36i(c), -36p(f).

Reporting
requirements

Standard of
proof

Seizing agencies must maintain an inventory of seized property.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-36a(b)(1).

Delaware

Government must show probable cause, at which point a rebuttable presumption in favor of forfeiture
arises, which an owner can rebut by a preponderance of the evidence.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4784(c)–(j); Brown v. State, 721 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Del. 1998); In re One 1987 Toyota, 621
A.2d 796, 799 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 4784(a)(7), 4785(a); Brown v. State, 721 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Del. 1998).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

154

Up to 100 percent.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 4110–4111; id. tit. 16, § 4784(f)(3).
None.

District of Columbia

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence (general rule); clear and convincing evidence (motor vehicles, real property
and up to $1,000 in currency).
If the property is the primary residence of the owner, an owner of the property must be convicted of the
offense giving rise to forfeiture.
D.C. Code § 41-308(d)(1), (4).

Innocent owner Government.
burden
D.C. Code §§ 41-302(b), 41-308(d)(1).
Profit incentive

No profit incentive. All currency and proceeds from sales of forfeited property must be deposited in the
general fund.
D.C. Code § 41-310(a)(2).

Reporting
requirements
Other sources

Standard of
proof

The attorney general and Metropolitan Police Department are required to create aggregate forfeiture reports
and will be required to publish them on their websites beginning January 1, 2016.
D.C. Code § 41-312.
D.C. Code § 41-306 (requiring a prompt hearing when property is seized).
Clear and convincing evidence.

Florida

Fla. Stat. § 932.704(8); Dep’t of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957, 967–68 (Fla. 1991) (requiring clear
and convincing standard of proof in forfeiture cases as a matter of constitutional law).

Government.
Innocent owner
Fla. Stat. § 932.703(6); Gomez v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 41 So. 3d 180, 184–85 & n.2 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that
burden
Florida law changed in 1995 to place the burden of proof on the seizing agency).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Standard of
proof

Up to 85 percent.
Fla. Stat. § 932.7055(5)(c)(3).
None.
Preponderance of the evidence.

Georgia

Ga. Code Ann. § 9-16-17(a)(1).

Innocent owner Owner. But in cases involving a jointly owned vehicle, no innocent owner claim is allowed.
burden
Ga. Code Ann. § 9-16-17(a)(2).
Profit incentive

Reporting
requirements

Up to 100 percent.
Ga. Code Ann. § 9-16-19(f).
Local law enforcement agencies and multijurisdictional task forces are required to file forfeiture reports with
their governing jurisdiction and state agencies and district attorneys with the state auditor. All agencies
are required to also submit their reports to the Carl Vinson Institute of Government at the University of
Georgia.
Ga. Code Ann. § 9-16-19(g).
https://ted.cviog.uga.edu/financial-documents/asset-forfeiture

155

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence.

Hawaii

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712A-12(8).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712A-12(8).
Profit incentive

Reporting
requirements

100 percent (25 percent to police, 25 percent to prosecuting attorney, 50 percent to attorney general for
various law enforcement projects).
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712A-16(2)–(4).
The Office of the Attorney General is required to aggregate agency forfeiture reports and submit them to the
Legislature.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712A-16(6).
http://ag.hawaii.gov/publications/reports/reports-to-the-legislature/

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence.

Idaho

Idaho Code § 37-2744(d).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Idaho Code §§ 37-2744(d)(3)(D)(IV) (conveyances), 37-2744A(d)(4) (real property).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

Up to 100 percent.
Idaho Code §§ 37-2744(e), 57-816(1).
None.

Illinois

In general, the government must show probable cause and an owner must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that her property is not forfeitable.

Standard of
proof

725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/9(G); People v. $174,980 United States Currency, 996 N.E.2d 1102, 1109–11 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2013).
But when property is worth less than $150,000 and is not real property, the government need not make
any showing. Forfeiture is automatic in these circumstances unless an owner files a claim and deposits a
bond worth the greater of $100 or 10 percent of the value of the property. The owner must pay the cost of the
forfeiture proceeding in full if she loses and must pay 10 percent of her bond to the court even if she prevails.
The owner forfeits 90 percent of the bond to the prosecutor if she loses any of her property in the proceeding.
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/6(C)–(D).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/8, 150/9(G).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

156

90 percent.
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/505(g).
Seizing agencies must provide an inventory of drug-related seizures to the Director of the Department of
State Police and reports of all property seized for forfeiture to the state’s attorney for the county.
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 550/12(d); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/5.

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence.

Indiana

Ind. Code § 34-24-1-4(a); see also Serrano v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1139, 1143–44 (Ind. 2011) (requiring state to
prove a close “nexus” between vehicle and drugs); Lipscomb v. State, 857 N.E.2d 424, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
(requiring state to show connection between money and drugs).

Depends on the property. The state bears the burden when an owner makes a claim to equipment allegedly
Innocent owner involved in the recording of a sex crime or makes a claim to a vehicle, but the owner bears the burden with
respect to other property.
burden
Ind. Code §§ 34-24-1-1(a)(10), (b), (c), (e), 34-24-1-4(a).

Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Other sources

Standard of
proof

No profit incentive.
Ind. Const. art. 8, § 2; Ind. Code § 34-24-1-4(c)–(d); Serrano v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1139, 1142 (Ind. 2011).
The Indiana Prosecuting Attorneys Council is required to aggregate forfeiture reports submitted by judicial
districts and, beginning on July 15, 2016, must submit a compiled report to the Legislature.
Ind. Code §§ 33-39-8-5(7), 34-24-1-4.5.
Gillers, H., Alesia, M., & Evans, T. (2010, November 7). Forfeiture law invites abuse of the system. The
Indianapolis Star. Retrieved from http://archive.indystar.com/article/20101107/NEWS14/311070003/
Forfeiture-law-invites-abuse-of-the-system.
Preponderance of the evidence.

Iowa

Iowa Code § 809A.13(7).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Iowa Code § 809A.13(7).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Standard of
proof

100 percent.
Iowa Code § 809A.17.
None.
Preponderance of the evidence.

Kansas

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-4113(g).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-4112(g)–(h), 60-4113(g)–(h).
100 percent.
Profit incentive

Reporting
requirements

Standard of
proof

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-4117(c)–(d); cf. Kan. Att’y. Gen. Op. No. 2007-15, 2007 Kan. AG LEXIS 16, at *7 –8, 2007
WL 2021740 (July 6, 2007) (determining that forfeiture proceeds may be applied to special law enforcement
projects, but cannot be used as a regular funding source).
Seizing agencies are required to submit forfeiture reports to their budgetary authorities.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-4117(d)(1)–(2).

Kentucky

Government must show clear and convincing evidence to forfeit real property but need only show “slight
evidence of traceability” to a crime for other property, at which point the owner must show the property’s
innocence by clear and convincing evidence.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.410(1)(j); Robbins v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 60, 64–65 (Ky. 2011).

Innocent owner Owner, except in the case of real property.
burden
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.410(1)(j); Robbins v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 60, 64–65 (Ky. 2011).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

100 percent.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.420(4).
Seizing agencies must report their forfeitures to the Office of the State Auditor and to the secretary of the
Justice and Public Safety Cabinet.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.440.

157

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence.

Louisiana

La. Stat. Ann. § 40:2612(G).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
La. Stat. Ann. § 40:2605.
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Standard of
proof

80 percent, while the remaining 20 percent goes to the criminal court fund.
La. Stat. Ann. § 40:2616(B)(3).
District attorneys are required to file annual seizure reports with the state Legislature.
La. Stat. Ann. § 40:2616(D).

Maine

Preponderance of the evidence.
Me. Stat. tit. 15, § 5822(3).

Owner, except in cases involving a family’s primary residence, when the government bears the burden to
Innocent owner show that any spouse or minor children knew about or consented to the owner’s illegal conduct.
burden
Me. Stat. tit. 15, §§ 5821(7)(A), 5822(3).
Profit incentive

No profit incentive—all forfeiture proceeds go to the general fund unless another transfer is specifically
approved by the court and by the governor or attorney general (in the case of a state forfeiture) or the
relevant governmental entity (in the case of county-level or municipal-level forfeitures).
Me. Stat. tit. 15, §§ 5822(4), 5824.

Reporting
requirements

Agencies must maintain an inventory of seized property.
Me. Stat. tit. 15, § 5825.

Maryland

Generally, preponderance of the evidence.
Standard of
proof

1986 Mercedes Benz v. State, 638 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Md. 1994).
But, in some circumstances, the government can (but need not) establish a rebuttable presumption in favor
of forfeiture if the government shows by clear and convincing evidence that, for example, money was
acquired shortly after a drug crime when there is no other apparent source for the money.
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 12-312(a).

Generally, an owner bears the burden of proof, but a primary family residence cannot be forfeited unless
Innocent owner both spousal co-owners are convicted of a crime.
burden
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. §§ 12-103(a), (e), 12-312(b).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Other sources

Standard of
proof

No profit incentive.
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 12-403(c)–(e).
None.
S.B. 528, 2015 Gen. Assemb., 2015 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015).
Snead, J. (2015, June 1). Hogan fails on forfeiture reform. The Baltimore Sun. Retrieved from http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-civil-forfeiture-20150601-story.html.
Probable cause.

Massachusetts

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 47(d); Commonwealth v. One 2004 Audi Sedan, 921 N.E.2d 85, 88–89 (Mass. 2010).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 47(d).
Profit incentive

158

Reporting
requirements

Up to 100 percent.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 47(d).
Agencies must maintain an inventory of seized property.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 47(e).

Michigan

Standard of
proof

Effective Jan. 18, 2016, clear and convincing evidence.
H.B. 4505, 98th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015) (to be codified at Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7521(2)).
Owner for drug-related forfeitures, government for other types of forfeiture.

Innocent owner Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7531(1); In re Forfeiture of a Quantity of Marijuana, 805 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Mich.
burden
Ct. App. 2011); cf. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.4707(6) (placing burden on government for non-drug-related
forfeitures).
Profit incentive

Reporting
requirements

Up to 100 percent.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7524(1)(b)(ii).
Agencies are required to file annual forfeiture reports with the State Police, which must compile those
reports at the county level, submit them to the state Legislature and, beginning on July 1, 2017, publish them
online.
H.B. 4504, 98th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015).
http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,4643,7-123-1593_34040_34043_54578-15547--,00.html

Minnesota

Standard of
proof

A criminal conviction is required for civil forfeiture and government must connect property to a crime by
clear and convincing evidence.
Minn. Stat. § 609.531, subd. 6(a), (b), (d).
Owner.

Minn. Stat. § 609.5311, subd. 3; Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 520 & n.6 (Minn. 2007);
Innocent owner Blanche v. 1995 Pontiac Grand Prix, 599 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Minn. 1999).
burden
NB: In DWI/DUI cases, a vehicle’s joint owner may not raise an innocent owner defense if the vehicle’s
other owner is guilty. Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d); Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 439–40
(Minn. 2009).
Profit incentive

Reporting
requirements

90 percent, except in cases involving prostitution or human trafficking, when 60 percent goes to law
enforcement.
Minn. Stat. § 609.5315, subds. 5, 5a, 5b.
Agencies are required to report their forfeitures to the state auditor on a monthly basis, and the auditor
must then make annual reports to the state Legislature.
Minn. Stat. § 609.5315, subd. 6.
http://www.osa.state.mn.us/default.aspx?page=CriminalForfeitures

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence.

Mississippi

Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-179(2).
Government.

Innocent owner Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-179(2); Galloway v. City of New Albany, 735 So. 2d 407, 411–12 (Miss. 1999); Curtis
v. State, 642 So. 2d 381, 384–86 (Miss. 1994); 1994 Mercury Cougar v. Tishomingo Cnty., 970 So. 2d 744, 747–49
burden
(Miss. Ct. App. 2007). But cf. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-153(a)(4)(B), (a)(7)(A) (placing burden on owner, but
statute has been interpreted in above cases to place burden on government).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Other sources

80 percent if one law enforcement agency participated in the forfeiture; 100 percent otherwise.
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-181(2).
None.
Wing, N. (2015, May 19). Police in Mississippi town buy new station, cruisers with funds from aggressive
civil forfeiture program. The Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/19/
richland-mississippi-civil-asset-forfeiture_n_7312988.html.

159

Missouri

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence and a criminal conviction or guilty plea.
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 513.607(2), (6), .617(1), .645(6); City of Springfield v. Gee, 149 S.W.3d 609, 615–16 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2004); State v. Eicholz, 999 S.W.2d 738, 742–43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor
Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Mo. 1996) (noting preponderance is the minimum standard in civil cases).

Owner.
Innocent owner
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 513.615; State v. Beaird, 914 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); State v. 1973 Fleetwood Mobile
burden
Home, 802 S.W.2d 582, 584 & n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
Profit incentive

Reporting
requirements

All forfeiture proceeds go to fund schools.
Mo. Const. art. IX, § 7; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 513.623.
Agencies are required to report seizures to the prosecuting attorney or attorney general, who must then
create annual aggregate reports and submit them to the state auditor.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 513.607(6)(2), (8)–(10).
http://www.auditor.mo.gov/AuditReports/AudRpt2.aspx?id=6

Montana

Standard of
proof

Clear and convincing evidence and a criminal conviction are required to forfeit property.
Mont. Code Ann. § 44-12-207(1).

Innocent owner Government must disprove innocent owner claim by clear and convincing evidence.
burden
Mont. Code Ann. § 44-12-211; see also id. § 45-9-206.
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

Standard of
proof

Up to 100 percent. When forfeiture money goes to the state, however, annual proceeds in excess of $125,000
must be divided equally between the general fund and a state forfeiture fund.
Mont. Code Ann. § 44-12-213.
None.

Nebraska

Beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the seizure is gambling-related, in which case the government’s burden
is preponderance of the evidence.
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-431(4), 28-1111; State v. Franco, 594 N.W.2d 633, 639–40 (Neb. 1999); State v. One 1985
Mercedes 190D Auto., 526 N.W.2d 657, 663 (Neb. 1995).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-431(4).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Other sources

Standard of
proof

50 percent.
Neb. Const. art. VII, § 5(2); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1439.02.
None.
United States v. $63,530.00 in U.S. Currency, 781 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2015).

Nevada

Clear and convincing evidence and a criminal conviction are required for civil forfeiture of property seized
in connection with a crime.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 179.1173.

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 179.1164(2).
Profit incentive

Up to 100 percent. However, if the government’s forfeiture account contains more than $100,000 at the end
of each fiscal year, 70 percent of the money in excess of $100,000 must be given to the school district in the
judicial district where the property was seized.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 179.1187.

160

Reporting
requirements

Agencies must submit annual forfeiture reports to the Office of the Attorney General, and the attorney general
must then aggregate those reports and, beginning on April 1, 2016, must publish reports on its website.
2015 Nev. Laws ch. 436 (S.B. 138), Sec. 30.

New Hampshire

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence. But no forfeiture may be maintained against a person’s interest in property
if that person has been found not guilty of the underlying criminal charge.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318-B:17-b(IV)(b), (d); State v. Pessetto, 8 A.3d 75, 79 (N.H. 2010).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318-B:17-b(IV)(b).
Profit incentive

90 percent (45 percent to local law enforcement, 45 percent to a state drug forfeiture fund), with caps. Local
law enforcement may keep no more than $225,000 from a single forfeiture, and amounts in the state drug
forfeiture fund over $1,000,000 must be turned over to the state general fund.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318-B:17-b(V).

Reporting
requirements

Standard of
proof

The attorney general must submit aggregate forfeiture reports to the state Legislature.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318-B:17-f.
http://doj.nh.gov/media-center/biennial-reports.htm
Preponderance of the evidence.

New Jersey

State v. Seven Thousand Dollars, 642 A.2d 967, 975 (N.J. 1994); State v. $2,293 in U.S. Currency, 95 A.3d 260, 266
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:64-5(b); State v. Seven Thousand Dollars, 642 A.2d 967, 974 (N.J. 1994).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Standard of
proof

100 percent when forfeiture is pursued by local law enforcement; 95 percent when forfeiture is pursued by
the attorney general.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:64-6(a), (c).
None.

New Mexico

Clear and convincing evidence and a criminal conviction are required to forfeit property.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-27-4.

When a person claims to be an innocent owner and shows an ownership interest, the government must
Innocent owner prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person had actual knowledge of the underlying crime
giving rise to the forfeiture.
burden
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-27-7.1(D).

Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

100 percent of proceeds must be deposited in the general fund.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-27-7(B).
Agencies are required to submit annual seizure and forfeiture reports to the Department of Public Safety,
which must aggregate the reports and, beginning on April 1, 2016, publish them on its website.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-27-9.

161

New York

Standard of
proof

Generally, forfeitures must be based on a criminal conviction. For drug crimes, however, a criminal conviction
is not necessary and the government need only establish that a drug crime has occurred by clear and convincing
evidence and then connect property to that crime by a preponderance of the evidence in order to forfeit it.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 1310(5)–(6), (9)–(10), 1311(3)(a)–(b)(McKinney); Hendley v. Clark, 543 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989).

Innocent owner Government.
burden
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1311(3)(McKinney).
Profit incentive

Reporting
requirements

60 percent.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1349(2)(g)–(h)(McKinney).
Agencies are required to make annual forfeiture reports to the Division of Criminal Justice Services, which
must provide aggregate annual reports to the Legislature.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1349(4)(McKinney); N.Y. Exec. § 837-a(6)(McKinney).
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ops/docs/

North Carolina

Standard of
proof

In general, forfeiture requires a criminal conviction. However, civil forfeiture is available in racketeering
cases, which are governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard.
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75D-5, 90-112; State ex. rel. Thornburg v. $52,029, 378 S.E.2d 1, 3–5 (N.C. 1989); State v.
Johnson, 478 S.E.2d 16, 25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).

Innocent owner In the context of a racketeering forfeiture, the owner bears the burden.
burden
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75D-5(i); State ex. rel. Thornburg v. 1907 N. Main St., 384 S.E.2d 585, 586–87 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

Standard of
proof

All forfeiture proceeds must go to public schools.
N.C. Const. art. IX, § 7; State ex. rel. Thornburg v. 532 B St., 432 S.E.2d 684, 686–87 (N.C. 1993).
None.

North Dakota

The government’s burden is probable cause; an innocent owner’s burden is preponderance of the evidence.
N.D. Cent. Code § 19-03.1-36.6; State v. One 2002 Dodge Intrepid Auto., 841 N.W.2d 239, 242 (N.D. 2013); State
v. $44,140.00 U.S. Currency, 820 N.W.2d 697, 702 (N.D. 2012); but cf. N.D. Cent. Code § 19-03.1-36.2 (stating
that the standard of proof in forfeiture proceedings is preponderance of the evidence).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
N.D. Cent. Code § 19-03.1-37(1).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Other sources

Standard of
proof

Up to 100 percent. If the government’s forfeiture fund exceeds $200,000 over any two-year budget period,
the excess must be deposited in the general fund.
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 54-12-14, 19-03.1-36(5).
None.
J.F. (2014, May 12). Not so fast. The Economist. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/blogs/
democracyinamerica/2014/05/asset-forfeiture.
Preponderance of the evidence.

Ohio

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2981.05(D).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2981.04(E), .09(A).
Profit incentive

162

Reporting
requirements

Up to 100 percent in general and up to 90 percent in juvenile cases.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2981.13(B)(4).
Agencies must maintain an inventory of seized property.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2981.03(G), 2981.11(B).

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence.

Oklahoma

Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-503(B)–(C).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-503(A)(4)(b), (A)(7); State ex rel. Campbell v. $18,235, 184 P.3d 1078, 1081 (Okla. 2008).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

Standard of
proof

Up to 100 percent.
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, §§ 2-503(F)(2), 2-506(L), 2-508.
Agencies must maintain an inventory of seized and forfeited property.
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-503(G).

Oregon

A criminal conviction is required for all civil forfeitures. Preponderance of the evidence applies to personal
property; clear and convincing evidence applies to real property.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 131A.255(1), (3).

Government, except in cases where cash, weapons or negotiable instruments were found in close proximity
Innocent owner to drugs, in which cases the owner bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
items are not the proceeds or instrumentalities of a drug crime.
burden
Or. Rev. Stat. § 131A.255(2), (5).

Profit incentive

Reporting
requirements

62.5 percent when brought by local law enforcement; 57 percent when brought by the state.
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 131A.360(4), (6), .365(3), (5).
Agencies are required to report forfeiture information to the forfeiture counsel, which is required to report
every seizure and its final disposition to the Asset Forfeiture Oversight Advisory Committee. The committee
must aggregate these reports and submit them to the Legislature.
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 131A.450, 131.600, 131A.455(5).
http://www.oregon.gov/cjc/assetforfeiture/Pages/Reporting.aspx

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence.

Pennsylvania

Commonwealth v. $6,425, 880 A.2d 523, 529–30 & n.6 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. 2314 Tasker St., 67 A.3d 202,
206 nn.8–9 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).

Owner.
Innocent owner
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6802(j); Commonwealth v. $6,425, 880 A.2d 523, 530 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. 2314 Tasker
burden
St., 67 A.3d 202, 206 n. 9 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Other sources

100 percent.
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6801(e)–(h).
Counties are required to submit annual forfeiture reports to the Office of the Attorney General, which must
aggregate the reports and provide them to the Legislature.
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6801(i)–(j).
Philadelphia district attorney budget figures: http://www.phila.gov/investor/CAFR.html

163

Rhode Island

Standard of
proof

Government must show probable cause for seizure and the owner must show that the property is not
forfeitable by a preponderance of the evidence.
21 R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5.04.2(p).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
21 R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5.04.2(p).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

Other sources

90 percent.
21 R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5.04(b)(3).
Agencies are required to provide annual forfeiture reports to the state treasurer, and the treasurer and
attorney general must submit aggregate annual forfeiture reports to the state Legislature.
21 R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5.04(d); 7 R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-4.1(e).
U.S. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs. (2015). Google forfeits $500 million generated by online
ads & prescription drug sales by Canadian online pharmacies [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/google-forfeits-500-million-generated-online-ads-prescription-drug-sales-canadianonline.
Office of U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse. (2013). U.S. Department of Justice grants RI cities flexibility to
use Google settlement funds to stabilize pensions [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.
senate.gov/news/release/us-department-of-justice-grants-ri-cities-flexibility-to-use-google-settlementfunds-to-stabilize-pensions.

South Carolina

Standard of
proof

Government must show probable cause for seizure and the owner must show that the property is not
forfeitable by a preponderance of the evidence.
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-53-520(b) to -586(b); Pope v. Gordon, 633 S.E.2d 148, 151 (S.C. 2006).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-540; Pope v. Gordon, 633 S.E.2d 148, 151 (S.C. 2006).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

Standard of
proof

95 percent (75 percent to law enforcement, 20 percent to prosecutors).
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-530(e).
Agencies are required to maintain an inventory of seized property and submit those inventories to the
appropriate prosecution agency.
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-520(j).
Preponderance of the evidence.

South Dakota

S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-80.

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20B-88.
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Other sources

164

100 percent. Forfeiture proceeds go into the attorney general’s “drug control fund” and then are distributed
to law enforcement for drug enforcement efforts.
S.D. Codified Laws §§ 34-20B-64, 34-20B-89.
None.
South Dakota Office of the Attorney General. (2013). South Dakota Highway Patrol to receive money
for SWAT vehicle from Drug Control Fund [Press release]. Retrieved from http://atg.sd.gov/News/
NewsReleases/NewsReleasesView/tabid/441/itemID/3177/moduleID/597/Default.aspx.

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence.

Tennessee

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-33-210(a); Stuart v. Dep’t of Safety, 963 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Tenn. 1998).

Government, except in cases of vehicles, when the claimant must prove that she had no knowledge of the
Innocent owner criminal use before a claim will be allowed.
burden
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-33-108(a), 40-33-210(a)(2), (c)–(f).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Standard of
proof

Up to 100 percent.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-33-211(a)–(b).
None.

Texas

Preponderance of the evidence.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.05(b).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.02(c), (h)(1).
Profit incentive

Reporting
requirements

Standard of
proof

Up to 100 percent in contested cases; up to 70 percent in cases where a default judgment is entered.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.06(c), (c-3); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. GA-0122 (Nov. 18, 2003) (noting
70–30 split between district attorney and Department of Public Safety).
The Office of the Attorney General is required to create annual aggregate forfeiture reports from reports
submitted by agencies and, beginning on April 30, 2016, to publish those aggregate reports online.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.06(g), (s).
Clear and convincing evidence.

Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 24-4-104(6).

Innocent owner Government.
burden
Utah Code Ann. § 24-4-107(2).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Standard of
proof

100 percent.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 24-4-115 to -117.
Agencies are required to maintain an inventory of seized property.
Utah Code Ann. § 24-2-103(2)(b).

Vermont

Clear and convincing evidence and a criminal conviction are required for civil forfeiture.
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 4243(a), (c), 4244(e).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4244(d).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Other sources

45 percent.
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4247(b)(1).
Agencies are required to submit reports of drug-related forfeitures to the state treasurer.
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit 18, § 4248.
Email correspondence between Angela C. Erickson of the Institute for Justice and Tim Lueders-Dumont,
public records officer in the Vermont Office of the State Treasurer (2015, June 15).

165

Standard of
proof

Virginia

Preponderance of the evidence.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-386.10(A).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-386.10(A), 19.2-386.8(3).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Other sources

Standard of
proof

100 percent (90 percent to participating agencies, 10 percent to the Department of Criminal Justice Services).
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-386.14(A1)–(B).
Agencies must report seizures and forfeitures to the Department of Criminal Justice Services.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-386.4; 6 Va. Admin. Code §§ 20-150-30, -40.
Fain, T. (2015, February 17). Virginia senate kills asset forfeiture reforms. Daily Press. Retrieved from http://
www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dp-nws-ga-asset-forfeiture-20150217-story.html.
Preponderance of the evidence.

Washington

Wash Rev. Code § 69.50.505(5).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.505(1)(d)(ii), (g), (h)(i).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Standard of
proof

90 percent.
Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.505(9).
Seizing agencies are required to file quarterly reports of forfeited property with the state treasurer.
Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.505(8)(c)–(d).
Preponderance of the evidence.

West Virginia

W. Va. Code § 60A-7-705(e).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
W. Va. Code § 60A-7-703(a)(5)(ii), (7), (8).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

Standard of
proof

100 percent.
W. Va. Code § 60A-7-706.
Agencies are required to submit annual forfeiture reports to their local budgetary authorities.
W. Va. Code § 60A-7-707(h).

Wisconsin

“[R]easonable certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence.”
Wis. Stat. § 961.555(3); In re Return of Prop., 594 N.W.2d 738, 744 & n.9 (Wis. 1999); see generally Nommensen
v. Am. Cont’l Ins. Co., 629 N.W.2d 301, 303–05 (Wis. 2001) (describing this unique standard as the burden of
proof in civil cases).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Wis. Stat. § 961.56(1).
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements

Other sources

166

No profit incentive.
Wis. Stat. § 961.55(5)(b), (e) (permitting seizing agencies to retain reasonable expenses).
None.
Balko, R. (2012, May 21). Under asset forfeiture law, Wisconsin cops confiscate families’ bail money. The
Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/20/asset-forfeiture-wisconsinbail-confiscated_n_1522328.html.
Park, M. (2009, August 17). 90 percent of U.S. bills carry traces of cocaine. CNN. Retrieved from http://
www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/08/14/cocaine.traces.money/.

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence.

Wyoming

See In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00, 2012 WY 75, ¶ 9, 278 P.3d 234, 237 (Wyo. 2012).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1050.
Profit incentive
Reporting
requirements
Other sources

Up to 100 percent.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1049(e).
None.
Harper, C. (2015, February 17). Wyoming governor vetoes asset forfeiture reform bill. The Daily Caller.
Retrieved from http://dailycaller.com/2015/02/17/breaking-wyoming-governor-vetos-asset-forfeiturereform-bill/.

Federal Government

Standard of
proof

Preponderance of the evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 983(c).

Innocent owner Owner.
burden
18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
Profit incentive

100 percent.
18 U.S.C. § 981(e); see also United States v. Pescatore, 637 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2011).
The Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury are required to compile annual forfeiture reports
and publish them online.

Reporting
requirements

28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6); 31 U.S.C. § 9705(f).
DOJ Assets Forfeiture Fund Annual Financial Statements: http://www.justice.gov/afp/annual-financialstatements
Treasury Forfeiture Fund Accountability Reports: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terroristillicit-finance/Asset-Forfeiture/Pages/annual-reports.aspx

167

Endnotes
1

168

Ingraham, C. (2015, June 30). Drug cops took
a college kid’s savings and now 13 police
departments want a cut. The Washington Post.
Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/06/30/drug-copstook-a-college-kids-life-savings-and-now-13-policedepartments-want-a-cut/.

Gabbidon, S. L., Higgins, G. E., Martin, F., Nelson,
M., & Brown, J. (2011). An exploratory analysis of
federal litigation in the United States challenging asset
forfeiture. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 22(1), 50–64.

Chi, K. A.-Y. (2002). Follow the money: Getting to
the root of the problem with civil asset forfeiture in
California. California Law Review, 90(5), 1635–1673.

State of Texas v. One 2004 Chevrolet Silverado, Civ. No.
2009-52869 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 19, 2009).

United States v. One Solid Gold Object in Form of a
Rooster, 191 F. Supp. 198 (D. Nev. 1961).

Boudreaux, D. J., & Pritchard, A. C. (1996). Civil
forfeiture and the war on drugs: Lessons from
economics and history. San Diego Law Review, 33,
79–135.

Boudreaux and Pritchard, 1996.

Pilon, R. (1994). Can American asset forfeiture
law be justified? New York Law School Law Review,
39(1–2), 311–333.

Boudreaux and Pritchard, 1996.

Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 310, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).

Among other modest changes, the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act required the government,
not the claimant, to prove the property is
connected to a crime, eliminated the requirement
that claimants post a cost bond before being able
to contest a civil forfeiture in court, and provided
representation for indigent claimants under
limited circumstances.

Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 106185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000).

Rainbolt, G., & Reif, A. F. (1997). Crime, property,
and justice: The ethics of civil forfeiture. Public
Affairs Quarterly, 11(1), 39–55.

Roberts, R. (2006). Incentives matter. Library of
Economics and Liberty. Retrieved from http://
www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/
Robertsincentives.html.

For the annual financial statements of the DOJ’s
Asset Forfeiture Program, see U.S. Department of
Justice. (2015). Annual financial statements. Retrieved
from http://www.justice.gov/afp/annualfinancial-statements.

For the annual accountability reports of the
Treasury Forfeiture Fund, see U.S. Department
of the Treasury. (2015). Annual reports. Retrieved
from http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
terrorist-illicit-finance/Asset-Forfeiture/Pages/
annual-reports.aspx.

2,107 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars.

724 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars.

338 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars.

These states may not be representative.

Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington and Wyoming.

This figure is an estimate for at least three reasons.
First, despite reporting requirements, agencies
in some states sometimes do not submit reports.
Second, some reports use calendar years and others
fiscal years, the latter of which may vary from state
to state. Third, some states do not have standardized
reporting requirements, making some degree of
interpretation necessary in calculating totals.

These 14 states were included because they had the
most consistent data over the time span. However,
in some states, agencies did not report in some years,
meaning that these numbers likely undercount total
forfeiture proceeds. In addition, these are estimates
for at least three reasons. First, despite reporting
requirements, agencies in some states sometimes do
not submit reports. Second, some reports use calendar
years and others fiscal years, the latter of which may
vary from state to state. Third, some states do not have
standardized reporting requirements, making some
degree of interpretation necessary in calculating totals.

82 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars.

Williams, H. E. (2002). Asset forfeiture: A law
enforcement perspective. Springfield, IL: Charles C.
Thomas.

Miller, J. M., & Selva, L. H. (1994). Drug
enforcement’s double-edged sword: An assessment
of asset forfeiture programs. Justice Quarterly,
11(2), 313–335; Wilson, B. J., & Preciado, M. (2014).
Bad apples or bad laws? Testing the incentives of
civil forfeiture. Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice;
Drug Policy Alliance. (2015). Above the law: An
investigation of civil asset forfeiture in California. Los
Angeles, CA: Drug Policy Alliance. Retrieved from
http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
Drug_Policy_Alliance_Above_the_Law_Civil_
Asset_Forfeiture_in_California.pdf.

Carpenter, D. M., & Salzman, L. (2015). Seize first,
question later: The IRS and civil forfeiture. Arlington,
VA: Institute for Justice.

For a detailed description of the steps necessary to
navigate just the federal forfeiture process, see The
Heritage Foundation. (2015). Arresting your property:
How civil asset forfeiture turns police into profiteers.
Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation.
Retrieved from http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.
com/2015/pdf/Forfieture-Booklet-FINAL-Full.pdf.

The states, the total value of forfeitures, the number
of properties forfeited and the median property
values are as follows. Note that these states may not
be representative.

State
California

Carpenter, D. M., McGrath, L., & Erickson, A. C.
(2013). A stacked deck: How Minnesota’s civil forfeiture
laws put citizens’ property at risk. Arlington, VA:
Institute for Justice.

Kelly, S. (2015). Guilty property: How law enforcement
takes $1 million in cash from innocent Philadelphians
every year—and gets away with it. Philadelphia, PA:
American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania.

Cassella, S. D. (2007). Overview of asset forfeiture
law in the United States. United States Attorneys’
Bulletin, 55(6), 8–21.

Kelly, 2015.

IJ analysis of Pennsylvania annual asset forfeiture
reports. See also: Compl. at 2–3, 9, 11, Sourovelis v.
City of Phila., No. 14-4687 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2014)
[hereinafter Sourovelis Compl.], available at https://
www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/private_property/
philadelphia-forfeiture/philadelphia-forfeiturecomplaint-8-11-14.pdf.

IJ analysis of Pennsylvania annual asset forfeiture
reports. See also: Sourovelis Compl. at 2.

IJ analysis of Pennsylvania annual asset forfeiture
reports. See also: Sourovelis Compl. at 10, 12–13.

NewsChannel 5. (2014, July 15). Timeline:
Policing for profit. Retrieved from http://www.
scrippsmedia.com/newschannel5/news/
newschannel-5-investigates/policing-for-profit/
Timeline-265640441.html.

Tuchman, G., & Wojtecki, K. (2009). Texas police
shake down drivers, lawsuit claims. CNN.com.
Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2009/
CRIME/05/05/texas.police.seizures/.

Tuchman and Wojtecki, 2009. For more on the
Tenaha scandal, see Stillman, S. (2013, August 12).
Taken. The New Yorker. Retrieved from http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken.

Number Median

$15,046,570

2,092

$1,901

$2,264,680

810

$655

$19,551,517

6,764

$530

$8,393,164

6,851

$451

$83,868

$1,529

$1,941,421

290

$1,525

$15,127,022

10,424

$502

Utah

$1,362,786

144

$2,048

Virginia

$6,951,900

1,425

$1,433

$116,084

$1,130

Ind. Code § 34-6-2-73.

Johnson, H. (2014, July 3). 5 low-cost alternatives
to your pricey cellphone plan. U.S. News & World
Report. Retrieved from http://money.usnews.com/

Marion County is not alone. Howard County has
demonstrated a similar pattern. See Munsey, P.
(2010, December 2). Prosecutor sued over forfeiture

Connecticut
Illinois
Minnesota
Missouri
Rhode Island
Tennessee

Wyoming

Value

money/blogs/my-money/2014/07/03/5-low-costalternatives-to-your-pricey-cellphone-plan.

169

County’s forfeiture practices. The Arizona Republic.
Retrieved from http://www.azcentral.com/story/
news/local/pinal/2015/07/22/pinal-countylawsuit-forfeiture/30512895/.

practices. Kokomo Perspective. Retrieved from
http://kokomoperspective.com/news/local_
news/prosecutor-sued-over-forfeiture-practices/
article_969e2ff2-fd8d-11df-981f-001cc4c002e0.html.

Coscarelli, K. (2002, December 13). State’s civil
forfeiture law struck down. The Star-Ledger.
Retrieved from http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_
folder/private_property/media_articles/The_Star_
Ledger_12-13-02.pdf.

Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996).

In Bennis v. Michigan, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that there is no right to an innocent owner defense
against forfeiture under the U.S. Constitution.
The Court found no violation of the 14th
Amendment’s guarantee of due process or of the
Fifth Amendment’s protection against takings in
Michigan law enforcement’s forfeiture of a car coowned by Tina Bennis after her husband solicited a
prostitute in it.

Compl., Cox v. Voyles, No. 2:15-cv-01386 (D.Ariz.
July 22, 2015) available at https://www.aclu.org/
legal-document/cox-v-voyles-et-al-complaint.

Associated Press. (2015, July 1). New law restricting
asset seizures takes effect. Las Cruces Sun-News.
Retrieved from http://www.lcsun-news.com/
las_cruces-news/ci_28417912/new-law-restrictingasset-seizures-take-effect.

2015 Nev. Laws ch. 436 (S.B. 138), Secs. 34.3, 34.6.

Somin, I. (2015, April 24). Montana Legislature
passes asset forfeiture reform law. The Washington
Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/04/24/
montana-legislature-passes-asset-forfeiturereform/.

Grossman, B. (2014, August 15). Interview by
D. Morris [Audio file]. Retrieved from https://
soundcloud.com/institute-for-justice/dick-morristalks-to-beth-grossman-about-civil-forfeiture-inphiladelphia.

S.F. 874, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2014), available
at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/text.
php?number=SF874&version=2&session=
ls88&session_year=2013&session_number=0.

D.C. Code § 41-310(a)(3).

Gaumer, C. (2007). A prosecutor’s secret weapon:
Federal civil forfeiture law. United States Attorneys’
Bulletin, 55(6), 59–73.

2015 Vt. Legis. Serv. 53 (S. 102), available at http://
legislature.vermont.gov/bill/status/2016/S.102.

Note that this does not refer to Minnesota’s
innocent owner burden, which remains unchanged.

Cassidy, M. (2015, July 22). Suit challenges Pinal

Mansfield, E. (2015, March 27). Civil asset forfeiture

170

Gillers, H., Alesia, M., & Evans, T. (2010,
November 7). Forfeiture law invites
abuse of the system. The Indianapolis Star.
Retrieved from http://archive.indystar.
com/article/20101107/NEWS14/311070003/
Forfeiturelawinvitesabuseofthesystem; RTV6. (2010,
September 29). Forfeiture unit racks up millions
in cash, cars. TheIndyChannel.com. Retrieved from
http://www.theindychannel.com/news/forfeitureunit-racks-up-millions-in-cash-cars.
The situation is even worse under Indiana’s RICO
statute. RICO—Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations—is a category of laws designed
to fight organized crime. Unlike the state’s basic
civil forfeiture law, the RICO statute makes no
provision at all for the common school fund, thus
allowing law enforcement to retain all forfeiture
proceeds (Ind. Code § 34-24-2-1). Unsurprisingly,
some prosecutors have taken to bringing forfeiture
cases exclusively under RICO, enabling them
to avoid even the pantomime of reckoning law
enforcement costs.
Making matters worse, while it is usually the
government’s job to prove the connection between
seized property and a crime, in a handful of
states where preponderance of the evidence is the
standard—Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Rhode Island and South Carolina—owners of
seized property must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that their property is not connected to
a crime.
Smith, K. (2010, April 7). Woman must forfeit
property. Arizona Daily Star. Retrieved from http://
tucson.com/news/local/crime/woman-mustforfeit-property/article_26658120-3cf4-5535-bbd1573d7a500021.html.

bill wins preliminary approval in Senate. VTDigger.
Retrieved from http://vtdigger.org/2015/03/27/
civil-asset-forfeiture-bill-wins-preliminaryapproval-in-senate/.

2015 Vt. Legis. Serv. 53 (S. 102), available at http://
legislature.vermont.gov/bill/status/2016/S.102.

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4247(b)(1).

D.C. Code § 41-310(a)(3).

McCartney, B. (2013, October 6). Gov. Matt Mead’s
asset forfeiture veto stands. Wyoming Tribune Eagle.
Retrieved from http://www.wyomingnews.com/
articles/2015/02/28/news/01top_02-28-15.txt#.
VZbySEZWIXE.

Shackford, S. (2015, May 22). Maryland governor
vetoes asset forfeiture reform, marijuana
decriminalization bills. Reason. Retrieved from
http://reason.com/blog/2015/05/22/marylandgovernor-vetoes-asset-forfeitur.

Evans, G. (2015, June 5). Simpson asset bill dies on
law enforcement objection. Longview News-Journal.
Retrieved from http://www.news-journal.com/
news/2015/jun/05/simpson-asset-bill-dies-onlaw-enforcement-objecti/.

Fain, T. (2015, April 15). Virginia’s civil asset
forfeiture reform effort goes down again. Daily Press.
Retrieved from http://www.dailypress.com/news/
politics/dp-virginias-civil-asset-forfeiture-reformeffort-goes-down-again-20150415-story.html.
Texas District & County Attorneys Association.
(2015a). Legislative update: Week 14. Retrieved from
http://www.tdcaa.com/content/legislativeupdate-week-14; Nicholson, E. (2015, April 24).
Texas prosecutors really don’t want you to know
how they seize and spend money. Dallas Observer.
Retrieved from http://www.dallasobserver.com/
news/texas-prosecutors-really-dont-want-you-toknow-how-they-seize-and-spend-money-7182287;
Texas District & County Attorneys Association.
(2015b). Legislative update: Week 18. Retrieved from
http://www.tdcaa.com/content/legislativeupdate-week-18; Evans, 2015. An additional
bill, H.B. 530, which did pass, requires the Texas
attorney general to publish aggregate forfeiture
reports on its website. The law also includes a
provision that allows forfeiture funds to be used
to pay for scholarships for children of parents
killed in the line of duty. According to legislative
committee documents, law enforcement did not
oppose this bill (H.B. 530, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tx.

2015), available at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/
BillLookup/Text.aspx?LegSess=84R&Bill=HB530).

H.B. 249, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2015); H.B. 472,
84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2015); H.B. 1012, 84th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2015); H.B. 1975, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tx. 2015); H.B. 3415, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2015).

Cato Institute (Producer). (2015, June 22). Policing
for profit in the Lone Star State [Audio podcast].
Retrieved from http://www.cato.org/multimedia/
daily-podcast/policing-profit-lone-star-state.

Evans, 2015.

Harki, G. A. (2015, January 26). Va. House
bill targets asset forfeitures that fund police.
The Virginia-Pilot. Retrieved from http://
hamptonroads.com/2015/01/va-house-bill-targetsasset-forfeitures-fund-police.

Harki, 2015.

FAIR Act, H.R. 540, 114th Cong. (2015), available at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/
house-bill/540/text; FAIR Act, S. 255, 114th Cong.
(2015), available at https://www.congress.gov/
bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/255/text.

FAIR Act, H.R. 540, 114th Cong. (2015); FAIR Act,
S. 255, 114th Cong. (2015).

U.S. Department of Justice. (2009). Guide to
equitable sharing for state and local law enforcement
agencies. Washington, DC: U.S. DOJ. Retrieved from
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usaori/legacy/2012/03/26/esguidelines.pdf, p. 6.

Weber, R. (2009). Foreword. In U.S. Department of
Justice, Guide to equitable sharing for state and local
law enforcement (n.p.). Washington, DC: U.S. DOJ.
See also 18 U.S.C. 981(e)(2) and 21 U.S.C. 881(e).

Calculated from FY 2004 and 2014 DOJ Assets
Forfeiture Fund Reports to Congress retrieved from
http://www.justice.gov/afp/reports-congress/
jmd-afp-2004-affr-equitable-share-cash-and-saleproceeds-0 and http://www.justice.gov/afp/
reports-congress/equitable-sharing-paymentscash-and-sale-proceeds-recipient-agency-fiscalyear-2014.

139 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars.

171

7 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars.

18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1).

Weber, 2009.

18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1).

Gaumer, 2007, p. 60.

For examples of scholarly criticism, see Blumenson,
E., & Nilsen, E. (1998). Policing for profit: The drug
war’s hidden economic agenda. The University of
Chicago Law Review, 65, 35–114; Duffy, M. J. (2001).
Note: A drug war funded with drug money: The
federal civil forfeiture statute and federalism.
Suffolk University Law Review, 34, 511–540; Hadaway,
B. (2000). Executive privateers: A discussion
on why the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
will not significantly reform the practice of
forfeiture. University of Miami Law Review, 55(1),
81–121; Worrall, J. L. (2004). The Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: A sheep in wolf’s
clothing? Policing: An International Journal of Police
Strategies and Management, 27(2), 220–240.

For examples, see Dillon, K. (1999, January 2).
Police keep cash intended for education. The Kansas
City Star. Retrieved from http://web.archive.org/
web/20000826225146/http://www.kcstar.com/
projects/drugforfeit/forfeit.htm and Pilger, L.
(2010, May 10). Cashing in: The fight over 12 cars,
$3.9 million seized in I-80 stops. Lincoln Journal
Star. Retrieved from http://journalstar.com/news/
local/crime-and-courts/cashing-in-the-fight-overcars-million-seized-in-i/article_00b97f70-5a20-11df86f4-001cc4c002e0.html.

The DOJ’s “Request for Adoption of State or
Local Seizure” form used to contain the following
language: “As a general rule, if a state or local
agency has seized property as part of ongoing
state criminal investigation, and if the criminal
defendants are being prosecuted in state court, the
forfeiture action should also be pursued in state
court. However, certain circumstances may make
federal forfeiture appropriate. These circumstances
include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) state
laws or procedures are inadequate or forfeiture
experience is lacking in the state system with the
result that a state forfeiture action may be unfeasible or
unsuccessful (emphasis added)” (Williams, M. R.,
Holcomb, J. E., Kovandzic, T. V., & Bullock, S. (2010).
Policing for profit: The abuse of civil asset forfeiture.
Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice). The current form
omits this language (cf. U.S. Department of Justice
and Department of the Treasury. (2015). Request
for adoption of state or local seizure. Retrieved
from http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
criminal-afmls/legacy/2015/01/16/request-foradoption-form.pdf).

Sibilla, N. (2014, April 2). The shame of
“equitable sharing.” Slate. Retrieved from http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2014/04/equitable_sharing_
legalized_marijuana_and_civil_forfeiture_the_
scheme_that.html.

Marroquin, A. (2013, October 8). Federal case over
rental to pot dispensary dropped. The Orange
County Register. Retrieved from http://www.
ocregister.com/articles/jalali-530131-governmentfederal.html.

Marroquin, 2013.

Holcomb, J. E., Kovandzic, T. V., & Williams, M. R.
(2011). Civil asset forfeiture, equitable sharing, and
policing for profit in the United States. Journal of
Criminal Justice, 39(3), 273–285.

Vecchi, G. M., & Sigler, R. T. (2001). Assets forfeiture:
A study of policy and its practice. Durham, NC:
Carolina Academic Press.

Sallah, M., O’Harrow, R., Jr., Rich, S., Silverman,
G., Chow, E., & Mellnik, T. (2014, September 6).
Stop and seize. The Washington Post. Retrieved
from http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/
investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/.

172

Interim policy guidance published in July 2014
explains, “Except as noted in this Guide, equitably
shared funds shall be used by law enforcement
agencies for law enforcement purposes only.”
Exceptions include support for community-based
programs, such as drug treatment facilities, jobs
skills programs and crime prevention education
(U.S. Department of Justice. (2014). Interim policy
guidance regarding the use of equitable sharing funds.
Retrieved http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/criminal-afmls/legacy/2014/07/31/Use-ofShared-Funds-Policy-2014.pdf).
The interim guidance states that “[s]haring will be
withheld from any state or local law enforcement
agency where the governing body, state or local
law, regulation, or policy requires or directs 1)
specific expenditures of shared funds, 2) the
transfer of federal equitable sharing funds to nonlaw enforcement agencies, or 3) expenditures for
non-law enforcement purposes” (U.S. Department
of Justice, 2014).

Drug Policy Alliance, 2015.

100 The need to reform asset forfeiture: Hearings before
the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. (2015) (Testimony of Chuck Canterbury).
Retrieved from http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/04-15-15%20Canterbury%20
Testimony.pdf, pp. 3–4.

101 Sallah et al., 2014.
102 Sallah et al., 2014.
103 Sallah et al., 2014.
104 O’Harrow, R., Jr., Sallah, M., & Rich, S.

(2014b, September 8) They fought the law.
Who won? The Washington Post. Retrieved
from http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/
investigative/2014/09/08/they-fought-the-lawwho-won/.

105 O’Harrow, R., Jr., & Rich, S. (2015, February 11). Justice
clarifies new limits on asset forfeiture involving local,
state police. The Washington Post. Retrieved from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/
attorney-general-holders-curbs-on-seizures-did-notgo-far-enough-critics-say/2015/02/11/19ec34b4a1c0-11e4-903f-9f2faf7cd9fe_story.html.

106 O’Harrow and Rich, 2015.
107 Sallah et al., 2014; O’Harrow, R., Jr., Sallah, M., &
Rich, S. (2014a, September 7). Police intelligence
targets cash. The Washington Post. Retrieved
from http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/
investigative/2014/09/07/police-intelligencetargets-cash/.

108 Sallah et al., 2014.
109 Office of the Attorney General of the United

States. (2015). Prohibition on certain federal
adoptions of seizures by state and local law
enforcement agencies [Order]. Retrieved from
http://www.justice.gov/file/318146/download;
U.S. Department of the Treasury Executive Office
for Forfeiture. (2015). Policy limiting the federal
adoption of seizures by state and local law
enforcement agencies (Directive no. 34). Retrieved
from http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/TEOAF%20
Dir.%2034%20on%20Adoptions%20-%20
Revised%20Jan%2016%202015.pdf.

110 Office of the Attorney General of the United States,
2015. Beyond these categories, adoptions under

the public safety exception require approval by the
assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division.

111 The need to reform asset forfeiture: Hearings before
the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. (2015) (Testimony of Darpana M. Sheth).
Retrieved from http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/04-15-15%20Sheth%20Testimony.
pdf, p. 8.

112 U.S. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs.

(2015). Attorney general prohibits federal agency
adoptions of assets seized by state and local law
enforcement agencies except where needed to
protect public safety [Press release]. Retrieved from
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-generalprohibits-federal-agency-adoptions-assets-seizedstate-and-local-law.

113 O’Harrow and Rich, 2015.
114 Sullum, J. (2015, January 19). The fine print in

Holder’s new forfeiture policy leaves room for
continued abuses. Reason. Retrieved from http://
reason.com/blog/2015/01/19/the-fine-print-inholders-new-forfeiture; Balko, R. (2015, January
20). How much civil asset forfeiture will Holder’s
new policy actually prevent? The Washington Post.
Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/01/20/howmuch-civil-asset-forfeiture-will-holders-newpolicy-actually-prevent/.

115 U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division.

(2015). Additional guidance on the attorney
general’s January 16, 2015 order on adoptions
(Policy Directive 15-2). Washington, DC: U.S. DOJ.
Current DOJ data provide no way of identifying
seizures labeled as joint that had no federal
involvement until after the seizure. However, such
data may be available in the future: The DOJ’s
new guidelines direct agencies to record whether
assets seized locally were accepted for federal
forfeiture under the public safety exception, as joint
seizures or under a federal seizure warrant. For
joint seizures, agencies must also indicate whether
the seizing agent was a state or local officer and
whether the seizure was initially part of a federal
task force or joint investigation and record the date
and name of the approving federal prosecutor.

116 Hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, 114th Cong., 2015 (Sheth Testimony), p. 9.

117 Hearings before the U.S. Senate Committee on the

Judiciary, 114th Cong., 2015 (Sheth Testimony), p. 9.

173

118 Ingraham, 2015.
119 Records on file with the Institute for Justice.
120 Ingraham, 2015.
121 U.S. Department of Justice, 2009.
122 The DOJ equitable sharing guide states, “Many

task forces involving federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies have pre-arranged, written
equitable sharing agreements based upon relative
numbers of personnel and other contributions
to the task force operation” (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2009, p. 13).

123 U.S. Department of Justice, 2014.
124 FAIR Act, H.R. 540, 114th Cong. (2015); FAIR Act, S. 255,
114th Cong. (2015).

125 O’Harrow, R., Jr. (2015, January 9). Lawmakers

urge end to program sharing forfeited assets
with state and local police. The Washington Post.
Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.
com/investigations/lawmakers-urge-end-toprogram-sharing-forfeited-assets-with-state-andlocal-police/2015/01/09/8843a43c-982f-11e4-80051924ede3e54a_story.html.

126 D.C. Code § 41-310(a)(3). Although the rest of

the District of Columbia’s reforms took effect
in June 2015, the equitable sharing provision
was delayed three years—over the objections of
the Institute for Justice and the American Civil
Liberties Union of the Nation’s Capital—because
the police department had already earmarked
anticipated payments for a department fund that
pays informants and rewards. D.C. Police Chief
Cathy L. Lanier denied planning for the funds
in the department’s budget, which would have
violated federal guidelines against committing
to spending in anticipation of equitable sharing
payments, saying that the department is using
them “to augment the reward pool of funding and
confidential fund programs (witness protection,
rewards for information in homicides)” (O’Harrow,
R., Jr. (2014, November 18). D.C. Council votes to
overhaul asset forfeiture, give property owners
new rights. The Washington Post. Retrieved from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/
dc-council-votes-to-overhaul-asset-forfeituregive-property-owners-new-rights/2014/11/18/
d6945400-6f72-11e4-8808-afaa1e3a33ef_story.
html; Civil Asset Forfeiture Amendment Act of

174

2013, B20-0048 (D.C. 2013), COUNC. OF THE
DIST. OF COLUMBIA OFF. OF THE SEC’Y –
LEGISLATION DETAIL, available at http://lims.
dccouncil.us/_layouts/15/uploader/AdminProxy.
aspx?LegislationId=B20-0048; Spitzer, A. B., &
Sheth, D. M. (2014). Re: Bill 20-48, the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Amendment Act of 2014 [Letter to
Council of the District of Columbia]. Retrieved
from http://ij.org/images/pdf_folder/11-17-14letter-to-dc-council-regarding-bill-20-48.pdf).

127 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-27-11(A)(1), (B).
128 In these states, it may be possible to collect

forfeiture records through public records requests,
but it would often be prohibitively time-consuming
and costly, requiring requests to every agency or
budgetary authority statewide. And in some states,
inventory records may even be considered exempt
from disclosure under public records laws.

129 2015 Nev. Laws ch. 436 (S.B. 138), Sec. 30.
130 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-27-9.
131 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.06(g), (s).
132 D.C. Code § 41-312.
133 Ind. Code §§ 33-39-8-5(7), 34-24-1-4.5.
134 Though required to provide detailed information

about each seizure, the New Hampshire attorney
general only provides the Legislature with the total
value of forfeited property.

135 Missouri law requires that this information be

reported, but it is frequently missing. Further,
Missouri reporting includes only assets that were
seized during the calendar year, when charges may
not yet have occurred, making the state’s data on
charges and convictions unreliable.

136 The Institute for Justice received only the

CATS variables considered releasable by the
DOJ. Hundreds of variables were considered
nondisclosable under various FOIA law
exemptions. See CATS: FOIA Disclosure Report as
of 4/11/2015. Retrieved from http://www.justice.
gov/file/441201/download.

137 State of Minnesota Office of the State Auditor

(2013). Criminal forfeitures in Minnesota for the year
ended December 31, 2012. Saint Paul, MN: Office of
the State Auditor. Retrieved from http://www.

osa.state.mn.us/reports/gid/2012/forfeiture/
forfeiture_12_report.pdf.

148 U.S. Department of Justice, 2015; U.S. Department

138 Harris, K. D. (n.d.). 2012 annual report asset forfeiture.

149 These categories represent the original categories

Sacramento, CA: Office of the Attorney General,
California Department of Justice. Retrieved from
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/
publications/asset_forf/2012_af/af.pdf?.

139 Michigan State Police. (2013). 2013 asset forfeiture

report (covers 2012). Lansing, MI: Department of
State Police. Retrieved from http://www.michigan.
gov/msp/0,4643,7-123-72297_34040_34043_5457815547--,00.html; Schweich, T. A. (2013). Citizens
summary: Compilation of 2012 Criminal Activity
Forfeiture Act seizures. Jefferson City, MO: State
Auditor’s Office. Retrieved from http://www.
auditor.mo.gov/AuditReports/CitzSummary.
aspx?id=171; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Office of the Attorney General. (n.d.). Asset forfeiture
report: Fiscal year 2012–2013.

140 Thompson, S. (2014, September 15). Re: Public

records request [Email to the Institute for Justice].

141 Schweich, T. A. (2015). Citizens summary:

Compilation of 2014 Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act
seizures. Jefferson City, MO: State Auditor’s Office.
Retrieved from http://www.auditor.mo.gov/
AuditReports/CitzSummary.aspx?id=366.

142 Hinton, R. (2002). Property forfeitures under state and
federal drug laws [Program evaluation]. Atlanta,
GA: Performance Audits Operations Division,
Department of Audits and Accounts.

143 Norman, E., & Sanders, A. (2011). Forfeiting

accountability: Georgia law enforcement’s hidden civil
forfeiture funds. Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice.

144 Carpenter, D. M., & McGrath, L. (2013). Rotten

reporting in the Peach State: Civil forfeiture in Georgia
leaves the public in the dark. Arlington, VA: Institute
for Justice.

145 Iowa Code § 809A.17(5)(e).
146 S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-530(e)(3).
147 Vermont had “no such records, reports, or funds …

sent to the Office of the State Treasurer,” suggesting
the possibility that zero forfeitures were conducted
under Vermont state law (Lueders-Dumont, T.
(2015, June 15). Re: Public records request [Email to
the Institute for Justice]).

of the Treasury, 2015.

from the Equitable Sharing Agreement and
Certification form. Some other categories were
combined into broader categories. Salaries are a
combination of salaries and overtime; equipment of
communications and computers with weapons and
protective gear; and investigations of informants,
“buy money,” and rewards and electronic
surveillance.

150 Williams, M. R. (2002). Civil asset forfeiture: Where
does the money go? Criminal Justice Review, 27(2),
321–329.

151 U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2012).

Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund: Transparency of balances
and controls over equitable sharing should be improved
(GAO-12-736). Washington, DC: GAO. Retrieved
from http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592349.pdf.

152 Drug Policy Alliance, 2015.
153 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § § 13-2314.01(F)–(H); Ark.

Code Ann. § 5-64-505(f); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 9-16-19(g); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712A-16(6); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § § 60-4117(4d)(1)-(2); Mich. Comp. Laws §
333.7524a; Minn. Stat. §§ 609.5315(5)(b), (6); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2981.11; Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 131.600,
131A.450; R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-15-4.1(c), (e); Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.06(g)(1).

154 Arkansas and Kansas law enforcement agencies

must send expenditure data to their local budgetary
authority; obtaining these reports would require
making records requests of each agency. In
Minnesota, only the commissioner of public
safety is required to report expenditures, and the
Institute for Justice did not obtain those numbers.
The Rhode Island attorney general did not include
expenditures in legislative reports.

155 Hawaii reports only the attorney general’s

expenditures; Michigan only provides the number
of agencies reporting to have spent money on
specific expenditure categories; and Oregon did
not produce a 2012 report. In Georgia and Ohio, the
reporting was too inconsistent to understand what
forfeiture expenditures were used for.

156 These four states do not break expenditures

down in exactly the same way. However, they do
have categories that can be combined to create
equivalent categories. In Arizona, the investigations

175

category covers witness protection, civil remedies
and outside services. In Oklahoma, confidential
informants and investigation were combined into
investigations, and operating expenses, rent and
storage into facilities. In Pennsylvania, equipment
comprises data processing equipment and supplies,
task force supplies, other equipment/supplies and
vehicles; investigations comprises confidential
cases, investigative equipment/supplies and
witness relocation/protection; and facilities
comprises maintenance of property and real estate.
In Texas, salaries and overtime were combined into
salaries; equipment and supplies into equipment;
training and travel into training; and miscellaneous
fees and other into other.

157 U.S. Department of Justice, 2009; Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 13-4315; Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-503; 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 6801; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.06.

158 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector

General. (2012). Audit of Mesa County sheriff’s
office equitable sharing program activities (Audit
Report GR-60-12-009). Grand Junction, CO: U.S.
DOJ. Retrieved from https://oig.justice.gov/
grants/2012/g6012009.pdf; Sallah, M. (2015a, June
19). License to launder: Cash, cops and the cartels.
The Miami Herald. Retrieved from http://pubsys.
miamiherald.com/static/media/projects/2015/
license-to-launder/index.html.

159 Mariano, W. (2013, October 5). Tally grows of

questionable purchases using state funds. The
Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Retrieved from http://
www.myajc.com/news/news/tally-grows-ofquestionable-purchases-using-state-/nbFRr/;
Sallah, 2015a.

160 Cuadra, A., Mellnik, T., & Tan, S. (2014, October

11). Spending seized assets. The Washington Post.
Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/special/investigative/asset-seizures/;
Krantz, L., & Trufant, J. (2013, February 15). Audit:
Worcester DA’s office bought Zamboni, lawn
gear with forfeited drug money. The MetroWest
Daily News. Retrieved from http://www.
metrowestdailynews.com/article/20130215/
NEWS/302159874; Sallah, 2015a; Schultze, S.
(2012, September 28). Clarke spent asset forfeitures
on workout equipment, horse patrol. Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from http://www.
jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/clarke-spent-assetforfeitures-on-workout-equipment-horse-patrol5j71hn1-171816481.html.

176

161 Sallah, 2015a.
162 Clifford, S., & Rashbaum, W. K. (2014, June 2).

Ex-Brooklyn prosecutor Charles J. Hynes accused
of misuse of funds. The New York Times. Retrieved
from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/
nyregion/charles-hynes-brooklyn-district-attorneyinquiry.html?_r=0.

163 Dorsey, M. S. (2012, September 27). Ex-Romulus

police chief, wife, 5 officers head to trial. Detroit
Free Press. Retrieved from http://archive.freep.
com/article/20120927/NEWS02/309270120/ExRomulus-police-chief-wife-5-officers-head-to-trial.

164 Editorial: Towed Porsche reinforces DA Watkins’

loss of trust. (2014, October 28). The Dallas Morning
News. Retrieved from http://www.dallasnews.
com/opinion/editorials/20141028-editorial-towedporsche-reinforces-da-watkins-loss-of-trust.ece.

165 Chang, D., & Sallah, M. (2012, October 31). Feds

order village to hand over drug loot. The Miami
Herald. Retrieved from http://www.miamiherald.
com/news/local/community/miami-dade/miamibeach/article23011665.html; Sallah, M. (2015b, July
4). As feds demanded answers, task force doubled
down on sting. The Miami Herald. Retrieved from
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
community/miami-dade/article26508889.html;
Sallah, 2015a.

166 2015 was a banner year for legislation supporting

greater forfeiture transparency. Six states—Indiana,
Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico and
Texas—and the District of Columbia added new
statutory language that strengthens reporting
requirements. Several of these statutes explicitly
require aggregate reports to be posted online,
which will make it easier for members of the public
to learn about forfeiture in their state.

167 Hunt, G. (Ed.). (1906). The writings of James Madison:

1790–1802 (Vol. VI). New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.

177

About the Authors
Dick M. Carpenter II, Ph.D.
Dr. Dick Carpenter is a director of strategic research at the Institute for Justice. He works with
IJ staff and attorneys to define, implement and manage social science research related to the Institute’s mission. His work has appeared in academic journals such as Economic Development Quarterly, Economic Affairs, The Forum, Fordham Urban Law Journal, International Journal of Ethics, Education
and Urban Society, Urban Studies and Regulation and Governance, as well as magazines including Regulation, Phi Delta Kappan and the American School Board Journal. His research results have also been
quoted in such newspapers as the New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal.
Carpenter’s research for IJ has resulted in reports including Disclosure Costs: Unintended Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, License to Work: A National Study of Burdens from Occupational
Licensing, Private Choice in Public Programs: How Private Institutions Secure Social Services for Georgians, Designing Cartels: How Industry Insiders Cut Out Competition and Victimizing the Vulnerable: The
Demographics of Eminent Domain Abuse.
Before joining IJ, Carpenter worked as a school teacher and principal, public policy analyst and
faculty member at the University of Colorado Colorado Springs, where he currently serves as a
professor. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Colorado.

Lisa Knepper
Lisa Knepper is a director of strategic research at the Institute for Justice, helping to manage
and create policy and social science research on issues central to IJ’s mission. Knepper co-authored
IJ’s reports Streets of Dreams: How Cities Can Create Economic Opportunity by Knocking Down Protectionist Barriers to Street Vending, License to Work: A National Study of Burdens from Occupational Licensing and Inequitable Justice: How Federal “Equitable Sharing” Encourages Local Police and Prosecutors to
Evade State Civil Forfeiture Law for Financial Gain.
Knepper previously served as IJ’s director of communications, securing news coverage in outlets nationwide, including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, USA Today, CBS Evening News and National Public Radio.
Prior to joining IJ, Knepper worked at Hill and Knowlton, served as a media relations and
promotions adviser for several entertainment and technology companies in Los Angeles, and was a
program coordinator at the Institute for Humane Studies. Knepper graduated from The Ohio State
University with a degree in political science and economics and a philosophy minor.

Angela C. Erickson
Angela C. Erickson is a senior research analyst at the Institute for Justice, where she works with
the strategic research team conducting original social science research. Her research is featured in
Street Eats, Safe Eats: How Food Trucks and Carts Stack Up to Restaurants on Sanitation, A Stacked Deck:
How Minnesota’s Civil Forfeiture Laws Put Citizens’ Property at Risk and License to Work: A National Study
of Burdens from Occupational Licensing. Before joining IJ, Erickson was a research assistant at the Cato
Institute. She holds a Master of Public Policy from the University of Chicago and a bachelor’s degree
in economics and political science from Beloit College.

Jennifer McDonald

178

Jennifer McDonald is a research analyst at the Institute for Justice, where she conducts original social science research as part of the strategic research team. Prior to joining IJ, McDonald
earned a Master of Public Administration, with emphases on management and economic policy,
with merit from the London School of Economics and Political Science. While a student at the LSE,
she worked with the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee and the
International Chamber of Commerce. Prior to beginning graduate school, McDonald worked in
California politics. She also holds a bachelor’s degree in history with a political science minor from
California State University San Marcos.

About the Contributors
Wesley Hottot
Wesley Hottot is an Institute for Justice attorney focusing on civil forfeiture, occupational licensing and transportation. Through his civil forfeiture work, Hottot has helped small businesses
in Iowa and North Carolina get seized money back from the Internal Revenue Service and represented forfeiture victims pressing the federal government to pay their expenses when prosecutors seize property only to return it years later. In 2015, Hottot won a landmark victory before the
Texas Supreme Court, in which the court struck down the state’s eyebrow threading regulations
and announced a new test for reviewing economic regulations under the Texas Constitution. His
work has been cited in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Oregonian, Tennessean, Seattle Times, Austin American-Statesman, Dallas Morning News, and other print, radio and
television outlets.
Hottot received his law degree from the University of Washington, where he completed a
judicial externship with Justice Richard Sanders of the Washington Supreme Court and a two-year
clerkship with IJ’s Washington office. He was an Echols Scholar at the University of Virginia and
graduated with distinction and Phi Beta Kappa.

Keith Diggs
Keith Diggs is an attorney with the Institute for Justice’s Arizona office who litigates across all
four of IJ’s core issues. Prior to joining IJ as a full-time attorney, Diggs was a summer clerk at IJ’s
Washington office and then a constitutional law fellow at IJ headquarters in Arlington, Va. In 2014,
he received his law degree cum laude from the University of Michigan Law School, where he was
an executive editor for the Michigan Law Review. Diggs graduated from Emory University in 2009
with a bachelor’s degree in political science and a music minor.

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Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge critical assistance from a host of
colleagues and others.
Andrew Lending logged many long hours organizing and doublechecking much of the data for this report, contributing persistence and a
keen eye to ensure the underlying data are as accurate as possible. Sam
Gedge lent valuable legal expertise that strengthened the analysis of
civil forfeiture laws. Rebecca Schieber initiated numerous public records
requests, while Sam Friedman of the Caesar Rodney Institute in Delaware
and Justin Owen of the Beacon Center of Tennessee helped with records
requests in their states. Parker Kobayashi, Will Dennis, Joseph Kessler
and Walker Mulley pitched in with data entry and verification. Hannah
Corning researched New York’s forfeiture laws to resolve a data problem,
while Laura D’Agostino and Josh Windham researched state forfeiture
reporting laws. Nick Sibilla helped identify stories of forfeiture victims.
Diana Simpson, Olivia Grady, Paul Sherman and Matt Cavedon reviewed
legal citations. The report’s text benefited greatly from review and
insightful comments by Chip Mellor, Steven Anderson, Paul Avelar, Robert
Frommer, Sam Gedge, Robert Everett Johnson, Lee McGrath, Matt Miller,
Arif Panju, Justin Pearson, Robert Peccola and Darpana Sheth, as well as
expert guidance from Scott Bullock and careful editing by Mindy Menjou.
Laura Maurice, as always, provided a terrific design and layout, as well as
much needed patience. Don Wilson and Mark Meranta also stepped up to
help with layout when time was tight.

About IJ
The Institute for Justice is a nonprofit, public-interest law firm
that litigates to secure economic liberty, school choice, private
property rights, freedom of speech and other vital individual
liberties and to restore constitutional limits on the power of
government. Founded in 1991, IJ is the nation’s only libertarian
public-interest law firm, pursuing cutting-edge litigation in the
courts of law and in the court of public opinion on behalf of
individuals whose most basic rights are denied by the government. The Institute’s strategic research program produces social
science and policy research to inform public policy debates on
issues central to IJ’s mission.

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