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Volume 5 Detention and Corrections Caselaw Catalog 26th Ed. 2016

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DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONS
CASELAW CATALOG

26th Edition
2015-2016

Volume Five: Sec. 32-38
Rod C. Miller
Donald J. Walter
Research and Review:
Joseph Heltzel
Chris Dickey
Richard Drennon
Kyle McCarty

CRS, Inc.

A Non-Profit Organization
925 Johnson Drive
Gettysburg, PA 17325
(717) 338-9100
Fax (717) 718-6178
www.correction.org
rod@correction.org
Copyright 2017

Table of Contents
DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS CASELAW CATALOG
VOLUME 1
How to Use the Catalog
Index and Topic Finder
Table of Cases
1. Access to Courts
2. Administration

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Administrative Segregation
Assessment of Costs
Attorney Fees
Bail
Civil Rights

VOLUME 2
8. Classification and Separation
9. Conditions of Confinement
10. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
11. Discipline

12. Exercise and Recreation
13. Ex-Offenders
14. Failure to Protect

VOLUME 3
15. Facilities
16. False Imprisonment/Arrest
17. Female Prisoners
18. Food
19. Free Speech, Expression, Assoc.
20. Good Time

21. Grievance Procedures, Prisoner
22. Habeas Corpus
23. Hygiene-Prisoner Personal
24. Immunity
25. Intake and Admissions
26. Juveniles

VOLUME 4
27. Liability
28. Mail
29. Medical Care

30. Mental Problems (Prisoner)
31. Personnel

VOLUME 5
32. Pretrial Detention
33. Privacy
34. Programs-Prisoner
35. Property-Prisoner Personal

36. Release
37. Religion
38. Rules & Regulations-Prisoner

VOLUME 6
39. Safety and Security
40. Sanitation
41. Searches
42. Services-Prisoner
43. Sentence
44. Standards

45. Supervision
46. Training
47. Transfers
48. Use of Force
49. Visiting
50. Work- Prisoner

CRS, Inc.
925 Johnson Drive, Gettysburg, PA 17325 (717) 338-9100
www.correction.org Fax (717) 718-6178 rod@correction.org
All Rights Reserved

SECTION 32: PRETRIAL DETENTION
Detention and Corrections Caselaw Catalog All Rights Baerved
. C~, Inc. 925 Johnson Drive, Gettysburg PA 17325 (717) 338-9100 www.correction.org/
The following pages present summaries of court decisions which address this topic area. These summaries
provide readers with highlights of each case, but are not intended to be a substitute for the review of the full case.
The cases do not represe1;1t all court decisions which address this topic area, but rather offer a sampling of
relevant holdings,
The decisions summarized below were current as of the date indicated on the title page of this edition of the
Catalog. Prior to publication, the citation for each case was verified, and the case was researched in Shepard's
Citations to determine if it had been altered upon appeal (reversed or modified). The Catalog is updated
annually. An annual supplement provides replacement pages for cases in the prior edition which have changed,
and adds new cases. Readers are encouraged to consult the Topic Index to identify related topics of interest. The
text in the section entitled "How to Use The Catalog" at the beginning of the Catalog provides an overview which
may also be helpful to some readers.
The case summaries which follow are organized by year, with the earliest case presented first. Within each
year, cases are organized alphabetically by the name of the plaintiff. The left margin offers a quick refe~nce,
highlighting the type of court involved and identifying appropriate subtopics addressed by each case.
1964

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
WORK

Tyler v. Harris, 226 F.Supp. 852 (W.D. Mo. 1964). Unconvicted persons can be kept
with convicted persons in federal medical centers, but they may not be subjected to
involuntary servitude. (Medical Center For Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri)

1986
U.S. District Court
SEPARATION

Johnston v. Ciccone, 260 F.Supp. 553 (W.D. Mo. 1966). Pretrial commement with
convicted persons in the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners is not
unconstitutional for persons found to be mentally ill. (United States Medical Center for
Federal Prisoners)

1969
U.S. Supreme Court
VOTING

McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). Pretrial detainees
in the Cook County Jail alleged that lliinois absentee ballot provisions violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment for two reasons: First, since the
distinction between those medically incapacitated, and those "judicially incapacitated"
bear no reasonable relationship to any legitimate state objective, the classifications ~
arbitrary. Secondly, since pretrial detainees imprisoned in other states, or in counties
within. the state other than those of their own residence can vote absentee as citizens
absent for any reason, it is clearly arbitrary to deny absentee ballots to other unsentenced
inmates because they happen to be incarcerated within. their own resident counties. This
action was instituted after the defendant Board of Election Commissioners rejected a
timely application for absentee ballots by plaintiffs,
The U.S. District Court for Northern District of lliinois granted summary judgment for
the defendants, holding that extending absentee ballots to those physically incapacitat.ed
for medical reasons constituted a proper and reasonable classification not violative of
equal protection. Plaintiffs appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. (Affirmed.)
HELD: lliinois' failure to provide absentee ballots for plaintiffs does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 894 U.S. at 806.
REASONING: a) Distinctions made by the absentee voting provisions are not drawn
on the basis of wealth or race, and while classif1cations which might invade or restrain
voting rights must be closely scrutinized, a more exacting judicial scrutiny is not necessary
here. b) State legislatures traditionally are allowed to take reform one step at a time, and
need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme because it failed to cover every
potential group. c) It is reasonable for lliinois to treat differently the physically
handicapped as there is nothing to indicate that the judicially handicapped plaintiffs are
absolutely prohibited from voting. d) Constitutional safeguards are not offended by the
different treatment accorded unsen.tenced inmates incarcerated within and those
incarcerated out of their counties of residence.
~ : Footnote 9, p. 810 "Maine appears to be the only state to allow absentee ballot
for absence from the polls for any sufficient reason. ... " 21 M.R.S.A. Section 1251, 1306
(1964). (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

1970
U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST

Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F.Supp. 1184 (S.D. N.Y. 1970). The only state interest in
incarcerating pretrial detamees is to guarantee appearance at trial. (City Jail, New
York)
32.1

1971

U.S. Appeals Court
CLCYfHING
CONDITIONS

Anderson v. Nosser. 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1971).
Male arrest.eee/petitioners forced t.o strip and kept in such condition for up t.o thirty-six
hours and female arrest.eelt'petitioners were forced t.o go without clothing other than
underwear leads t.o finding of constitutional violation. (Mississippi State Penitentiary,
Parchman)

U.S. District Court
PUNISHMENT

Conklin v. Hancock. 334 F.Supp. 1119 (D. N:H. 1971),;' Pretrial detainees are not
subject t.o "punishment. n (New Hampshire State Prison, Con.cbrd, Hew Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST
PUNISHMENT
CONDITIONS
"LEAST RESTRICTIVE
MEANSn

Hamilt.on v. Love, 328 F.Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971). The only legitimate purpose
served by pretrial detention is assuring defendants' presence at trial. Minimally, a
detainee ought t.o have the reasonable expectation that he would survive his period of
detainment with his life; that he would not be assaulted, abused, or molested during
his detainment; and that his physical and mental health would be reasonably protected
during this period. Detainees may not be subjected t.o any punishment, "cruel and
unusualn or not. Conditions of incarceration for detainees must, cwnulati,vely, add up t.o
the least restrictive means of assuring appearance at trial. One female staff member must
be on duty twenty-four hours a day. There should be one staff member patrolling on each
cell floor in the immediate area of every detainee on a twenty-four hour basis. (Palaski
County Jail, Arkansas)
1972

U.S. Supreme Court

SPEEDY TRIAL

Barker v. Wingo. 407 U.S. 514 (6th Cir. 1972). A defendant's constitutional right t.o a
speedy trial cannot be established by an inflexible rule, but can be determined only on
an ad hoc balancing basis, in which the conduct of the prosecution and that of the
defendant are weighed. Among relevant factors t.o be considered are: the length and
reason for d&ay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice t.o the defendant.
(Christian County, Kentucky).

U.S. District Court
ATI'ORNEY VISITS
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED

Brenneman v. Madigan. 343 F.Supp. 128 (N.D. Ca. 1972). Pretrial detainees must
have opportunities t.o participate in educational, vocational and recreational programs
comparable t.o those of sentenced misdemeanants. Pretrial detainees have a first
amendment right t.o visit with attorneys. (Alameda County Jail Facility, California)

U;S. District Court
STATE INTEREST

Collins v. Schoonf'l.eld, 344 F.Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972). A detainee can be deprived of
constitutional rights •only t.o the extent such denial is required t.o insure that he
appears at trial and t.o restrain him from endangering or disrupting the security of the
institution in which he is detained, or t.o deter him, if his conduct has already caused such
danger or disruption, from repeating such conduct. Pretrial detainees may not be forced
t.o change the length or manner in which they wear their hair, except where jail officials
can demonstrate a health or identifu:ation :need for so doing. (Baltimore City Jail,
Maryland)
.

HAIR

U.S. District Court
PROGRAMS

Hamilt.on v. Landrieu, 351 F.Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972). All inmates, in.eluding pretrial
detainees, shall be eligible t.o participate in rehabilitative programs. Rehabilitative
programs shall be immf'ltiately established and maintained. (Orleans Parish Prison,
Louisiana)

Smith v. Sampson, 849 F.Supp. 268 (D. N.H. 1972). Difference in state interest
U.S. District Court
mandates that detainees be treated better than convicts. Least restrictive alternative
STATE INTEREST
"LEAST RESTRICTIVE principles applies t.o detainees. (New Hampshire State Prison)

MEANS"
1973

U.S. District Court
PUNISHMENT
CONDITIONS

DUE PROCESS

U.S. Appeals Court

DUE PROCESS

Inmates of Suffolk. Co. Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), afrd, 494
F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974). Where precious penal liberties of detainees are affected. the
state bears the burden of justification. Detainees may not be punished- Detainees'
conditions must be superior t.o those of convicts. If detainees are subjected t.o
gratuitous and wholesale deprivation of rights which are unrelated t.o assuring their
presence at trial, due process is violated. (Suffolk. County Jail, Massachusetts)

Johnson v. Glick. 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033. While it
is doubtful that the cruel and unusual punishment clause applies 1:o pretrial detainees,
they are prot.ected by the due process clause again.st acts of. brutality by correction officers.
However, protection is less ext.ensive than that provided by common law t.orts.
(Manhattan House of. Det.ention, New York)

32.2

1974

U.S. District Court
WORK

Main Road v. Atych. 385 F.Supp. 105 (E.D. Penn. 1974). Unsent.enced prisoners cannot
be required t.o perform uncompensat.ed labor. (Philadelphia Prison System,
Pennsylvania)
·

U.S. District Court
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED
RIGHTS RETAINED
"LEAST RESTRICTIVE
MEANS"

Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594 (S.D. N.Y. 1974). Detainee may not. be confined
under conditions more rigorous than a convicted prisoner. Detainees retain all rights
except where necessary t.o assure their appearance at trial, and conditions must be
least restrictive means t.o achieve that end. (Manhattan House of Detention, New
York)

U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST
"LEAST RESTRICTIVE
MEANS"

Wilson v. Beame, 380 F.Supp. 1232 (E.D. N.Y. 1974). Stat.e's int.erest in interfering
with the personal liberty of pretrial detainees is limit.ed t.o the least restrictive "form of
incarceration" consonant with the accused being available for trial. (House of Det.ention
For Men, Brooklyn, New York)

1975
U.S. District Court
SEPARATION

Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris Co., 406 F.Supp. 649 (S.D. Tex. 1975). No pretrial detainee
shall be housed in the same cell or cellblock with any person who has been convicted
and sent.enced. Alcoholic and drug-dependent inmat.es shall be housed in an incarcerative
environment specifically designed and equipped for the treatment of withdrawal problems.
(Harris County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
PUNISHMENT

Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F.Supp. 1225 (C.D. Calif. 1975). The conditions under which
unconvict.ed prisoners are detained may be so onerous as t.o constitut.e summary
punishment without due process of law. (Los Angeles County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST

Giampetruzzi v. Malcolm, 406 F.Supp. 836 (S.D. N.Y. 1975). First Amendment rights
of detainees may be limit.ed only t.o the ext.ent necessary t.o ensure their appearance at
trial and t.o assure the security of the institution. (New York City House of Det.ention for
Men)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED
EQUAL PROTECTION

Miller v. Carson. 401 F.Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975). aff"d, 563 F.2d 741
(5th Cir. 1977). Conditions of pretrial det.ention which are worse than those
experienced by sent.enced prisoners deny equal protection. (Duval County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
PROGRAMS
STATE INTEREST
PUNISHMENT
CONDITIONS

Padgett v. Stein, 406 F.Supp. 287 (M.D. Penn. 1975). Pretrial detainees should not be
forced t.o participat.e in rehabilitative programs. The only legitimat.e purpose of pretrial
detention is the det.ention itself. Although pretrial detainees may not be punished,
conditions that may be viewed as punitive are constitutional if they further the purpose
of maintaining cust.ody, security, or int.ernal order and discipline. (York County Prison.
Pennsylvania)
1976

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
WORK

Barnes v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 415 F.Supp. 1218 (D, V.I. 1976).
Detainees are t.o be separat.ed from convicted inmates in separat.e buildings if physically
possible. Detainees are not required t.o work except t.o keep cell areas clean. (Golden
Grove Adult Correctional Facility, Virgin Islands)

U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST

Bell v. Manso~ 427 F.Supp. 450 (D. Conn. 1976). Detainees "may be treat.ed as
prisoners only t.o the ut.ent the security, internal order, health and discipline of the
prison demand...considerations of rehabilitation, det.errence, and punishment are not
relevant fact.ors when an unconvicted inmat.e challenges on constitutional grounds a
regulation or procedure governing prison life." (Community Correctional Cent.er,
Bridgeport. Connecticut)
·

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE INTEREST
DUE PROCESS

Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976). As a matter of due process, pretrial
detainees may suffer no more restrictions than are reasonably necessary t.o ensure their
presence at trial. (Cook County House of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Supreme Court
CLOTHING- COURT
APPEARANCES

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), cert. denied. 426 U.S. 9~ (1974). Williams,
unable t.o post bond, was held while awaiting trial on a charge of assault. When.
Williams learned he was t.o go on trial, he requested his civilian clothes. The request
was denied, but no objection was made at trial. Williams was convicted of assault with
int.ent t.o commit murder with malice. a decision upheld by the Texas Court of Appeals.
32.3

Williams then petitioned the U.S. district court for a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that requiring him to stand trial in prison garb was unfair. While the district
court agreed such practice was unfair, it denied relief on the ground that the error was
harmless. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed solely on the issue of harmless
error. Defendant Estelle, Texas Corrections Director, sought certiorari from the U.S.
Supreme Court. The decision was reversed.
HELD: "[A]lthough the state cannot, consistently with the fourteenth amendment,
compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while ·dressed in identifiable prison clothes,
the failure to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever
reasons, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a
constitutional violation." 425 U.S. at 512. (Harris County Jail, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3rd Cir. 1976).
Protection of detainees is founded in due process and equal protection clauses, not the
eighth amendment or the presumption of innocence. (Holmesburg Federal Penitentiary,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION

Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F.Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976). No pretrial detainee may be
housed in the same cell with a convicted person. (Escambia County Jail, Pensacola,
Florida)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
STATE INTEREST

Moore v. Janing 427 F.Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976). Housing of convicts and detainees
together contributes to finding of unconstitutionality. Detainees may not be subjected
to restrictions unrelated to securing appearance at trial and maintaining internal order
and security. (Douglas County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
VISITS
DUE PROCESS

Wolfish v. Levi, 406 F.Supp. 1243 (S.D. N.Y. 1976). Restrictions on visitation of
pretrial inmates must be justified by compelling necessity. Prison officials have the
ultimate burden of proof on this issue. Due process requires that the least restraint
necessary to assure institutional security and administrative manageability be employed.
{Metropolitan Correctional Facility, New York)

1977
U.S. District Court
INTAKE SCREENING
SEPARATION

Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F.Supp. 873 (W.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 288. Screening
officer shall inquire as to detainee's need for psychological or counseling care and shall
report to the correctional staff. So far as practicable, pretrial detainees shall not be
housed in the same cell with convicted persons. Juveniles may not be housed in the jail for
longer than it takes to arrange to transfer them. {Platt.e County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
STATE INTEREST

. Forts v. Malcolm, 426 F.Supp. 464 (S.D. N.Y. 1977). A prohibition on the wearing of
pants by detainees is unconstitutional where its only justification is the administrative
inconvenience of having one rule for detainees and another for sentenced prisoners.
This justification is not rationally connected with assuring appearance at trial or jail
security, which is the only legitimate purpose of detention. {New York City Correctional
Institute for Women)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATE INTEREST
PUNISHMENT

Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977). The guiding principle of pretrial
detention conditions cases is that prior to trial a defendant is presumed innocent. His
incarceration during that period is permissible only to assure his appearance at trial,
not to inflict punishment. (Dade County, Florida)

U.S. District Court
VISITS

Vest v. Lubbock County, 444 F.Supp. 824 (N.D. Tex. 1977). Pretrial detainees are
ordered to be permitted daily visits, others at least twice_ a week. (Lubbock County Jail,
Texas)

U.S. District Court
STATE INTEREST

Vienneau v. Shanks, 425 F.Supp. 676 (W.D. Wisc. 1977). Pretrial detainees may be
subjected only to those deprivations reasonably necessary to ensure presence at trial.
(Sauk County Jail, Wisconsin)

1978
U.S. Appeals Court
WORK

Biieol v. Nelson, 579 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1978). Pretrial detainees may be required to
perform general housekeeping tasks. (Metro Correctional Center, Chicago)

1979
U.S. Supreme Court
PUBLICATIONS
PACKAGES
SEARCHES
DUE PROCESS

Bell v. Wolilsh, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Pretrial detainees cxmfined in the Metropolitan
Correction Center (MCC) in New York City challenged virtually every facet of the
institution's conditions and practices in a writ of habeas corpus, alleging such
conditions and practices violate their constitutional rights. MCC is a federally
operated, short-term detention facility constructed in 1975. Eighty-five percent of all

32.4:

inmates are released within sixty days of admission. MCC was int.ended to include the
most advanced and innovative features of modern design in detention facilities. The
key design element of the facility is the "modular" or ''unit" concept, whereby each floor
housing inmates has one or two self-contained residential units, as opposed to the
traditional cellblock jail construction. Within four months of the opening of the twelvest.ory, 450 inmate capacity facility, this action was initiated.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of N.Y. enjoined no less than twenty
practices at the MCC on constitutional and statutory grounds, many of which were not
appealed. See, United Stat.es Ex Rel Wolfish-v. Levi. 439 F.Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y.). The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision, See. Wolfish v. Levi.
573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), and reasserted the "compelling-necessity" test as the standard
for determining limitations on a detainee's freedom.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider the important constitutional
questions raised by [recent prison decisions] and to resolve an apparent conflict among the
circuits." 441 U.S. at 524: Do the publisher-only rule, the prohibition on receiving
packages from outside sources, the search of living quarters, and the visual inspection of
body cavities aft.er contact visits constitute punishment in violation of the rights of pretrial
detainees under the due process clause of the fifth amendment?
HELD: "Nor do we think that the four MCC security restrictions and
practices...constitute 'punishment' in violation of the rights of pretrial detainees under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.• 441 U.S. at 560, 561.
REASONING:
a. [T]he determination whether these restrictions and practices constitute punishment
in the constitutional sense depends on whether they are rationally related to a legitimate
nonpunitive governmental purpose and whether they appear excessive in relation to that
purpose. 441 U.S. at 561.
b. Ensuring security and order at the institution is a permissible nonpunitive
objective, whether the facility houses pretrial detainees, convicted inmates, or both... [W]e
think that these particular restrictions and practices were reasonable responses by MCC
officials to legitimate security concerns. [Detainees] simply have not met their heavy
burden of showing that these officials have exaggerated their response to the genuine
security considerations that activated these restrictions and practices. 441 U.S. at 561,
662.
CLOSING COMMENTS OF MAJORITY OPINION: "[T]he inquiry of federal courts
into prison management must be limited to the issue of whether a particular system
violates any prohibition of the constitution, or in the case of a federal prison, a statute.
The wide range of 'judgment calls' that meet constitutional and statutory requirements are
confided to officials outside of the judicial branch of government." 441 U.S. at 562.
GENERAL NOI'ES: The Court saw this case, a challenge to virtually every aspect of
the operation of a state of the art detention facility, as an opportunity to clarify the
judiciary's role in the operation of prisons. The five-four decision indicates there was no
general consensus as to what that role is, gr how it should be applied. No less than three
possible standards of review are contained in the majority and dissenting opinions: 1) A
"rational basis", subjective test; 2) A balancing of interests test; 3) An objective standard of
review.
Despite J. Rehnquist's statement that "our analysis does not turn on the particulars of
the MCC concept or design," the majority's reasoning frequently looks to that concept or
design for justification of its positions. 441 U.S. at 525. Clearly, the "double-bunking"
holding should be interpreted as applicable only to facilities where:
a) Inmates are locked in their cells a maximum of eight hrs. a day and have access to
a wide range of activities and programs; and
b) No inmate is detained longer than sixty days.
Situations other than these likely will not fall within the strict holding on this issue.
(Metropolitan Correction Cent.er (MCC), New York)
State Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
CONTACT VISITS

Cooper v. Morin, 424 N.Y.2d 168 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct 2965 (1979).
The New York State Court of Appeals has ruled that state due process laws do allow
for contact visitation rights for pretrial detainees when the government's only argument
against such visitation centers on additional adrnini~ative costs. The court ruled that,
although federal constitutional requirements would not dictate such a finding in light of
the Bell v. Wolfish decision, state due process requirements called for an opposite finding.
The court examined carefully the rationale that was the basis for the Supreme Court
decision in the Bell case and made it clear that, at least in part, they felt the Supreme
Court had erred:
While we are in agreement with the Supreme Court's holding in Bell v. Wolfish
that due process forbids the punishment of pretrial detainees because punishment
can only be imposed aft.er conviction, we cannot agree that the validity of the
regimen imposed upon such persons during detention turns no more than whether
a regulation has a legitimate purpose other than punishment and is not excessive
in relation to that purpose. So one-sided a concept of due process we regard as
unacceptable. In our view what is required is a balancing of the harm to the
individual resulting from the condition imposed against the benefit sought by the
government through its enforcement.
32.5

In a dissenting opinion, two judges 1:ook the position that to find that state due process ·
requirements were different from federal requirements was impossible, since the wording
in the respective clauses is identical. Therefore, they claimed, the Bell case and its
holding must dictate the state court's decision. (Monroe County Jail, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEPARATION
DISCRIMJNATION
VISITS
MAIL
LAW LIBRARY

Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 27
(1980). In this opinion, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Mississippi
District Court Judge William Cox's ruling on what the Fifth Circuit termed a
"challenge to nearly every conceivable facet of the Jackson County Jail at Pascagoula,
Mississippi." The court first noted that the conditions at the Jackson County Jail were
not "uncivilized" or "barbaric and inhumane", as the court had found rulings on the
conditions of other jails. A peculiar aspect of this case was that convicted felons were
being held in the jail while the state penitentiary was being brought up to constitutional
standards. Consequently, there were convicted felons, convicted misdemeanants and
pretrial detainees in the jail. Accordingly, the court, in reviewing the conditions at the
jail, applied different standards depending on.whether the inmate was pretrial detainee or
a convicted felon or misdemeanant. The court then reviewed the history of corrections in
the State of Mississippi and specifically in Jackson County. It noted that Jackson County
officials had spent a considerable amount of money and instituted several new programs
in the last ten years. In addition, at the time of this opinion, the county was in the
process of erecting a new jail. After noting these facts, the court made rulings in the
following areas.
DISCRIMINATION. The appellate court upheld the lower court's ruling that the cells
at the Jackson County Jail were not segregated. Two bull pens at the jail, however, were
ruled to be unconstitutionally segregated. In response to the plaintiff's interrogatories, the
jail officials had produced documents showing that the large bull pen was ''white" and the
small bull pen was "colored." The jail officials argued that they were not responsible for
the segregation because each new inmate was given the freedom to choose which bullpen
he wished to occupy. The court held that this was not enough, stating: "In the inherently
coercive setting of a jail, it is evident to us that the withdrawal of decision making by the
public officials for only part of the jail (here, the bull pens} amounts to impermissible
racial segregation of prisoners.
VISITATION. The court noted that convicted criminals do not have a constitutional
right to visitation except for legal counsel, whereas pretrial detainees rights are limited in
that they must yield, where necessary, to the needs of institutional security. In the Fifth
Circuit, the courts have held that a pretrial detainee also does not have constitutional
right to contact visitation. At the jail, visitation was officially limited to a brief period on
Sundays, although jail officials often allowed visitation at other than regular hours.
However, there had been a serious smuggling problem at the jail. When the officials
ordered that visit.ors be searched before being allowed visitation to prevent smuggling, the
inmates rioted, causing $30,000 damage. The appellate court upheld the lower court's
ruling that the existing visitation regulations were constitutionally adequate. The court
specifically pointed out that depriving inmates of contact visitation was unconstitutional.
MAIL. The court clearly spelled out the rights of inmates with regard to mail:
[P]rison officials may constitutionally censor incoming and outgoing general
correspondence. No numerical limitations may be placed upon prison correspondence, but
jail officials may employ a 'negative mail list' to eliminate any prisoner correspondence
with those on the outside who affirmatively indicate that they do not wish to receive
correspondence from a particular prisoner. Officials may not require prior approval of the
names of individuals with whom prisoners may correspond. Finally, letters which concern
plans for violations of prison rules or which contain a graphic presentation of sexual
behavior in violation of the law may be withheld. Outgoing mail to licensed att.orneys,
courts, and court officials must be sent unopened, and incoming mail from such sources
may be opened only in the presence of the inmate recipient, if considered necessary to
determine authenticity or to inspect for contraband. Prisoners may be required to submit
the names of att.orneys reasonably in advance of proposed mailings so that officials can
ascertain whether the named att.orney is licensed. Prisoners have the same general rights
as to media mail.
CLASSIFICATION. The court noted that the Constitution does not require that a
classification plan be put into effect, although a court may order such a plan to protect
inmates from homosexual attacks, violence and contagious diseases. The court ruled that
the policies in existence under the Mississippi Code were adequate to protect the inmate.
SECURITY. While noting that an inmate is to be protected from assaults from other
inmates, the court also stated that relief could be provided only where there was a
showing of deliberate indifference to the inmates' security and protection. Here, there was
no such showing, and the court refused to issue injunctive relief.
SANITATION. At the Jackson County Jail, the prisoners were responsible for
cleaning their own. cells, and a trusty was to assume responsi'bility for cleaning the cells
when the inmat.e was unable or unwilling to clean after himself. There was no evidence of
rodents in the jail. The jail was sprayed for insect.s once a month to

32.6

· minimize the cockroach problem. Sheets and other bedding as well as clothes were
cleaned regularly. Under these circumstances, the Court found no constitutional
violations regarding the sanitation of the Jack.son County Jail.
'LAW LIBRARY. Prisoners were able to acquire books by asking a public defender or
private attorney to obtain the book for them from the County Law Library. The Court
ruled that this was inadequate for convicted inmates who had exhausted their rights of
direct appeal. However, the Court ruled, the State of Mississippi, and not the County of
Jack.son, was the proper party to remedy the situation, and since the State had not been
named as a defendant, the Court refused to grant relief. The Court stated, however, that
its order would not preclude the inmates from taking an appropriate action against the
State of Mississippi in the future. The availability of public defenders and the ability of
prisoners to "page" books from the County Law Library provided adequate access to the
Courts for pretrial detainees. Where convicted
prisoners were provided neither public defender assistance nor access to the law library,
they were denied access to the Courts and their claims for relief could be heard. (Jackson
County Jail, Pascagoula, Mississippi)
State Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
PUNISHMENT

Pruitt v. Joiner. 395 N.E.2d 276 (1979). The Indiana Court of Appeals for the Third
District has ruled that even where conditions of pretrial detention include "beatings,
deprivation of food, detention in solitary cells without bedding, punishment without due
process, and denial of medical care, visitation, and mailing privileges," the use of writ
of habeas corpus is not a satisfactory method of obtaining relief. The court specifically
refuted the broad use of habeas corpus in the federal system, which was argued by the
appellants. "Indiana.. has not chosen to expand the interpretation, this state has taken
the strict common law. By statute and judicial interpretation, this state has taken the
strict common law position that habeas corpus may be used only to inquire into the
legality of the cause of the restraint." Since the appellants did not challenge the legality of
their restraint but rather the manner used to accomplish it, the court reversed the lower
court decision. In a dissenting opinion one of the three panel judges argued that such a
separation of habeas corpus relief from due process considerations should not occur.
Not only has punishment been administered without a trial as required by due
process of law, but the punishment administered here could be characterized as
cruel and unusual even after trial and conviction...The petitioners are entitled to
immediate relief from the Indiana courts. This is not a question of civil rights. It
is a question of due process of law. Under what conditions does a lawful executive
commitment become unlawful as a violation of due process of law?
(Laite County Jail, Indiana)

1980
U.S. District Court
SEPARATION

Campbell v. Bergeron, 486 F.Supp. 1246 (M.D. La. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 719
(5th Cir., 1981). Jail inmates have a right of personal safety when incarcerated.
However, there is nothing inherent in a failure to sep!ll'ate sentenced and pretrial inmates
which violates this right. (West Baton Rouge Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
'LAW LIBRARY

Delgado v. Sheriff of Milwaukee Co. Jail, 487 F.Supp. 649 (E.D. Wisc. 1980).
Allegations that a pretrial detainee is denied the use of an adequate law library states
a claim in which relief could be granted. (Milwaukee County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY

Epps v. Levine, 484 F.Supp. 474 (D. Md. 1980). Pretrial detainees transferred to the
state penitentiary and classified to protective custody shall have regular commissary
privileges. (State Penitentiary, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS

Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F.Supp. 1276 (W.D. Mo. 1980). Class action is brought
challenging the constitutionality of numerous conditions and practices at the county
jail. The district court held that: (1) prison authorities' failure to immediately evacuate
inmates from any sewage contaminated cell, pending thorough cleaning of cell, violated
constitutional rights of inmates subject to that condition; (2) deficiencies in jail, including
lack of fire escape, absence of windows, lack of necessary fire doors, and limited number of
fire extinguishers amounted to constitutionally intolerable conditions. Prison conditions
for an unconvicted person are to be judged against due process standards of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments and conditions within the penal institution which are
unconstitutional for the convicted person under eighth amendment review are likewise an
abridgment of due process guarantees afforded unconvicted persons. The claim that
financial restrictions have prevented improvements in jail conditions is not a defense to
constitutional violations.
Although lights were left on all night in the county jail, and there was a high noise
level at night, such were not per se unconstitutional conditions, since inmates could sleep
during the day, and there was no indication that inmates had developed psychological or
physiological problems.

32.7

An entirely inadequate ventilation gystem at the county jail constituted a
constitutionally intolerable living condition. Deficiencies in the county jail, including lack
of fire escapes, absence of windows, lack of necessary fire doors, and limited number of fire
extinguishers amounted to constitutionally intolerable conditions. Failure of county jail
authorities to provide each inmate one hour per day of exercise outside cells was a
constitutionally intolerable condition. (Clay County Jail, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES

Santori v. Fong, 484 F.Supp. 1029 (E.D. Penn. 1980). A statutorily established policy
of provisions of pgychiatric and pgychological services to pretrial detainees does not
create an enforceable entitlement to such services. (Chester County Farm Prison,
Penngylvania)

State Appeals Court
TRANSFER

State v. Grey, 602 S.W.2d 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). A pretrial detainee, about
whom rumors of escape were abundant, could not be transferred :to the state
penitentiary under the Tennessee safekeeping statute: Barry Grey was incarcerated in
the Davidson, Tennessee County Jail, unable to post bond after an arrest. Shortly after
his arrest, based upon alleged rumors of an imminent escape attempt, the state sought to
transfer him. The statute involved, (T.C.A. 41-1125) provides:
In all cases where the jail in which a prisoner is confined becomes insufficient
from any cause, any circuit or criminal judge, upon the application of the sheriff
and proof of the fact, may order the prisoner, by mittimus or warrant, to be
removed to the nearest sufficient jail.
Based upon the above statute the trial judge before whom the motion was presented
allowed the transfer, and an immediate appeal was taken. On appeal, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Tennessee held that the state penitentiary was not a "jail" as defined
by the statute. The court noted that the stigma attached to confinement in the state
penitentiary should not be imposed upon a pretrial detainee without specific statutory
authorization. The court then ruled that this statute did not provide such authorization.
(Davidson County Jail, Tennessee)

1981
U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSFER
DUE PROCESS

Cobb v. Aty-ch, 643 F.2d 946 (3rd Cir. 1981). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, sitting ~ bane, held that the sixth amendment right to counsel prohibits the
transference of pretrial detainees to distant state prisons without first affording them
notice and an opportunity to be heard in court. Such transfers, the court found, severely
interfere with the inmates' access to counsel. A majority of the court also relied heavily on
the speedy trial clause in its argument. Eighty percent of the pretrial detainees involved
in the suit were represented by the public defenders, who were financially unable to make
long trips to the state institutions. Due to the prolonging of the pretrial period due to
continuances and other factors associated with the distance to the detention facility, some
transferred inmates spent more time incarcerated pretrial than the eventual length of
their sentences. Three of the judges also concluded that the right to counsel, speedy trial
provisions and the bail clause of the eight amendment create a federally protected interest
in reducing pretrial incarceration and minimizing interference with a pretrial detainee's
liberty. "The eighth amendment's prohibition against excessive bail bears plainly and
directly upon the ability of charged persons to prepare for trial and upon the presumption
of a right to be free from restraint which those persons enjoy. It should also be read as
preventing not merely the fact of detention, but also those forms of detention that
unnecessarily interfere with those liberty interests." The case also involved the transfer of
sentenced prisoners and those who have been convicted but are still awaiting sentencing.
The court found that no federally protected interests were involved for the sentenced
population, but unsentenced prisoners have speedy-trial and counsel rights similar to
those of pretrial detainees. (Philadelphia Prison System, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
RIGHTS RETAINED
DUE PROCESS

Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981). Prisoners being held in county jail
brought an action challenging conditions of their confinement and seeking damages for
violation of their civil rights. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi entered judgment generally favorable to county officials, and
prisoners appealed. On rehearing, 594 F.2d 997, the court of appeals held that due
process clause accords pretrial detainees rights not enjoyed by convicte_d inmates: while a
sentenced inmate may be punished in any fashion not cruel and unusual, the due process
clause forbids punishment of a person held in custody awaiting trial but not yet adjudged
guilty of any crime. (Jackson County Jail, Pascagoula, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1981). Adopting most of the findings of the
district court, the United States of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ordered major
reforms in the Hartford Community Correctional Center (HCCC), dealing generally with
overcrowding. The constitutional standard for the legality of conditions of confinement
is different for pretrial detainees and for convicted inmates. For pretrial detainees, the
test is whether the conditions amount to punishment without due process in violation

PUNISHMENT
CROWDING
STATE INTEREST

32.8

of the fourteenth amendment. With respect t.o convicted inmates, the criterion is whether
the punishment is cruel and unusual as defined under the eighth amendment.
Reviewing the numerous findings of the district court, the appellate court looked to
the supreme court case of Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520. Viewing overcrowding at the
HCCC as related t.o pretrial detainees, the. court cited the following standard of whether
such conditions amount t.o punishment: ''It must be shown that the overcrowding subjects
a detainee over an extended period t.o genuine privation and· hardship not reasonably
related t.o a legitimate governmental objective."
Based upon this standard the court found that double-bunking in cells originally
designed for one person, compounded by overcrowded dayrooms, imposed unconstitutional
punishment on pretrial detainees in all cases except where such hardship was related t.o a
legitimate governmental purpose. The court here found that these hardships promoted
neither security nor the effective management of the institution.
Other conditions were even less acceptable. The use of a glass enclosed dayroom
(dubbed the "fish tank") as a dormit.ory room housing numerous inmates on a full time•
basis was held t.o amount t.o punishment and was thus unconstitutional with regard to
pretrial detainees. In addition, the placing of mattresses on the floors of cells t.o ·
accommodate more inmates and the assignment of healthy inmates t.o medical cells
(sometimes with mentally or physically ill cellmates) t.o alleviate overcrowding were held
t.o constitute impermissible punishment.
The court further stated that the length of incarceration of pretrial detainees becomes
relevant in such determination: "Conditions unacceptable for weeks or months might be
t.olerable for a few days." As such, the court indicated that while double-bunking and
overloaded dayrooms might be t.olerable, and thus constitutionally permissible for a few
days, after 15 or so days, they would become unacceptable punishment. The use of the
"fish tank" and floor mattresses, however, were held to constitute punishment regardless
of the number of days imposed.
Viewing the conditions as they related t.o convicted persons, the court pointed out that
it was t.o be guided by a wholly different standard. Here, in order t.o constitute a
constitutional violation, the conditions had t.o be such as t.o amount t.o cruel and unusual
punishment. Nevertheless, the court found the overcrowded conditions int.olerable.
Noting that the thirty t.o thirty-five square feet of living space per inmate fell far short of
the standards promulgated by groups such as the Connecticut Department of Corrections,
the American Correctional Association, the United Nations and the National Sheriffs'
Association, and further noting that the dayroom at the HCCC offered the "relief of a
noisy subway platform" the court held that double-bunking, with respect t.o convicted
inmates, was unconstitutional except where inmates are confined no more than about
thirty days.
As with the pretrial detainees, the court found that the constitutional rights of the
convicted inmates were immediately violated by confinement in the "fish tank" and by
policies requiring them t.o sleep on mattresses on the floors and t.o be assigned to medical
holding cells for no reason other than t.o alleviate overcrowding.
Finally, the court ordered that all newly admitted inmates, with minor exceptions, be
given a medical examination within forty-eight hours of admission. (Hartford Community
Correctional Center, Connecticut)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PUNISHMENT
USE OF FORCE
CELLS
CONDITIONS
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED

Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981). The test for determining the

constitutionality of treatment of pretrial detainees alleged t.o deprive them of liberty
without due process of law is whether those conditions amount t.o punishment of the
detainee. It is appropriate t.o consider t.ogether all the conditions of confinement in
order t.o determine whether they amount t.o punishment. The use of tear gas t.o
retrieve a metal food tray from a pretrial detainee or t.o stop others from shouting and
utt.ering threats was found constitutionally impermissible. (Indiana State Prison,
Michigan 9ity, Indiana) Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that having pretrial detainees confined t.o twentyseven square foot cells for twenty-two hours a day at the Indiana State Prison constitutes
illegal "punishment" under Bell v. Wolfish.
In Wolfish, the Supreme Court found no due process violations in holding two pretrial
detainees in a cell measuring seventy-five square feet. The Court pointed out that
inmates were required t.o be in their cells only seven t.o eight hours a day and that of the
pretrial detainees at the Metropolitan Correctional Center, the facility sued in Wolfish,
more than half were released within ten days, three-quarters within a month, and more
than eighty-five percent within sixty days. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit cited Wolfish
because of the amount of time. spent by pretrial detainees at the Indiana institution, an
average of about sixty days. The Circuit Court stated:
It seems t.o us that a minimum requirement as t.o cell area should be imposed and
this minimum should be determined flexibly in relation t.o the amount of time
individuals are t.o be kept in the cell...Except where individual circumstances show
the need for more restrictive confinement, (detainees) should be allowed t.o spend
significant periods· of each day out of their cells and some activities or programs
should be regularly available t.o them in their time out of cells.•.
32.9

We do not read anything in Wolfish as requiring this court to grant automatic
deference to ritual incantations by prison officials that their actions foster the goals of
order and discipline. Under the facts before us, we find that the (detainees) in this action
have been denied equal protection of the laws by being held under significantly more
burdensome conditions than convicted prisoners in the absence of any justification of such
treatment of each individual. (Indiana State Prison, Michigan City, Indiana)
U.S. Appeals Court

STATE INTEREST
CLOTHING

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
PUNISHMENT
DUE PROCESS

STATE INTEREST

Olgin v. Darnell, 664 F.2d 107 (1981). The restrictions and conditions placed on a
pretrial detainee, particularly the removal of all his clothes but his underwear for one
day, were not arbitrary and purposeless. Those steps were unreasonably related to the
legitimate governmental objective of calming participants in the stabbing of a fellow
prisoner, restoring order and protecting inmates from a fire hazard created by the pretrial
detainee. (Midland County Jail, Texas)
Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851 (1981). A majority of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, sitting ~ bane, ruled that the allegations of a pretrial detainee
raised a legitimate factual issue as to the constitutionality of the conditions to which
he was subjected during his pretrial confinement. The court found, therefore, that the
trial judge should have presented the case to the jury rather than directed the verdict
against the plaintiff. The circuit court found that the jury might have concluded that the
conditions of confinement were punitive in nature. Since the due process clause prohibits
the punishment of persons prior to a judgment of conviction, plaintiff Robert Villanueva
would have to persuade the jury that punitive conditions existed during his pretrial
detention. According to the decision:
The question of whether there is sufficient evidence of the defendants' punitive
intent is one for the jury. Moreover, the jury may 'infer that the purpose was
punishment from the fact that the condition either bore no reasonable relation to a
legitimate goal or exceeded what was necessary for attaining such a goal... '
Putnam v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415 at 420 (8th Cir. 1981). See also Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. at 539. There is evidence in this record from which the jury could have
reasonably concluded that Villanueva's conditions of confinement were
unnecessarily excessive and bore no reasonable relation to a legitimate
governmental interest...We emphasize that our decision is not based solely on the
fact that Villanueva was confined in a cell measuring six feet by six feet, ~
Rhodes v. Chapman, 29 CrL 3061 (1981). It is rather based upon the totality of
the circumstances, including cell size, time spent in the cell, lack of opportunity for
exercise or recreation, general sanitary conditions, and the fact that the
appellant's past behavior demonstrated an ability to be confined under less
restrictive conditions without incident.
In dicta the court suggests that the classification procedure which resulted in the
plaintiffs being placed in segregation while awaiting trial was valid. The procedure took
into account the nature of the crime charged and particularly whether the crime was
violent or aggressive, the prisoner's desire to remain in a particular classification, the
psychological state of the individual and other similar factors. (St. Louis County Adult
Correctional Facility, Missouri)

1982
U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
VISITS

Boudin v. Thomas, 543 F.Supp. 686 (S.D. N.Y. 1982). Administrative detention is
terminated and contact visits are restored by Court. A pretrial detainee sought a writ
of habeas corpus challenging her confinement in administrative segregation. The
United States District Court held that administrative detention was to be immediately
suspended and contact visits between the petitioner and approved visitors were to be
initiated, where the detainee had not committed any act or engaged in any conduct
threatening herself, staff or institutional security and was not shown to be an escape risk.
The defendants presented only vague assertions in attempts to demonstrate the risks
posed by contact visits with her infant son. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY

Campbell v. McGruder, 554 F.Supp. 562 (D.C. D.C. 1982). Double celling of pretrial
detainees is allowed but additional guards are ordered to be placed in each cellblock in
which double-celling occurs. No pretrial detainee is to be confined in the company of
another inmate in his cell for more than twelve hours per day. No pretrial detainee is to
be double-celled for more than thirty days. (D.C. Jail)

STAFFING

U.S. District Court
JUVENILES
CONDITIONS
PUNISHMENT

D.B., et al. v. Graham Tewksbury, et al., 545 F.Supp. 896 (D. Ore. 1982). A federal
district court judge in Oregon rules in a class action suit brought by Oregon Legal
Services on behalf of children confined in the Columbia County Correctional Facility
(CCCF). Judge Helen J. Frye held that it is unconstitutional to hold children in adult
jails, whether they are accused status offenders or are alleged to have committed crimes.
Jud_ge Frye first ruled that the conditions at CCCF constituted punishment, citing a
failure by the jail to provide any form of work, exercise, education, recreation, recreational
materials, adequate hygiene, minimal privacy, adequate diet or medical
32.10

care, emergency health service, "treatment of emotionally disturbed children who panic in
a jail setting," or visits with families. The twenty-three page opinion cited numerous other
deprivations.
Judge Frye indicated that the decision as to whether these conditions are punishment
was "simple,• since the director of the Columbia County Juvenile Department, Graham
Tewksbury, "has stated expressly that he intends to punish children" held in the jail. The
court cited Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), stating that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished.
However, Judge Frye went further and ruled that the confinement of children,
whether status offenders or accused of conµnitting crimes, in !!m: adult jail is
unconstitutional:
... [TJo put such a child [status offender] in a jail--aey jail--with its criminal
stigma--constitutes punishment and is a violation of that child's due process rights
under the fourteenth amendment. ..
Would it be constitutionally permissible to lodge children accused of
committing crimes [in modern, 'enlightened' kinds of jails]?...Due process• or
fundamental fairness - does not guarantee to children all the rights in the
adjudication process which are constitutionally assured to adults accused of
committing crimes. For example, children are not entitled to a jury trial, to
indictment by grand jury, or to bail. In lieu of these constitutional rights, children
are not t.o be treated or considered as criminals...
Juvenile proceedings, in the state of Oregon as elsewhere, are in the nature
of a guardianship imposed by the state as parens patriae to provide the care and
guidance that under normal circumstances would be furnished by the natural
parents. It is, then, fundamentally fair constitutional - to deny children charged
with crimes, rights available to adults charged with crimes if that denial is offset
by a special solicitude designed for children. But when the denial of constitutional
rights for children is not offset by a 'special solicitude' but by lodging them in
adult jails, it is fundamentally unfair. When children who are found ~ of
committing criminal acts cannot be placed in adult jails, it is fundamentally unfair
to lodge children accused of committing criminal acts in adult jails...
The supervisors at jails are guards - not guardians. Jails hold convicted
criminals and adults charged with crimes...A jail is not a place where a truly
concerned natural parent would lodge his or her child for care and guidance. A
jail is not a place where the state can constitutionally lodge its children under the
guise of parens patriae.
To lodge a child in an adult jail pending adjudication of criminal charges against that
child is a violation of that child's due process rights under the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution.
Since this decision, all children have been removed from CCCF. However, Oregon
state law permits placement of juveniles in adult facilities under certain circumstances.
(Columbia County Correctional Facility, Oregon)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Hunt v. Polk County, 551 F.Supp. 339 (S.D. Iowa 1982). Strip searches of
pre-arraignment detainees charged with minor offenses are declared impermissible. A
federal district court judge in Iowa found that no strip searches of pre-arraignment
detainees charged with minor offenses would be permitted unless the offense is associated
with weapons or contraband, or unless there is a basis for reasonable suspicion that the
particular detainee is concealing a weapon or contraband.
Because these detainees are being held solely due to their inability to post cash bail,
and because most are traffic violat.ors, the court found that there was little reason to
believe that a particular detainee would be concealing contraband or a weapon. (Polk
County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
TEMPORARY
RELEASE

Samuals v. Department of Corrections, N.Y.C., 548 F.Supp. 253 (E.D. N.Y. 1982).
Detainee does not have right to attend funeral. A federal district court has ruled
that allowing a prisoner t.o be temporarily released to visit sick relatives or to attend a
funeral is entirely within the discretion of the off'J.cials responsible for confinement. City
officials denied a pretrial detainee permission t.o attend the wake of his twin children, and
he filed suit. The court noted that pretrial detainees have no greater right to free
movement than 4o convicted criminals. (Queens House of Detention, New York)
1983

U.S. Appeals Court
PROBABLE CAUSE

Bernard v. County of Santa Clara, 699 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir., 1983). A probable cause
hearing shall be ordered within twenty-four hours of arrest without warrant. In a
decision that could affect police, sheriffs, and pretrial release policies throughout
California, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Santa
Clara County must hold a probable cause hearing within twenty-four hours after an arrest
without a warrant. The plaintiff had alleged a violation of his right to a prompt

32.11

determination of probable cause, citing Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103 (1975), which held
that the fourth amendment required "as a condition for any s1gnil'icant pretrial restraint
on liberty" a fair and reliable determination of probable cause made by a judicial officer
"either before or promptly after arrest."
U.S. District Court

TRANSFER

CROWDING

U.S. Appeals Court
PARITY WITH

SENTENCED
SEPARATION
STATE INTEREST

U.S. Appeals Court

METHADONE
TREATMENT

U.S. District Court
MAil,

Black v. Delbello. 575 F.Supp. 28 (S.D. N.Y. 1983). Pretrial detainee's transfer left
within the discretion of jail officials. A pretrial detainee was transferred to another jail
by administrators who cited overcrowding as the reason for the transfer. The detainee
sued, alleging that since there were many empty beds in the facility, there was no need for
the transfer. The federal district court found that the transfer was authorized by New
York statu.t.es and an order by the New York State Commission of Corrections. Relying on
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532 (1976). the court refused to interfere,
finding that this matter was properly left within the discretion of jail officials.
(Westchester County and Orange County, New York).

court

Drayton v. Robinson, 719 F.2d 1214 (3rd Cir. 1983). Appeals
orders the same
protections for pretrial detainees as provided to sentenced offenders. Pennsylvania
prison officials housed pretrial detainees, at the request of local officials, in state
facilities with convicted offenders. At times, detainees were placed in administrative
segregation without applying the same policies and procedures used for convicted
offenders prior to placement.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with this practice, stating that •...to
accept appellants' interpretation of the regulations would create an anomalous situation
where inmates who were charged, tried, convicted and sentenced would have greater
constitutional protection from segregat.ed conimement than inmates who are merely being
held awaiting trial, or convicted but unsentenced. •
The court ruled that detainees had as much of a protectable interest in remaining out
of administrative segregation as all other inmates at the facility and were entitled to the
same protections. (Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections)
Fredericks v. Huggins, 711 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1983). Pretrial detainees are not entitled
to methadone treatment in jail. A federal circuit court has upheld the practices of the
sheriff of Fairfax County with regard to the treatment of pretrial detainees who were
participating in methadone detoxification programs prior to detention.
The sheriff had developed a procedure for handling inmates with drug withdrawal
problems, and the procedure had been approved by the American Medical Association.
The procedure required consistent monitoring of detainees during withdrawal.
The court found that the sheriff's security concerns about introducing drugs into the
facility, even those administered on a controlled basis. were legitimate, and that
subsequent refusal to detoxify detainees did not amount to. unconstitutional punishment.
(Fairfax County Jail, Virginia)
Odom v. Tripp. 575 F.Supp. 1491 (E.D. Mo. 1983). Pretrial detainee in city jail is not
entitled to receive mail on Saturday. A detainee at the St. Louis City Jail sued the
city, alleging that the practice of not delivering mail to prisoners on Saturday amounted to
punishment. Based on the reason present.ed by administrators (lack of personnel) and the
lack of intent to punish, the federal district court found the practice "reasonably related"
to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, and therefore, found no violation of
the plaintiff's constitutional rights. (St. Louis City Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
PROTECTION

Reynolds v. Sheriff, City of Richmond, 574 F.Supp. 90 (E.D. Va. 1983). Sheriff may be
liable for pretrial detainee's beating while housed with convicted felons. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has refused the motion of the
defendant sheriff to dismiss him from a suit brought by a pretrial detainee.
The detainee alleges that he was beaten by convicted felons while he was detained at
the sheriff's facility. He accuses the sheriff of directing the act or acquiescing to it after it
happened. The court did not dismiss the sheriff from the suit because the plaintiff alleged
that he established and maintained a policy of not segregating convicted felons from
pretrial detainees. Because of a lack of separation, the plaintiff was attacked. Also, the
court ruled that the case could be pursued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 because it alleged
a violation of the plaintiff's right to be free from bodily injury, and that cruel and unusual
punishment need not be alleged. (Richmond City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTACT VISITS
WINDOWS

Rutherford v. Pit.chess, 710 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 3227
(1984). Pretrial detainees class action suit brings changes. A class action suit was
f'tled against the Los Angeles County central jail by pretrial detainees. The federal
district court ordered twelve changes after a trial. Three of the changes were appealed by
county officials. The Ninth Circait Court of Appeals decided that: low risk detainees were
to be allowed one contact visit per week; detainees would be allowed to be present during
searches of their cells; and the replacement of transparent windows by concrete enclosures
was justif'ied. Subsequently the United States Supreme Court reversed on the f':irst two
issues. (Los Angeles County Central Jail)

CELL SEARCHES

32.12

U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
PUNISHMENT
STATE INTEREST

Union County Jail Inmat.es v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct.
1600 (1983). Overcrowded conditions are found unconstitutional. Litigation challenging
severe overcrowding at the Union County Jail in New Jersey result.ed in a finding by a
federal district court and its special master that the overcrowded conditions at the·
jail were unconstitutional. The most serious concern of the court was placement of
inmat.es on mattresses on the floor of one man cells. Rejecting the stat.e corrections
commissioner's request to resolve the problem by double bunking, the district judge
ordered the convicted inmates removed from the jail and into the stat.e prison system to
which they had been sent.enced (537 F.Supp. 1009).
In reversing the district court's prohibition against double bunking, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that under the "totality of the circwnstances," the double bunking
proposal would satisfy the constitutional prohibitions against the punishment of pretrial
detainees and against cruel and unusual punishment of sent.enced prisoners.
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit relied on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979), in which the Supreme Court held that while detainees may not be punished, there
is no punishment where conf'mement conditions serve legitimat.e nonpunitive purposes and
are not excessive in relation to those purposes. In addition, the court must inquire as to
whether the conditions cause inmat.es to endure "genuine privations and hardship over an
ext.ended period of time."
Both courts concluded that overcrowding served two legitimat.e purposes:
effective management of a det.ention facility during a stat.ewide prison overcrowding
emergency and the int.erests of stat.e and local government in not releasing inmat.es into
the streets. However, the circuit disagreed with the lower court's finding that conditions
would still violat.e the due process rights of detainees because of sheer lack of space and
because the totality of conditions would in any event be unconstitutional.
According to the appeals court, double bunking would resolve the "totality" issue by
providing adequat.e space for sleeping and would allow for reclaiming large recreation
areas, permitting each inmat.e one hour of exercise each day in the larger space. The
circuit claimed that this recreation period would offset the "cramped and overcrowded
conditions" of the remaining fifteen waking hours, during which square footage per inmat.e
varies from thirty-one to thirty-three and one half square feet. The Circuit Court was
further persuaded that such conditions were not unconstitutional because they were
convinced that the majority of detainees are conf'med for no more than sixty days, an
assertion disput.ed by some local parties. (Union County Jail, New Jersey)
1984

U.S. Supreme Court
CONTACT VISITS
CEIL SEARCHES

Block v. Rutherford, 104 S.Ct. 3227 (1984). U.S. Supreme Court reverses lower court
rulings; pretrial detainees in Los Angeles Central Jail will not have contact visits and
will not be allowed to be present when cells are searched.
Pretrial detainees at the Los Angeles County Central Jail brought a class action in
Federal District Court in 1975 against the County Sheriff and other officials, challenging
the jail's policy of denying' pretrial detainees contact visits with their spouses, relatives,
children and friends, and the jail's practice of conducting random, irregular "shakedown"
searches of cells while the detainees were away at meals, recreation, or other activities.
The district court concluded that the danger of permitting lower security risk inmat.es to
have contact visits was not great enough to warrant deprivation of such contact and, with
regard to cell searches, that allowing inmat.es to watch from a distance while their cells
are searched would allay inmat.e concerns that their personal property would be
unnecessarily conf'JSCat.ed or destroyed.
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court relied upon its previous ruling in Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, to uphold practices at the Los Angeles County Central Jail.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger stat.ed that " ...The principles artic:wat.ed in
Wolfish govern resolution of this case....We affirm that, 'proper deference to the informed
discretion of prison authorities demands that they, and not the courts, make the difficult
judgments which reconcile conflicting claims affecting the security of the institution, the
welfare of the prison staff, and the property rights of the detainees.' 441 U.S. at 557.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed."
Contact Visits. The Supreme Court based its decision on a narrow question: is the
prohibition of contact visits reasonably relat.ed to legitimate governmental objectives?
Finding, as in Wolfish. that there is no basis to conclude that pretrial detainees pose any
less security risk than convict.ed inmat.es, the court not.ed that detainees may in fact
present a greater risk to jail security. The district court had ordered: "Commencing not
more than ninety days following the dat.e of this order, the defendants will make available
a contact visit once each week to each pretrial detainee that has been held in the jail for
one month or more, and concerning whom there is no indication of drug or escape
propensities; provided, however, that no more than iift.een hundred such visits need be
allowed in any one week. App. to Pet. for Cert. 88.
The majority of the court held that the burden of identifying candidates for contact
visits is made even more difficult by the brevity of det.ention. The majority criticized the
district court for not ending its inquiry after the County had established reasons for
denying them; the "balancing" that the district court attempt.ed in its decision,
32.13

"result.ed in an impermissible substitution of its view on the proper administration of
Central Jail for that of the experienced administrators of the facility," according to the
majority opinion. The opinion concluded, on this issue, by stating: "In rejecting the
district court's order, we do not in any sense denigrat.e the importance of visits from f-amily
or friends to the detainee. Nor do we int.end to suggest that contact visits might not be a
factor contributing to the ultimat.e reint.egration of the detainee into society. We hold only
that the Constitution does not require that detainees be allowed contact visits when
responsible, experienced administrators have det.ermined, in their sound discretion, that
such visits will jeopardize the security of the facility." In a separat.e concurrmg opinion,
Justice Blackm.un' challenged the reasonmg of the majority, stating that when a detainee
attempts to demonstrat.e the punitive int.ent of a policy he is necessarily calling into
question the good faith of the prison adrninisb-ators: "Under those circumstances, it seems
to me to be somewhat perverse to insist" that a court assessing the rationality of a
particular administrative practice must accord prison administrators 'wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices' ... such a requirement
boils down to a command that when a court is confront.ed with a charge of administrative
bad faith, it must evaluat.e the charge by assuming administrative good faith." The appeal
present.ed to the Supreme Court the issue of whether detainees are entitled to obse"~ jail
staff when their cells are being searched according to jail policies which require irregular
or random "(shakedown)" searches. The majority found the method of conducting searches
virtually identical to that present.ed in Wolfish, and found no reason to reconsider the
prior support of that method in light of a fourth amendment challenge and a due process
challenge. (Los Angeles County Central Jail)
U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
MEDICAL CARE

Gibson v. Babcock, 601 F.Supp. 1156 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Supervisors liable for
Detainee beating. A federal district court has held supervisors responsible for failing
to prot.ect a detainee from an assault by another prisoner. The court found that
knowledge of a history of violence within a jail, rather than a specific risk of harm t.o a
particular prisoner, was enough to hold the supervisors liable. The court found that the
eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to
pretrial detainees, and that a detainee need not demonstrat.e deliberat.e indifference t.o
stat.e a claim for denial of medical care under the due process clause of the eighth
amendment. (Lake County Jail, Waukegan, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Kathriner v. City of Overland, Missouri, 602 F.Supp. 124 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
The U.S. District Court held that strip searching a pretrial detainee without reason to
believe she possessed contraband or weapons violat.ed her constitutional rights. The
plaintiff challenged the blanket policy of strip searching all prisoners, regardless of their
length of det.ention. Corrections officials who conduct.ed the search were grant.ed good
faith immunity because they adopt.ed the strip search policy when Bell v. Wolfish was
decided and had not been put on notice that their actions were unconstitutional. The
court held the city liable for their violations. (Overland City Lockup, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court

Maey Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1984). Female detainees are
awarded damages for strip searches. Four women who were strip searched at a lockup
while awaiting arrival of bail funds brought action against the city. The women were all
arrest.ed for misdemeanor charges. The court found the strip search policy which result.ed
in the searching of prisoners who were not inherently dangerous and were only detained
briefly while awaiting bond was unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Equal
prot.ection was violat.ed as similarly situat.ed males were subject.ed to only hand searches.
Each plaintiff was awarded between $25,000 and $35,000 in damages. Attorney's fees
were also awarded. (Chicago City Lockups)

SEARCHES

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
PROTECTION

Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1984). Appeals court reverses lower
court ruling; finds that pretrial detainee's due process rights may have been
violat.ed by alleged denial of compet.ent medical care, and section 1983 action
possible for failure to protect. The plaintiff sought damages for injuries received while a
pretrial detainee at the St. Clair County Jail in Belleville, Illinois. A federal magistrat.e
had dismissed the action. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
The plaintiff was admitted to the jail as a detainee. A Caucasian, he "had some trouble"
with black inmat.es shortly after admission and was transferred to another cell block. In
his new cell block he was involved in another int.erracial fight and was transferred to
segregation. His att.orney brought his assignment to segregation to the attention of the
court, and he was subsequently transferred to cell block A. The plaintiff request.ed
transfer from cell block A, fearing additional problems with black imnat.es. Four days
lat.er he was beat.en by two black inmat.es and suffered the loss of three teeth, a fractured
nose and an eye injury. The plaintiff alleged that he was beat.en for over fifteen minut.es
before the c:orrections officer came to investigat.e. Although taken to a hospital the next
day, injuries to his teeth and eye were not treat.ed for three months, and he allegedly
suffered permanent injury. The appeals court reversed the dismiSSAl, ordering the case to
proceed to trial. (St. Clair County Jail, lliinois)

32.14

U.S. Supreme Court
PREVENTIVE

DETENTION
JUVENILES

U.S. District Court
CROWDING

Schall. Commissioner of New York Department of Juvenile Justice v. Martin et al., 104
S.Ct. 2403 (1984). Preventive detention of juveniles is upheld. A divided United
States Supreme Court (6 justices concurring, 3 justices dissenting) upheld section
320.4(3)(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which authorized pretrial detention of
an accused juvenile delinquent based on a finding that there is a "serious risk" that the
child "may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult would
constitute a crime." Attorneys brought action on behalf of a class of all juveniles detained
under the provisions of Section 320.4(3)(b), arguing that it permitted detention without
due process of law. The federal district court found for the plaintiffs and ordered the
immediate release of all members of the class. 513 F.Supp. 691 (1981).
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the finding of the
lower court, finding the provision "unconstitutional as to all juveniles" because the statute
is administered in such a way that "the detention period serves as punishment imposed
without proof of guilt established according to the requisite constitutional standard." 689
F.2d 365, at 373-374 (1982). The majority of the Supreme Court found that:
•... preventive detention under the Family Court.Act serves a legitimate state
objective, and that the procedural protections afforded pretrial detainees by the
New York statute satisfy the requirements of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 11
The district court rejected the equal protection challenge offered by the plaintiffs
attorneys, but agreed that the detention authorized under the Family Court Act violates
due process. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court finding, stating
that ''the vast majority of juveniles detained under Section 320.5(3)(b) either have their
petitions dismissed before an adjudication of delinquency or are released after
adjudication. 11 689 F.2d at 369. The appeals court concluded that section 320.5(3)(b) is
used principally not for preventive purposes but to impose punishment, as the early
release of so many of those detained contradicts the asserted need for pretrial confinement
to protect the community. The appeals court concluded that section 320(5)(b) was
unconstitutional for all juveniles, reasoning that individual litigation would be a practical
impossibility because the periods of detention are so short.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered by Justice Rehnquist, concluded
that the preventive detention system chosen by the state of New York and applied by the
New York Family Court comports with constitutional standards because the purpose for
detention under the act is regulatory, and proper procedural protections precede its
imposition.
In the majority opinion, Rehnquist stated "There is no doubt that the due process
clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings." Citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1967),
he stressed that the issue is to "ascertain the precise impact of the due process
requirement upon such proceedings.• Justice Rehnquist further stated: "We have held
that certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply
to juveniles. See In re Gault, supra, at 31-57 (notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege
against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-examination); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519
(1975) (double jeopardy). But the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all
differences in the treatment of juveniles...The state has a 'parens patriae interest in
preserving and promoting the welfare of the child', Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766
(1982), which makes a juvenile pl'ON!eding fundamentally different from an adult criminal
trial. We have tried, therefore, to strike a balance- to respect the 'informality' and
'flexibility' that characterize juvenile proceedings, In re Winship. supra, at 366, and yet to
ensure that such proceedings comport with the 'fundamental fairness' demanded by the
due process clause."
The majority opinion defined two questions to answer in determining the
constitutionality of the act: "...does preventive detention under the New York statute serve
a legitimate state objective? .... are the procedural safeguards contained in the Family
Court Act adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some juveniles charged
with crimes?."
In finding positively for the first question, the majority cited the widespread use and
judicial acceptance of preventive detention in the United States. The limitations imposed
by the act on the length of detention, and the entitlement of a detainee to a probable
cause hearing and an expedited fact-finding hearing were also discussed in the majority
opinion. In overturning the lower court decision, the majority opinion stated:
We are unpersuaded by the court of appeals' rather cavalier equation of detentions
that do not lead to continued confinement after an adjudication of guilt and
'wrongful' or 'punitive' pretrial detentions... A delinqueru::y petition may be
dismissed for any number of reasons collateral to its merits... (Department of
Juvenile Justice, New York)
Tyler v. United States, 602 F.Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo. 1984). Court praises city
officials for reducing pretrial population. A U.S. District Court noted that although
the City of St. Louis initially violated its order to limit the number of prisoners housed in
the city jail, subsequent actions purged the city of its contempt of court responsibility.

32.15

An earlier order set limits on the city jail capacity. When excess prisoners were
housed at other facilities, the court stated that those facilities must also meet the
constitutional conditions ordered for the city jail. The court not.ed that staff levels at the
city jail were maintained at a time when other city agencies were reducing their force, and
efforts to expedit.e processing of cases showed the willingness of the city to comply with
the court order. As a result, the pretrial population was steadily decreased, as was
reliance on other facilities to house overflow populations. (St. Louis City Jail. Missouri)
1985

Stat.e Supreme Court
CROWDING
FACILITY PLANS

Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, Mass., 477 N.E.2d 361 (Mass,
1985). The attorney general filed a complaint seeking an order to compel the sheriff to
accept into his cust.ody all pretrial detainees committ.ed to him by courts of the
Commonwealth. The sheriff then brought action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
against the mayor, city council and commissioner of corrections. The actions were
consolidated, and the detainees and inmat.es were permitt.ed to int.ervene. A single justice
ordered the construction of a sevent.een story jail and re:eort.ed the, propriety of those
orders. The Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County hela that: (1) mandamus was
available to require the city council to construct the jail; (2) the order requiring fulfillment
of the city's statutory obligation to provide a suitable jail did not violat.e the principle of
separation of powers; and (3) the orders did not violat.e the supremacy clause. (Suffolk
County Jail, Massachusetts)

Stat.e Supreme Court
TRANSFER

Cleveland v. Goin, 703 P.2d 204 (Ore. Sup. Ct., 1985). Prisoner ordered back to
jail in county of trial. The plaintiff was transferred to a jail in another county
because, according to the sheriff. his jail was overcrowded. Aft.er examining records and
logs, the court det.ermined that jail occupancy had not exceeded the limit set by federal
court. As a result, the prisoner was ordered housed in the jail in which his upcoming trial
would be held. (Clatsop County Jail, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE

Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985). Appeals court aff'll'Dls
$147,000 judgment against county for admitting unconscious detainee who died after
admission. Although the county had a policy of taking all unconscious arrestees to a
hospital, evidence showed that they were routinely admitted to the jail if they were
suspected of being intoxicated. In this case, the arrestee was taken to the hospital
following a traffic accident. While there he ingested some barbiturat.es which had been
prescribed earlier and escaped while unattended. He was found unconscious in front of
the hospital, was examined by a doct.or. and then admitt.ed to the jail. He was checked
every thirty minutes by an officer. but was not examined by a medic until four hours after
admission. He eventually died after being placed on life support systems.
The appeals court agreed that jail practices differed from policies, and practices
therefore became "policy" for the purpose of det.ermining liability. In this case. the county
was held liable for implementing the "policy" and was ordered to pay $147.000 plus costs.
The court noted that eighth amendment prot.ections do not apply until after an
adjudication of guilt, but that pretrial detainees are entitled to the same degree of
prot.ection and care as convict.ed offenders under the due process standard (fourt.eenth
amendment). (Salt Lake County Jail. Utah)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Goodson v. City of Atlanta, 763 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1985). Detainee awarded
$50,000 damages for conditions of det.ention. The plaintiff was held as a rape
suspect in the Atlanta jail. A jury concluded that he was subjected to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement (sanitation, toilet facilities. medical care, lack of bedding. lack of
heating, roach infested food). The jury believed that the City of Atlanta and the jail
adrnini~ator knew of these conditions and had even made public stat.ements to the media
that the jail was "unfit for human habitation". Concluding that the administrator had
failed to properly train and supervise staff. they held him liable for $5,000 damages, and
held the city liable for $45,000 compensatory damages. (Atlanta City Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096.
Eleventh circuit imds Wolfish stat.em.ent inadequat.e for determining pretrial detainee
conditions. The court assert.ed that the standard established in Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520 (1979), does not produce a clear result when applied to a jail's provision of basic
needs such as food, living space and medical care. The Wolfish t.est, developed for pretrial
detainees in a federal det.ention center, asks if conditions are reasonable and related to a
legitimat.e governmental objective, and whether conditions amount to "punishment." The
court concluded that pretrial conditions be evaluat.ed under the same standard that has
been developed for eighth amendment analysis of conditions for convict.ed offenders.
As many county and city jails hold both detainees and convict.ed prisoners, applying
the two separate standards necessarily requires courts to become "...enmeshed in the
minutia of prison operations," which the Supreme Court has warned agamst.

STATE INTEREST

32.16

Therefore, in addition to requiring pretrial conditions and practices to serve a legitimate
governmental purpose, the court also held that jails must furnish the detainees with a
reasonably adequate diet and living space, and with reference to medical needs that they
must not be deliberately indifferent to detainee's serious medical needs. (DeKalb County
Jail, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court

LAW LIBRARY
ACCESS TO COURTS

Love v. Summit County. 776 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 814.
Detainee not denied access to courts because no access to law library. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that although the plaintiff's seven months detention
triggered the right to petition the courts, his continuing access to counsel provided
sufficient access. In addition, the court noted that his attorney, while declining. to
represent him in his civil claim, provided referral to others and appropriate forms to
pursue the claim. The court also noted that there was no evidence that the defendants did
anything to impede the detainee from contacting the courts or attorneys. (Summit Co.
Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS .

Miles v. Bell, 621 F.Supp. 51 (D.C.Conn. 1985). The focus of this complaint was
overcrowding, particularly in the housing unit, which once consisted of open
dormitories. Pretrial detainees brought a class action suit primarily alleging that the
overcrowded dorms increased the spread of disease among them and were psychologically
harmful because of the stress, lack of control over their areas and lack of privacy. Most of
the plaintiffs' proof on the issue was based on comparisons between illness rates in
dormitories and other housing methods such as cubicles or single or double cells.
Testimony did show higher levels of complaints and a higher level of illness among
inmates housed in the open dorms. A doctor testified that the installation of cubicles
could correct many of these problems. In fact, the defendants had corrected the situation
by installing cubicles, rendering much of the pretrial detainees' complaint moot. The
cubicles mitigate the spread of disease, as well as afford privacy, testified the doctor. He
said that the decrease in stress would likely improve both the physical and mental states
of the inmates. Although there was no testimony as to what effect the cubicles had on
ventilation, the court found no violation on the matter. The barriers were likely to
decrease the effects of smoking and body odor of other inmates. The inmates complained
of drafts if windows were left open and of stifling heat if left closed. The living units
made up of cubicles were not challenged by the inmates. The court also found no
constitutional violation in that the number of toilets and showers did not conform to the
standards set by the American Correctional Association (ACA) and by the American Public
Health Association (APHA). The ACA advised one toilet and shower facility for every
eight inmates, and the APHA advised one toilet for every eight inmates and one shower
for every fifteen inmates. The defendants provided one toilet for every ten to frl'teen
inmates, and one shower for every fourteen to twenty-four inmates, depending on the
housing unit. These figures were nearly twice that advised. Still, the court found no
violation absent a showing that waiting in line led to either physical or mental problems.
Sanitary conditions were not challenged.
Although there were certain violations of the health code in the food service in that
maggots and weevils were occasionally found, the court found no constitutional violation.
With regards to recreational opportunities, the inmates had enough forms of exercise and
equipment available regularly. For security reasons and for the safety of a correctional
officer, he is not permitted to carry a key to the· exterior doors in the housing units if he is
working alone. The inmates claim this and staff shortages would prevent them from
evacuating in case of a fire. The court found no violation, since the correctional officer
does carry keys to exit doors that empty into adjoining units. (Federal Correctional
Institution at Danbury, Connecticut)

State Appeals Court
SEARCH

People v. Nagel, 38 CrL 2101 (Ill App. Ct. 4th Dist., October 1, 1985). Appeals court
rules that police should not have conducted inventory search of detainee's locked
briefcase. A police prisoner had more than enough cash to meet the 50 dollar bond set for
the offense on which he had been arrested, but his locked briefcase was searched by police
aeyway. Although the Supreme Court has permitted inventory searches of prisoners'
property as a valid exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirements, the
majority of the Illinois Appellate Court found that the search is permissible only if it is
incident to the further incarceration of the prisoner. The state had argued that
"incarceration" should be interpreted to mean any period of detention, no matter how
short, including the booking process. The majority disagreed.
Incarceration must mean something more intrusive than simple detention for the
purely admini~ative purpose of booking an individual who would otherwise be
subject to immediate release on a non-substantial criminal charge. Simply put,
the significant inquiry is whether there is a reasonable belief that the defendant
will be subject to :furt}ler incarceration. If he is, then the inventory search is
legitimate... The focus must necessarily begin and end with an examinat\on of the
reasonableness of the police officer's necessarily ad hoc determination based on the
facts and information available to the officer at the station house following arrest.
32.17

U.S. Appeals Court
Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1985). Pretrial detainees not
PARITYWITH
protec:t.ed by eighth amendment. but rights are analogized to those of detainees under
fourt.eenth amendment to avoid extending great.er constitutional protection to sentenced
SENTENCED
EQUAL PROTECTION offenders. Shortly after admission to the City of Troy jail, a prisoner committed
SUICIDE
suicide. His mother sued the city under U.S.C. 42 Section 1983 and under state law,
claiming that officials should have identified him as suicidal during admission and should
have supervised him more closely. A federal jury found for the defendants. On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the jury verdict concerning section 1983 claims
but reversed the prior summary judgment which released Chief of Police Fisher from
liability for state claims. In reaching its conclusions, the appeals court noted that
although pretrial detainees are not protected by the eighth amendment, those protections
must be analogized under the fourteenth amendment. (Troy City Jail, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Roclt v. McCoy, 763 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1985). City to pay $100,000 damages to
prisoner for excessive force and failing to provide treatment while detained. The
plaintiff was arrested by city police following a complaint by his mother-in-law who
had called them because he was drunk. After following Jiiis ,car hC?me1 ~o officers
grabbed his feet ash~ left his car, pulled him out and kicked him several times in the
ribs, legs and face, and repeatedly slammed the car door against his shins. Upon
admission to the city jail he received no medical treatment beyond wiping the blood from
his nose. He was released the next day. A district court jury found for the plaintiff,
awarding $100,000 actual damages against the city, $2,100 actual damages against each
police officer, and $1,000 in punitive damages against each officer. On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld both the verdict and the awards. (Chelotah, Oklahoma
Police)

State Appeals Court
JUVENILES
DIVERSION

State v. Washingt;on, 37 CrL 2226 (Wash CtApp, &'&'85). Policy which excludes
juveniles charged with prostitution from diversion program struck down. King
County (Seattle) juvenile court officials had a policy against accepting any teenage
prostitution defendant for diversion. The policy was based on the defendants' mobility,
their repeated failure to appear for court, and officials' perception that the courts could
provide better supervision than the diversion program. The Washington Court of Appeals
struck down the policy, finding that the legislature clearly viewed prostitution as suitable
for diversion. The Court ordered the officials to consider juvenile prostitution defendants
for diversion and to reject them from the program only on a case-by-case basis. (King
County, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
BAll, REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Alatishe, 37 CrL 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Motion for pretrial detention may
follow a temporary detention in spite of provision of bail reform act. In this
complicated case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia added another
interpretation to the provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (USC 3141-56). After
learning that the defendant who had been arrested on a serious drug charge was already
on probation, the government requested the magistrate to detain the defendant for t.en
days under the provisions of the act at the time of presentment. The request was granted,
allowing time for the court supervising his probation to ·revoke it.
Toward the end of the temporary detention period the magistrate allowed the
government to move for pretrial detention, over the objections of the defendant. The
appeals court found that while Section 3142(f), read literally, precludes a pretrial
detention hearing if one is not held "immediately upon the person's first appearance," the
court found that the provision for temporary detention and the legislative history dictate a
different interpretation, ruling that under the confusing circumstances of this case, the
detention hearing was timely.

U.S. Appeals Court
BAll, REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Al-AzzaWY, 768 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1985). Ninth circuit requires strict
adherence to time requirements of bail reform act. Aligning itself with the
Second and Fifth Circuits, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that if
the procedures under Section 3142(f) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 are violated in any
material way, unconditional pretrial detention may not be ordered. In this case, the
hearing for indefinite pretrial detention did not occur, as required in the act, "immediately
upon the defendant's first appearance before a judicial officer." This hearing followed the
defendant's f'lrst appearance by nearly a month, during which time he was detamed.

U.S. Appeals Court
BA.Il, REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51 (2nd Cir. 1985). Indictment by grand jury
establishes probable cause for purposes of bail reform act. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that if an indictment alleging the offense has
been returned, a district court facing bail decisions should rely on the indictment rather
than making «n. independent assessment of probable cause in the context of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 (18 USC Section 3142-e). (East.em District, New York)

32.18

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

U.S. v. LoFranco. 620 F.Supp. 1324 (N.D. N.Y. 1985). Defendant ordered released
from detention as federal court fmds violation of due process clause. The continued
detention of a defendant since May 1985, whose "complex case" will not come to trial until
February, 1986, did not consider the defendant's due process rights ~ therefore was
ordered discontinued by a federal district court. "In the absence of statutory limitations
on pretrial det.ention in a complex case like this, there is no indication that the legislative
and executive branches have considered the defendant's due process rights and therefore
no basis for confidence that the det.ention is constitutional," observed the court. In
weighing the defendant's liberty int.erest against society's interest in his continued
detention, the court concluded that the defendant must be released, even though he "will
create potential dangers to the public and to the integrity of his trial." (Northern District,
New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Maull. 768 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1985). Eighth circuit creates split in
circuits over interpretation of "first appearance" requirement of bail reform
act. Disagreeing with other circuits, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Eighth Circuit has
held that the requirement of subsection (f) of section 3142 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984
(detention hearing shall be held immediately upon the person's first appearance before the
judicial officer) should not be interpreted literally. Rather, the majority says that reading
the sentence in isolation is an error; when read in context and in the spirit of the act, the
majority submits that the sentence indicates that the hearing is to be held promptly when
one is ordered. (Eastern District, Massachusetts)

1986
U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION

Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949.
Female detainees confined overnight were denied fourteenth amendment rights; city
could be held liable for conditions. Nine females and one male, ages seventeen to twenty,
were arrested at 11:l,5 p.m. by city police for loud radio playing. The male arrestee was
able to post bail and was released. The females were held until 11:00 the following
morning. The females filed suit, alleging that their conf'mement in cells without drinking
water, food or mattresses violated their constitutional rights. The federal district court
dismissed several counts prior to trial and directed a verdict against the plaintiffs
following a trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that: (1) the city is
responsible for the use of a bail schedule in violation of a rule of the New Jersey Supreme
Court; (2) the conditions of confinement to which the non-disruptive, non-violent, nonalcoholic women were subjected constituted privation and punishment in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. (City of Wildwood, New Jersey)
·

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILES

H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1986). A juvenile, who had been
commed at a juvenile detention center pending a trial on delinquency charges, brought
action for imposition of isolation without notice or hearing, excessive length and conditions
of isolation, unjustified and excessive force applied to him by superintendent of the center,
and denial of medical care. The United States District Court awarded nominal damages
on claims that isolation without notice and hearing and conditions of isolation violated due
process and determined that the juvenile had not been deliberately deprived of medical
attention, and that battery of the juvenile by the superint.endent did not rise to a
constitutional violation. The juvenile appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) the
superintendent's battery of the juvenile violated the juvenile's liberty interests protected
by the fourteenth amendment; (2) the superintendent was liable both personally and in
his capacity as the center's superintendent for denying the juvenile medical care; (3)
compensatory damages should have been awarded to the juvenile for imposition of
isolation without procedural due process, for being a period beyond the maximum period
set out in relevant regulations, and for his humiliation and dejection sustained as a result
of such isolation; and (4) the superintendent's conduct warranted the award of punitive
damages. The due process clause forbids punishment of pretrial juvenile detainees; the
conditions of a pretrial juvenile detainee incarceration affect interests protected by the
fourteenth amendment rather than the eighth amendment. (Volusia Reg. Juv. Detention,
Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Justice v. Dennis, 793 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1986). The source of constitutional protection
against the use of excessive force on a pretrial detainee is the detainee's liberty
interest in bodily security, grounded in the fifth and fourteenth amendments rather than
the fourth amendment. The lower court's jury instruction, setting out a spectrum in which
int.entional conduct was contrasted with simple negligence and failing to suggest that
conduct short of intentional wrongdoing, such as wantonness, recklessness, or gross
negligence, was sufficient for imposition of liability, constituted reversible error in the
pretrial detainee's action against a state highway patrol trooper for alleged
unconstitutionally excessive force used while the detainee was held in the county
courthouse jail. The f11ndamental inquiry in all excessive force cases, regardless of
protected int.erest's fourth, fifth, or eighth amendment origins, is whether the degree of
force used against the arrestee was necessary to protect legitimate state int.erest and, hus,
was permissible under all the circumstances. (Onslow County, North Carolina)

32.19

U.S. District Court

CONDITIONS

SEPARATION

U.S. District Court

CONDITIONS

SEPARATION

U.S. District Court

MEDICAL CARE
TELEPHONE

U.S. District Court
SEARCH

Morales Feliciano v. Romero Bercelo, 672 F.Supp. 591 (D. P.R. 1986). According t.o a
federal court, prison overcrowding, inmate idleness, and the threat of violence among
inmates, combined with the continuous frustrations of reasonable expectation produced
by administrative incompetence, resulted in an ascertainable psychological deterioration in
the Puert.o Rican prison population. The psychological deterioration inflicted on inmates
in the prison system was an unnecessary and want.on infliction of pain in violation of
prisoners' Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment.
Inmates of Puert.o Rican jails were denied due process as a result of inefficient,
inexperienced, and often incompetent social-penal counseling system, which had a severe
negative impact on inmates' opportunities t.o establish eligibility for parole and t.o actually
be heard in a timely manner by a parole board. Commingling of pretrial detainees with
convicted prisoners, in conjunction with finding that qonditions which prevailed in all
institutions at which pretrial detainees were housed violated the Eighth Amendment
rights of convicted inmates, was a sufficient basis for holding that pretrial detainees were
being punished prior t.o conviction and that, therefore, they were deprived of liberty
without due process of law. (Commonwealth of Puert.o Rico)
Reece v. Gragg, 650 F.Supp. 1297 (10th Cir. 1986). A pretrial detainee representing a
class of all present and future pretrial detainees and sentenced inmates held in the
county jail brought action seeking injunctive relief t.o require that operation of the jail
under present conditions cease. The district court held that: (1) the current operation and
condition of the county jail violated the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments and the eight amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, and (2) due t.o unconstitutional conditions at the jail, an injunction was
warranted, but would be stayed under conditions outlined by court.
To the extent that the county jail is unable to segregate pretrial detainee~ and
sentenced inmates, the higher standard applicable under the due process clause, rather
than the eighth amendment, must be met by the entire facility. Jail overcrowding for the
purpose of allowing the county t.o house more inmates without creating more jail space is
an impermissible justification for resulting violations of due process and prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Severe overcrowding combined with lack of area
for exercise, lack of separate dining area, inadequate ventilation, inadequate temperature
control, and antiquated and unsanitary plumbing at the county jail violated due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and ran afoul of the eighth amendment's
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. (Sedgwick County Jail, Kansas)
Robinson v. Moses, 644 F.Supp. 975 (N.D.Ind. 1986). The medical care given a pretrial
detainee while he was incarcerated in a county jail did not violate his right t.o due
process under the fourteenth amendment. The allegations of the complaint
demonstrated that the detainee was treated on numerous occasions, had an ear, nose, and
throat specialist appointed, and received medicine. The standard under the fourteenth
amendment was the same as that applied t.o prisoners bringing claims under the eighth
amendment.
A pretrial detainee did not establish that his being h1ald in a city-county lockup rather
than the county jail amounted t.o punishment without due process in violation of the
fourteenth amendment, where the only difference between the city-county lockup and the
county jail was the absence of television and a common area. The pretrial detainee's bare
allegation that he was denied the use of a telephone for three days while in the citycounty lockup was insufficient t.o create a genuine issue of material fact, precluding
summary judgment, in view of the affidavit of the jail commander indicating that
prisoners were permitted t.o use telephones while in the lockup and ha4 direct access t.o
phones while in holding cells. (Allen County Jail, Indiana)
Smith v. Montgomery County, Md., 643 F.Supp. 435 (D.Md. 1986). An arrestee who
was strip searched while temporarily detained at the county jail brought action against
the county and several of its officials for certification of a retrospective damages class.
The district court held that: (1) jail officials had probable cause t.o search temporary
detainees arrested for felonies or misdemeanors involving weapons or contraband or with
prior records of convictions or unresolved arrests for felonies or misdemeanors involving
weapons or contraband, and (2) members of class whose fourth amendment rights were
violated by jail's strip search policy were entitled t.o $200 nominal damages. Reasonable
suspicion would exist t.o strip search all felony arrestees and all temporary detainees
arrested for misdemeanor offenses that involved weapons or contraband, for purposes of
determining the plaintiff class in an action against the county for conducting
indiscriminate strip searches. Reasonable suspicion would also exist t.o strip search all
temporary detainees with prior records of convictions, umesolved arrests for felony
offenses, or for misdemeanors involving weapons or contraband. (Mon~mery County
Detention Center, Maryland)

32.20

U.S. District Court

BAIL

U,S. District Court

BAIL

U.S. Appeals Court

RELEASE

U.S. Appeals Court

BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. Appeals Court

Talbert v. KellY. 799 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1986). Rule 3:4-1 of the Rules Governing
Criminal Practice promulgated by the New Jersey Supreme Court allows supervising
police officers present at a stationhouse to issue a summons to those arrested for
misdemeanors and then release them or admit them to bail. However, the City of
Newark's policy was to hold the accused until he appeared before a magistrate, rather
than to allow bail at the stationhouse.
The trial judge called the city's procedure "absurd" and "ponderous" in that
transportation arrangements had to be made for court appearances, among other
"complexities." He held the city liable for "deviation from the procedure set forth in the
court rules."
The federal appellate court upheld the city's procedure in light of the availability of
magistrates on a twenty-four hour basis. Jail personnel were instructed to call them at
home on weekends or after court hours to obtain a "telephone" hearing within twenty-four
hours of an arrest. The fact that this procedure was not followed by an employee was not
grounds to hold the city liable for what ended up to be ·a four-day detention after a
magistrate left court early on a Friday. The statute of limitations had run before
interrogatories were served seeking the names of individuals at the station house. (City of
Newark, New Jersey)
United States v. Deitz. 629 F.Supp. 655 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). The standard for obtaining a
stay by the court of appeals of a district court order releasing defendants on bail is the
same as the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction. It was unclear whether the
court of appeals applied that standard in staying a district court order because the court
did not write an opinion explaining the reason for its stay. Thus, defendants may have
been unconstitutionally detained between the time the order was stayed and the time they
pleaded guilty. However, even if the defendants were unconstitutionally detained, the
district court could not grant the request to compensate them by releasing them before
sentencing. The district court had to apply 18 U.S.C.A.
Section 3143 providing that a person who is found guilty and awaiting sentence must be
detained unless he shows by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee or
pose danger to the community if released. (New York)
United States v. Frisone. 795 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1986). The detention of the defendant
for twelve months on federal charges was affected by the majority position in a second
circuit case that rendered unconstitutional the continued pretrial detention of a defendant
solely on the basis of dangerousness. Therefore, remand was necessary to determine
whether there were conditions of release which would reasonably assure the defendant's
appearance as required and, if so, to establish appropriate conditions of release. (New
York)
United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156 (3rd Cir. 1986). The Bail Reform Act does not
authorize the detention of a defendant based on danger to the community from the
likelihood that he will, if released, commit another offense involving false identification.
Any danger which he may present to the community may be considered only in setting
conditions of release. He may be detained only if the record supports a finding that he
presents a serious risk of flight. The magistrate properly ordered the temporary detention
of the defendant upon being informed that there was an outstanding Florida warrant for
the defendant's arrest as well as a detainer lodged against him by the Pennsylvania
Department of Probation and Parole, in order to give other officials time to take the
defendant into custody, where the defendant appeared on charges involving production of
a false identification document, being an international driving permit. The judicial officer
must impose least restrictive bail conditions necessary to assure appearance and safety if
judicial officer finds that release on personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond
will not provide requisite assurances. (Pennsylvania)
United States v. Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1986). Imposing as a condition of

RELEASE-CONDITION pretrial release for a defendant in a prosecution for racketeering that he not associate
with any person who has been convicted of a felony except when necessary for business
purposes or the preparation of his defense was an abuse of discretion. The condition was
imposed as a general matter without any statement of reasons why the condition was
necessary to assure the defendant's appearance. (Missouri)
U.S. Appeals Court

SPEEDY TRIAL
DUE PROCESS

U.S. v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2nd Cir. 1986). cert. denied 107 S.Ct. 562. A
federal appeals court ruled that defendants' due process rights were not violated by
their detention for more than 19 months prior to trial due to the risk of flight. There
was evidence that the defendants were leaders of a paramilitary terrorist group dedicated
to achieving independence for Puerto Rico and that they participated in a conspiracy
surrounding the 7.6 million dollar Wells Fargo robbery, as well as the robbery itself. Both
defendants had very limited ties to the community and had a record of prior flight.

32.21.

1987
U.S. Appeals Court

SEARCHES

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

MEDICAL CARE

U.S. District Court

SEARCHES

State Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2cl 1277 (4th Cir. 1987). $7,000 Award upheld in strip
search case. A jury award of $7,000 in damages against three police officers who
strip searched an arrestee without proper cause was upheld by a federal appeals court.
Following his arrest by police in Baltimore, Maryland, for disorderly conduct, Thomas
Abshire as taken to a police station and handcuffed to a railing. At trial, Abshire testified
that he made numerous requests to use the telephone, all of which were denied. After
Abshire became indignant, it was suggested by one of the officers that he be strip .
searched. Abshire was then unhandcuffed and escorted to a utility room, where he was
forced to disrobe and subject himself to a strip search. Baltimore County strip search
policy provides that arrestees should not be subjected to a strip search unless specific
factors are present. Considering this testimony, the court of appeals found that there was
a question as to the reasonableness of the search and the jury's resolution of that question
was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the award of $2,000 in compensatory damages .and
$5,000 in punitive damages against the tbree officers was upheld. However, the award of
$4,000 in attorney's fees was found to be too small and the court of appeals ordered the
district court to recalculate this award. (Towson Precinct #6 of the Baltimore County
· Police Department, Maryland)
Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1987). A pretrial detainee, who allegedly had a
heart attack approximately three months prior to det.ention brought a 1983 civil rights
action against parish prison officials. The federal district court granted summary
judgment dismissing the action with prejudice. The pretrial detainee appealed. The
appeals court ruled that the detainee was not entitled to a stress-free atmosphere while
incarcerated. The court held that: (1) the pretrial detainee failed to establish that he had
been denied reasonable medical care; (2) the magistrate did not abuse discretion by
refusing to appoint counsel to assist the pretrial detainee; (3) the magistrate did not abuse
discretion by refusing to subpoena witnesses; and (4) the magistrate did not abuse
discretion by denying requests for production of jail documents. According to the court,
pretrial detainees are entitled to reasonable medical care unless failure to supply that care
is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective; furthermore, pretrial
detainees are entitled to protection from adverse conditions of confinement created by
prison officials for a punitive purpose or with punitive intent. (Richmond Pai:ish Jail)
Davis v. City of Camden, 657 F.Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1987) A suit was filed against
county officials by a woman who came to the police station to file a complaint against
her neighbors was arrested and strip searched. Police officials found that the woman had
several outstanding arrest warrants when they ran an identification check. She was
arrested and sent to the Camden County Jail in New Jersey. At the jail a strip search
was conducted by a female officer. The policy at the jail was to conduct a strip search on
any person arrested who could not post bail. The court found that policy unconstitutional.
The suit was filed against the sheriff and the matron who performed the search claiming
the strip search was illegal. While the court did not hold the sheriff and matron liable, it
did find the county liable because "We believe that a municipality should be held liable
under Section 1983 when it officially adopts a policy that subsequently is declared
unconstitutional, notwithstanding the fact that the policy was mandated by state law."
The court reasoned that, for purposes of determining whether a particular strip search is
justified. reasonable suspicion that a particular arrestee is concealing weapons or
contraband can arise not only from specific circumstances relating to the arrestee or
arrests, but also from the nature of the charged offense. (Camden County Jail, New
Jersey)
DeBow v. City of East St. Louis, 510 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. App. 1987), cert. denied, 116 112d
552. A detainee was injured during his conf"mement in a city lockup. He was arrested
for illegal transportation of alcohol and he was placed in the same cell with a man
arrested for aggravated assault. The plaintiff was later found unconscious on the floor of
the cell with a severe head injury. Blood was found on one of the boots that were in the
possession of the other occupant of the cell. The injured detainee sued the city and its
police chief alleging that pre-trial detainees were inadequately supervised, that officers
failed to monitor their conduct and failed to segregate violent detainees from other
detainees. The inmate suffered permanent brain injury from the assault and a jury
initially awarded $3.4 million in damages. On appeal, the court upheld this award, noting
that "specific intent" to deprive the detainee of his rights was not required. The state
appeals court found that the plaintiff had established that the defendants had received
numerous notices of noncompliance with minimum jail safety standards, including a
warning that detainees were being inadequately supervised. Hourly visual checks of
detainees were not being conducted and no one understood it to be their offlcial duty to
conduct such routine checks. According to the court, it is sufficient that the defendants
acted recklessly by disregarding detainee safety. This disregard can be demonstrated
either by both deliberate acts or by the failure to act.
32.22

Since the repeat.ed notices of noncompliance with safety standards provided notice of
unsafe conditions, the appeals court agreed that the jury could conclude that the failure t.o
act t.o correct the situation ~s reckless. (City of East St. Louis, Illinois)
U.S. District Court

PROTECTION

Stat.e Appeals Court

PROTECTION

Gagne v. City of Galveston, 671 F.Supp. 1130 (S.D. Tex. 1987). Even though a
departmental policy called for him t.o do so, an officer's failure t.o remove a belt of a
prisoner who used it t.o hang himself, while a violation of policy, was not a constitutional
violation. A Section 1983 lawsuit was brought against the city and the police department
by the deceased prisoner's estat.e and surviving family members. There was nothing in
the prisoner's behavior t.o notify the officer that there was a possibility of suicidal
t.endencies. Further, because there was no showing that the incident occurred pursuant t.o
an official policy, even if there had been a constitutional violation in this case, there would
be no city or departmental liability. This appeared t.o be a single, isolated incident,
insufficient t.o demonstrat.e official policy. There was no showing of a wide-spread pattern
of similar incidents. The plaintiffs' argument that understaffing of the facility result.ed in
this case in a deprivation of rights was also rejected by the court. (Galveston City Jail,
Texas)
Gordon v. City of New York, 517 N.E.2d 1331 (N.Y. 1987). The New York Court of
Appeals stated that there is a duty t.o provide reasonable care when prison authorities
know or should know that a prisoner has suicidal t.endencies or that a prisoner might
physically harm himself--t.o assure that such harm does not occur. But the city was found
not liable for lack of knowledge or proper supervision when a detainee sustained injuries
caused by his plunging headfirst int.o a t.oilet bowl locat.ed in his cell. The court found
that the injury that occurred was not reasonably foreseeable and that the city took "every
possible precaution" against foreseeable harm. The 19-year-old detainee, who was charged
with attempted grand larceny and possession of burglary tools, exhibit.ed "boist.erous,
irrational and delusional behavior" at the time of his arrest, and was consequently placed
alone in a bare cell without a belt or shoelaces and with a correctional officer seated
directly outside his cell monit.oring him. The court rejected the argument that the
detainee should have been physically immobilized or restrained until he received medical
attention. The behavior that the detainee exhibit.ed, which included climbing the bars of
the cell, stating that he would like t.o fly, and yelling out "I am God," "Jesus Christ
Superstar" was "not uncommon in holding pens and would not in itself warrant medical
attention." The care taken in this case, according t.o the court, was reasonable and no
liability was imposed given the facts that the detainee had stated his int.ention t.o feign
insanity, although he appeared normal before the incident, and the officers had no
knowledge of a suicidal hist.ory. (New York City Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 667 F.Supp. 697 (D.C. Cal. 1987). The policy of
the Los Angeles Police Department mandating a visual body cavity search for every
pretrial detainee arrested on any felony charge is unconstitutional according t.o a federal
district court. Some det.ermination of reasonable suspicion is required for persons initially
booked on felonies as well as those booked on misdemeanors. The classification by an
offense alone is not sufficiently probative of the question of whether a particular arrest.ee
is harboring contraband. The court ruled that body cavity searches of pretrial detainees
cannot take place if they are arbitrary and purposeless. (Los Angeles Police Department)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
CONDITIONS

Ryan v. Burlingt.on County, 674 F.Supp. 464 (D.N.J. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct.
1745. A pretrial detainee rendered quadriplegic by his cellmat.e, a Stat.e prisoner who
had been awaiting transfer to a Stat.e run facility as a parole violator for 58 days
alleged deprivation of a constitutional right in an action against various Stat.e and county
defendants. The federal district court ruled that pretrial detainees had a constitutional
right to be housed separately from known dangerous convicted imnat.es who posed a threat
t.o their personal security unless physical facilities did not permit their separation and
that the detainee could prove a constitutional violation if he could prove at trial that
classification was feasible at the county jail. The court noted that while detained at a
county jail, a pretrial detainee was entitled t.o rights grant.ed t.o convicted persons as well
as a right to be free of any practice or restriction placed on him as punishment. Whether
overcrowding of prisons or jails arises t.o such a level as t.o violat.e prisoners' or pretrial
detainees' constitutional rights, requires det.erminations as to whether conditions caused
mm.at.es t.o endure genuine deprivations and hardships over extended period of time and
whether adverse conditions become excessive in relation to purposes assigned for them.
Affirmed 860 F.2d 1199. (Burlingt.on County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court

U.S. v. Gonzalez, 675 F.Supp. 208 (D. N.J. 1987). Defendants, charged with narcotics
offenses, were subject to a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of
conditions would.reasonably assure their appearance and the safety of other persons in
the community. One defendant overcame the presumption and was conditionally

BAIL REFORM ACT

32.23

released from pretrial detention pursuant t.o the Bail Reform Act. He offered about
$800,000 in security, lived in a local community where he owned a house and an antique
business, and had previously been free on bail for a period of 18 months prior t.o another
conviction.
U.S. Supreme Court
BAIL REFORM ACT
DUE PROCESS

U.S. v. Salemo, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987). The section of the Bail Reform Act of 1984
authorizing pretrial detention on the ground of future dangerousness is not facially
invalid under the due process clause, ruled the United Stat.es Supreme Court. The
provision does not violat.e substantive due process on the ground that it constitut.es
impermissible punishment before trial. Congress formulated the det.ention provisions not
as punishment for dangerous individuals, but as a pot.ential solution t.o the pressing
problem of crimes committ.ed by persons on release. The government's regulat.ory int.erest
in community safety can, in appropriat.e circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty
int.erest. Moreover, the Act's extensive procedural safeguards are specifically designed t.o
further the accuracy of the dangerousness determination, and are sufficient t.o withstand a
facial challenge. The court noted that, t.o qetermine whether a restriction on liberty
constitut.es impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, the Supreme Court first
looks t.o legislative int.ent. The due process clause does not cat.egorically prohibit pretrial
det.ention imposed as regulat.ory measure on ground of community danger, without regard
t.o duration of detention. Although primary function of bail is t.o safeguard courts' role in
adjudicating guilt or innocence of defendants, the Eighth Amendment does not
cat.egorically prohibit Government from pursuing other admittedly compelling int.erests
through regulation of pretrial release. Finally, t.o det.ermine whether Government's
proposed conditions of release or det.ention are excessive, for Eighth Amendment purposes,
the Supreme Court must compare Government's proposed conditions against int.erest
Government seek t.o protect. The high Court has allowed court t.o essentially set bail at an
inf'lnit.e amount for reasons not related t.o risk of flight. The Eighth Amendment did not
require release on bail when Congress had mandated det.ention on basis of compelling
int.erest other than prevention of flight, as Congress had done through Bail Reform Act.

1988
U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Anderson v. Gutschenritt.er, 836 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1988). A pretrial detainee was
stabbed by his cellmat.e. The detainee had informed the prison authorities that he had
heard rumors that "someone was out t.o get him." The due process clause prot.ects pretrial
detainees from both deliberat.e exposure t.o violence, and from a failure t.o protect when
prison authorities know of a strong likelihood that an inmat.e will be assaulted or injured.
According t.o the appeals court, evidence presented by the pretrial detainee would have
permitt.ed a reasonable jury t.o conclude that a sheriff and a warden failed t.o protect the
detainee. (Sangamon County Jail)

U.S. Pistrict Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE SCREENING

Boyd v. Harper, 702 F.Supp. 578 (E.D. Va. 1988). Action was brought under a civil
rights statut.e against custodial officials for the suicide of a pretrial detainee. On the
defendants' motions for summary judgment, the district court found that in order for
the suicide of a prisoner or pretrial detainee t.o form a basis for a civil rights cause of
action against the custodial official, it is necessary t.o prove that the official was
deliberat.ely indifferent t.o the suicidal stat.e of the prisoner or detainee. Deliberat.e
indifference may be manifested in one of three ways: by showing that the defendant knew
about the suicidal t.endencies and was deliberat.ely indifferent t.o the prisoner's or
detainee's condition in light of such knowledge; by showing that the defendant was
deliberat.ely indifferent t.o discovering any pot.ential suicidal t.endency; or by showing that
the defendant's conduct could be considered deliberat.ely indifferent t.o the possibility of
suicide even with no specific knowledge of the prisoner's or de~'s condition. No
deliberat.e indifference on the part of custodial officials was established with respect t.o the
suicide of the pretrial detainee, so as t.o provide a basis for civil rights cause of action.
Even if officials had previously been informed that the inmat.e was weeping in his cell or
of the fact that the official who had conduct.ed the classification int.erview had not received
proper training, such allegations showed at most merely negligent conduct on the part of
the sheriff and the staff of a correctional cent.er. The jail officials' providing the pretrial
detainee with a safety razor did not provide a basis for a civil rights claim on the theory of
deliberate indifference t.o the possibility of a suicide, where superficial injuries t.o the
detainee's wrists inflicted with the safety razor were not the cause of his death, which
resulted instead from asphyxia by hanging. (Pet.ersburg Correctional Cent.er, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1988). A civil rights suit
was brought against the county, the cnrnrnander of the county jail, and others for the
death of a pretrial detainee. Following a verdict against the county and jail
cnrnrnancJ'!r, motion for judgment was denied by the U.S. District Court and attorney
fees were awarded. The appeals court affirmed the lower court ruling, noting that the
sufficiency of evidence could not be reviewed except for plain error absent a motion for
directed verdict at the close of all the evidence.

MEDICAL CARE
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES

There were issues of the fact as to the liability of the county and the jail commander ·
on the ground of the policy of deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs.
Even though the detainee was not denied access to medical and psychiatric help, but was
in fact evaluated on several occasions by medical personnel, this did not preclude the
finding of deprivation of constitutional rights without due process based on a deliberate
indifference to medical needs, in light of the demonstration of inadequate staff such that
psychiatric staff could only spend minutes per month with disturbed inmates, so that any
psychological illness would go undiagnosed and untreated.
.
It was also found by the court that the plaintiff's unsuccessful claims against
individual county officers were related to successful claims against the county and the
commander of the county jail that inadequate psychiatric care led to the pretrial detainee's
suicide. There was no abuse of discretion in reducing the attorney fee award by 25% to
reflect limited success, where the plaintiff's overall relief was materially diminished for a
failure to make out claims against individual defendants who could have been found
individually liable for their own deliberate indifference to a detainee's medical and
psychiatric needs. (Los Angeles County Jail, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Colburn v. Upper Darby Township. 838 F. 2d 663 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 1338. The estate of a detainee who committed suicide while incarcerated brought
action against township and police officials; the district court dismissed the case and the
plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court held that: (1) the allegation that custodial
personnel knew or should have known that the detainee was a suicide risk was sufficient
to state a Section 1983 claim against official; and (2) the allegation that the township had
a custom of inadequately monitoring jail for potential suicides was sufficient to state a
cause of action. Further, the court found that the fact that the deceased inmate was the
third person to commit suicide while in custody of the same jail was reason to state a
Section 1983 claim. Prior suicides could be viewed as providing a governing body with
knowledge of its alleged custom. The appeals court ruled, however, that the police
commissioner and mayor could not be held personally liable in a Section 1983 action
arising out of suicide of a detainee absent allegations that either was personally involved
in any activity related to detainee's death. (Upper Darby Police Department)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Estate of Cartwright v. City of Concord, Cal., 856 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988). A mother of a
pretrial detainee who committed suicide by hanging himself in a city jail brought a Section
1983 action against the city and city employees for alleged violation of constitutional
rights. The United States District Court entered judgment for the defendants following a
bench trial, and the mother appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found
that the city jail employees did not violate the constitutional rights of the pretrial detainee
in failing to prevent him from committing suicide. Although the jailers overheard him
speaking of suicide, none of the detainee's other statements gave them reason to believe
that he needed preventive care. The jailers took reasonable steps to safeguard him by
taking away all his possessions except "soft clothing," and placed him in a cell with
another detainee. He W{ls also checked periodically. Finally, the city could not be held
separately liable on the basis of its policies, customs and practices. The city's training
program complied with relevant state laws and standards and there was no practice or
pattern showing ~ city investigated jail deaths inadequately or destroyed evidence in a
manner inconsistent with established policies. (Concord City Jail, Concord, California)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Francis v. Pike County, Ohio, 708 F.Supp. 170 (S.D. Ohio 1988). The administrator
and personal representative of a deceased arrestee brought a Section 1983 action
against the city, county, and their law enforcement officers for the failure to remove a belt
of the deceased arrestee who then committed suicide while in a cell. The defendants
moved for a summary judgment. The district court found that the police officers did not
use excessive force in arresting the arrestee. It was also found that neither the city nor its
police officers were liable for the arrestee's suicide while in the county jail following the
arrest assisted by the city officer. Since the arrestee was not in their custody or control at
the time of the suicide, the county deputies' failure to remove the drunk driving arrestee's
belt before placing him in a holding cell, without knowledge or reason to know that the
arrestee would commit suicide, did not impose a civil rights liability on them after the
arrestee committed suicide. The lack of allegations or evidence that the county was
grossly negligent in training its law enforcement officers precluded its liability. (Pike
County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
MEDICAL CARE

Grim v. Moore, 745 F.Supp. 1280 (S.D. Ohio 1988). A city jail detainee brought an action
against jail officials and others, alleging constitutional deprivations. On the motion of jail
officials and others for summary judgment, the district court found that the restrictions
placed upon the detainee during his detention in the city jail for 13 hours and 41 minutes
did not amount to constitutional deprivation, in view of evidence that the restrictions
amounted not to an express intent to punish, but rather were reasonably related to the

legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective of short term holding of prisoners. The
detainee, who claimed that jail personnel confiscated his personal property upon his
arrival at the jail, did not have a procedural due process claim redressable under Section
1983, given his ability to sue officials in tort, under state law; at best, the loss of his
property appeared to be a random and negligent act of jail personnel. (City of Urbana
Jail, Ohio)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
CELL CAPACITY

Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1988). A pretrial detainee brought action
alleging violation of his civil rights. The federal district court 'dismissed complaint for
failure to state cause of action, and appeal was taken. The appeals court held that the
pretrial detainee's allegations that he was confined to a cell for 22-23 hours per day for a
27-day period, and was forced to sleep on a floor mattress, were sufficient to state a
Section 1983 cause of action on ground of deprivation of liberty without due process. The
court was troubled by the inmate's contention that he was confined to a cell for 27 days
with another inmate, during which time he was forced to sleep on a mattress on the floor
of the cell, and his claims that the mattress nearly covered the floor of his cell, and placed
appellant in a position which was in close proximity to the open toilet in the cell,
According to the court, "Based on the foregoing considerations, we conclude that the
district court incorrectly dismissed appellant's complaint for failure to state a cause of
action." The court ruled, however, that the pretrial detainee was not denied access to
court. The detainee was given periodic access to a law library, and was not
constitutionally entitled to also receive assistance from "persons trained in the law." (New
Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
SEARCHES

Moenius v. Stevens, 688 F.Supp. 1054 (D. Maryland, 1988). An arrestee filed suit in
state and federal court, alleging that the jailor's discretionary decision to place him in
a detention cell bearing a sign entitled "AIDS cell" intentionally and maliciously
inflicted emotional distress. The arrestee sought compensatory and punitive damages
from the mayor and city council as well as the jailor. According to the police sergeant, the
idea of putting the sign on the cell was conceived because some prisoners were under the
impression that they wouldn't be searched for drugs if they told turnkeys that they were
infested with AIDS. By putting a sign on the cell the jail personnel were hoping that the
arrested person would see it and admit that they really didn't have AIDS, and to go ahead
and search them. The court held that these facts showed "at most" a "half-baked idea of
unknown origin which terminated at the first inquiry by supervising officials in the police
department." The federal court granted summary judgment for the mayor, city council
and the jailor. State claims that arose out of the incident were allowed to proceed to trial.
(Baltimore City Police Department, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

O'Brien v. Borough of Woodbury Heights, 679 F.Supp 429 (D. N.J. 1988). According to a
federal district court, a municipality was liable under Section 1983 for causing arrestees to
be subjected to unconstitutional strip/body cavity searches at the county jail, where it had
a policy of bringing arrestees to the county jail and was aware of the county jail's policy of
conducting stri:wbodY cavity searches on all arrestees. Two arrestees filed claims against
the Borough, County, and other law enforcement officials alleging that they were
unlawfully detained and stri:wbody cavity searches were performed on them even though
there was no suspicion that either arrestee was concealing contraband. The federal court
held that the county jail's rule of performing routine strip/body cavity searches on anyone
arrested, regardless of the offense, was unconstitutional. The court also denied a qualified
immunity claim by officers, stating that the law against such searches was clearly
established at the time of arrest. (Gloucester County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
SPEEDY TRIAL
DUE PROCESS

U.S. v. Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1988). The due process limit on the length of
pretrial detention requires assessment on a case-by-case basis. The length of
confinement is considered in conjunction with the extent to which the prosecution bears
responsibility for the delay that has ensued. In deciding whether a defendant's pretrial
detention violat.es due process rights, a court should consider both length of confinement
and extent to which prosecution bears responsibility for any delay. In this case, the
defendants' ten-month eonfinement pending trial of racketeering and narcotics charges did
not violate due process rights, where the defendants were responsible for the delay
inasmuch as they had moved for continuance to enable them to prepare for trial.

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Wilkes v. Borough of Clayton, 696 F.Supp. 144 (D.N.J. 1988). An arrestee
brought an action against the Borough, chief of police, and two police officers,
for violation of her fourth amendment rights following an arrest. Both parties moved for
summary judgment. The district court found that the arrestee's fourth amendment rights
were affected by the officer's maintenance of visual observation over the arrestee while the
arrest.ee attended to the hygienic needs of changing a sanitary napkin, and the Borough's
policy of subjecting every arrestee t.o the humiliation of visual oversight while using the
bathroom facilities was unreasonable, and the application of that policy t.o the arrestee,
deprived her of rights secured by the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment does not
prohibit all government intrusions int.o citizens' privacy interest, but only those intrusions
found t.o be unreasonable. The fourth amendment forbids the police from visually
observing arrestees using bathroom facilities unless the police have a reasonable suspicion
that the arrest.ee will harm herself if allowed to defecate, urinate, or change a sanitary
napkin or tampon behind a closed stall or bathroom door; thus, only when an.arrestee's
behavior, emotional or physical condition, or past record of such harm are such as t.o
engender a reasoned and articulable basis for maintaining a direct visual oversight at all
times is viewing of an arrestee's bathroom use constitutionally justifiable. The application
of the policy t.o a driver arrested on a charge of driving under the influence, refusal to take
a breath test, and disorderly conduct deprived her of rights secured by the fourth
amendment. (Clayton Police Station, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROBABLE CAUSE
SPEEDY TRIAL

Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 818. A
majority of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that judicial
determination of probable cause within 24 hours is not constitutionally mandated,
contrary t.o an earlier ruling by a New York federal district court. The court found that
New York City's practice of delaying arraignment up t.o 72 hours and combining it with
the probable cause hearing affords arrestees certain benefits not available at an
immediate minimal hearing, such as the presence of counsel--improved opportunity t.o
obtain pretrial release, and a chance to negotiate a plea. These advantages suggest that
the "constitutional 'promptness' of a probable-cause hearing must be determined in light of
the t.otality of the process afforded the defendant," said the court. (New York City Police
Department)
1989

U.S. District Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE

Carapellucci v. Town of Winchest.er, 707 F.Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1989). The
administratrix of a deceased pretrial arrestee's estate brought a civil rights action and
state law claim against police officers and the t.own for violation of the eighth
amendment right t.o medical treatment. On the motion for summary judgment, the federal
district court found that in light of the similarity between the sympt.oms of drug ingestion
and alcohol intoxication, the police officers and the t.own were not grossly negligent in
failing to arrange for the medical treatment of the arrestee. Both the expert and the lay
testimony were insufficient t.o raise a genuine issue of material fact. The court also found
that the booking procedures recommended by the American Correctional Association were
insufficient t.o determine what standard was applicable t.o the t.own jail. It was
determined that the officers had qualified immunity, and under Massachusetts law, the
police officers and the policy chief had immunity. The police officers' failure to supervise a
pretrial arrestee was not an adequate basis for a f'mding of gross negligence or worse after
the arrestee died in his cell from a prearrest drug ingestion, sufficient to impose liability
on them, where the officers were unaware of a serious medical need. The sympt.oms of the
arrestee were barely distinguishable from alcohol intoxication. The police officers' failure
to give a blood test or a medical examination to a drunk driving arrestee was not grossly
negligent or sufficient t.o impose liability following the arrestee's death. The evidence that
was found was inadequate t.o show that the town was grossly negligent for failing t.o have
a policy or facilities to allow for the treatment of the drunk driving arrestee who died in
cust.ody as a result of the previous ingestion of alcohol, glutethimide and large quantities
of codeine; the lack of evidence that any agency used the expert's recommended
procedures, or that any government unit had adopted the expert's suggested guidelines
rendered the opinion insufficient. The difference of seven minutes from the recommended
schedule for checking on an int.oxicated pretrial arrestee would not support the fmding of
negligence, nonetheless gross negligence, after the arrestee died in his cell as the result of
a prearrest drug ingestion. The jail's failure t.o have booking forms inquiring whether the
arrestee had consumed medication or drugs was not evidence of gross negligence of a
minimally accepted standard booking practice for holding jail facilities, notwithstanding
the recommendation for the use of such forms by the American Correctional Association.
(Winchester Police Department, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
PUNISHMENT
WORK

Charron v. Medium Sec. Inst., 730 F.Supp. 987 (E.D. Mo. 1989). A former pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights action against the city and staff members of a city
workhouse, alleging various constitutional violations which occm-red in connection with
his refusal to work in the kit.chen of the workhouse, and the medical treatment that
was afforded him for a workhouse injury. The U.S. District Court found that as a
32.27

pretrial detainee, the plaintiff has no claim under the eighth amendment for cruel and
unusual punishment, arising from his being placed in segregation for refusing to work in
the workhouse kit:chen, however the placement in segregation did amount to punishment
in violation of his due process rights. According to the court, pretrial detainees do not
stand on the same footing as convicted inmates. If pretrial detainees are subjected to
restrictions and privations other than those inherent in their confinement itself or which
are justified by compelling necessities of jail administration, their rights are violated
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Placing
the detainee in segregation was not reasonably related to a legitimate goal or purpose
inasmuch as he did not pose a threat to security. The court found that he was entitled to
nominal damages, since he suffered no actual harm as a result of his segregation for six
days; thus, the plaintiff was awarded the sum of $600 in damages for the six days in
punitive segregation at $100 per day. It was also stated that nothing in the Constitution
requires that pretrial detainees be allowed contact visits when prison administrators had
determined that such visits will jeopardize the security of the facility. The court also
found that the members of the workhouse staff were not entitled to qualified immunity
from the civil rights claim; the law clearly established that the unnecessary imposition of
security confinement on a pretrial detainee violated the detainee's rights to due process.
(Medium Security Institution, Missouri)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1473. A
pretrial detainee's family and estate brought a civil rights action against police officers,
police supervisors, and the city after the detainee committed suicide. The U.S. District
Court found that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Interlocutory
appeal was taken. The appeals court reversed the lower court's decision and found that
the police officers and supervisors enjoyed qualified immunity from liability. The law
which existed at the time of the police officers' action did not clearly establish the right to
have the officers diagnose the pretrial detainee's condition as prone to suicide and to take
extraordinary measures to restrain the pretrial detainee; therefore, the police officers had
qualified immunity from liability. The police officers were not subject to a clearly
established constitutional duty to diagnose the pretrial detainee's condition as prone to
suicide; and given that, the supervisors could not be held liable. (Roseville City Jail,
Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
SUICIDE

Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The representatives of
a detainee's estate brought a Section 1983 action against a municipality to recover for
the suicide of the detainee in a cell. The U.S. District Court denied the municipality's
motion for judgment notwithAtanding a verdict and the municipality appealed. The court
of appeals, reversing and remanding the lower court's decision, found that the
municipality was not liable. According to the court, the training of police officers on
suicide prevention did not rise to the level of a conscious choice by the municipality or the
policy of deliberate indifference to the eighth amendment rights of the detainee who
committed suicide in his cell and, therefore, did not permit the imposition of a Section
1983 liability upon the municipality, even though the police officers did not receive a
specific course on suicide prevention. The officers were trained to recognize abnormal
behavior, could not accept arrestees who showed signs of mental illness or abnormal
behavior, and utilized "WALES" computer system with information about previous arrests
and suicide attempts. The detainee's suicide was the first in the cell block in the
memories of the sergeant and the inspector who had been assigned there for eight years.
The alleged deficiencies in the training of police officers on suicide prevention did not
cause the suicide of the young male detainee in his cell. The mere fact that the detainee
was somewhat docile at the time of the arrest and closed his eyes at the police station
during lulls in the processing was insufficient to give the officers notice that he might be
suicidal. The court found that the case presented was insufficient to be submitted to a
jury and the verdict for the plaintiff was therefore reversed. (Fifth District, Metropolitan
Police Department, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
MAIL

Faulkner v. McLocldin, 727 F.Supp. 486 (N.D. Ind. 1989). A pretrial detainee brought
a civil rights action against the county sheriff, alleging the opening of his legal mail
outside of his presence. The district court found that the county jail, which had adopted
no policy or procedure concerning the marking of legal mail, violated the pretrial
detainee's civil rights by opening letters from the American Civil Liberties Union, legal
services program, and the U.S. Senate committee outside of the detainee's presence. The
letters were from attorneys or a senator and bore designations sufficient, absent specific
requirements articulated by the jail, to alert the jail personnel to their privileged nature.
Inmate mail from elected officials or government agencies is entitled to the same
protection from opening outside of the inmate's presence as mail from attorneys. Just as
attorney mail touches upon the su:th amendment right to counsel and the first
amendment right to access to courts, mail from elected officials and government agencies
touches upon

32.28

the inmate's first amendment. The court found that the pretrial detainee was entitled
only to nominal damages. Jail officials had honored the detainee's rights more
scrupulously than necessary with respect to the vast majority of the detainee's legal mail,
and there was no showing of actual damage. (Fulton County Jail, Indiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES
PUNISHMENT

Green v. Baron, 879 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1989). A pretrial detainee brought a civil
rights action against the staff of a mental facility. The U.S. District Court granted the
inmate's a motion for judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, new trial, and, following a
separate trial and damages, the defendants appealed. The appeals court found that the
trial court properly granted judgment n.o.v. based on erroneous instructions. It was
also found by the court that a pretrial detainee could not be punished, and the issue of
whether he is punished depended upon whether deprivations he suffered were reasonably
related to a legitimate government purpose and not excessive and, the jury could find that
the treatment of a pretrial detainee in a mental health institute did not constitute
punishment, even though he was deprived of bedding and clothing and hot meals. In view
of the evidence that he was not placed in the treatment program until all other treatment
efforts had failed, the staff believed that the deprivation were vital to the success of his
behavioral modification program. The program was structured and supervised by medical
personnel, and deprivations were medically supervised, limited in degree, and restricted in
duration. (Security and Medical Facility, Oakdale, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
BAIL

McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1989). An arrestee for
public intoxication brought a civil rights suit against the city and its chief of
police. The U.S. District Court entered a judgment on the jury verdict in
favor of the arrestee, and the city appealed. The appeals court, affirming in part and
reversing in part, found that the city chief of police was entitled to qualified immunity
from liability, but some evidence supported the finding that the city had an
unconstitutional policy for detaining the warrantless arrestee for public intoxication for
four hours even after determining that the arrestee was sober and had not been
intoxicated. A policy requiring the continued detention of a public intoxication arrestee
and denial of otherwise available bail aft.er the determination beyond a reasonable doubt
that the arrestee is in fact not intoxicated and that probable cause no longer exists raises
obvious constitutional concerns, but the arrestee is not constitutionally required to be
released immediately upon the ascertainment that he is clearly not intoxicated. It is
permissible for the detaining authority to take a reasonable amount of time for
administrative processing, the return of property, and making bail if appropriate.
(Houston City Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Mosier v. Robinson, 722 F.Supp. 555 (W.D. Ark. 1989). An arrestee who was
allegedly beaten by an intoxicated sheriff sued the sheriff, deputy sheriff, and
the county which employed them. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was
taken into custody and transported to the county jail. The plaintiff stated that upon his
arrival at the jail, the sheriff beat and choked him without provocation, that the plaintiff
offered no resistance, and that the arresting officer made no att.empt to stop the attack.
The plaintiff further contended that at the time of the attack, the sheriff was under the
influence of alcohol, and that he had acted in his official capacity as sheriff while under
the influence of alcohol on previous occasions. The county moved for summary judgment.
The district court found that the county was not subject to tort liability or liability for
punitive damages, and the county was potentially liable for the arrestee's Section 1983
claim. The county policy of condoning violations by the sheriff could be inferred from the
failure to take action on the sheriff's alleged violations of department policies occurring
over a period of time. (Ashley County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE
SCREENING

Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458 (3rd Cir. 1989). The
estate of an arrestee who committed suicide by hanging after jailing officers
failed to remove his belt sued officers and the city police department under
the federal civil rights statute. The U.S. District Court entered a judgment
for the officers and municipality and the estate appealed. The appeals court, affirming
the decision, found that the officers placing the arrestee in a cell lacked the knowledge of
his suicidal tendencies. The dispatcher was not responsible for the suicide, as he had no
prisoner care responsibilities; and the municipality was not liable, as none of the
individual officers were liable. A man and his twin brother were arrested in a store--one
of them for suspect.ed shoplifting and the other for allegedly threatening people in the
store and re-entering the store aft.er being told not to do so. Officers at the station placed
each man in a separate cell. They failed to remove the belt of the man with suicidal
tendencies. Of the three officers present, one then went off duty, one went out for dinner,
and a dispatcher stayed at his station answering the radio and the phone. While the
dispatcher heard noises coming from the cell area, he did not check the cell block. When
the other officer returned from dinner, he discovered that the detainee had hung himself
. with his belt. (West Chester Police Department, Pennsylvania)

32.29

1990

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE
PROTECTION

Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1990). A civil rights action was brought
against the city, mayor. chief of police, and police officers, by the daughter of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide with a belt while detained at the city jail on charges of
public intoxication and hazardous driving. Reversing and remanding the lower
court decision, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals found that the general right of pretrial
detainees to receive basic medical care does not place upon jail officials the responsibility
to screen every detainee for suicidal tendencies. The officers' failure to afford medical
screening or attention to the detainee did not violate constitutional standards. There was
an absence of evidence tliat indicated to the officers that the detainee posed a risk of
suicide. It was also established that the failure of the police officers to remove the
detainee's belt and shoelaces did not reach a level of "deliberate indifference," and
therefore the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. (Clendenin City Jail, West
Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES
SUICIDE

Burns v. City of Galveston, Tex., 905 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1990). The mother of a
detainee who committed suicide while in jail sued the city under Section 1983. The
U.S. District Court entered a judgment for the city and the mother appealed. The
court of appeals found that the alleged noncompliance by police department officials
with a city policy requiring that detainees in jail be checked visually at hourly
intervals did not form a basis for a Section 1983 action following the suicide of a detainee
where the suicide occurred within one hour of confinement and would not have been
prevented by compliance with the requirement. It was also found by the court that the
city was not required to provide psychological screening which might have detected
suicidal tendencies of the detainee. The civil rights of the detainee were not violated by
the city's failure to train officers in psychological screening procedures and to utilize a
sample medical psychological screening questionnaire found in the detainee treatment
manual. The detainee did not have an absolute right to psychological screening.
(Galveston City Jail. Texas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Village of Calumet Park, 737 F.Supp. 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1990). reversed, 936 F.2d
971. A defendant brought a Section 1983 action alleging that village officials
unconstitutionally denied the defendant, while a pretrial detainee, access to adequate
medical care. After a trial by jury, the defendant was awarded $1 in compensatory
damages and $1,500 in punitive damages. The federal appeals court reversed the
decision, finding that an objectively reasonable officer would not have thought the injuries
were serious. (Village of Calumet Park, Illinois Jail)

U.S. District Court
OBSERVATION BY
STAFF

DiLoreto v. Borough of Oaklyn, 744 F.Supp. 610 (D. N.J. 1990). A detainee who was
subjected to a strip search brought a civil rights action against police officers. On cross
motions for summary judgment, the district court found that a female officer's observation
of the female detainee's urination, absent any particularized suspicion that the detainee
might harm herself or be in possession of contraband, violated the detainee's civil rights.
(Oaklyn Police Station, New Jersey)
·

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SUICIDE
INTAKE SCREENING

Elliott v. Cheshire County. N.H., 750 F.Supp. 1146 (D. N.H. 1990). The father of a
pretrial detainee who committed suicide in his cell brought a civil rights action against the
county and jail officials. On defendants' motions for summary judgment, the district court
found that the jail officials did not act with deliberate indifference to the pretrial
. detainee's serious medical needs when they failed to diagnose his mental condition as
potentially suicidal or prevent his suicide, entitling them to qualified immunity; there was
no evidence that the officials were given actual notice of the detain.ee's need for special
care or for protection or that their failure to act placed the detainee in any serious danger.
The arresting officer who knew that the pretrial detainee had a history of mental illness
did not act with deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs when he failed to
recommend immediate treatment to prevent suicide, entitling him to qualified immunity;
the officer did not know that the detainee had suicidal tendencies, and had never
witnessed any violent behavior by him. It was also found that the county's alleged
inadequate training of jail officials in dealing with suicide risk inmates did not amount to
deh'berate indifference to the rights of the inmates, precluding the county from being held
liable. Although there had been other suicides and attempted suicides in the jail in the
previous ten years, the county had implemented suicide prevention procedures and there
was no evidence that better training in suicide prevention would have alerted the jail
officials that the detainee was a suicide risk. (Cheshire County House of Corrections, New
Hampshire)
Hamlin v. Kennebec County Sheriff's Dept.. 728 F.Supp. 804 (D.Me. 1990). A pretrial
detainee who had attempted suicide at the county jail brought a pro se civil rights suit
against the county sheriff and others. On defense motions to am.end and for summary
judgment, the district court found that the officers who were on duty at the county jail
on the night of the pretrial detainee's suicide attempt were necessary parties ·for

32.30

adjudication of the civil rights suit, and thus would be joined as defendants and added as
moving parties on the defense m9tion for summary judgment. The alleged conduct of the
county sheriff and the officers on duty at the county jail on the night of the pretrial
detainee's suicide attempt in allowing the detainee to keep the laces of his boots, which
the detainee used in an attempt to hang himself, was at most negligent and did not rise to
a level of constitutional violation, even though the jail policy required the removal of the
laces and the detainee was arrest.eel for driving while intoxicated. The guard at the jail
asked the detainee to remove the boot laces, the laces were difficult to remove and the
guard said they would have to be cut. The detainee objected on the grounds of cost, and
another guard said that they should admit the detainee with the boot laces because he
had been there before and would not "try anything." The plaintiff alleged that he suffered
severe physical and emotional distress as a result of his suicide attempt at the Kennebec
county jail.
The court stated, "It is plain that the defendants decided to deviate from their
standard procedure in processing jail admittees only after the plaintiff himself had
expressed concern for the cost to him of replacing the boo~ laces and another guard had
offered her opinion that based on her knowledge of the plaintiff he did not represent a
suicide threat. The plaintiff had not alleged that he manifest.eel any suicidal tendencies,
and clearly at the time of the incident the plaintiff was rational enough to express concern
over the price of the laces. If it represents any breach of the standard of care owed
pretrial detainees, the defendants' conduct, based on an informed opinion of the plaintiffs
state of mind by one of their colleagues, is negligence, and it does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation". (Kennebec County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
RIGHTS RETAINED

Hodge v. Ruperto, 739 F.Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). A former pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights claim against police officers, commissioner and
mayor alleging constitutional violation as a result of treatment before he was
arraigned. The district court found that the claim that officers deprived the
detainee of food and water for two and one-half days while confining him to an
overcrowded unsanitary cell charged sufficiently flagrant conduct to allow reasonable
inference that the conduct was attributable to municipal policy. The alleged deprivation
allowed a reasonable inference of inadequate supervision which was deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights.
The constitutional rights of pretrial detainees were not violated by the failure of police
to allow him to contact family or att:orney during prearraignment detention. A pretrial
detainee does not have a constitutional right to a telephone call on completion of booking
formality. Prearraignment detainees are entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter,
sanitation, medical care, and safety. The allegation by the pretrial detainee that he had
to sleep on a steel frame without a mattress, that sanitation facilities were so filthy he
was unable to use them and that he was denied access to necessary medical care stated a
claim for violation of fourteenth amendment rights. (43rd Precinct, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Lyons v. Powell, 729 F.Supp. 1404 (D. N.H. 1990). A pretrial detainee, who had been at a
state prison and was transferred to a federal facility, filed a civil rights lawsuit
complaining that he was confined to a cell for 22-23 hours per day during a 27 day period
at the federal facility, during which time he was forced to sleep on a mattress on the floor.
The federal prison officials filed a motion, stating that they were entitled to qualified
immunity. The court denied the motion, noting that the defendants had a duty to check
on the institutions where federal pre-trial detainees were lodged and were also responsible
for any omissions they made in a supervisory capacity. (New Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

McDay v. City of Atlanta, 740 F.Supp. 852 (N.D. Ga. 1990). The daughter of
an arrestee who committed suicide brought a civil rights action against the
city and police officers. The district court found that there was no basis for imposition of
liability on the city or police chief and at the time of the arrest in 1986, the police officers
were not deliberately indifferent to the needs of the pretrial detainee even though they left
him in a position where he was able to obtain a gun and kill himself. He had never
previously attempted suicide or threatened suicide on the night of his arrest. In the
absence of any allegation that the arrestee had attempted suicide previously or that he
was threatening suicide on the night he was arrest.eel, police officers were not deliberately
indifferent in their treatment. Gross negligence is not a ground for imposing municipal
liability for failure to train. (Homicide Task Force Office, Somerset Terrace, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADEQUACY OF CARE
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE

Pedraza v. Meyer, 919 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1990). An inmate at a county jail appealed an
order of the U.S. District Court dismissing his pro se civil rights action. The court of
appeals found that the allegation in the inmate's action, that jail officials failed to give him
medical attention for his withdrawal symptoms while he was being held as a pretrial
detainee, was suff'JCient to state an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical attention
claim, where the allegation was not contradicted by a portion of the off'JCial prison medical
records. (Victoria County Jail, Teus)

32.31

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Redman v. County of San Diego, 896 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1990). A pretrial
detainee who was raped during confinement brought a Section 1983 action
against the sheriff, the supervisor of the detention facility, the second in
command at the facility, the shift supervisor, the station deputy, and the
county. The U.S. District Court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants, and the
detainee appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court decision and found that
the jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's due process right to
personal security. Transferring the 18-year-old pretrial detainee from the "young and
tender" unit to a cell with a homosexual and investigating an alleged rape of the detainee
by questioning him in front of the cellmate and other inmates was not "deliberate
indifference" to the detainee's due process right to personal security, even though the jail
officials knew that the cellmate had a history of trying to coerce otheJ"s into sexual favors.
The knowledge about the cellmate and the detainee's profile merely gave jailors a
suspicion of a possible attack. (San Diego County's South Bay Detention Facility,
California)

U.S. District Court
ESCAPE
USE OF FORCE

Wright v. Whiddon, 747 F.Supp. 694 (M.D. Ga. 1990). A civil rights action was brought to
recover damages for the wrongful death of and deprivation of the constitutional rights of a
. pretrial detainee, who was fatally shot while attempting to escape, against a city police
officer, a city police chief, the city, and the county sheriff. On the defendants' motions for
summary judgment, the district court found that the Fourth Amendment, rather than the
Eighth Amendment, provided the standard for analyzing a claim that the pretrial detainee
who was fatally shot while attempting to escape was subjected to unconstitutional use of
excess force. The pretrial detainee had the status of a presumptively innocent individual,
so was more akin to suspect than a convicted prisoner, and the Fourth Amendment's
objective reasonableness standard accordingly applied. It was also found that genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether a reasonable police officer could believe the
pretrial detainee who was attempting an escape posed a serious threat, thus rendering
lawful the officer's action in fatally shooting the detainee, so as to preclude summary
judgment on the issue of whether the officer was entitled to qualified immunity with
respect to constitutional claims asserted under the civil rights statute Section 1983. The
county sheriff who ordered the city police officer to shoot·the pretrial detainee who was
attempting the escape was not liable for violation of the fatally wounded detainee's
constitutional rights, although it was argued that the sheriff intentionally authorized the
commission of the unlawful act which resulted in the death and violation of constitutional
rights. The sheriff did not have authority to command the police officer, and the police
officer did not act pursuant to any command from the sheriff, but in reliance on his own
training and city policy, in deciding to draw his gun and fire at the detainee. (Turner
County, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Zwalesky v. Manistee County. 749 F.Supp. 815 (W.D. Mich. 1990). A widow of an
intoxicated prisoner who committed suicide while a detainee, brought a Section 1983
action against jailers, the county, and the sheriffs department. The U.S. District Court
found that the jailers were entitled to qualified immuni-ty with respect to the "medical
needs" claims brought by the widow. A general constitutional right to medical care did
not establish a clear constitutional right to be appropriately screened by prison officials for
suicidal tendencies and psychological problems. In addition, the jailers did not deprive the
prisoner of a clearly established right by failing to prevent his suicide while detained in
an allegedly inadequate detoxification room, and, thus, the jailers' supervisors could not
held liable for improper training. (Manistee County Jail, Michigan)

1991
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Allen v. Board of Com'rs of County of WY8Ildott.e, 773 F.Supp. 1442 (D.Kan. 1991). Ail.
arrestee, charged with a misdemeanor traffic offense, sued the county sheriff's
department, the county sheriff, a sergeant, and deputies alleging that the defendants
battered and falsely imprisoned her and subjected her to a strip search in violation of the
federal constitution. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The U.S. District
Court found that the strip search of the arrestee was unreasonable under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments absent any showing of necessity to confine the arrestee with
other prisoners, but the five hour detention was not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The deputy who conducted the strip search was not entitled to qualified
immunity because the strip search of traffic offenders without some level of suspicion that
they were harboring drugs, contraband or a weapon was pre se unreasonable at the time
of the plaintiff's arrest. The state law claims for battery, negligence per se, false and
negligent imprisonment, and negligent training and supervision and adoption of policies
fell within exceptions to the Kansas Tort Claims Act. (Wyandott.e County Sheriff's
Department, Kansas)

32.32

U.S. Appeals Court
ARREST AND
DETENTION
DUE PROCESS

Austin v. Hamilton. 945 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1991). Arrest.ees brought an action alleging
that excessive force was used during arrest and subsequent detention, and that the
arrestees were detained following a warran~ess arrest t9r l!ID. unreasonably extended
duration without a probable cause determination by a judicial officer. The U.S. District
Court denied the agents' motion for summary judgment, and one agent appealed. The
court of appeals found that a reasonable officer, under either the Fourth Amendment or
substantive due process standard, could not have believed that the manner of the arrest
and detention was constitutionally permissible; therefore the district court properly denied
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Fourth Amendment protections
imposed restrictions on the treatment of arrest.ees detained without a warrant. The
substantive due process principles controlled the issue as to any excessive force employed
aft.er an arrest, where the Fourth Amendment law currently recognized as controlling up
until the arrested suspect's first judicial hearing was not. at the time of the arrest.
established with clarity. A genuine issue of material fact precluding judgment, existed as
to whether the warrantless detention was unreasonably prolonged in violation of the
Fourth Amendment principles. The court of appeals noted that. under the circumstances
of this case, in which the specific facts are unsettled and disputed regarding both the
length and the reasons for the delay, the district court's denial of summary judgment was
proper. (U.S. Customs, U.S. Immigration)
·

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Bell v. Stigers, 937 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1991). The guardian for a prisoner who attempted
to hang himself with a belt that the jailer had not detected during a pat search filed a
civil rights suit against an Iowa county and individual employees. alleging violations of
the prisoner's constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the county sheriff and communications operator on duty but denied summary judgment
for the jailer, who appealed. The appeals court found that the jailer did not violate the
civil rights of the prisoner, absent a showing that the jailer possessed a level of knowledge
required under the deliberate indifference standard that would alert him to a strong
likelihood that the prisoner would attempt suicide; the prisoner's offhand comment during
the booking procedure "well I think I'll shoot myself" could not reasonably constitute a
serious suicide threat when no gun was available. and there was no evidence that the
jailer was familiar with a "suicide profile" or that he was under any duty to be.
(Washington County Jail. Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION

Chestnut v. Magnusson. 942 F.2d 820 (1st Cir. 1991). A state prisoner petitioned for
habeas corpus. The petition was dismissed by the U.S. District Court, and the prisoner
appealed. The court of appeals found that the failure to the State of Maine to provide a
syst.em of good-time credits to pretrial detainees. while allowing such credits to sentenced
prisoners, did not amount to denial of equal protection to the sentenced prisoner who.
unable to make bail because of indigency, was incarcerated prior to trial. Pretrial
detainees already had an incentive for good behavior in avoiding longer sentences. (Maine
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Christian By and Through Jett v. Stanczak, 769 F.Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1991). Survivors
of a prisoner who committed suicide in a holdover cell brought a Section 1983 action
against the arresting officer and a police dispat.cher. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The U.S. District Court found that the officer's failure to designate the arrestee
as a suicide risk did not subject the officer to liability in the Section 1983 action, even
though the arrestee committed the suicide while he was incarcerated in a holdover cell.
The warnings concerning the arrestee"s reference to suicide. his state of intoxication, and
his abusive behavior were insufficient to apprise the officer of the arrestee"s suicidal
tendencies. It was also found that the police dispat.cher was not liable under Section 1983
for the suicide of the prisoner; while the dispatcher's failure to turn on the camera in the
holdover cell at the beginning of her shift may have constituted negligence on her part, it
did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. (City of Florissant Police Department,
Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Colburn v. Upper Darby Tp., 946 F.2d 1017 (3rd Cir. 1991). The administratrix of the
estate of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a civil rights action
against the township and police officials. The U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint
and the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. On remand,
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff
appealed. The court of appeals found that the municipality was not liable for the suicide
of the pretrial detainee. Two components of the concept of serious. medical needs of
prisoners, as to which deliberate indifference by prison officials violates the Eighth
Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, are that the detainee's
condition must be such that failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and
unnecessary suffering, injury or death, and that the condition be o~ that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doct.or's attention. (Upper Darby
Township·Police Department, Pennsylvania)
32.33

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Jones, 936 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1991). A pretrial detainee who suffered a scraped
elbow and a one-inch cut in his temple during the course of an arrest brought. a civil
rights action against police. The U.S. District Court found that by not immediately taking
the detainee to a hospital or offering him the option of going to a hospital, the police
violated the detainee's due process rights, and appeal was taken. The court of appeals
found that police must offer medical care to a pretrial detainee if there is reason to
suspect that an injury to the detainee is serious, but because an objectively reasonable
officer would not have thought that the detainee's injuries were serious, failure to offer
medical care was not improper. (Calumet Park Police, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
LENGTH
PRIVACY

Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F.Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1991). An arrestee brought a civil
rights action against a city. The district court found that the arrestee's fourth
amendment rights were not violated by 27-hour detention, as a jurisdiction providing
judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest, as a general matter,
did not violate a persons Fourth Amendment rights. The court also found that regulations
which permitted the disclosure of the fact that the prisoner was suspected of having AIDS
only to certain persons did not violate the prisoner's constitutionally-protected privacy
rights; and e'1dence did not show that the city had a policy of c}eliberately failing to train
itself with respect to confidentiality of booking records when the fact that the prisoner was
suspected of having AIDS was improperly disclosed. (Sixth Police District Headquarters,
Cleveland Police Department, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Draper v. Walsh, 790 F.Supp. 1553 (W.D. Okl. 1991). A pretrial detainee who was
subjected to a visual strip search in a county jail filed suit against the county sheriff. On
the sheriff's motion for summary judgment, the district court found that the county's
policy of subjecting detainees arrested for traffic violations or other minor offenses to a
visual strip search at the discretion of a police officer was unconstitutional on its face,
making qualified immunity an unavailable defense. (Cleveland County Detention Center,
Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRISONER SUICIDE

Elliott v. Cheshire County, N.H., 940 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1991). The father of a detainee who
committed suicide while in a county jail brought a civil rights action against the county,
individual correctional officers, and the arresting officer. The U.S. District Court entered
summary judgment in favor of all defendants and the father appealed. The court of
appeals found that fact issues existed on the question of whether jail personnel knew or
reasonably should have known of the detainee's suicidal tendencies. The detainee made
suicide threats to fellow inmates, and whether inmates reported such threats to jail
personnel in such a manner as to be taken seriously, and whether jail personnel
responded reasonably or with deliberate indifference, precluded summary judgment for
them. The arresting officer was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical
needs; although the officer was informed of the detainee's mental illness, he was not
informed that the detainee had previously threatened suicide, and there was no reason to
suspect from the detainee's demeanor or actions that such danger existed. The county
could not be held liable absent an indication of inadequately training its officers or
maintaining an unsafe jail. (Cheshire County House of Corrections, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
INTERROGATION
CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT
SPEEDY TRIAL
CONDITIONS

Hickombottom v. McGuire, 765 F.Supp. 950 (N.D. Ill. 1991). An inmate sued police
officers who arrested him alleging that officers arrested him without probable cause, that
they failed to properly bring him before a magistrate, that they violated his right to due
process by denying him food and water, and that they coerced his confession. The officers
moved for summary judgment. The district court found that the arrestee had no civil
rights claim based on that fact that police officers questioned him for 11 hours after his
arrest without bringing him before a magistrate; 11 hours was not an unreasonable period
in which to delay an appearance before a magistrate. It was also found that the arrestee's
claims that police officers deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
by denying him food and water for an unreasonable length of time while he was in their
cust.ody and violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right not to incriminate
himself when they coerced bis confession, which were indirect attacks on the arrestee's
confinement, were better pressed in a habeas corpus proceeding rather than a Section
1983 proceeding, and to the extent that the prisoner's claims would be proper in a Section
1983 proceeding, they were barred by the circuit court's determination that the prisoner's
confession was not coerced. (Danville Correctional Center, Danville, illinois)

U.S. District Court

Hinkfuss v. Shawano County. 772 F.Supp. 1104 (E.D. Wis. 1991). The personal
representatives and survivors of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide brought a
Section 1983 action against the county and jail officials who moved for summary judgment.
The U.S. District Court found that the county could not be held liable for the suicide based
on the claim of deliberate indifference to the right of detainees to medical attention.
There was no contention that the county's policy of giving jailers discretion in determining
medical conditions and needs of detainees was one of deliberate indifference. The jailers'
failure to provide the detainee with emergency medical attention did not show that the

TRAINING
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE

32.34

jailers were inadequately trained pursuant to policies or customs of the county, and the
detainee's request for medical attention was not specific or urgent. The court also found
that the jail officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability; there was nothing
which indicated that the conduct of the jailers was deliberately indifferent to the medical
needs of the detainee nor was there anything on the record to indicate a strong likelihood
that the detainee would commit suicide. (Shawano County Jail, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
LAW LIBRARY

Kaiser v. County of Sacramento, 780 F.Supp. 1309 (E.D.Cal. 1991). Jail inmates brought
an action seeking access to legal materials. The district court found that.the pretrial
detainees and convicts who alleged denial of access to the law library but who did not
allege that they were denied access to alternative legal assistance had standing to
challenge the adequacy of the law library. It was also found that an incarcerated pretrial
detainee is entitled to limited access to law books and other legal materials, but the
county is not obligated to facilitate nonlawyer legal assistance for pretrial detainees who
are proceeding prose. The ''paging" or "slip" system for convicted inmates to obtain legal
materials, standing alone, is unconstitutional. Finally, the court would not grant
preliminary injunctive relief requiring the county to provide additional legal assistance to
convicts held in jail. It was unclear whether the combination of paging assistance and
legal assistance met constitutional requirements. The court did require the posting of a
copy of reference materials available. (Sacramento County Jail and Rio Cosumnes
Correctional Center, California)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Kocienski v. City of Bayonne, 757 F.Supp. 457 (D, N.J. 1991). An administratrix of a
pretrial detainee's estate brought a civil rights action against a city and city police officers
based on the detainee's suicide death. On the officer's motion for summary judgment, the
U.S. District Court found that even if the police officer was aware of the detainee's
suicidal tendencies, the officer's failure to communicate those tendencies to other officers
did not constitute deliberate indifference to the detainee's needs in violation of due
process; any failure by the officer to communicate suicidal tendencies to other officers
constituted negligence only. The police officers' failure to assure that the detainee's
pantyhose were removed after becoming aware that she was wearing pantyhose did not
constitute deliberate i.ndi!ference to the detainee's psychological needs because no evidence
indicated that the officers had knowledge of the detainee's suicidal tendencies. After it
was determined that police officers were not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial
detainee's needs when they failed to prevent her suicide, the city could not be held
separately liable for failing to train its police officers. (Bayonne Municipal Jail, New
Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
PSYCHOLOGICAL
CARE
SUICIDE

Leshore v. County of Worcester. 945 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1991). A civil rights action was
brought against a county and county officials in connection with a suicide of a pretrial
detainee. The U.S. District Court entered judgment on the verdict in favor of the
defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals found that the U.S. District
Court did not abuse its discretion in removing default against the county two weeks before
trial, on the grounds that failure to respond was due to an illness of the defendant
county's attorney, despite the plaintiff's contention that the short interval between the
removal of default and trial precluded discovery against the county. The plaintiff was not
prejudiced where she never moved to continue the case to conduct a discovery and had
already deposed several county officials in preparing her case against individual
defendants, who were themselves county officers. In addition, it was found that there was
no plain error in instructing the jury to consider whether the detainee was in need of
psychiatric care "particularly" at the time of the suicide, or in a comment concerning the
lack of evidence that a suicidal person remains forever suicidal, in light of evidence that
the detainee's condition did appear to have changed following an earlier suicide wat.ch,
and since the jury was not precluded from finding that earlier manifestations were so
severe that the defendants should have known that the detainee continued to need
treatment on the date of the suicide. (Worcester House of Correction, Worcester,
Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PLACEMENT

Martucci v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1991). A former pretrial detainee filed a
Section 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations by sheriff's department
officials in concert with a State Bureau of Investigation agent. The U.S. District Court
entered summary judgment against th~ detainee, and he appealed. The court of appeals
found that conditions imposed on the pretrial detainee during his segregated confinement
were reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives and aborting his escape and
ensuring his presence at trial and, thus, the segregation did not amount to
unconstitutional "punishment• and, consequently, his placement in segregated
confinement did not, in and of itself, violate due process. In addition, the pretrial detainee
was not denied procedural due process by the lack of a hearing at which he could contest
reasons for his con:f"mement, as he was not subjected to "discipline" for violation of a prison
rule a:nd, thus, could derive no liberty•interest from a regulat.oi:y provision requiring
jailers to provide for disciplinary hearings in cases of alleged violations of prisoner conduct
rules. (Anderson County Jail, Tennessee)
32.35

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION FROM
HARM
PRISONER ON
PRISONER
ASSAULT

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991). A pretrial detainee sued a
county and county jail personnel under Section 1983 after he was placed in a holding cell
with a homosexual resulting in his rape. The U.S. District Court direct:ed a verdict in
favor of all defendants. and the detainee appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. Aft.er
granting rehearing en bane, the court of appeals found that the pretrial detainee
established a violation of his right to personal security under the due process clause of the
Fourt:eenth Amendment by demonstrating either that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference or that their conduct was so reckless as to be tantamount .to desire to iDflict
harm. In addition, a jury question was presented as to whether jail officials were acting
pursuant to county policies or customs when placing the pretrial detainee in a cell with
the alleged "aggressive homosexual," who subsequently raped him. and whether that
policy or custom exacerbated the danger posed by the aggressi~e homosexual to the
general prison population to such an extent that it amounted to deliberate indifference to
the pretrial detainee's personal security in violation of Section 1983. A second jury
question was presented as to whether the county sheriff was deliberately indifferent to the
pretrial detainee's personal security rights by allowing overcrowding of the county jail and
whether the sheriff acquiesced in the deficient policy which was the moving force behind
the pretrial detainee's rape by his cellmate and which repudiated the detainee's
constitutional right to personal security. A final jury question was presented as to
whether the police captain in charge of the county jail facility developed and implemented
policies that were deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's personal security and
were the moving force in violation of the detainee's constitutional rights and as to whether
the captain's assumption that heterosexual inmates were more able to protect themselves
from "aggressive" homosexuals than "passive" homosexuals exhibited deliberate
indifference to the potential security risk posed by placing an "aggressive" homosexual in
a cell with a heterosexual inmate. (San Diego County's So. Bay Detention Facil., Calif.)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1991). An administrator of the estate of
a pretrial detainee who died following his arrest on DWI charges brought federal civil
rights and state law claims. The U.S. District Court directed verdict on the civil rights
claims against the arresting and lockup officers and against the city based on police
department policy and entered judgment on jury verdict in favor of the paramedics on the
federal civil rights claims. The district court then dismissed the remaining state law
claims for want of prosecution aft.er denying the administrator's motion to dismiss those
claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. and the administrator
appealed. The court of appeals found that the deliberate indifference standard applied to
determining whether the police officers and paramedics deprived the pretrial detainee of
his life without due process of law. However. it was found that the police officers did not
exhibit deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's medical needs such that they could
be held liable for depriving him of his life without due process of law when he died several
hours after being arrested for DWI following a traffic accident. There was no evidence
that the detainee displayed any obvious external signs of injury or complained about pain
or mjury, the officers knew that he had refused further treatment at the accident scene
and officers saw the detainee walk under his own power. Although the detainee staggered
and vomited at one point, the behavior was consistent with the fact that he was drunk. In
addition, the paramedics could not be held liable for violating the civil rights of the
pretrial detainee. where there was no evidence that they exhibited deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs. Prior to refusing further treatment, the detainee allowed
paramedics to conduct a preliminary examination which revealed that his vital signs were
normal and that his skin color and skin moisture were normal and that his pupils were
responsive and equal, and the paramedics were not required to take the detainee to the
hospital to check for internal mjuries simply because he was intoxicated. It was also
found that the district court had discretion to retain jurisdiction over pendent state law
claims where both federal and state law claims had been tried, and the state law claims
remained for retrial after the jury in the first trial failed to return verdicts on the state
law issues. (19th District Police Station. Chicago, illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042 (3rd Cir. 1991). A mother and
administratrix of the estate of a detainee who hung himself in a Philadelphia station
house lockup after having been arrested for intoxication brought an action seeking
damages under Section 1983 and under state law. On the defendants' motions for post
trial relief, following a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. the United States District
court denied relief and the city and turnkey appealed. The court of appeals found that
evidence made a question for the jury whether the city violated the detainee's rights by
means of custom or policy tainted by deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
intoxicated detainees and as to whether the city violated the detainee's rights through
deliberately indifferent failure to train officers responsible for intoxicated detainees in
suicide detection and prevention, and was sufficient to support a conclusion that
indifference to the needs of detainees and failure to train was the cause of violation of the
detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights. In addition, it was found that the Pennsylvania
political subdivision Tort Claims Act did not nullify a city owUnance waiving immunity
from liability arising from the negligence of city police officers. (Sixth Police District,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania}
32.36

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Trask v. County of Strafford, 772 F.Supp. 42 (D. N.H. 1991). The mother of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide brought a Section 1983 action against correctional officers
and the officers moved for summary judgment. The U.S. District Court found that the
allegation that a classification specialist, who int.erviewed the pretrial detainee and
perceived no signs that he would injure himself. and contravened county policy when he
failed to contact a doctor or nurse after learning of the detainee's dependency on alcohol,
would only have supported a negligence claim and did not amount to the deliberate
indifference that would have required remedy under Section 1983. (Strafford County Jail,
New Hampshire)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRO SE LITIGATION
APPOINTED

Tucker v. Randall. 948 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1991). A pretrial detainee filed a pro se civil
rights complaint against officers at a jail. The U.S. District Court disn;rlssed the
complaint. and the detainee appealed. The court of ,app~allj found thpt the appointment of
counsel would be appropriate in the action 'brought 'by i!he. indigent pretrial detainee
against officers ·of the jail, where the detainee had presented a colorable claim of
deliberat.e indifference to his serious medical needs. the detainee's incarceration in ·a
facility different from that in which the alleged conduct took place rendered him unable to
investigate crucial facts. it was clear that the detainee could not present his case properly.
and the detainee's complaint raised numerous complex constitutional issues. (Kendall
County Jail. Illinois)

ATI'ORNEY

U.S. District Court
PLACEMENT

U.S. v. Gotti. 755 F.Supp. 1159 (E.D. N.Y. 1991). Pretrial detainees obtained an order
directing the warden of a federal facility and the United States Attorney to show cause
why an order releasing them. or in the alternative. modifying the conditions of their
pretrial detention. should not be entered. The U.S. District Court found that the fact that
pretrial detainees who were charged with multiple murders. conspiracy and solicitation to
murder, and obstruction of justice, including witness tampering. did not justify their
placement in administrative detention, in absence of evidence that since the detainees had
been in custody they committed an act or omission which posed a serious threat to
inmates or to the security of the institution. (Metropolitan Correction Center. New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT

Wayland v. City of Springdale, Ark., 933 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1991). A civil rights action
was brought for fatal iiljuries sustained by an arrestee who hung himself in a cell. The
U.S. District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. and appeal
was taken. The court of appeals found that material question of fact, as to whether the
arrestee was detained in jail for an unreasonable period of time without being taken
before a judicial officer, precluded entry of summary judgment for the defendants on the
Section 1983 claim. The officials in the municipal police department could be liable under
Section 1983 for detaining the arrestee, even though they were not responsible for the
delay in the arraignment. The officers were under no obligation to continue to hold the
arrestee for an unreasonable period of time. (Springdale Police Department, Arkansas)

1992
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Barber v. City of Salem, Ohio, 953 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1992). An administrator of a pretrial
detainee's estate brought a Section 1983 action against police officers and a city based on
the detainee's suicide. The United States District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the police officers and the city, and the administrator appealed. The appeals
court, affirming the decision, found that there was no clearly established right to suicide
prevention screening or facilities in 1982 when the pretrial detainee hanged himself;
therefore, the law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity from liability
in the action. The city could not be held liable for any failure to better train personnel to
detect and deter jail suicides. Although the pretrial detainee expressed concern over his
job, his engagement, and his ability to obtain custody of his young son due to his arrest,
such a reaction to arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol could not be considered
abnormal and would not have alerted jail authorities to a strong likelihood that the .
detainee would commit suicide in such a manner that failure of the city to take
precautions amounted to deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs.
(Salem City Jail, Salem, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Bragado v. City of Zion/Police Dept., 788 F.Supp. 366 (N.D. ID. 1992). An estranged
husband of a detainee who committed suicide while in custody brought action on behalf of
himself and the detainee's estate against officials alleging violation of civil rights. The
defendants brought a motion for summary judgment. The district court found that
material issues of fact as to whether police had actual or constructive knowledge of the
detainee's suicidal condition and whether the response to that condition constituted
"deliberate indifference" precluded granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
There was substantial evidence that the detainee suffered from psychological problems of
which the police were aware, or should have been aware. Police reports of two incidents
involving the detainee include stat.ements by her former boyfriend and others that she
threat.ened to commit suicide and may have attempted to do so. When she was arrested,

MEDICAL CARE

32.37

she had cuts on her wrists and had just written a note stating her "life is over now." The
police were clearly aware of both the. cuts and the notle, atid the deWnee threatened·to
commit suicide repeat.edly while she was in her cell. The police cqnsultation with the
State's Attorney's office and the decision to hold the detainee overnight, apparently for her
own safety, also suggest that the police considered her suicidal. The detainee was not
constantly supervised, and it was clearly established at the time of the arrest that the
"deliberate indifference" standard applied to the handling of suicidal pretrial detainees,
and that failure to take special precautions toward such detainees could violate that
standard. (Zion, Illinois, Police Station)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
MEDICAL CARE
ACCESS TO COURT

Brownlee v. Conine, 957 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1992). A prisoner brought a civil rights action
against jail personnel, accompanied by a request to be permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis, complaining about the treatment he received while confined in jail awaiting
trial. The U.S. District Court dismissed the claims as frivolous, and the prisoner
appealed. The court of appeals found that the claim that a jail official turned down
requests to return documents needed for a suit that had been confiscated by a guard, and
that the suit was dismissed because the documents were not returned, was not frivolous
on its face. The detainee's claims that another jail official deliberately loosed mentally ill
inmates on the detainee so that they would assault him, and that another official, in
retaliation for the detainee's having complained about him to the jail doctor, refused to
allow the prisoner to see a dentist though he was in severe pain, were, on their face,
perfectly good claims of violations of the right that the due process clause grants persons
held in jail awaiting trial to be spared punishment until they are convicted, and they
should not have been dismissed as frivolous under the in form.a pauperis statute.
(Wisconsin, Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROVIDE CARE
PRETRIAL
DETENTION

Hall v. Ryan. 957 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1992), The estate of a detainee who committed
suicide while being held in jail brought a Section 1983 action against police officers. The
U.S. District Court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment, and appeal was
taken. The court of appeals found that a jury question exist.ed as to whether the police
officers had treated the detainee, who had committed suicide in his cell, with wilful
neglect, so as to lose the benefit of qualified immunity, when they neglected to consult his
file after observing him cursing, flinging his shoes, urinating in his cell, and repeat.edly
flushing the toilet. (City of Decatur Police Department, Illinois)
·

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING
MEDICAL CARE

Lile v. Tippecanoe County Jail, 844 F.Supp. 1301 (N.D. Ind. 1992). Pretrial detainees sued
a county jail and jail officials under Section 1983 alleging violations of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court found that allegations that pretrial detainees
were asked to wat.ch another inmate who had allegedly been brought to the jail because of
mental problems, that another inmate twice attempted to commit suicide, and that the
detainees were required to clean up after an initial suicide attempt, failed to state a
Section 1983 claim against any of the county jail officials under the prevailing standard of
deliberat.e indifference. The court found that there was no evidence that the actions of the
officials were intended to punish the detainees, or that their conduct toward the detainees
amounted to criminal recklessness. The court also found that the conditions of detention,
including overcrowding and lack of ventilation, either alone or in combination, were not a
result of deliberate indifference by jail officials or a policy or custom designed to punish
pretrial detainees. In addition, a pretrial detainee's allegation that the county sheriff
refused to have the county pay for removal of nose polyps could not be characterized as a
deliberat.e effort to punish the detainee in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because it was entirely possible that the surgery could not have been scheduled within the
time the detainee had left at the county jail. Also, there was no indication that the
proposed surgery was a matter of urgency or that the detainee's condition was serious.
Finally, it was found that a county jail official's refusal to open windows after an inmat.e
started a f'ire in a cell block allegedly resulting in a detainee passing out was not int.ended
to punish the detainee in violation of the Eighth Amendment. There was no medical
evidence suggesting that the detainee suffered any injury resulting from the fire or the
presence of smoke in the unit. The officials responded to and extinguished the fire, and
there was no indication as to the length of time smoke was present or that any other
inmates complained about the presence of smoke or suffered any discomfort or injury.
(Tippecanoe County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Manarit.e v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1992). The estate and minor
daughter of a detainee who committed suicide while in prot.ective custody sued the police
chief and the city under Section 1983 for their alleged failure to prevent the suicide. The
U.S. District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff's
appealed. The court of appeals found that the police chief's failure to insist that officers
who implement.eel the suicide prevention policies remove shoelaces from persons in
prot.ective custody was not "deliberat.e indifference" that would permit holding the chief
liable for suicide of a person in protective detention. Although four detainees tried to
hang themselves with shoelaces in the preceding '1line months, the chief's conduct ~ht
have been negligent, but not deliberat.e)y indifferent. In addition, the city's failure to
32.38

provide training and education for police officers in suicide detection and prevention was
not "deliberat.e indifference" in violation of Section 1983, as the city's training and policies
regarding suicide prevention wei, in accord with requiren:ients of state law at the time of
the detainee's suicide, and there was no basis for fqiding that·his·suicide was closely
related to the city's failure to train officers itl suicide preTention. The'prison official's
failure to prevent the suicide of the detainee did not violated the detainee's minor
daught.er's right of familial associational privacy, and thus, afforded her no right of
recovery under Section 1983; the daught.er had no liberty interest prot.etj;ed by the due
process clause in her familial relationship with her father. (Springfield Police Station,
Springfield, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE ATl'EMPI'

Rich v .. City of Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1992). Action was brought
against police officers, paramedics, the city, and the police chief based on a pretrial
detainee's attempt to ·hang himself. The U.S. District Court denied the summary
judgment motion and the officers, city, and police chief appealed. The court of appeals
found that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity from liability. According
to the court, the defendant police officers reacted immediat.ely by calling for the
paramedics, and the paramedics arrived within minutes. The police officers did not
intentionally deny or delay access to medical care, and there was no recognized
constitutional right that would have required the officers to cut down the detainee
themselves rather than call for medical assistance. (Mayfield Heights City Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Swofford v. Mandrell. 969 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1992). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against a sheriff to recover for a beating and sexual assault by other inmat.es. The U.S.
District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the detainee
appealed. The court of appeals, reversing and remanding; found that a due process claim
was stat.ed against the sheriff by the pretrial detainee's allegations that he was arrest.ed
on suspicion of aggravated sexual assault, placed in a holding cell with ten inmat.es, and
was jumped on, beat, kicked, urinated on, and sodomized with a broom handle. Neither
the sheriff nor the deputy came to the detainee's aid despite repeated screams, no one
inspected or guarded the cell for eight hours, and the sheriff "had to know" that the
actions put the detainee's life in great danger. The court also found that the pretrial
detainee was entitled to appointed counsel for the meritorious Section 1983 action as the
state of mind required for a due process violation was difficult and subtle, the detainee
had been unable to investigate crucial facts during his incarceration, the detainee's claim
was likely to turn on the credibility of witnesses, and the detainee was unable to present
the case adequat.ely without counsel. (Franklin County Jail, Benton, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONDfflONS
PUNISHMENT
RIGHTS RETAINED

Washingt.on v. Tinsley, 809 F.Supp. 504 (S.D. Tex. 1992). Pretrial detainees challenged a
city ordinance prohibiting smoking in public buildings, including the county jail. The
district court found that the city ordinance did not violat.e the Constitution and
impermissibly punish pretrial detainees without a trial; the city's ban affected all public
buildings, the ordinance did not disproportionately affect the inmat.es, and the ban
protected the health of smoking and nonsmoking workers and visitors, and eliminated a
fire hazard. (Harris County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
EQUAL PROTECTION
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED

Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185 (M.D. Pa. 1992). A pretrial detainee brought a
Bivens civil rights action alleging that prison officials violated the detainee's constitutional
rights. Cross motions for summary judgment were made. The district court found that
the prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on claims that overcrowding
violated the detainee's due process rights. The detainee was confined to one room with up
to eleven other people between twenty-two and twenty-four hours per day without a wash
basin, toilet, table or chairs, or drinking fountain under mo.re .restrictive conditions than
those placed upon convicted prisoners. {United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania)

1993
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE ATl'EMPI'

Camps v. City of Warner Robins, 822 F.Supp. 724 (M.D. Ga. 1993). The administrators of
an arrestee's estate brought a civil rights action against city, county, and various law
enforcement officers, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the psychological needs
of the arrestee, who lapsed into a coma after a suicide att.empt and died approximately one
year later. On motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the decision
of a municipal holding facility supervisor to transport the arrestee to a county jail rather
than the hospital or a psychiatric facility was, at most, negligent, rather than deliberately
indifferent to the arrestee's serious psychological needs. Although the supervisor was
aware that the arrestee had att.empted suicide while at the det.ention facility, the
supervisor directed officers who transferred. the arrestee to inform jail officials that the
arrestee was acting suicidal, Triable issues msted regarding whether deputies and a
supervising officer at the county jail were aware that the arrestee was suicidal but were
deliberately indifferent to his psychological needs. However, absent any allegation that
32.39

the sheriff was personally involved in any way with the arrestee's suicide att.empt while in
cust.ody at the county jail, or that any failure to train by the sheriff caused this injury, the
sheriff was not subject to supervisory liability. The administrators of the arrestee's estate
failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that the county jail's suicide prevention
policy was inadequate, as would preclude summary judgment for the county of the civil
rights municipal liability claim, where the administrators made only general allegations
that policies regarding suicide prevention were grossly inadequate, and otherwise charged
violations of county policy. (Houston County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993). Detainees brought a civil rights
action against a sheriff to recover damages after they were subjected to strip searches at a
jail following arrest. The U.S. District Court denied the sheriff's motion for summary
judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court,
affirming and remanding, found that it was clearly established law in late 1991 and early
1992 when the arrests took place, that a blanket policy of strip searches for detainees was
unconstitutional, so that the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity. (Creek
County Jail, Sapulpa, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1993). A pretrial detainee brought a Section 1983
action against jail officials for their alleged deliberate indifference to his medical
condition. The U.S. District Court dismissed, and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court, affirming the decision, found that the pretrial detainee's allegations that he was
denied access to his crutches and to the jail's infirmary, despite a broken ankle, did not
state a deliberate indifference claim under the due process clause. (St. Louis County Jail,
Missouri)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
PROGRAMS
RIGHTS RETAINED

Donnell C. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 829 F.Supp. 1016 (N.D.Ill. 1993). School-aged
pretrial detainees in a county jail filed an action against the state Board of Education
concerning alleged inadequate education. The state filed a motion to dismiss. The district
court found that the allegation of inadequate education by the pretrial detainees
sufficiently stated a claim of violation of substantive due process to overcome a motion to
dismiss. The detainees alleged that only about 40% of the detainees in need of special
educational services were receiving the needed services, and that instruction was lacking
on the educational basics of reading and math, or even lacking altogether. The allegations
of inadequate education also sufficiently stated a claim of violation of equal protection to
overcome a motion to dismiss, absent a showing by the state of a rational relationship
between the lack of education and maintaining security. The state merely made
apocryphal claims that the county jail's actions were justified to avoid burdensome
litigation by the prisoners. The detainees had a constitutionally protect.ed due process
property interest in participation in educational programs during detention, and the
interest was not diminished by a probable cause hearing or indictment process undertaken
before confinement. Finally, the court found that the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) applied to the school-aged pretrial detainees' claims of inadequate
education, in light of the application of the Act to state correctional facilities by the
Department of Education's Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, and
absent any showing that the Department's regulations were arbitrary or capricious. (Cook
County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
SPEEDY TRIAL

Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1993). An arrestee brought a
Section 1983 action against a county and its officials. The U.S. District Court dismissed
the action, and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court found that a four-day
incarceration period between arrest and presentation to a magistrate violated the
arrestee's right to prompt presentation, for the purposes of her Section 1983 action. The
county made no showing of justification for the delay other than as a measure to force her
to cooperate with booking procedures. The refusal to cooperate with booking procedures
did not excuse the ext.ended detention. The court noted that the county and its officials
were not entitled to qualified immunity from either official or personal liability under
Section 1983 for violating the arrestee's right to be taken before a magistrate promptly, as
no objectively reasonable officer could consider a four-day incarceration to be brief,
arraignment to be prompt, or the purpose of coercing compliance with booking procedures
to be sufficiently exigent to justify the delay. (Ada County Jail, Idaho)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 814 F.Supp. 1312 (N.D. Miss. 1993). The estate of a
detainee who committ.ed suicide while in jail sued city and cust.odial officials, under
Section 1983 and the Mississippi Wrongful Death Act. Cross motions for summary
judgment were made. The district court found that material issues of fact, precluding
summary judgment, aist:ed as to whether the detainee displayed a particular
vulnerability to suicide, triggering obligations of cust.odial officers to provide special care.
The officer in charge had made sure that the detainee did not have shoe laces or a belt,
had considered removing the blanket that the detainee later tore up to fashion a noose but
decided she lacked the strength to use the blanket as a suicide device, and had asked that
she be
32.40

wat.ched by a dispat.cher. However, the detainee was in jail for the first time, was under
the influence of a chemical drug, and exhibit.eel severe mood swings including distraught
and frantic activity. In addition, she sat in a fetal-type position during one int.erview,
attempt.ed to destroy a videotape of her int.erview and said she would kill herself if she
had to stay in jail another night. Although the detainee was chemically dependent,
undergoing withdrawal and depression, had made a suicide threat and exhibit.eel unstable
behavior, she was placed alone in a cell not allowing full-time observation. Mat.erial
issues of fact exist.eel on the question of whether the municipality had acquiesced in policy
or cust.om of inaction on the question of suicide prevention; there had been another suicide
in the same jail three months previously, and there was no attempt made to adopt policies
or procedures to prevent subsequent suicides.. However, the ~vidence did not support'a
claim of wrongful death involving the jail suicide; th~ officer's act of placing the detainee
in jail overnight could not have caused the d,evelopment of an irresistible impulse leading
the detainee to take her own life. (Corinth Jail. Mississippi)
U.S. Appeals Court
Hause v. Vaught. 993 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1993). cert. denied. 114 S.Ct. 702. A former
EQUAL PROTECTION pretrial detainee brought a civil rights action challenging his conditions of confm.ement.
PUBIJCATIONS
The U.S. District Court grant.eel summary judgment in favor of the defendant jail officials.
WORK
and the detainee appealed. The appeals court found that restrictions on receiving outside
publications did not violat.e the detainee's First Amendment rights. Limitations placed on
the short-t.erm detainee's constitutional rights when the detainee was prevent.eel from
receiving outside publications while confined were reasonably relat.ed to penological
int.erests in the prevention of smuggling and of preventing fires. Requiring the detainee
to participat.e in the cleaning of a cell-block was not inherently punitive and was relat.ed to
a legitimat.e governmental int.erest in prison cleanliness, and thus was not a violation of
the detainee's right not to be punished before conviction for some crime. (Horry County
Det.ention Cent.er, Conway, South Carolina)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Hood v. Itawamba County, Miss.• 819 F.Supp. 556 (N.D. Miss. 1993). In an action arising
out of a suicide by a detainee. the county moved for summary judgment on Section 1983
claims. The district court found that. assuming that the detainee had shown suicidal
t.endencies, the county was not liable under Section 1983 for the detainee's suicide on the
theory of inadequat.e training, where the sheriffs office did have a policy regarding
cust.odial confinement of detainees who exhibit.eel a possible inclination to self-injury. The
negligence of a county law officer in not adhering to a county policy for custodial care of
the detainee did not support county liability under Section 1983. It was the deviation
from policy and standard practice that contribut.ed to the detainee's suicide, not the policy
or practice itself. (Itawamba County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
PUNISHMENT
SUICIDE ATrEMPr
USE OF FORCE

Jones v. Thompson, 818 F.Supp. 1263 (S.D. Ind. 1993). A pretrial detainee filed a Section
1983 civil rights action arising from the use of three-way restraints on the detainee
following his suicide attempt. The district court found that the ext.ended use of three-way
restraints on the detainee, coupled with the absence of medical review or treatment and
the denial of even basic amenities such as personal hygiene and toilet usage constitut.ed
deprivation of his due process rights. Various officers at the jail were found liable for
$5,000 compensatory damages in their individual capacities. In addition, an officer
responsible for management of the jail was liable for $2,000 punitive damages in her
individual capacity and the county was liable for $5,000 compensatory d!UJl&&'e&. (Madison
County Jail. Indiana)
'

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Kidd v. Gowen. 829 F.Supp. 16 (D.N.H. 1993). An action was brought against a county
concerning the strip search of an intoxic:at.ed prot.ective custody detainee. The district
court found that the facility's policy of strip-searching intoxicat.ed prot.ective custody
detainees violat.ed the Fourth Amendment because it permitted such searches without·any
individualized suspicion that a particular detainee might be secreting weapons or other
contraband. The county offered no evidence showing that such detainees were more likely
to secret.e weapons or other contraband or that the threat of self-harm by such detainees
was great.er. (Strafford County House of Correction. New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
SEARCHES
TELEPHONE

Newkirk v. Sheers, 834 F.Supp. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Pretrial detainees brought a suit
against a local government and prison officials in their official and individual capacities
alleging violation of th~ detainees' constitutional rights. On cross motions for summary
judgment, the district court found that the double celling of the detainees in other than
exigent circumstances violat.ed their due process rights. In addition. blanket strip and
body cavity searches of the pretrial detainees violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
and the restricted use of t.elephones during the prison's required initial 48-hour lockdown
period did not violat.e constitutional rights. (Schuylkill County Prison. Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SPEEDY TRIAL

Rodriguez v. U.S., 847 F.Supp. 281 (D.Puerto Rico 1993). An arrest.ee sued the
government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act for false arrest after she was held
overnight before being brought to a magistrat.e. The arrest.ee was released the following

32.41

day when additional identification material convinced authorities that she was not the

subject of an arrest warrant from New York. The district court found that the defendant
officers' failure to wait for the arrival of photographs or fingerprint evidence before
conducting the arrest did not make the arrest illegal. In addition, the failure to bring the
arrestee before a magistrate until the morning following her arrest was not proof of failure
to bring the arrestee before a magistrate without undue delay. The arrestee did not show
any statute, regulation or rule in effect at the relevant time that would have required a
magistrate to see her imediately after the arrest. (Hogar Crea, Quisqueya Detention
Facility, Puert.o Rico)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Russell v. Knox County, 826 F.Supp. 20 (D.Me. 1993). A Section 1983 action was brought
against a county, the sheriff and county corrections department officials' for an inmate's
death by suicide. On the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close
of the plaintiff's case, the district court found that the county was not liable for the
inmate's death, based on an alleged county policy of allowing all involuntary detainees to
retain their shoelaces. In addition, the actions of a line corrections officer at the county
jail, in allegedly delaying his inspection of the inmate's cell as part of a suicide watch for
four minutes while he went to the bathroom, did not manifest any "deliberate indifference"
to the inmate's constitutional rights, such as might support a Section 1983 action against
the officer when the inmate hanged himself in his cell. The officer had never been told
anything by the inmate suggesting that he intended to commit suicide, and the officer was
surprised that the inmate committed suicide. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE

Tucker v. Randall, 840 F.Supp. 1237 (N.D.Ill. 1993). A former pretrial detainee brought a
Section 1983 action against officers of a sheriff's department, alleging inadequate medical
care, inadequate access to the telephone and illegal taping of phone conversation, and
inadequate jail conditions. The district court dismissed, and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court found that the officers did not act with "deliberate indifference" to the
pretrial detainees' medical needs, even if they failed to treat him with ice and aspirin as
instructed by a doctor or delayed over two months in having the injuries viewed again. A
reasonable person would not have viewed the detainee's injuries as being life threatening
or serious. The detainee was transported to a hospital prior to booking and the hospital
doctor did not treat the injuries as serious or life threatening. In addition, the inmate did
not complain of injuries to the booking officer upon arrival. The court found that officers
did not violate clearly established law in 1986, when they allegedly denied the detainee
access to a telephone for the first 67 hours of his incarceration. The alleged secret taping
of the pretrial detainee's telephone calls did not substantially affect his right to confer
with counsel and, therefore, was not a "clearly established" constitutional violation in
1986. The detainee's counsel met with the detainee in person rather than by using the
phone, and the counsel could not recall any complaints by the detainee that the meetings
were less convenient than using the phone. The alleged intensely cold and hot
temperatures in the detainee's cell, and alleged lack of food in the jail, did not meet
"d'1iberate indifference" or "malicious motives" standards so as to defeat the qualmed
immunity defense asserted by the sheriffs department officials. Attempts to remedy
prison conditions, including the use of a space heater, giving the defendant an extra
blanket and clothes to wear, installing fans and opening windows, and giving the detainee
extra snacks, showed something less than a criminally reckless or malicious state of mind.
(Kendall County Jail, Illinois)

TELEPHONE

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2998. A pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights action against a jail official, alleging that the official used
excessive force against him during a jail disturbance. The U.S. District Court entered
judgment in favor of the detainee, and the official appealed. The appeals court, affirming
the decision, found that the substantive due process standard, rather than the Fourth
Amendment excessive force standard, applied to the pretrial detainee's excessive force
case, where the alleged use of excessive force occurred three weeks after the initial arrest.
The court also found that the jail official's use of a choke hold and other force to subdue
the nonresisting pretrial detainee during the jail disturbance was a malicious and sadistic
use of force to cause harm, rather than a good-faith effort to maintain or restore security,
violating due process. The use of force rendered the detainee temporarily unconscious.
The officer then struck the detainee while the detainee was handcuffed, kneeling, and
nonresisting. The court found that the jail official's use of force was not objectively ·
reasonable, so that the official was not entitled to qualified immunity in the detainee's
civil rights action, where the detainee suffered severe injuries as a result. The detainee
was awarded damages in the amount of $2,500 from the jail official, and was also granted
approximately $27,600 in attorneys' fees and costs. (Brewster County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Vineyard v. County of Murray, Ga., 990 F.2d 1207 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
636. An arrestee brought a Section 1983 action against deputies and a sheriff, alleging
that the defendants violated the arrestee's constitu.tional rights by beating mm. The U.S.
District Court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the arrestee, and the defendants
32.42

appealed. The court of appeals found that the evidence supported a finding that the county's
deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees to be free frQJD use of excessive force by the
county's deputies was a moving force of the violation of the arrestee's constitutional rights
resulting from the beating by deputies. An expert wi1ness testified that, assuming the
arrestee's version of the beating was true, the beating would not have occurred if county policies
were such that officers knew they must report any confrontations, that others would call the
sheriffs department to report complaints to the department, and that the department would
investigate complaints. (Murray County Sheriffs Department)
1994

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PUNISHMENT

Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons. 855 F.Supp. 530 (D. Puerto Rico 1994). A pretrial
detainee who was placed in solitary confinement as a disciplinary sanction applied for a
writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted the application, fmding that the
disciplinary segregation imposed on the pretrial de~ee as a sanction for an escape attempt
constituted punishment and served no legitimate regulatory purpose, in violation of substantive
due process. (M.D.C. Guaynabo, Puerto Rico) ·

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Hare v. City of Corinth. MS, 22 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1994). The estate of a pretrial detainee
who committed suicide brought a civil rights action against jail officials. The U.S. District
Court denied the officials' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and
the officials appealed. The appeals court noted that, at the time the pretrial detainee
committed suicide in 1989, jail officials were under a clearly established constitutional duty to
respond to the detainee's serious medical needs, including suicidal tendencies and attempts to
commit suicide, with at least more than deliberate indifference. The pretrial detainee
committed suicide in her cell by hanging herself with a blanket she had tom into strips. The
court found genuine issues of material fact as to whether jail officials knew or should have
known of the detainee's vulnerability to suicide. She was placed in an isolated cell which was
not visually monitored and which could not be reached by a trustee or the dispat.cher on duty.
The court precluded summary judgment in favor of the officials on qualified immunity grounds.
(Corinth City Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Hare v. City of Corinth. MS, 36 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 1994). The estate of a pretrial detainee
who committed suicide brought a Section 1983 action against jail officials. The U.S.
District Court denied the officials' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds and the officials appealed. The appeals court found that when the pretrial detainee
committed suicide in 1989, jail officials were under a clearly established constitutional duty to
provide reasonable care for serious medical needs, unless the deficiency reasonably served a
legitimate governmental objective. The court ruled that whether the officials denied reasonable
medical care for the pretrial detainee and whether a legitimate governmental objective justified
the denial were questions of fact precluding summary judgment on the issue of qualified
immunity. (Corinth City Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS

Hines v. Sheahan. 845 F.Supp. 1265 (N.D.Ill. 1994). A pretrial detainee brought a Section
1983 action for alleged constitutional deprivations suffered while incarcerated. On the
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court found that the
pretrial detainee's complaint alleging that he was required to sleep on a mattress on the floor
with rats and roaches failed to state a due process claim based on unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. The complaint did not set forth facts that would support a claim of deliberate
indifference, and failed to allege facts indicating what harm the detainee suffered. (Cook
County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
METHADONE
TREATMENT

Messina v. Mazzeo. 854 F.Supp. 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). An arrestee brought a federal civil
rights action against a correctional facility physician. The district court found that the ·
pretrial detainee stated a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs by alleging
that the intake physician at the correctional facility denied him methadone which was
allegedly warranted upon the detainee's arrival. If, based on the detainee's condition, it was
medically necessary that he receive the methadone immediately, the physician's action was
more than negligent. (Rikers Island, New York)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Newsome v. Webster, 843 F.Supp. 1460 (S.D. Ga. 1994). Jail detainees brought a Section
1983 action against various officers, alleging excessive use of force. Motions were made to
dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court found that the jail detainees failed to
establish the liability of the sheriff, either individually or officially. The detainees did not
allege that the sheriff had personally participated in any force inflict.ed upon them, and their
conclusory statements as to the inadequacy of training and policies towards the use of force did
not show that force was excessive. The detainees had not stated a cause of action for excessive
force against personnel who had arrested them or personnel responsible for their jail
confinement. (Richmond County Jail, Georgia)

32.43

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
VISITS

Pippins v. Adams County Jail. 851 F.Supp. 1228 (C.D. Ill. 1994). A pretrial detainee
brought a civil rights action against a jail and a jail administrator for violating his
constitutional rights. The district court found that the jail's denial of a hard-cover Koran.
because of legitimate security interests of preventing weapons and smuggling. and its failure t.o
provide a substitute main course when serving pork did not support the detainee's claim of
religious discrimination. The pretrial detainee's right to exercise religious freedom was not
violated by the jail's refusal to permit a visit from his Imam minister. who was on parole.
Obvious concerns dictate against allowing paroled felons to meet with incarcerat.ed people. and
jail officials never barred any other Imam from visiting the jail. (Adams County Jail. Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Plasko v. City of Pottsville, 852 F.Supp. 1258 (E.D.-Pa. 1994). Th.e estate of a pretrial
detainee brought claims against a city and city officials under Sections 1983. 1985. and
1986, under the Eighth and Fourt.eenth Amendments, and under Pennsylvania law, to recover
damages resulting from the pretrial detainee's suicide. On motions to dismiss, the district court
found that the estate of the pretrial detainee did not state a claim under Section 1983 against
jail officials for failure to prevent the detainee's suicide, absent an allegation of facts concerning
the mental hist.ory of the detainee or other facts showing that jail officials knew or should have
known the detainee posed a particular risk of suicide and that they disregarded those risks.
Without any reason to believe that the detainee was potentially suicidal, the fact that officials
did not take a belt from the detainee while he was in a holding cell amounted to nothing more
than negligence. The state law claims were also dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs
right to reassert them as supplemental claims in an amended complaint in district court or in
state court if no amended complaint was flied. (Pottsville Police Department, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
VISITS

Young v. Larkin. 871 F.Supp. 772 (M.D. Pa. 1994). affirmed, 47 F.3d 1163. A pretrial
detainee filed a civil rights action against prison officials complaining about treatment
during pretrial detention. On the defendants motion for summary judgment the district court
found that the prisoner, who was confmed in a restrictive housing unit, was not denied
constitutional rights by the fact that he was allowed fewer visits with family than other
prisoners in the general population and that he had to visit family with handcuffs on, unlike
prisoners in the general prison population. The restrictions were justified by valid security
concerns. (State Correctional Institution, Dallas. Pennsylvania)
1995

U.S. Appeals Court
CEU.S
CONDITIONS
SUICIDE ATTEMPI'

Anderson v. County of Kem, 45 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1995). Pretrial detainees and
convicted prisoners brought an action against prison officials under Section 1983. The
U.S. District Court refused to enjoin pri.son officials from placing mentally disturbed or
suicidal prisoners in safety cells. The detainees and prisoners appealed. The appeals
court found that the district court did not err in refusing to enjoin the county from ever making
use of safety cells for mentally disturbed or suicidal prisoners. There was ample testimony that
some prisoners became so violent and such a danger to themselves that temporary placement in
a safety cell was needed to deprive the prisoners of all means of harming themselves. The fact
that some prisoners who were violent might be mentally disturbed or suicidal did not detract
from the need. The deprivation of sinks, stand up toilets, and beds for short periods ·of time
during violent episodes was constitutionally justifiable because the inmates were confined to the
safety cells only for short periods of time. (Kem County Jail. California)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Burton v. Cameron County, Tex.• 884 F.Supp. 234 (S.D. Tex. 1995). A detainee who
suffered from AIDS brought Section 1983 and Texas tort claims actions against a sheriff. a
physician for the jail, and the county for insufficient medical care. On motions for
summary judgment by the county and the physician, the district court found that the physician
under contract to provide medical services to the county jail was not liable to the detainee for
alleged insufficient medical treatment. The detainee was given reasonable medical care and
suffered no adverse effects from the time spent in jail. In addition. the physician was not liable
to the detainee for alleged medical negligence because the detainee was not harmed by any
alleged shortcomings of treatment, and any failure by the infirmary staff to properly provide
the detainee with AZT treatment was not conduct which could be imputed on the physician.
The physician was not liable to the detainee for intentional infliction of emotional distress
regarding allegedly insufficient medical treatment. The administration of a placebo did not
constitute extreme or outrageous conduct and significant care was provided by the infirmary
staff in coordination with the care provided by the detainees private physician. The detainee's
private physician testified that the confinement had not affected the detainee's medical
conditions or his mental health. (Cameron County Jail, Texas)

32M

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
PUNISHMENT
SEPARATION
TELEPHONE
VISITS

Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 1995). A pretrial detainee
subjected to disciplinary sanctions petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S.
District Court granted the writ and the government appealed. The appeals court, vacating
and remanding, found that even if a restriction or condition of confmement may be viewed
as having a punitive effect on a pretrial detainee, it is constitutional if it also furthers
some legitimate governmental objective and is not excessive. The court found that 90-day
disciplinary segregation and a six-month revocation of telephone and visitation privileges were
reasonable sanctions for the pretrial detainee's attempted bribe and attempted escape.
(Metropolitan Detention Center, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
PRIVACY

Ellis y. Meade, 887 F.Supp. 324 (D.Me. 1995). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against
a jail officer and jail administrator seeking compensation for alleged mistreatment while
confined at the jail. The district court entered judgment for the defendants, fmding that the
male officer's comments to the detainee, "How are you doing little boy," and "How's the little
guy doing," did not constitute sexual harassment. The court also held that the officer's patting
of the detainee on the buttocks did not constitute a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes
and did not violate the detainee's right to privacy, nor did it constitute "punishment" in
violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court found that the officer's actions of
patting the detainee were immune from liability on an· assault and battery claim and that the
officer's observation of the detainee while naked did not violate the detainee's Fourth
Amendment privacy rights. The court noted that the officer's purpose in patting the inmate
was not to punish, but to placate the detainee, which was rationally connected to the officer's
stated purpose and was not excessive. The court commented that while the officer's actions
were possibly mistaken and ill-advised, they were not so egregious that they exceeded as a
matter of law the scope of any discretion the officer could have possessed. (Penobscot County
Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
USE OF FORCE

Fickes v. Jefferson County, 900 F.Supp. 84 (E.D.Tex. 1995). A pretrial detainee brought a§
1983 action against a county, sheriff, and corrections officials. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied it in part. The court found that a
corrections officer was at most negligent in leaving mops and brooms in a cell; the detainee
alleged that other inmates beat him with the mops and brooms. The court noted that bringing
an end to the flood that had disrupted several cells was a legitimate government purpose that
justified bringing the mops, brooms and squeegees into the cell. The court held that genuine
issues of fact remained as to whether an officer knew of the ongoing attack when he made his
rounds and chose to do nothing or whether the altercation erupted after the officer made his
rounds, precluding summary judgment. The court held that genuine fact issues remained as to
whether officers used excessive force when removing the detainee to another cell by continuing
to exert force directly on the detainee's neck by means of a headlock. after the detainee
announced he had injured his neck, precluding summary judgment. (Jefferson County Jail,
Texas)

U.S. District Court
VISITS

Flournoy v. Fairman, 897 F.Supp. 350 (N.D.IU. 1995). A pretrial detainee brought§ 1983
actions against a direct.or of a county department of corrections and a social worker at a county
jail. The district court held that denial of visitation when the visiting room was overcrowded,
when visitors refused to produce identification, when visitors did not know on which tier the
detainee was housed, or when insufficient time remained during visiting hours, did not violate
the detainee's right to due process. The court found that such policies and practices were
perfectly sensible and were reasonably related to the need to maintain internal security at the
jail. The court also noted that an Illinois statute governing visitation at state correctional
facilities did not apply to county jails and therefore did not give rise to any protected liberty
interest. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE A'ITEMPI'

Litz v. City of Allentown, 896 F.Supp. 1401 (E.D.Pa. 1995). The guardian of a pretrial detainee
who had attempted suicide brought a civil rights action against a city and its police officials.
The district court found that evidence did not show that the detainee had a particular
vulnerability to suicide necessary for liability under § 1983 and that even if individual officers
were liable, the municipality was not liable absent some showing that it somehow
communicated a message of tacit approval or acquiescence in attempted suicides. The court
also found that any improper action by the police chief was at most negligence, which would not
support a § 1983 claim. The court noted that the actions of the detainee, who was intoxicated
and was asking why he could not go home, did not indicate a possibility that he was going to
harm hlmself for the purpose of showing a strong likelihood--rather than a mere possibility-that self-inflicted harm would occur. The court also noted that the city had taken measures to
prevent suicides. The detainee had attempted to hang himself using his socks in a holding cell
at the police department. (Allentown Police Department, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
REIJGION

Muslim y., Frame, 891 F.Supp. 226 (E.D.Pa. 1995). A former pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action alleging that a county prison rule prohibiting inmates from wearing head gear in
common areas unconstitutionally restricted the Muslim detainee from wearing his prayer cap in
an expression of his faith. The district-court granted summary judgment for the defendants in
part, and denied it in part. The court found that state law-did not give prisoners a h'berty
interest in the unrestricted wearing of religious ornamentation, and that the prison head gear
rule was not the result of religious discrimination. But the court denied summary judgment on
32.45

the issues of whether the ban on head gear substantially burdened the detainee's free exercise
of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and whether the head gear
restrictions were the least restrictive means of achieving safe prj.llOllS, The court noted that
prison officials failed to establish that allowing h~ad gear would unduly increase their
administrative costs, that allowing head gear would permit a means of expressing gang
affiliation, and that allowing head gear would impede the need to visually identify prisoners
during movement. (Chester County Prison, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAIWRE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Neville v. True. 900 F.Supp. 972 (N.D.Ill. 1995). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983
action against officials alleging denial of adequate medical care. The district court granted
summary judgment for the officials, fmding that although the inmate's heart condition,
pacemaker and poor circulation provided evidence of a serious medical need, the officials were
not deliberately indifferent. The court noted thl!,t the inmate was given medical attention, had
several appointments with outside doctors at three different hospitals, the inmate repeatedly
refused the doctor's advice to undergo pacemaker surgery, and the inmate caused certain
injuries to himself and hindered treatment by re-opening healing wounds. (Metropolitan
Correctional Center, Chicago, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Nowosad v. English, 903 F.Supp. 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). A plaintiff brought a § 1983 action
against county officials and individuals involved with his arrest and prosecution. The district
court found that the plaintiff stated an excessive force claim, where he alleged that during the
course of his arrest he was pushed, his arm was painfully and roughly twisted, and he suffered
such difficulties as a disabling knee injury, arm, shoulder, back and leg injuries causing pain.
The court found that a strip search did not _violate the Fourth Amendment, where the fact that
the plaintiff was charged with menacing with a weapon provided an element of reasonable
suspicion that another weapon was concealed. (Suffolk County Police Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
USE OF FORCE
BAIL

~ !:·

Village of Orland Park, 906 F.Supp. 1196 (N.D.Ill. 1995). The estate of an arrestee who
committed suicide while in detention brought a civil rights action against a village and police
officers. An eighteen-year-old youth in police custody committed suicide by hanging himself
from the bars of his cell with his t-shirt. The court found that the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity on claims against them in their official capacity, but the officer who put the
arrest.ee in a chokehold was not entitled to immunity on the claim of excessive force, nor was
immunity available for an officer who failed to intervene in the first officer's takedown of the
arrestee. The court also found that the officers were not entitled to immunity on the claim that
they struck the arrestee in violation of his right to be free from pretrial detention that
constituted punishment; a videotape showed no sign of aggression or violence by the arrestee
before the officer grabbed him and placed him in a chokehold. The court found that the officers
were entitled to immunity on the claim of failure to provide medical care and that the village
had no policy of deliberate indifference as to measures to prevent suicide. The municipality was
not liable for the suicide of the arrestee based on its alleged failure to train police officers
regarding suicide awareness absent any evidence that the municipality had a large suicide
problem which it was ignoring or that statutes or regulations required officers either to perform
CPR upon the arrestee after he was discovered hanging in his cell or to take suicide awareness
classes. The court ruled that the arrestee's sister lacked standing and could not recover under §
1983 for loss of society and companionship. The court left the proximate cause issue to be
determined by a jury. The court ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on
the claim that they failed to process the arrestee for bail or allow bail to be posted in a timely
fashion, because the right to bail was not a clearly established right at the time of the incident.
(Overland Park Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARIES
CONDITIONS
EXERCISE

Smith !:· Harvey County Jail, 889 F.Supp. 426 (D.Kan. 1995). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983
suit against jail officials alleging violation of his rights by the provision of inadequate medical
care, improper diet, denial of access to a law library, and denial of outdoor exercise. The
district court dismissed the case. The court held that serving plain but nutritious food did not
violate the detainee's constitutional rights; the detainee had complained of portion size, the food
selected and food preparation. 'lhe court held that while regular exercise of some type is crucial
for the psychological and physical fitness of inmates, determining what is adequate exercise will
depend on the circumstances of each case, including the physical characteristics of the cell and
jail, and the average length of stay of inmates. 'lhe court found no violation from the denial of
outdoor exercise because the detainee had access to printed instructions for calisthenics, the jail
made some recreational materials available to detainees, the average stay of a detainee was
seven days (although the plaintiff in this case spent nearly six months in confinement), the jail
was not crowded during his stay at the jail, and the detainee exercised in his cell at least part
of the time he was confined. 'lhe court noted that where a prisoner has a reasonable
opporbmity for exercise and does not allege any significant physical deterioration, there is no
Eighth Amendment violation. The court held that the detainee's rights were not violated by the
refusal of the jail to allow him access to the county law library, which was located in the same
building but which was not secure. 'lh.e detainee was represented by counsel throughout his
pretrial det.en1ion, removing any need for the county jail to allow him access to materials in the
law library to prepare his defense. The county also granted the detainee's requests for copies of
legal materials. (Harvey County Jail, Kansas)

32.46

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION
EXERCISE
CROWDING

Stone-El v. Sheahan, 914- F.Supp. 202 (N.D.Ill. 1995). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 civil
rights action against a sheriff. executive director of the county department of corrections, and
the superintendent of the county jail. The detainee alleged that various conditions of his
confinement violated his right to due process. The district court granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss. The court found that the defendants had not personally caused the conditions at the
jail, nor could they limit the number of pretrial detainees assigned there or appropriate funds to
improve conditions. The court also found that the detainee failea to allege conditions of
confinement serious enough to violate the objective component of a due process claim. The
detainee had asserted that he had slept on the floor without a mattress, that the jail was noisy,
that the jail lacked showers. that he was not able to maintain his personal hygiene, that
ventilation was poor, and that inadequate security permitted gangs to intimidate him. The
detainee also alleged a lack of exercise opportunities, but the court found that even dramatic
restrictions on outdoor exercise do not violate due process as long as detainees have ample
opportunities to participate in indoor activity. The court noted that the detainee failed to allege
any harm caused by the poor ventilation or any adverse health effects from the alleged lack of
exercise. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURTS

Turiano v. Schnarrs. 904- F.Supp. 4-00 (M.D.Pa. 1995). A§ 1983 action was filed by an inmate
alleging he was denied meaningful access to courts while a pretrial detainee in a county jail.
The district court found that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment in
favor of the jail officials. The county jail law library did not contain volumes one through 700
of the Federal Supplement, volumes one through 800 of the Federal Reporter Second Series.
contained only two volumes of the Supreme Court Reporter, and contained no volumes of Title
4-2 of the United States Code or any federal indices; the court found this to be inadequate to
provide meaningful access to courts. The court also found the county's paging system
inadequate; the system allows inmates to obtain law books or copies of cases and other legal
reference materials upon request from the county courthouse library, but no list of books
available was ever provided to inmates and officials did not make inmates aware of the system.
(Huntingdon County Jail, Pennsylvania)

LAW LIBRARY

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
STAFFING

Wilson v. Cook County Bd. of Commissioners, 878 F.Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ill. 1995). A
pretrial detainee brought a Section 1983 action against detention facility officials and a
county board of commissioners alleging due process violations. On the defendants' motions
to dismiss, the district court found that the failure to allege remedial injury warranted the
dismissal of claims alleging overcrowding, inadequate staffing, inadequate opportunity for
exercise, and inadequate grievance procedures. However, the court found that the pretrial
detainee's allegations that the detention facility failed to provide clean sheets, clothing, and a
towel, had a limited number of toilets, showers, and sinks, and lacked sufficient toilet paper,
soap, and cleaning materials stated a claim for violation of due process, where these conditions
were probably not reasonably related to any legitimate government objective. The detainees
allegation that the facility lacked adequate ventilation was sufficient to state a claim for due
process violation. The detainee's allegation that the detention facility failed to treat the
detainee's back injury and that the facility's officials were aware that the detainee's sleeping
conditions could adversely affect the injury also stated a claim for violation of due process. The
pretrial detainee's allegation that the detention facility served inadequate food under
unsanitary conditions and that facility officials were aware.of such conditions and the fact that
the conditions created an excessive risk. to the detainee's health and safety stated a claim for
violation of due process. The detainee's allegation that the board of commissioners failed to
appropriate and provide funds sufficient to improve the conditions at the detention facility,
despite its knowledge of unconstitutional conditions at the facility, and that the board was
deliberately indifferent to the excessive risk. created by the conditions, adequately stated a due
process claim against the board. (Cook. County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

~ :!·

Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1995). A pretrial detainee filed a pro se § 1983 action
against guards, alleging violation of her due process rights. The district court dismissed in part
and entered summary judgment for the guards in part. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed in part, finding that allegations that a guard showed deliberate indifference for the
detainee's rights by placing her in a cell with a mentally ill inmate who presented an imminent
potential for assault were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim. But the appeals court found that
allegations that a guard failed to supervise subordinate guards and allowed them to provide
inadequate medical care failed to state a claim. The court also found that the detainee was not
entitled to a presegregation hearing; she had been segregated for her own protection and that of
other inmates after a verbal confrontation. (Sangamon County Jail, Illinois)

1996

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURI'S

Casteel v. Pieschek., 94-4- F.Supp. 74-8 (E.D.Wis. 1996). Detainees brought a§ 1983 action
against a county jail and jail officials, alleging violation of their right to meaningful
access to courts and other claims. 'Ihe district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, finding that providing the detainees with weekly access to law h"brary materials
and letter access to legal assistance organizations did not violate the detainees' right to
meaningful access to courts. 'Ihe court noted that physical access to a law h"brary was not
provided and that the detainees were not provided with assistance of counsel for various civil
claims. (Brown County Jail, Wisconsin)
·
32.47

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
PROTECTION

Cephas v. Truitt. 940 F.Supp. 674 (D.Del. 1996). A pretrial detainee who had been
placed in administrative segregation for 18 days pending a disciplinary hearing brought
a federal civil rights action against a jail official, alleging violation of his due process
rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the
imposition of administrative segregation prior t.o a disciplinary hearing did not violate a
protected liberty interest. The court held that the 15-day isolation sanction given to the
detainee following a disciplinary hearing did not violate a protected liberty interest and that the
punishment was reasonably related to legitimate objectives and was permissible; nothing
indicated that the sanction was arbitrary or disproportionate to the offense. The court also
found that the detainee, who was assaulted by other inmates while in administrative
segregation, failed to establish that the jail official had been deliberately indifferent to the risk
that the detainee would be assaulted. According to the court, nothing indicated that the official
was actually aware of any risk prior to the assault or that the risk was apparent, nor that the
delay of the disciplinary hearing, during which time the detainee was kept in segregation, was
unreasonable. (Sussex Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
INTAKE SCREENING

Clark v. McMillin. 932 F.Supp. 789 (S.D.Miss. 1996). A wrongful death suit alleging state law
and federal civil rights claims was brought against a sheriff, a county, and an wmamed
defendant seeking damages for the death of a pretrial detainee who was assaulted and killed by
his cellmate. The district court remanded the state law claims and dismissed the federal
claims. The court found that the sheriff's policy of checking cells containing pretrial detainees
on suicide watch every 15 minutes was not deliberate indifference, even though 15 minutes was
more than enough time for one inmate to kill another. The court found that although the
sheriff did have constructive knowledge of the perpetrator's violent propensities from county
records, the sheriff did not have actual knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the
victim. The plaintiffs had alleged that the county had no policy to safeguard inmates from
attacks from other inmates, that the sheriff failed to place the perpetrator in a unit for violent
felons, that the county failed to properly screen inmates for violent propensities, and that the
county failed or refused to provide adequate medical care to the victim after the assault. (Hinds
County Detention Center, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court

Dorsey v. St. Joseph Co. Jail Officials. 910 F.Supp. 1343 (N.D.Ind. 1996). A former pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights action under § 1983 against county jail officials, alleging they
failed to protect him, used excessive force, and failed to meet his medical needs. The court
found that the inmate failed to show that jail officials failed to provide adequate medical
treatment for his diabetes and his broken arm; medical records indicated that he was treated by
a physician but that he was belligerent and uncooperative and that he refused treatment on
several occasions. The court found that jail officials did not fail t.o protect the inmate from
other prisoners, as all inmates could not be accommodated in single cell housing to ensure their
safety.· When jail officials attempted to transfer the inmate to a single cell for his own
protection the inmate became recalcitrant and belligerent; the court found that jail officials did
not use excessive force when transferring him to the single cell. (St. Joseph County Jail,
Indiana)

MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE
PROTECTION

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Dugas v. Jefferson County. 931 F.Supp. 1315 (E.D.Tex. 1996). A female arrestee brought a §
1983 action against a county and a sheriff's deputy claiming that a strip search ordered by the
deputy following her arrest for a misdemeanor violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The
district court denied the deputy's motion for summary judgment, finding that he was not
entitled t.o a qualified immunity defense because it was clear at the time of the deputy's order
that a strip search of a minor offense arrestee violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also
found that the deputy was not shielded from civil liability for illegal acts simply because he was
following orders. (Jefferson County Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996). The estate and mother
of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in a psychiatric ward brought a civil rights
action in state court against nurses and a psychiatrist who assisted in the detainee's treatment.
After removal by the defendants to federal court the district court granted them summary
judgment. The appeals court affirmed, finding that allegations of medical malpractice were not
sufficient to sustain a § 1983 action. The court also held that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that the defendants were subjectively aware that the detainee would try t.o commit
suicide. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate deliberate indifference by the
psychiatrist's classification of the detainee as a potential suicide risk rather than a high suicide
risk. Although the defendants conceded that plastic bags such as the one the detainee used to
asphyxiate himself posed a substantial risk to a patient intent on suicide, the court found that
the fact that the detainee was placed on the lower of two levels of suicide precautions showed a
subjective conclusion that the detainee did not intend to kill himself. The court noted that
determining the point at which a detainee's right under the due process clause to be free from
bodily restraint during psychiatric hospitalization intersects with the right t.o be restrained so
he will not harm himself is a matter of medical judgment. (Marion County Jail and Wishard
Memorial Psychiatric Ward, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Estate of Frank v. City of Beaver Dam, 921 F.Supp. 590 (E.D.W1S. 1996). The personal
representative of the estate of a detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action
against police officers who had contact with the detainee prior t.o his suicide. The district court

32.48

found that the officers enjoyed qualified immunity and dismissed the case. The court noted
that although one officer was told that the detainee had exhibited severe mood swings on his
way to jail, the detainee did not make any threats, cause any disturbances, stagger, slur his
speech or do anything bizarre which would have lead the officer to believe he was suicidal. The
court also noted that the only contact a jail officer had with the detainee was while escorting
him to his cell and the officer only observed that the detainee was quiet and did not respond to
a question she asked him. According to the court, the detainee's behavior did not suggest that
he was in imminent danger to himself since he answered questions directly and clearly, walked
to his cell without problems, ate breakfast and engaged in a telephone conversation. (Dodge
County Jail, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
CLOTHING
VISITS

Gerakaris v. Champagne, 913 F.Supp. 646 (D.Mass. 1996). A plaintiff who was detained at a
local police station and transferred to a county jail sued officials and law enforcement officers
alleging he was threatened and intimidated in an attempt to prevent him from testifying
against a public official, his father-in-law, in a grand jury investigation of professional
misconduct. The district court held that the plaintiff stated a § 1983 claim based on alleged
denial of free speech, deprivation of medical care, delayed booking, and conspiracy. Following
an alleged concerted period of intimidation seeking to dissuade him from cooperating with the
investigation of his father-in-law, the plaintiff was arrested at his mother's home for allegedly
violating a restraining order. The plaintiff informed the arresting officers that he suffered from
several illnesses, for which he was taking prescriptions. The officers refused to permit the
plaintiff to retrieve his medications before transporting him to the police station. During his
booking at the police station, the plaintiff complained again about his medical and dietary
needs. Law enforcement officers deliberately delayed the plaintiffs booking until after the local
court had closed, denying him an immediate appearance before a judge. Unable to make bail,
the plaintiff was transported to the county jail later that evening, remaining there for two
nights. The plaintiff alleged that jail staff and officials abused him during his confmement by
refusing to allow him to wear warm clothing, placing him in solitary confinement, misleading
visitors about his location and thereby denying his visitation rights, denying him prescription
medication, and providing him with inadequate food during his 40-hour confinement. The court
noted that although the plaintiffs period of confmement was short, it must be measured against
the intolerability of the conditions endured and the egregriousness of the defendants' conduct.
(Peabody Police StatiOIV'Middleton House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
ACCESS TO COURTS
RECREATION

Hamilton.!· ~ 74 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 1996). A parolee who was detained for an alleged new
offense brought a § 1983 action challenging conditions of confinement at a city jail. The district
court dismissed the case as frivolous and the parolee appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
ruling that the alleged conditions did not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. The
parolee had alleged that he was denied visitation, recreation, mail, legal materials, sheets, and
showers for a three-day period, but the court found that the conditions were not
unconstitutional and that the parolee presented no evidence that the defendants intended to
punish the parolee for his pending charges. (DeSoto City Jail, Texas)

MAIL
TELEPHONE

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Hare v. City of Corinth, MS, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996). The estate of a detainee who
committed suicide while in custody brought a § 1983 action against a city and its officials. The
district court denied the officials' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds
and the officials appealed. The appeals court dismissed the appeal, but after rehearing the case
en bane the appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that an episodic act or omission of a
jail official does not violate a pretrial detainee's due process right to medical care or protection
from suicide unless the official acted or failed to act with subjective deliberate indifference.
(City Jail, Corinth, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court

Hare v. City of Corinth. Miss., 949 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Miss. 1996). The estate of a
detainee who committed suicide brought a § 1983 action against the City of Corinth and police
officers. The district court denied the police officers' motion for summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds and the appeals court dismissed the appeal. Hearing the case en bane, the
court of appeals vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court denied the officers'
motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether the officers had actual knowledge of an objectively substantial risk of harm to the
detainee, and whether they responded to that risk with deliberate indifference. The court noted
that law was clearly established in 1989 that the officers had a minimum duty to the detainee
not to be subjectively aware of a substantial risk of harm to the detainee and then be
deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs. (City of Corinth, Mississippi)

FAILURE TO

PROTECT

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Kaufman v. Carter, 952 F.Supp. 520 (W.D.Mich. 1996). A parole violator who was a
bilateral amputee had been confined in a county jail while awaiting trial on new
charges. The detainee brought a § 1983 action against county officials and staff alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
violation of the Rehabilitation Act and violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The district court held that the sheriff and county were entitled to summary judgment on the
deliberate indifference claim, but that issues remained as to whether nurses failed to provide
the inmate with materials needed to maintain the stumps of bis amputated legs in a condition
that would accept prostheses. The detainee had requested rubbing alcohol BO that he could
clean his prosthetic limbs and "ace wraps" BO that he could maintain the size of his leg stumps
32.49

while not wearing his prosthesis. As a result of being denied these materials, the detainee was
not able to walk until he was able to obtain new prostheses to fit his enlarged stumps. The
court found that the Rehabilitation Act and ADA applied to state correctional facilities, and that
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds was precluded with respect to
Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims. (Kalamazoo County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819 (5th Cir. 1996). An arrestee filed a§ 1983 action against police and
jail officials asserting constitutional and tort claims. The district court denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
dismissed in part, and remanded the case. The appeals court held that the conduct of the
arrestee in making an illegal left tum and failing to present a driver's license did not create
reasonable suspicion that she was hiding weapons or contraband so as to justify a strip search
for the purposes of a police officer's claim of qualified immunity. The court found that the strip
search was not objectively reasonable under the law at the time of the search, absent
individualized suspicion. The court ruled that jail officials may strip search a person arrested
for a minor offense and detained pending posting of bond only if they possess reasonable
suspicion based on such factors as the nature of the offense, the arrestee's appearance and
conduct, or a prior arrest record. The court noted that although the arrestee lacked photograph
identification and failed to post bond within five hours, she readily identified herself, explained
that she had left her driver's license in her hotel room, cooperated with police, and presented a
purse full of other nonphoto identification. (City of New Orleans and Sheriff)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSFER
PUNISHMENT

Laza y. Reish. 84 F.3d 578 (2nd Cir. 1996). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
warden alleging that he had been subjected to unlawful punishment as a pretrial detainee
when he was transferred from state prison and held in a federal prison to await trial on federal
charges. The district court dismissed the suit and the appeals court affirmed, ruling that since
the prisoner had not completed his state sentence at the time he was held, he had not been a
pretrial detainee with a due process right to freedom from punishment under Belly. Wolfish.
The prisoner assaulted a counselor who was attempting to conduct a routine search of his cell
and was transferred two days later from a federal metropolitan correctional facility to a federal
correctional institution where he was placed in administrative detention. (Metropolitan
Correctional Center, Federal Bureau of Prisons, New York)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Mathie v. Fries. 935 F.Supp. 1284 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). A form.er inmate of a county
correctional facility brought an action against the facility's Director of Security alleging
that the director sexually abused him while he was confined as a pretrial detainee. The district
court entered judgment for the inmate, fmding that evidence was sufficient to support findings
that the director repeatedly sexually abused the inmate and that the director sodomized the
inmate while he was handcuffed to pipes in the security office. The court found that these acts
violated the inmate's due process rights and that the director was not qualifiedly immune from
§ 1983 claims, awarding compensatory damages of $250,000 and punitive damages of $500,000.
The court noted that evidence showed that the inmate sustained physical injury to his anal
area and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of sexual abuse by the
director. The court called the director's action an outrageous abuse of power and authority.
(Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Richerson v. Lexingt.on Fayette Urban County Government. 958 F.Supp. 299 (E.D.Ky.
1996). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights action challenging a strip search that
was conducted when he returned from a courtroom. The district court entered judgment for the
defendants, finding that it was reasonable to have a policy of strip searching detainees, even
those held for minor, nonviolent traffic offenses, upon their return from a courtroom to the
general population of the detention center. According to the court, when pretrial detainees,
including those charged with minor, nonviolent offenses, are kept in the detention center's
general population prior to arraignment and are then put in a position where exposure to the
general public presents a very real danger of contraband being passed, the policy of strip
searching is justified and reasonable. (Fayette County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court

Robey v. Chester County. 946 F.Supp. 333 (E.D.Pa. 1996). The mother and the minor
children of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide after being taken off of a suicide
wat.ch brought civil rights and state law claims against the county, its board of prison
inspectors, two wardens, a prison counselor and a psychologist who treated the detainee. The
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part.
The court ruled that the wardens' failure to institute disciplinary proceedings following the
detainee's suicide did not constitute knowing acquiescence so as to preclude qualified immunity.
'Ihe court also held that the prison counselor's failure to respond to requests to see the detainee
was not a violation of clearly established rights so as to preclude qualified immunity, if the
counselor had not known of the detainee's prior suicide attempt until after the detainee's death.
However, the court ruled that reasonable jurors could find that the psychologist acted with
deh"berate indifference to the detainee's psychological needs so as to be liable under a§ 1983
civil rights claim, precluding summary judgment. The psychologist knew when the detainee
entered the prison of his prior suicide attempt and that the detainee was diagnosed upon
ent.ering the prison as suffering from major depression as well as impaired insights and
judgment. 'Ihe psychologist apparently ordered the discontinuation of the suicide wat.ch and
failed to perform a promised follow-up check. The court found evidence supporting a punitive

FAILURE TO

PROTECT

32.50

damage claim only against the psychologist and that the county and board of prison directors
had sovereign immunity from state law claims. (Chester County Prison, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Smithy. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 1996). A pretrial detainee brought a federal civil
rights action against jail officials alleging the use of excessive force and challenging his
conditions of confinement. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on
several issues and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, fmding that the inmate's
allegations that he was exposed to raw sewage for four days due to an overflowing toilet failed
to state a constitutional claim based on conditions of confmement. The court found that having
to endure the stench of his own feces and urine for four days amounted to a de minimis
imposition on detainee's rights, and noted that the inmate did not dispute the assertion by jail
officials that he was offered the opportunity to clean up the mess himself. (Cape Girardeau
County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Swain v. Spinney. 932 F.Supp. 25 (D.Mass. 1996) reversed in part 117 F.3d 1. A female
arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a city and several of its police officials alleging that
her rights were violated by a strip search conducted by a female officer. The court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, fmding that the search did not violate the arrestee's
constitutional rights and that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court
also found that the arrestee failed to show that the city was deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of its citizens. Before her arrest, an officer witnessed the arrestee try to
discard concealed contraband (marijuana) and police legitimately discovered rolling papers in
her pocketbook after her arrest. The strip search was conducted out of public view in front of
only one person of the same sex, and the arrestee was never touched during the procedure.
(North Reading Police Station, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996). After a defendant was convicted in federal
court of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery he appealed, challenging
the audiotaping of his telephone calls while he was confmed as a pretrial detainee. The appeals
court found that audiotaping of the calls did not implicate the Fourth Amendment and did not
violate Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The court found that the
detainee did not have a subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone calls at
a jail, that the detainee knew of the policy of audiotaping calls before he made his first phone
call, that the detainee signed a form warning him of monitoring and taping, and that the
detainee read signs about the phones warning of taping and read a prisoners' manual that
warned of the recordings. (Metl'opolitan Detention Center, Los Angeles, Federal Bureau of
Prisons)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Walton. 935 F.Supp. 1161 (D.Kan. 1996). A defendant in a criminal case who
was a detainee in a correctional institution moved to suppress a letter which was seized
by a correctional officer. The district court ruled that the detainee did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of an envelope he gave to an officer to be delivered to a
visitor. The court found that the detainee's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when
the officer opened the envelope and read the letter it contained, where the envelope was not
sealed, was not properly marked as legal mail, was addressed to the detainee rather than a
court or his lawyer, and where the detainee knowingly and voluntarily gave the envelope to the
officer. (Corrections Corporation of America's Leavenworth Detention Center, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Wilson Y! Williams. 83 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 1996). A pretl'ial detainee brought a civil rights
action against a correctional officer for use of allegedly excessive force. The district court
granted summary judgment for the officer and an appeals court reversed the decision. On
remand, the district court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the officer and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed the district court decision. The appeals court
found that a jury could properly consider objective factors in determining intent, particularly
where the court listed a variety of factors that could be used to infer an intent to punish. The
detainee alleged that the correctional officer attacked him without provocation, continued to
beat him while he was restrained by other correctional officers, and attacked him again when
he was restrained in a different area of the jail. The appeals court ruled that the jury
instruction constituted an error. The jury was instructed to determine, through objective
means, whether the prohibited punitive intent was present, but was then told even if this was
found, a reasonable good faith punitive intent would excuse it. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

1997
U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
FALSE ARREST

Astrada v. Howard, 979 F.Supp. 90 (D.Conn. 1997). After the plaintiff had burst into a police
station, banged frantically on a desk window and brandished a smoking pistol, four
individuals arrived at the station and claimed that the plaintiff fired his pistol at them.
The plaintiff was held in a room in the station while police attempted to sort out the events.
The plaintiff was eventually arrested and charged with reckless endangerment, but after a year
the charge was nolled. The plaintiff sued police officials under§ 1981 and§ 1983 claiming
intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest and racial discrimination. The district
court held that the plaintiff failed to show a causal link between race and the alleged
32.51

discriminat.ory actions. The court found that detaining the plaintiff in an allegedly "scummy"
room at the police station did not amount t.o arrest without a showing of probable cause because
the detention was no more intrusive than was necessary. (West Haven Police Department,
Connecticut)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Barrie v. Grand County, Utah, 119 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 1997). A detainee's heirs brought
a civil rights action against a county and various individuals after the pretrial detainee
committed suicide in a county jail. The district court entered summary judgment for the
defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the defendants' duty t.o
the detainee was based on the deliberate indifference standard, not objective reasonableness,
and that the defendants did not act with deliberate indifference. The detainee was placed in the
jail's "drunk tank" after being booked, and a deputy noted that he had been drinking alcohol.
The detainee was allowed t.o retain the clothes he was wearing at the time of his arrest, which
included a pair of sweat pants containing a cloth cord t.o cinch the waist of the sweat pants. The
detainee was checked about four hours after he was placed in the cell, and again about two
hours later. An hour later the cell was checked and the detainee was found hanging from the
38-inch draw cord. (Grand County Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
ACCESS TO COURI'

Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.Supp. 727 (D.Virgin Islands 1997). Detainees and inmates
housed in a criminal justice complex asked the court t.o find officials in civil contempt of
a consent decree. The district court found that the consent decree comported with the
principles of the Prison Litigation Reform A-ct (PLRA) because it was narrowly drawn,
ext.ended no further than necessary to correct the violation of federal rights, and was the least
intrusive means necessary t.o correct the violations. The court found the officials in contempt for
failing t.o comply with the terms of the consent decree, and continued noncompliance with a
court order requiring officials t.o pay detainees' and inmates' attorney fees. The officials
admitted they never fully complied with the order and failed to make meaningful progress
toward reducing the inmate population. The officials had paid only $50,000 of the $155,000
attorney fees that the court had ordered paid to the National Prison Project of the American
Civil Liberties Union. The court found inmates' were denied meaningful access t.o courts where
the law library at the facility lacked recent volumes of legal reference materials and was not
comprehensive, and because officials at times allowed library access on an ad hoc basis t.o
sentenced inmates only.
The court found that conditions in the criminal justice complex continued to violate the
Eighth Amendment, where the complex housed an average of 168-190 prisoners in a facility
designed 51 short-term detainees, five or six persons were often housed in a single cell, single
cells housed two or more prisoners, and prisoners slept on mattresses on the floor. Crowding
was so severe that prisoners sleeping on the floor often had t.o sleep with their heads against a
toilet, resulting in inmates urinating on one another during the night. The disrepair of
plumbing, heating, ventilation and showers effected the sanitation and health of inmates in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
According t.o the court, medical care was inadequate in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
where an on-site nurse and physician and two part-time nurses serviced 168 t.o 190 prisoners,
sick call was administered by prison security staff instead of medical staff, prisoners were not
seen promptly as needed, the facility did not maintain adequate equipment for emergencies,
personal hygiene items were not routinely distributed, intake health evaluations were
inadequate, and the facility failed t.o offer out.door access to all inmates.
The courted cited "abominable" treatment of mentally ill inmates at the facility. Mentally ill
inmates were housed t.ogether in clusters with often four or five inmates per cell, the majority of
inmate assaults occurred in the clusters, and correctional staff taunted mentally ill inmates,
rewarding them with cigarettes after instructing them t.o pull down their pants and hold their
crotch, or crawl across the floor. According t.o the court, when overcrowding and commingling of
mentally ill inmates with the general population contributes to inmate-to-inmate violence, the
failure t.o remedy the situation constitutes deliberate indifference t.o the inmates' basic safety
and security in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court held that a officials may not use
restraints on mentally ill inmates as matter of course, but may restrain them only under special
circumstances.
The court also cited the failure of officials t.o house inmates according t.o an objectively
based classification system and the failure t.o maintain separate housing for violent inmates.
(Criminal Justice Complex, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands)

MEDICAL CARE

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
CONDITIONS

Casaburro v. Giuliani, 986 F.Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A pretrial detainee alleged that he
was subjected t.o cruel and unusual punishment because he was handcuffed in a holding cell
for over 7 hours. According t.o the detainee, he was placed in a holding cage "that had no seats,
no water, poor ventilation." He had notified officers that he was under a chiropract.or's care for
back problems but was allegedly tightly handcuffed behind his back anyway. After he
complained he was re-handcuffed t.o a hook approximately 12 inches off of the floor. After
complaining about this he was allegedly cuffed t.o the front of the cell in a standing position.
The district court found that the detainee stated a § 1983 claim against
officers, the police department and the city. (City of New York)

32.52

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDERS
RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Cutshall v. Sundquist. 980 F.Supp. 928 (M.D.Tenn. 1997). A sex offender brought an
action which challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Sexual Offender
Registration and Monitoring Act. The district court found that the Act's requirement that
offenders register with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBO did not trigger protections
of procedural due process. But the court also held that the Act's discretionary disclosure
provisions violated due process. According to the court. the additional injury to a convicted sex
offender's reputation which would result from the disclosure of registry information to the
public under the provisions of the Act, coupled with the loss of rights to privacy and
employment, satisfied the "stigma plus" test and thus the offender deserved the protection of
procedural due process before law enforcement could disclose information about him to those
not involved with law enforcement. The court found that the state's interest in public safety did
not outweigh the offender's interest in not having false information disseminated. The Act
allowed dissemination of information from the registry without the control of anyone other than
local law enforcement and without an opportunity for a hearing. The court found that when a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what a government is
doing to him, notice and the opportunity to be heard are essential. (Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
TRANSFER

Dodson v. Reno. 958 F.Supp. 49 (D.Puerto Rico 1997). An inmate in a federal pretrial
detention facility brought a Bivens action against facility officials challenging his
proposed transfer to a segregated wing of a federal penitentiary which also housed
members of a gang that posed a threat to his life. The district court granted summary judgment
for the officials, finding that the proposed transfer did not violate the inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights and that the inmate was not entitled to an injunction preventing prison
officials from transferring him to any penitentiary in the United States. The court noted that
the proposed facility offered an unusually high level of security for inmates whose lives were
threatened by other inmates. making the transfer a reasonable measure designed to ensure the
inmate's safety. The court also held that denying the inmate physical access to a prison law
library did not deny him his right of access to courts. (Metropolitan Detention Ctr., Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
PRISONER ON
PRISONER ASSAULT
STAFFING
SUPERVISION

Earrey v. Chickasaw County. Miss., 965 F.Supp. 870 (N.D.Miss. 1997). An inmate
detained in a county jail as the result of an alleged parole violation sued the county
because he was beaten by other inmates while detained. The district court held that the
detained parolee could not avail himself of Fourteenth Amendment claims, but could
pursue a failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment. The court denied
summary judgment for the county, finding it was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
as to the existence of subjective knowledge of risk on the part of the jail and the sheriff. The
parolee and most other persons housed at the jail were allowed to leave the jail during the day
to work and returned in the evenings. According to jail policy, only one jailer was provided for
the facility, and he was required to be present at the jail twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week. The jailer was only allowed to leave the jail when deputy sheriffs were present at the
facility. Policy required the jailer to check on prisoners every hour during the day, but
nighttime checks were not made. The jailer could monitor inmates electronically in two ways:
an intercom, and an emergency switch available to inmates. The parolee alleged he was
severely beaten by other inmates, who prevented him from reaching the emergency switch.
(Chickasaw County Jail, Okolona, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416 (10th Cir. 1997). A motorist sued state highway patrol
officers alleging she was illegally detained and subjected to a strip search. The district
court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and the
officers and plaintiff appealed. The appeals court held that one of the troopers was not entitled
to qualified immunity for the strip search because undisputed facts known to the trooper did
not justify the strip search under clearly established law. The motorist had been arrested for
driving under the influence and tested neg~tive for alcohol on a breathalyzer. She was not
placed in the general population of a detention facility, had no opportunity to hide anything
.beneath her clothing after her vehicle was stopped. and a thorough pat-down search of her
lightweight summer clothing at the jail revealed no drugs. The county jail's policy of conducting
strip searches of all persons arrested on drug charges had been held unconstitutional by a
federal appeals court in 1993, but a jail officer testified that all persons arrested on drug
charges were subjected to strip searches. (Davis County Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Hahn v. City of Kenner. 984 F.Supp. 424 (E.D.La. 1997). An arrestee brought a § 1983
action against city officials in connection with his arrest and detention. The district court
held that a three hour and 12 minute delay before his telephone call, or a five hour and 32
minute delay between arrest and release in pre-dawn hours, were not unreasonable. (City of
Kenner, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Haslar v. Megerman. 104 F.3d 178 (8th Cir. 1997). A county detainee brought a§ 1983
action after a guard refused to loosen or remove shackles from his swollen leg while he
was being treated in an outside hospital. The district court dismissed the complaint and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that keeping the detainee shackled
while receiving treatment at an outside facility did not display indifference to the medical needs
of the detainee, nor did it constitute punishment in violation of the detainee's Fourteenth

32.53

Amendment rights. According to the court, the shackling was necessary to prevent the detainee
from overpowering the single guard who was watching him, and there were safeguards against

applying the shackles so as to cause pain and other medical problems. (Jackson County
Detention Center, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Heisler v. Kralik. 981 F.Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A pretrial detainee sued a county, the
county sheriffs department, the medical department of a correctional facility, and various
individual correctional officers, alleging deliberate indifference to his safety and medical needs.
The district court found that the detainee adequately stated a claim for municipal liability
under § 1983, and that the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee did
not depend on the seriousness of the injuries actually received in an assault. The court noted
that the detainee's constitutional right to be protected from a risk of harm from inmates was
clearly established at the time he was assaulted. The detainee was charged with sexual assault
of a minor and feared that he would be hanned by other prisoners when he was transferred to
another jail. The detainee claimed that he witnessed a telephone call by a police detective to the
receiving county's sheriffs department advising them that the detainee desired protective
custody. The detainee said he was told that the sending sheriff contacted the receiving sheriff to
advise him of the need for extra security. Six days after his transfer the detainee was assaulted
by another inmate and suffered contusions and swelling. The detainee alleged that officers
witnessed the actual assault but did nothing to stop it and that he was not given adequate pain
medication following the assault. (Rockland County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CEIL CAPACITY
CONDITIONS

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir. 1997). A sheriff moved to
terminate a 1979 consent decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (Pl.RA). The
decree arose from a class action challenging conditions of confinement. The district court
granted the sheriffs motion in part, but denied the Massachusetts Commission of Correction's
motion to vacate the decree. The appeals court held that PLRA did not violate the separation of
powers principle, the detainees· due process rights, or the detainees· equal protection rights. The
appeals court found that PLRA mandates the termination of extant consent decrees unless the
district court makes specific findings that are necessary to keep a particular decree alive. The
court also found that the district court was not required to conduct an inquiry into whether
violation of a federal right currently existed. or would come into existence, before it terminated
a consent decree governing confinement conditions for pretrial detainees. The district court
determined that double-bunking of the county jail's pretrial detainees did not violate the federal
rights of detainees, given that such conduct. in and of itself, was not a constitutional violation.
(Suffolk County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY
STAFFING
CONDITIONS
CROWDING
EXERCISE
PRIVACY
ACCESS TO COURT
SANITATION

Jones v. City and County of San Francisco. 976 F.Supp. 896 (N.D.Cal. 1997). Pretrial
detainees brought a class action against the City and County of San Francisco and various
city officials challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement at a jail.
The district court granted various summary judgment motions filed by the plaintiffs and
the defendants, enjoining future overcrowding based on past unconstitutional overcrowding.
The court found due process violations based on the defendants' inadequate response to fire
safety risks at the jail. excessive risks of harm from earthquakes, physical defects in the
jail's water, plumbing and sewage systems, excessive noise levels, and poor lighting. The
court held that the plaintiffs failed to show deliberate indifference or another basis for liability
on the claims of current overcrowding, inadequate food preparation and storage,
provision of medical services, personal visitation, hours and accessibility of legal visitation, legal
materials and assistance, and outdoor recreation. The court noted that pretrial detainees enjoy
the greater protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, rather
than the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
Conditions violated the pretrial detainees' due process rights where the jail operated at
about 124% of its capacity on average during a nine-month period, resulting in double-celling of
inmates in 41-square-foot cells designed for single occupancy, and causing excessive time in
cells and insufficient day room space when inmates were allowed to leave their cells.
The court found that officials were entitled to swnmary judgment precluding any finding of
deliberate indifference on crowding and space allocation claims because of their efforts to move
inmates from the jail to relieve overcrowding.
The court found that the detainees were not provided with reasonable safety from fire
because the defendants failed to install door assemblies or additional sprinklers and had not
responded reasonably to fire safety risks at the jail.
The detainees were exposed to excessive risks of harm from earthquakes in violation of
their due process rights, where the jail lay a quarter mile from the San Andreas fault and faced
a 50%, chance of experiencing a high magnitude earthquake over the next 50 years. The jail
appeared structurally unable to withstand substantial seismic activity and had a
malfunctioning bar locking system and inadequate staffing that further augmented risk by
potentially leaving inmates trapped in their cells during and after an earthquake. The court
rejected the government's contention that more than 30 public buildings in the area had the
same seismic rating as the jail. The court noted that the public's alleged tolerance of risk
associated with entering a poorly-constructed library or museum for an hour did not equate to
tolerance for spending 100 days continuously trapped in such a facility.

32.54

The court found deliberat.e indifference to the risk of earthquakes despit.e the defendants'
contention that it would cost more than $33 million to upgrade the jail and efforts to gain vot.er
approval for funding for a new facility had failed. The court not.ed that the city could have
attempted other funding methods and did have some funds allocated for seismic repairs but
diverted that money to other projects.
The court found due process violations resulting from physical defects in the jail's wat.er,
plumbing and sewage syst.em which creat.ed safety hazards. The jail's antiquat.ed wat.er supply
syst.em violated public health requirements and safe drinking wat.er codes. Det.eriorat.ed
sanitary fixtures such as unsealed floors, hot wat.er pipes with det.eriorat.ed asbestos insulation,
violated the detainees' rights as did sewage leaks from plumbing equipment. These conditions
violated detainees' rights even though there was no evidence of any disease resulting from the
deficiencies.
The court found that although conditions relating to food preparation and storage remained
inadequat.e, recent improvements including efforts to combat vermin infestation and allocating
$100,000 to replace a floor and make other repairs shielded the defendants from liability for
deliberat.e indifference.
The court found that questions of fact precluded summary judgment on the claims that the
jail's video conferencing syst.em did not permit confidential attorney-client discussions, and
whether a substantial number of inmat.es could easily utilize the syst.em. The court held that to
establish a constitutional violation for lack of privacy for attorney-client consultations, it was
enough that harm appeared imminent, to the extent that any inmat.e might be hesitant to
disclose names and information relevant to his or her attorney's investigation and necessary to
secure advice.
Despit.e some efforts to reduce noise in the jail, the detainees established a constitutional
violation in noise levels which ranged behyeen 73 and 96 decibels, exceeding acceptable levels,
and caused increased risk of psychological harm and safety concerns due to officers' inability to
hear calls for help. The extent to which noise continued to exceed maximum standards
suggested that previous noise reduction efforts were merely cosmetic and that far more could be
done.
The court found due process violations from poor lighting where correctional standards
mandated lighting of at least 20 foot-candles in living areas, and some health standards
required 30 foot-candles, but readings in the jail ranged from 0.28 to 5 foot-candles.
The court found that the detainees' rights were not violat.ed by the jail's outdoor recreation
conditions which were substantially improved by the defendants. Detainees were offered
approximat.ely six hours of outdoor exercise per year and the defendants had hired a recreation
coach to ensure safe and healthy exercise habits. Although clothing remained inadequat.e for
cold weather, the shortage of suitable garments typically did not prevent inmat.es from using
the yard.
The court concluded that development and implementation of a narrowly tailored remedial
plan was an appropriat.e remedy, and that the plan was to address each condition that was
found unconstitutional including fire safety, seismic safety, wat.er, plumbing, sewage, noise,
lighting and overcrowding. (San Francisco Jail No. 3, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Lancast.er v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1997). The administrator of
the estat.e of a pretrial detainee who died due to an injury sustained while in custody at
a county jail brought an action against the county, county commission, sheriff and jailers
alleging constitutional violations. The district court grant.ed summary judgment for the
defendants and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that the sheriff and jailers were not entitled to qualified
immunity on the claim of deliberat.e indifference, but that the jailers were stat.e officials and
were thus immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in their official capacities. The
appeals court held that the sheriff and jailers were immune under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from stat.e law claims brought against them in their individual capacities.
The detainee was a chronic alcoholic who, according the court, died in custody because the
sheriff and jailers delayed treatment despit.e their knowledge of his urgent medical condition.
The court found that the sheriffs and jailers' conduct amounted to deliberat.e indifference under
clearly established law at that time. The detainee was t.ested upon his admission to the jail,
where he registered blood alcohol cont.ents of .324 and .323. He was placed in the holding cell,
or the "drunk tank" as it was called, which was the normal practice for DUI detainees.
Relatives of the detainee informed jail officers and the sheriff that the detainee was a chronic
alcoholic who had been in the hospital recently with grand mal seizures. The relatives
repeat.edly att.empt.ed to secure treatment for the detainee, or to have him released to them so
that they could secure treatment. The detainees cellmat.es reported that no jail officers or
officials made any cell checks for several hours during the night. The following morning the
detainee was shaking, and he fell when he attempted to sit up. He fell backwards out of his
upper bunk and landed on his back on the floor where his head struck the floor and he began
bleeding from the mouth. According to the cellmat.es, it took at least t.en minut.es for anyone to
arrive at the cell after they called for help. When an officer did arrive, she did not ent.er the cell
to provide assistance because of a jail policy that prevented a jailer from ent.ering a cell without
a deputy being present. More than 30 minut.es after he fell from his bunk, the detainee was
transport.ed to the hospital by ambulance, where he lat.er died from an intracranial hemorrhage.
(Monroe County Jail, Alabama)
32.55

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Martinez v. Mathis, 970 F.Supp. 1047 (S.D.Ga. 1997). An arrestee who alleged he was
physically assaulted because a jailer encouraged other inmates to beat him brought a § 1983
claim against the jailer. The district court held that the arrestee established a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, but that the jailer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not
clearly established that prison officials violate the constitution when they make statements in
the presence of inmates that a particular inmate is "sick" and "should have his ass beat." The
arrestee was suspected of molesting a child and he was placed in a cell with other inmates. (Jeff
Davis County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88 (7th Cir. 1997). A detainee's mother brought a civil
rights action against jail personnel following the detainee's suicide while in custody. The
district court entered summary judgment for the personnel and the mother appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that personnel did not exhibit deliberate indifference to the
threat of suicide. The court noted that jail staff were concerned enough about the detainee's
strange behavior to have a paramedic speak with him, to have him evaluated psychologically,
and in deference to his fear that someone was trying to kill him, to place him in a single cell.
After a mental health specialist concluded that the detainee did not pose a threat to himself, he
was returned to the general jail population. The mother had alleged that the jail failed to
adequately staff the facility, and to adequately train its employees. A newly-hired officer was
responsible for supervising the 25 inmates on the non-aggressive protective custody tier on
which the detainee was housed. The officer, on his first day on the job, initially noticed the
detainee's strange behavior and alleges that he reported it to his supervisor. The officer
was hired less than a week earlier, and had just completed a four or five-day orientation. The
appeals court noted that while cadets like the officer may not have been trained in suicide
prevention, the jail maintained a psychiatric unit for that purpose. (Cook County Department of
Corrections. Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Morris v. City of Alvin, Tex.• 950 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.Tex. 1997). The representative of the
estate of an arrestee who died in jail from a drug overdose brought a § 1983 action
against the city. The district court dismissed the case, finding that allegations were
insufficient to establish the existence of a municipal policy with regard to detainees who
exhibited possible signs of a drug overdose. The court found that as a matter of law, the city's
policies neither deprived the arrestee of adequate medical assistance nor violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's required level of care. The court noted that the arrestee had already
taken the overdose at the time of her arrest, and that the city was not constitutionally required
to train jailers to recognize the ambiguous signs of a drug overdose. According to the court, the
city had provided prompt medical care on two occasions during the arrestee's brief one-day stay
at the jail, and the arrestee was immediately transferred to a hospital when she exhibited
physical symptoms of a serious medical problem. (Alvin City Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
VISITS

N.E.W. v. Kennard, 952 F.Supp. 714 (D.Utah 1997). Pretrial detainees and their children
brought a § 1983 action challenging a county jail policy restricting visitation by persons
younger than eight years of age, alleging violation of due process and equal protection. The
district court held that the restrictions did not violate due process or equal protection. The court
also held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney fees, despite the claim that their suit
was the catalyst for a change in visitation policy. The court noted that a policy in effect since
1992 was clarified by the county, allowing visits with children under eight years of age with the
permission of the jail command. (Salt Lake County Metro Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Nelson v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 1452 (M.D.Fla. 1997). The personal
representative of an inmate who died of an acute myocardial infarction while awaiting
trial in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county, county sheriff, the private
company that provided medical services to the jail, and individual nurses employed by the
company. The district court held that the sheriff was protected from individual liability under
the qualified immunity doctrine, but that the nurses were not entitled to raise a defense of
qualified immunity even though they were considered state actors under § 1983. The court held
that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the nurses were deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's medical needs and failed to provide treatment. According to the court, the nurses
delayed giving the inmate her prescription medication for her cardiac condition for 36 hours,
failed to verify her medications after she disclosed them to the screening nurse, failed to
examine the inmate when she complained of chest pains, and failed to call for an emergency
response team until the inmate had stopped breathing. The court held that reports of a court
appointed monitor regarding the pervasive failure of the private medical service company to
provide medical care to the inmates of the county jail, and the company's own internal
memoranda characterizing the attitude of the nurses at the jail as one of deliberate
indifference, were sufficient to establish a custom of violating inmates' constitutional rights to
medical treatment. (Pinellas County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS

Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3rd Cir. 1997). Inmates brought a class action suit
against a county prison and warden challenging the constitutionality of a program under
which the prison charged inmates a small fee ($5) when they sought certain types of
medical care. The district court entered a judgment in favor of the defendants and the

32.56

appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the program was not per se
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and did not violat.e the Eighth Amendment as
implement.ed. The court found that Spanish-speaking inmat.es did not receive deficient notice of
the program due to the absence of a written Spanish translation of the program description.
The program was explained in Spanish by officers and counselors to all Spanish-speaking
inmat.es during orientation, the prison always had a Spanish-speaking employee on duty, and
the medical department employed at least three nurses who were fluent in Spanish. The court
held that the program did not violat.e procedural due process as the result of providing for fee
deductions from an inmat.e's account even when the inmat.e did not sign an authorization form.
The inmates had alleged that the program charged higher fees than the stat.e Medicaid
program, but the court found that the fees charged under Medicaid did not represent the
maximum that could be constitutionally charged against a prisoner. According to the court, the
failure of the prison to define the t.erms "chronic" and "emergency" which described in the
inmat.e handbook conditions for which no fees would be assessed, did not make the program
unconstitutionally vague. The court found no violation of the inmat.es' right of access to courts
in response to the inmates' claim that the program reduced their funds available for legal mail
&l)d photocopying, where the inmates failed to establish actual or imminent interference with
their access to court. (Berks County Prison, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a police officer, alleging the use of excessive force during an interrogation
after his arrest. The district court grant.ed summary judgment for the officer and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, fmding that the Fourth Amendment did not extend
protection from excessive force to pretrial detainees, and that the alleged use of force did not
violate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the Fourth Amendment applies to the
initial decision to detain the accused, not to conditions of confmement after that decision has
been made. The court also held that the officer's alleged use of force did not violate due process
where any injury suffered by the detainee was de minimis. The court found that the detainee's
encounter with police officers did not amount to "interrogation" within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment because officers did not directly question the detainee and their other conduct
(exchanging insults with the detainee and requesting that the detainee sign a waiver form for
genetic testing) was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The detainee
alleged that the officer used handcuffs, inserted the tip of a pen into the detainee's nose,
threatened the detainee and slapped the detainee across the face. (Henrico County Public
Safety Building, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Santiago v. Semenza, 965 F.Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A pretrial detainee brought an
action claiming excessive force against a Unit.ed States marshal who struggled with the
detainee during a commotion in a holding cell area. The district court granted summary
judgement for the marshal, fmding that the marshal was not liable for the alleged use of
excessive force and had qualified immunity. The court found that the marshal's actions were
necessary to secure the detainee, safeguard other marshals, and restore security to the holding
cell area. According to the court, there was no indication that the marshal's actions, which may
have been the cause of the detainee's bruise or scratch, were disproportionat.e to the situation.
(Holding Cell Area, United States Courthouse, Southern District of New York)

U.S. District Court

Schreter v. Bednosky, 963 F.Supp. 216 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). A former pretrial detainee filed
a prose§ 1983 action against the warden of a county facility and the county, alleging
violation of his due process rights. The district court found that the pretrial detainee did not
experience a sufficient delay in medical treatment for a kidney stone to support his claim of
violation of due process based on a county policy requiring transportation to a hospital by
sheriff's deputies rather than by on-site corrections officers. The court noted that the detainee
was moved from his cell to the medical unit, examined, and transferred to a hospital, all within
35 to 45 minutes of informing county personnel about his condition. (Suffolk County
Correctional Facility, New York)

MEDICAL CARE

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
STAFFING

Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997). A pretrial detainee who alleged she was
sexually assault.ed by a correctional officer brought a § 1983 action against a city and its
police chief. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, but the
appeals court remanded. the case on the claim of inadequate staffing. On remand, the district
court again entered summary judgment for the defendants and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court vacat.ed and remanded. On rehearing en bane, the court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the detainee met the burden or establishing a constitutional violation but that the
city's failure to adopt a policy of adding jail staff did not constitute deliberate indifference.
According to the majority of the appeals court, there was no showing that the city had actual
knowledge that its staffing policy creat.ed a substantial risk of harm to female detainees. As a
condition of employment, jailers underwent background investigations, medical examinations
and polygraph tests, none of which revealed any concerns about the jailer who allegedly
sexually assaulted the detainee. The majority not.ed that the jailer had been a commissioned
police officer for four years prior to his employment with the jail, without incident, and that he
had been trained in the official policies of jail management by experienced jailers. The detainee
had been arrested for public intoxication, assault and resisting arrest, and was taken to a city

32.57

jail, processed by a female jailer who was on duty at the time, and placed in a holding cell
pending arraignment. A male jailer subsequently replaced the female officer, entered the
detainee's cell, and sexually assaulted her repeatedly during the course of his eight-hour shift.
The jailer resigned and pleaded guilty to criminal charges. The majority of the appeals court
rejected the detainee's argument that constitutionally adequate staffing would have included, at
a minimum, a female jail officer, or at least two male officers, whenever a female pretrial
detainee is in custody. The majority noi:ed that the jail is located on the first floor of the police
department, in the patrol division area, and a patrol duty sergeant periodically checks on jail
personnel. However, four appeals judges disseni:ed, suggesting that the city's policy of
inadequate staffing enabled the harm to be committed and actually facilitated the sexual
assault. While the majority asseri:ed that the assault was episodic--by definition incidental or
occasional, rather than regular and systematic. The minority argued that the long established
custom of inadequate staffing was far from episodic, and that the city only offered financial
justifications for its staffing policy. In the dissenting opinion, the judges stated they were
unwilling to "classify the issues in this case as 'minutia.'" (City of Killeen Police Department,
Texas)
U.S. District Court
JUVENILES

Thompson v. City of Galveston, 979 F.Supp. 504 (S.D.Tex. 1997). A mother on her own
behalf and on behalf of her minor son, brought a civil rights action challenging her arrest
and the taking into custody of her son. The district court dismissed with prejudice her claims
for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. According to the court, because
the mother pled nolo contendere to the charges surrounding her arrest, imprisonment and
prosecution, she was barred from bringing any claims relating to her conviction unless she
could prove that the conviction or seni:ence had been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
direct order, or otherwise declared invalid. The court found that her false arrest claim in
connection with taking her minor son into custody had failed because his mother was arrested
for contributing to the delinquency of another child and where the child was not arrested and
the officers were authorized to take the child into custody. Police had arrested the mother on an
arrest warrant on the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. When she was
arrested, her 10-year-old son was taken into custody at the same time and taken to a juvenile
detention center. (Galveston Police Department)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
LAW LIBRARIES

U.S. v. Beckwith, 987 F.Supp. 1345 (D.Utah 1997). An indigent defendant who was detained
prior to trial on bank robbery charges elected to proceed pro se. The district court held that
the defendant was entitled to access to a satellite law library in the federal courthouse, with
his hands free, for two hours per day for five consecutive days, and for two hours per day
three days a week thereafter. The court noted that no special security problems regarding the
inmate's hands had been shown, notwithstanding the contention that the inmate was a martial
arts expert. The court also held that the detainee must be afforded unlimited mail access to
court, standby counsel, and prosecution, unless he abused that privilege. (Salt Lake County
Jail, Utah)

MAIL

U.S. District Court
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. Jones, 980 F.Supp. 359 (D.Kan. 1997). The government sought a review of a
magistrai:e judge's order releasing a defendant on bond pending trial. The district court
held that the detention of the defendant pending trial was appropriate under the criteria set
forth in the Bail Reform Act because the defendant had a prior conviction for solicitation to
commit murder, had a history of violence and a history of narcotics related arrests, and the
weight of evidence against the defendant was substantial. (U.S. District Court, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Wray, 980 F.Supp. 534 (D.D.C. 1997). The government moved to detain a
defendant prior to trial and the district court grani:ed the motion. The court found that
there was clear and convincing evidence that supported detention, including the
defendant's criminal history and his committing crimes while on parole for violent offenses.
(U.S. District Court, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK

Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202 (11th Cir. 1997). A pretrial detainee who was
allegedly required by correction officials to perform translation services for other
inma1:es, medical personnel, and court personnel, filed suit in federal court. The detainee
alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and violation of his civil rights
because he was not paid for his services. The district court dismissed the claim and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee was not an "employee" within
the meaning of FLSA and that the detainee's forced performance of translation services was not
cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the four-factor standard for determining
whether labor falls within the Fair Labor Standards Act does not apply in the prison context,
but that a broader approach is applied to inmate labor, focusing on the economic situation as a
whole. The court noted that although there was no question that the sheriffs intent in
requesting that the detainee perform translation services was punitive in nature, the cerebral
task of language translation posed no risk to the detainee's safety or welfare, and presumably
the performance of the services served to occupy the detainee's time, keep him out of trouble,
and allow him interaction with others. (Gadsden County Correctional Facility, Florida)

32.58

1998
U.S. District Court
USEOFFOROE
SEARCHES

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

U.S. District Court
USEOFFOROE

MEDICAL CARE

Adewale v. Whalen, 21 F .Supp.2d 1006 (D.Minn. 1998). An arrestee sued a police
officer and the city that employed him under federal civil rights laws and state tort
claims. The district court found that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity
from liability for his decision to jail the arrestee, but found that genuine issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment on the grounds of official immunity on
allegations of assault, battery and false imprisonment. The court held that the officer's
decision to detain the arrestee for a misdemeanor did not violate her federal rights and was
objectively reasonable, given the arrestee's admission that she .had been drinking and
intended to drive. The court held that the arrestee failed to show that the city improperly
trained its officers to arrest noncooperative persons for obstruction of legal process, based
only on the decision of a deputy director of police that it was proper to arrest someone for
refusing to open a security door for the police. The arrestee suffered a broken arm which she
alleged was the result of excessive force used by the officer during a pat-down search. (City
of Richfield Police Department, Minnesota)
Boyer v. City of Mansfield. 3 F.Supp.2d 843 (N.D.Ohio 1998). An arrestee brought§
1983 claims against a police oftlcer, corrections officer and city who allegedly used
excessive force and failed to provide medical care. The district court grant.ed summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the city was not liable for a custom or
policy of using excessive force or for not properly investigating, supervising, training or
disciplining its officials. The city's police officers had reviewed the policy on use of force
regularly, the night watch rnroroander placed a hold on the videotape of the incident and
issued a personal complaint against the police officer who allegedly used excessive force. The
city's &afety service director eventually fired the officer for his actions, and the city saw to it
that the officer was charged and convicted on a misdemeanor assault charge. The court held
that the corrections officer was entitled to qualified immunity, where he helped the police
officer restrain the arrest.ee by holding the arrestee's legs and carrying the arrestee to a
padded cell. The corrections officer said that he entered the booking room and found the
arrestee kicking away at the police officer who was the only officer in the room, and the
corrections officer denied that be saw the police officer mistreating the arrestee until be
subsequently viewed the video tape of the booking. (Mansfield Police Department and City
Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION

Canell v" Ughtner, 143 F .3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1998). A pretrial detainee brought a§
1983 action against a correctional officer, sheriff and county detention center
alleging violation of his First Amendment rights arising from the officer's alleged
proselytizing activities. The district court grant.ed summary judgment for the defendants
and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the sheriff was not liable under
the theory of failure to train. According to the court, the officer's actions did not violate the
First Amendment's establishment clause absent evidence of endorsement by government.
The court concluded that the officer's activities did not impermissibly interfere with the
detainee's free exercise of religion. The detainee alleged that the officer had brought
Christian literature to work, engaged in mock-preaching, and belittled other religions. The
officer was a licensed minister of the Church of God. (Multnomah County Detention Center,
Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court

Collignon v. Milwaukee County. 163 F .3d 982 (7th Cir. 1998). An arrestee's parents
and estate sued county and village officials after the arrestee, who had a mental
illness and some criminal history, committed suicide after he was released on bail.
The district court grantedjudgment on pleadings for the village and grant.ed summary
judgment for the county defendants. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the treatment
of the arrestee by a county psychiatrist while he was in pretrial detention did not violate
substantive due process. The court also found that neither the police officers' failure to
commence emergency detention proceedings, nor their return of the arrestee to his parents,
amounted to a substantive due process violation. The court held that due process was not
violated by the alleged refusal of a police officer to provide the arrestee with access to
medical personnel capable of assessing the arrestee's condition. The appeals court held that
the treatment of the arrestee by a county psychiatrist did not violate the arrest.ee's
substantive due process rights because the psychiatrist exercised professional judgment in
the face o!tbe known serious medical needs of the arrestee. The psychiatrist, who was
principally responsible for deciding the course of the arrestee's treatment at the jail,
prescribed a nontherapeutic dosage of an antipsychotic drug with the intention of forming a
"therapeutic alliance" with the arrestee, planning to slowly increase the dosage so that the
arrestee could gradually overcome his aversion to side effects. The arrestee was able to lead
a productive life while on bis prescribed medication to treat his schizophrenia, but he
stopped taking his medication and was arrest.ed for damaging property and placed in a
county jail for 17 days. He was released on bail to his parents, and shortly thereafter was
temporarily detained by village police officers, who also released him to his parents. The
next day be committed suicide. (Shorewood Police Department and Milwaukee County,
W"JSCOnsin)

SUICIDE

MEDICAL CARE
RELEASE

32.59

U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
CELL CAPACITY
EXERCISE
SANITATION
CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT

Craig v. Eberly, 164 F .3d 490 (10th Cir. 1998). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a sheriff in his individual capacity, and a county, alleging he was
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement while he was confined in the
jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that summary
judgment for the sheriff was precluded by the nature, seriousness and duration of
the alleged deprivations. The detainee alleged that he was placed in a cell that measured
eleven by fifteen feet with five or six other men for 24-hours a day, that his bed linens were
never cleaned nor exchanged, that he was permitted only two showers a week in an
unsanitary shower stall, that the sink in his cell frequently clogged and prevented his basic
hygiene, that his cell had poor ventilation, and that he was allowed out of his cell for
recreation only two times during his confinement. The parties disagreed on the length of the
detainee's confinement, which the court found to be between two-and-one-half months and
six months. (Otero County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
HOME DETENTION

Cucciniello v. Keller, 137 F.3d 721 (2nd Cir. 1998). A federal prisoner brought a habeas
corpus petition seeking credit against his sentence for time spent in home confinement. The
prisoner claimed he was not informed, when he accepted bail release, that his time spend in
home confinement as a condition of release would not be credited against his sentence. The
district court dismissed the petition and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that statutes did not entitle the prisoner to credit for time spent in home confinement and
that the absence of notice to the prisoner was not a due process violation. (Fed. Bur. Pris.)

u.s. Appeals Court

Davis Y: Brady, 143 F .3d 1021 (6th Cir. 1998). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action
against police officers who allegedly left him in an inebriated condition on a dark,
unfamiliar highway where he was subsequently hit by an automobile. The district
court denied summary judgment for the officers and the appeals court affirmed and
remanded. The appeals court held that the officers had a duty to not place the arrestee in
danger once he had been in custody, and that the arrestee's right not to be abandoned by
police was clearly established at the time of this incident. According to the court, once the
police officers took the affU'IIlative act of restraining the arrestee's freedom to act on his own
behalf by taking him into custody, the officers imposed on themselves the duty to ensure
that they were not placing the arrestee in danger, and that duty existed even after the
arrestee was released from custody. The arrestee had been arrested for intoxication and
disorderly conduct and was taken to a police station and subsequently transferred to a
county jail, but the jail was full. The desk sergeant instructed the officers to release the
arrestee "at the county jail ifhe was not so drunk that he would be a hazard to himself." The
officers then drove the arrestee to a road just outside the city limits and released him in an
area with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit with few street lights and no sidewalks. The
officers alleged that the arrestee requested this release site but the arrestee denied this.
About seven minutes after he was released by the officers, the arrestee was struck by a car,
sustaining serious permanent injuries, resulting in the amputation of one of his legs. (Flint
Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILE
PROTECTION
CLASSIFICATION
CONDITIONS

Doe By and Through Doe v~ Washington County, 150 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998). A
juvenile brought a § 1983 action against a county and a sheriff alleging that he was
beaten, raped and tortured by other pretrial detainees when he was detained in the
county jail. The district court jury awarded $8,000 in compensatory damages to the
juvenile and the district court awarded $34,824 in attorney fees. The juvenile
alleged that rough-housing among the five juvenile prisoners in a 200-square-foot holding
cell turned dangerous and he asked to be moved to a different cell. He was moved for a few
hours, but he was taken back to the holding cell by another guard who told the other
occupants that the juvenile was a "snitch" and they should "handle it." Over the following
five days the juvenile was subjected to unrelenting abuse, torture and humiliation. The
county appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that there was
sufficient evidence that county policies regarding the housing of juveniles, resulting in
overcrowding, caused violations of the juvenile's constitutional rights to support the
imposition of liability. The sheriff had acknowledged the dangers of housing five juveniles
together in a 200-square-foot holding cell for months at a time. The appeals court found that
a jury verdict that found that the sheriff was not liable in his official capacity did not
exonerate the county by implication. The court suggested that the jury might have had a
mistaken belief that the sheriff was a defendant in his individual capacity, and did not find
that the county should "reap any benefit" from this inconsistency. The appeals court decided
that the juvenile was not a "prisoner" at the time he filed suit and therefore the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not apply to his case so as to limit an award of attorneys'
fees. (Washington County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
FALSE ARREST
SEARCH

Duffy v. County of Bucks, 7 F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D.Pa. 1998). An individual who had
been arrested and detained over a weekend brought a § 1983 action against the
probation officer who had sought the warrant under which he was arrested, and
various county officials. The district court held that the arrest and detention of the
probationer pursuant to a facially valid warrant did not violate his substantive due

PROTECTION
RELEASE

32.60

process rights, even though the individual had informed officials that the warrant was
actually for a different person who had the same name. The court found that the officials did
not have a duty to take every step to eliminate the possibility that they were holding an
innocent person, and that they had no authority to ignore a bench warrant. The court also
held that the individual's detention over a weekend did not violate his procedural due
process rights. The court found that although the probationer failed to allege that strip
searches to which he was subjected had been performed pursuant to a pattern or practice,
his allegations regarding strip searches were sufficient to state a due process claim against
officers of the facility. The individual was subjected to strip searches at least once daily for
no apparent reason, even though he had no access to contraband or visitors. The court held
that the probation otr1cer was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable
probation officer could not have believed that his actions did not violate the individual's
substantive due process rights. (Bucks County, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
SillCIDE

Ellis v. Washington County, Tenn., 80 F.Supp.2d 791 (E.D.Tenn. 1998). The mother and the minor
child of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide while confined brought a § 1983 wrongful death
action against a city, county and jail officers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of all but one of the defendants, finding that they were not liable for failing to take special
precautions and to screen the detainee for suicidal tendencies in violation of his constitutional
rights because the detainee did not exhibit a strong likelihood that he would attempt to take his
own life. But the court denied summary judgment for a jail officer who allegedly failed to make
other officers aware that he had seen the detainee initiate his hanging until ten minutes later.
(Washington County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Farabee v. Rider, 995 F .Supp. 1398 (M.D.Fla. 1998). An arrestee sued a county sheriff
and deputies alleging negligence and malicious prosecution. The district court found that
the sheriff owed a duty to protect the arrestee from the risk of use of excessive force created
by his alleged failure to train and supervise deputies. The court held that the sheriff was not
entitled to qualified immunity. The arrestee was pushed to the ground and handcuffed while
a deputy put his knee in her back. She was transported to the county jail where she was
incarcerated for at least 12 hours and she was suffering from back and arm injuries inflicted
by the deputy while confmed. (Glades County Jail, Florida)

u .s. District Court

Faulcon v. City of Philadelphia, 18 F.Supp.2d 537 (E.D.Pa. 1998). A pretrial
detainee who had been stabbed by another inmate sued city officials and
correction officers alleging failure to protect, failure to supervise and failure to train under
the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants,
fmding that the facility's policy of keeping pretrial detainees in the same housing unit as
convicted inmates did not constitute deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm.
The court also held that the lack of guidelines or training procedures regarding segregation
of convicted inmates was insufficient to support claims for failure to supervise or failure to
train. According to the court, a state statutory provision that indicated that sentenced
prisoners should be housed separately from detainees was merely a recommended guideline
rather than a mandatory requirement. (Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Foote v. Spiegel, 995 F .Supp. 1347 (D.Utah 1998). A detainee sued state and county
officials alleging violation of her rights because she was strip searched. The district court
denied summary judgment for the arresting officers and the case was atru-med in part,
reversed in part, and dismissed in part on appeal. On remand, the district court held that
there was not reasonable suspicion to strip search the detainee after a pat down search did
not reveal contraband and the detainee was not being placed in the general jail population.
The court found that suspicion that the detainee was under the influence of drugs or alcohol
did not provide adequate justification for the search. The court found the county liable for
failing to promulgate an adequate strip search policy that included reasonable suspicion of
concealed contraband that would not be discovered through a rub search as a prerequisite to
the strip search ofa detainee who is not entering the generaljail population. The court
noted that flaws in the jail policy were known for a year prior to this incident and the
county's refusal to change the policy exhibited deliberate indifference to the likelihood of
future violations. (Davis County Jail, Utah)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
HANDICAP
CLASSIFICATION
MEDICAL CARE

Frost!:~ 152 F .Sd 1124 (9th Cir. 1998). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983
suit against a sheriff, corrections officers and others alleging that he was subjected
to unconstitutional conditions because of his disability. The district court entered
judgment for the officers and the detainee appealed. The appeals court atru-med in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that, as a matter of
first impression, denial of adequate handicapped-accessible shower facilities to the detainee
who wore a leg cast and relied on crutches could support a § 1983 claim. The appeals court
held that the detainee failed to establish a § 1983 claim that the method utilized to deliver
food posed a significant safety risk to him, alleging that he slipped several times as he
attempted to carry his food tray while balancing himself on crutches. The detainee never
informed the otr1cers that he was having trouble with his food tray because he relied on

FAILURETO
PROTECT

32.61

crutches, and the risk of having to carry his food tray while using crutches was not,
according to the court, obvious enough to infer a subjective awareness of a substantial risk
of harm. The appeals court held that the detainee failed to establish a§ 1983 claim that he
was improperly classified as a close custody inmate, absent any showing that the jail's
classification system was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
The appeals court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the
detainee was administered a psychotropic drug without proper procedural safeguards. The
detainee alleged that he was tricked into taking amitriptyline by a nurse who told him that it
was a pain medication. He asserted that he would not have taken the medication if he had
know that it had "antipsychotic" effects.
According to the appeals court, the detainee failed to establish a§ 1983 claim based on
his contention that he was denied the opportunity to participate in outdoor recreation
because evidence indicated that he was denied recreation only once because officials
misunderstood a note in his file. The court found that an accidental, one-time denial of
recreation could not support a constitutional claim.
The appeals court held that the detainee failed to establish a § 1983 due process claim
based on alleged delays in the administration of his pain medication, treating his broken
nose, and providing him with a replacement crutch. The court found that while the jail
officials may have acted negligently, the detainee did not establish that they acted with
deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (Madison Street Jail, Maricopa County,
Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE
PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY

Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 1998). A detainee who was questioned
by police and then involuntarily committed to a detoxification facility overnight
filed a § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations. The district court entered
judgment in favor of the defendants on a jury verdict and the appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that a private non-profit firm that
provided involuntary detoxification services did not enjoy qualified immunity from § 1983
liability. The court found that the private firm was not a private individual that was briefly
deputized to assist government actors, in light of its nature as a company that was organized
to assume a major lengthy administrative task. The appeals court also held that
confinement for six hours overnight was not too short, as a matter of law, to trigger a due
process right to communicate with someone outside the facility. But the court found that a
facility can control the manner and timing of a telephone call from a detainee, so that it
comports with reasonable institutional requirements. The court found that the detainee was
given sufficient notice or opportunity to demonstrate sobriety to satisfy due process, where
testimony indicated that he was told why he was at the facility and that he was observed for
indications of drunkenness or sobriety. (Central City Concern, and City of Portland, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE
BAIL
PRIVACY
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act

Hanson v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept., 991 F.Supp. 1059 (C.D.Ill.1998). An
arrestee who was deaf alleged failure to provide him with an adequate means of
communication in his suit against a county, a sheriff and a sheriff's department. The
district court held that the arrestee stated a claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, and that he stated a § 1983 claim
against the sheriff. The arrestee alleged that he was denied, due to his disability, the
opportunity to post bond and make a telephone call when the department failed to provide,
despite his repeated requests, alternatives to a conventional telephone such as an
interpreter or a text telephone device (TTD). The arrestee alleged that the sheriff
maintained an express policy of forbidding officers from allowing deaf arrestees to use a
TTD which was stored in an office. The court denied qualified immunity for the sheriff,
noting that while there may have been a lack of caselaw directly on the point, the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act had been enacted several years prior to the arrest, and at least two
Courts of Appeal had held that the Rehabilitation Act was applicable to prisons and
prisoners. The plaintiff was arrested and informed officers that he was deaf. The officers did
not attempt to communicate with him, but rather placed him in a police van with eight to
ten other arrestees and transported him to a local jail. Throughout the night the arrestee
attempted to notify the officers of his need for alternative assistance in contacting his
friends and/or relatives, to no avail. He was eventually assisted in making a telephone call by
an officer and made arrangements to be released on bail, several hours after all of the others
who were arrested at the same time had been released. (Sangamon County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Higgins v. Correctional Medical Services of Ill.• 8 F.Supp.2d 821 (N .D.Ill. 1998). A
pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against medical personnel and a correctional
medical provider for allegedly denying him his constitutional right to medical care. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that
medical personnel's failure to order x-rays of the inmate's shoulder based on the inmate's
claim that it was dislocated was an exercise of medical judgment and did not amount to
deliberate indifference. The court found that evidence was insufficient to establish that
medical personnel strongly suspected that the inmate's shoulder was dislocated. The court
also found that the inmate failed to establish that the correctional medical service provider
had conspired to deny medical treatment to inmates who were soon to be transferred. The
court noted that the provider was contractually obligated to provide inmates with medical

32.62

care mandated by the Eighth Amendment and therefore could be held liable for
constitutional violations under§ 1983. (Kane County Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Jones v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, 4 F.Supp.2d 606 (E.D.La. 1998). A pretrial
detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff, warden, captain and parish based on
alleged failure to provide adequate medical care. The district court found that the captain,
sheriff and warden could not be held individually liable for the alleged unconstitutional
conduct and that the parish could not be held liable for alleged constitutional deprivations
related to the management of the jail. But the court found that genuine issues of fact
precluded summary judgment for the sheriff in his oftlcial capacity, as to whether the sheriff
had a policy or practice of maintaining an inadequate number of wheelchairs at the jail and
whether any such practice was reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose. At
the time of his arrest, the 57-year-old detainee was disabled due to a prior injury to his back.
He was assigned to the top bunk in his dorm, which had no ladder. Fourteen days after his
arrest the detainee fell from the top bunk and sustained several serious injuries, including a
fractured leg in three places, a partially severed fmger, broken ribs and a concussion. He was
placed in a full leg cast up to his hip and an arm cast. A week after he returned to the jail
from the hospital, he suffered another fall when his crutches slipped out from under him.
The detainee claimed that offi~ials ignored his repeated requests to be assigned a lower
bunk, and his repeated requests for a wheelchair because he could not walk safely on
crutches due to his arm and rib injuries. (St. Tammany Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Liebe v. Norton. 157 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998). Adetainee's wife and the administrator of his
estate sued a county, sheriffandjailer for damages under§ 1983, after the detainee
committed suicide while incarcerated in a county jail. The district court dismissed the case
and the appeals court affirmed, fmding that the jailer who classified the detainee as a suicide
risk, took preventive measures by placing the detainee in a temporary holding cell and
removing his shoes and belt, and periodically checked on the detainee, did not act with
deliberate indifference to the detainee's health or safety. The court found the jailer was
entitled to qualified immunity because the steps taken by the jailer were affirmative,
deliberate steps to prevent suicide. The court held that the county could not he held liable on
a§ 1983 claim of failure to supervise, based on the on-the-job training received by the jailer,
the county's failure to test the jailer on his knowledge of a manual outlining suicide
prevention policies, and the county's decision to leave the jailer in charge. The appeals court
found that this did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The court also found that
the county was not liable for failing to train jailers on the risks of inmate suicides, when the
county had in place policies intended to prevent suicides and no suicides had occurred at the
jail before the detainee's. The court found that failing to lead the jailer, step by step, through
policies in the manual did not amount to failure to train. The detainee had been arrested
and taken to the jail and was intoxicated at the time of his admission. The admitting jail
officer classified the detainee as a "suicide risk" because he admitted to previously
attempting suicide and was on both clonazepam and valiwn. The officer checked on the
detainee at intervals ranging from 7 minutes to 21 minutes, but did not turn on the audio
system in the holding cell. The detainee used his long-sleeved shirt to hang himself on a
metal-framed electrical conduit in the cell. The jailer was the only staff member on duty at
the time. Before being assigned to work by himself he was given on-the-job training for 2½
weeks. The jailer was scheduled to attend a jailer training course but it was not offered for
another month. At the time of the suicide the jailer had worked full-time for approximately
two months. (Fall River County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
RELEASE

Love v. Ficano, 19 F.Supp.2d 754 (E.D.Mich. 1998). A murder defendant who was
confmed in a county jail pending the prosecution's appeal of a grant for a new trial,
petitioned for habeas corpus relief, challenging the revocation of his bond by a state
court of appeals. The district court granted relief, fmding that the defendant was effectively
a pretrial detainee for the purposes of entitlement to release pending appeal, and that
defendant had a protected liberty interest in remaining at liberty on a bond granted by the
trial court. (Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ludlam v. Coffee County, 993 F.Supp. 1421 (M.D.Ala. 1998). A pretrial detainee and her
minor child brought a civil rights action against a sheriff and a county alleging
constitutional violations arising from alleged failure to provide her with adequate medical
treatment during her incarceration. The detainee was pregnant during her detention. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, fmding that the detainee failed
to establish the sheriff's supervisory liability for alleged indifference to her medical needs.
According to the court, the sheriff was not shown to have been personally involved in the
alleged deprivation of treatment for the detainee, the county jail's policy was to provide
access to appropriate treatment for all inmates, and the sheriff never received a request
from the detainee regarding medical attention and knew of no inmate who had ever been
denied medical treatment. The court held that the county was not liable because, under
Alabama law, the county had no role in operating, administering or overseeing the local jail,
nor had the county ever received any notice that the detainee was denied medical treatment.
The detainee alleged that the county failed to provide adequate treatment for her during her

32.63

confinement, including failure to take her to an obstetrician/gynecologist as recommended
by the jail physician. The detainee alleged that as the result of the county's inadequate
treatment, her daughter, who was born four months after her release, experienced
diminished weight, limited development, and excessive medical problems. (Coffee County
Jail, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Magill v. Lee County, 990 F.Supp. 1382 (M.D.Ala. 1998). Pretrial detainees filed a civil
rights action challenging a county's policy of conducting limited strip searches before
detainees are placed in cells. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
county, finding that the policy was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
According to the court, no heightened suspicion was necessary before jail officials could
conduct limited strip searches because the dangers posed by the detainees to the jail were as
high for one inmate as for another, no matter what crimes those inmates were charged with.
The policy required removal of outer clothing only, and was found reasonable by the court
given that small objects, such as pills, needles, or other contraband, could pose difficult and
dangerous situations for jail administrators. The court noted that the searches were
conducted by officers of the same sex as the detainee, and that pat-down searches or use of a
metal detector would not find drugs or small objects. (Lee County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1998). A defendant who was
arrested in Mexico at the request of a U.S. police department sued a city and police
officials. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the
appeals court affl.rmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that
material fact issues precluded summary judgment on the plaintiffs false imprisonment and
negligence claims based on his prolonged detention. The court held that under California
law, a jailer and the public entity that employs a jailer may be liable for false imprisonment if
the jailer knows that imprisonment is unlawful or if there is some notice sufficient to put
him, as a reasonable man, under a duty to investigate the validity of incarceration. Los
Angeles police had asked Mexican authorities to arrest a murder suspect. The plaintiff was
arrested, but was innocent and was nevertheless held in a Mexican prison for 59 days. Ten
days after his arrest and detention, the plaintiffs lawyer sent a letter to a Los Angeles
detective telling him that the Mexican authorities had arrested the wrong man, providing
information that challenged the validity of the arrest, but the two witnesses to the Los
Angeles murder were never given the opportunity to identify the plaintiff at the prison or to
view a picture of him. The plaintiff was eventually released when the true suspect was
identified. (Los Angeles Police Department)

U.S. District Court
USEOFFORCE

McClanahan v. City of Moberly, 35 F.Supp.2d 744 (E.D.Mo. 1998). A pretrial
detainee alleged that she was the victim of excessive force used in connection with
her transfer from a police department to a county jail. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, finding that the detainee's allegations of being slapped three
times, without any evidence of any resulting injury. was at most a de minimis injury that did
not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Moberly Police
Department and Shelby County, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

McNally v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 28 F.Supp.2d 671 (D.Me. 1998). A pretrial
detainee sued a county jail and its private health care provider alleging that his
constitutional rights and his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) were
violated by the denial of his human immuno-deficiency virus (HIV) medication. The district
court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently
plead a § 1983 claim that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. The court found that the detainee suffered significant harm from the jail's failure to
provide care, noting that he suffered from fevers. night sweats, and infections from cuts
received from his arresting officers. The detainee was arrested by a local police department
and was injured by the arresting officers, suffering blackened eyes and cuts on his nose. The
local police took him to a hospital for treatment before taking him to the county jail. Upon
admission to the jail, the detainee told employees of the private health care provider that he
had been diagnosed with HIV and was on a strict regime of medication. He identified the
medication and the dosage, and told medical personnel that he had missed a dosage due to
his arrest and needed one at that time. Although the detainee's private physician confirmed
his medication and dosage, he was denied his medication throughout his three-day stay at
the jail. He was hospitalized immediately after his release for several days as the result of
being deprived of his medication. (Cumberland County Jail, Maine, and Prison Health
Services, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F.Supp.2d 128 (E.D.N .Y. 1998). An arrestee sued a county,
arresting officer and jail officials under § 1983 alleging false arrest and false
imprisonment. The district court granted judgment as a matter oflaw in favor of
the defendants at the close of the arrestee's case. The court found that the jail
officials' decision to condition the release of this arrestee on his agreement to stay away
from his residence for 24 hours was reasonable and did not give. rise to a false arrest claim.
The court also found that the county's "pro-arrest" policy relating to domestic disputes did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Suffolk County Police Department, New York)
32.64

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
PRIVACY
USEOFFORCE

Moore v. Hosier. 43 F.Supp.2d 978 (N.DJnd. 1998). A former pretrial detainee sued a county
sheriff's department and individual law enforcement officers alleging civil rights violations
arising out of his treatment while he was being held in county confinement. The district court
held that the restraint of the detainee by officers for the purposes of decontaminating him
after a pepper spray cannister malfunctioned did not amount to assault and battery under
state law. The detainee alleged that officers strapped him to a chair with his arms tied
behind his back and beat him about his face and body, and placed his face and mouth in front
of a shower. The court held that even if these allegations were true, they did not amount to
an invasion of privacy under Indiana law. The court denied summary judgment for officers
who did not participate in the beating of the detainee but witnessed it and had the
opportunity to stop it. The court held that the sheriff's department did not negligently train
its employees in the use of force, where the department had developed and maintained
detailed procedures for training incoming officers in handling inmates, and the department
policy specifically stated that officers were expected to use force only in a lawful and
justifiable manner. The detainee admitted that he was intoxicated when officers arrived at
the scene and that he fled on foot when they arrived. The detainee was involved with
altercations with officers at a detention center, and was strapped into a restraining chair
and was sprayed with pepper spray. (Allen County Confinement Center, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
USEOFFORCE

Moore v. Nov~ 146 F .Sd 531 (8th Cir. 1998). An arrestee brought a civil rights
action against correctional officers under § 1983, alleging the use of excessive force
and violations of equal protection and due process. The district court entered judgment for
the oftlcers and the appeals court aftlrmed. The appeals court held that the fmding that
excessive force was not used was not clearly erroneous, even if the fact that a videotape of
the incident was missing raised the inference that the videotape would have supported the
arrestee's version of the incident. The court noted that a supervisor's testimony sufficiently
rebutted this inference. The arrestee was intoxicated, agitated, and refused to comply with
commands, kicked the arresting officer, continued to struggle and attempt to get away, and
posed an immediate threat to his own safety and to the safety of the officers. (Lancaster
County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILES
SUICIDE

Mroz v. City of Tonawanda. 999 F.Supp. 436 (W.D.N .Y. 1998). The administrator of
the estate of a minor who committed suicide after release from custody brought a
state court action asserting state and § 1983 claims. The case was removed to federal court,
which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the minor,
who had been released by police and taken home, was not owed a duty of protection under
the due process clause because the minor was no longer in custody. The minor committed
suicide shortly after he was driven home by police. He had been held in a booking room at
the police headquarters after being arrested. The court found that the officers did not have
actual knowledge that the minor posed a risk of suicide; although the minor was crying and
distraught while in custody, the police did not overhear any suicide threats. The court found
that probable cause existed for the arrest of the minor and that any force used was
reasonable. (City of Tonawanda Police Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Neal v. City of Harvey, Ill., 1 F.Supp.2d 849 (N.D.Ill. 1998). An arrestee brought a
§ 1983 action against a city and police officials. The district court held that
probable cause of the arrestee's attempted murder arrest barred his claims for false
arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. (City of Harvey, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Nelson!: City oflrvine. 143 F .Sd 1196 (9th Cir. 1998). Two arrestees brought a§
1983 action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against city officials,
alleging that they were coerced into submitting to blood tests to determine their alcohol
levels following arrest for driving under the influence. The arrestees alleged that they were
deprived of the option to take breath or urine tests instead. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants but the appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part. and remanded. The appeals court held that arrestees who were forced to
undergo blood tests after requesting or consenting to breath tests stated Fourth
Amendment claims. According to the court, requiring the arrestees to submit to warrantless
blood tests after they have consented to available breath or urine tests violates the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. The court found that arrestees who consented to breath
tests did not impliedly consent to blood tests. (City oflrvine, California)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Owens v. City of Philadelphia. 6 F.Supp.2d 373 (E.D.Pa. 1998). The administratrix
of a pretrial detainee's estate and his surviving children brought a § 1983 action against
prison guards and ofllcials and the City of Philadelphia to recover for the detainee's suicide.
The district court found that fact questions precluded summary judgment in favor of the
guards on questions of qualified immunity, deliberate indifference and the adequacy of the
City's training program. According to the court, the detainee's statement to a guard that he
felt "schizy" and that he was "going to hurt myself' raised questions of fact on issues of
knowledge and deliberate indifference. According to the court, it was not necessary to show
that a guard believed that harm would actually befall the detainee; rather. the detainee's
children only needed to show that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm. The guard called a psychiatrist knowing she intended to

32.65

issue a pass for the detainee to go to the psychiatric unit but failed to note in the prison log
the detainee's statement about hurting himself in order to inform the incoming officers and
his superiors. There was nothing in the record that indicates that the pass was ever issued.
The court also found that the otTl.cials' alleged conduct as policy-makers with respect to
inadequate training to prevent suicide by pretrial detainees was actionable under § 1983 in a
suit against them as individuals. The court held that whether the jail guards acted with
objective reasonableness after they learned that the pretrial detainee was hanging in his cell
involved questions of fact, precluding summary judgment. (Philadelphia Detention Center,
Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Payne for Hicks v. Churchich. 161 F .3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1998). The children and
estate of an arrestee who committed suicide in a city jail brought a state court action and a §
1983 action asserting wrongful death and survival claims. The district court dismissed the
case. The appeals court affirmed in part. reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court
held that allegations that the arrestee was subjected to maltreatment while in custody as a
pretrial detainee were properly treated as claims arising under the Due Process Clause. The
court found that a deputy sheriff who transported the arrestee to a city jail did not violate
the due process rights of the arrestee. According to the court, the arrestee's intoxication, his
tattoo questioning life. and his angry cursing did not indicate an obvious, substantial risk of
suicide. The court found that failing to monitor the arrestee or recognize the risk of suicide
was, at most, negligence. The arrestee was admitted to the holding cell of a city police
department at 1:00 a.m. and died of suffocation after hanging himself with a blanket
sometime between 1:00 a.m. and 4:04 a.m. (Madison County Sheriff's Department, City of
Madison Police Department, Illinois)

u.s. Appeals Court

Perkins v. Grimes, 161 F .3d 1127 (8th Cir. 1998). A pretrial detainee, who was
raped by another inmate, sued jail officials under § 1983 for failing to protect him.
The district court enteredjudgment for the officials and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that jailers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's safety
when they housed him with an inmate who raped him. The court noted that although jailers
were on notice that the inmate was easily provoked, they also knew that the detainee and
the inmate had previously been housed together without incident, and the jailers neither
knew. nor had reason to know, that the inmate was a violent sexual aggressor. The detainee
had been arrested for public intoxication and was booked at a county facility and placed in a
holding cell for approximately five and one-half hours. During the final hour of his time in
the holding cell, the detainee shared the cell with an inmate who was also booked for public
intoxication. The detainee was subsequently raped by the inmate, who was larger and
heavier. The detainee alleged that ajail officer was aware of the assault and did not
intervene. (Sebastian County Adult Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Petrazzoulo v. U.S. Marshals Service, 999 F.Supp. 401 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). A pretrial
detainee alleged that the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and a county which housed the
detainee under contract to the USMS failed to provide him with dentures. in violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights. The district court held that the USMS was not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's dental needs and that the detainee failed to state a § 1983 claim
against county officials. The inmate's teeth had been extracted to treat a brokenjaw, and a
dentist had "recommended" that the detainee obtain dentures. The USMS concluded that
the dentist's recommendation was not a prescription and that the dentures were an elective
treatment. The detainee received prompt treatment for his brokenjaw, pain medication and
a soft food diet. The court also held that the detainee could not bring an action under the
Federal Tort Claim Act. (Chautauqua County Jail, New York)

u .s. Appeals Court

Ringuette v. City of Fall River, 146 F .3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998). A person who was
injured while in protective custody as the result of apparent intoxication brought a
§ 1983 action against a city and police officers. The district court granted qualified
immunity for the defendants, and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that under the circumstances, including the plaintiff's refusal of offers to let
him leave. the officers had qualified immunity for detaining the plaintiff in protective
custody beyond the 12 hours permitted by statute. The court found that the while further
corumement of the plaintitrbeyond the 12-hour limit could be called an unreasonable
seizure, the unreasonableness was mitigated by the belief that the plaintitrremained
incapacitated and the implicit willingness to let the plaintiff go whenever he said he was
ready. (City of Fall River. Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Sanders v. Howze, 50 F.Supp.2d 1364 (M.D.Ga. 1998). The estate of a prisoner who
committed suicide while in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against jail officials. The
district court denied summary judgment for the officials fmding it was barred by fact issues
as to whether the officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's known suicidal
propensity and whether the county had adequate policies for dealing with potential suicides.
The court also found a material issue offact as to whether county jail officials were properly
trained in dealing with potential suicides. After being confined in the jail for six weeks the
prisoner removed a razor blade from a disposable razor and cut his wrists. He was
transferred to a state hospital for a psychological evaluation but returned to the jail two

PROTECTION
SEPARATION

PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY
PROTECTION
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

32.66

months later. He was placed in an isolation cell near the jailer's office, where he hung himself a
week later from a light fixture with a bed sheet. A few days earlier a judge had ordered a
psychiatric evaluation which was in the process of being arranged by the sheriff. <Dougherty
County Jail, Georgia}
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE

Smith v. Montefiore Med. Center-Health Services, 22 F.Supp.2d 275 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). A pretrial detainee sued a city and city corrections officials to recover from
alleged injuries he suffered as the result of his alleged exposure to asbestos. The district court
held that a three-day delay in treating the detainee after his alleged exposure did not amount to
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, noting that a mere delay in rendering medical
treatment does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court also found that prison
officials' failure to warn the detainee of the dangers of exposure to asbestos in connection with
asbestos abatement work in the prison did not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Warning
signs were reportedly posted three days after the alleged incident, which the court found to be at
most negligent conduct. (George Motchan Detention Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
HANDICAP
CONDITIONS

Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 1998). An arrestee who was
wheelchair-bound brought a§ 1983 action against officials, alleging violation of his
constitutional rights during his arrest and detention. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the
disabled detainee's inability to put on his jail-issued pants, obtain drinking water from his cell
sink, and get into the bed in his cell, during 44 hours of detention, were insufficiently severe to
amount to punishment in violation of the detainee's substantive due process rights. According to
the court, the detainee was not deprived of any of his basic necessities, but rather did not receive
the level of comfort he had demanded. The court noted that correctional officials are not required
to provide comfortable jails, even for pretrial detainees. The detainee suffered from muscular
dystrophy and was confined to a wheelchair, but was physically unable to function fully in a jail
cell that was equipped for handicapped inmates. (Green Lake County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Turguitt v. Jefferson County. Ala., 137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998). The estate of a pretrial
detainee who was killed during an altercation with another inmate at a county jail filed a
civil rights action against the county. The district court denied the county's motion to
dismiss and the county appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that an
Alabama county cannot be liable in a civil rights case for harms that befall jail inmates due to
improper operation of the jail or negligent supervision of its inmates because the county has no
responsibility in that area. According to the court, the sheriff, not the county, is responsible for jail
conditions under Alabama law; counties have no duties with respect to daily operation of county
jails and have no authority to dictate how jails are run. The deceased inmate was fatally injured
in a fight with another inmate, who was a convicted felon, in the dayroom of the jail. (Jefferson
County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES
MEDICAL CARE

U.S. v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998). A pretrial detainee sought a judicial
hearing on the issue of whether he could be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic
drugs to render him competent to stand trial. The district court held that an
administrative hearing would be sufficient to satisfy due process, and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that due process required a judicial
hearing and that the detainee should be allowed to present his own rebuttal testimony on the
issues involved. The court also found that the strict-scrutiny standard of substantive due process
review applied, and that the government must prove its case with clear and convincing evidence.
(Federal Medical Center, Rochester, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. v. DeBeir, 16 F.Supp.2d 592 (D.Md. 1998). The government moved for pretrial
detention under the Bail Reform Act for a defendant who was charged with
interstate travel for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with a minor. The district court
denied the motion, finding that the defendant did not pose a serious risk of flight and that the
offense was not a crime of violence. (Maryland)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Floyd, 11 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.D.C. 1998). A defendant moved to revoke a
magistrate's order of detention pending trial. The district court held that the charge
of possession of a firearm by a felon is a crime of violence and that evidence was sufficient to
warrant pretrial detention. (U.S. District Court, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE-CONDITION

U.S. v. Herrera, 29 F.Supp.2d 756 (N.D.Tex. 1998). After a defendant who was on
pretrial release tested positive for the use of a controlled substance, a pretrial services officer
petitioned the court for revocation of release. A U.S. Magistrate dismissed the motion, and the
district court affirmed. The district court noted that only an attorney for the government, not a
pretrial services officer, may initiate a proceeding for revocation of release. (U.S. District Court,
Northern District, Texas)

U.S. District Court
ELECTRONIC
MONITORING

U.S. v. Malloy, 11 F.Supp.2d 583 (D.N.J. 1998). A defendant charged with violating
the Arms Export Control Act moved to modify his bail conditions. The district court
granted his motion, finding that the defendant was entitled to have his bail conditions modified
from 24·hour house arrest with electronic monitoring to the use of a satellite tracking system. The
32.67

court found that the satellite tracking system provided a sufficient level of control over the
defendant's whereabouts to assure that the defendant would appear at trial. (U.S. District Court,
New Jersey)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Vinson v. Clarke County, Ala., 10 F.Supp.2d 1282 (S.D.Ala. 1998). A§ 1983 action
was brought by the administrator of the estate of an intoxicated arrestee who had committed
suicide while being held in a county jail. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, finding that the sheriff and jailer acted within the scope of their discretionary
authority and did not violate clearly established law. The court held that the county was not
deliberately indifferent to the risks of suicide. According to the court, it was not clearly
established in October 1994 that a county sherifrs failure to train jail personnel in the care of
intoxicated inmates amounted to deliberate indifference. The court found that the risk of suicide
among a class of intoxicated detainees at the county jail was not so obvious that the county's
failure to remedy conditions of confinement which gave detainees the opportunity to commit
suicide could be seen as showing deliberate indifference. The detainee committed suicide within
30 minutes of his admission by hanging himself from the bars of his jail cell. An autopsy revealed
that the detainee's blood contained .205 percent alcohol, which was well over the maximum of .1
allowed under state DUI law. (Clarke County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Webb y_. Lawrence County, 144 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1998). A prisoner who was allegedly
sexually assaulted by a cellmate brought an action against a county, sheriff, and sheriff
department employees, asserting§ 1983 and state-law negligence claims. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that the prisoner failed to establish that the defendants actually knew of a substantial risk of
harm to the prisoner from his cellmate. The appeals court also held that the defendants were
protected by state statutory immunity on the prisoner's negligence claim. The court noted that
while the defendants knew generally of the risk of inmate rape and assault for young, physically
slight inmates such as the plaintiff, there was no evidence or allegations that inmate rape was
common in this particular institution, nor was there evidence that the cellmate, who was a sexual
offender, had assaulted other inmates or caused any other problems while incarcerated. Further,
the prisoner had requested to be placed with the cellmate. (Lawrence County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
RECREATION
EXERCISE
CONDITIONS
LAW LIBRARIES

Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 1998). A federal pretrial detainee
brought an action under § 1983 and Bivens claiming a federal marshal, wardens of
a city jail and corrections officers subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement in a city jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and the appeals court affrrmed. The appeals court held that the lack of a law library at
the city jail did not prevent the detainee from pursuing civil rights claims or his criminal appeal to
the extent that his right of access to courts was violated. The appeals court agreed that the
wardens were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not have the authority or ability to
provide the jail with a law library or exercise area; according to the court, their duty was to
administer the jail pursuant to an agreement with the Marshals Service, which was aware of the
lack of a law library and exercise space. The appeals court also affrrmed the grant of qualified
immunity to the marshal because he did not violate clearly established law by transporting the
detainee to the city jail under the terms of an intergovernmental agreement. The court noted that
the detainee's stay at the facility was relatively brief. <Montgomery City Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
CELLSEARCH
ACCESS TO COURT
LAW LIBRARIES

Zimmerman v. Hoard, 5 F.Supp.2d 633 (N.D. Ind. 1998). A state prisoner brought a
§ 1983 action concerning events that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at a
county jail. The district court held that state directives and recommendations did
not provide the basis for § 1983 claims. The inmate had alleged that the county officials failed to
implement the Indiana Jail Standards and Rules and comply with the recommendations of the
State Jail Inspector. The court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to cell searches.
According to the court, the inmate's allegations that the county jail failed to have an adequate
collection of legal materials and its prohibition against defendants receiving incoming legal
publications stated a claim that would survive dismissal at the pleading stage. The inmate alleged
that the county had a blanket policy of prohibiting inmates from receiving any type of publication
through the mail. The court also found that a pro se inmate could not claim violation of attorney·
client confidentiality. The inmate had complained that he was forced to conduct attorney-client
consultations in a room equipped with a two-way intercom speaker that allowed jail personnel to
breach confidentiality. (Carroll County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
COMMISSARY
SEPARATION
PRNACY
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Zimmerman v. Tippecanoe Sherifrs Dept., 25 F.Supp.2d 915 (N.D.lnd. 1998). A
state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against county officials and employees
alleging constitutional violations during his pretrial detention period in a county
jail. The district court found in favor of the defendants for all but one of the
allegations. The court found that the sheriff's decision to order the prisoner to be
held in a disciplinary segregation unit of the jail without a disciplinary hearing did
not violate the prisoner's due process rights because the decision was administrative and was
made in response to the prisoner's previous escape attempt. The court held that a jail physician's
failure to refer the prisoner to a dentist for emergency treatment of an abscess and bone
fragmentation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the prisoner did not state that
he was in pain or had any discomfort when the physician examined him. According to the court,

32.68

the fact that the prisoner failed to receive one of his commissary orders did not constitute a
disciplinary action without due process, even if the prisoner was unable to purchase stamps and
materials with which to correspond with his family and his attorney. The court noted that the
prisoner had received regular commissary orders, including a large order with correspondence
materials placed just before his missed order, and he received regular orders after the missed
order. The court held that even if a county jail employee hid the prisoner's outgoing mail rather
than delivering it, the action did not violate the Fourth Amendment because another employee
found the mail and ensured that it was mailed, so that the prisoner suffered no harm. The court
found no constitutional violation of access to court because a jail official required the prisoner to
hold conversations with his attorney in a room equipped with a two·way intercom system because
the official did not actually listen to the conversation but merely stood in a control room. But the
court found triable issues of fact regarding whether the prisoner suffered an injury when a jail
employee handcuffed him immediately after an escape attempt. (Tippecanoe County Jail, Indiana)
1999
U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISON·
MENT
FALSE ARREST

Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Systems, Inc., 196 F.3d 684 (10th Cir. 1999). Detainees who
were seized by police, transported to an alcohol detoxification facility and then detained, brought
a § 1983 action against the operator of the facility and government officials alleging violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights. The detainees had been seized from their front porches, from
their bedrooms and from the back seats of their cars under a policy of the City of Trinidad. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the detainees appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court found that the seizures set the standard
for detention well below the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and that the government
officials were not entitled to qualified immunity because the right against unreasonable seizures
for potential drunkenness was clearly established at the time of the seizures. (City of Trinidad,
Colorado)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CLOTHING
MEDICAL CARE

Anton v. Sheriff of DuPage County. Ill., 47 F.Supp.2d 993 (N.D.111. 1999). A pretrial
detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials alleging that he was
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement at a county jail. The district court
refused to dismiss the case, finding that his alleged exposure to low temperature in a
detention cell while naked and with no alternative means of protecting himself from the cold
supported a claim of inadequate shelter against the county. The detainee allegedly repeatedly
complained to jail officers for hours and they responded with jeers and laughter, and he was not
provided with medical care until he threatened litigation. When a nurse finally attended to the
detainee, his body temperature was three degrees below normal. The detainee had just attempted
suicide and had been placed in a rubberized cell without clothing and was observed every 16
minutes. The court also found that deputies' alleged thwarting of medical treatment given to the
detainee supported a claim of violation of his right to medical attention. The officers allegedly
removed a blanket that was given to the detainee by the nurse, which the court held supported a
claim for deliberate indifference. The court denied qualified immunity for the officers, finding that
it was clearly established at the time of this incident that pretrial detainees had a constitutional
right to adequate heat and medical attention. (DuPage County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Baker v. Willett, 42 F.Supp.2d 192 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). A jail inmate brought an action against a
county and county officials alleging excessive use of force in violation of § 1983. The district
court denied, in part, the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that a named sheriffs deputy was
not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established at the time of the incident
that unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The deputy allegedly pushed the inmate in the back, causing
him to fall off of a table and strike his head on metal bars approximately four or five feet from
where he had been sitting. The inmate sustained a laceration on his forehead which required
sutures. The county Undersheriffreviewed the incident and spoke to the inmate and the deputy,
but did not conduct a formal investigation nor discipline the deputy. The district court dismissed
the sheriffs department and county from the suit, finding that they could not be held liable on the
ground that the sheriffs department had a practice of not investigating use of force complaints or
disciplining officers. The court noted that three of five meritorious complaints in the past ten
years had been directed toward one officer who had been terminated after disciplinary
proceedings. (Warren County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITION

Benjamin v. Jacobsen, 172 F.3d 144 (2nd Cir. 1999). Officials who had entered into a consent
decree governing New York City jail conditions moved for immediate termination of the decree
under provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Pretrial detainees opposed the
motion. The district court vacated the decree and the appeals court affirmed in part and reversed
in part. A rehearing en bane was granted and the appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainees were entitled to present evidence of
current and ongoing violations of federal rights and of the need for continuation of the prospective
relief provided in the decrees. According to the court PLRA provides for decrees to be terminated,
but it does not require that decrees be vacated. The appeals court found that the PLRA
termination provision does not violate the Constitutional separation of powers principle nor does
it strip the courts of their Article III power and duty to remedy constitutional wrongs. (New York
City Department Correction)
32.69

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Dorsey, 167 F.3d 411 (8th Cir. 1999). A former pretrial detainee who allegedly
was injured when he fell in a jail shower brought a § 1983 action against jail officials and a
hospital The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that material fact issues precluded
summary judgment for correctional officers and jail medical staff. The detainee fell in the shower,
hitting the back of his head and his left arm. He was not seen by medical staff following the fall
but he was given three Tylenol. For several days he requested medical attention but correctional
officers refused to process his requests or complete an incident report that would enable him to
receive emergency medical treatment. After five days the detainee was seen by a nurse, who made
disparaging remarks and did not clean his wounds or give him any medication. The appeals court
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the officers and jail medical staff,
fmding that they "utterly failed to address many of the allegations in [the detainee's] verified
complaint." (St. Louis City Jail, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago County, 165 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 1999). Survivors of an
detainee who died in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against county officials alleging
failure to provide proper medical care to the detainee. The district court granted summary
judgment for the officials and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court found that the
officials were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs, despite their
alleged failure to consult medical personnel or actively administer medication when the inmate's
condition deteriorated during the days preceding his death. The court noted the officials' threemonth record of treating the detainee's medical condition and their lack of knowledge about the
detainee's specific condition of myasthenia gravis (MG). Treatment of the detainee began
immediately after he was admitted to the jail, when he complained of blurry vision as the result of
a car accident several weeks earlier. The detainee received various services and tests in the
following three months and was tentatively diagnosed by a specialist with MG, which had
intermittent symptoms offatigability and muscle weakness. Jail medical staff were not familiar
with MG, nor were they aware of the specialist's diagnosis. Several weeks later jail staff found the
detainee lying on his cell floor with his head resting on his bunk, claiming he had fallen and hurt
his neck. Officers could find no signs of an injury and the detainee was able to move his limbs
easily, so arrangements were made for close observation of the detainee. The detainee was seen
several times by jail medical staff in the next few days, but his condition gradually worsened and
he was found dead in his cell. (Winnebago County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Ellis v. Washington County and Johnson City. Tenn., 198 F.3d 225 (6th Cir. 1999). A mother and
a minor child of a deceased pretrial detainee brought a wrongful death action under § 1983
against a city, county, and jailers after the detainee committee suicide in a county jail. The district
court entered summary judgment for all defendants except for one jailer and the plaintiffs and
jailer appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the county's alleged failure to train
jailers on suicide prevention was not the proximate cause of the detainee's injury absent any
circumstances from which a reasonable jailer would have foreseen the suicide. The appeals court
also found that one of the jailers was entitled to qualified immunity even though he made a
mistake in assessing the detainee's suicidal tendencies because he was not deliberately indifferent
toward the detainee and exhibited a genuine concern for the detainee's welfare while confined.
But the appeals court refused to grant summary judgment for one jailer because of his alleged
delay in informing an emergency medical team of his alleged observation of the detainee tying a
noose in his cell. The detainee committed suicide by handing himself in a county jail three hours
after his transfer from a city jail. The cell in which the detainee hung himself had a monitor
camera at one end but was not designed as a suicide prevention cell. The detainee had been held
overnight at a city jail after he was arrested because he was believed to be drunk or under the
influence of drugs. After his arraignment the following morning he was taken to the county jail
where, during the three hours preceding his suicide, "nothing occurred that would put reasonable
jailors on notice of a possible suicide attempt" according to the appeals court. The detainee was
asked about possible suicidal tendencies when he was admitted to the jail and responded that he
"loved life." A few minutes later a jailer who had gone to high school with the detainee came on
duty and was concerned about his mental health. The jailer found the detainee talking on the
phone to his mother and seemingly crying. After the call the jailer asked the detainee if he was
feeling suicidal and the detainee responded "Hell no, I've got a baby on the way that I've got to
take care of." But most persuasive to the court was the statement of the mother in a letter two
months after the death of her son that her son was "not suicidal at 11:30 when I talked to him [on
the phone] ... knew he was getting out [of jail.1" The detainee's mother was an experienced,
practicing, licensed clinical psychologist who held a Ph.D., and the court considered her statement
to be an expert opinion. The appeals court held that it was "unreasonable to attribute fault to the
County or its jailors for failing to predict suicide." (Johnson City Jail and Washington County Jail,
Texas)

Estate of Brooks Ex Rel. Brooks v. U.S., 197 F.3d 1245 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal detainee who was
U.S. Appeals Court
held by a county in pretrial detention for 12 days without being arraigned or brought before a federal
SPEEDY TRIAL
FALSE IMPRISONMENT judicial officer brought a § 1983 action. The detainee reached a settlement with the United States and
the charges against other defendants were dismissed. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the
county's actions were not the legal cause of the detainee's injuries and the county was not liable for
false imprisonment under state law. The court noted that the county was not authorized to act for the
United States and bring the detainee before a federal magistrate, nor could it release the detainee

32.70

without violating a state law. (United States Marshals Service and Alameda County, California)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ferris v. County of Kennebec, 44 F.Supp.2d 62 CD.Me. 1999). A pretrial detainee sued county
officials and staff in state court. The case was removed to federal court, where the court denied
qualified immunity for a nurse and found that the detainee had adequately alleged the nurse's
indifference to her serious medical needs. The detainee alleged that the nurse responded to her
statement that she believed she was having a miscarriage by taking her pulse, telling her that she
was menstruating, and ordering her to lie down. According to the detainee, the nurse did not
speak to her again except to inform her that she was being transferred to a different cell because
she would not lie down as ordered. The nurse made no attempt to confirm whether the detainee
was pregnant, even though the detainee had told jail staff during her intake interview that she
was pregnant. The nurse also refused to provide the detainee with sanitary supplies. (Kennebec
County Jail. Maine)

U.S. District Court

Ford v. Nassau County Executive, 41 F.Supp.2d 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). A pretrial detainee
brought an action against a county correctional facility and county executive alleging
violation of his constitutional rights because he was required to serve as a "food cart worker"
without payment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
court held that making the detainee choose between distributing food to inmates and being
segregated in "lock in" could not be deemed punishment, and therefore did not deprive the
detainee of liberty without due process. The court also held that requiring the detainee to work
without payment as a food cart worker did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment; according to
the court, to sustain a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment the detainee would have to
demonstrate he was subjected to compulsory labor "akin to African slavery." The court found that
the detainee's own alleged assistance in the distribution of food, for which he received at least
some consideration, did not rise to the level of the indignity and degradation that accompanied
slavery. As a food cart worker the detainee was required to push a pre-loaded food cart
approximately 125 yards to an elevator, and occasionally to hand out certain foods such as milk,
bread or oranges. He was also sometimes required to perform other tasks, such as sweeping a
guard walk or emptying garbage. According to the detainee, he was required to work seven days
per week, for all three meals. The detainee was required to take medication to control his epilectic
seizures and was accordingly assigned to a ''workers and medical dorm," which involved him in
work activities. The court held that there was no evidence that the detainee's chores, despite his
medical status, were overly burdensome to him. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

WORK
FORCED LABOR

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1999). A jail inmate who had been assaulted
by another inmate sued a jail employee, sheriff and county alleging violations of§ 1983. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that summary judgment was precluded by a factual
dispute about the scope of the jail shift supervisor's responsibility and whether he abdicated his
responsibility. The inmate was threatened by a cellmate when he left his cell to meet with a
detective. After the meeting the inmate was moved to a different cell, apparently in response to
the threat. The inmate was threatened again the next day when he was escorted past his former
cell, and was allegedly threatened by other inmates while dining. The inmate requested protective
custody. Although he was not moved, he was placed on "cell feed" status which eliminated his
contact with other inmates in the common dining area. Several days later the inmate was
involved with a visit which required him to use a common visiting area. While in the visiting area
he was assaulted by his former cellmate who was also involved with a visit. The inmate suffered a
broken nose, torn shoulder ligaments and a head laceration which required stitches. <somerset
County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 1999). The administrator for the estate of a deceased detainee
sued officers and county officials under § 1983 asserting constitutional violations, negligence, gross
negligence, negligent training and negligent supervision. The district court granted summary
judgement for the defendants on all§ 1983 claims and declined to assume supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims. The appeals court affirmed. The detainee had been arrested and
transported to the county detention center and the following day was declared brain dead. During
his booking the detainee was acting irrationally, his speech was slurred, and he kept repeating in
an intoxicated manner "I can't believe this is all over a traffic ticket." He was then taken to a cell
and strip searched, but at the conclusion of the search attempted to crawl out of the cell and a
struggle ensued. Officers used pepper spray to subdue him. Early the next morning the detainee
began acting belligerent again. He resisted being moved to another cell and a five-man cell
extraction team pinned him face down. During the struggle he was sprayed with pepper spray
and he was punched several times. Once restrained, he was carried face down to another cell and
was placed in four-point restraints. A few minutes later he appeared to be unconscious and was
checked by medics and was found to be "okay." Another officer then noticed that the detainee was
not breathing, CPR was initiated and he was taken to a local hospital where he was found to be
brain dead. The appeals court held that officers at the county detention center were not
deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the deceased detainee, either when the detainee
was booked or during his custody. A trained medic was on hand in the booking area and discerned
no sign of a medical problem. According to the court, the failure to clean pepper spray off of the
detainee in a timely manner was, in the first instance, due to the detainee's violent response to
the officer's offer to wash the spray off, and in the second instance was due to the need to rush the
32.71

detainee to a hospital for emergency care. The appeals court held that the officers did not use
excessive force against the detainee, but rather that they applied the force necessary in a good
faith effort to restore discipline. The court also found that there were no actionable deficiencies in
the sheriffs policies, customs or training. According to the court, "...the appellant's own expert
penologist conceded that [sheriff] Peed's policies met the standards of both the Virginia Board of
Corrections and the American Correctional Association." The court also concluded, "...claims that
[sheriff] Peed provided inadequate training for his employees must also fail. As of the time of this
incident, the ADC had been accredited for more than ten years by both the American Correctional
Association and the National Commission on Correctional Health Care, two organizations whose
training requirements often surpass minimal constitutional standards." (Fairfax County Adult
Detention Center, Virginia)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 693 (5th Cir. 1999). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action alleging that a jail
was deliberately indifferent to his kidney condition, his orthopedic pains, his diabetes and his
epilepsy. The district court dismissed the action and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that any discrimination that may have occurred against the arrestee was not "because ot" his
alleged disability, within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and that jail
physicians were not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The court noted that
even if the defendants had failed to administer or provide the arrestee's medication on some
occasions, the arrestee refused to take his seizure medication several times and refused to appear
to receive his medication on some occasions. (Harris County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISON.

Hardy v. Town of Hayneville, 50 F.Supp.2d 1176 (M.D.Ala. 1999). An arrestee brought a§
1983 suit against an arresting officer, chief of police. mayor and town, alleging false
imprisonment and use of excessive force. The court found that the arrestee's allegations that the
police officer arrested him and detained him in a county jail without informing him of the nature
and cause of the accusations against him were sufficient to state a Sixth Amendment claim. The
court also found that allegations that the police chief and town failed to provide police officers
with adequate training on the lawful use of force, and that the unlawful use of force would be
condoned by their superiors, were sufficient to state a Fourth Amendment claim. The arrestee had
been preaching the gospel and greeting people as they came into a store, with the permission of
the owner. A police officer instructed the arrestee to leave the store and then allegedly followed
the arrestee to the back of the store when he attempted to protest to the owner. The officer
allegedly assaulted the arrestee and battered him about the head and back, threw him to the
ground and struck his wrists repeatedly with unopened handcuffs. (Town of Hayneville, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING
PRNACY

Harris v. Brewington-Carr, 49 F.Supp.2d 378 (D.Del 1999). A pretrial detainee challenged
his conditions of confinement and a district court judge refused to dismiss the case, finding
that the detainee had sufficiently alleged violation of his due process rights. The pretrial
detainee alleged that he was required to sleep on the floor for one week while being held in a
booking and receiving area, that he had to sleep on the floor for three weeks before receiving a
bed, that he was housed in a one man cell with two other men, that the open toilet in his cell was
unsanitary and deprived him of his right to privacy, that there was a lack of showers and
excessive noise, that he was housed with sentenced and unsentenced inmates, and that as a non·
smoker he had to breathe cigarette smoke from other inmates. (Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice
Facility, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Harris v. Morales, 69 F.Supp.2d 1319 (D.Colo. 1999). An inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging
excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs while he was confined in a
county jail. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the
allegations that the inmate was unnecessarily subjected to pepper spray and was then denied
medical attention stated Eighth Amendment claims. (Summit County Jail. Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 1999). U.S. Cert. Den. at 120 S.Ct. 2691. A pretrial
detainee who was held in a county jail for four-and ·one·half years brought a § 1983 action against
the sheriff and corrections officials claiming injuries allegedly sustained as the result of his
exposure to second·hand smoke. The district court dismissed the action. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the inmate's alleged present injuries were not sufficiently serious to support
a due process claim and that the detainee could not recover for future injuries absent a showing to
a reasonable medical certainty that he faced an increased risk of developing a future injury
attributable to the alleged exposure. The detainee alleged present injuries that included breathing
problems, chest pains, dizziness, sinus problems, headaches, and loss of energy. Although the jail
had a non-smoking policy the detainee claimed that inmates routinely violated it. (Cook County
Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
SUICIDE

Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 1999). The family of a detainee who died
in his jail cell brought a § 1983 action against a city and police officers, asserting claims for
unlawful arrest, excessive force and wrongful death. The district court denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and the appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by factual issues
regarding the amount and degree of force used during the detainee's arrest, but that the officers
were not liable for wrongful death, absent any evidence that the officers were subjectively aware
of any risk that the detainee would inflict harm on himself. The detainee did not threaten to

32.72

commit suicide during his incarceration or otherwise indicate that he might do so, he was never
classified as a suicide risk, and the officers were not shown to have knowledge of a prior incident
when the detainee swallowed a metal crack pipe. The court noted that a showing that a jailer was
negligent in failing to recognize a prisoner's suicidal tendencies is insufficient to satisfy the § 1983
deliberate indifference standard. (Dumas Police Department, Arkansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Lopez v. LeMaster. 172 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 1999). A pretrial detainee who was beaten by other
inmates while confined in a jail brought a § 1983 action against the county sheriff individually
and in his official capacity. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff
and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
The detainee was arrested and placed in a general population cell in the county jail where he was
threatened by another inmate. A jail officer took the detainee to an office where he prepared a
written statement about the threat. But the officer returned the detainee to the general
population cell where he was attacked and beaten by several inmates. The officer returned later
and the detainee asked to be taken to the hospital. The officer took the detainee to an office, called
an unknown person to ask for instructions, and then told the detainee "you are still conscious, we
don't have to take you." The detainee was given aspirin, placed in a different cell and was released
the next day. He went to the hospital after his release and was diagnosed with a severe contusion
to the skull with post-concussion syndrome and a severe strain to the cervical, thoracic and
lumbosacral spine. The appeals court held that the detainee failed to establish a claim for failure
to provide adequate training and supervision of jail personnel because he failed to identify specific
deficiencies that were closely related to his injuries. The court noted that evidence which showed
that the jailers were generally poorly trained was insufficient to support the training and
supervision claims. But the appeals court found that material issues of fact precluded summary
judgment on the claim that the county maintained an unconstitutional policy of understaffing the
jail and failing to monitor inmates, with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. The
court noted that a suit against the sheriff in his official capacity is the equivalent of a suit against
the county. The appeals court found that fact issues precluded summary judgment for the sheriff
in his individual and official capacities on the detainee's failure to protect claims. The appeals
court also held that summary judgment was precluded on the detainee's claim alleging that the
sheriff was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Jackson County Jail. Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROBABLE CAUSE
FALSE IMPRISON·
MENT

Luck v. Rovenstine. 168 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 1999). An arrestee who was jailed for a
week without a probable cause hearing following his warrantless arrest brought a §
1983 action against a sheriff in his personal and official capacities. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the sheriff could not be held
liable in his individual capacity. Fact issues as to whether the arrestee's detention without a
probable cause hearing resulted from the sheriffs deliberate decision not to monitor detainees
who were brought to the jail by outside agencies precluded summary judgment on the official
capacity claim. According to the court, the sheriff, as the custodian of persons incarcerated in the
county jail. had a duty to ensure that detainees arrested without warrants received probable
cause hearings or gained release. The court noted that according to the Supreme Court, "prompt"
in this context means, under most circumstances. within 48 hours. (Kosciusko County jail,
Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
WORK
SENTENCE
REDUCTION
GOOD TIME

MacFarlane v. Walter. 179 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999). After their state habeas petitions were
denied, state prisoners petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, challenging two counties'
"good conduct" and "good performance" policies as they were applied to them. The district
court granted summary judgment for the respondent corrections officials, but the appeals
court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that there was an equal protection
violation in the counties' allowance oflesser good time credits for defendants who were
detained pretrial in county jails because of their financial inability to post bail. than that allowed
for defendants who were able to wait to serve their sentences until after sentencing to a state
correctional facility. The counties· early release policies limited presentence detainees to a
maximum good-conduct credit of 15% of the sentence imposed; the court noted that persons who
had posted bail and served their entire sentence at a state correctional facility could end up
serving 23 days less on a five· to six·year sentence. The court upheld the policies under which
pretrial detainees were not eligible for participation in work and other programs through which
they could earn good-performance credit, finding the counties had established a strong rational
connection between the legislative means and purpose of protecting community safety. (Pierce and
Clark County Jails, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS

Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). An inmate in a county jail system brought a
§ 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of a sheriffs department policy prohibiting
inmates from possessing "sexually explicit" material. The district court granted summary
judgment for the county and the appeals court affirmed, finding that the policy which excluded all
material containing frontal nudity was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests of
maintaining jail security, rehabilitating inmates and reducing sexual harassment of female
detention officers. According to the court, the policy was neutral in that jail administrators drew a
distinction based solely on the basis of the materials' potential effect on the jail. and was not so
remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational. The court noted that the jail's goal of
rehabilitation was legitimate only as it applied to convicted inmates housed at the jail, and was
32.73

not a legitimate goal to the extent that it was attempting to impose rehabilitation on pretrial
detainees. <Maricopa County Jail System, Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hudson, 185 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1999). A pretrial detainee brought
a § 1983 action alleging she suffered damages because of negligence, cruel and unusual
punishment, and deliberate denial of medical treatment for her asthma. The district court granted
summary judgment for all defendants. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee failed
to show that her medical needs were "serious" while she was in custody, and that officers were not
deliberately indifferent to her medical needs. (City of Houston, Texas)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Peters v. City of Biloxi, Mississippi, 57 F.Supp.2d 366 (S.D.Miss. 1999). An arrestee brought
a § 1983 claim challenging the use of force during his arrest. The district court found that the
arresting officer's conduct in handcuffing, shackling and verbally harassing the arrestee was
objectively reasonable and was not clearly excessive. The court noted that there was no evidence
that the officer hit or otherwise physically injured the arrestee. (City of Biloxi, MS)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
SANITATION

Preval v. Reno, 57 F.Supp.2d 307 (E.D.Va. 1999). A detainee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) filed a prose action under§ 1983 alleging violation of his
constitutional rights. The district court found that loud noise, constant light, bad odor and
low room temperature could not be characterized as ''punishment" unrelated to the
detainee's detention. The district court also found that the detainee failed to state a due process
claim based on INS staff failure to protect him from an assault by another inmate, where there
was no allegation that any official or staff member was aware of the potential for the specific
altercation before it took place. <Piedmont Regional Jail, Virginia, under contract to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE
FALSE IMPRISON·
MENT/ARREST

Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 1999). An arrestee brought a civil rights action alleging
arrest without probable cause, and wrongful denial of adequate medical treatment. The district
court entered summary judgment for the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court
atrrrmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. According to the court, "when the events
leading to this lawsuit began to unfold, ambiguous behavior combined with a severe language
barrier led to the arrest" of the plaintiff. After his initial arrest, police determined that he could be
released, but "because he did not want to pay for a hotel room, they then re-arrested him,
consigned him to the drunk tank, and failed to recognize that he was suffering from a serious
medical condition." The sheriff's department translator spoke the wrong Chinese dialect, making
communication very difficult. The appeals court held that summary judgment on the wrongful
arrest claim was precluded by fact questions as to whether a second arrest, without probable
cause, occurred when the arrestee refused to book a room at a hotel and a police officer took him
back into custody and brought him to a local jail. The court held that while the initial arrest for
driving while intoxicated was supported by probable cause, whether the police officer actually took
the arrestee into "protective custody" for his own safety rather than arresting him was an issue of
fact precluding summary judgment. The court noted that state law permits an officer to take into
custody someone who appears to be mentally ill and who may present a danger to himself or
others, but such involuntary incarcerations must meet requirements that include a medical
assessment of the detainee's condition and approval by a judge. The appeals court atl"irmed
summary judgment for the defendants on the medical care claim, noting that absent evidence that
county sheriffs' officials actually knew of the arrestee's medical condition, they could not be held
liable. (LaPorte County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY
DISCIPLINE
PUNISHMENT
RELIGION
SEGREGATION

Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 1999). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, county jail employees and a police detective claiming constitutional violations
during his detention. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that although it is permissible to punish a
pretrial detainee for misconduct while in pretrial custody, that punishment can be imposed only
after affording the detainee some sort of procedural protection. The defendants had kept the
detainee in segregation as punishment for his conduct while confined, but he did not receive a
written notice or a hearing, or any other process. His misconduct continued while he was in
solitary confinement, resulting in a variety of interdepartmental reports and memoranda, and he
remained there for 270 consecutive days. During this time his phone and commissary privileges
were suspended for periods of time, he was denied writing materials, he received no access to
recreational facilities, and he was denied showers and personal hygiene items. But the appeals
court held that the detainee was not deprived of "anything necessary for his sustenance." The
appeals court granted qualified immunity to the defendants, finding that the law was not
sufficiently clear at the time to apprise the sheriff and employees that procedural safeguards were
required. The court also held that the detainee's free exercise rights were not violated when he
was denied his request for a pork free meal on three occasions, noting that it appeared that the
denial was based on the unavailability of a non-pork meal and was at most a de minimis
infringement in light of the more than 810 meals that were served to the detainee during his
confinement. (Vigo County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
PUNISHMENT
DISCIPLINE

Resnick v. Adams, 37 F.Supp.2d 1154 (C.D.Cal. 1999). A presentence detainee filed a habeas
corpus petition alleging that 27 days of good time credit were unlawfully taken from him as a
sanction for violating a prison regulation. He petitioned to have the 27 days restored. The district
32.74

court dismissed the petition, finding that denial of good time credit as a sanction for violating a
prison regulation during a detainee's presentence incarceration was not prohibited, if the sanction
is not excessive in light of the seriousness of the violation. While detained in a federal detention
center a routine drug screening had detected morphine in the detainee's urine. (Federal Detention
Center at Dublin, California, and United States Penitentiary at Lompoc, California)
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
CROWDING
EXERCISE

Robeson v. Squadrito, 57 F.Supp.2d 642 (N.D.Ind. 1999). Inmates brought an action against
a county and jail officials alleging violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court
held that the conditions of confinement in the overly-crowded jail did not rise to the level of
deprivations of"the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities." The court found that
the officials' failure to give an inmate his high blood pressure medication for 36 hours was not
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs given there was no evidence he was denied the
medication out of anything approaching a total unconcern for his welfare, and the inmate did not
suffer any injury or harm. The court also found that the failure of jail officials to give the inmate
his hypoglycemic diet was not deliberate indifference where the inmate's blood sugar was tested
daily in accordance with his physician's order, and no special diet was ordered because his sugar
levels were normal. According to the court, the cumulative conditions of confinement in the
crowded county jail did not rise to the level of deprivations required to find an Eighth Amendment
violation, even though the inmate was required to sleep on a thin mattress on the floor, had one
shower, was assaulted by another inmate, was not taken to a gymnasium, was given small
servings of food, and was initially denied an "indigent pack" of hygiene items. The court noted that
the inmate had a blanket, clean sheets, functional toilets, sinks, drinking fountain and television,
he exercised in the cell, and he did not suffer any injury as a result of the assault. CAllen County
Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
EXERCISE
SANITATION
MEDICAL CARE
SEGREGATION

Roop v. Squadrito, 70 F.Supp.2d 868 (N.D.Ind. 1999). An inmate who was HIV-positive and incarcerated in a county jail on an outstanding arrest warrant brought a§ 1983 claim and a claim under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against county officials. The district court denied summary
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that evidence raised an issue of material fact
as to whether the inmate's medical condition required that he be treated differently from other
inmates in jail, in violation of ADA The inmate had informed jailers that he was HIV-positive upon
his arrival at the jail and he was given an initial medical assessment. According to the inmate, he was
told that because of"your medical condition, and you having AIDS, you're going to be locked down."
He was initially housed by himself in an old shower room, which had a working shower but no
flushable toilet. After five days he was moved to a solitary cell located close to the jail's command
module, where there was no toilet or shower in the cell The court found that the fact that the inmate
was required to sleep on a floor mattress for an extended period of time and was not provided with
a bunk while detained in the jail was not a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.
The court also found no constitutional violation in the alleged lack of ability to exercise while in the
county jail, since he could have done sit·ups or push·ups in his cell and was only in jail for 30 days.
No violation was found regarding the inmate's complaint that he was not able to take showers more
often while confined because the court held that the deprivation of"a mere cultural amenity" is not
cruel and unusual punishment. The inmate's complaints about sanitation, including dirt on the floor
of his cell, were not found to be a constitutional violation. However, the court found that the alleged
deprivations and violations, when taken together, constituted a violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights, precluding summary judgment for the jail officials. (Allen County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1999). An arrestee brought
a§ 1983 action against a city, police chief, police officer, and physician alleging
excessive force during his arrest and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The
court entered judgment against the police officer upon jury verdict, granted a directed motion for
the physician, and dismissed the remaining claims. The district court found that the physician's
failure to take the arrestee's medical history while treating him at the jail, and his failure to
diagnose the arrestee's broken ribs, did not establish a claim of deliberate indifference under §
1983. The arrestee was brought to a jail dispensary for treatment after he was arrested. He was
moaning, almost incoherent, and complained of severe pain in his chest. The jail physician did not
take a medical history. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The
appeals court held that whether the officer's use of force was in furtherance of the city's allegedly
unconstitutional dog-bite policy was an issue for the jury for the purposes of the arrestee's claims
against the city and the chief. The court noted that although the arrestee could not recover further
compensatory damages from the city or the chief, nominal damages were available. (City of Los
Angeles, California)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Samuel v. City of Chicago. 41 F.Supp.2d 801 (N.D.Ill. 1999). A detainee sued a city alleging
excessive use of force and denial of medical care. The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss, in part, finding that the detainee stated a conspiracy claim against two police
who removed him from his vehicle and allegedly beat him and took him to the station house. The
court also held that the detainee stated a claim that the police showed deliberate indifference to
his medical needs, where the detainee alleged that he was denied insulin over an 11 hour period of
confinement at the police station house, even though he informed the police he was a diabetic. The
detainee allegedly suffered an aggravation of his pre-existing heart condition and diabetic
condition as a result of the City's actions. The detainee also allegedly suffered contusions,
32.75

lacerations and other injuries about his legs, abdomen and chest. He remained at a local hospitals
for six weeks. (Fourth District Police Station, City of Chicago, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Sanders v. Howze, 177 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 1999). The administrix o.f a detainee's estate sued
jailers alleging violation of the detainee's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights arising
from the detainee's suicide in jail. The district court denied summary judgment for the jailers and
they appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with directions. The appeals court held
that the jailers were entitled to qualified immunity, absent any preexisting Eleventh Circuit
caselaw clearly establishing that the suicide prevention measures taken by the jailers were so
inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference. Several weeks after he was arrested and
placed in the jail, the detainee removed a razor blade from a disposable razor and cut his left
wrist. Following jail policies, staff transported the detainee to a local hospital's emergency room
for treatment and evaluation. He was then transferred to a state hospital where he remained for
several months. He returned to the jail and was placed in the general population where two days
later he used a pencil to reopen his wrist wound. He was treated at the local hospital and returned
to the jail the same day, where he was placed in an isolation cell near the jailers' office to prevent
his access to items that might be used to injure himself. The next day he reopened the wound, was
treated at the hospital, and returned to the isolation cell. He was transferred to a state hospital for
several weeks and was placed in an isolation upon his return. The state hospital gave no special
instructions concerning his care. The county petitioned the court for a psychiatric evaluation of the
detainee but before the evaluation could be conducted the detainee was found dead, hanging from
a light fixture in his cell by a bedsheet. Two jailers were on duty the night the detainee died but
they did not detect his death for four to six hours after it occurred, despite a jail policy requiring
lights in isolation cells to remain on at all times and for inmates in isolation are to be visually
monitored every 30 minutes. <Dougherty County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Shain v. Ellison, 53 F.Supp.2d 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). A detainee sued a county challenging
its policy of strip searching all detainees regardless of the nature of the crime for which they
were detained. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the detainee, finding that
the Fourth Amendment prohibited strip searches in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a
detainee was concealing weapons or other contraband. The court held that the county's policy
violated the Fourth Amendment and that a qualified immunity defense was not available as the
unconstitutionality of the practice was known for years. (Nassau County Corr'l Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Snell v. DeMello, 44 F.Supp.2d 386 (D.Mass. 1999). A jail inmate brought a§ 1983 suit against
a sheriff and various prison officials alleging failure to protect him from an attack by another
inmate. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants finding that the inmate
failed to state a claim for supervisory liability and that the defendants provided adequate medical
care. The court noted that the inmate was immediately treated after the attack by the another
inmate, the next day he was again treated by a physician and three days later was taken to a
hospital for X-rays which showed no injury. The inmate had allegedly reported being threatened
by other inmates but the court held that the inmate failed to show that the sheriff, prison
superintendent or state commissioner for corrections either knew of a substantial risk to the
inmate or harbored a subjective belief that he faced potential injury from other inmates. The
inmate testified that he had conversations with the sheriff and jail administrator in which he
indicated that he had received threats of bodily harm from other inmates and that he sent a letter
through the internal mail system addressed to the sheriff and others asking to be moved to an
alternate housing unit "to prevent any further aggression or physical assault." (Barnstable County
Jail and House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSPORT
RESTRAINTS
PROTECTION

Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equipment Co., 183 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 1999). A pretrial
detainee who had suffered injuries that rendered him quadriplegic after he was placed with
his hands cuffed behind his back in a police transport vehicle, and was thrown forward into
the bulkhead of the passenger compartment, brought a § 1983 action against city officials.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals court affirmed.
The appeals court held that neither the purchase of patrol wagons which lacked safety restraints,
nor the manner of transporting arrestees in those wagons, showed deliberate indifference to the
rights of the pretrial detainee. (Kansas City Police Department, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Tapp v. Banks, 72 F.Supp.2d 739 (E.D.Ky. 1999). An arrestee brought a civil rights action against
state police officers and county jail officials, alleging that he was denied proper medical care for an
injury to his knee. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that
the fact that the arrestee remained in the county jail for 20 days with a broken patella did not
amount to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court noted that the arrestee
was taken to a hospital after his arrest, that the hospital did not diagnose any knee problems, and
that the arrestee subsequently did not ask to see a physician. (Perry County Jail, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Thornton v. City of Montgomery. 78 F.Supp.2d 1218 (M.D.Ala. 1999). The relatives of a jail inmate
who committed suicide while in custody filed a wrongful death action. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the jail officials' failure to prevent the suicide
did not violate sections 1985 and 1986 and that the city could not be held liable under § 1983. The
court found that whether the jail officials handled the inmate under a mental health policy or
under their suicide risk policy, they were no less diligent and were adequately trained in both
32.76

policies. The court found that the city and the jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's medical needs. The court held that the officials were not liable for failing to train jail
officers and staff. The detainee died of asphyxiation and a spoon was found in his mouth. He had
been placed in a cell reserved for inmates with mental health problems after he repeatedly
claimed he was going to die during the admission process. (Montgomery City Jail, Alabama)
U.S. Appeals Court
WORK

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236 (3rd Cir. 1999). A detainee brought a prose§ 1983
action against state prison officials alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by
being compelled to work in a prison cafeteria while he was a pretrial detainee. He also alleged he
was denied meaningful access to courts by being compelled to work in the cafeteria while
preparing an appeal from his conviction. The detainee asserted that he was entitled to
compensation pursuant to the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
The district court dismissed the complaints. The appeals court held that the detainee failed to
state a claim for meaningful access to court, and that prisoners and pretrial detainees who
perform intra·prison work are not entitled to minimum wages under FLSA. (Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
GRIEVANCE
ACCESS TO COURT

Trobaugh v. Hall, 176 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1999). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against
county officials alleging violation of his First Amendment right to petition for the redress of
grievances was violated when he was placed in administrative segregation for filing repeated
grievances. The district court entered summary judgment for the jail administrator and awarded
$1 nominal damages against the deputy. The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court abused its
discretion by awarding only $1 in compensatory damages, which was "patently insufficient" to
compensate for the injury suffered by the inmate by being placed in segregation. The appeals court
also held that the deputy who placed the inmate in segregation was potentially subject to punitive
damages for his conduct. The inmate had filed a grievance to contest his transportation to court
early and when it was denied he filed a second grievance which was also denied. The inmate filed
a third grievance challenging the apparent lack of an appeal process, which was also denied. The
day after his third grievance was denied he was awakened at 12:30 a.m. and was escorted to an
isolation cell (Linn County Correctional Center, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
BAIL REFORM ACT
BAIL

U.S. v. Battle, 59 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.D.C. 1999). In a criminal proceeding the district court
held that a defendant who had a history of committing crimes while on pretrial release
represented a serious risk of flight and was thus subject to pretrial detention. The court noted
that the defendant had been convicted of two violations of the Bail Reform Act for failing to
appear when required. (U.S. District Court, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
SPEEDY TRIAL
BAIL REFORM ACT

U.S. v. Enriguez, 35 F.Supp.2d CD.Puerto Rico 1999). A defendant challenged his
pretrial detention and sought dismissal of his indictment alleging failure to comply
with speedy trial requirements. The district court held that the defendant should be detained,
noting that his alleged offense was serious and was punishable by up to life imprisonment, the
weight of evidence against him was strong, and although he had family ties he also had a prior
record of seven felonies. The court also found that the defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial
rights were not violated, even though the earliest trial date was in July 1997, and the trial had not
commenced as of January 1999. (United States District Court, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Heatley, 41 F.Supp.2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). A pretrial detainee moved to suppress
evidence seized from his nonlegal correspondence. The district court denied the motion, finding
that although the detainee had an expectation of privacy in his nonlegal mail, the evidence was
secured under a valid warrant. The court noted that even though the detainee had signed a form
acknowledging that prison staff could open and read his general correspondence, the detainee was
not "signing away any remnant of protection the law otherwise might have afforded him."
<Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York)

MAIL

U.S.Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

U.S. v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 1999). A pretrial detainee who was found incompetent to stand
trial sought a review of an administrative order that permitted medical personnel to forcibly treat the
detainee with antipsychotic medication. The district court upheld the order and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court vacated the order and remanded the case. The appeals court found that
the detainee was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing before the district court before being forcibly
medicated, but that remand was required to determine whether a correctional officer had sufficient
education and experience to act as the detainee's staff representative. According to the appeals court,
medical personnel had an affirmative obligation to ensure that the detainee was represented by a
qualified staff member. (United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

U.S. v. Rollack, 90 F.Supp.2d 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). A defendant moved to suppress evidence seized
in prison mail and cell searches that occurred during his pretrial detention. The district court held
that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison mail when a search is
performed or initiated by law enforcement officials other than those in charge of a prison and is
unrelated to institutional security concerns. The court noted that a prisoner had a reasonable
expectation to privacy in his mail as to searches that did not target concealed weapons, drugs orother items clearly related to security inside the prison. The court held that seizure of letters from
his jail cell and mail was valid despite the overbreadth of warrants that authorized seizure. The
32.77

court found that seizure of non·mail writings and photographs from the defendant's cell was
invalid. (Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Central Jail, North Carolina)
U.S. District Court
HOME DETENTION

U.S. v. Rudisill, 43 F.Supp.2d 1 CD.D.C. 1999). A detainee who had been committed to the
custody of the U.S. Department of Justice was brutally attacked by eight other inmates while
detained at the Central Detention Facility of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections.
He remained comatose in a hospital for nearly a month and was eventually released to his
mother's care for outpatient treatment under a home detention program. The federal district court
determined that the detainee was no longer competent to stand trial and that he would not become
competent in the foreseeable future. The court noted that the detainee appeared to have benefitted
from his home confinement. (District of Columbia Central Detention Facility)

U.S. Appea1s Court
USE OF FORCE
PUNISHMENT

U.S. v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37 (2nd Cir. 1999). A corrections officer who was convicted of violating an
inmate's constitutional rights appealed his conviction on three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 42,
that makes it a criminal act to willfully deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States while acting under the color of law. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the officer's acts constituted punishment and rose to the level of a constitutional violation.
The corrections officer was found to have stepped on an inmate's penis and to have perpetrated
other assaults on inmates. The officer, who was six feet two inches tall and weighed over 300
pounds, instructed an inmate to kneel and put his penis on a horizontal bar of his cell, and then
stood with his full weight on the penis for a few seconds. The court concluded that the officer was
acting under the color of state law, noting that the officer was "on duty and in full uniform, was
acting within his authority to supervise and care for inmates under his watch when the assaults
occurred." (Orleans County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Weaver v. Tipton County. Tenn., 41 F.Supp.2d 779 (W.D.Tenn. 1999). The administrix of the
estate of a detainee who had died of alcohol withdrawal while in a county jail brought a § 1983
action against county officials alleging deliberate indifference to the deceased detainee's medical
needs. The district court granted summary judgment, in part, in favor of the defendants. The
district court held that the protections of the Eighth Amendment do not attach to pretrial
detainees and that the Captain of the jail was not deliberately indifferent to the needs of the
detainee by failing to act when he was left in a single·occupancy cell with no medical care. The
court also held that jail supervisors were not liable for failure to supervise their subordinates. The
court noted that the jail Captain had no contact with the detainee during his incarceration and
knew nothing about the incarceration until after the detainee's death, and that the supervisors did
not implicitly authorize, approve or acquiesce in their subordinates' failure to provide medical
treatment to the detainee. According to the court, the jailers' failure to provide medical care to the
detainee over the course of six days was not a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. The court cited
hundreds of other instances in which other inmates received medical attention. But the court
denied summary judgment for the sheriff and the county, finding that it was precluded by issues of
fact as to whether their failure to ensure that adequate staffing, medical training, and supervision
policies were in place and were enforced. (Tipton County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PROTECTION

Wilson v. City of Chanute, 43 F.Supp.2d 1202 CD.Kan. 1999). The parents of a detainee who
died of a drug overdose shortly after being released from police custody brought a § 1983
action alleging conspiracy and violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
defendants moved for summary judgment, which was granted in part and denied in part by the
district court. The court held that the police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity
because there was sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical
needs. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence that the police chief failed to properly
direct or supervise officers. Summary judgment was also denied for the city because the court
found fact questions as to whether municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the
officers' alleged violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court found sufficient evidence
to create an inference that two police officers and a detective had agreed to deprive the detainee of
his due process rights by releasing him rather than providing medical treatment, for the purposes
of a § 1983 conspiracy claim. (City of Chanute, Kansas)

2000
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Adams v. Franklin, 111 F.Supp.2d 1255 (M.D.Ala. 2000). A county jail detainee brought a§ 1983
action against county officials alleging he was denied medical treatment for two hours after he
complained about symptoms manifesting an imminent heart attack. The district court found that
the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity because the detainee's right to medical care
was clearly established at the time of the violation. But the district court found that the Eleventh
Amendment provided absolute immunity to sheriff department personnel in this § 1983 action
because they were deemed to be executive officers of the state under state law. (Elmore County
Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
GRIEVANCE

A.N.R. Ex Rel. Reed v. Caldwell, 111 F.Supp.2d 1294 (M.D.Ala. 2000). A 16·year-old detainee at a
county jail sued the sheriff alleging inadequate provision of educational programs. The district
court dismissed the case, finding that the detainee failed to comply with the exhaustion
requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Tallapoosa County Jail, Alabama)
32.78

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Anderson v. Simon, 217 F.3d 472 (T1' Cir. 2000). A widow of a county prisoner brought a§ 1983
action against a prosecutor alleging that he violated the prisoner's Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by failing to approve charges against him and ordering police to keep him in
custody until a lineup could be arranged, leading to his death from suicide. The district court
dismissed the action and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the prosecutor
was absolutely immune from the claim predicated on a delay in charging. The prisoner had been
held in a police lockup pending charging. During the night the prisoner began to experience
heroin withdrawal symptoms and told officers on duty that he was becoming depressed and
wanted to kill himself. A lineup was held the next afternoon and the prisoner was found dead in
his cell. hanging from a noose, early that evening. (25th District Police Station, Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PUNISHMENT

Benjamin v. Kerik. 102 F.Supp.2d 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Corrections officials who had entered into
consent decrees governing the conditions of New York City jails moved for immediate termination
of the decrees under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court terminated
provisions of the decree that addressed several operational issues. The court held that city jail
officials did not inflict punishment upon pretrial detainees by subjecting them to restrictive
housing, because disciplinary due process was required within 72 hours of an infraction leading to
the housing assignment. The court found that jail practices with respect to inmate correspondence
did not constitute a current and ongoing violation of federal court relief under the provisions of
PLRA, where mail was transmitted in a timely manner, without intrusion on the property rights
of the inmates and occasional problems were only isolated incidents of negligence. (New York City
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
GRIEVANCE

Bowman v. City of Middletown, 91 F.Supp.2d 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). An arrestee who was held for
19 days on suspicion of murder brought a § 1983 action alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution
and civil rights violations while confined. The district court held that denial of commissary
privileges for five days was not a due process violation, especially since the only deprivation
suffered was the inability to order cigarettes, which was the sole item the detainee desired from
the commissary. The court found that the jail superintendent was entitled to qualified immunity
from liability for his decision to have the pretrial detainee shackled when outside of his cell based
on the wording of the note that the detainee had sent to the superintendent complaining of his
loss of commissary privileges, because the right to complain to prison administrators was not
clearly established. The note asked "[who] do you think you are" and promised "I will see you or
whomever in court." (Orange County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELLS
CONDITIONS

Brown v. Bargery. 207 F.3d 863 (61h Cir. 2000). An inmate sought permission to proceed in forma
pauperis in his § 1983 action that alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights because his
sleeping bunk was installed upside down causing him to slide off and land on the concrete floor,
and that anchor bolts that fastened the bunk to the wall improperly protruded into the sleeping
area posing a potential for injury. The district court denied the inmate's motion finding the action
to be frivolous, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that
the inmate's claims could conceivably implicate an Eighth Amendment concern. (Hardeman
County Correctional Facility, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Butler v. Coitsville Tp. Police Dept., 93 F.Supp.2d 862 (N.D.Ohio 2000). The administrator of a
deceased detainee's estate brought a § 1983 action alleging that the detainee's rights were
violated by his arrest and detention. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and dismissed state law claims without prejudice. The district court found that the
detainee's slurred speech and unsteadiness during his arrest did not make the potential for an
alcohol seizure so obvious as to permit the inference that the arresting officer or other law
.enforcement officers acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs. The court
noted that although the detainee may have appeared intoxicated, he never complained of physical
distress, he signed a medical form stating that he suffered no medical ailment other than "bad
knees" and he explicitly stated that he typically suffered no ill effects when he ceased drinking
alcohol. The detainee had refused to submit to any sobriety tests and was processed at a township
police station. He was then transported to a jail and was placed in a detention cell after
completing intake and booking procedures. Seventeen hours after his admission the detainee
suffered an alcohol withdrawal seizure in his cell, falling and sustaining a serious head injury. He
was immediately taken to a hospital where he died three days later. <Mahoning County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
PROTECTION

Burciaga v. County of Lenawee, 123 F.Supp.2d 1076 (E.D.Mich. 2000). A pretrial detainee brought
a civil rights action against county officials, alleging harm as the result of housing him with an
assaultive prisoner. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court
held that the county did not violate the detainee's due process rights by housing him with another
detainee or by improperly classifying both inmates as medium·security inmates. Both inmates
had been previously incarcerated for assault. (Lenawee County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH

Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350 (2 nd Cir. 2000). A prisoner who had been confined for up to 72
hours after he was found incompetent to stand trial on a misdemeanor charge to allow for a
determination of the need for a civil commitment brought a § 1983 action. The district court
dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
appeals court held that the confinement did not violate the prisoner's due process rights but that
the prisoner had an equal protection right not to receive treatment that was more onerous than
32.79

that given to candidates for civil commitment. (New York State Office of Mental Health}
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Chavez v. Cady, 207 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2000). A former pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against a sheriff, jail administrator, correctional officers and nurse practitioner who supervised
the jail clinic, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals court held that issues of fact
precluded summary judgment for the nurse practitioner and the correctional officers. According to
the court, the actions of the nurse practitioner in the treatment of the detainee who had a
ruptured appendix may have represented a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment. The appeals court also found that the correctional officers may have been deliberately
indifferent by failing to follow the directives of the nurse practitioner. The court noted that the
county jail did not have its own written manual of policies for operation of the jail but rather
relied on the Illinois County Jail Standards which are issued by the Illinois Department of
Corrections. (Henry County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Cornelia v. Laib, 117 F.Supp.2d 754 (N.D.Ill. 2000). A detainee alleged that medical personnel
were deliberately indifferent to his diabetic condition. The district court granted partial summary
judgment to the defendants, finding that a nurse did not display deliberate indifference by
declining to send the detainee to a hospital, and a physician was not deliberately indifferent by
not authorizing the administration of insulin. The court noted that the nurse took the detainee's
vital signs and monitored his blood sugar level while she attempted to confirm the details of his
insulin regimen. The physician had refused to authorize the administration of insulin until the
detainee's insulin regimen could be confirmed. (Correctional Medical Services, Will County Adult
Detention Facility, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SUPERVISION

Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433 (D.C.Cir. 2000). A former District of Columbia jail
inmate who had been forced to perform a striptease in front of other prisons and male and female
guards, sued the District and corrections officials for§ 1983 violations. The district court entered a
jury verdict awarding $350,000 in compensatory and $5 million in punitive damages, and denied
the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. The appeals court atl'"irmed in part and
reversed in part. The appeals court held that the $350,000 award for mental and emotional
distress resulting from the§ 1983 violation was reasonable, but that the former inmate was not
entitled to punitive damages from the District for negligent supervision, because District law bars
the imposition of such awards against the District. The mental and emotional distress award was
supported, according to the court, by the fact that the inmate was denied library assistance
because she refused to have sex with the librarian, she was attacked with the assistance of
correctional officers, she was confined in isolation without underwear or a mattress, she felt
constant stress, anxiety and dread of imminent sexual attack, she had to sleep during the day for
fear of what guards might do to her at night, she suffered from insomnia and eating disorders, and
spent months emotionally and psychologically debilitated, withdrawn and depressed. The appeals
court agreed with the jury finding that the District's failure to train or supervise jail employees
amounted to deliberate indifference toward the female inmate's constitutional rights, so that the
District was liable under § 1983. The court noted that seven months prior to this incident the
district court had found the District liable under § 1983 for being deliberately indifferent to
repeated sexual abuse and harassment of female prisoners by correctional officers and for failing
to train staff to prevent such misconduct. According to the court, the fact that the District jail
officers sought to conceal the incident did not insulate the District from § 1983 liability based on
its deliberate indifference. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County. 209 F.3d 973 (-ri, Cir. 2000). An arrestee brought a§ 1983
action against a sheriff in his official capacity alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
violations. The district court denied the sheriffs motion to dismiss and the appeals court affirmed.
The appeals court held that the sheriff was a county officer when he managed the jail, and was
thus not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. According to the court, under Illinois law the
sheriff had final policymaking authority over jail operations, was designated as a county officer by
the state constitution, and the sheriff was required as warden of the jail to notify the county board
if he decided that the jail was insufficient to secure prisoners. The arrestee told arresting officers
that he suffered from a serious cardiac condition that required medication but they did not
provide him with medical treatment even though they saw him holding his chest. The arrestee did
not receive his medication until his release the next day. (DuPage County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Douglas v. Stanwick, 93 F.Supp.2d 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983
action against a jail physician and nurse alleging that he received inadequate medical care when
he was denied narcotic pain medication. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, finding that the prisoner did not show sufficient culpability on either the physician or
nurse's part to support his Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court noted that a mere
disagreement over proper medical treatment does not create a constitutional claim. The jail
physician had instructed the nurse to hold the detainee's narcotic prescription from an outside
doctor until nurses could determine if non·narcotic pain control medications would adequately
address the detainee's hand pain. (Monroe County Jail, New York)

32.80

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Dry v. U.S., 235 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000). Members of an Indian tribe brought a§ 1983 and
Federal Tort Claims Act against tribal law enforcement officers who allegedly committed torts
when arresting them. The district court dismissed the claims and the appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that city jailers did not violate the constitutional rights of tribal members by
detaining them, in accordance with cross·deputization agreements with the tribe, based on the
representations of tribal law enforcement officers that offenses had been committed. The court
noted that the jailers had no constitutional duty to question the tribal officers as to their probable
cause for arrest, to verify the validity of the grounds for detention under tribal law, or to conduct
an independent constitutional or historical analysis to determine whether the tribe's assertion of
jurisdiction over the detainees was legitimate. (City of Talihina and City of Clayton, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE

Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2000). A detainee alleged he was deprived of his due
process and First Amendment rights when he was given fifteen days of disciplinary segregation
after being found to have had unauthorized contact with a member of the general public by
handing a flier to a visitor without permission. The district court dismissed the detainee's actions
and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the detainee's 11·day pre-hearing
detention and 15-day disciplinary detention did not violate the detainee's due process rights. The
detainee had handed a member of a group who was touring the prison a note that stated
"Welcome to Louisiana, home of the INS Terrorist-Styled Concentration Camp where all
constitutional rights are dispensed solely on the basis of national origin." (Federal Detention
Center, Oakdale, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Estate of Novack Ex Rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2000). The estate and
mother of an inmate who committed suicide filed a § 1983 action against a county. The district
court granted summary judgment to the county and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that mere knowledge that an inmate is behaving violently or "acting in a 'freaky' manner" is
not sufficient to impute an awareness of a substantial risk of suicide for Eighth Amendment
purposes. The court found that jail personnel were not subjectively aware that the inmate posed a
high risk of suicide and there was not a pattern of suicides that led to the inference that the
county was aware that policies for treating mentally ill inmates were inadequate and chose to do
nothing. (Wood County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Frake v. City of Chicago, 210 F.3d 779 (71h Cir. 2000). The administrator for the estate of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide in a police lockup sued the city in state court and under § 1983.
After removing the action the city moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted.
The appeals court affll'med, finding that the city was not deliberately indifferent to the welfare of
pretrial detainees. According to the court, even though the city continued to place detainees in
cells containing horizontal metal bars despite past suicides by detainees using the bars, there was
no evidence that anyone had knowledge that this detainee was suicidal. The court noted that the
facility used a thorough screening process and took precautions to protect detainees from the risk
of suicide, facility personnel received suicide awareness training, cells were checked every fifteen
minutes··which "far exceeds" the hourly checks required in state municipal jail standards,
dangerous items were removed the detainees' possession, and cell construction was authorized by
state standards. (District 12 Chicago Police Department lockup)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3rd Cir. 2000). An inmate who had been detained in a county
prison while awaiting sentencing sued corrections officers and prison officials under § 1983 for the
alleged use of excessive force. A district court jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court aff1rmed, finding that whether the inmate was placed
in a restraint chair to stop his disruptive behavior and maintain prison order or for purposes of
punishment was a jury question and that placement of the inmate in a restraint chair for eight
hours did not violate substantive due process under the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that
the inmate was not kept in the chair any longer than was authorized, his physical condition was
checked every fifteen minutes and he was released every two hours for ten minutes to allow
stretching, exercise, and use of the toilet. He was examined by a nurse at the end of the eight-hour
period. According to the court, an inmate awaiting sentencing had the same status under the
Constitution as a pretrial detainee and the Due Process Clause protected him from the use of
excessive force amounting to punishment. (Berks County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE ATTEMPT
USE OF FORCE

Garcia v. City of Boston, 115 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.Mass. 2000). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against a city, a hospital and the hospital's emergency psychiatric services program, alleging
excessive force and denial of medical and psychological care. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants. The detainee had been arrested by the city police following a
domestic disturbance and was taken to a police station where he was booked and placed in a cell.
That evening the detainee made an apparent attempt to commit suicide by cutting his left wrist
with the aluminum top of a juice container that had been given to him with his dinner. An
ambulance was summoned but the detainee refused treatment. He was placed on the suicide list
at the station and handcuffed to a bar on the wall iq the booking area, where he could be closely
monitored. The following evening the detainee again attempted to commit suicide when he
obtained a book of matches and set fll'e to his own c)pthing while still handcuffed to the bar. He
sustained burns and was taken to a hospital. Hospiqtl personnel explored various mental health
alternatives for the detainee but he was eventually returned to the police station and handcuffed
to the bar, where he lit his shirt on fll'e fifteen minutes after returning from the hospital. The
32.81

detainee's clothes were taken away and he remained in the booking area. Later that day the
detainee pulled an officer's gun out of its holster, shot the officer and another prisoner, and was
then shot by another officer. The district court held that the officials and hospital staff were not
negligent in their failure to place the detainee in a state mental facility since the detainee was not
eligible for placement while charges were pending. The court also held that firing of a gun at the
detainee was not an excessive use of force because there was a clear need for the use of force, only
one round was fired, and the detainee sustained only a limited injury. (Boston Police Department,
Area B, District 2 Police Station, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriffs Dept., 228 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000). Survivors of an arrestee
who had committed suicide brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff's department and against the
sheriff and deputies. The district court denied individual defendants' motions to dismiss on the
ground of qualified immunity and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded the case. The appeals court held that the sheriff and senior deputy, who knew
of a prior suicide under similar circumstances, could have been found to have acted with
deliberate indifference to the arrestee's known suicidal tendencies, but that a newly-hired deputy
who only followed orders which were not facially outrageous, was entitled to qualified immunity.
The arrestee had been placed in a cell that had a significant blind spot and tie off points, and was
provided with a blanket and towel even though a prior detainee had hanged himself in the same
cell under similar circumstances. The female arrestee had been brought to the local jail by state
troopers who informed jail employees that she had tried to kill herself when she was
apprehended. She was placed in a "detox" cell which is used to house inmates who are intoxicated,
who need to be isolated for security reasons, or who are designated for placement on a suicide
watch. The arrestee was placed on a suicide watch, but the cell could be completely observed only
if an officer viewed it from an adjacent hallway. The following evening the arrestee was discovered
hanging from a light fixture in the cell, having not been observed by jail staff for as many as 45
minutes prior to being discovered. (West Feliciana Parish Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEPARATION

Janes v. Hernandez, 215 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2000). A traffic offender sued a county to recover for
alleged violation of his civil rights based upon a sheriff's policy of confining all manner of
arrestees, including those with prior felony records, in one large cell. The district court entered
judgment in favor of the offender and awarded attorney fees. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the sheriff, as the county policymaker, did not have to know that specific felons and other
inmates with whom the traffic offender was confined posed a risk of harm to him, in order to be
liable for violation of the offender's civil rights. The appeals court found that the section of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that limited attorney fees that may be awarded in suits by
inmates did not reply to the offender, who was not a prisoner when his complaint was filed.
<Bastrop County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Kelleher v. New York State Trooper Fearon, 90 F.Supp.2d 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). An arrestee
brought a § 1983 action against a police officer, alleging that he was subjected to an unlawful strip
search. The district court held that the issue of whether the officer had an objectively reasonable
suspicion to strip search the arrestee was for the jury, but that the jury award of damages in the
amount of $125,000 as compensation for emotional distress were excessive to the extent that they
exceeded $25,000. According to the court, although the unlawful strip search in which the arrestee
was touched by the officer was an "egregious intrusion" on the arrestee's person, there was no
corroborating medical evidence concerning the arrestee's emotional distress. The officer had
transported the arrestee to a state police barracks and conducted the strip search in a bathroom.
(~tate Police Barracks in Brewster, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Mason v. Village of Babylon, New York, 124 F.Supp.2d 807 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). An arrestee who was
taken into custody based on a traffic warrant that was later determined to have been recalled,
filed an action under § 1983 alleging false arrest and illegal search. The district court found that a
no-contact partial strip search, incident to arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because neither
the nature of the offense nor the circumstances of arrest raised any suspicion that would justify
such an intrusion. The court noted that the unconstitutionality of a blanket strip-search policy
had been well-established. The female arrestee was asked by a female arresting officer to lift her
shirt, lower her pants, and rearrange her undergarments to dislodge any contraband that might
be concealed. (Village of Babylon, Second Precinct, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS
ACCESS TO COURT
EQUAL PROTECTION

May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2000). A pretrial detainee who suffered from Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and was hospitalized brought an action against a county
and county officials. The district court denied summary judgment for the sheriff on qualified
immunity grounds and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court atimned, finding that the detainee
stated an equal protection claim by alleging that the sheriff, for no legitimate reason, treated
hospitalized detainees differently from jail detainees by shackling them to their beds and not
taking them to court on their assigned court dates. The appeals court found that the allegation
that the sheriffs restrictive policies caused the detainee to miss scheduled court appearances and
impeded access to his attorney stated a claim for violation of his right of access to court. The
appeals court found that the allegation that the sheriff implemented a policy that required him to
be shackled to his bed around the clock, despite his weakened state and despite being watched by
armed guards, was sufficient to state a substantive due process claim. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

32.82

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCH

Miller v. Kennebec County, 219 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against
an arresting officer, town, counties and county sheriffs alleging Fourth Amendment violations and
state law claims arising out of her arrest and detention. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
vacated and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the arresting officer was not entitled
to qualified immunity because the warrant under which he brought the arrestee to jail explicitly
directed that it was to be executed by bringing the defendant immediately before a sitting judge.
The court also found that a fact question precluded summary judgment on the unreasonable strip
search claim against the county where the arrestee was jailed. (Kennebec Co. and Knox Co.,
Maine)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE

Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 626 (W.D.La. 2000). A detainee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) who was awaiting removal from the United States brought a § 1983
action against parish jail officials challenging the constitutionality of his conditions of
confinement. The district court held that the failure of jail officials to segregate pretrial detainees
who were HIV positive did not violate the due process rights of non-infected detainees. The court
denied summary judgment for the officials on the issue of whether the detainee was transferred
before his request to see a dentist could be processed, finding issues of material fact and noting
that even a convicted inmate has a right of ready access to dental care. The court denied
summary judgment for the officials on the issue of whether the jail's dormitory violated state fire
and sanitation codes. The detainee alleged that the dormitory was overcrowded and had only
eight sinks, commodes and showers for 72 pretrial detainees that were housed in the dormitory.
According to the court, the detainee's allegation that he was denied a meal at the jail dining hall
on one occasion because he was not wearing shoes, as required by jail policy, was insufficient to
state a due process violation. The court denied summary judgment to the officials on the issue of
whether denial of a mattress during the initial part of his detention, which the court characterized
as a "basic human need," violated the due process rights of the detainee. The court denied
summary judgment to the officials on the allegation that preventing inmates from accessing
sexually explicit material was an exaggerated response to the officials' concerns about reducing
violence and sexual assault. (Avoyelles Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
SAFETY
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 643 (W.D.La. 2000). A detainee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) who was awaiting removal from the United States brought a § 1983
action against parish jail officials challenging the constitutionality of his conditions of
confmement. The district court found that the fact that INS detainees held at the parish jail had
fewer privileges than INS detainees held at a federal detention center did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The court also found that housing INS detainees with convicted prisoners did
not violate the Due Process Clause. The court denied summary judgment for the officials on the
allegation that the housing unit at the jail had serious sewage problems that created unsanitary
conditions. The court also denied summary judgment to the officials on the allegation that the jail
had an inadequate number of emergency exits. <Avoyelles Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING

Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 654 (W.D.La. 2000). A detainee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) who was awaiting removal from the United States brought a § 1983
action against parish jail officials challenging the constitutionality of his conditions of
confinement. The district court held that the allegation that the detainee was deprived of a
mattress and bed presented a cognizable constitutional claim. According to the court, the
detainee's allegation that he was forced to sleep on a cold, wet floor for seven hours presented a
due process claim. Jail officers had removed mattresses from a cell in which the detainee and
others were housed after they had placed barriers in front of the ventilation system in an attempt
to control the temperature in the cell. The court held that an issue of fact existed as to whether
jail officials were personally involved in creating and perpetuating the conditions. (Avoyelles
Parish Jail, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ralk v. Lincoln County, GA., 81 F.Supp.2d 1372 (S.D.Ga. 2000). A pretrial detainee brought an
action alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, finding that the county jail physician had not been deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. The detainee had alleged that the physician
failed to see him to treat his back pain but the court noted that even if the physician had been told
about the detainee's condition, he had previously prescribed medication for the pain. (Lincoln
County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 2000). A federal prisoner brought a§ 1983 action claiming
that a warden and correctional officers violated his constitutional rights when they confined him
in the prison's special housing unit. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. finding that the prisoner who had been convicted but not
yet sentenced had no liberty interest in not being confmed in a special housing unit pending a
disciplinary hearing. The court noted that the prisoner should be treated as a sentenced inmate
rather than as a pretrial detainee. (Federal Detention Center, Dublin, California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURETO
PROTECT

Richards v. Southeast Alabama Youth Ser. Diversion, 105 F.Supp.2d 1268 (M.D.Ala. 2000). The
mother of a detainee who had committed suicide while in custody brought a civil rights action
against city and county officials. The district court denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to the
32.83

city defendants and denied summary judgment for the defendants on a deliberate indifference
claim. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by issues of material fact as
to whether the actions of the police officer who transported the detainee to a privately·owned
facility rose above the level of mere negligence and constituted deliberate indifference, and
whether his actions were the proximate cause of the detainee's death. Despite his knowledge of
the detainee's suicidal tendencies, the officer failed to search the detainee for weapons, failed to
handcuff the detainee, and failed to inform the subsequent custodians of the detainee's suicidal
proclivities. The court also found fact issues as to whether the actions or inactions of juvenile
probation officers rose above the level of mere negligence and constituted deliberate indifference,
and whether the detainee was in the custody of the officers at the time he escaped from the
detention facility and committed suicide with a gun he had surreptitiously brought into the
facility. The detainee had been taken to a privately-operated "diversion center" and was left alone
in an intake room where he produced a gun, fled the center, walked into a wooded area and fatally
shot himself. (Southeast Alabama Youth Services Diversion Center)
U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Santiago v. C.O. Campisi Shield #4592., 91 F.Supp.2d 665 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). A pretrial detainee
brought a § 1983 action against a city corrections department alleging that an officer assaulted
him in his cell The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that a
corrections officer's alleged open·handed slap of the detainee after an altercation was de minimis
where the detainee suffered no physical injury. The court found that the slap was not sufficiently
repugnant to the conscience of mankind to constitute a due process violation. (Bronx County
Courthouse, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Scull v. New Mexico, 236 F.3d 588 (10th Cir. 2000). A detainee sued state and local officials
alleging he was unlawfully detained for 30 days without initiation of extradition proceedings. The
appeals court found that the detainee, who had previously signed a waiver of extradition as a
condition of parole in another state, had no constitutional or statutory right to specific extradition
procedures. The appeals court held that county detention center officials were not required by the
federal constitution or statute to independently investigate the detainee's claim that he was
entitled to be released pursuant to an order issued by a judge in another county. According to the
court, the officials believed they had lawful authority to imprison the detainee based on a "hit" on
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database indicating the existence of an
outstanding warrant for the detainee's arrest in another state. The court held that officials were
not liable for false imprisonment under state law. (Bernalillo Co. Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Skurstenis v. Jones, 236 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2000). A female detainee brought an action against a
county sheriff and sheriffs department staff, alleging that a strip search of her pelvic region
violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. The appeals court afi""irmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the jail policy that required
each inmate to be strip-searched by a same-sex jail staff member, before being placed in a cell or
detention room, violated the Fourth Amendment. But the court found that the detainee's
possession of a handgun at the time of her arrest provided the "reasonable suspicion" needed to
permit her strip search. The detainee was taken to a bathroom and observed by a female officer,
who instructed the detainee to disrobe but did not conduct a body cavity search. A second
medically-related search took place in the infirmary, with no one other than the detainee and a
male nurses assistant present. The search was conducted pursuant to a contract between the
county and a hospital, and involved an examination of the detainee's cranial and pubic hair for
lice. The court held that the search was reasonable in manner and scope and did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. (Shelby County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE A'ITEMPT

Stewart v. Robinson, 115 F.Supp.2d 188 (D.N.H. 2000). The guardian of a pretrial detainee
brought a civil rights action against police and county officials to recover for injuries sustained by
the detainee as the result of a suicide attempt that left the detainee in a vegetative state. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that neither the police
department nor the county could be held liable for the suicide attempt. The suicide attempt
occurred four days after the detainee was transferred from the police department's custody to the
jail Although police officers were possibly negligent by failing to complete an available intake
form, the court found that the department could not be held liable. The court held that the record
did not suggest that jail officials or the county were aware that the detainee posed a suicide risk
or that they should have known that jail cells posed an unreasonable danger to potentially
suicidal inmates. The court noted that police officials apparently failed to inform county jail
officials of the detainee's previous suicidal statements when he was transferred to the jail. The
detainee attempted to hang himself with a sheet tied around one of the supports of the upper
bunk in his cell, but was discovered approximately five minutes later and survived. (Carroll
County House of Corrections and Conway Police Department, New Hampshire)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Taylorv. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11 th Cir. 2000). In an action arising from the death of a pretrial
detainee, the district court denied summary judgment to three firemedics and a jail nurse and
they appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the
firemedics were not deliberately indifferent because they acted on whatever knowledge they had
of the detainee's condition and tried to check him out and administer aid, questioned him
repeatedly regarding his desire for treatment but the detainee declined treatment. (Mobile County
32.84

Jail, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Taylor v. Plousis, 101 F.Supp.2d 255 (D.N.J. 2000). A former county jail detainee brought a § 1983
action against a county, county officials and a private health services provider alleging inadequate
medical treatment. The district court found that the detainee's deteriorating prosthesis which
caused pain and mobility problems was a serious medical need and that fact issues needed to be
resolved concerning a doctor's efforts to seek a replacement and a nurse's alleged delayed delivery
of the replacement. (Cape May County Jail, New Jersey, and Correctional Health Services, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Thornhill v. Breazeale, 88 F.Supp.2d 647 (S.D.Miss. 2000). Survivors of a pretrial detainee who
committed suicide while in custody brought a § 1983 and wrongful death action. The district court
held that a sheriff and deputy did not act with deliberate indifference by placing the detainee in a
cell with a non-breakaway shower rod and neglecting to remove his shoes. But the court denied
summary judgment on the issue of whether the jail's lack of a written policy for suicide prevention
was reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. The plaintiffs challenged the lack of
a policy relating to the administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to detainees who
attempt suicide, and the lack of a written policy for detection and prevention of suicide. The
detainee was jailed awaiting trial for allegedly raping his estranged wife. The sheriff and his staff
were aware of the detainee's troubled mental history and that he had threatened suicide on two
prior occasions. He was initially placed in the jail's mental holding cell where he was isolated from
other inmates. He was placed on suicide watch which, according to an unwritten policy, required
him to be checked approximately every fifteen minutes. Items with which he could injure himself,
including his shoes, were taken from him. After three days without incident the detainee was
moved to a juvenile cell in the same section of the jail that was equipped with a toilet and shower
and had a non-breakaway shower rod. He remained on suicide watch. He was given his shoes and
allowed to leave his cell to exercise and watch television one morning but a deputy forgot to
remove his shoes when placing the detainee back in the cell. The detainee hung himself with his
shoelaces from the shower rod. He had been observed alive approximately ten minutes before he
was found hanging. After he was found hanging it took a period of time for the officers to open the
cell and he was eventually cut down and checked for vital signs. Finding no vital signs no
attempts were made to revive him. (Lamar County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Thornton v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 93 F.Supp.2d 1057 (D.Minn. 2000). An inmate who was a
federal prisoner incarcerated at a county jail sought damages arising from injuries he sustained
while at the jail. The district court held that a nurse did not treat the inmate with deliberate
indifference by failing to refer him to an emergency room for treatment of frostbite the night he
was admitted. The court found that a deputy subjectively acted with deliberate indifference when
she failed to notify a medical professional immediately about the prisoner's condition. The
prisoner informed the deputy that he could not feel most of his toes even though he had been
indoors in the custody of the U.S. Marshals for several hours, and that he had walked around
outside in frigid January temperatures for many hours before turning himself in. The court also
held that the inmate's complaint, which alleged a series of failures to attend to his medical needs
by several different county officials over a period of several weeks, adequately pleaded that
county officials had a widespread custom of failing to provide care for the prisoner's serious
medical needs. (Anoka County Jail, Minnesota, and United States Marshals Service)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
CONDITIONS
SEGREGATION

U.S. v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74 (2nd Cir. 2000). A defendant who was an alleged member of an
international terrorist organization moved to be released on bail and for modification of his
conditions of pretrial detention. The detainee was separated from the general population and
limited to only three telephone calls per month to his family. The district court denied the motions
and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee's conditions were
reasonably related to the government's asserted security concerns given ample evidence of the
detainee's extensive terrorist connections. (U.S. District Court, Southern Dist. of New York)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
MENTAL HEALTH

U.S. v. Keeven, 115 F.Supp.2d 1132 (E.D.Mo. 2000). A detainee sought judicial review of a
determination that psychotropic medication could be administered involuntarily because she was
a danger to herself and others, and to render her competent to stand trial. The district court held
that the detainee was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the forcible administration of
medication and that her due process rights were adequately protected. The court also found that a
psychiatrist who conducted an administrative hearing qualified as a neutral hearing officer
because he was not currently involved with the diagnosis or treatment of the detainee at the time
of the hearing. (Federal Medical Center, Carswell, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

U.S. v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C.Cir. 2000). A district court upheld the decision of the federal
Bureau of Prisons to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to a pretrial detainee. The
detainee appealed and the appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the record did not
support the district court's conclusion that the medication was essential for safety. (Federal
Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Wagner v. Bay City, Tex., 227 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2000). Survivors of an arrestee who died in police
custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, alleging the use of excessive force and
deliberate indifference to the need for medical attention. The district court denied summary
judgment for the officers. The appeals court reversed, entered judgment for the officers, and

32.85

remanded. The appeals court held that the officers did not act with deliberate indifference to a
risk of harm. The arrestee had resisted arrest and struck an officer with his fists. The arrestee
stopped breathing and died after officers sprayed him with pepper spray, placed him face down on
the pavement to handcuff him, placed a shin across his back to hold him down, and placed him on
his stomach in the back of a patrol car to transport him to the jail. The officers said that they
heard the arrestee groaning on the way to the police station and therefore believed he was still
breathing. Although the officers did not take the arrestee to the hospital, the court noted that
pepper spray decontamination could effectively be done in jail and the officers believed the
arrestee was still breathing. (Bay City, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Weiss v. Cooley. 230 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2000). A suspect in a highly publicized rape case, who had
been assaulted by fellow inmates while detained in a county jail, brought a § 1983 action against
the sheriff, jail commander and a jail officer. The district court dismissed the claims against the
sheriff and jail commander and granted summary judgment for the officer. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment
for the officer was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the officer had actual knowledge that
the suspect faced an objective risk of danger. Affirming the dismissal of the sheriff and jail
commander from the action, the appeals court noted that allegations that circumstances were
such that assaults on prisoners like the suspect were inevitable, and that the system used to
classify inmates for housing safety purposes were inadequate, were insufficient to provide
adequate notice to the sheriff and commander in order to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim
against them. Upon admission to the jail, the suspect had been asked if he had any enemies in the
jail, ifhe needed any special care, or ifhe had ever assaulted anyone or was contemplating
assaulting anyone, and the suspect answered "no" to each of these questions. (Morgan County
Jail, Indiana}

U.S. District Court
PRNACY
CONDITIONS

Wilson v. City of Kalamazoo, 127 F.Supp.2d 855 (W.D.Mich. 2000). Arrestees who were allegedly
detained in a city jail without any clothing or covering at all for varying periods of time, brought
eight separate actions against the city and others. After the actions were consolidated, the federal
district court ruled that the arrestees stated claims for violation of their Fourth Amendment right
to privacy and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The arrestees had been
detained without clothing or covering for periods ranging from six to eighteen hours with at least
limited exposure to viewing by members of the opposite sex. The court noted that the city's
legitimate interest in suicide prevention could have been just as well served by less humiliating
and degrading means. (Kalamazoo City Jail, Michigan}

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Wilson v. Shelby County, Ala., 95 F.Supp.2d 1258 (N.D.Ala. 2000). A female arrestee who was
strip searched before being placed in jail following her arrest on charges of driving under the
influence sued county officials for damages. The district court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss, finding that the policy of strip searching all jail admittees, regardless of personal
circumstances, violated the bodily privacy rights of the arrestee. The court held that the sheriff
was not entitled to qualified immunity from suit. The arrestee was kept in an isolated cell with no
opportunity to interact with the general population. The court noted that a strip search of an
arrestee charged with a minor offense may be conducted only when there is a reasonable suspicion
that the arrestee may be secreting drugs, weapons or other contraband on or in his or her body.
The arrestee was an 18·year·old high school student who had been stopped at a drivers' license
checkpoint and registered 0.08 percent blood alcohol. According to the arrestee, she was taken
into a restroom by a female deputy and was ordered to strip, and then according to the arrestee
"she checked my breasts and behind my ears and in my mouth and nose ...and then she told me to
squat and spread my butt apart and cough three times." (Shelby County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Yellow Horse v. Pennington County. 225 F.3d 923 (81h Cir. 2000). The administrator for the estate
of an inmate who hanged himself in a county jail brought a§ 1983 action against a county,
correctional officer and deputy sheriff. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the corrections officer who
removed the inmate from a suicide watch was entitled to qualified immunity because she followed
the routine practice for removing an inmate from a suicide watch, which included reviewing the
contact journal for information on the inmate's eating, sleeping and social habits, and
interviewing and evaluating the inmate. The appeals court found that the officer on duty at the
time of the suicide was not deliberately indifferent to the risk of suicide when she failed to make
more timely cell checks, despite learning from other prisoners that the inmate was upset and
talking about heaven and hell. According to the court, the county's suicide prevention policy did
not show deliberate indifference to the rights of others because it included inmate screening,
officer training, and annual policy review and was reasonable and comprised an effort to prevent
suicide. (Pennington County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Zentmyer v. Kendall County, Ill.• 220 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2000). A pretrial detainee brought a civil
rights action to recover for his jailers' alleged indifference to his serious medical needs. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that guards' failure to dispense the detainee's medication for a middle ear
infection consistently on schedule did not manifest any conscious disregard for the detainee's
health of the kind needed to support a Fourteenth Amendment claim, where guards administered
medication of various forms to the detainee 162 times over a 20-day period and were not shown to
32.86

have any knowledge that serious medical consequences might result from occasionally missing the
prescribed dosage. (Kendall County Jail, Illinois)
2001
U.S. Appeals Court
A'ITORNEY VISITS
RESTRAINTS
PRNACY

Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175 (2nd Cir. 2001). A city corrections department moved for
immediate termination of consent decrees requiring judicial supervision over restrictive housing,
inmate correspondence, and law libraries at city jails, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA). The district court vacated the decrees and pretrial detainees appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand the district court granted the
motion in part and denied it in part and the city appealed. The appeals affirmed. The appea1s
court held that the detainees were not required to show actual injury when they challenged
regulations which allegedly adversely affected their Sixth Amendment right to counsel by
impeding attorney visitation. The appeals court concluded that there was a continuing need for
prospective relief with respect to the detainees' right to counsel, and the relief granted by the
district court satisfied the requirements of PLRA. The court found that detainees were
experiencing unjustified delays during attorney visitation. The district court required procedures
to be established to ensure that attorney visits commenced within a specified time period
following arrival at the jail, and the city was instructed to ensure the availability of an adequate
number of visiting rooms that provide the requisite degree of privacy. The appeals court held that
the restraints used when moving certain detainees within, or outside, the jail, had a "severe and
deleterious effect" on the detainees given that such restraints were often painful and could result
in injury. The appeals court agreed with the district court that detainees were entitled to
reasonable afterthe·fact procedural protections to ensure that such restrictions were terminated
reasonably soon if they were not justified. These procedures include a hearing, written decision,
timely review of appeal from placement in special restraint status, and the opportunity to seek
further review based on good cause. (New York City Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE SCREENING

Boncher ex rel. Boncher v. Brown County. 272 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 2001). The estate of a prisoner
who had committed suicide brought a § 1983 action against jail officials alleging deliberate
indifference to the risk of the prisoner's suicide. The district court granted summary judgment for
the jail officials and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that evidence was
insufficient that jail officials were deliberately indifferent, even though intake officers had little
training and relied on a checklist that was deficient in several areas. The court noted that the
officers were making a judgment that was not likely to be assisted by special training and that the
jail was in compliance with the state's minimum standards for suicide prevention. The prisoner
had been arrested after a domestic altercation, and had a long history of alcoholism and had
attempted suicide at least three times, but this history was not known to the arresting officers or
the personnel of the jail. The prisoner was joking with officers during his admission to the jail and
the officers thought him to be a "happy drunk." He was placed in a regular cell instead of the jail's
suicide-watch cell, and he died within 45 minutes by hanging himself with a bedsheet. The
appeals court also held that the evidence offered by an expert witness was "useless" and should
have been excluded. The criminologist had testified that the rate of suicide in the jail (five suicides
in the preceding five years) was unusually high. (Brown County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2001). The father of a detainee who committed suicide in a
jail brought state tort claims and § 1983 claims against county officials. The district court granted
judgment as a matter of law to the defendants and the father appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the adult detainee committed common law suicide under
Virginia law, precluding the estate of the detainee from recovering on wrongful death and gross
negligence claims. The court found that even if the jail supervisor was informed that the detainee
was suicidal, he did not act with deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs because he
placed the detainee on "medical watch" which established constant video surveillance of the
detainee's cell The court noted that although the supervisor failed to place the detainee in a paper
gown or have him examined by medical staff, his failure amounted to, at most, negligence, not
deliberate indifference. (Virginia Beach General Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING

Castillo v. Cameron County, Tex., 238 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2001). Pretrial detainees and convicted
inmates held at a jail brought a class action under § 1983 against a county, state and various
individuals, alleging that overcrowding at the jail resulted in cruel and unusual punishment. The
state moved to terminate previously-entered injunctions and the district court dismissed the state
from the action and ordered continuation of injunctive relief designed to reduce the jail
population. The appeals court vacated the decision and remanded the case. The appeals court
found that the order continuing injunctive relief was a "prisoner release order" within the
meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and that the state had standing to appeal the
continuation of injunctive relief. The appeals court held that on remand, the district court must
determine if a continuing and ongoing constitutional violation exists, and if so, whether the
remaining requirements of PLRA are met. (Cameron County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Chilcote v. Mitchell, 166 F.Supp.2d 1313 (D.Or. 2001). A former prisoner and detainees at a
federal detention center sued officials alleging they were subjected to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials, finding no
32.87

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations from the size of the cell. The court noted that all
three occupants of the cell could not be off of their bunks at the same time because the cell was so
small, and the occupants were confined in the cell for 20 to 21 hours daily. The court found that
the crowding was necessitated by the volume of incoming detainees and the lockdown was needed
because of the danger posed by detainees had not yet been evaluated. The cells had been designed
to house two inmates and ranged in size from 80. 7 to 96 square feet. In a triple-bunk cell, 40 to 45
square feet of floor space is covered by the bunks, sink and toilet. The remaining floor space, 35 to
40 square feet "effectively does not permit all three occupants to be off their bunks at the same
time." There are no lockers, chairs or tables in the cells. (Fed'l Detention Ctr., Sheridan, Oregon)
U.S. Appeals Court
HANDICAP
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Chisolm v. McManimon. 275 F.3d 315 (3rd Cir. 2001). A hearing-impaired detainee brought a suit
against the warden of a pretrial detainment facility and county court system. alleging violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act, § 1983 and a state discrimination
law. for failing to provide an interpreter and other services. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that the county court system was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity during an ongoing merger with the state court system. The appeals court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) the effectiveness of
alternate aids or services provided to the detainee when the jail failed to provide a sign language
interpreter during the intake process, activate closed captioning capabilities on a prison
television, (2) provide a text device for transcribing telephone calls; and whether pencil and paper
were effective auxiliary aids in place of a sign language interpreter; and (3) whether exceptions to
institutional rules on telephone calls were an effective alternative to providing special telephones.
The court held that extradition was a "program" within the meaning of ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act such that the court was required to ensure the ability of the detainee to
participate in the hearing. When the detainee arrived at the detention facility on a Saturday, he
was locked down in his cell to keep him apart from the general population until Monday when
facility classification staff arrived. This practice was applied to all detainees admitted when
classification staff members were not working at the facility. Such unclassified detainees
consumed meals in their cells and did not have television or telephone privileges. When the
detainee was not provided with an interpreter at intake he became upset and was eventually
interviewed by a nurse, who concluded that he was a suicide risk. He was kept in solitary lockup
from Saturday until Tuesday. On Monday he was taken to meet with a classification staff
member. where he was interviewed and was given a medium security classification. But the staff
member had described the detainee as a "vagrant" in spite of the fact that he had worked for the
U.S. Postal Service for 13 years and had lived at the same address for three years. This error
added two points to his classification score, moving him from "minimum" security to "medium."
(Mercer County Detention Center, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT

Covillion v. Alsop. 145 F.Supp.2d 75 (D.Me. 2001). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action alleging
excessive use of force while he was confined. The district court found that the arrestee failed to
show excessive use of force based on the allegedly freezing temperature of his holding cell. The
arrestee had alleged that he had been placed in the cell "where they turned the freezer on.. " and
implied that the jail administrator was responsible for cooling the cell. The court noted that the
thermostat that controls the cell temperature also controls the temperature of the jail control
room, booking room. and visitors' room. (Somerset County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Craw v. Gray. 159 F.Supp.2d 679 (N.D.Ohio 2001). An arrestee sued law enforcement officers
under § 1983 asserting claims for use of excessive force. The district court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the officers, finding that the allegations did not support a claim for
inadequate training of an officer and that past ''use of force" incident reports did not support the
claim for inadequate supervision of the officer. According to the court, the assertion that a
particular officer may be unsatisfactorily trained does not alone "suffice to fasten § 1983 liability"
on a municipality for failure to train. The court noted that none of the reports showed that the
deputy acted improperly. The officer had brought the arrestee to a county jail and during the
booking process an altercation between the arrestee and the officer resulted in a right hip fracture
and dislocation for the arrestee. <Mercer County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Curry v. Kerik. 163 F.Supp.2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against corrections officials alleging violation of the due process clause arising out of dangerous
conditions. The court held that the detainee stated a due process violation by alleging that he was
exposed to an unsanitary and hazardous showering area for over nine months. The court found
that the detainee's allegation that officials negligently appointed, trained and supervised
employees and failed to enforce rules requiring facility inspections and addressing repair
complaints were sufficient to show the personal involvement of the officials. The detainee alleged
that he had alerted the officials to dangerous conditions on several occasions, and the conditions
led to his injury when he fell in a shower. which stated a claim of deliberate indifference according
to the court. The inmate alleged that the shower facility in his unit leaked, tiles were falling off
the wall, and there were no shower curtains or floor mats. (North Infirmary Command,
Correctional Facility. New York City Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Davis v. Hill, 173 F.Supp.2d 1136 (D.Kan. 2001). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
county. sheriff, and employees alleging that he was the victim of excessive force while detained.
32.88

The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion in part,
and denied it in part. The court held that fact issues as to whether sheriffs deputies beat the
arrestee senseless in his cell precluded summary judgment on the detainee's Fourth Amendment
excessive force claim. The court also found that the arrestee could maintain a suit against
deputies who were near the cell at the time, despite his inability to identify the two who allegedly
administered the beating. The arrestee was allegedly handcuffed in his cell during a staff shift
change. The arrestee was yelling and kicking his cell door and alleged that an officer entered the
cell and hit him behind his ear, knocking him into the steel bed and against a steel wall, and then
ground his thumb behind the arrestee's ear. According to the arrestee, another officer entered and
the two "proceeded attacking and torturing me on every joint in my body..." (Sedgwick County
Adult Detention Facility, Kansas)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Doan v. Watson, 168 F.Supp.2d 932 (S.D.Ind. 2001). Former inmates filed a§ 1983 suit against a
former and current sheriff, individually and in their official capacities, alleging unconstitutional
strip search policies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the former inmates,
finding that the jail policy of stripping inmates and requiring them to undergo a delousing
procedure was an unreasonable search. According to the court, the policy authorized a blanket
strip search without justification. The court noted that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
did not require the former inmates to produce evidence of physical injury to pursue their claims.
The inmates had been arrested for misdemeanor offenses and were subjected to intake searches
before entering the general jail population. (Floyd County Jail. Indiana)

U.S. District Court
SillCIDE

Ellis ex rel. Lanthorn v. Jamerson, 174 F.Supp.2d 747 (E.D.Tenn. 2001). The mother and the
minor child of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action against
county jail officials. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the county jailor who was
on duty at the time of the detainee's suicide was entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs
attempted to introduce evidence that the jailor was watching video surveillance monitors and saw
the detainee fashion a noose and place it around his neck but did not summon help immediately.
The court refused to allow a statement made by the county sheriff to the media to be used as
evidence, even though it might support the assertion that jail staff did not act expediently to
prevent the detainee's death. (Washington County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Gailor v. Armstrong, 187 F.Supp.2d 729 (W.D.Ky. 2001). The estate of a deceased pretrial
detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county and correctional officers for the beating death of
the detainee by officers. The district granted summary judgment in favor of the county, finding
that there was insufficient evidence to hold the county liable, but denied summary judgment for
the officers. The court held that fact issues remained as to whether the officers' use of force was
excessive. The court ruled that the officers and their supervisor were not entitled to qualified
immunity. The court held that the county was not liable under § 1983 because evidence that the
officers failed to follow the county's use of force policy, officials allegedly falsified reports, and
evidence that some officers received only limited use of force training, did not demonstrate custom

or usage necessary to support a § 1983 claim. The court denied summary judgment for a
supervisor who allegedly failed to intervene when she saw excessive force being used against the
detainee. (Jefferson County Department of Corrections, Kentucky)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady. 141 F.Supp.2d 304 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). Male and female detainees
sued a city claiming they were strip searched under an unconstitutional city policy. The district
court held that the city policy of strip searching all detainees who were awaiting court action
violated the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the police did not have reasonable
suspicion to strip search a male detainee and a female detainee, who were charged with minor
offenses. The court noted that the Fourth Amendment precludes strip or body cavity searches of
arrestees charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses unless officials have reasonable
suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based on the crime charged,
particular circumstances of the arrestee, or the circumstances of the arrest. (City of Schenectady,
New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Hawkins v. Comparet·Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2001). A convicted prisoner who had a
"stun belt" placed on him, and activated, when he appeared in court for sentencing, brought a §
1983 action. The district court certified a class action and granted a preliminary injunction. The
appeals court reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the class of all persons
in the custody of the county sheriff was improperly certified since the convicted prisoner could not
serve as a representative for those prisoners who had not yet been convicted. The appeals court
also found the district court injunction against the use of the belt was overbroad because it did not
allow for use of the belt to protect courtroom security, such as restricting violence or preventing
escape. But the court noted that even at sentencing, where a defendant's guilt is no longer in
dispute, shackling is inherently prejudicial and detracts from the dignity and decorum of the
proceeding, and impedes the defendant's ability to communicate with his counsel. (Los Angeles
County, California)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Hedrick v. Roberts, 183 F.Supp.2d 814 (E.D.Va. 2001). Pretrial detainees who were assaulted and
injured by other inmates brought separate actions in state court against a sheriff. The cases were
consolidated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff. The court held
that the detainees were exposed to a substantial risk of harm in violation of the Eighth and
32.89

Fourteenth Amendments, but that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent and was entitled to
qualified immunity. The court noted that the sheriff took immediate and reasonable measures to
alleviate problems associat.ed with the overcrowded jail and provided medical treatment to
detainees who were injured. (Hampton Jail, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SUICIDE

Holland v. City of Atmore, 168 F.Supp.2d 1303 <s.D.Ala. 2001). Survivors of an inmate who
committed suicide during his period of pretrial confinement filed a § 1983 action. The district
court grant.ed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that jail staff did not
have a duty to take any precautions to prevent his suicide, where the inmat.e had not shown a
strong likelihood of taking his life. The inmate had been admitted to the city jail aft.er being
arrested for driving under the influence and other offenses. He was booked into the facility and
locked down. Within thirty minutes he was found dead or dying in his cell, having used his
shoelaces to hang himself. The plaintiffs had argued that the inmate had previously attempted to
take his own life and that city police knew about these attempts. (Atmore City Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Johnson v. Herman, 132 F.Supp.2d 1130 (N.D.lnd. 2001). A detainee who was incarcerated
beyond his release date brought a § 1983 action against jail authorities, alleging violation of his
substantive due process rights. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants,
finding that a jailer's record notations that a judge had ordered the detainee to remain in jail and
later had ordered the detainee released, were admissible as non-hearsay evidence that the jailer
did not act with deliberate indifference in retaining custody. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by an issue of material fact as to whether the jail's "Inmate Request
Form" policy, which was used to correct defects in its "will call" policy for holding detainees
following their appearances in court, was being implemented in a manner suggesting deliberate
indifference to the right of detainees to be timely released. The court noted that the jailers were
not entitled to qualified immunity because the right of a detainee not to be held without a court
order was clearly established at the time of the incident. (Allen County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Jordan v. Cobb County, Georgia, 227 F.Supp.2d 1322 (N.D.Ga. 2001). A pretrial detainee brought
a§ 1983 action against a jail officer and a county, alleging excessive force, wrongful seizure, and
assault and batt.ery. The district court held that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity
and that a fact issue as to whether the officer violated the detainee's substantive due process
rights, precluded summary judgment. The court found that the county could not be held liable for
the officer's alleged conduct. The detainee had been arrested for suspicion of driving under the
influence of alcohol and was detained in a holding cell at a police precinct. While in the holding
cell, the detainee allegedly resisted being handcuffed by the officer. After a struggle or altercation,
the detainee was shot twice in the abdomen by the officer. There were no witnesses to the
shooting. The court not.ed that "virtually all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
altercation and shooting are in dispute." (Cobb County Police Department, Precinct One. Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Kostrzewa v. City of Troy. 247 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001). An arrestee sued a city and police officers
asserting claims for use of excessive force. The district court dismissed the case but the appeals
court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the allegations supported a claim for
use of excessive force and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The appeals
court found that the city's handcuff policy, that required all detainees to wear handcuffs,
supported a§ 1983 claim of the arrestee who allegedly suffered pain and injury from being
restrained with handcuffs that were too small for his wrists, despite being arrested for a non·
violent misdemeanant offense. (City of Troy, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Lee v. Perez, 175 F.Supp.2d 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). An arrestee brought an action against a
correctional officer, alleging he had been unconstitutionally strip searched. The district court
entered a jury verdict in favor of the officer and the arrestee moved for reconsideration. The
district court granted the motion, finding that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's
conclusion that the officer relied on permissible factors in making his decision to perform a body
cavity search on the arrestee. According to the court, the officer t.estified that he had not
considered the nature of the two misdemeanors with which the arrestee had been charged and
could not identify any charact.eristic of the arrest.ee that led to his conclusion that the arrestee
might have been carrying contraband. The arrestee had spent the night in a police holding cell
and was arraigned in court the next morning. Bail was set at $250 but the arrestee was not
allowed to post bail at the police station using money that had been in his possession at the time
of his arrest. He was transported to the local jail where he was processed in. The intake process
included a "personal hygiene check/visual body search" which consisted of having the arrestee
remove his clothes, followed by a visual inspection of his body. The officer contended that this
hygiene check was not the same as a strip search because it did not require the inmate to open his
mouth or bend over and spread his buttocks. (Orange County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Lewis v. Board of Sedgwick County Com'rs., 140 F.Supp.2d 1125 (D.Kan. 2001). A detainee
brought a federal civil rights suit against a county alleging that jail officers used excessive force
against him. A jury returned a verdict of $500,000 in favor of the inmate and the county asked for
a new trial or for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted judgment as a matt.er of
law, finding that evidence was insufficient to show that the county had been deliberately
indifferent to the use of excessive force against detainees at the county detention facility.
According to the court, the size of the damage award suggested that the jury was excessively or
32.90

improperly motivated by its desire to punish the county. The court held that the county was not
deliberately indifferent to the rights of the detainee because it provided training designed to
prevent the use of excessive force at both a training academy and on·the·job, and had established
a use-of-force policy of which its detention officers were aware. The court found that it was not a
"glaring omission" to fail to instruct detention officers during training that they were prohibited
from standing on a detainee's back in an effort to restrain a person. The court held that it was not
deliberate indifference by the county to state in county training manuals that it was permissible
to use pressure point tactics when inmates were being placed in a restraint chair, where the
manuals cautioned that the tactics were to be used with the minimal amount of force necessary to
gain compliance. The court noted that the county had encountered only 22 complaints of excessive
force in its jail from approximately 90,000 detainees who went through the facility. (Sedgwick
County Adult Detention Facility, Kansas)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Lutz v. Smith, 180 F.Supp.2d 941 (N.D.Ohio 2001). A man who was arrested for domestic violence
brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and others alleging deliberate indifference to his medical
needs while he was in custody. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court found no violation in the actions of the sheriff's staff when they declined to
accompany the arrestee in an ambulance that transported him from the jail to a hospital to treat
him for an overdose of medication he ingested before he was arrested. The arrestee was returned
to the jail after receiving treatment. The court held that the county acted properly by ensuring
that the arrestee received treatment when he became ill in custody and the county was not
required to do so in a manner that made it responsible for the expense of the treatment. (Hardin
Co. Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
CLASSIFICATION

Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2001). A pretrial detainee who was severely injured in
a gang-instigated jailhouse riot brought a civil rights suit against a county sheriff and jail officers,
alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his safety. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the failure of the jail to segregate
inmates by gang affiliation was not a constitutional violation, given the high number of gang
members housed in the jail and the burden that would be placed on administrators by such a
policy. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the
detainee had asked an officer for protective custody and was ignored, and whether an officer
delayed in summoning help when fighting broke out. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

McGregor v. City of Olathe, KS, 158 F.Supp.2d 1225 (D.Kan. 2001). An arrestee brought a pro se
action against a city and city police officers challenging the removal of her keys from her
pantyhose as an illegal search. The arrestee was arrested and transported to a police station
where she was taken into a room to be searched. A female officer told the arrestee that they were
looking for some keys and the arrestee responded that the keys were in her pantyhose because
she did not want to be searched. The officer removed the keys from the arrestee's pantyhose. The
district court held that the search was not illegal (Olathe Police Department, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Morris v. Crawford County. Ark., 173 F.Supp.2d 870 (W.D.Ark. 2001). A detainee in a county jail
brought a § 1983 action and state law battery claims against the county, sheriff and deputies. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion in part and
denied it in part. The court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the type of force
used by a deputy against the detainee, and whether the detainee sustained injuries, precluding
summary judgment. The court also found that the deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity
for his alleged use of force on the detainee, who was allegedly not resisting. There was evidence
that the deputy used a ''knee drop" on the detainee, thereby severing his intestine. (Crawford
County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Napier v. Madison County, KY., 238 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 2001). An arrestee who suffered from
complete kidney failure and who was kept from scheduled dialysis treatment during his period of
detention, brought a § 1983 action against a county and jail officials. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that
the detainee failed to show any detrimental effects from the delay in treatment. The court noted
that the detainee, prior to his confinement, had missed over 40 treatments during the same year,
and did not go directly to the hospital after his release from confinement. (Madison County
Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Naumoffv. Old, 167 F.Supp.2d 1250 (D.Kan. 2001). A mother whose son had committed suicide
while confined in a jail brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff. The sheriff moved for
summary judgment and the court granted the motion, finding that the mother failed to allege an
injury to her own constitutional rights. The court held that the mother lacked standing to bring
the § 1983 action because she brought the action in her individual capacity rather than as
representative of her son's estate. The mother did not make a claim for deprivation of familial
association or otherwise allege injury to her own constitutional rights. (Wabaunsee C. Jail,
Kansas)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Pittman v. Kurtz, 165 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Kan. 2001). An inmate brought an action against jail
officials and a county jail alleging that he was physically assaulted by staff while he was
32.91

incarcerated at the jail, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
finding that the force applied by jail officials to restrain the inmate did not violate his rights. The
inmate had refused to go to his cell after multiple orders to do so, and struck at one official with a
pencil, hitting him in the neck and shoulder area between six and ten times. The altercation
lasted only a few seconds and the inmate's injuries were minor. (Sedgwick County Jail, Kansas)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RELEASE
PROTECTION FROM

HARM

Ramsey v. Schauble, 141 F.Supp.2d 584 (W.D.N.C. 2001). A former detainee whose finger tip was
severed after a sheriff's deputy allegedly shut a cell window on it, brought a pro se complaint
against the deputy and the sheriff. The district court held that the detainee stated a cognizable
civil rights complaint against the sheriff, and the detainee pled a cause of action under a state law
that provided that a keeper of a jail must pay treble damages if he/she does any wrong or injury to
a detainee, and is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. The court found that jail officials ignored the
detainee's cries for help after he was injured by the deputy and displayed deliberate indifference
to his need for quick medical attention to preserve the possibility of reattaching the fmger. The
detainee was released from custody several hours after he was returned from the hospital, but
officials refused to give the detainee pain medication prescribed by the hospital, requiring him to
return to the jail periodically over the next several days to receive each pill individually. (Watauga
County Law Enforcement Center, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2001). A misdemeanor detainee in a local correctional
facility sued a county and various individuals, challenging the policy of requiring strip searches of
all detainees regardless of the nature of the crime for which they were detained. The district court
granted summary judgment for the detainee and awarded $1 in nominal damages. The appeals
court affirmed in part and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the county's strip search
policy violated the Fourth Amendment and its illegality was clearly established in 1995, but the
detainee was not entitled to a new trial on the question of damages. The court noted that the
searching officer did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the search of the detainee, and that
even if other officers had information that may have justified the search, the information was not
relayed to the searching officer. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Spencer v. Sheahan, 158 F.Supp.2d 837 (N.D.Ill. 2001). A former pretrial detainee brought a§
1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The district court denied
summary judgment for the defendants. The detainee was a known diabetic who suffered from a
cut between two toes on his right foot and subsequently developed an infection that resulted in
two amputations and stump revision surgery. The court noted that there was a seven-day delay
between the time that a physician observed "positive skin changes" on the detainee's foot and the
time of diagnosis and treatment. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2001). Detainees brought a§ 1983 action
against a county and sheriff's department seeking damages for overdetention. The district court
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the county would be subject to liability under § 1983 and that the sheriff's department was
not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because the department was not acting as an arm
of the state when it administered county jails. Before an inmate is released from custody the
sheriff's department conducts a check of a computerized database to confirm that the inmate is
not wanted by any other law enforcement agency. But the department's policy requires this check
to be run only after all wants and holds that arrive on a given day are entered into the database.
Entering wants and holds can take up to two days, resulting in extended incarceration for inmates
beyond their release date. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
ALCOHOIJDRUGS

Thompson v. Upshur County, TX, 245 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2001). Parents whose son had died of
medical conditions associated with his delirium tremens while he was a pretrial detainee in a
county jail, sued under § 1983. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds and the defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the sheriff of the jail to which
the detainee was first admitted was entitled to qualified immunity in connection with the death of
the detainee, which occurred following his transfer to another county jail that had the
detoxification facilities that his jail lacked. The sheriff of the jail in the receiving county did not
violate any clearly established right in failing to instruct his staff on the potentially life·
threatening nature of medical conditions associated with delirium tremens and was entitled to
qualified immunity, according to the appeals court. But the appeals court found that a sergeant at
the jail in which the detainee died was not entitled to qualified immunity because of fact questions
as to whether she had instructed her subordinates not to disturb her at home unless a detainee
was on the verge of death, or whether she had otherwise interfered with the detainee's receipt of
medical care. (Upshur County Jail and Marion County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSFER

U.S. v. Wallen, 177 F.Supp.2d 455 (D.Md. 2001). A defendant who was charged with importation
of cocaine moved to be held at an alternative detention facility because he was allegedly being
provided with poor medical care. The district court granted the motion, noting that the
defendant's ·medications were dispenses irregularly and incompletely, leading to his collapse in his
cell. The court ordered the defendant to be detained in an infirmary or hospital and that he be
32.92

provided with medical care that complied with the relevant standard of care that applied to that
facility. (Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center)
U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH

U.S. v. Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.D.C. 2001). An appeals court affirmed the decision of the
federal Bureau of Prisons to administer antipsychotic medication to a detainee who allegedly
killed Capitol police officers. On remand to the district court, the court held that the government
would be permitted to treat the defendant involuntarily with such medication because it was
appropriate and essential in order to render the defendant non-dangerous based on medical/safety
concerns, and to restore the defendant's competency to stand trial. (Federal Corr'l Institute,
Butner, N.C.)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Watford v. Bruce. 126 F.Supp.2d 425 (E.D.Va. 2001). The district court held that a pretrial
detainee stated a claim for cruel and unusual punishment under § 1983 against a deputy sheriff
who allegedly assaulted him with such force that he sustained bruising, scarring and swelling,
despite the claim that the injuries were de minimis. (Virginia Beach Corr'l Center. Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
MEDICAL CARE

Watkins v. City of Battle Creek. 273 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2001). The personal representative of the
estate of a prisoner who died in jail custody. after denying that he had ingested cocaine and
refusing medical treatment, brought a federal civil rights suit against a city, county and various
officials and employees. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants and the
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the arresting officers and jail personnel were
not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. and
that the detainee was not punished in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The court found that the
city and county could not be held liable for failure to train, in the absence of a constitutional
violation by individual defendants. According to the court, jail personnel were not deliberately
indifferent to the medical needs of the detainee even though he exhibited some behavioral
symptoms at the time of intake, where the personnel asked the detainee whether he had
swallowed drugs, stated that they would get him medical help if he had and that he would not face
additional charges. and generally kept him under observation even though one officer failed to do
so. The court noted that detainee repeatedly denied ingesting drugs, refused medical treatment,
and offered an alternative explanation for his symptoms. (Battle Creek Police Dept., and Calhoun
County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Wells v. Jefferson County Sheriff Dept., 159 F.Supp.2d 1002 (S.D.Ohio 2001). A former inmate
filed a § 1983 action against a county sheriff's department, sheriff and two deputy officers
employed at a county jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The
court found that jail officers were not liable for failing to protect the inmate from another prisoner
who had previously attacked him. The officers moved the former inmate to a different cell block
upon learning of the history between the inmates, and the former inmate did not allege that he
experienced any physical injury as the result of being attacked a second time. The court held that
the former inmate's allegations that the single blanket he was allowed in a holding cell was not
adequate to keep him warm, and that cockroaches climbed on him while he slept, did not state
Eighth Amendment claims where he did not complain to any officers or officials that the cell was
uncomfortable or unsanitary. (Jefferson County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
SEPARATION

Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2001). A female arrestee brought a civil rights action
against a county sheriff challenging her strip search following her arrest for driving under the
influence. The district court denied the sheriff's motion to dismiss. The appeals court reversed.
The appeals court held that the strip search violated the arrestee's Fourth Amendment privacy
rights, but that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity because the unconstitutionality of
the county's blanket strip search policy was not clearly established at the time of the search. The
arrestee had been strip searched by a female corrections officer before being placed in a cell with
the general female population because the county did not have separate facilities to temporarily
hold female detainees. (Shelby County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION FROM
HARM
USE OF FORCE

Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567 (4th Cir. 2001). The parents of a boy who died in
custody brought state law negligence and wrongful death claims. and constitutional claims under
§ 1983, arising from the death of their son. Following removal from state court, the federal district
court dismissed the complaint and the parents appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
dismissed in part. The appeals court held that the conduct of officers who took the boy into
custody for emergency psychiatric evaluation fell within the "middle range of culpability," between
gross negligence and intentional misconduct, noting that the boy was owed the same duties owed
to a more typical pretrial detainee. The appeals court held that the conduct of the officers fell
short of deliberate indifference, as needed to establish§ 1983 liability. The boy had resisted when
officers tried to take him into custody. The officers used pepper spray to subdue him and then
handcuffed him and placed him face down in the back seat of their police car. He was transported
to a local hospital where he was found to have no pulse and where efforts to resuscitate him failed.
An autopsy revealed that he had PCP in his system. His parents alleged that he died from
"positional asphyxiation." (Mount Ranier Police Dept., Maryland)

32.93

2002
U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Alkire v. Irving. 305 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2002). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff, county, and county judge, alleging violation of his Fourth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The district court denied the arrestee's motion for class certification and
granted summary judgment for the defendants on the remaining issues. The appeals court
affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the Sherill's
policy of detaining persons in the county jail until their initial appearance was the type of "policy
or custom" under which the county could be held liable under § 1983. As the result of the policy,
persons arrested without warrants from late Friday afternoon through Sunday morning would not
likely appear in court before Tuesday morning, in violation of a requirement that a probable cause
hearing be held within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest. The appeals court held that the county,
sheriff and county clerk's office had quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity from § 1983
liability for failing to allow credit toward fines and costs for time served. (Holmes County Jail,
Ohio)

U.S. District Court
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS
DUE PROCESS

Allen v. Leis, 213 F.Supp.2d 819 (S.D.Ohio 2002). A former pretrial detainee brought a class
action under § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of a county jail's pay-for-stay program. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court held that the jail's
policy of appropriating cash immediately upon a pretrial detainee's arrival at jail to cover the
"booking fee" was not statutorily authorized, and that the jail's policy violated due process. The
court noted that a detainee could obtain a refund of funds paid if the charges were subsequently
dismissed or if the detainee was acquitted, but the court found this post-deprivation remedy to be
inadequate. The county had adopted a $30 book-in fee in order to defray a portion of the booking
cost. Incoming prisoners were asked to sign a Release of Funds Waiver, but they were also advised
that their refusal to sign the waiver had no effect because the book-in fee was taken from the
prisoner with or without his signature on a waiver. In 1999, the county collected over $468,000
under the program, from 50,134 inmates. <Hamilton County Justice Center, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Bobbitt v. Detroit Edison Co., 216 F.Supp.2d 669 (E.D.Mich. 2002). An arrestee filed a§ 1983
action in state court alleging that city police officers violated her constitutional rights in
connection with her arrest for disorderly conduct. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that the arrestee failed to establish liability with her
allegations that a city jail was not clean, did not provide sufficient seating, and did not provide
ready access to a telephone. According to the court, the arrestee's assertions that the city
maintained inadequate policies for training and hiring its police officers, and that an arresting
officer had been involved in one other incident of alleged misconduct, were insufficient to subject
the city to liability under § 1983 for failing to provide adequate training. The arrestee alleged she
was forced to stand for approximately five hours in a police holding cell, that the cell contained
only a 4-inch concrete slab on which to sit, and that the slab was too low. (Eighth Precinct, Detroit
Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Bozeman v. Orum, 199 F.Supp.2d 1216 <M.D.Ala. 2002). The representative of the estate of a
pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and officials at a county detention
facility, alleging that the detainee's death was the result constitutional violations. The district
court held that detention officers' use of force to restrain the detainee did not violate his
Fourteenth Amendment right against the use of excessive force, even though the officers
threatened to "kick" the detainee's "ass." The officers apparently punched or slapped the detainee,
and the detainee died as the result of the officers' actions, but the court found that some level of
force was necessary to restore order where the detainee was apparently undergoing a mental
breakdown in his cell. The court held that nurses at the detention facility were not deliberately
indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee when they failed to obtain treatment and
medication upon learning that the detainee had been evaluated for mental health problems and
prescribed medication in the past. The court noted that the nurses had no knowledge during
intake beyond a "slight flag" of past evaluations for mental illness and that the detainee had
medication to help him "rest.• The court also found that the failure of the detention facility to
implement a policy requiring staff to follow up on inmates who had acknowledged past mental
health problems or evaluations for mental health problems, did not violate the detainee's
Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care. The court held that municipal jails are
not required to provide on-site psychiatric care for their inmates, and that the detention facility
was not required to train its officers in diagnosing or treating mental illness. According to the
court, the facility provided adequate training in the proper use of deadly force, including warnings
on the dangers of positional asphyxia, and was therefore not liable under § 1983 for failing to
supervise staff. The court found that summary judgment in favor of the county was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact on the allegation that officers were deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of the detainee by failing to resuscitate him after they realized that he was not
breathing. (Montgomery Co. Det. Fae., Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEPARATION
PROTECTION
CELL CAPACITY

Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee who was severely
beaten by a fellow detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials, alleging
deliberate indifference to his health and safety in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
detainee also alleged an Eighth Amendment violation resulting from failure to segregate violent
and nonviolent detainees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

32.94

defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The detainee had told one jail official that he was
threatened by a fellow detainee who had a history of assaults, but the officials failed to separate
them. The court noted that the plaintiff told one official he had a black belt in martial arts and
was a decorated war hero and never requested protective custody. The court found that the
county's policy of not screening or segregating potentially violent inmates from non-violent ones
did not constitute deliberate indifference to the health and safety of detainees, because inmates
were housed in single cells and were able to lock their cells from the inside at any time.
(Hampshire County Jail/House of Corrections, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Butera v. Cottey, 285 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action against
a county sheriff after the detainee was sexually assaulted by other detainees. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that the detainee was required to show a deliberate action attributable to the sheriff,
not just any jail employee. According to the court, the detainee's statements to jail officers that he
was having unspecified problems and needed to be moved from his cellblock, and the detainee's
mother's telephone call to an unknown jail employee advising that the detainee had been
threatened with sexual assault, were not sufficient to give the sheriff actual notice of a specific
risk of serious harm. The appeals court also found that violence at the jail was not so prevalent as
to put the sheriff on notice of a substantial risk of harm to the detainee. The court noted that the
sheriff implemented policies to prevent violence by requiring jail officers to undergo annual
training, requiring officers to patrol cellblocks regularly, by allowing detainees to post anonymous
complaints, and by separating the most violent detainees from the rest of the population. (Marion
County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE

Calderon-Ortiz v. Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002). A former pretrial detainee brought
a§ 1983 action against officials, alleging failure to protect him from other inmates. The district
court dismissed the action. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the detainee's
complaint sufficiently stated a claim. The detainee alleged he had been forcibly sodomized by
other inmates, that officials were aware that inmates were being housed without adequate regard
to their custody and security needs, and that staff did not provide adequate supervision.
(Bayamon Regional Metropolitan Detention Center, Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Cuesta v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County. Fla., 285 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 2002). A high school
student sued a school board and a county under § 1983 alleging she was subjected to an
unconstitutional strip search. The district court entered summary judgment for the school board
and county and the student appealed. The appeals court affumed, finding that there was
reasonable suspicion to strip search the student. The student had distributed, with eight other
students, an anonymous pamphlet on school grounds that included an essay in which the author
"wondered what would happen" ifhe shot the principal, teachers or other students. The students
were arrested for hate crime violations and transported to juvenile and adult detention facilities,
depending on their ages. The plaintiff student, who was over 18 years old, was booked and strip
searched at an adult detention facility pursuant to a policy that required the search of all newly·
arrested felons. (Turner Guildford Knight Correctional Facility, Metro-Dade County, Florida)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
DISCIPLINE
PARITYWITH
SENTENCED
EQUAL
PROTECTION
PUNISHMENT
RESTRAINTS

Davis v. Milwaukee County. 225 F.Supp.2d 967 (E.D.Wis. 2002). A state prisoner filed a prose§
1983 action claiming that his constitutional right of access to the courts was violated when he was
a pretrial detainee at a county jail. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion in part, and denied it in part. The district court held that the detainee's
access to courts was impeded because the county sheriff and others interfered with the detainee's
ability to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). According to the court, the detainee was unable to learn about the newly-enacted PLRA
due to the absence of any legal materials at the jail, and only learned of the Act's exhaustion
requirements after he had been transferred from the jail, when it was too late. The court noted
that even if the detainee had known about PLRA, the absence of materials at the jail about the
grievance procedure itself would have prevented him from knowing how to fully exhaust. When
the defendants' rejected the detainee's grievance they advised him that it was "not a grievable
situation." The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was subjected to corporal
punishment and that he was provided with no medical attention during the ordeal. were not
frivolous. The detainee alleged that he had been placed in painful physical restraints in a hot cell
in retaliation for a complaint he had recently filed against a jail officer. The court held that the
detainee's claim that he had to pay too much for postage on his letters because the jail had no
meter mail service to weigh them, was frivolous. Because the detainee had access to a court·
appointed lawyer at all times during his case, the court held that alleged lack of legal materials at
the jail did not hinder his defense. The court held that the detainee's claim that the defendants
rejected his mail without notifying him was non-frivolous, as required to establish a claim that he
had been denied access to courts. The court found that the detainee's allegations that pretrial
detainees such as himself were treated worse than convicted prisoners in a number of ways,
including being given less time out of their cells, was a non-frivolous claim of violation of equal
protection. <Milwaukee County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
FOOD
SANITATION

Drake v. Velasco, 207 F.Supp.2d 809 (N.D.111. 2002). An inmate sued county corrections officials
and a food service company under § 1983, alleging failure to provide him with sanitary meals. The
district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmate's

32.95

allegations supported Fourteenth Amendment claims and a claim of deliberate indifference under
§ 1983. The court found that the inmate sufficiently alleged sufficient injury. The inmate alleged
that the food service company's preparation was so unsanitary as to pose both an immediate risk
to the inmate's health, and that the food served hindered his recovery from his ulcer, cirrhosis of
the liver, and Hepatitis B and C. The inmate alleged that unsanitary conditions included serving
meals on trays that contained spoiled food from previous meals, and inadequate supervision of
employees that resulted in improper handling, preparation and sterilization of equipment. (Cook
Co. Jail, Illinois, Aramark Food Services)
U.S. District Court
CROWDING
MEDICAL CARE
SUPERVISION
RELEASE

Foster v. Fulton County. Georgia. 223 F.Supp.2d 1292 (N.D.Ga. 2002). Inmates at a county jail,
who had tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), brought an action complaining
of their conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care. The parties entered into a
settlement agreement. Two years later the district court responded to a report that described ten
areas in which the county had failed to comply with the terms of the settlement. The court held
that continued overcrowding at the jail deprived the HIV-positive inmates of their constitutional
right to minimal civilized measures of life's necessities. The court ordered the county to institute
additional measures to reduce crowding, including: providing counsel within 72 hours of arrest to
all persons accused of minor offenses who could not make bail; expanding the authority of Pretrial
Services to include supervision of persons arrested for misdemeanor offenses; eliminating any
unreasonable factors used to exclude persons charged with felonies from pretrial release; ensuring
persons charged with misdemeanors were offered a reasonable bond; and imposing additional
restrictions on the length of time a person could remain in jail without accusation or indictment,
or accused or indicted but untried. The court found the county had violated the settlement
agreement by failing to refer HIV-positive inmates to outside specialists in a timely manner when
the jail's own staff lacked the resources to provide timely care. The court noted that even though
the county had eliminated its financial review procedures, other bureaucratic problems remained
and resulted in delays of three weeks to six months. The court held that the county failed to
employ sufficient numbers of trained correctional staff to meet the health needs of HIV·positive
inmates. The court ordered the county to immediately develop and implement a plan to increase
security staffing at the jail to the level necessary to provide timely access to medical care for the
current population of inmates. The court also ordered the county to avoid unreasonable disruption
in the continuity of new inmates' medication, noting that only half of the inmates with a credible
history of HIV medications were receiving their first doses of medication within 24 hours after
admission. (Fulton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE
ACCESS TO COURT

Foster v. Fulton County. 223 F.Supp.2d 1301 (N.D.Ga. 2002). Inmates at a county jail, who had
tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), brought an action complaining of their
conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care. The parties entered into a settlement
agreement. Two years later the district court responded to a report that described ten areas in
which the county had failed to comply with the terms of the settlement by ordering remedies. The
county moved to stay the corrective actions that were ordered and the district court denied the
motion. The court aff1rmed its requirement that the county develop a unified system for providing
counsel within 72 hours of arrest to persons arrested on state law misdemeanor charges. The
court also ordered the county to develop a meaningful discharge planning process for physically
and mentally ill inmate. (Fulton County Jail, Georgia)

BAIL

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Frye v. Pettis County Sheriff Dept., 41 Fed.Appx. 906 (8th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought
a § 1983 action against county officials, alleging unsafe and hazardous living conditions at a
county jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the appeals
court aff1rmed. The appeals court held that the detainee failed to show that jail officials were
deliberately indifferent to his health and safety because the toilet in his cell leaked both sewage
and water. Jail staff frequently provided blankets or towels to absorb the water and a plumber
had attempted to fix the toilet after the detainee slipped and fell. <Pettis County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court

Gatlin Ex Rel. Gatlin v. Green, 227 F.Supp.2d 1064 (D.Minn. 2002). The estate of a cooperating
witness in a murder investigation brought civil rights, civil rights conspiracy, and state law claims
against a police officer and city. The witness had been murdered after police released a prisoner's
letter that identified the witness. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. The court found that there was no clearly established right at the time of the murder,
that required police or jail officers to embargo or detain threatening prison mail or to protect
cooperating confidential informants from retaliatory violence. The court noted that the officer who
released the prisoner's letter repeatedly warned the informant and took steps to help the
informant leave the state and to protect him. The court found that the city's failure to provide
more training to police officers in prisoner-rights law or the regulation of jail correspondence, was
inadequate to support civil rights liability for the city under a failure·to·train theory. (Carver
County Jail, Minnesota)

BAIL

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICATION

Gibson v. County of Washoe. Nev., 290 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2002). The widow of a manic depressive
detainee who suffered a heart attack and died while in a county jail, sued the county, sheriff and
various officials under § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants
and the widow appealed. The appeals court afi1rmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that several fact issues precluded summary judgment: whether the county's
policy of delaying medical screening of combative inmates posed a substantial risk of serious harm
32.96

to the detainee; whether the county was aware of that risk; whether the nurse who received the
detainee's medication at the jail was deliberately indifferent; and whether the county was liable
based upon its policy regarding handling of prescription medication. The appeals court found that
deputies who had contact with the detainee after he was admitted to the jail, and who took part in
the forcible restraint that preceded his death, were not deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs because they knew nothing of his mental condition beyond what they could observe.
(Washoe County Jail, Nevada)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PROTECTION

Gonzalez v. Cecil County, Maryland, 221 F.Supp.2d 611 (D.Md. 2002). The widow of a pretrial
detainee who died while in custody filed a § 1983 action against a county, sheriff, and detention
center medical personnel. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, in part,
finding that fact issues remained as to whether the care provided to the detainee amounted to
deliberate indifference. The detainee was admitted to a county detention center at approximately
5:00 p.m. Shortly after his admission he identified himself as a heroin user during a standard
intake medical screening. He told three nurses employed by the detention center, upon his arrival,
that he was likely to undergo acute heroin withdrawal symptoms. The only treatment provided to
him at this time was to be placed on twice-daily doses of Clonidine, a blood pressure medication.
The detainee allegedly became violently ill and progressed to acute pulmonary distress, disease
and pneumonia during the night and during the next day. He complained to the nurses but was
only given an over-the-counter stomach remedy, Kaopectate. Two days later he was found in his
cell, unresponsive, and was pronounced dead twenty minutes later. His body was taken to a
nearby hospital where an autopsy revealed he died from "pneumonia, complicating narcotics
abuse." The district court held that the fact that the nurses were acting in conformity with the
county's established protocol in treating the inmate did not entitle them to qualified immunity
from liability under§ 1983. (Cecil County Detention Center, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Gonzalez-Mercado v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 206 F.Supp.2d 257 (D.Puerto Rico 2002). A
plaintiff brought a § 1983 action following her arrest and indictment, alleging violations of her
right to medical assistance and malicious prosecution. The district court dismissed the action, in
part. The court held that the plaintiffs allegations were insufficient to establish a violation of her
Eighth Amendment right to medical assistance, even though her initial request for assistance was
denied. The court noted that the plaintiff was eventually examined by two paramedics while she
was detained in a police lockup. She was detained for seven hours and the indictment against her
was later dismissed. (Guaynabo Mun. Police Station, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION FROM
HARM
MEDICAL CARE

Gulett v. Haines, 229 F.Supp.2d 806 (S.D.Ohio 2002). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against a sheriff, corrections officer, and a jail inmate asserting claims under §1981 and §1983.
The detainee had been assaulted by other prisoners and alleged that he was not protected from
harm and was denied adequate emergency medical care. The district court held that the jail's
emergency medical care policy was not unconstitutional on its face because the policy accounted
for any emergency and left medical decisions, subject to an obvious security concern, to a health
care staff member. The court denied summary judgment to one corrections officer, finding it was
prevented by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officer knew that other prisoners
were likely to assault the detainee and whether he was responsible for preventing an assault.
<Montgomery County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SAFETY

Hammond v. Gordon County. 316 F.Supp.2d 1262 (N.D.Ga. 2002). Female former county jail
inmates sued county officials and officers, claiming they were subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment,
in part, for the defendants. The court held that a claim was stated by allegations that a male
officer required female inmates to strip and engage in lewd behavior in return for female hygiene
items and toiletries, and that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied
summary judgment to higher jail officials in connection with a claim that they violated the Eighth
Amendment by showing deliberate indifference to officer-inflicted harm of inmates. The court also
denied summary judgment and qualified immunity for a deputy jailer who was claimed to have
intentionally inflicted emotional harm and assault and battery on female inmates. The court
granted qualified immunity to an officer on a claim that he violated the rights of a female inmate
by opening the door of her cell and allowing a male inmate to enter, finding that there were no
precedents establishing that the conduct was illegal and the opening of the door was not so
obviously unlawful that immunity should not apply. According to the court, an inmate stated an
Eighth Amendment claim against an officer when she alleged that the officer had sex with her,
and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. But the court did not find deliberate
indifference on the part of an officer who allegedly offered a female inmate cigarettes if she would
expose her breasts, noting that the officer could not, under the circumstances, be placed on notice
that his conduct was unacceptable. The court granted qualified immunity to a jail administrator
and sheriff from a claim that they were deliberately indifferent by not intervening when male
officers required female inmates to strip in order to receive toiletries and instigated and
participated in sexual activities with inmates, because the jail administrator and sheriff did not
violate any clearly established law when they did not intervene. (Gordon County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

Hanuman v. Groves, 41 Fed.Appx. 7 (8th Cir. 2002). An inmate brought a civil rights action
alleging that, while he was a pretrial detainee, prison officials violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by placing him in segregation, where his telephone privileges were limited.
32.97

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the prison officials and the appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the limitations placed on phone privileges did not give rise
to First and Fourteenth Amendment violations, where the inmate did not demonstrate any actual
injury from having to use the telephone while it was noisy or in the evening. (Pulaski Co. Det.
Facil., Arkansas)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Helton v. U.S., 191 F.Supp.2d 179 (D.D.C. 2002). Female arrestees brought an action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging that United States Marshals conducted unlawful
searches and invasions of their privacy. The district court held that the alleged strip search of
arrestees satisfied the elements of a tort intrusion upon seclusion. The court noted that the
Fourth Amendment precludes police or prison officials from conducting a strip search of an
individual arrested for misdemeanors or other minor offenses, unless there is reasonable suspicion
that the individual is concealing contraband or weapons. The five women plaintiffs had been
arrested for unlawful entry in connection with an "anti-fur" demonstration at a department store.
According to their complaint, they were compelled "to remove clothing and submit to a strip and
squat search" while six men arrested with them were not subjected to such searches. (U.S.
Marshals Service)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
PUNISHMENT
SEGREGATION

Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437 (7"' Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought a civil right action
alleging due process violations and retaliation. The district court dismissed the complaint and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The
district court held that issues of fact existed as to the reason for the detainee's segregation, and
that the detainee's retaliation allegations sufficiently stated a claim. The appeals court was
unable to determine from the record whether the detainee was placed in lockdown segregation for
preventive purposes or for punishment. (Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY
RESTRAINTS

Hill v. McKinley. 311 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2002). A prisoner brought § 1983 action alleging jail
officers and a sheriff violated her Fourth Amendment right to privacy, and her privacy rights
under state law. The prisoner had been marched down a hallway naked, escorted by staff
members of the opposite sex, and was then strapped face down to a restrainer board in a spread·
eagle position. The district court denied the defendants' request for judgment as a matter of law,
refused to reduce damages, and granted attorney fees to the prisoner. The appeals court affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. The appeals court held that the use of
male officers in an otherwise justified transfer of an unruly and naked female prisoner did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the prisoner's Fourth Amendment rights were
violated when she was allowed to remain completely exposed to male officers on a restrainer
board for a substantial period of time after the threat to security and safety had passed. But the
court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not
violate clearly established law, noting that prisoners were entitled to very narrow zones of
privacy. The court found that evidence supported the verdict for the prisoner on her state law
privacy claim and the $2,500 compensatory damage award for invasion of privacy. (Story County
Jail, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSPORT

Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car. Inc., 300 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee who was
transported to a police station by a private transportation service at the request of a police
department, brought a § 1983 action against the service and one of its drivers, alleging denial of
adequate medical care. The district court granted summary judgment against the detainee and
the appeals court affirmed. The appeals held that the decision of the driver to transport the
detainee to a police station, rather than taking him to a hospital, did not amount to deliberate
indifference to the detainee's objectively serious medical needs. The detainee collapsed from an
overdose of medication shortly after reaching the police station. The court noted that primary
authority for the detainee rested with the police officers, who had last determined that he should
be taken to the police station, and the driver lacked medical training or any realistic control over
the detainee. According to the court, "deliberate indifference" is simply a synonym for intentional
or reckless conduct, and "reckless" describes conduct so dangerous that the deliberate nature of
the defendant's actions can be inferred. (City of Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Loeber v. County Of Albany. 216 F.Supp.2d 20 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). An arrestee who was strip
searched several times after being arrested brought an action under § 1983, alleging numerous
constitutional violations and state law claims. The arrestee had been arrested pursuant to a
contempt order that was later expunged. The district court held that the county jail's strip search
policy was constitutional. The policy only called for strip searches upon admission to the jail
where there was a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee possessed contraband, including the
cigarettes and candy that the arrestee had in his possession. The court noted that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits a blanket policy under which all misdemeanor or minor offense arrestees
are strip-searched when admitted to a jail. The court found that a strip search could also be
conducted based on the crime charged, the particular characteristics of an arrestee, and/or the
circumstances of the arrest. The arrestee had been strip searched when he was admitted to a
courthouse holding cell, again when he was admitted to the county jail, and once again when he
was taken to a Special Housing Unit for possessing cigarettes and candy, which were considered
to be contraband. (Albany County Penitentiary, New York)

32.98

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
USE OF FORCE

Morris v. Crawford County, 299 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2002). A county detention center detainee
brought§ 1983 and state law battery claims against a sheriff, county, and deputies. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants, in part, and the remaining claims were
voluntarily dismissed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that there was not a strong causal
connection between a deputy sheriff's background and the specific constitutional violation alleged
by the detainee. The detainee had been arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated and
disorderly conduct. After arriving at a county detention center, he refused to take a breathalyzer
test and began to yell and bang on his cell door. Four deputies responded, and according to the
detainee, they repeatedly assaulted him as they dragged him to another cell. One deputy allegedly
used excessive force on the detainee by utilizing a "knee drop" on him, which severed the
detainee's intestine. The court noted that the only violent act in the deputy's record was an
incident in which he slapped an inmate, although ex parte protective orders were obtained against
the deputy by both his ex·wife and girlfriend. The appeals court held that the sheriff and the
county were not liable under§ 1983 on the theory of deliberate indifference in hiring the deputy.
(Crawford County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Munoz v. Kolender, 208 F.Supp.2d 1125 (S.D.Cal. 2002). A civil detainee who was confined in a
county jail under the provisions of California's Sexually Violent Predator Act brought a § 1983
action against a county sheriff, challenging his confinement and the conditions of his confinement.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff. The court held that the Act
had a dual purpose, to remove dangerous sexually violent predators from society and to provide
them with treatment, and that confinement pursuant to the Act was civil in nature, rather than
criminal and punitive. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that he was handcuffed
while speaking with his lawyer, subjected to strip searches, provided with poor food and with
clothes in poor condition, were insufficient to support a § 1983 Eighth Amendment violation. (San
Diego County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Murcia v. County of Orange, 185 F.Supp.2d 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). An arrestee who was, according
to the court, "the unfortunate victim of mistaken identity" was arrested by city police officers who
believed he was the same person named in a federal arrest warrant. The arrestee brought a §
1983 claim because he was subjected to one strip search at the city police department and three
subsequent strip searches at a county correctional facility. The district court granted the
arrestee's motion to amend his complaint, dropping false arrest claims but allowing the strip
search claims to continue. The court noted that if the county sheriffs alleged policy of strip·
searching every arriving prisoner existed, it was clearly unconstitutional and there could be no
qualified immunity defense. (Orange County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Murcia v. County of Orange, 226 F.Supp.2d 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). A detainee filed a§ 1983 action
alleging that a county violated his constitutional rights by strip searching him, under a policy of
strip searching all detainees upon arrival at the correctional facility. The district court granted
qualified immunity for the county sheriff, finding that the detainee's right to be free from strip
searches without reasonable suspicion was not clearly established at the time. The court noted
that the county's policy of subjecting all new felony detainees to visual body cavity searches
required further scrutiny, although such searches for misdemeanor detainees had been clearly
established as unconstitutional in 1994. (Orange County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
LENGTH
FAILURE TO PROTECT
CROWDING

Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action against a
county sheriff and two jail employees, alleging confinement in unconstitutional conditions. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that
the detainee did not suffer more than a de minimis physical injury from his jail confinement and
therefore could not make the required showing for the purpose of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). But the appeals court held that the detainee was entitled to seek nominal and punitive
damages under the Fourteenth Amendment. The detainee had admitted during a deposition that
the back and leg pain he allegedly suffered from sitting and sleeping on benches and the floor of a
temporary cell was not serious. The detainee had been temporarily confined on three separate
occasions. In one instance he was confined in a temporary holding cell equipped with benches,
toilets and sinks. Inmates eat three meals per day in the cell, and are not provided with cots,
blankets or pillows. At one time the detainee was housed for 51 hours with approximately 50
other men in a cell measuring 404 square feet. He was transferred to another cell where he spent
another 74 hours confined with an average of 18 prisoners in a cell that measured 174 square feet.
The detainee described conditions in the cells as "a human carpet." (Clark Co. Detention Ctr.,
Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE SCREENING

Pardue Ex Rel Christian v. Ashe, 36 Fed.Appx. 199 (6th Cir. 2002). The next friend and next of kin
to an arrestee who committed suicide while being held in a county jail on a domestic assault
charge, brought a § 1983 action alleging that the county failed to recognize the arrestee's suicidal
tendencies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the arrestee did not have a constitutional
right to be screened correctly for suicidal tendencies, and that he did not show a strong likelihood
that he was going to attempt suicide such that the failure to take precautions amounted to
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The appeals court also held that the.re was no
evidence that the county had a policy or custom of deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees
32.99

who were in similar situations to the arrestee. The arrestee had been admitted to a county jail
and was placed in a temporary holding cell near the intake desk. Sometime during the night the
arrestee hanged himself and his body was discovered the following morning. The appeals court
held that "this single incident is not sufficient to impose liability on Wilson County because it does
not establish a pattern of unconstitutional conduct." (Wilson County Criminal Justice Complex,
Tennessee)
U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL

Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2002). Arrestees brought an action against two
county jails that charged a bond fee, above and beyond the set bail amount, as a condition of their
release. The district court dismissed the action and the arrestees appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the arrestees sufficiently satisfied their
standing requirement by alleging violation of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The court noted that the arrestees suffered monetary injury when they were required to make the
extra payments, and that these injuries could be traced to the policy of each jail. A 1999 Illinois
law allowed a bond fee to be added to the required bond and set the fee at $1. The law empowered
county boards to increase the statutory fee by ordinance if the increase is justified by an
acceptable cost study that demonstrates that the $1 fee is not sufficient to cover the costs of
providing the service. Nineteen of Illinois's 102 counties charged a bail fee at the time of the
appeal. The plaintiff arrestees were charged $11 on one jail and $15 in another. (Kane County Jail
and DuPage County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Peacock v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 199 F.Supp.2d 306 (D.Md. 2002). A detainee sued
local and county officials alleging false arrest and false imprisonment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that members of the sheriff's office could
not be held liable for detaining the inmate for 10 days without investigating his claim that he had
already completed his sentence for violation of probation. It was eventually confirmed that the
detainee had served his sentence, and he was released (Baltimore Co. Detention Center,
Maryland)

U.S. District Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Potts v. City of Philadelphia, 224 F.Supp.2d 919 (E.D.Pa. 2002). An arrestee sued a city and city
officials asserting § 1983 claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on federal claims and dismissed state claims. The court held that the 30·hour
detention of the arrestee did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment protection against
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court
suggested in Baker v. McCollan (443 U.S. 137 1979) that prolonged detention in the face of a
person's protestation of innocence may violate the Fourteenth Amendment but that detention for
three days "does not and could not amount to such a deprivation." Because the arrestee in this
case was detained for 30 hours, the court found no constitutional violation. (Southwest Detective
Division, City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
TRANSPORT

Proffitt v. Ridgway. 279 F.3d 503 (7 th Cir. 2002). The estate of an arrestee brought a § 1983 action
alleging excessive force on the part of a police officer and a private citizen. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the death of the arrestee from a choke hold administered by a bystander,
where the arresting officer made no effort to use deadly force against the arrestee, was not
deliberate indif·ference. The appeals court noted that the officer could not have foreseen that the
small unarmed man would kill the "hefty" arrestee, even though it was later learned that the man
was a martial-arts expert. The officer took reasonable efforts, according to the court, to protect the
arrestee from excessive force by telling the bystander to ease up on the choke hold. (City of Pana,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE

Rapier v. Kankakee County, Ill., 203 F.Supp.2d 978 (C.D.Ill. 2002). The wife of a detainee who
committed suicide while in jail filed a§ 1983 suit individually, and as the special administrator of
the detainee's estate. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding
that the county was not liable for alleged deliberate indifference toward the prevention of suicide
by detainees. The court found that the county's policy of placing potentially suicidal detainees in a
special needs cell, along with its policy to require checks of these inmates every 15 minutes, was
an effective way to prevent suicides. The court also found that the county's failure to adequately
deal with the problem of understaffing at the jail was not the cause of the detainee's suicide,
because an officer saw or spoke to the detainee 15 to 20 minutes prior to the time he was found
hanging in his cell. The sheriff has stated that seven staff members were working at the jail at the
time of the suicide, the jail's census was lower than usual at the time, and that he did not think
that having additional staff would have made a tremendous difference. (Kankakee Co. Detention
Ctr., Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
DRUG TEST

Saulsberry v. Arpaio, 41 Fed.Appx. 953 (9th Cir. 2002). A detainee brought an action against a
county sheriff alleging violation of his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. The district court
entered judgment for the sheriff and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that a
physician working for the sheriff's office ordered catheterization and drug screening for the
detainee solely for medical purposes, not for any administrative or investigative reasons, and
therefore the tests did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Maricopa Co. Sheriff's Office, Arizona)

32.100

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

MAIL
DISCIPLINE

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
TELEPHONE

MAIL
DISCIPLINE

Simpson v. Gallant, 223 F.Supp.2d 286 (D.Me. 2002). A pretrial detainee filed a §1983 action
alleging his constitutional rights were violated when county jail officials denied him access to
telephone and mail services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court held that the refusal to permit the pretrial detainee access to a telephone to
arrange bail, after he was placed in disciplinary segregation for violations of jail rules, did not
violate the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights, where the detainee retained the ability to
use the mail and to meet with his attorney. (Penobscot County Jail, Maine)
Simpson v. Gallant, 231 F.Supp.2d 341 (D.Me. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against county officials, alleging violations of his right of access to telephone and mail services as
the result of disciplinary actions taken against him. The district court held that the detainee's
claim was properly characterized as a claim that jail disciplinary sanctions violated his
constitutional right to make bail and to prepare his defense while he was a pretrial detainee. The
court declined to determine, at the motion to dismiss phase of the case, if sanctions restricting
access to mail and telephone were imposed to enforce reasonable disciplinary requirements. The
court held that the detainee's allegations supported a claim that the officials interfered with his
right to counsel, bail, and access to courts. The detainee alleged that the officials' restrictions
forced his trial to be postponed, and that soon after his release from detention he was cleared of
the charges. The detainee also alleged that he was able to make bail soon after he was able to
contact his associate. <Penobscot County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Smith v. Lejeune, 203 F.Supp.2d 1260 (D.Wyo. 2002). Following the death of her husband who
had been detained at a county detention facility, a wife brought an action against a physician,
nurses and others, alleging deliberate indifference in violation of§ 1983. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the physician had trained
nurses regarding alcohol withdrawal, and the nurses did not have the requisite state of mind,
knowledge and disregard of possible risks to sustain a deliberate indifference claim. According to
the court, the physician did not fail to train the nurses, where he provided the nurses with
protocols and policies to deal with alcohol and alcohol withdrawal, and conducted monthly
meetings during which the policies were discussed. The nurses had not identified any signs that
the detainee was suffering for alcohol withdrawal, and the detainee had denied any history of
suffering from alcohol withdrawal. The detainee had been arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol, and a breath alcohol test identified a level of .317. (Laramie County Detention Facility,
Wyoming)

U.S. District Court
PUNISHMENT
MENTAL HEALTH
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES
SPEEDY TRIAL

Terry Ex Rel. Terry v. Hill, 232 F.Supp.2d 934 (E.D.Ark. 2002). Pretrial detainees brought a class
action against the Arkansas Department of Human Services, claiming that inordinate delays in
providing evaluation and treatment of detainees who were referred by the court to determine
their fitness to stand trial, violated their Constitutional rights. The district court entered
judgment for the detainees. The court held that the inordinate delays amounted to prohibited
punishment that violated the detainee's due process rights. The court also found that the officials
displayed deliberate indifference to the detainees' circumstances, violating their Eighth
Amendment rights. According to the court, the Arkansas Constitution speaks of the State's duty
toward the mentally ill, and the Arkansas State Hospital, a division of the Department of Human
Services, has responsibility for treating citizens committed by civil courts or by criminal courts for
evaluation. <Arkansas State Hospital, Arkansas Department of Human Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Troville v. Yenz, 303 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2002). A civilly committed detainee filed a§ 1983 action
challenging his conditions of confinement. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state
a claim and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the
civil detainee is not a "prisoner" for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and
therefore the PLRA provision requiring full payment of the filing fee on appeal did not apply. The
appeals court held that the district court should have permitted the detainee to amend his
complaint. According to the court, the definition of "prisoner" in the in forma pauperis statute
applies only to persons incarcerated as punishment for a criminal conviction, and a civil detainee
is not a "prisoner." (South Bay Detainee Unit, South Bay Correctional Facility, Florida)

U.S. District Court
SEARCH
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Turner v. Kight, 192 F.Supp.2d 391 CD.Md. 2002). A female detainee who was arrested on an
outstanding warrant associated with a civil matter and detained at a jail brought an action
against county and state officials. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court held that arresting and booking officers were deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's serious medical needs when they allegedly removed a neck brace and seized
medication, ignoring her complaints of pain and muscle spasm. The detainee sometimes limped
and walked with a cane, but the court found that the detainee's alleged pain did not rise to the
level of a serious medical need. The court granted qualified immunity to the officers, finding that
there was no indication that the officers actually knew of, and ignored, a serious need for medical
care. The court also found that the officers were not deliberately indifferent by failing to dispense
medication in response to the detainee's complaints of pain, where the officers were not permitted
to dispense medication and they notified the detention facility's medical staff of a nonemergency
situation, who did not respond during the six hours the detainee was confined. The court held that
the detainee's allegation that she was brutally handcuffed did not present a constitutional
violation, particularly in the absence of any explanation of how the handcuffing led to any injury.
The court held that if a strip search was conducted by an officer of the same sex during the
32.101

processing of the detainee, it did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, where the
search was conducted in private and there was no physical contact between the detention officer
and the detainee. <Montgomery County Detention Center, Maryland)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Turner v. Kight, 217 F.Supp.2d 680 (D.Md. 2002). A detainee who was arrested on an outstanding
warrant brought a civil rights and state tort suit arising out of her arrest and the conditions of her
detention. The district court held that the detainee was entitled to reconsideration of the court's
determination that she was a "pretrial detainee" at the time of an allegedly unconstitutional strip
search. The detainee claimed that she was a "temporary detainee" at the time of the search, which
exempted her from a strip search according to county jail policy. <Montgomery County Detention
Center, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
MAIL
TELEPHONE
VISITS

U.S. v. Flores, 214 F.Supp.2d 1193 (D.Utah 2002). A prisoner who was indicted for alleged
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, filed a writ of habeas
corpus challenging restrictions placed on his conditions of confinement. The district court denied
the petition. The court held that the secure confinement of the prisoner was justified and that
restrictions placed upon his confinement were warranted because the prisoner was a flight risk,
and a danger to others. The court upheld restrictions on the prisoner's mail that required mail to
be read for threats, conspiracy, or obstruction of justice efforts, because members of the prisoner's
gang outside the prison could act on his instructions. The court also upheld that the limitation of
one visitor per day and telephone restrictions. The court clarified that the prisoner's right of
access to counsel included investigators or other special assistants working for the prisoner's
attorney. (Utah State Prison)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
BAIL REFORM ACT
RELEASE·
CONDITIONS

U.S. v. Hammond, 204 F.Supp.2d 1157 (E.D.Wis. 2002). A defendant moved to modify his bail and
conditions of release. The U.S Magistrate reduced bail and set conditions of release and the
government moved for revocation of the order. The district court denied the motion, finding that
the government failed to show that the defendant was dangerous and that no conditions of release
would reasonably assure the safety of the community, and that the conditions of release were
insufficient. The defendant's bail was reduced to $135,500 (from $150,000) and he was required to
submit to electronic monitoring, travel restrictions, random urine tests, and reporting to pre·trial
services. He was also ordered not to associate with the Outlaws Motorcycle Club. (East. Dist.,
Wisc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
SPEEDY TRIAL
LENGTH

U.S. v. Hernandez, 281 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 2002). An inmate who had been convicted in federal
court sought to appeal his conviction. The appeals court affirmed, finding that an overnight delay
between the defendant's arrest on a drug charge and his appearance before a magistrate was
neither excessive nor unnecessary, and that the defendant's statements while detained would not
be suppressed. The court noted that the defendant was arrested in the evening and was
questioned by police for two hours, and appeared before a magistrate the next morning, following
a total delay of 15 hours. (Iowa)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
TRANSFER

U.S. v. Johnson, 225 F.Supp.2d 982 <N.D.Iowa 2002). A pretrial detainee charged with murder
while engaged in a conspiracy moved to be transferred to a different facility. The district court
denied the motion, finding that denial of the transfer motion was not clearly erroneous, absent a
showing that detention at the current facility had interfered with the detainee's right to counsel.
The court noted that one of the detainee's lead attorneys had an office in the same city as the
current detention facility. The court also found that transfer was not warranted absent a showing
that conditions at the current facility amounted to unconstitutional "punishment." (Linn County
Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT

U.S. v. McKinley. 228 F.Supp.2d 1158 (D.Or. 2002). A defendant charged with murder was
arrested and detained at 10:40 a.m. on Friday and was not arraigned until the following Monday.
The district court held that the delay in bringing the defendant before a magistrate was not
excessive. The court noted that it was 100 miles to the nearest magistrate and that authorities
spent all day Friday conducting an investigation needed to support the charge. (Warm Springs
Correctional Facility, Warm Springs Indian Reservation, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights
action against a federal prosecutor and jail officials alleging that his constitutional rights were
violated during his detention in a state-operated jail, as the result of restrictions placed upon his
telephone access. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that a state law that allowed prisoners
reasonable access to the telephone did not give the pretrial detainee a liberty interest in telephone
usage. The appeals court held that telephone restrictions did not violate the detainee's due process
rights nor the First Amendment, and that the detainee could not maintain a Sixth Amendment
claim based on the telephone restrictions. The court noted that the restrictions, which limited the
detainee's telephone access to calls to his attorney only, were reasonably related to the legitimate
government interest of ensuring the safety of police officers when they were executing arrests,
and preventing the detainee from helping his co-conspirators elude arrest. The court noted that
the detainee was allowed to receive visitors and could send and receive mail, but allowing the
detainee phone access would have required jail staff to monitor his calls, and there was no
obvious, easy alternative to the restriction. (Alaska Cook Inlet Pretrial Facility)
32.102

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
CROWDING

Washington v. LaPorte County Sheriffs Dept., 306 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee
brought a § 1983 due process claim against a jail and its officers, alleging that injuries he suffered
when he was attacked by another inmate were caused by the jail's cell assignment policy. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed, finding that the jail's cell assignment policy did not demonstrate
deliberate indifference on the part of officials to a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee.
The policy allowed inmates to choose their own cell assignments. The detainee was charged with
driving with a suspended license and he was detained at the jail pending trial, as he was unable to
post bond. He was assigned to a cell block originally designed to hold ten inmates, but which
actually housed seventeen. The detainee was allowed to choose his own cell assignment within the
housing unit. The court noted that the detainee shared a cell with the inmate who eventually
assaulted him for two weeks without incident prior to the attack, and did not inform jail officers
he had fought with the inmate or that he feared harm. (LaPointe County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

White v. Crane, 45 Fed.Appx. 552 (8th Cir. 2002). A county jail inmate brought a civil rights
action against a sheriff, jail administrators, and jail officers, seeking compensation for injuries
incurred when he was placed in a cell with another inmate who assaulted him. The appeals court
granted summary judgment in favor of the jail officers, but the appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that the officers could not reasonably believe they were not violating the
inmate's right to be free from attack. Upon admission to the jail, the plaintiff inmate had notified
an officer that the other inmate should be put on his enemy-alert list because of a problem he had
just had with his wife. When officers placed plaintiff inmate in the same housing unit with the
other inmate, the plaintiff had asked them to at least handcuff the other inmate before opening
the door and the officers refused. When the door was opened the attack immediately occurred.
(Hempstead County Detention Facility, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Williams v. City of Las Vegas, 34 Fed.Appx. 297 (9th Cir. 2002). An arrestee brought a suit against
a city and correctional officer alleging the use of excessive force. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that
the officer's use of force and restraints when the arrestee refused to cooperate during the booking
process was not excessive under either the Eighth Amendment standard for prisoners, nor the
Fourteenth Amendment standard for pretrial detainees. The court noted that all of the officer's
conduct associated with this claim had been videotaped from three different positions by
surveillance cameras. According to the court, the use of waist and leg restraints on the inmate in
his jail cell did not violate the Eighth Amendment, where the inmate had refused to stand still
during a frisk search and displayed erratic and seemingly uncooperative behavior. <Las Vegas
Department of Detention, Nevada)
2003

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE

Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). An arrestee brought an action
against a deputy and county, alleging that the county violated his constitutional rights by failing
to timely release him from jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that a 39-hour
delay in releasing the detainee was not unreasonable and did not violate his constitutional rights.
The court found that the arrestee did not have a constitutional right to have his release papers
processed in any particular order, or ahead of other prisoners whose papers the sheriffs
department received the same day as his. According to the court, the order in which the
department handled prisoner releases was an administrative matter primarily within the
department's discretion. The court held that the county's policy of not starting to process the day's
releases until it received all information relating to prisoners scheduled for release, , including
wants and holds, was justified and reasonable in light of its responsibilities. (Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
SUPERVISION

Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2003). The personal representative of the estate of a
pretrial detainee who hung himself in his cell brought a § 1983 action, alleging that officials failed
to prevent his suicide. The district court denied summary judgment in favor of the defendants and
they appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the county's
violation of a consent decree that arose out of a voluntary settlement of a prior jail conditions
lawsuit, did not establish a violation of the pretrial detainee's constitutional rights actionable
under § 1983. The consent decree required the county to provide a second nighttime jailer to staff
the jail during the hours that the detainee committed suicide, but the court noted that the prior
lawsuit was not concerned with the risk of prisoner suicides. According to the court, the county's
failure to fund the second jailer did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to the strong
likelihood that a suicide would result. The court also found no deliberate indifference on the part
of the jailer who waited for one hour and forty·six minutes after his last cell check, even though
the detainee had expressly threatened suicide. The court noted that the jailer was aware that the
detainee's belt, shoelaces and the contents of his pockets had been confiscated, the cell had been
stripped of implements that might assist suicide, and the jailer regularly observed the detainee
through a closed circuit monitor that viewed the majority of the cell. The detainee was able to
commit suicide by tearing the elastic band from his underwear, tying it around his neck, and
hanging himself from the top bunk. (Winston County Jail, Alabama)
32.103

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Cardenas v. Lewis, 66 Fed.Appx. 86 (9th Cir. 2003). [unpublished] A pretrial detainee brought a
prose§ 1983 action against a county, alleging deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to his
safety. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals
court held that officers who placed the detainee in a holding tank with an inmate, from whom the
detainee was supposed to be kept separated, were not acting with deliberate indifference, even if
the officers were negligent in failing to check the detainee's "keep separate" wristband. The court
found that the detainee was deprived of due process in disciplinary proceedings in which he was
allegedly not allowed to call witnesses, to have his exculpatory statement read, or to tape the
hearings, and was placed in segregation without a hearing. (Yakima County Department of
Corrections, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROVIDE
CARE
SUICIDE ATTEMPT

Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2003). The mother of a pretrial detainee who
attempted suicide brought a§ 1983 action against a police officer, alleging deliberate indifference
to the detainee's risk of attempting suicide. The district court denied summary judgment for the
officer and the officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that summary
judgment was precluded by an issue of fact as to whether the officer was aware that the detainee
was on the verge of trying to commit suicide and whether the officer was deliberately indifferent
to the detainee's safety. The court noted that the detainee's right to be free from deliberate
indifference to the risk that he would attempt suicide was clearly established. The detainee was
transferred to a county facility after a brief period of detention in a city jail. When he was
admitted to the county facility he was not placed on suicide watch, but he did ask to speak to a
mental health advisor. He was assigned to a holding cell that contained a telephone with a strong
metal cord. When the police officer called the county facility to complain about calls from the
inmate, county employees found the detainee unconscious, hanging from the wire telephone cord.
The detainee remained in a vegetative state after his unsuccessful suicide attempt. (Champaign
County Correctional Facility, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
BAIL

Clynch v. Chapman, 285 F.Supp.2d 213 (D.Conn. 2003). An arrestee filed a § 1983 action arising
from his arrest for driving under the influence. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants, in part. The court held that city police officers' roles in setting the arrestee's bail
were functionally comparable to that of a judge, and that the officers were entitled to absolute
immunity from liability, even if they did not consider individualized circumstances. Under state
law, officers were required to attempt to conduct an interview with the arrestee to obtain
information relevant to the terms and conditions of his release from custody, before setting bail.
The arrestee was a 69-year-old man who had lived his entire life in the same house, who was
charged with Driving Under the Influence. He was taken to a police station where he was
detained in a holding cell. The police officer ordered him held on a $500 surety bond and set a
court date. (City of Derby, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Coleman Ex Rel. Coleman v. Parkman, 349 F.3d 534 (8th Cir. 2003). The administratix of a
pretrial detainee's estate brought an action, alleging that prison officials had been deliberately
indifferent to the risk that the detainee would commit suicide. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants in part, and the parties appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The appeals court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the arresting officer knew that the
detainee presented a substantial suicide risk, and whether a jailer recklessly failed to take
reasonable measures. The arresting officer had been told by someone who was with the detainee
before his arrest, that the detainee had been carrying a rifle and threatening suicide. After
interviewing the detainee, the officer concluded he was not a suicide risk. Jail records stated that
the detainee had threatened suicide and needed to be placed in isolation and monitored. The
detainee was placed in the jail's drunk tank, instead of the holding cell that was usually used for
suicidal inmates. The drunk tank had eighteen exposed bars, while the holding cell had none. The
drunk tank was difficult to observe because it was upstairs in the jail, unlike the holding tank.
Because the detainee was assigned to the drunk tank, and in spite of his being on a suicide watch,
an officer issued the detainee the usual items, including a bed sheet. The officer checked on the
detainee at 1:30 a.m.; the detainee was found hanging from the exposed bars by a bed sheet at
1:42 a.m. (St. Francis County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003). The personal representative of the estate ofa
pretrial detainee who was killed by a mentally-ill co-inmate, brought a § 1983 action. The district
court denied qualified immunity for the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed
in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity because they failed to monitor a known violent inmate that was housed in a unit for
mentally ill inmates. The court held that supervisory officials were entitled to qualified immunity
from § 1983 liability for their failure to train and supervise officers on duty at the time of the
murder, absent an allegation of a constitutional violation on their part. (North Broward Detention
Center, Florida)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Crocker v. County of Macomb, 285 F.Supp.2d 971 (E.D.Mich. 2003). The personal representative
of the estate of deceased arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county and officials, alleging
they were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the inmate, who committee
suicide in a holding cell. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding

32.104

that the arrestee did not demonstrate a strong likelihood of taking his own life, as required to
trigger a due process right to reasonable protection. The arrestee was brought to the county jail on
an outstanding warrant. The admitting officer noted that the arrestee smelled like alcohol but
saw that he was able to walk and talk without difficulty, remember telephone numbers, and use
the telephone. The arrestee was placed in a holding cell with a telephone where he made more
than twenty calls during the two hours he was held. He was discovered hanging from the
telephone cord approximately two hours after he was admitted. The court noted that the
arrestee's behavior while confined indicated an awareness of the present and a concern for the
future, indicative of a person wanting to live, not die. <Macomb County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH
ADA· Americans with
Disabilities Act

Disability Advocates, Inc. v. McMahon, 279 F.Supp.2d 158 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). An advocacy group for
disabled persons, and an individual subjected to a mental hygiene pickup, brought an action
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that the
state criminalized mental hygiene pickups by treating or labeling them as arrests, thereby
discriminating against persons with mental disabilities. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants. The court held that the custodial detention of a mentally ill person
constituted an "arrest" but that the detention did not violate due process. The court found that an
individual taken into custody in connection with a mental hygiene pickup was not stigmatized by
reason of her disability in violation of ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, where police acted because
the individual appeared to be mentally ill and was acting in a manner that was likely to result in
serious harm to herself or to others. (New York State Police)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Dodge v. County of Orange, 282~.Supp.2d 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). A suit sought a permanent
injunction against a county jail's policy of strip searching newly arrived pretrial detainees upon
their initial admission. The dist ct court held that the policy, in its initial form and in two
subsequent revisions, violated t Fourth Amendment to the extent that it allowed a strip search
without individualized reasonab suspicion that a detainee was carrying contraband. The court
granted a permanent injunction gainst the unconstitutional aspects of the policy. The banned
policy allowed strip searches for factors such as being a known gang member or having prior
escape charges. (Orange County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Eberle v. City of Newton, 289 F.Supp.2d 1269 (D.Kan. 2003). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action
against a city and city officials and staff, alleging that she was subjected to excessive force while
in police custody. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, in
spite of finding violations, because the arrestee had signed a waiver of all civil rights claims. The
court found that an officer's use of violence against the arrestee during questioning at a police
station violated the arrestee's clearly established right to be free from excessive force, and that
the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The arrestee had attempted to leave an
interrogation room and the officer grabbed her by the arm, throwing her in the direction of a chair
and causing her to fall, and then the officer kicked the arrestee even though she posed no threat
to him. (City of Newton Police Department, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
LENGTH

Edwards v. Oberndorf, 309 F.Supp.2d 780 (E.D.Va. 2003). A driver arrested for driving under the
influence challenged his detention. The district court dismissed the action, finding that housing
the driver in a holding cell for a minimal period of time following the first court's order for the
inmate's release, while the sheriff's department checked on whether a detainer was still lodged by
a second court, did not violate due process. The court noted that the detainee was held for less
than 20 hours and there was no evidence of negligence or malice. (Virginia Beach City Jail, VA)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Engelleiter v. Brevard County Sheriffs Dept., 290 F.Supp.2d 1300 (M.D.Fla. 2003). A pretrial
detainee who as an insulin-dependent diabetic brought a civil rights action against a county
sheriff's department, claiming deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the department. The court held that even if jail
officials were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical condition by giving him
only one shot of insulin during a period of approximately 48 hours, the detainee did not establish
the existence of a "policy or custom" based on treatment decisions by the department or the jail
nurses. (Brevard County Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Estate of Allen v. City of Rockford, 349 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir. 2003). A pretrial detainee sued a city
and several police officers under § 1983, alleging due process violations stemming from unwanted
medical treatment received at a hospital following her arrest for driving under the influence of
drugs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the officers owed the detainee a duty of care and safety
during the time that the detainee was at the hospital, and that the officers' failure to intervene
with the forcible medical treatment of the detainee did not violate her due process rights. The
officers had taken the detainee to a hospital for the purpose of obtaining a urine sample. An
emergency room physician stated that the detainee was not competent to make medical decisions
regarding her health and might suffer a potentially life-threatening drug overdose if a drug screen
was not conducted. The officers did not prevent the forcible extraction of blood and urine samples.
(City of Rockford, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Gaines v. Choctaw County Com'n., 242 F.Supp.2d 1153 (S.D.Ala. 2003). Administrators of a
deceased inmate's estate asserted state and federal law claims against a sheriff and county,
32.105

alleging that the inmate's death resulted from the denial of medical treatment while the
inmate was a pretrial detainee in a county jail. The district court held that the county could not be
held liable for any alleged lack of training or supervision of the sheriff, or sheriffs employees. The
court found that allegations failed to support a claim against the county based on its statutory
duty to maintain a jail, but that the allegations supported a claim against the county for an
alleged breach of duty to fund medical care, where the alleged failure to provide adequate funding
to meet the medical needs of inmates supported a claim for deliberate indifference under § 1983.
The court noted that although the county did not have a duty to appoint a physician, but merely
had the authority to do so, the county had the authority to act and its failure to do so could be
construed as a county policy. The court held that the allegations stated a § 1983 claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment against the sheriff in his individual capacity, based on his direct
participation. The sheriff allegedly removed the inmate from the hospital against medical advice,
failed to provide adequate treatment during his subsequent incarceration, and refused to readmit
the inmate to the hospital. At the time of his arrest, the inmate was a patient at an infirmary
where he was being treated for acute renal failure and pneumonia. The sheriff personally removed
the inmate from the hospital, over the strenuous objections of the inmate's physician. He was
placed in jail, where his condition deteriorated to the point that he was unable to walk or to feed
himself. His family found him in worsening condition during their visits and eventually paid other
inmates to help bathe and feed the inmate. Jail staff allegedly refused to administer prescription
medication because, according to the family, the Sheriffs policies did not require them to do so.
The she.riff finally took the inmate to a nearby medical clinic where the treating physician
recommended that the inmate be hospitalized, but the sheriff refused. The family contacted the
state human resources agency, which intervened and caused the inmate to be admitted to the
hospital. Upon admission, he was found to be dehydrated and malnourished and his illness had
become irreversible; he died a few days later. The court held that the alleged conduct of the county
in failing to equip the jail with audiovisual equipment to monitor inmates failed to support a claim
against the county, absent an allegation that the failure caused, or in any way contributed to, the
inmate's death. (Choctaw County Jail, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Gray v. Tunica County, Mississippi, 279 F.Supp.2d 789 (N.D.Miss. 2003). The estate of a jail
inmate and his relatives brought a suit against a county and a jailer, alleging federal civil rights
claims and state law claims. The inmate had committed suicide in a jail holding cell. The district
court granted summary judgment, in part, for the defendants. The court held that the county had
no civil rights liability for jail conditions or policies related to the suicide of the pretrial detainee
who was placed in a new "lunacy" cell under a suicide watch. The detainee apparently managed to
strangle himself with a ripped·off piece of his jail jumpsuit. The court found that the holding cell
was new and safe and that the method of suicide was unforeseeable. The court noted that it was
doubtful that the detainee could have been helped, even if a jailer had entered the cell
immediately upon noticing that the detainee had removed his jumpsuit and was lying nude in a
peculiar position. According to the court, the jail policies involving intermittent checks were
reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of protecting inmates from harm. The jailer had
decided to finish feeding other inmates before he returned to check on the welfare of the detainee
in the holding cell. The detainee had been checked about an hour after being placed in the new
holding cell, and the jailer returned 30 minutes later to discover the detainee unconscious in the
cell. (Tunica County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark., 285 F.Supp.2d 1132 (E.D.A.rk. 2003). An arrestee brought a§
1983 action against a county, sheriff and jail administrator, complaining of his long detention
prior to an initial court appearance. The district court entered judgment in favor of the arrestee,
finding that the county's detention policy was deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's
constitutional rights. The court held that the sheriff did not possess the requisite level of personal
knowledge to be individually liable, but that the jail administrator was not entitled to qualified
immunity. The sheriff and jail administrator were responsible for the policy under which the
she.riffs office submitted the names of those confined in jail to the court, and then waited for the
court to schedule a hearing. The policy resulted in a 38-day delay for the arrestee, in violation of
his Fourth Amendment right to a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to
extended restraint of liberty following arrest. The court held that it would enter an order
awarding compensatory damages and attorney fees and costs, if the parties were unable to settle
the amounts between them. The court found that the arrestee was entitled to compensatory
damages because his reputation in the community was compromised as the result of his
confinement, he suffered mental anguish, emotional distress and physical pain while incarcerated,
and he was financially injured when his home and property were left unattended for the 38 days
he was confined. The arrestee had been brought to the jail when two outstanding warrants were
discovered during a traffic stop. (Faulkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILES

Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro. Area Transit. 284 F.Supp.2d 145 (D.D.C. 2003). The mother of a
12-year-old girl who was arrested for eating a french fry in a rail transit station. brought a § 1983
action alleging equal protection and other violations. The district court entered judgment for the
defendants. The court held that the city's "no citation" policy for juvenile offenses did not violate
the daughter's equal protection rights. Adult violators were able to be released with a citation,
while the law required juveniles to be arrested and detained. The 12-year-old ate one french fry in
a transit station and she was arrested. The transit police officer searched the girl and her
possessions and handcuffed her behind her back. The handcuffs remained on until she was
32.106

released from the juvenile processing station several hours later. (Juvenile Processing Center,
D.C.)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Jimenez v. New Jersey. 245 F.Supp.2d 584 (D.N.J. 2003). An arrestee whose charges were
subsequently dropped, brought a state court action alleging violation of his constitutional rights
and various state court claims. The case was removed to the federal district court, where it was
dismissed. The district court held that the arrestee had no due process right to pre·trial DNA
testing, and therefore officers could not be held liable under § 1983. The arrestee had been held
for 22 months, during which time he asked for DNA testing, asserting it would prove him innocent
of the charges. (Atlantic County, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Joseph Ex Rel. Estate of Harbin v. City of Detroit, 289 F.Supp.2d 863 (E.D.Mich. 2003). The
personal representative of the estate of an arrestee brought a § 1983 action in state court, alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The representative alleged that jailers
delayed attending to the arrestee when he repeatedly complained of chest pain. The arrestee was
eventually taken to a hospital where he died 12 hours later. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, finding that the police department's alleged five·hour delay in
taking the arrestee to the hospital did not rise to the level of an objective, serious harm. The court
noted that there was no evidence that any officer actually perceived, or knew of, a substantial risk
of serious harm, nor that his death could have been avoided if he had received more prompt
medical treatment. (Sixth Precinct Station House, Detroit Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
USEOFFORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2003). A pretrial detainee filed a§ 1983 action
alleging the use of excessive force, and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The
district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The appeals court affirmed in part, and
reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that there were genuine issues of material
fact, precluding summary judgment, as to whether sheriff's department officers were aware that
the detainee was diabetic and was showing signs of a ketoacidic condition, but failed to provide
him with food. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded on the issue of whether
sheriff's department officers employed excessive force against the detainee. The detainee claimed
that a deputy grabbed him and pulled him to the ground and that several deputies then kicked
him, punched him, hit him with batons or similar objects, twisted his arms and legs, poked his
face, knuckled his ear, and pepper sprayed him. The detainee had been arrested for an
outstanding warrant on an unpaid parking ticket. The detainee told the arresting officer that he
was diabetic and needed to eat as soon as possible. Upon admission to the jail the detainee's blood
was tested and a nurse told him that he would receive food promptly. The nurse's records
indicated that the detainee was not combative, verbally abusive, or agitated at intake. (Orange
County Men's Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court

Lumley v. City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 2003). An arrestee who was wounded
in a shoot·out brought a suit against police officials. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants on the arrestee's Sixth Amendment claim. but rejected their qualified
immunity defense, and both sides appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The court held that a law enforcement officer's decision while he was present in the hospital
watching the arrestee as he awaited surgery for a bullet wound, that the arrestee should be
strapped to the hospital bed in order to minimize the risk of flight. did not rise to the level of a
substantive due process violation. The court found that the officers who took no part in a doctor's
decision to remove a bullet from the arrestee's jaw but not to treat a fracture of his right cheek
bone, could not be held vicariously liable for the doctor's conduct. (Dade City Police Dept., Florida)

MEDICAL CARE

RESTRAINTS

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Lynn v. O'Leary. 264 F.Supp.2d 306 (D.Md. 2003). An arrestee sued state prison officials, alleging
that he was subjected to an unlawful arrest, excessive force, and an illegal cavity search. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied it in part. The
court held that officials were not entitled to governmental official immunity. under state law, in
light of allegations that the officials acted with malice or were grossly negligent when they
allegedly searched the arrestee's cavities while he was attempting to visit his son, after the
officials informed the arrestee that a drug dog had falsely alerted on him. The arrestee had
arrived at a state prison with his wife. intending to visit his son who was an inmate. While he was
waiting to be admitted to the visiting area, a search dog was brought into the area and canvassed
the room on a long leash. The dog gave a positive alert for drugs and the arrestee was subjected to
a pat down search and his visitor locker was searched. No drugs were found on his person or in his
locker and he was told that the dog had made a false alert. But he was not allowed to visit. and
waited in lobby while his wife visited their son. After the visit prison officials ordered the arrestee
into a side room where his wife heard him scream in pain. He informed the officials that he
suffered from a medical condition. He was informed that he was under arrest and that he would
be subjected to a strip and body cavity search, and the arrestee demanded that a warrant be
produced. His clothes were forcibly removed and no contraband was found. $2,000 was taken from
his wallet and divided among the prison officials. His person was then searched, including a body
cavity examination. While he was dressing after the search one officer jerked up the arrestee's left
leg. causing him to fall off a chair and hit his head against a wall, and he was knocked
unconscious. He was taken to a hospital where he was found to be suffering from a contusion to
his brain. and injury to his back, shoulder and arm. He was permanently banned from visiting his
son. (Maryland House of Corrections Annex, Jessup, Maryland)
32.107

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 2003). The estate of a suspect who was fatally
injured during a standoff with police officers brought a§ 1983 action. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants and the estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that a police chiefs decision to require an officer to drive an ambulance, so that both
medical personnel could attend to the wounded suspect during the drive to the hospital, did not
violate the suspect's due process right to medical care. The court noted that the suspect
subsequently died at the hospital and the driving arrangement had caused a delay at the arrest
scene, but found that there was no evidence that the chief was deliberately indifferent to the
suspect's medical needs. (City of Palestine, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Mitchell v. Newryder, 245 F.Supp.2d 200 CD.Me. 2003). A detainee brought a § 1983 action against
a county jail officer, alleging permanent traumatization as a result of being made to sit in his feces
for five hours after his repeated requests to use a toilet were denied by the officer. The district
court denied the officer's motion to dismiss. The court found that the detainee sufficiently alleged
that he was denied a minimum civilized measure of life's necessity and that the officer had a
culpable state of mind. The court held that the detainee could not seek compensatory damages
absent an actual physical injury. The court agreed to consider the detainee's request for injunctive
relief, barring further interference with his rights by the officer. The detainee alleged that the
officer refused to allow him to use a toilet and then refused to let him clean himself up for five
hours after he defecated in his pants. According to the detainee, the officer displayed hostility
towards him during his denial, using insulting and offensive language and expressions. The
detainee had been placed in a cell without a toilet, mattress or blanket, upon his admission to the
jail. He was not being punished for anything but he was purposefully being separated from other
inmates. The detainee alleged that he was not intoxicated, nor did he act disrespectfully.
<Aroostook County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Mladek v. Day, 293 F.Supp.2d 1297 (M.D.Ga. 2003). An arrestee brought a suit against county
officials alleging they violated his Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they
used excessive force during and after his arrest, and when they denied him medical attention as a
pretrial detainee. The district court dismissed the suit in part, and denied dismissal in part. The
court held that allegations that a deputy violently handcuffed the arrestee with no justification,
and that the handcuffing caused physical injury to the arrestee, were sufficient to state an
excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the alleged denial of
medical attention for the detainee's injuries during the one day he was detained was insufficient
to assert a constitutional violation. (Walton County, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Mooring v. San Francisco Sheriffs Dept., 289 F.Supp.2d 1110 (N.D.Cal. 2003). A county jail
inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his safety when he was
housed unwillingly with gang rivals who assaulted him. The court granted summary judgment for
the defendants. The court held that a deputy sheriff did not violate the inmate's due process right
to protection from violence, absent any evidence that the deputy knew the inmate's particular
gang atrtliation or that the deputy could have learned the inmate's gang affiliation from
information on the inmate's housing records. (San Francisco County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility. 318 F.3d 575 (3rd Cir. 2003). A detainee who was
an insulin-dependent diabetic, brought claims under§ 1981 and § 1983 in state court, alleging
that he suffered a stroke due to a delay in the administration of insulin during his first twenty·
one hours of incarceration. The case was removed to federal court, where summary judgment was
granted to the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that fact questions precluded summary judgment on the detainee's claim that his right to
adequate medical care was violated, and to whether the actions of private prison health service
employees could be attributed to their employer. The court noted that the employees failed to call
the detainee's treating physician to determine how often he needed insulin, and that they did not
even ask the detainee. (Camden County Correctional Facility, Prison Health Services, Inc., New
Jersey)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
SEARCH

Omar v. Casterline, 288 F.Supp.2d 775 (W .D.La. 2003). A detainee brought a Bivens suit alleging
that federal prison officials subjected him to an unconstitutional search and failed to
accommodate his religious needs. The district court held that a body cavity search conducted upon
the detainee's arrival at a federal institution did not violate the Fourth Amendment, even though
a female officer was present and officers allegedly ridiculed the detainee during the search. The
district court denied summary judgment for the defendants on the detainee's religious claims. The
detainee alleged that he informed the facility chaplain about his dietary restrictions, was served
pork, could not see a clock from his cell, and was misinformed about the starting date of Ramadan.
(United States Penitentiary, Pollock, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Palmer v. Marion County. 327 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2003). A pretrial detainee who was severely
beaten by other inmates at a county jail, brought a § 1983 claim alleging deliberate indifference to
his safety and failure to properly train and supervise jail officials. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that the detainee's affidavit that stated he personally observed the county jail's practices of
segregating inmates by race, placing gang members with non-gang members, not segregating
inmates who feel threatened, and not intervening to stop inmate·on·inmate violence in cell blocks
32.108

occupied predominantly by non-white inmates, was insufficient to show that the county had either
a widespread practice of allowing jail inmates to fight or segregating them by race. <Marion
County Jail, Indiana)
U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCH
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Perkins v. Brown, 285 F.Supp.2d 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). An inmate brought a prose§ 1983 action
alleging use of excessive force by colll."ections officers and failure to provide medical care. The
district court held that the inmate would be treated as a pretrial detainee. The court granted
summary judgment in favor of the officers. The court held that the officers did not use excessive
force against the detainee when they forcibly undressed and searched him in a courthouse holding
cell. The court found that the detainee's injuries were minor and noted that he was taken to the
courthouse infirmary immediately after he was injured. (New York City Department of
Correction, Brooklyn Criminal Courthouse)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Richardson v. Nassau County, 277 F.Supp.2d 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). A jail inmate sued a county
and sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to his glaucoma condition. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of a jail nurse, sheriff, and county. The court denied summary
judgment for medical officials, finding that it was precluded by fact issues as to whether the
worsening of the glaucoma condition could be the result of the withdrawal of medication. The
inmate alleged that there was a 51-day delay in the provision of an eye exam and the resumption
of his medication. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
TRANSPORT

Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). A state prisoner
brought a§ 1983 action after a default judgment was issued against him in a civil personal injury
action because he failed to appear due to his detention in jail on an unrelated criminal action. The
district court dismissed the case and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that a
sherifrs refusal to transport the pretrial detainee from a jail to a courthouse for his civil personal
injury trial did not violate the prisoner's due process right of access to courts. The court noted that
the detainee did not claim that the sheriff's failure to transport him was intended to punish him,
and the court found that punitive intent could not be inferred. The court held that the sherift's
refusal was rationally related to a legitimate penological interest in keeping detainees in jail
unless absolutely necessary. (Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCH

Thomas v. City of Clanton, 285 F.Supp.2d 1275 (M.D.Ala. 2003). A detainee brought a§ 1983
action alleging that he was subjected to an unconstitutional strip search, and that he had been
subjected to sexual harassment while confined. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. The court held that the strip search violated the detainee's Fourth
Amendment rights, but that officials were not liable for the unwarranted strip search conducted
by an officer. The court also held that a single complaint of sexual misconduct against an officer
did not put the police department on notice of the need for increased supervision of the officer. The
detainee was a passenger in a car in which marijuana was found, but the driver's wife had told
the arresting officer that the marijuana belonged to the driver. There was no reasonable suspicion
that the detainee was concealing a weapon, but he was subjected to a strip search anyway. The
detainee had been taken to the police station where he was never booked, but was subjected to a
strip search that was conducted in a bathroom. The detainee was then taken to the officer's home
where the officer discussed oral sex. The detainee fled from the officer's home. The court noted
that the officer's violation of the detainee's rights was deliberate, and that no amount of training
would have prevented the violation. The court also noted that the police chief had attempted to
investigate an earlier complaint of sexual misconduct lodged against the officer. (City of Clanton,
Alabama)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
PUNISHMENT
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

Tilmon v. Prator, 292 F.Supp.2d 898 (W.D.La. 2003). A state inmate who was held in a county jail
awaiting sentencing filed a § 1983 action, alleging civil rights violations when he was punished for
possessing contraband in his cell. The district court dismissed the complaint and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court dismissed the
action, finding that the inmate who had been convicted, but not yet sentenced, was not entitled to
a hearing before being punished. The court held that the inmate had no liberty interest in not
being placed in disciplinary segregation, and was therefore not entitled under the Due Process
Clause to a hearing before such placement. The inmate was punished for possessing contraband in
his cell. His punishment included eight hours confinement in a punitive cell, loss of telephone
privileges, loss of visitation privileges, and loss of recreation privileges. (Caddo Correctional
Center, Shreveport, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
GOOD TIME

Torres v. Stewart, 263 F.Supp.2d 463 (D.Conn. 2003). A state inmate sued prison officials, alleging
that as a pretrial detainee he was designated as a security risk without a hearing, and confined in
segregation in violation of his due process rights. The inmate sought damages and the restoration
of forfeited good time credits. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court held that the inmate's request for restoration of good time credits was not
cognizable under§ 1983, and that as a pretrial detainee, he had not protected liberty interest in
his classification. The court noted that the classification was not punishment proscribed by due
process principles. The detainee had received a notice of his hearing two days prior to its
scheduled date, declined to present witnesses, declined the assistance of an advocate, admitted to
being a soldier for a gang, was identified as a regional commander in the gang, and had been
arrested for the murder of a rival gang member. (Northern Correctional Institution, Connecticut)
32.109

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Gangi, 57 Fed.Appx. 809 (10th Cir. 2003) [unpublished]. A defendant who was convicted
for bank fraud challenged the taping of his jail telephone calls. The appeals court held that it was
not objectively reasonable for the detainee to have any expectation of privacy in his outgoing calls
from jail, and that the detainee impliedly consented to the taping of his calls from jail. The court
noted that the detainee was cognizant of detention settings, which permitted a strong inference
that he fully understood the fact that jail telephones were monitored. According to the court, the
detainee was a "keen observer of detail" and was presumed to have seen signs above other
telephones that provided notice of telephone monitoring. The court held that the Fourth
Amendment is not triggered by the routine taping of outgoing jail calls. (Uinta Co. Det. Ctr.,
Wyoming)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Roy, 349 F.Supp.2d 60 (D.Mass. 2003). A detainee charged with drug, firearms and witness
tampering offenses moved to suppress the contents of his telephone conversations that were
recorded when he was in custody. The district court denied the motion, finding that the detainee
impliedly consented to the recording of his telephone conversations because he was informed that
his calls were subject to monitoring and recording, he chose to proceed with the conversations,
and those to whom the defendant made the calls expressly consented to participate in possiblyrecorded telephone conversations. (Worcester County House of Corrections, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Walters v. County of Charleston, 63 Fed.Appx. 116 (4th Cir. 2003) [unpublished]. The personal
representative of a detainee who died in custody brought a § 1983 action, alleging that the
detainee's death was the result of officers' use of excessive force. The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the officers' use of force in restraining the detainee was not excessive, even
though the detainee died as the result of a compression injury to his neck sustained while officers
attempted to subdue him. The court noted that the detainee was an exceptionally large man who
became violent while in his cell and after he was let out of his cell, and that there was no evidence
that the officers intentionally choked the detainee. The detainee had been housed in a temporary
detention facility pursuant to a civil contempt order of a family court, for refusing to pay back
child support. (Charleston County Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
STRIP SEARCH
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Williams v. Kaufman County. 352 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 2003). Detainees brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff and county, alleging violation of their civil rights during the execution of a search
warrant at a night club. The district court entered judgment against the defendants and they
appealed. The appeals court held that the strip searches of the detainees were unlawful, absent
individualized suspicion or probable cause, and that the law on this matter was clearly
established at the time of the searches. The court found that the prolonged detention of the
detainees was unlawful, but that the law was not clearly established at the time of the detention
and the district court had properly granted qualified immunity to the defendants on the unlawful
detention claims. The court held that the detainees established the county's municipal liability for
their strip search and detention, and that the district court did not err in imposing nominal
damages of $100 per plaintiff. The searches and detention were conducted according to a sheriff
department's unwritten policy for executing "hazardous" warrants, according to the court. The
appeals court found that the record supported the district court's conclusion that the sheriff acted
with reckless indifference toward the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, justifying an award of
punitive damages, and held that punitive damage awards of $15,000 per plaintiff were not
excessive. The plaintiffs had been held for three hours and were subjected to highly intrusive strip
searches, and the sheriff kept the plaintiffs handcuffed after they had been searched and no
weapons or contraband had been found. (Kaufman County, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SEARCH

Wood v. Hancock County, 245 F.Supp.2d 231 (D.Me. 2003). A misdemeanor arrestee brought a
civil rights action against a county and county officials, alleging he was subjected to
unconstitutional strip searches while in jail. The district court denied the defendants' motions for
judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment. The court held that the arrestee stated a
claim, precluding judgment on the pleadings. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of fact as to whether the jail policy of strip searching misdemeanor
arrestees after contact visits was reasonable, and whether the jail had a custom of conducting
strip searches upon admission. The court noted that further proceedings were needed to
determine if it was a "custom" to strip search misdemeanor arrestees without reasonable
suspicion that an arrestee harbored contraband or weapons, and that evidence suggested that
officers did not comply with recording requirements for strip searches. (Hancock Co. Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCH

Wood v. Hancock County Sheriff's Dept., 354 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2003). A jail inmate sought
damages under § 1983, alleging he was unconstitutionally strip searched on three separate
occasions by correctional officers. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a
partial new trial. The appeals court held that a jury instruction that incorrectly defined a strip
search, improperly limited the jury's deliberations on the nature of the searches of the
misdemeanor detainee. The court found the district court's use of the term "deliberate," when
describing a strip search, unduly directed the jurors to the officers' subjective intent, and that
other elements of the definition (scrutiny of the mouth and armpits) were not prerequisites for
finding that a strip search took place. The court noted that an individual detained on a
misdemeanor charge may only be strip searched as part of the booking process if officers have
32.110

reasonable suspicion that he is either armed or carrying contraband. According to the court, a
blanket policy of strip-searching inmates after contact visits is constitutional, except in atypical
circumstances. (Hancock County Jail, Maine)

2004
U.S. District Court
SPEEDY TRIAL
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS

Atwood v. Vilsack, 338 F.Supp.2d 985 (S.D.Iowa 2004). Pretrial detainees who were awaiting
hearings on their sexually violent predator (SVP) petitions, brought a class action against a state
corrections department alleging denial of speedy justice. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants in part and denied it in part. The court held that the failure of the
co1Tections department to initiate proceedings for civil commitment of sexually violent predators
until immediately prior to discharge of their criminal sentences did not violate their speedy trial
rights, because the department was under no duty to minimize time in custody by ensuring that
commitment proceedings overlapped substantially with criminal incarceration. The court found
that a seven·month average time for trying an SVP case after appointment of defense counsel was
not presumptively prejudicial. According to the court, a civil commitment candidate does not have
a speedy trial right, until such time as he is identified by the statutory process to be a candidate
for commitment. The court held that even though the SVP Act stated that the purpose of pretrial
detention was for evaluation, and the detainees were held for periods exceeding the time needed
for evaluation, the Act also provided for a safekeeping component. The court concluded that denial
of bail for the detainees did not violate their due process rights, where the detention was premised
upon a judge's probable cause finding and a determination of mental abnormality and
dangerousness was made at the outset of confinement. The court held that the conditions of the
detainees' confinement violated their due process rights because the conditions were not
reasonably related to the government's objective of preventing them from harming themselves or
others. The detainees were kept in lockdown the majority of the day, denied reasonable access to
visitors, telephones, educational programming,.mental health treatment, recreation, exercise,
religious services, medical care, and hygiene. The court noted that when the detainees' conditions
are harsher than the conditions of criminal inmates, due process cannot be satisfied unless the
conditions are reasonably related to the purpose of confinement. The court found that the
implementation of the act, which resulted in an additional period of "dead time" incarceration,
violated the double jeopardy rights of detainees who had previously served criminal sentences.
(Iowa Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE
BAIL

Barham v. Ramsey, 338 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C. 2004). Persons who were arrested during a
demonstration at the World Bank in Washington, D.C., brought a § 1983 action alleging that their
arrests and detentions violated their constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the action,
in part. The court held that failure to provide the arrestees with citation release, or a post and
trial release option, did not constitute a deprivation of due process or equal protection, even
though the arrestees were detained for a lengthy period. According to the court, the unavailability
of citation release was due to unintended technological failures, and there was no evidence that
the arrestees were treated differently than other groups of arrestees regarding the availability of
a post and trial release option. The court noted that there were incompatibility problems with the
cameras used to photograph arrestees and computer software. (Metropolitan Police Department,
Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE

Bern: v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2004). In three separate actions, arrestees who had been
detained in a county jail for periods ranging from 26 to 29 hours after courts had authorized their
release following resolution of their charges, brought § 1983 claims against a county sheriff in his
official capacity. The district court consolidated the cases and dismissed them. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to
whether the application of county policies which resulted in the detentions was unreasonable
under the circumstances and thus amounted to a policy of deliberate indifference to the arrestees'
constitutional rights. The court found that as a matter a law, a county's system of administrative
processing of jail inmates could not be immune from allegations that, in practice, it amounts to
deliberate indifference. (Los Angeles County SherifPs Department)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 2004). A former detainee brought an
action under § 1983 asserting claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failure to
provide prompt medical treatment during his detention. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the officials' delay in treatment posed a substantial risk of serious harm, where
the seriousness of the detainee's appendicitis could be discerned without competent medical proof,
and the detainee's manifestations of pain and injury during his detention were so obvious that
even a layperson could have easily recognized the necessity for a doctor's attention. The court also
found unresolved fact issues as to the officials' culpable state of mind, where the detainee had
complained of stomach pain within an hour of his arrest, and officials were aware that the
detainee was subsequently experiencing sharp abdominal pain and vomiting. The detainee
received no medical attention until more than 50 hours after his arrest. <Kalamazoo County Jail,
Michigan)

32.111

U.S. District Court
MENTAL HEALTH
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act

Bolden v. Stroger, 306 F.Supp.2d 792 (N.D.Ill. 2004). Pretrial detainees brought an action
challenging a county's policy of barring individuals with mental illness from various pre-release
programs, and its policy of discharging mentally ill individuals without providing them with
medication and referrals necessary to manage their illnesses. The district court dismissed the
action, finding that a court monitoring consent decree that had created pre-release programs at
the jail was the proper forum for claims regarding eligibility for the programs, and for challenging
the treatment of mentally ill detainees, even though the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
was not in existence at the time the decree was originally entered. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT

Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88 (2 nd Cir. 2004). A pretrial detainee in a county jail who sought
replacement of his court-appointed attorney, brought a§ 1983 due process and equal protection
action against county officials. The detainee alleged denial of access to courts because he was
denied access to law library materials. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee was
not denied access to the courts when he was allegedly denied materials from the jail law library,
because the detainee had unrestricted access to an attorney. The court noted that there was no
evidence of denial or restriction of the detainee's access to his attorney, and that he never
requested the same law library reference materials from his attorney. (Chenango County Jail,
New York)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT

Brewster v. Nassau County, 349 F.Supp.2d 540 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). A detainee brought a§ 1983
action. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the detainee failed to state a §
1983 conspiracy claim against a legal aid society, which had sent three successive attorneys work
with the detainee. The court considered these to be state law malpractice claims and declined to
exercise jurisdiction. The court found that even if the detainee suffered all of the psychological
and emotional injuries that he alleged, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) precluded
recovery against corrections officials under§ 1983 because the detainee did not allege any
physical injury. (Nassau County Correctional Facility, and Nassau County Legal Aid Society, New
York)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
INITIAL APPEARANCE
SPEEDY TRIAL

Bunyan v. Burke County, 306 F.Supp.2d 1240 (S.D.Ga. 2004). A detainee brought a§ 1983 action
stemming from his arrest and the alleged refusal of jail authorities to release him on bail. The
court denied summary judgment for the defendants on the issue of whether the sheriffs
department failed to bring the detainee before a judicial officer within 72 hours after his arrest.
The court held that the sheriffs department contravened state statutes and violated the
detainee's procedural due process rights by refusing to release the detainee, despite his proffer of
sufficient funds to post the amount of bail that had been set. (Burke County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Byar v. Lee, 336 F.Supp.2d 896 (W.D.Ark. 2004). A former county jail detainee filed an action
against a former county sheriff, alleging violations of her constitutional rights arising out of the
sheriffs promulgation of a set of detainee rules for the county jail. The district court held that the
rules, which were modeled on the Ten Commandments, were excessively and impermissibly
entangled with religion and constituted an endorsement or advancement of religion. The court
found that a sufficient nexus existed between the requirement that the detainee read, sign, and
agree to follow the rules and the imposition suffered by the detainee by having religious tenets
forced upon her in the guise of secular rules of behavior. The detainee alleged that she considered
it offensive to have the government direct her to obey particular religious tenets and she was
fearful that she might be perceived as violating the rules and therefore be disciplined. The court
denied the sheriff qualified immunity from liability, finding that he knew, or reasonably should
have known, that his actions violated the Establishment Clause. The court noted that the sheriff
had previously been sued about the rules and was given notice that posting the Ten
Commandments in any form would violate the Establishment Clause. The court found that the
use of the Ten Commandments as a model for detainee rules served no secular purpose and that
the primary effect of the rules was to advance religion. (Benton County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION

Carmichael v. Richards, 307 F.Supp.2d 1014 (S.D.Ind. 2004). A county jail prisoner who was
injured by his cellmate brought a§ 1983 action against a sheriff in his individual and official
capacities, claiming that the sheriff failed to take reasonable measures to ensure his physical
safety, and did not provide necessary medical care. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that the sheriff could not be held individually liable for
failing to ensure the physical safety of a medium security inmate who was injured by a maximum
security inmate, absent evidence that the sheriff knew of a substantial risk that the inmate would
be harmed, or evidence of a causal link between the policy of mixing of medium and maximum
security prisoners and the increased risk of violence. The court also found that the sheriff was not
liable in his official capacity. The jail had three types of cell classifications: maximum, medium
and minimum security. Inmates are classified by the shift leader who is on duty at the time an
inmate arrives at the jail. (Johnson County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
LENGTH

Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2004). Arrestees brought a§ 1983 action
alleging that their arrests for violating a ticket-scalping ordinance was a violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants and the
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the arrests were reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment and that the length of detention, from three to fourteen hours, was reasonable. The
32.112

court noted that the arrests were humiliating, that the arrestees were held in a police vehicle
until one·halfhour after the start time for the event, that they were subjected to body cavity
searches, prevented from making phone calls, and forced to share holding cells with other
prisoners. The court concluded that the arrestees were not subjected to more harmful treatment
than would be involved in a normal custodial arrest. Police officials explained that the detention
center to which the arrestees were taken was busy at the time of the arrests, supervisors were
required to monitor the booking process, and the arresting officers processed the paperwork as
quickly as possible. {Milwaukee Police Department, Wisconsin)
U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE
CROWDING
CONDITIONS

Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2004). Persons who were detained at police license
check.points after a concert brought a civil rights action. The district court denied summary
judgment for the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. The appeals court held that even if the arrestees were detained without
phone calls or mattresses for a period of less than 24 hours in a crowded jail, such conditions
would be in the nature of a de minimis imposition that did not rise to a violation of the detainee's
due process rights. (Copiah County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Cooper v. Office of Sheriff of Will County, 333 F.Supp.2d 728 (N.D.Ill. 2004). A pretrial detainee's
surviving father brought an action against a county, sheriff, and deputies after his son died as the
result of an asthma attack while he was incarcerated. The district court held that state law did
not preclude the possibility of respondeat superior liability on the sheriff for a deputy's intentional
or willful conduct. According to the court, the father's allegations were sufficient to state a § 1983
claim against the deputies based on deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical
condition. The court noted that the central allegation in the complaint was that the deputies failed
to provide timely medical care and treatment to the detainee. The detainee had been placed in the
general population of the jail, and had previously had an asthma attack that required inhaler
medication. When -the detainee had a subsequent attack, he and other inmates informed deputies
on duty that immediate medical care was necessary, but the deputies failed to act in a timely
manner and the detainee died. (Will County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SAFETY

Davis v. Reilly. 324 F.Supp.2d 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). A prisoner who was injured when he slipped
and fell on a wet floor outside of a shower area brought a pro se § 1983 action, alleging failure to
remedy the wet shower area and inadequate medical care. The district court dismissed the action.
The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and that the injuries
the inmate sustained did not constitute a serious medial condition. The inmate had sprained his
back and neck, and experienced pain in his left testicle. The court found that failure to provide
mats for the wet shower area did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. <Nassau
County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY
PUNISHMENT

Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). Pretrial detainees brought an action seeking a
preliminary injunction to prevent a county sheriff from continuing to use world·wide web
cameras, or "webcams," to broadcast live images of the pretrial detainees on the Internet. The
district court granted the request for an injunction and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the use of webcams constituted punishment prior to adjudication of guilt, in
violation of the due process clause. According to the court, the detainees were harmed by having
every moment of their daily activities exposed to general and world·wide scrutiny,
notwithstanding the sheriff's claim that the webcams served purposes of deterrence and public
scrutiny. The appeals court held that the grant of the injunction did not violate the sheriff's First
Amendment free speech rights, where the webcam transmissions were not the sheriff's personal
communications, but rather constituted governmental speech since the sheriff could not have
obtained or transmitted the images absent his official position. The court noted that improving jail
security was not a legitimate alternative purpose for the webcams. <Maricopa County Madison
Street Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court

Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 322 F.Supp.2d 1045 (C.D.Cal. 2004). A detainee arrested for
domestic violence brought a § 1983 Eighth Amendment action alleging that bail of $1 million was
excessive. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held
that bail of $1 million, enhanced from the $50,000 bail listed in the county's felony bail schedule,
was not excessive. The court noted that the alleged victim had both older and more recent
injuries, including a seven·inch laceration, and allegedly feared for her safety. The detainee was a
local attorney who had obtained bail within hours by paying $50,000 to post bond, and the option
of denying bail was unavailable under state law. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department,
California)

BAIL

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

George v. City of Wichita, 348 F.Supp.2d 1232 (D.Kan. 2004). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action
against a city and a city detective alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the strip search to
which the arrestee was subjected after being arrested for a violent felony and booked into jail, did
not violate his Fourth Amendment or due process rights. There was no evidence that the arrestee
was subjected to anything beyond a visual examination or that he was intrusively touched by jail
officials as part of the search. The court noted that the search was apparently conducted in an
appropriate room and in an appropriate manner, and that the facility had a legitimate interest in
32.113

preventing detainees charged with violent felonies from bringing weapons or contraband into the
facility. (Sedgwick County Detention Facility, Kansas)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ginest v. Board of County Com'rs. of Carbon County, 333 F.Supp.2d 1190 CD.Wyo. 2004). County
jail inmates brought a class action against a county and sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to
the inmates' medical needs, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Following the entry of a
consent decree governing medical care, the inmates sought a contempt order, alleging specific
violations of the decree's terms. The defendants moved to terminate the consent decree. The
district court held that the county was potentially liable, and the sheriff was potentially liable for
failure to train. The court found that the constitutional rights of the inmates were violated by
inadequate medical care and inadequate medical records at the jail, including lack of training in
suicide prevention. According to the court, jail medical records that are inadequate, inaccurate
and unprofessionally maintained are actionable under the Eighth Amendment. The court found
that many physician progress notes and other medical records were missing, there was no written
definition of a medical emergency requiring immediate care, there were numerous delays in
responding to inmate requests for medical care, there was no suicide prevention training nor
written policies, and potentially suicidal inmates were often isolated physically and provided with
little or no counseling. (Carbon County Jail, Wyoming)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Graham ex rel. Estate v. County of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2004). The estate of an
arrestee, who died after secretly ingesting cocaine upon his arrest, brought a § 1983 action
alleging that a county policy regarding provision of medical care to prisoners in the county jail
contributed to the arrestee's death. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
county and the estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the county policy of
giving responsibility for the provision of medical care to its contractual medical provider, was not
the cause of the alleged unconstitutional denial of adequate medical care to the arrestee. The
court noted that even if the policy required jail personnel to defer all medical decisions to the
medical provider's employees, and even if the medical care received by the arrestee constituted
deliberate indifference, there was no showing that the county policy was the moving force behind
the violation. (Washtenaw County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Green v. Baca, 306 F.Supp.2d 903 (C.D.Cal. 2004). An arrestee sued a county sheriff, seeking
damages for his alleged over-detention. The district court denied summary judgment for the
sheriff, in part. The court held that fact issues as to the reasonableness of a twelve and one·half
hour delay, between receipt of an order authorizing release of the arrestee and the execution of
the order, precluded summary judgment. The court found that Fourteenth Amendment due
process standards, rather than the Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles, governed
the question of whether the constitutional rights of the arrestee were violated when, following a
legal arrest for a parole violation, he was detained for several days after a hearing that ended
with a determination that he had not violated parole. (Los Angeles County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Guerra v. Drake, 371 F.3d 404 (81h Cir. 2004). A pretrial detainee brought civil rights claims
seeking damages from correctional officers, alleging they used excessive force and left him in a
"restraint" chair for prolonged periods. The district court entered judgment against a Captain for
$1,500 on the restraint chair claim and against another officer for $500 on the excessive force
claim. The district court refused to award punitive damages and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the district court's refusal to award punitive damages was not
an abuse of discretion. The inmate had alleged that during his first six days of detention he was
subjected to unprovoked beatings and was placed in a "torture chair" for long periods. (Benton
County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 2004). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
asserting that jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that fact issues precluded summary judgment
on the deliberate indifference claim and whether a jail custom or policy contributed to the alleged
deliberate indifference. The jail personnel allegedly failed to arrange for dental treatment until
about six weeks after the detainee's written request for it, causing him to suffer further pain and
infection. (Scott County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURTS
SPEEDY TRIAL

Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark., 388 F.3d 669 (8th Cir. 2004). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action
against a county, sheriff and jail administrator, stemming from his 38·day detention prior to an
initial court appearance. The district court entered judgment in favor of the arrestee and the
defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the county's detention policy
was deliberately indifferent to the substantive due process rights of the arrestee and that the 38·
day detention of the arrestee shocks the conscience. The county's detention policy involved the
sheriffs office submitting names of those confined in jail to the court, and then waiting for the
court to schedule a hearing. The court found that the policy improperly delegated the
responsibility of bringing arrestees promptly to court for first appearance, and ignored the lack of
authority for long-term confinement. The court held that the jail administrator was deliberately
indifferent because he did nothing about the lengthy detention, even after he received four
separate grievances from the arrestee. The administrator testified that he would have continued
to wait for the court to schedule an appearance, even if the arrestee were held for 99 days.
32.114

According to the court, a reasonable official would know that detentions of less than 38 days
violated a state criminal procedural rule and the constitutional rights of the arrestee. The
arrestee had been ticketed for not having automobile tags and insurance and had failed to appear
in municipal court, resulting in the issuance of a bench warrant. When he was stopped for a traffic
violation he was arrest on the warrant and did not post the $593 cash·only bond at the jail.
(Faulkner County Jail, Arkansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILES

Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. 1 386 F.3d 1148 (D.C.Cir. 2004). The mother
of a 12·year·old who was arrested and detained for eating a french fry in a rail transit station
brought a § 1983 action. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants and the mother
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the city's "no-citation" policy for juveniles was
rationally related to the legitimate goal of promoting parental awareness and involvement with
children who commit delinquent acts. The court held that the policy did not violate equal
protection, even though adults who were seen eating food in transit authority facilities would
merely have been given a citation. According to the court, classifications based on youth, like
those based on age in general, do not trigger heightened scrutiny for equal protection purposes.
The appeals court expressed dissatisfaction about the case in the opening paragraph of its opinion:
"no one is very happy about the events that led to this litigation. A twelve·year·old girl was
arrested, searched, and handcuffed. Her shoelaces were removed, and she was transported in a
windowless rear compartment of a police vehicle to a juvenile processing center, where she was
booked, fingerprinted, and detained until released to her mother some three hours later-all for
eating a single french fry in a Metrorail station." (Juvenile Processing Center, District of
Columbia)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRIS·
ONMENT
FALSE ARREST

Johnson v. Board of Police Com'rs, 351 F.Supp.2d 929 (E.D.Mo. 2004). Homeless persons sued a
city board of police commissioners and a police captain, claiming harassment with the intent to
remove them from a downtown area in violation of their constitutional rights. The district court
entered a preliminary injunction on behalf of the plaintiffs. The court barred the continuation of
the challenged police practices, which included a pattern of arrests without probable cause,
throwing firecrackers into homeless groups, and inflicting community service work without the
adjudication of any crime. Several homeless persons were given a choice of performing manual
labor or remaining in jail, without being charged with any offense nor found to have committed
any offense. (City of St. Louis, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
PUNISHMENT
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9 th Cir. 2004). A jail detainee brought a civil rights against a sheriff
and county for violations of his constitutional rights during the period he was civilly confined
awaiting adjudication and eventual commitment under the California Sexually Violent Predator
Act (SVPA). The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with
instructions. The court held that fact issues as to whether the restrictive conditions of
confinement were justified by legitimate, non-punitive interests and were not excessive,
precluding summary judgment on the detainee's conditions of confinement claim. The court held
that the yearlong confinement of the civil detainee who was held in the general criminal
population of a county jail pending commitment proceedings, created a rebuttable assumption
that the confinement was punitive in violation of the detainee's substantive due process rights.
(Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Kelley v. County of Wayne, 325 F.Supp.2d 788 (E.D.Mich. 2004). A pretrial detainee's survivor
brought a civil rights action against two deputy marshals, alleging they were deliberately
indifferent to a detainee's serious medical needs stemming from his heroin withdrawal, and that
they proximately caused his suicide. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
deputy marshals. The court held that the failure of the deputy marshals to notify county
authorities who had the resources to care for the inmate, that the detainee was suffering from
heroin withdrawal, did not create a known risk of suicide or other serious harm. The court noted
that the suicide occurred more than four days after the detainee's arrest, and the deputy marshals
did not know of any correlation between heroin withdrawal and suicide. According to the court,
the deputy marshals' failure to comply with a judge's instructions to transport the detainee to a
particular detention center so that the detainee could be treated for his heroin withdrawal did not
manifest deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs, because had the marshals
taken the detainee to the requested center, the detainee either would not have been accepted or, if
accepted, would not have been treated due to a lack of treatment resources at that institution.
(Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Kramer v. Gwinnett County, Georgia, 306 F.Supp.2d 1219 (N.D.Ga. 2004). A pretrial detainee
filed a·§ 1983 action alleging that jail officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held
that the officials did not act with deliberate indifference to the detainee's psoriasis and related
conditions, even if the detainee's condition greatly deteriorated from the time of his arrival at the
facility until his release. The court noted that the detainee missed some of his appointments, and
that he was seen by jail physicians seven times, and by jail nurses at least fifteen times.
(Gwinnett County Detention Center, Georgia)

32.115

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Layman Ex Rel. Layman v. Alexander, 343 F.Supp.2d 483 CW.D.N.C. 2004). A detainee who had
suffered a serious head or brain injury following a blow from another prisoner, brought § 1983
claims against a sheriff and sheriff's department officers. The district court denied summary
judgment in favor of the sheriff with respect to the detainee's failure to train claim, finding
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the department's training of new detention officers
properly and thoroughly trained them to respond to and appreciate the dangers associated with
injuries and other medical conditions of inmates. The court held that summary judgment for a
detention officer was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officer acted
with deliberate indifference when she did not ensure that the detainee was taken to an emergency
room following a display of abnormal behavior after he suffered a serious head or brain injury
following a blow. (Haywood County Detention Center, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
TELEPHONE

Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642 (6 th Cir. 2004). A detainee joined a class action that challenged a
county policy that allowed prisoners to make only collect telephone calls, which in combination
with the public defender's policy of refusing collect calls operated to deny pretrial detainees their
right to counsel. The district court found a Sixth Amendment violation of the pretrial detainees'
rights and ordered an injunction. The county complied with the injunction. The district court
awarded attorney fees to the detainee and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed,
finding that the detainee lacked the standing to join the class action suit and thus was not
entitled to attorney fees. (Hamilton County Justice Center, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
SEGREGATION
DUE PROCESS

Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2004). A former pretrial detainee brought an action
against federal officials asserting constitutional claims relating to the conditions of his
confinement. The district court dismissed several defendants for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed
the case against the remaining defendants for failure to state a claim. The detainee appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court dismissed the detainee's first
amended complaint and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainee stated a claim that he suffered
unconstitutional conditions of confinement and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified
immunity. The detainee alleged that he was confined under extremely harsh conditions, that he
was placed in solitary confinement and locked in an extremely small closet-sized space, with
minimal contact with other human beings for a prolonged time that exceeded 500 days. The
detainee alleged that the harsh conditions were imposed solely for the sake of punishment. The
court noted that ample federal caselaw existed at the time of the challenged conduct to give fair
warning to officials that it was unconstitutional to hold a detainee in solitary confinement 500
days, for punishment, with virtually no procedural protection in the form of periodic reviews.
(United States Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
STAFFING

McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283 (11 th Cir. 2004). A former inmate of a county jail brought a§
1983 Eighth Amendment action against a county, alleging improper failure to treat his emergency
medical condition. The inmate also asserted negligence claims against the jail's health services
subcontractor and against a nurse employed by the subcontractor. The district court dismissed the
claims against the subcontractor and nurse and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the county jail's staffing problems, allegedly resulting from the county board's
custom of inadequate budgeting for the sheriffs office and jail, did not satisfy the "custom or
policy" requirement of the inmate's § 1983 action. The inmate alleged that the county failed to
transport him to a hospital during a medical emergency. The court noted that the jail had a policy
to call an ambulance to transport inmates with emergency medical needs if jail personnel were
unable to do so. The inmate's transport to the hospital emergency room was delayed by nearly
twelve hours as jail staff accomplished other transports. By the time the inmate arrived at the
hospital he was experiencing paralysis in his legs. (Dekalb County Jail, Georgia, and Wexford
Health Sources, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
PRIVACY

Mills v. City of Barbourville, 389 F.3d 568 (6 th Cir. 2004). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action
claiming that her constitutional rights were violated when a male jailer saw her bare chest during
a search at the jail after her arrest. The district court dismissed some of the defendants and
granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants, and the arrestee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the
fact that a male jail employee may have seen the arrestee's bare breasts accidentally as he was
walking by while the arrestee was being searched, was not a Fourth Amendment violation in the
absence of any evidence that either the normal search policy was unconstitutional or that the
search was carried out in an unconstitutional manner. The court noted that the search was
conducted by female jailers. (Knox County Jail, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Munera v. Metro West Detention Center, 351 F.Supp.2d 1353 (S.D.Fla. 2004). A former pretrial
detainee brought a§ 1983 action against a county correctional officer who escorted him on a visit
to an optometrist, alleging that the officer used excessive force, threatened him, and deprived him
of access to medical care. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
The court held that the alleged profanity and ethnic slurs that the officer directed at the detainee
did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court found that the officer's decision to
remove the detainee from an eye clinic because of security concerns did not deprive the detainee of
needed medical care and did not amount to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in
violation of the Due Process Clause. According to the court, the force applied by the officer was the
32.116

minimum necessary under the circumstances, where the force included wrist cuffs secured to a
waist chain with the detainee seated in a wheelchair. The court noted that the officer checked
that the cuffs were properly applied when the detainee complained of discomfort, and told the
detainee not to struggle. The officer used additional force and restraints to keep the detainee
seated in the wheelchair, when the detainee was repeatedly moving between the wheelchair and
another seat in the waiting room. (Ward D, Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami·Dade County,
Florida)
U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILES
SEARCHES

NG. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2 nd Cir. 2004). Parents of two female juveniles brought a suit
under § 1983 for damages and injunctive relief, alleging that strip searches of the juveniles in
juvenile detention facilities violated their Fourth Amendment rights. After a bench trial, the
district court dismissed the complaint. The juveniles appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. The appeals court held that strip searches conducted on female juveniles after their
transfer from one detention facility to another were unlawful because they were undertaken
after the juveniles had been initially searched and had remained in custody. The court found
that a strip search of a juvenile to determine whether the juvenile had taken a missing pencil
required reasonable suspicion that the juvenile possessed the pencil. The court held that strip
searches performed upon juveniles' initial admission to state detention facilities did not violate
the Fourth Amendment because the state had an enhanced responsibility to take reasonable
action to protect them from hazards resulting from the presence of contraband, even though they
had not been convicted of any crime and were not confined awaiting trial on criminal charges.
(Girls Detention Center, Connecticut)

U.S. Distriec Court
ACCESS TO
COURT

Purkey v. CCA Detention Center, 339 F.Supp.2d 1145 (D.Kan. 2004). A federal prisoner brought
a Bivens action against private prison employees. The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss. The district court held that employees at a private company under contract to
house federal pretrial detainees were "federal actors" for the purposes of potential Bivens
liability, since the detainees were in the custody of the United States Marshal and held under
the authority of the United States pending disposition of federal charges against them.
According to the court, the prisoner sufficiently stated that he was prejudiced by the employee's
destruction of his legal papers, for the purpose of his claim under Bivens that he was denied
access to court. The court also found that the prisoner stated a claim for violation of his free
speech and association rights. The court noted that prisoners incarcerated at prisons under
contract to the federal government enjoyed the same constitutional protections as those inmates
incarcerated at prisons that are actually run by the federal government. The court held that the
prisoner was prejudiced by the employee's destruction of his legal papers because the papers
contained written recollections of police interrogations shortly after they were conducted and
also recounted representations that were made to him to elicit his cooperation in return for a
lighter sentence. The court found that the prisoner stated a Bivens claim by alleging that
employees disciplined him because he assisted other inmates in the preparation of grievances
against the prisoner. According to the prisoner, the prison did not provide a law library and an
attorney employed by the prison to answer legal research requests refused requests for
assistance in preparing legal actions against the prison and its personnel. The prisoner alleged
that employees harassed and threatened him, placed him in segregation, entered his cell and
scattered his papers and belongings, denied him visits with his wife, and confiscated his legal
materials because he filed grievances. (Corrections Corporation of America, Leavenworth,
Kansas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Quint v. Cox, 348 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Kan. 2004). A former jail detainee brought a§ 1983 suit
against a county sheriff, alleging that the sheriff showed deliberate indifference to the detainee's
lithium poisoning. The district court entered judgment in favor of the sheriff. The court held that
although the detainee may have been visibly suffering from lithium toxicity during his first few
days of incarceration, there was no evidence that the sheriff was aware that the detainee was
facing a substantial risk of serious harm, or that he personally saw the detainee at any time. The
court noted that under the sheriffs leadership, there was a policy of dispensing all inmate
medicines at set times, and of prompt response to inmate medical problems. The court found
that the sheriffs failure to provide a medical nurse or specially trained person to dispense
medications to the detainee did not amount to deliberate indifference, where the jail was
required to regularly provide medication, and there was a procedure in place for responding to
medical emergencies that was followed in the detainee's case. (Meade County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRIS·
ONMENT

Ramos Bonilla v. Vivoni Del Valle, 336 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.Puerto Rico 2004). A protester filed a §

XIX

1983 action alleging violation of his constitutional rights at a demonstration. The district court
dismissed the action. The court held that the protester's half·hour detention during a protest
was not so egregious as to violate his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, noting that the protestor was able to return to the demonstration after his release.
(Puerta de Tierra Police Station, Puerto Rico)

32.117

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCH

Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211 (2nd Cir. 2004). A misdemeanor detainee in a county correctional
facility challenged a blanket policy that required strip searches of all detainees, regardless of the
nature of the crime for which they were detained. The detainee sought a declaration that the
policy was unconstitutional, monetary damages, and injunctive relief. The district court entered
judgment in favor of the detainee and awarded $1 in nominal damages. The parties appealed
and the appeals court affirmed in.part, and remanded on the issue of injunctive relief. On
remand, the district court granted injunctive relief to the detainee and the defendants again
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that the detainee lacked standing to
seek prospective injunctive relief because he failed to show that he was likely to be rearrested or
that he would be remanded to the county correctional facility overnight if he was rearrested. The
court noted that the county had implemented a new policy that required reasonable suspicion
that a detainee is concealing contraband to justify a search. (Nassau Co. Corr'l Center, New
York)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILES

Smith v. Barber, 316 F.Supp.2d 992 (D.Kan. 2004). Five high school students who were arrested
for plotting an armed attack on a school sued city and county officials under § 1983, alleging
violations of the Fourth Amendment relating to searches and their arrest, malicious prosecution,
and violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. The court held conditions of pretrial detention in a county jail did not violate
the Eighth Amendment where state law required the juveniles to be held separate from adults,
the students were only held from 11 to 21 days, and they were allowed outside. The court found
that the requirement that they clean their own cells did not implicate the Eighth Amendment.
The court also held that a detention hearing broke the chain of causation required to support a
claim for malicious prosecution. (Labette County Jail, Kansas)b

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Stewart ex rel. Estate of Stewart v. Waldo County, 350 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Me. 2004). The estate
of a deceased inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that a county violated the inmate's
constitutional right to medical care and supervision, and asserting a wrongful death claim. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the
officials' knowledge that the inmate was intoxicated did not demonstrate deliberate indifference
to suicide risk. State and county policies and procedures required constant monitoring of
intoxicated individuals, but the court found that the officials had no subjective knowledge that
the inmate was suicidal or at risk for any reason. The court noted "despite the inmate's high
blood alcohol content, he was functioning and coherent enough to understand directions and
walk unassisted." The inmate hanged himself shortly after admission to the jail. Jail staff
checked on the inmate at least every fifteen minutes before his death. (Waldo County Jail,
Maine)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Stiltner v. Crouse, 327 F.Supp.2d 667 (W.D.Va. 2004). The father of a pretrial detainee who
committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action against jailers. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the jailers. The court held that the jailers were not deliberately
indifferent to the substantial risk of harm to the detainee, and that they were not negligent in
their handling of the detainee. The 39-year-old detainee had been arrested for suspicion of
operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs and was waiting for her bond to be posted at a
county jail. She was placed in a holding cell. Several hours later jailers discovered that she was
unconscious. After attempts to resuscitate her were unsuccessful she was transported to a local
hospital where she was pronounced dead. An autopsy showed that her death was caused by
either self-hanging or strangulation by another person. According to the court, the detainee did
not request medical aid from the jail nurse who saw her initially, and there was no indication to
jailers that she might be a danger to herself. (Buchanan County Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Strickler v. McCord, 306 F.Supp.2d 818 (N.D.Ind. 2004). A pretrial detainee sued jail officials
under§ 1983, alleging they were deliberately indifference to his serious medical needs. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that
although the jail officials allegedly placed the inmate on a suicide watch, noted that the detainee
hid razor blades and medication in his cell, observed that the detainee had tried to cut himself,
and saw the detainee draw pictures expressing sadness, the detainee could not demonstrate that
the officials were aware of a substantial risk that he would attempt suicide. The detainee had
been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and his car contained whiskey, a shotgun
and a suicide note. The detainee subsequently attempted suicide by cutting his arm, but jail staff
detected his condition and provided the detainee with medical treatment. (Miami County Jail,
Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTAKE
SCREENING

Sullivan v. Bornemann, 384 F.3d 372 (7 th Cir. 2004). An arrestee brought an action against
police officers and hospital staff. He had been arrested for disorderly conduct but jail staff
refused to admit him to confinement without medical clearance because of his high breathalyzer
test result. The arresting officers took him to the emergency room of a local hospital where he
failed to voluntarily produce a urine sample. The emergency room doctor ordered a
catheterization, and the officers restrained the arrestee during the brief procedure. The district
32.118

XIX

court entered judgment for the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the officers' acquiescence in the hospital nurse's request to
help her restrain the arrestee during the catheterization process did not violate the arrestee's
Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that the State's substantial interest in assuring the
medical stability of the pretrial detainee outweighed the arrestee's due process right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment. (Shawano County Jail, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
SUPERVISION
STAFFING

Thompson v. Spears, 336 F.Supp.2d 1224 (S.D.Fla. 2004). A prisoner brought an action against a
county and a jail official, alleging deliberate indifference to his safety, negligent supervision, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. The court held that a lack of monitoring devices in jail cells did not pose an
objectively substantial risk of harm to the inmate, particularly in light of the fact the state
Model Jail Standards did not require cameras. The court found that the inmate presented no
evidence that the officer posts were located so far that officers could not hear calls for help. The
court held that the county was not liable under § 1983, even if jail officers did not actually follow
the county policy of making hourly walk·throughs to monitor cells, where there was no evidence
that the county had officially sanctioned or ordered the officers to disregard the county policy.
The prisoner had been temporarily transferred from a state prison to the county jail in order to
be involved in a family court matter. '.I'he inmate, who was from Jacksonville, Florida, alleged
that he was severely beaten by other inmates for over two hours, after the Miami Dolphins beat
the Jacksonville Jaguars in a football game. (Pretrial Detention Center, Miami-Dade County,
Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

Tilmon v. Prator, 368 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2004). A prisoner brought a civil rights action alleging
due process violations in connection with prison disciplinary proceedings. The district court
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that a prisoner who has been convicted but who has not yet been sentenced has
the same status as a sentenced prisoner for the purposes of analyzing whether the prisoner has a
liberty interest in having certain procedural protections before being punished in connection
with a prison disciplinary proceeding. The court found that the prisoner had no due process
protected liberty interest implicated by his confinement in a punitive cell for eight hours without
an administrative hearing. (Caddo Correctional Center, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PROTECTION
FALSE IMPRIS·
ONMENT

Tinius v. Carroll County Sheriff Dept., 321 F.Supp.2d 1064 (N.D.Iowa 2004). A detainee filed a §
1983 action alleging that deputy sheriffs unlawfully detained him, and that medical procedures
were performed on him without his consent. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the deputy sheriffs
were justified in detaining the apparently intoxicated detainee under their community
caretaking function, where a deputy came across the detainee walking along a rural roadway in
winter without proper attire. According to the court, the law was not clearly established at the
time of the incident that the Fourth Amendment barred law enforcement officials from seizing
apparently intoxicated persons, or from restraining a detainee during medical procedures that
were being conducted for non-investigatory purposes. The court found that the detention did not
constitute false imprisonment. The court held that the hospital was not immune from liability
for failing to obtain informed consent before performing an involuntary catheterization on the
detainee, where the detainee never requested treatment at the hospital, and the officers who
brought him to the hospital had no authority to act on his behalf. (Carroll County Sheriff
Department, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
INTAKE
SCREENING

Turney v. Waterbury, 375 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2004). A mother brought a civil rights action to
recover damages related to the in-custody suicide of her son. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants and the mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, and reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the sheriff was not
entitled to qualified immunity, where the sheriff knew of, but did not investigate, the arrestee's
earlier suicide attempt at a jail from which he was transferred, did not permit a jailer to
complete the arrestee's intake form, placed the arrestee in a cell alone with a bed sheet and
exposed ceiling bars, and ordered the jailer not to enter the arrestee's cell without backup and
yet left the jailer as the only staff member on duty at the jail. Before the arrestee was
transferred to the jail in which he committed suicide, he had told jail staff that "he was going to
hang it up" and shortly thereafter he was found in his cell with a bed sheet tied around his neck.
During his processing into the next jail he told staff he did not want to return to prison, and that
he would die and take someone with him ifhe received more than a 15 year sentence. The court
found that training provided to county officials was not inadequate, where the county provided
manuals that informed police officers how to recognize and respond to suicide risks. (Bennett
County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
CLASSIFICATION

US. v. Catalan-Roman, 329 F.Supp.2d 240 (D.Puerto Rico 2004). Two pretrial detainees filed a
motion contesting their placement in administrative segregation after they were certified as
being death-penalty eligible. The district court granted their motion, finding that death

XIX

32.119

certification did not justify their automatic placement in administrative detention. The court
noted that the detainees had resided in the general prison population without incident for over
one year before being death-certified, there was no evidence that death-certified detainees were
more likely to be disruptive or to take hostages, and their placement in administrative
segregation eliminated their ability to establish mitigating evidence relative to their character
and adjustment to life in prison. (M_etropolitan Detention Center-Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)
U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO
COURT
LAW LIBRARIES

U.S. v. Cooper, 375 F.3d 1041 (10th Cir. 2004). A defendant who was convicted of bank robbery
appealed his conviction and alleged that he was deprived of due process by refusal of his request
of access to a law library. The appeals court affirmed the conviction. The appeals court held that
a prisoner who voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel in a criminal
proceeding is not entitled to a law library or other legal materials. (Utah)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Faulkner, 323 F.Supp.2d 1111 (D.Kan. 2004). Three detainees who were indicted on
charges of attempting to kill a government witness moved to suppress recordings of their jail
telephone conversations. The court held that the detainees had impliedly consented to the
recording of telephone conversations because notices that conversations might be recorded were
posted throughout the facility, and a recorded warning was given before the commencement of
long distance calls. The district court noted that the recordings made by employees of a private
corrections company, were not covered by the wiretapping exemption that was applicable when
the interception was done by law enforcement officers. (Corrections Corporation of America,
Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
SEGREGATION
DISCIPLINE

U.S. v. Lopez, 327 F.Supp.2d 138 (D.Puerto Rico 2004). A pretrial detainee who was placed in a
special housing unit because he faced the death penalty, filed a motion for an evidentiary
hearing on the conditions of his pretrial confinement. The district court held that the detainee's
placement in a special housing unit solely because he faced the death penalty amounted to
unconstitutional punishment. (Special Housing Unit, MDC-Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
USE OF FORCE

Webster v. City of New York, 333 F.Supp.2d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Arrestees brought an action
against a city, police commissioner and police officers alleging unreasonable use of force and
punishment without due process. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, in part. The court held that failure to provide food and water to the pretrial
detainees for a few hours when they were held at a police station did not rise to the level of a due
process violation, because of the relatively brief duration and the absence of allegations of injury
or punitive intent. The court also held that the use of handcuffs on the pretrial detainees, and
subjecting them to abusive language, did not rise to the level of a due process violation. (City of
New York Police Department)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Wever v. Lincoln County, Nebraska, 388 F.3d 601 (8 th Cir. 2004). A personal representative
brought a civil rights action against a county and county sheriff alleging that an arrestee's
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The district court denied the sheriffs motion for
summary judgment and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
arrestee had a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to be protected from the known
risks of suicide, and two prior suicides in the county jail should have put the sheriff on notice
that his suicide prevention training needed revision. The court held that the representative
stated a supervisory liability claim under the due process clause, noting that a supervisor may
be held liable under§ 1983 if a failure to properly supervise and train an employee causes a
deprivation of constitutional rights. (Lincoln County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL
COMMITMENT
PUNISHMENT
CONDITIONS

Wilson v. Watters, 348 F.Supp.2d 1031 (W.D.Wis. 2004). A patient confined as a sex offender
brought an action alleging he was deprived of his due process rights. The district court denied
the patient's motion. The court found that the use of a polygraph examination as part of a sex
offender treatment program did not violate the patient's due process rights, even if the patient
was subject to more restrictive conditions solely because of his refusal to participate in the
polygraph examination. The court held that even if the treatment learning plan offered to the
sex offender was inappropriate, the sex offender's due process rights were not violated. According
to the court, confining the sex offender at a state detention facility did not violate his due process
rights, absent allegations that his conditions of confinement were different from those imposed
on any other civil detainee at the detention facility. (Wisconsin Resource Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Woodward v. Correctional Medical Services, 368 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2004). The administratrix of
the estate of a pretrial detainee who had committed suicide in a county jail brought a§ 1983
action against a private contractor hired by the county to provide medical and mental health
services at the jail, and against the contractor's agents. The district court entered judgment on a
jury verdict against the contractor and the contractor's social worker, awarding $250,000 in
compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages, and denied motions for summary
judgment as a matter of law. The contractor appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
the contractor's employee's lack of training and carelessness were relevant toward establishing
32.120

XIX

deliberate indifference, even though the employee herself was not found liable. The court held
that the fact that no previous suicides had occurred in the jail did not preclude the contractor's
liability. According to the appeals court, the district court did not abuse its discretion by letting
the punitive damages award stand. The estate proffered evidence that the contractor failed to
adequately train its employees and condoned employees' failure to complete mental health
intake forms and the social worker's practice of challenging suicide watch referrals. According to
the court, employees knew that the detainee was suicidal but failed several time to place him on
suicide watch, in violation of its own written procedures. The court found that evidence of an
alcohol-impaired nurse, intake backlogs, and claims of delayed or denied medical care to other
inmates was relevant to the contractor's state of mind and was therefore admissible. (Lake
County Jail, Illinois)
2005
U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
R i~STRAINTS

Agster v. Maricopa County, 406 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2005). The parents and the representative of
the estate of an inmate who died in jail brought an action against the county in state court. The
case was removed to federal court, where the county was ordered to produce a mortality review
report that was conducted by a private health provider. The county appealed the district court
decision. The appeals court upheld the district court order. The appeals court held that no
protected privilege of peer review protected the mortality review. The inmate had been arrested
and taken to a county jail where he was placed in a restraint chair. His respiration decreased
and he developed an irregular heartbeat. Attempts were made to resuscitate him and he was
transported to a hospital where he was placed on life support. He was pronounced dead three
days later. (Maricopa County Sheriffs Office, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Arline v. City ofJacksonville, 359 F.Supp.2d 1300 (M.D.Fla. 2005). A suspect who was acquitted
of murder brought a § 1983 action challenging a delay in his release after he was acquitted. The
court held that the city was not liable under § 1983 for an allegedly improper custodial
interrogation. The court found that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the suspect's nearly three·hour post-acquittal
detention by a sheriffs office was reasonable. The suspect alleged that the city's policies and
procedures relating to transporting and releasing detainees following acquittal at trial violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. (City of Jacksonville, Florida)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Beltran v. O'Mara, 405 F.Supp.2d 140 (D.N.H. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against correctional officers, alleging civil rights violations. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the officers in part, and denied in part. The court held that the failure to
exhaust some claims did not mandate dismissal of the entire complaint. The court found that
fact issues precluded summary judgment regarding whether officers used excessive force in
repeatedly placing the detainee in a restraint chair. The court held that the purported
withholding of toilet paper from the detainee did not deny him a minimal measure of necessities
required for civilized living, as required to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The
only evidence that supported the allegation consisted of a complaint that the detainee was
regularly made to wait over one hour for toilet paper, and there was no evidence regarding the
frequency of such events. (Hillsborough County Department of Corrections, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Birdine v. Gray, 375 F.Supp.2d 874 (D.Neb. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against jail employees claiming violation of his right to be free of punishment and his right to
privacy. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court held that the detainee did not
have a privacy right that would allow him to cover the window of his cell with towels, noting that
the cell contained a privacy wall which allowed for partial privacy while using the toilet. The
court found that the inmate's privacy rights were not violated when he was moved from one cell
to another, naked. The inmate had removed all of his clothes and refused to put them back, and
jail staff moved him unclothed to a cell closer to their station where he could be constantly
watched. The court found no violation when the inmate was placed in a restraint chair because
he was confined as a last resort when all other restraint options proved ineffective. According to
the court, the detainee was monitored, the chair was not used to punish, and the detainee was
offered the opportunity to be released in return for acting appropriately. The court found no due
process violation when a stun gun was applied to the detainee two times, after he engaged in
violent actions as jail officers attempt to settle him into a cell to which he was being transferred.
The court found that the detainee's conduct was an immediate threat to institutional safety,
security and efficiency. (Lancaster County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
MEDICATION

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469 (7 th Cir. 2005). Arrestees who were detained in a county jail
following their arrest on murder charges brought a civil rights action against a county sheriff
and jail staff following their acquittal and release from jail. The district court denied summary
judgment for the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that he violated a
detainee's right to receive adequate attention for a serious medical condition, when he allegedly

XIX

32.121

deprived one detainee of toothpaste for over three weeks and another detainee for over 113 days.
One detainee suffered dental pain throughout his incarceration and had to have several teeth
extracted because of tooth decay. The court denied qualified immunity for jail staff who allegedly
deprived a detainee of his asthma inhaler on multiple occasions. The court also denied qualified
immunity on the claim that they failed to provide humane health conditions as the result of the
allegedly unhealthy condition of the jail's ventilation system. The detainees alleged that the flow
of black fiberglass from the ventilation system caused nosebleeds and respiratory problems, and
allegedly exacerbated the serious asthma condition of one detainee. (Edgar County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2005). The representative of the estate of a pretrial
detainee who had died during a struggle with county correctional officers brought a § 1983 suit
alleging use of excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The district court
granted summary judgment for several defendants but denied summary judgment for
corrections officers. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
officers' alleged conduct in subduing the detainee was actionable as excessive force and that the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that the officers' alleged
conduct following the struggle·· waiting 14 minutes before summoning medical assistance even
though the detainee appeared lifeless·· was actionable as deliberate indifference and the officers
were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the law defining excessive force
was clearly established at the time of the incident, and the officers should have known that
continuing to apply force to the unruly detainee after he had given up his struggle was not
acceptable. (Montgomery County Detention Facility, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE

Brookins v. Williams, 402 F.Supp.2d 508 (D.Del. 2005). A former pretrial detainee brought a §
1983 action against a prison warden, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the warden. The court held that forcing the
detainee to sleep on the floor, without a mattress, next to a toilet was not punishment and
therefore did not violate his due process rights, where the conditions served a legitimate
governmental purpose of housing inmates in an overcrowded facility and only lasted for a period
of five days. The court found that the warden was not deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of the detainee, where the inmate was given all of his medication within a day of
being booked, except for medication that the inmate was unable to name for prison medical staff.
The detainee was given tests to determine what he would need to treat his detected conditions.
(Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Brown v. Williams, 399 F.Supp.2d 558 (D.Del. 2005). A detainee brought an in forma pauperis
action against prison officials alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The court held that the detainee was
not exposed to unreasonably high levels of contaminated water, although water from his cell
sink was allegedly discolored, and the detainee fainted shortly after he drank the water. A
sample of the water was taken to a laboratory for independent testing and it met or exceeded
requisite standards. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
LENGTH

Bryant v. City ofNew York, 404 F.3d 128 (2 nd Cir. 2005). Detainees who had been arrested for
disorderly conduct brought a§ 1983 action alleging a substantive due process violation as the
result of overlong detention. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the police officers'
decision to detain the arrestees overnight rather than issuing desk appearance tickets (DATs)
which were authorized under state law, was not objectively unreasonable. The court noted that
DATs were discretionary rather than required, and the length of detention was well within the
range of flexibility allowed to states. According to the court, the detainees were members of a
difficult·to·control crowd that demanded substantial police manpower, and the additional
paperwork required for DATs would have drawn officers off of the streets. The detainees had
been part of a demonstration protesting antigay violence. (New York City Police Department)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
CONDITIONS
CELL CAPACITY

Calhoun v. Thomas, 360 F.Supp.2d 1264 (M.D.Ala. 2005). A detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff and deputy sheriff in their individual capacities, raising excessive force,
deliberate indifference and conditions of confinement claims. The defendants moved for
summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. The court held
the detainee's allegation that he was deprived of shower shoes, clean clothes and a toothbrush
upon his arrival at the jail did not rise to the level of a constitutional level. The court also found
no violation in the allegation that he was made to sleep on the floor as the third person in a two·
person cell. The court found a potential violation in the alleged conduct of officers during his
interrogation. The officers allegedly choked and beat the detainee, who was restrained and posed
no threat to anyone's safety, punched him in his gunshot wound, and slammed him into a door
several times telling him they wanted to make him suffer as the victim in a robbery and shooting
had suffered. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the
excessive force claim. (Pike County Jail, Alabama)
32.122

XIX

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Calvin v. Sheriffof Will County, 405 F.Supp.2d 933 (N.D.Ill. 2005). County inmates sued a
sheriff under § 1983 alleging that a strip search policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The
court granted summary judgment in favor of the inmates. The court held that the blanket policy
of strip-searching persons arrested on failure-to-appear (FTA) warrants in misdemeanor traffic
cases violated the Fourth Amendment. The court also found a Fourth Amendment violation in
the blanket policy of strip-searching persons who were returned to jail for processing after being
ordered released on traffic or misdemeanor charges, absent individualized suspicion or probable
cause that a person was concealing contraband or weapons. The court noted that the searches
were unconstitutional, even though arrestees had been given an opportunity to post bond before
the searches, and notwithstanding that persons arrested on FTA warrants were intermingled
with the general population. (Will County Adult Detention Facility, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Collins v. County ofKern, 390 F.Supp.2d 964 (E.D.Cal. 2005). An inmate brought a§ 1983 action
against a county and a sheriffs department, stemming from an attack by other inmates while he
was incarcerated. A fight had erupted in a jail housing unit between Black and Hispanic inmates
and the inmate was injured. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court held that inmate failed to establish that department officials knew of and
disregarded a risk of attack when they moved the inmate to another jail unit. At the time of the
move, the inmate did not inform anyone of safety concerns or segregation issues due to a
purported gang affiliation. The court found that officials took prompt action to stop the fight,
secure the area, and ensure prompt medical treatment for the inmate. The court noted that a
"prison official need not believe tcr [a] moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack another
at [a] given place at time certain before he is obligated to prevent such an assault." According to
the court, before being required to take action, an official must have more than a mere suspicion
that an attack will occur. (Lerdo Pre-Trial Facility, Kern County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Cook Ex Rel. Tessier v. Sheriff ofMonroe County, 402 F.3d 1092 (11 th Cir. 2005). The personal
representative of the estate of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide while incarcerated
brought an action against a sheriff, in his official capacity, asserting claims for deliberate
indifference to the detainee's medical needs in violation of§ 1983, negligent training and
supervision of jail employees, and vicarious liability for the employees' negligence. The district
court excluded the representative's expert witness testimony, precluded reference to other
suicides at the facility, and granted judgment as a matter of law for the sheriff. The
representative appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The appeals court held that the district court acted within its discretion in excluding evidence of
other suicides at the jail. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that the detainee' s
suicide was foreseeable to the sheriff and therefore any deficiencies in the sheriffs training or
supervision did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. But the court held that evidence
was sufficient to support a jury verdict on the plaintiffs claim that the sheriff was vicariously
liable under state law for employees' alleged negligence. The court noted that the detainee made
two written requests to see a psychiatrist, one on each of the two days immediately preceding his
suicide, and that the detainee stated in one request that he was "mentally sick" and asked to see
the psychiatrist "as soon as possible." Three deputies observed the detainee as nervous and
anxious, and one specifically observed the detainee apparently having an anxiety attack and
complaining of chest pains. (Monroe County Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Copeland v. County ofMacon, Ill., 403 F.3d 929 (7 th Cir. 2005). A former pretrial detainee who
had been beaten by another inmate sued a county seeking indemnification under the "scope of
employment" provision of the state's local government tort immunity statute. The detainee
alleged that a county correctional officer recruited and encouraged other inmates to commit the
beating. The district court jury awarded the detainee $400,000 and the county appealed. The
appeals court reversed, finding that the corrections officer was not acting within the scope of his
employment within the meaning of the tort immunity statute, and that the county jail, not the
citizens of the county, was the officer's employer. (Macon County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
CROWDING
STAFFING

Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598 (8th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 and a §
1988 action against officials at a county detention center, alleging violations of the Fifth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the officials' motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity, and the officials appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded. The court held that the detainee failed to establish that officials disregarded any
known risks to the detainee's health or safety while he was incarcerated. According to the court,
the detainee's allegations regarding inadequate records, overcrowding, poor supervision, and
understaffing showed at most that the officials were negligent, and did not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference. (Faulkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Cruise v. Marino, 404 F.Supp.2d 656 (M.D.Pa. 2005). The mother of a pretrial detainee who had
committed suicide in a holding cell brought an action against a city and officers, alleging
deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held the officers were not deliberately

XIX

32.123

indifferent, where the detainee did not have a particular vulnerability to suicide and had not
threatened or attempted suicide. The court noted that the detainee's intoxication was not, by
itself, an indication of a suicidal tendency. The court found the city was not deliberately
indifferent, where it had no history of numerous suicides by detainees, the city had policies for
removing harmful items from detainees, and the city placed a video monitor in a cell following a
previous suicide. (Scranton Police Department, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
JUVENILES
SEPARATION
PROGRAMS

Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730 (6 th Cir. 2005). A juvenile who had been detained at a county
jail on a murder charge brought a § 1983 action alleging violation of a state law governing
pretrial detention of juveniles, and violation of due process when he was expelled from an
alternative education program. The district court granted summary judgment for a sheriff and
school district, but denied it for a school superintendent. The juvenile and the superintendent
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court
found no violation of state law, where the law provided an exception for housing dangerous
juveniles in jails, and the statutory requirements of sight and sound separation were followed.
The court held that conditions of confinement deriving from the juvenile's classification as a
suicide risk did not constitute punishment prohibited by the Due Process Clause, or cruel and
unusual punishment. The juvenile was subjected to 24-hour lock-down, deprived of exercise,
dressed in a suicide gown that did not close in the back, denied access to a shower and personal
hygiene products, and denied visitors. The court found that the juvenile, who dropped out of high
school when he attained the age of 16, did not have a protected property interest in attending an
alternative high school program offered by the school district, and therefore the due process
claim against the superintendent was precluded. (Macomb County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL

Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259 (3 rd Cir. 2005). A commercial bail bondsman brought an action
against the clerk of a state superior court, contending that the clerk wrongfully removed his
name from the bail bondsman registry following the discharge of his bail bond debts in a chapter
7 bankruptcy proceeding. The district court dismissed the action and the bail bondsman
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the judgments against the commercial bail
bondsman which arose from bond debts were "forfeitures," excepted from discharge in a chapter
7 proceeding. The court noted that the judgments against the bondsman arose from the failure of
criminal defendants to appear in court and the bondsman's nonperformance of his duty to
produce those defendants. (New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING
SUICIDE
ATTEMPT
SUPERVISION

Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 393 F.Supp.2d 756 (D.Minn. 2005). The legal guardian for an
incapacitated person, who attempted to commit suicide while he was a pretrial detainee in a
county jail, and the state human services department sued a county and various officials under §
1983 alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and a state law claim for
negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court
held that the officials did not act with deliberate indifference in failing to recognize and respond
to the risk that the detainee was suicidal, even assuming there was a 72-minute gap between the
last time the detainee was checked and when he was found. According to the court, the officials
did not know that the detainee presented a substantial risk of suicide, based on a physician's
reports describing the detainee's depression as only "mild" or "situational." There was nothing in
the reports to suggest that anti-anxiety medication would have helped prevent the detainee's
depression and attempted suicide. The court held that the county was not shown to have any
official policy or custom of overcrowding or understaffing that played a role in the detainee's
attempted suicide. The court held that the officials acted with discretion with respect to their
placement and treatment of the detainee, and in accordance with a physician's orders, and they
promptly took the detainee to the hospital when they discovered he had harmed himself, and
were therefore entitled to official immunity as to the negligence claims. (McLeod County Jail,
Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Esmont v. City of New York, 371 F.Supp.2d 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). An arrestee filed a§ 1983
action alleging that city health inspectors and police officers violated her constitutional rights
during her arrest and detention for violations of a city nuisance law. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the officials were not
deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's serious medical needs when they did not comply with
the arrestee's request for hot tea during an asthma attack, but called emergency medical
services instead. The female detainee was handcuffed to a cross bar outside of a holding cell for
over 7 hours, with no place to rest her elbow. She was required to use a bathroom that was
monitored by a security camera and an officer insisted on watching her while she used the
bathroom. She sought medical attention two days after her release for damage caused to her
wrist by the handcuffing. The court held that the detainee was not exposed to excessive force,
where the jail had only one cell and officials had a policy of not placing prisoners of opposite
sexes in the cell together. The court noted that there was no evidence that the handcuffs were
too tight, and the arrestee did not request that her handcuffs be loosened. (City of New York
Police Department)
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XIX

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Estate ofAdbollahi v. County ofSacramento, 405 F.Supp.2d 1194 (E.D.Cal. 2005).
Representatives of the estates of two county jail detainees, and one inmate, who committed
suicide while in their cells brought a § 1983 action. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court held that the county
was not liable for failing to train jail personnel in suicide prevention where the county had a
policy of periodic observation of cell occupants. The court noted that an officer, lacking
knowledge that a detainee was suicidal, made no observations, and falsely entered on duty logs
that he had done so. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by material issues
of fact as to whether a jail commander ratified or encouraged the practice of "pencil-whipping,"
which involved making false entries on records showing observations of cell occupants that were
not actually made. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by material issues of
fact as to whether the county knowingly established a policy of providing an inadequate number
of cell inspections and of falsifying logs showing completion of cell inspections, creating a
substantial risk of harm to suicide-prone cell occupants. The court ruled that the sheriff and jail
commander had immunity under state law from liability claims that there were holes in the
bunks that could be used for death by hanging, where use of the bunk holes for suicide was not
foreseeable. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact as
to whether a county jail nurse ratified, condoned, and encouraged the deliberately indifferent
behavior of a social worker who conducted an allegedly perfunctory interview of an inmate who
later committed suicide. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by material
issues of fact as to whether a psychiatric services clinician satisfied applicable standards of care,
under state law. (Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Estate of Bradich v. City of Chicago, 413 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2005). The estate of an arrestee who
hung himself while in a county jail brought an action alleging failure to protect the arrestee from
the risk of suicide, and failing to react properly when the arrestee was discovered hanging. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that jail staff
did not display deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of suicide by putting the intoxicated
arrestee in a regular cell and allowing him to keep his civilian clothes, rather than placing him
on a suicide watch or sending him to a hospital until he sobered up. The arrestee had been
arrested numerous times had never attempted to injure himself, and he did not have a mental
health history that implied any disposition toward suicide. The court found that the city could
not be liable for jail staffs' failure to comply with a rule requiring close monitoring of intoxicated
prisoners, where the city's policy requiring staff to check intoxicated prisoners every 15 minutes
was adequate and there was no allegation that the city systematically failed to enforce its
policies. The court noted that the record did not imply that the suicide rate in the city's jail was
abnormally high. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether three members of the jail staff acted with deliberate indifference by
failing to seek outside assistance for ten minutes after finding the arrestee hanging in his jail
cell. The court asked ''Why did it take all three officers to provide unhelpful assistance? Two
might have done what they could, while the third phoned for help (which would take only a
minute) and then rejoined the others. Why did the two officers who lacked CPR training think
that they should shout at a hanging prisoner rather than call for help? Why did the officer with
CPR training not use his skills?" The arrestee had been booked and put in a cell at the city police
stationhouse. (City of Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Estate of Carter v. City ofDetroit, 408 F.3d 305 (6 th Cir. 2005). The estate of a detainee who died
while in custody brought a state court § 1983 action that was removed to federal court. The
district court denied a police officer's motion for summary judgment and the officer appealed.
The appeals court affirmed, finding that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the officer was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious
medical needs. The detainee suffered a heart attack while in custody and was pronounced dead
on arrival at the hospital. Shortly after the detainee was booked she told the officer that she was
having chest pains and needed to go to the hospital, and that she had not taken her heart
medicine for three days. Other detainees testified that the detainee cried loudly for help and
continued to complain that her chest hurt for several hours before another officer called for a car
to take her to the hospital. (Detroit Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Estate ofMoreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 74 7 (7 th Cir. 2005). Family members of a county jail
detainee who died in custody, brought a § 1983 action alleging the use of unnecessary and
excessive force. The district court entered judgment, upon jury verdict, in favor of the family
members and against county deputies, and awarded $29 million in compensatory damages, and
$27.5 million in punitive damages. The parties appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the punitive damages award was not excessive, where evidence showed that the deputies
threw the detainee's head against a concrete wall, discharged a can of pepper spray into his face
when he was fully restrained, and repeatedly assaulted him, without attending to the detainee's
medical needs. The detainee died of a fatal hematoma caused by one of the head traumas
inflicted by the deputies. The deputies lied to a jail nurse about the detainee's injuries and filed

XIX

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false reports to conceal their wrongdoing. The court held that neither multiple prior incidents
involving the use of pepper spray, nor alleged jail overcrowding, established that a sheriff was
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to the detainee. The detainee had been
admitted to jail after he was arrested for driving under the influence. Shortly after his admission
to the jail, the detainee provoked a confrontation with another detainee by directing racial slurs
at him. Jail staff responded to the altercation with excessive force. (St. Joseph County Jail,
Indiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUPERVISION
STAFFING
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Fisher v. Lovejoy, 414 F.3d 659 (7 th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a prose§ 1983
Fourteenth Amendment action against a corrections officer, alleging that the officer failed to
protect the detainee from assault by other inmates of the facility. The district court entered
summary judgment for the officer and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the fact that the officer witnessed the stabbing of the detainee by another inmate
did not render the officer deliberately indifferent to a second assault on the detainee that was
perpetrated minutes later by several inmates. The court noted that the officer entered the room
where the stabbing had occurred and attempted to restore order, found and confiscated a knife
near the spot where he had observed the stabbing, which permitted the inference that the first
assailant was unarmed. The officer did not identify the inmates who mounted the second attack
as participants in the first attack. The court held that the officer reasonably responded when he
witnessed the stabbing of the detainee, precluding liability. At the time of the assaults, the
officer had been assigned to "cross-watch" two separate housing units, one of which housed 48
inmates. He was required to walk back and forth between the two units' dayrooms. When the
first assault began the victim ran toward the locked dayroom door and saw the officer outside.
He pushed an intercom button near the door and summoned help. The officer immediately called
for assistance but was not able to enter the dayroom until it was unlocked by a central control
post. By the time the door opened, approximately twenty officers were waiting to enter. (Cook
County Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRIS·
ONMENT

Garcia Rodriguez v. Andreu Garcia, 403 F.Supp.2d 17 4 (D.Puerto Rico 2005). An arrestee
brought a civil rights claim alleging that he was illegally detained following his arrest on a
warrant for failure to pay alimony. The district court held that the arrestee stated a claim for
false imprisonment in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The arrestee alleged that the
officers who arrested him had no authority under the arrest warrant to immediately incarcerate
him, but should have caused his appearance before a judge. The arrestee was held in prison for
five days until bail was paid by his relatives. (Bayamon Penitentiary, Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Garretson v. City ofMadison Heights, 407 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought
an action against a city, police department and individual police officers alleging constitutional
violations and asserting state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded in part. The court held that the diabetic detainee who had allegedly been deprived of
insulin while in custody suffered a serious deprivation of necessary medical treatment, for the
purpose of a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. The detainee was later
admitted to a hospital for emergency treatment and stayed in the hospital for several days. The
court denied summary judgment for the booking officer and the officer who escorted the detainee
to her cell, both of whom were allegedly informed by the detainee of her diabetic condition and
need for insulin. (Madison Heights Police Department Lock· Up, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
BAIL

Golberg v. Hennepin County, 417 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2005). A detainee brought a civil rights
action against a sheriff and county, alleging that she was subjected to an excessive delay in
releasing her from custody. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The detainee had appeared
in court in response to a felony fraud charge. The court continued the proceeding but ordered the
detainee to be booked at the detention center before her release. When detention center officials
discovered that the detainee had two outstanding warrants they required her to post bail before
she could be released. As a result, she remained in custody for 32 hours, including ten hours
after her father posted the required bail. The court noted that the detainee conceded that the
officials had probable cause to detain her after the outstanding warrants were discovered. The
appeals court held that the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis applied to
the constitutionality of the delayed release, and that the failure to process the detainee more
rapidly did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The court found that a sign advising
detainees that completing their paperwork might take "more than eight hours" did not show
reckless disregard. The court held that the county could not be liable under§ 1983 for adopting
administrative procedures that allegedly slowed the bail posting and release process, absent a
showing that the procedures violated federal law on their face or were intended to deprive
detainees of their constitutional rights. (Hennepin County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION

Gonzales v. Martinez, 403 F.3d 1179 (10 th Cir. 2005). A female inmate who was sexually
assaulted at a county jail brought a civil rights action against the county, county sheriff and jail
32.126

XIX

officials. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the sheriff and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sheriff had the requisite
knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to inmates because of conditions at the jail. The female
inmate was sexually assaulted on more than one occasion by the jail administrator and a jail
officer. The administrator and officer were suspended and were later charged with, and
convicted of, the assaults. (Huerfano County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. Apprals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE
SUPERVISION

Gray v. City ofDetroit, 399 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005). The personal representative of the estate of
a pretrial detainee who had committed suicide while in a police cell at a hospital brought a §
1983 action alleging inadequate medical treatment and failure to adequately monitor the
detainee. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the personal
representative appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the city could not be
held liable for deliberate indifference given the absence of an obvious and clear suicide risk. The
court concluded that an officer enjoyed qualified immunity because the detainee's pre-suicide
behavior did not give rise to a duty to monitor for suicide. The detainee had registered only
physical complaints and had engaged in no self-injurious behavior at the hospital. The officer
was not aware of, and could not be charged with knowledge of the detainee's behavior prior to
reaching the hospital, according to the court. The court found that the city could not be held
liable for failure to adequately train its officers regarding suicides, where officers complied with
city policies regarding medical care, including screening by an intake nurse at the hospital, and
no previous inmate suicides had occurred in the hospital cells. Although the detainee had been
destructive before he was transferred to the hospital-·ripping a phone from his cell wall and
breaking a sink and toilet-- the court noted that none of his destructive acts had been selfdirected. (Detroit Receiving Hospital, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
PUNISHMENT
FAfLURE TO
PROTECT

Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2005). Female pretrial detainees brought an action
against a county and jail superintendent alleging deprivation of liberty without due process. The
district court dismissed the case and the detainees appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that the detainees stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
detainees alleged that during monthly lockdown searches of the jail, they were confined for 48 to
50 hours at a time to their cells, where they were not under observation or within hailing
distance of correctional officers. The detainees alleged that serious injuries resulted from their
inability to get the officers' attention during a crisis. The court noted that an alternative
procedure was available to the jail that would allow inmates in each locked tier to be released
from their cells after that tier was searched, resulting in shorter lockdown periods. (Cook County
Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Harvey v. County of Ward, 352 F.Supp.2d 1003 (D.N.D. 2005). The surviving spouse of a jail
inmate who died after a suicide attempt brought an action under§ 1983 and state law, alleging
deliberate indifference to the inmate's known risk of suicide. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The district court held that the plaintiff failed to establish
that the sheriff and jail administrator knew of the inmate's potential risk of suicide. According to
the court, evidence of conversations between the spouse and jail employees about the inmate's
suicide risk, an officer's note that the inmate's wife thought that they should keep an eye on the
inmate, and another officer's report that the inmate may have been trying to save up some of his
medications to take at another time, was insufficient to establish that the sheriff and jail
administrator knew of the inmate's potential risk of suicide. The court found that the county was
not deliberately indifferent to the training of its employees on inmate suicide prevention. The
court held that the jail's suicide prevention policy appeared reasonable and comprised an effort
to prevent suicides, even if the policy had not been updated in recent years, and the jail was not
accredited by the American Correctional Association (ACA). The court noted that the policy set
forth a detailed list of factors to identify potentially suicidal inmates, set forth a procedure for
identification and screening of inmates, and required ongoing training in the implementation of
suicide prevention and intervention for all staff. (Ward County Jail, North Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2005). A former pretrial detainee brought an action
challenging strip search practices at a county jail. The district court denied immunity for the
defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the mere fact that a detainee was to be placed in the jail's general
population did not justify a strip search, but that reasonable suspicion existed for the plaintiffs
strip search because he had been charged with a family violence battery offense. The court noted
that battery is a crime of violence that would permit the inference that the detainee might be
concealing weapons or contraband. (Habersham County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hollenbaugh v. Maurer, 397 F.Supp.2d 894 (N.D.Ohio 2005). The estate of a pretrial detainee
sued a city, county, and jail officials under§ 1983 alleging the defendants violated the detainee's
constitutional rights by failing to provide necessary medical care during his arrest and
detention. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied

XIX

32.127

it in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by material issues of genuine
fact as to whether jail officials who dealt directly with the detainee and who had the opportunity
to closely observe him, knew that the detainee was seriously ill. The court noted that although
the detainee was allegedly intoxicated when he was arrested and brought to the county jail, he
was adamant about his need for medical attention and his belief that he was suffering from a
serious medical condition. The detainee died from a heart attack within a few hours of his arrest.
(Wayne County Jail, Ohio)

t: .S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
SEGREGATION

Holly v. Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee placed in segregation for two
days without a prior hearing brought a § 1983 action for damages against correctional officers.
The district court dismissed the case and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the placement of the detainee did not violate his due process rights,
where the officers had reason to believe that the detainee was disrupting a jail headcount, which
would interfere with jail security and discipline. The court noted that the detainee was given a
hearing upon his release from segregation and that he was returned to the general population.
The court expressed confusion about "what damages he could prove for being confined to a cell
for two days rather than being free to roam the dangerous general-population area of the jail-and dangerous it is." (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
CONDITIONS
CELL CAPACITY

Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150 (3 rd Cir. 2005). Pretrial detainees filed a suit under § 1983,
challenging the conditions of their confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainees
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the district must employ
the "due process" analysis to determine whether the conditions of confinement amounted to
"punishment" that was improperly imposed prior to the adjudication of guilt, not the Eighth
Amendment standards regarding cruel and unusual punishment. The detainees challenged the
practice of triple-celling three detainees to a cell that had been designed to be occupied by a
single person, which required one of the occupants to sleep on the floor in proximity to a toilet.
(Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility, Gander Hill, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

Jeanty v. County of Orange, 379 F.Supp.2d 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). A county jail inmate whose arm
was broken in an altercation with corrections officers sued the officers and the county, alleging
excessive use of force. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in
part, and denied it in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues
as to whether excessive force was applied when the officers allegedly beat the prisoner in his cell
to the point of breaking his arm, and wantonly ignored his cries of pain and pleas that they
desist. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by issues of fact as to
whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the conviction of
the inmate for assaulting an officer, arising out of the same incident, did not preclude the
inmate's claim. The court held that the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment,
applied to this action because the inmate had been convicted of arson and was awaiting
sentencing. (Orange County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
WORK
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Johnson v. Board ofPolice Com'rs, 370 F.Supp.2d 892 (E.D.Mo. 2005). Homeless persons brought
a§ 1983 action against a city police captain and a city, claiming that their Fourth, Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when they were periodically removed from a
downtown area. After the district court entered a preliminary injunction barring the
continuation of the alleged harassment, the defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
denied the motions. The court held that the Fourth Amendment rights of the homeless persons
who were allegedly wrongfully detained were further violated when jailers ordered them to
perform manual labor or risk continued confinement, before they were charged with or found
guilty of the commission of a crime. (City of St. Louis, St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868 (6 th Cir. 2005). A detainee who had severely cut his hand
immediately prior to his arrest brought a civil rights action alleging violation of his right to
adequate medical care during his incarceration. The district court entered summary judgment in
favor of all defendants, and the detainee appealed. A divided appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded due to
genuine issues of fact as to whether a jail doctor had knowledge of the detainee's fully severed
tendons, whether the doctor disregarded the risks inherent in delayed tendon surgery, and
whether the doctor acted under the color of state law as an employee of a private contractor. In
his deposition, the detainee testified that he remembered an emergency room doctor telling him
that his tendons had been completely severed and that he was to return for surgery within three
to seven days. (Franklin County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Johnson v. Wright, 423 F.Supp.2d 1242 (M.D.Ala. 2005). An arrestee sued an arresting officer, a
volunteer riding with the officer, and county jail officers, claiming violation of his Fourth
Amendment protections against false arrest and excessive force. The officer, volunteer and jail
officers moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the jail officers were not
32.128

XIX

entitled to qualified immunity due to material issues of fact, as to whether the jail officers beat
the arrestee without provocation while he was in his cell. According to the arrestee, officers
dragged him out of his cell and put him in some type of harness chair, and he was in handcuffs
during the entire time he was being beaten at the jail and he was still in handcuffs when he was
strapped into the harness chair. The arrestee alleged that officers continued to beat him after he
was strapped into the harness chair. (Chilton County Jail, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROrESS
ACCESS TO
COURT
INITIAL
APPEARANCE

Lingenfelter v. Bd. Of County Com'rs ofReno Cty., 359 F.Supp.2d 1163 (D.Kan. 2005). A
detainee filed a civil rights complaint alleging that he was arrested without a warrant and
detained unlawfully for eight days without a judicial determination of probable cause. The
district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the detainee stated a
claim for violation of his right to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause. The court
found that the detainee state a claim against a sheriff in his official and personal capacities, and
denied qualified immunity from liability for the sheriff. The court found that the facts could
conceivably be produced that the sheriffs alleged policy or custom of not effectuating probable
cause determinations for detainees who were arrested without a warrant was a substantial
factor in bringing about the alleged violation. (Reno County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Little v. Shelby County, Tenn., 384 F.Supp-.2d 1169 (W.D.Tenn. 2005). An inmate brought a§
1983 action against a county and sheriff, alleging that he had been raped in jail in violation of
his Eighth Amendment rights. The county stipulated to liability and an order of injunctive relief
was issued. Later, the district court found the county in contempt, and the county sought to
purge itself of the contempt finding. The court entered a purgation order. The court held that the
county and sheriff complied with·the Eighth Amendment and purged themselves of contempt
through the adoption of a structured reform to correct conditions that included violence, rape
and gang control among inmates. In reaching its conclusion, the court considered whether
officials took all reasonable steps within their power to comply with the order, which included
whether they marshaled their own resources, asserted their highest authority, and demanded
the results needed from subordinate persons and agencies in order to effectuate the course of
action required by the order. The court praised the county, noting that it had adopted a focused,
systemic and information-driven structural reform based on critical exert assessment of
essential institutional functions. The county adopted a 14-point remedial scheme that included
implementing direct supervision management of inmate cellblocks, improving population
management, collecting and utilizing data, and installing an objective inmate classification
system. (Shelby County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
LENGTH
INTAKE
SCREENING

Luckes v. County of Hennepin, 415 F.3d 936 (8 th Cir. 2005). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action
against a county and a sheriff related to his 24-hour detention after his arrest. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that the arrestee's due process rights were not violated by his twenty-four
hour detention following his arrest for an outstanding bench warrant, since the length of the
detention did not shock the conscience and the arrestee did not complain of any mistreatment by
jail staff. The arrestee had failed to pay fines for two traffic citations and bench warrants had
been issued. His license had also been suspended. He was stopped and cited for driving without a
license and then he was arrested pursuant to the bench warrants. He was placed in a holding
cell, where an officer told him that he had "picked the worst day to be here" because the jail had
just activated a new computerized jail management system and problems were encountered. A
sign posted in the jail asked inmates to ''be patient" and that it "may take more than eight
hours" to process their paperwork. During his 24-hour detention the arrestee was repeatedly
placed in overcrowded cells with persons arrested for crimes that were significantly more violent
in nature than failure to pay traffic fines. He endured threats and intimidation from other
inmates, as well as mockery prompted by his speech impediment. (Hennepin County Adult
Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Manier v. Cook, 394 F.Supp.2d 1282 (E.D.Wash. 2005). A county jail inmate brought a§ 1983
action against jail officers, alleging cruel and unusual punishment based on the use of excessive
force. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held
that the use of force was within the scope of the jail's policy for maintaining and restoring order.
According to the court, the inmate had refused to return to his cell as ordered and he had
verbally abused jail officers. An officer fired two Taser gun shots rather than one continuous
trigger shot, and the officer decided not to fire a third short. The court noted that the inmate
suffered only a minor injury and that he had a history of self harm. (Spokane County Jail,
Washington)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Mann ex rel. Terrazas v. Lopez, 404 F.Supp.2d 932 (W.D.Tex. 2005). Representatives of the
estates of two detainees who had committed suicide while confined brought an action against a
sheriff and jail officers, alleging failure to supervise and failure to train. The district court found
that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity for failing to prevent the detainees' suicides,
where there was no evidence that the sheriff was personally aware of any suicidal thoughts the

XIX

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detainees might have had and did not personally direct any actions involving the detainees
during their incarceration. The court ordered further proceedings to determine if the sheriffs
failure to modify his policies regarding potentially suicidal detainees was an intentional choice,
or merely unintentionally negligent oversight. One inmate was known to have mental health
problems and was housed in a mental health unit that provided a 1 to 18 officer to inmate ratio,
compared to the 1 to 48 ratio required by state standards. The inmate hanged himself using a
torn-up bed sheet. The other inmate was being held in a new detox cell and was founding
hanging four minute after she had been visually observed by an officer. She also used a bed
sheet to hang herself. (Bexar County Adult Detention Center, Texas)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Martin v. Somerset County, 387 F.Supp.2d 65 (D.Me. 2005). The representative of the estate of a
county jail inmate who hanged himself in his cell, sued the county, sheriff and jail officials
alleging violation of the inmate's federal and state rights. The district court granted summary
judgment in part for the defendants, and denied it in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether jail officials displayed deliberate
indifference to the inmate in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prior to the hanging. The court
noted that it was necessary to determine if a jail shift supervisor and a control room officer
subjectively knew that the inmate was suicidal and whether they unreasonably disregarded the
risk. The court found that an officer who merely assisted in cutting down the inmate was not
liable for deliberate indifference, where he brought a seat belt cutter to the cell on orders of the
shift supervisor, and when it failed to release the sheet the inmate had used to hang himself, he
brought scissors. The court found officials did not show deliberate indifference after the hanging
when they did not apply cardio·pulmonary resuscitation, noting that the inmate was warm and
appeared to be breathing, and it was only a few minutes before an emergency medical team
arrived. The court held that the county did not show deliberate indifference to the suicide-prone
inmate when it established a suicide prevention protocol, noting that the thrust of this claim was
that the officials failed to follow the protocol in supervising the inmate. (Somerset Co. Jail,
Maine)

U.S. District Court
BAIL

McLaurin v. New Rochelle Police Officers, 368 F.Supp.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). An arrestee
brought a § 1983 action against a county, alleging constitutional and state law violations after
being released on bail. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the arrestee
who alleged adverse conditions ofrelease on bail, failed to establish a policy or custom of the
county that deprived him of his civil rights. The court noted that the court system, rather than
county government, was responsible for setting bail. The arrestee alleged that he was forced, as
a condition of bail, to attend a domestic violence program, and that he and another black man
were the only persons who were at the program as a condition of bail. (Westchester County, New
York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

McRoy v. Sheahan, 383 F.Supp.2d 1010 (N.D.111. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights
suit against jail authorities and a municipality, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
court held that jail authorities were not deliberately indifferent to the presence of tuberculosis
bacteria in the jail in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the detainee who
contracted a latent form of tuberculosis. The court noted that the jail followed the screening,
isolation and treatment policies of the Center for Disease Control and the American Thoracic
Society. The court also found no deliberate indifference in the treatment of the detainee because
the detainee suffered no detrimental effects as the result of an alleged delay in treatment, or the
missing of four doses of medication during the treatment process. (Cook County Department of
Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILE
CLASSIFICATION
PROTECTION

Merrriweather v. Marion County Sheriff, 368 F.Supp.2d 875 (S.D.lnd. 2005). A county jail
detainee who was beaten and raped by fellow detainees sued a sheriff, claiming deprivation of
his due process rights and negligence. The district court denied the sheriffs motion to dismiss
the action. The court found fact issues as to whether the sheriff had shown deliberate
indifference to the risk posed to the detainee by housing him with detainees who had a record of
prior violence, and whether the sheriff had immunity from the negligence claim under state law.
The court also found material issues of fact as to whether the level of violence in the juvenile
detention portion of the jail was significant and obvious, and whether the sheriffs policies and
procedures were systematically inadequate. The court noted that alleged material improvements
in procedures for protecting jail detainees from assault, implemented after the detainee was
beaten and raped by fellow detainees, were irrelevant in determining whether the due process
rights of the detainee were violated. (Marion County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
TRAINING

Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2005). The sister of a detainee, who died of a
brain tumor while in pretrial custody in a county facility, brought a wrongful death action under
§ 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs and gross negligence. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the sister appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that county did not have a custom or policy of deliberate
32.130

XIX

indifference so as to support a § 1983 claim, given that there was no evidence of a clear and
consistent pattern of mistreatment of detainees, and that the shift commander followed the
county's policy and contacted the on·call doctor. The court found that the shift commander did
not act with deliberate indifference, noting that he questioned the detainee about his fall in the
cell, promptly consulted the on-call physician, and placed the detainee under observation. The
court noted that the sheriff had appointed a training coordinator for the facility, sought
accreditation for the facility, requested bids for medical services, changed medical providers,
formulated a policy for medical care at the facility, and initiated an investigation into the
detainee's death. The 44-yearold detainee had told facility staff at the time of admission that he
had sustained a head injury a month earlier. (Calhoun County Correctional Facility, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILES
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Myers v. Potter, 422 F.3d 347 (6 th Cir. 2005). A juvenile detainee brought a suit against a police
officer and a police chief, alleging unlawful detention for interrogation in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that the police officer was not entitled to
qualified immunity for detaining the juvenile without probable cause to arrest, or a valid consent
from his mother or the detainee, and for failing to allow the detainee to leave upon request. The
court noted that the district court should have given the detainee given more time to conduct
discovery before ruling on the claim against the police chief. The detainee alleged, among other
things, that the officer conducted a polygraph examination, threatened him with life
imprisonment, repeatedly called him profane names, and showed him photographs of charred
bodies discovered during the fire that was under investigation. (City of McMinnville, Tennessee)

U.S Di:;trict Court
USE OF FORCE

Niemyjski v. City ofAlbuquerque, 379 F.Supp.2d 1221 (D.N.M. 2005). An arrestee brought a
state court action against a city, alleging that police officers committed a civil rights violation in
connection with his arrest and detention. The action was removed to federal court, where the
district court granted summary judgment for the city and remanded state law claims. The court
held that the arrestee failed to show that a municipal custom or policy contributed to the alleged
violations. The court noted that the city's policy manual stated that staff were required to
received training in the legitimate use of force and restraints, and that no correctional officer
was permitted to work with inmates until and unless such training was successfully completed.
The arrestee had been placed in a holding cell. When he was denied the opportunity to make a
telephone call he protested by refusing to have his photograph taken. Because of his resistance,
jail officers used force to position him to take his photograph. The arrestee and the officers later
traded racial insults. He was taken up stairs rather than an elevator, and he fell down and
alleged that officers punched and kicked him resulting in an injury to his ribs. He was released
less than 24 hours after his arrest on a warrant. (Bernalillo Co. Detention Center, New Mexico)

ffS. District Court
SEARCHES

Nilsen v. York County, 382 F.Supp.2d 206 (D.Me. 2005). County jail inmates brought a class
action suit against a county, claiming that the practice of forced disrobing of all incoming
inmates, in the presence of an officer, was an unauthorized strip search. The parties submitted a
proposed settlement for court approval. The district court approved the settlement, in part. The
court found that the practice of having inmates remove their clothing in the presence of an
officer was the equivalent of a strip search conducted without cause. The county agreed to create
a $3.3 million settlement fund, from which members of the class would be compensated. The
court approved higher "incentive" payments of $6,500 to the first class representative, and
$5,500 and $5,000 to the other two class representatives, noting that they put considerable time
into the case and were required to give embarrassing deposition testimony. They also received
unfavorable publicity regarding their arrest and humiliation, due to the small size of the county
and the ease of their recognition. The court noted that a privacy factor was strong in this case,
and that requiring individual class members to prove damages would stifle individuals who are
too embarrassed to discuss their searches. The court rejected the proposal that would have
awarded twice as much to females. The proposal had been based on the assertion that females
had two areas of the body subject to privacy protection. The county contended, even when the
settlement was offered, that its policy was constitutional because the officers were looking for
contraband in the clothing and were not intentionally viewing arrestees' naked bodies. (York
County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 414 F.3d 596 (6 th Cir. 2005). The estate of a detainee who died in
the course of a police encounter sued officers and others, asserting § 1983 and state law claims.
The district court resolved certain claims on summary judgment and denied the officers qualified
immunity. On appeal, the court held that the officers were not entitled to immunity on the claim
that the officers denied the detainee adequate medical care. The court found that the officers had
time to fully consider the potential consequences of their conduct during the six minutes that the
detainee was denied medical care after being taken into custody, given that the officers had time
to do such things as greet each other, prepare for their superiors' arrival, pick up dropped items,
and comment on the apparent severity of the detainee's injuries. The court applied the
traditional deliberate standard of culpability rather than the heightened standard requiring
malice and intent to harm. According to the court, each officer viewed the detainee in significant

XIX

32.131

physical distress, but made no attempt to summon or provide medical care until several minutes
later when a sergeant checked on the detainee and discovered that he was not breathing. The
detainee's death had been ruled a homicide resulting from the police officers' restraint attempts.
The estate alleged that one officer pulled the arrestee's head up when he was on the ground and
drove his knees into the arrestee's back. The estate also alleged that an officer twice sprayed
mace directly into the arrestee's eyes and nose from a distance of six inches, although police
policy directed a distance of five to ten feet. (City of Cincinnati, Village of Golf Manor, Ohio)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Patrick v. Lewis, 397 F.Supp.2d 1134 (D.Minn. 2005). The heirs and next of kin of an arrestee
who died while in detention brought an action alleging that officers violated the arrestee's
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to seek medical attention for the arrestee
after he was involved in a motorcycle accident. The district court granted summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity for the officers in part, and denied it in part. The court held that
officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment in failing to summon medical aid during the
booking process, noting that the arrestee refused medical attention after being treated by
paramedics at the scene of the accident. The court found that an overnight jailer who made cell
checks periodically throughout the night was not deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's serious
medical needs, even though the arrestee died in his cell sometime in the early morning from
complications of a blunt force chest injury. The court noted that there was no indication that the
jailer heard the arrestee's alleged call for help during her overnight shift, or knew that the
arrestee had serious injuries. The court denied summary judgment on the claim that the jailer
was deliberately indifferent, finding it was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the jailer delayed in summoning aid for the arrestee after she discovered that he
appeared not to be breathing. (Brooklyn Park Police Department, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION
ACCESS TO
COURT
TELEPHONE

Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers, 422 F.3d 1090 (10 th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee who was
housed at a detention center operated by a private contractor under a contract with the United
States Marshals Service brought actions against the contractor and its employees, alleging Fifth
and Eighth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the action and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the employees did not punish
the pretrial detainee in violation of his due process rights when they placed him in segregation
upon his arrival at the center and kept him in segregation for approximately 13 months without
a hearing. The detainee was first placed in segregation because the center lacked bed space in
the general population, and he remained in segregation due to his plot to escape from his
previous pretrial detention facility. According to the court, the detention center has a legitimate
interest in segregating individual inmates from the general population for nonpunitive reasons,
including threats to the safety and security of the institution. The court found that the detainee
did not suffer an actual injury as the result of the violation of his right of access to the courts.
The inmate was not provided with access to a law library and the lawyer who assisted him would
only retrieve case law when a specific citation was provided. The detainee did not allege that he
had missed court dates, been unable to make timely legal filings, been denied legal assistance to
which he was entitled, or lost a case which could have been won. The court precluded the
detainee's Bivens claim for damages under eavesdropping and breach of privacy statutes because
state law provided the detainee with a cause of action. The detainee challenged the failure of the
facility to provide him with unmonitored calls to his attorney. (Corrections Corporation of
America, Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MENTAL
HEALTH
SUPERVISION

Perez v. Oakland County, 380 F.Supp.2d 830 (E.D.Mich. 2005). The father and personal
representative of the estate of an inmate brought a suit under § 1983, alleging that the
defendants violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide appropriate
mental health treatment or monitoring when the inmate was being held in the county jail,
leading to the inmate's suicide. The district court held that the county did not act with deliberate
indifference in allowing the inmate caseworker, who allegedly lacked sufficient medical
background or expertise, to make decisions affecting the health care needs of the inmate. The
court noted that the challenged practice was widespread, with the "vast majority" of county jails
allowing employees who were not psychiatrists, but who had been trained in suicide detection
and prevention, to make determinations whether inmates were suicidal or potentially suicidal.
The court found that the father failed the establish that deputies actually perceived that the
inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm if they conducted their rounds 16 minutes
further apart than mandated under jail policy. The court held that the father failed to establish
that a deputy actually perceived a risk of placing the inmate in a single cell. The inmate had
been placed in a single cell and no special watch status had been ordered by the inmate
caseworker, who was responsible for cell assignments. The court held that the caseworker was
entitled to qualified immunity because it was not established at the time of the inmate's suicide
that the caseworker's actions of making determinations concerning the inmate's cell
assignments, without first consulting the inmate's physician or psychiatrist, would violate the
inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. According to the court, the jail psychiatrist did not
disregard a known and serious medical need, where evidence demonstrated that even though the
psychiatrist knew that the inmate was not taking his medication, he determined through his
32.132

XIX

own direct evaluation that the inmate was suicidal. The court found that allegations that the
sheriff failed to ensure that the county's deputies enforced and followed the law could not sustain
a § 1983 claim absent evidence that the sheriff himself engaged in active unconstitutional
behavior by directly participating, encouraging, authorizing, or acquiescing in the allegedly
offending conduct of the sheriff's deputy. (Oakland County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
FALSE
IM!'R.I.SONMENT
hELEASE

Perez-Garcia v. Village ofMundelein, 396 F.Supp.2d 907 (N.D.Ill. 2005). A county jail detainee
brought an action against a county and sheriff under§ 1983 alleging violation of his due process
rights, and asserting claims for false imprisonment. The district court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the detainee's complaint
against the sheriff sufficiently stated a claim for deprivation of due process rights, where the
detainee alleged he was jailed for nearly one month over his vigorous and repeated protests that
he was the wrong person, that he provided jail personnel with his identification card and
repeatedly told them he was not the named suspect, that his physical appearance did not match
the suspect's description, and that his detention continued for a day after a court ordered his
release. According to the court, the detainee sufficiently alleged that a policy, practice or custom
of the sheriffs department caused the alleged deprivation, and that the sheriff was responsible
for setting and supervising jail policies and procedures that did not require confirmation of the
detainee's identity. (Lake County Jail, Illinois)

US. District Court
SE.\RCHES
RELEASE

Powell v. Barrett, 376 F.Supp.2d 1340 (N.D.Ga. 2005). Former detainees at a county jail
initiated a class action complaining about "blanket strip searches" conducted on inmates when
they initially entered or returned to the jail. The detainees also alleged that they were detained
beyond their scheduled release dates. The district court dismissed the action in part, and denied
dismissal in part. The court denied qualified immunity to the two sheriffs who were defendants,
on claims that they continued detention beyond scheduled release dates, noting that the
detainees claimed they were over-detained for durations ranging from one to ten days, with an
average over-detention period of 3.9 days. According to the court, the detainees stated a claim
against the county under § 1983 with their allegations that the county defendants had actual
knowledge that the challenged practices at the county jail were unconstitutional. The court
granted qualified to immunity to the sheriffs with respect to the Fourth Amendment claims
challenging the jails search policy, which required detainees to submit to a visual "front and
back" inspection upon leaving a shower, without regard to reasonable suspicion. An arrested
individual would be assigned to a room with thirty or forty other arrestees, asked to remove his
clothing, and instructed to place the clothing in a box. As a group, the arrestees were required to
shower and then, standing in a line with others, were visually inspected front and back by
deputies. The court found that the policy did not violate clearly established rights of detainees at
the time the searches were allegedly performed in 2003 and 2004. The court noted that some of
these searches involved persons who were returning from court proceedings and who were
entitled to be released from the facility. (Fulton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTION
SEPARATION
COMMISSARY
CLASSIFICATION

Purcell ex rel. Estate ofMorgan v. Toombs County, 400 F.3d 1313 (11 th Cir. 2005). The mother of
a county jail inmate who died after he was beaten and injured by three other inmates brought a
§ 1983 action against a sheriff and jail administrator. The district court denied qualified
immunity for the defendants, and Eleventh Amendment immunity for the sheriff, and they
appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that the conditions at the county jail did
not pose a "substantial risk of serious harm" as required to show an Eighth Amendment
violation. The inmate was beaten by three other inmates in his cell over an alleged money
dispute. Inmates were allowed to keep money in their cells, play cards and gamble, the jail had a
history of inmate-on-inmate assaults, and the jail's layout presented some difficulty in the
continuous observation of inmates. But the court noted that inmates were segregated based on
particularized factors, including the kind of crime committed and personal conflicts, the jail was
not understaffed at the time of the attack, serious inmate-on-inmate violence was not the norm,
fights that did occur were not linked to any recurring specific cause, and jailers had a history of
punishing inmate violence. At the time of the incident the jail held 118 inmates and was staffed
at normal levels, having five officers on duty. The sheriff had directed that a new commissary
system be instituted to manage inmate funds so that inmates would not have to keep money on
their persons, but the system had not been put in place by the day of the incident. (Toombs
County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SENTENCE
REDUCTION

Rickenbacker v. US., 365 F.Supp.2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). After pleading guilty to credit card
fraud and being sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment, a defendant moved to vacate, set
aside, or correct the sentence. The district court denied the motion. The court held that defense
counsel was not deficient in failing to move for a downward departure of the defendant's
sentence based on perceived hardships the defendant endured while being detained prior to
sentencing. According to the court, the alleged substandard conditions, consisting of being served
food that the defendant believed had been accessed by rodents, and not being provided with a
fully stocked library, were not conditions that rose to the level that would warrant a downward
departure. The defendant had been served bread that rodents had apparently partially eaten,

XIX

32.133

and in one instance a mouse had created a tunnel inside of the bread. (Nassau County
Correctional Center, New York)
U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
CLOTHING
CONDITIONS

Rose v. Saginaw County, 353 F.Supp.2d 900 (E.D.Mich. 2005). Twenty-two pretrial detainees
sued a county, sheriffs department, sheriff and individual police officers, challenging the
county's policy of housing uncooperative and disruptive detainees naked in administrative
segregation. The district court held that the policy violated the detainees' due process rights and
their rights to be free of unreasonable seizure. According to the court, the policy was an
exaggerated response to the county's concerns about suicide, officer safety, and administrative
costs. The court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, and granted qualified immunity to
several of the defendants because the detainees' right not to have their clothes removed was not
clearly established at the time of the incidents. The court held that the forced removal of clothing
by an officer of the opposite sex was not justified by safety and security concerns. (Saginaw
County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE
RELEASE·
CONDITIONS
FALSE IMPRIS·
ONMENT

Russell v. Hennepin County, 420 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2005). A detainee sued a sheriff, deputies,
inspectors and a county, alleging that his six·day prolonged detention at a county detention
center violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and constituted false
imprisonment under state law. The district court granted the county's motion for summary
judgment and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
detention center's policy regarding the monitoring of inmates who were subject to conditional
release was not deliberately indifferent to inmates' constitutional rights because of the lack of
policies to expedite the process of conditional release. The court found that the detainee failed to
establish that the detention center's policy regarding the monitoring of inmates who were
subject to conditional release caused his prolonged detention, where at worst, his detention for
six additional days resulted not from the executing of the policy, but from the failure to
assiduously follow the policy. The court held that the detainee did not demonstrate municipal
liability where he failed to show a widespread pattern of failing to follow the "check daily" policy
with respect to detainees subject to conditional release. (Hennepin County Adult Detention
Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
RELEASE

Sizer v. County ofHennepin, 393 F.Supp.2d 796 (D.Minn. 2005). An arrestee sued a county and
county officials asserting a state claim for false imprisonment and violations of state and federal
constitutional rights. The arrestee complained that his 10½ hour detention pending release on
bail was unreasonable. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
court held that the 10½ hour detention was objectively reasonable and not unconstitutional. The
court found that the arrestee failed to prove a continuing, widespread, persistent custom or
practice of unconstitutional over-detentions, despite an alleged sign posted in a waiting area that
alerted inmates that they could expect delays of up to eight hours in processing their releases.
The county responded that the arrestee's processing was delayed by problems with its security
count, which halted out-processing of detainees for two hours. (Hennepin County Adult
Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS
DUE PROCESS

Slade v. Hampton Roads Regional Jail, 407 F.3d 243 (4 th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee sued a
jail, challenging the constitutionality of a one·dollar per day charge that was intended to
partially defray the costs of incarceration. The district court dismissed the complaint and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the charge was not punishment, and
therefore did not violate due process. According to the court, the state statute that authorized
the charge expressed no intent to punish on its face, was an effort to offset the cost of housing,
had a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest, and was not excessive in
relation to that purpose. The court also held that due process was not violated by the lack of a
hearing before the charge was deducted from the detainee's account. (Hampton Roads Regional
Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILE
SEARCHES

Smoak v. Minnehaha County, S.D., 353 F.Supp.2d 1059 (D.S.D. 2005). Former detainees at a
county juvenile detention center brought a § 1983 action challenging the center's policy of strip·
searching all juveniles admitted to the facility, regardless of the seriousness of their charged
offense or the existence of suspicion. The district court granted partial summary judgment in
favor of the detainees and the defendants appealed. The appeals court held that the center's
policy of strip searching minors arrest for minor or non-felony offenses, without any
individualized determination of reasonable suspicion that the individual was or was likely to be
carrying or concealing weapons, drugs or other contraband, violated the Fourth Amendment.
The court denied qualified immunity for former and current directors of the detention center.
The court noted that there was no demonstration that the incidence of smuggling weapons or
contraband into the center was more than minimal, nor that any weapons or contraband could
not have been discovered with less invasive searches. (Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention
Center, South Dakota)

32.134

XIX

U.S Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, AL., 420 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2005). The administrator of
the estate of a pretrial detainee who had committed suicide while in jail brought an action
against a city, its mayor and several police department employees, alleging violations of the
detainee's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment and asserting a state wrongful
death claim. The detainee had been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the federal claims and
dismissed the state law claims. The administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that police department
employees who lacked a subjective knowledge of the detainee's potential for suicide were not
liable, in their individual capacities, for any constitutional violations. The court noted that the
employees had no knowledge of either the detainee's emergency room records showing that the
detainee told emergency room staff she had attempted suicide four times before, or of doctor's
notes showing that the detainee had suicidal ideation. The court denied summary judgment for
one police officer, finding fact issues as to whether he believed that there was a strong risk that
the detainee would attempt suicide and did not take any action to prevent her suicide. According
to the court, the city's alleged lack of a suicide policy did not cause any constitutional violation.
(City of Citronelle Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
SEARCHES
SEGREGATION

Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against a county jail and jail personnel, alleging that he was falsely accused of an infraction,
deprived of due process in disciplinary proceedings, and subjected to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. A jury found the defendants liable on three counts and the district court denied
judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that a hearing officer deprived the detainee of due process because she
was not an impartial decision-maker. The officer testified that she declined to interview an alibi
witness based on her preconceived belief that the witness would lie, and the officer rushed to
impose sanctions on the detainee despite having been asked by officials to withhold judgment
pending the completion of a parallel investigation into the incident. The court held conditions of
confinement were shown to be constitutionally deficient, where the detainee was placed in
around-the-clock segregation with the exception of a five-minute shower break every third day,
all hygiene items were withheld from him, he could only access water-including water to flush
his toilet··at the discretion of individual officers, and was subjected daily to multiple strip
searches that required him to place his unwashed hands into his mouth. (Hillsborough County
Jail, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiffv. Knox County, 397 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.Me. 2005). A class action suit was brought against
a county, its sheriff, and jail officers claiming that the Fourth Amendment rights of some
detainees were violated when they were subjected to strip searches without reasonable suspicion
that they were harboring contraband on or within their bodies. The district court held that the
county violated the Fourth Amendment by adopting a policy that allowed for strip searches of all
detainees alleged to have committed felony offenses, although the sheriff was granted qualified
immunity because the law on this matter was not clearly established at the time the policy was
implemented. The policy provided for the strip-searching of all detainees alleged to have
committed non-violent, non-weapon, non-drug felonies. The court found that the county and the
sheriff were liable for a policy that called for the strip searches of detainees alleged to have
committed misdemeanors, without reasonable suspicion. According to the court, the sheriff was
responsible, in his individual capacity, for Fourth Amendment violations arising from strip
searches of all detainees alleged to have committed misdemeanors without a showing of
reasonable suspicion that they were harboring contraband on or within their bodies. The court
found that the sheriff was aware of the custom of these universal strip searches and did not take
effective action to halt the practice. The court noted that specific standards that described which
strip searches may be undertaken in jails and prisons had been issued by the state attorney
general. The state corrections department had conducted a review of the jail's policy and
procedure manual and informed the sheriff that the policy pertaining to body searches needed to
be revised to comply with the attorney general's rules for searches. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Tatum v. Simpson, 399 F.Supp.2d 1159 (D.Colo. 2005). A detainee who was confined in a county
jail after being found in contempt of court for failing to comply with a state water court case
brought a § 1983 action and moved for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the
action. The court held that a sheriff was not liable under§ 1983 to the detainee for allegedly
denying him medications and medical treatment while he was detained, absent evidence that the
sheriff knew about the detainee's need for prescribed medication or medical treatment during his
detention. (Pueblo County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL
COMMITMENT
CONDITIONS

Thiel v. Wisconsin, 399 F.Supp.2d 929 (W.D.Wisc. 2005). A detainee held under the Wisconsin
Sexually Violent Persons Law (WSVPL) brought a § 1983 action alleging due process violations
in connection with his commitment. The district court denied the detainee's motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and dismissed the action. The court held that no due process liberty interests
were implicated by the manner in which the detainee was treated, either in regard to his

XIX

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commitment, or in regard to trips outside the facility to a county jail for court proceedings. The
court found that the maximum security classification imposed on the detainee was an ordinary
incident of such confinement and did not pose atypical or significant hardships. The court found
no violations with the manner in which the detainee was strip-searched, dressed in prison
clothes and placed in restraints before being transported to a county jail for court proceedings.
(Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Thomas ex rel. Smith v. Cook County Sheriff, 401 F.Supp.2d 867 (N.D.111. 2005). The
administrator of a detainee's estate brought an action arising from the death of the detainee at
the jail, allegedly due to inadequate medical attention. The district court granted the defendants'
motions to dismiss in part, and denied in part. The court held that the administrator had
standing to sue on behalf of the surviving spouse and next of kin, and that the allegations were
sufficient to state most of the § 1983 claims. The court found that allegations of conspiracy were
insufficient to state a claim. The court held that the allegations were sufficient to remove the
shield of immunity under a state tort immunity act by pleading ''willing and wanton conduct."
According to the court, allegations that an institutional policy, whether an express policy or a
widespread practice, led to the death of the detainee due to deliberate indifference to the
detainee's medical needs, were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim. The detainee was suffering flulike conditions at the time of arrest and he complained of these symptoms to medical personnel
during his initial screening at the jail. Three days later his condition worsened and he requested
medical attention from several officers, who refused and told him he was just "dopesick." The
next three days the detainee, and fellow detainees on his behalf, requested medical attention and
their requests were denied by officers and medical technicians, and even made written requests.
The detainee was found unconscious on the floor of his cell on the seventh day after his
admission and he died of meningitis later that day. (Cook County Dept. of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
MAIL
ACCESS TO
COURT
MEDICAL CARE

Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Minn. 2005). A detainee brought a§ 1983 civil rights
action against a county and county employees, alleging he was wrongfully strip searched and
suffered a broken hand after he arrested on driving under the influence (DUI) charges. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied it in part.
The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
regarding the reasonableness of the strip search, and the existence and implementation of a
county policy authorizing strip searches for all gross misdemeanant arrestees. The court found
that even if a police officer grabbed the detainee and threw him to the floor, his actions did not
amount to the use of excessive force in violation of due process, absent evidence that the officer's
actions caused the detainee's lost tooth and broken hand. The court held that opening three of
the detainee's attorney letters outside of his presence did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment
right to court access, where the letters were not confiscated and did not prevent the detainee
from communicating with his attorney, and did not address matters of defense strategy.
According to the court, the detainee failed to identify any conceivable way in which the
information contained in the letters, even if read by jail officials, interfered with his defense or
hindered his access to the courts. The court noted that respect for the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments obliges a jail to open legal mail in the inmate's presence and to ensure it is not
read. The court found that the detainee's broken hand was not a serious medical need, such that
a 48-hour delay by county employees in taking the detainee to a hospital could amount to
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, absent evidence that a red and swollen hand
was a critical or escalating situation requiring immediate attention, or that the delay
jeopardized the detainee's prognosis. The court noted that employees took the detainee to the
hospital on the on the evening he made the written request for treatment. (Crow Wing County
Jail, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
TELEPHONE
VISITS

U.S. v. Ali, 396 F.Supp.2d 703 (E.D.Va. 2005). A pretrial detainee who was charged with
terrorism-related offenses filed a motion for relief from conditions of confinement. The district
court denied the motion, finding that the measures imposed did not violate due process. The
court also found that judicial relief was not available because the detainee did not exhaust
available administrative remedies, even though the detainee completed an inmate request form
seeking permission to receive regular phone calls to his family and lawyers, and visits from his
family. According to the court, the detainee did not pursue succeeding options available to him
when his request was denied. The court held that the "Special Administrative Measures" (SAM)
imposed on the detainee at the request of the Attorney General did not violate the detainee's due
process rights, where the SAMs were imposed to further the legitimate and compelling purpose
of preventing future terrorist acts. The measures prevented the detainee from receiving regular
phone calls from his family and lawyers, and from receiving visits from his family. According to
the court, there was no alternative means to prevent the detainee from communicating with his
confederates, and the special accommodations sought by the detainee would have imposed
unreasonable burdens on prison and law enforcement personnel. The court noted that the
measures did not restrict the detainee's ability to help prepare his own defense. (Alexandria
Detention Center, Virginia)
32.136

XIX

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
SEPARATION

U.S. v. Basciano, 369 F.Supp.2d 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). A purported crime boss who was being
held as a pretrial detainee petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his detention in a
restrictive special housing unit. The district court granted the petition, finding that indefinite
solitary confinement of the detainee was not reasonably related to the government's legitimate
objective of preventing the detainee from allegedly planning or approving violent criminal
conduct while behind bars. The court held that to justify such "harsh" detention, more
substantial proof was required that the detainee committed or directed the crime of murder in
aid of racketeering while in detention, or had conspired with another inmate to murder a federal
prosecutor. According to the court, the security restrictions placed obstacles on the detainee's
communications with his attorneys, which was especially important because the detainee was
charged with a crime for which he could receive the death penalty. (Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Metropolitan Correctional Center, Manhattan, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL
HEALTH

U.S. v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005). A detainee appealed the decision of a district court
to medicate a detainee against his will to render him competent to stand trial. The appeals court
vacated and remanded with instructions, finding that the government failed to demonstrate that
involuntary medication would "significantly further'' its prosecutorial interest and that it was
"medically appropriate." According to the court, the government did not disclose the particular
medication and dose range that it proposed to give the detainee, or indicate that it considered
the detainee's particular mental or physical condition in reaching its conclusions. (Federal
Correctional Institution, Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
INITIAL
APPEARANCE

U.S. v. Johnson, 352 F.Supp.2d 596 (D.Md. 2005). A detainee challenged his two-and-a-half day
delay in being presented to a judicial officer after his arrest. The court found that the delay was
reasonable, and was necessitated by the detainee's urgent need to receive medical care. (Western
District Police Station and Central Booking, Baltimore, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

U.S. v. Marcello, 370 F.Supp.2d 745 (N.D.Ill. 2005). In a pretrial detention hearing, the
government asked the court for permission to have the son of the murder victim offer an oral
statement opposing the release of the defendants. The district court denied the request, finding
that the statute that allows crime victims to be "reasonably heard at any public proceeding in
the district court involving release, plea, sentencing or any parole hearing" did not mandate oral
presentation of a victim statement. The court noted that a written statement could be
considered, but that the statement was not material to the "decision at hand." (U.S. District
Court, Northern District of Illinois)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

U.S. v. Rivera-Morales, 365 F.Supp.2d 1139 (S.D.Cal. 2005). After a defendant was determined
to be incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the Attorney General for treatment, the
government moved for an order directing the facility director to evaluate the defendant for
future dangerousness. The district court held that the use of involuntary medication to restore
the defendant to competency was inappropriate and ordered the defendant to be detained for an
additional 30 days to determine if he was subject to state commitment. (Federal Medical Center,
Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
SUPERVISION

Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732 (7 th Cir. 2005). A county jail detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against a county correctional officer, alleging that the officer failed to protect him from an
assault by another inmate by failing to adequately respond and investigate the situation when
the detainee pushed the emergency call button in his cell. The detainee had unsuccessfully
attempted to alert the officer who checked the cell during his rounds, but his cellmate was
holding a razor to his neck at the time. After the officer left the area, the detainee pushed the
emergency call button in his cell, hoping for help. The detainee had to choose his words carefully
and said he was "not getting along'' with his cellmate. The officer did not investigate the
situation nor ask the other officers to do so. The detainee was raped by his cellmate, bitten on his
back several times, and cut on his neck. The district court denied the officer's motion for
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and the officer appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that the detainee need not show that the officer had a specific awareness
that an assault would occur, but that it was sufficient to show that the officer failed to act
despite his know ledge of a substantial risk of harm. The court held that the detainee had a
clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from the officer's deliberate
indifference to an assault by another inmate. (Milwaukee County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Woloszyn v. County ofLawrence, 396 F.3d 314 (3 rd Cir. 2005). The administratrix of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action and wrongful death claims
against and county and corrections officers. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants and the administratrix appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the administratrix failed to establish that the corrections officers were aware of the
detainee's vulnerability to suicide. The court noted that even though a captain said he would put
the detainee on five-minute checks, he also said that he would follow a nurse's advice. The nurse
found the detainee to be polite, cooperative and alert, and cleared the detainee for one-hour
32.137

XIX

checks for signs of alcohol withdrawal. The detainee told a booking officer he was not suicidal
and appeared to be in good spirits. The court also held that the fact that a breathing mask was
not in its designated location did not constitute deliberate indifference. Upon finding the
detainee hanging by a sheet, officers immediately initiated CPR without waiting for the
protective mask to arrive, they continued CPR until a protective breathing mask arrived, and
the administratrix did not claim that immediate use of the protective mask would have
prevented the detainee's death. The court found that the administratrix's expert failed to
identify what specific type of training would have alerted officers to the fact that the detainee
was suicidal. (Lawrence County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)
2006
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Acosta v. U.S. Marshals Service, 445 F.3d 509 (1st Cir. 2006). A detainee brought an action
against the United States Marshals Service, various county jails where he was detained, doctors
in a federal prison, a private medical center, a private doctor, and others, alleging claims under §
1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and alleging negligence under state law. The
district court dismissed the action and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that filing of an administrative claim with the United States Marshals Service was
insufficient to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), for the purpose of§ 1983 claims against county jails and a federal prison doctor. The
court noted that administrative claims against the county jails had to be directed to those
facilities, and claims alleging wrongdoing by a doctor at a federal prison had to be filed with the
federal Bureau of Prisons. The court ruled that FTCA claims against county facilities were
barred by the independent contractor exemption of the FTCA. According to the court, allegations
did not state deliberate indifference claims against a private medical center or a private doctor
with allegations that someone at a private medical center overmedicated him, and that a private
doctor failed to properly diagnose the severity of his foot injury. The detainee had been arrested
on federal drug and firearm charges and he was held without bail. During his pretrial detention,
the United States Marshals Service lodged him in several county jail facilities with which it
contracts, and he also spent time in two federal facilities. (Hillsborough County Department of
Corrections, NH; Cumberland County Jail, Maine; Merrimack County House of Corrections, NH;
FMC Rochester, MN; Strafford County House of Corrections, NH; FCI Raybrook, NY)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Beasley v. City ofSugar Land, 410 F.Supp.2d 524 (S.D.Tex. 2006). An arrestee sued a city under
§ 1983, claiming she was subjected to a strip search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
city moved for summary judgment and the district court entered summary judgment for the city.
The court held that the municipality's policy of authorizing strip searches only when an official
had reasonable suspicion that an arrestee was a threat to facility security, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. The arrestee was cited for driving her mother's car with no driver's license,
no current motor vehicle inspection or registration, no insurance, and no license plate light, a
few days after her eighteenth birthday. She was summoned to appear in court but mistakenly
appeared five days late. She was arrested at her house on a warrant for failure to appear and
she was allowed to put on shoes and socks, but was taken to jail in the clothes she was wearing··
pajama pants and a cotton shirt with no bra. On the way to the city jail the arresting officer
radioed for a female officer to meet him at the jail to perform a search. At the jail a female police
officer told the arrestee to stand with her hands against a wall. She instructed the arrestee to lift
her shirt and the officer lifted Beasley's breasts to feel beneath them. The officer then instructed
the arrestee to drop her pants while continuing to hold up her shirt. The officer pulled the
arrestee's panties taut and did a quick two-finger swipe across Beasley's vagina. The male
arresting officer allegedly witnessed this search. The arrestee initially alleged that she was
subjected to a "strip search and body cavity search," but the court found that her description of
the events did not indicate that a body cavity search occurred. (City of Sugar Land, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
ADA- Americans
with Disabilities
Act
RA· Rehabilitation
Act

Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 410 F.Supp.2d 1280 (S.D.Fla. 2006). A deaf motorist brought an
action against a county, alleging that his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and
subsequent detention violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation
Act (RA). The motorist alleged that throughout the arrest process, the county failed to establish
effective communication because it did not provide him with any auxiliary aids as required by
the ADA and RA. The county moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the motorist's arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and his
subsequent stationhouse detention was not covered by the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act (RA).
According to the court, the motorist's arrest was due to his erratic and suspicious driving, not his
disability, and following his arrest the police merely communicated the breath test consent form
to the motorist, who foreclosed further questioning by requesting an attorney through his
driver's rights card. The court held that the detention of the motorist following his arrest for
driving under the influence (DUI) did not violate the Rehabilitation Act (RA), where the motorist
was not detained because of his disability, but instead was detained because Florida law
required a DUI arrestee to be detained for at least eight hours. The court found that a county
police officer did not intentionally discriminate, act in bad faith, or act with deliberate
32.138

XIX

indifference during the initial stop and arrest of the motorist, as required to support the award
of compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act (RA). As the officer became aware of the
motorist's disability, the officer allowed the motorist to get out of his car so they could speak face
to face, and attempted to communicate through sign language. The officer believed in good faith
that effective communication was established because the motorist responded to him, and the
motorist read the implied consent form. The court found that the detention of the deaf motorist
in solitary confinement following his arrest did not rise to the level of intentional discrimination
or deliberate indifference to the motorist's disability, as required to support the award of
compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act (RA). Corrections facility officers believed
that their communication with the motorist was effective and they detained the motorist in
solitary confinement as a good faith protective measure, not as a discriminatory act. (MiamiDade County, Florida)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Burkett v. Wicker, 435 F.Supp.2d 875 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a
civil rights action under § 1983 against a jail nurse and others, alleging that he was denied
medical treatment while he was a pretrial detainee. The inmate alleged that a jail nurse made a
false entry into the prisoner's medical record, denied him doses of his prescribed medication,
prevented him from seeing a doctor, and delayed filling his prescription, that the nurse knew
that his hand was injured and that it would get worse without treatment, and that because of
her deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, he developed an infection, his hand did
not heal properly, he had permanent disfigurement, and he was in prolonged, unnecessary pain.
The district court held that the allegations supported a claim for violation of Eighth
Amendment's prescription against cruel and unusual punishment. But the court found that no
liability existed against the nurse in her official capacity, for allegedly denying the prisoner
medical treatment while he was a pretrial detainee, in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
absent any allegation that the nurse was acting pursuant to a policy or custom. (Cass County
Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2006). A prisoner who was transferred from a county

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
RELEASE

Bynum v. District of Columbia, 412 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2006). Persons who had been, were, or
would be incarcerated by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections brought a § 1983
class action challenging the Department's policy of conducting suspicionless strip searches of
inmates who were declared releasable after their court appearances, and challenging alleged
over-detentions. The district court preliminarily approved a proposed settlement. Following a
final approval hearing, the district court held that final approval was warranted and that the
allocation of a sum for distribution to all class members who submitted claims was a fair method
of distribution. The court held that the distribution fund of $12 million was very favorable,
especially in view of the low number of opt-outs and objectors. The court found that there was no
collusion between the parties or their counsel and that the settlement comported with the rule
governing class actions and with due process requirements. The court found that the attorney fee
award of 33% of the settlement fund, or $4 million, was reasonable, noting that counsel had
engaged in protracted efforts over four years to obtain the outstanding settlement in both
monetary and injunctive terms, the case was complex and involved novel issues, the case carried
a serious risk of lack of success, and the settlement met with a high level of class satisfaction.
The court defined the “Over-Detention Injunctive Relief Class” as: (a) Each person who has been,
is or will be incarcerated in any District of Columbia Department of Corrections facility
beginning in the three years preceding the filing of the action on or about May 16, 2002 up to
and until the date this case is terminated; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future will
not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court
order or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired. (District of
Columbia Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422 (1st Cir. 2006). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action

jail to a prison after his conviction, where he tested positive for tuberculosis (TB), filed a § 1983
action against a county sheriff, alleging the sheriff violated his substantive due process rights by
failing to adopt and implement adequate safeguards protecting county jail inmates from TB
infection. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the sheriff and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff did not act with deliberate
indifference to a serious health risk that TB posed to detainees in the county jail. The prisoner
alleged that he spent most of his time at the jail in two-person cells and in larger holding cells,
where as many as twenty-six short-term detainees were held under deplorable sanitary
conditions. He asserted that the sheriff’s policy of placing short-term detainees in multi-person
cells without an initial TB screening inadequately protects detainees from the serious health
risk of TB. (Ramsey County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

against a city, city officers, a county, and county officers alleging excessive force. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that an officer who handcuffed the arrestee in the
customary manner by cuffing her hands behind her back did not use excessive force, even if the

32.139
XX

officer knew that the arrestee had a hand deformity. The court noted that the officer's decision to
not deviate from the standard practice of placing handcuffs behind the back was a judgment call.
The arrestee had told the officer to be gentle because she was frail and had recently undergone
elbow surgery. The officer double-locked the handcuffs behind her back so that they would not
tighten. He then marched her outside, deposited her in his cruiser, and belted her in for
transport to the jail. Upon arriving at the lockup, the arrestee was transferred to the custody of
a jail officer, who unlocked the handcuffs, patted her down, and placed her in a holding cell.
After other required aspects of the booking process had been completed, another jail officer
fingerprinted the arrestee, who claimed that the officer who fingerprinted her repeatedly pushed
her fingers down hard, in spite of being told that she had a hand deformity. She also claimed
that the fingerprinting caused injuries to her wrist and her surgically repaired middle finger.
(Knox County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
RESTRAINTS

Carroll v. City of Quincy, 441 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Mass. 2006). A pretrial detainee who was injured
when he fell in a cell after being left with his hands handcuffed behind his back, sued a city and
city police officers, alleging negligence and violations of his federal and state civil rights. The
detainee fell as he attempted to exit the cell when he was still handcuffed. It was later
determined at the hospital that the detainee had a blood alcohol content of 0.37. The detainee
allegedly sustained serious injuries, including a subdural hematoma, traumatic brain injury,
depressive illness and seizure disorder. The district court held that genuine issues of material
fact existed as to whether city police officers had subjective knowledge the detainee's highly
intoxicated state, and whether they acted with deliberate indifference when they left him with
his hands handcuffed behind his back. The court found that the officers' conduct in leaving the
highly intoxicated pretrial detainee in a cell was not undertaken pursuant to any city policy or
custom, as required for the imposition of municipal liability, where the city had rather detailed
written policies restricting the use of handcuffs. The court noted that an officer testified that if
an arrestee was too intoxicated to be booked, it was the usual practice to put the arrestee in a
cell until he/she sobered up and, during that period, the handcuffs would be removed unless the
detainee was acting violently. According to the court, the officers' conduct in leaving the
detainee alone with his hands handcuffed behind his back was not caused by deliberately
indifferent policies of the city, where the city's policies clearly delineated the proper procedures
for the use of restraints on intoxicated detainees and the handling of such detainees. (City of
Quincy Police Station, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Cirilla v. Kankakee County Jail, 438 F.Supp.2d 937 (C.D.Ill. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Dare v. Knox County, 465 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Me. 2006). In a class action, persons strip-searched
by jail officials agreed to a consent decree. The district court approved the agreement, issuing an
injunction ensuring compliance with the Fourth Amendment law governing strip searches of
certain arrestees. The court enjoined the county from strip searching any persons charged with a
crime that does not involve weapons, violence or controlled or scheduled substances during the
jail admission process, while they are being held awaiting bail or a first court appearance, or
after being arrested on a default or other warrant, unless the officer or person conducting the
strip search has reasonable suspicion to believe the person does possess a weapon, controlled or
scheduled substances, or other contraband. The court ordered the sheriff and his successors to
keep a written log that records every instance in which a newly-admitted individual is subject to
a strip search procedure, with the following information: (1) the date and time of the search
procedure; (2) the name of each officer participating in the search procedure; (3) a brief
statement of facts found to constitute “reasonable suspicion” for a strip search, to include the
crime with which the individual was charged; and (4) the name of the officer who made the
determination that “reasonable suspicion” warranted a strip search and who approved the
search. The agreement also provided for monetary compensation of persons who had been
improperly strip-searched. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff filed an action on behalf of an inmate’s
estate, alleging that county jail officials failed to provide adequate medical assistance to the
inmate. The inmate’s death in the county jail was due to sudden withdrawal from his prescribed
methadone medication. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials
and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

§ 1983 action against a county jail and jail personnel, alleging violations of his due process
rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held
that the county jail and jail personnel were not aware of, and deliberately indifferent to, a
specific, impending, and substantial threat to the pretrial detainee's safety, as required for
liability under § 1983 for failure to protect detainee from other inmates in violation of detainee's
right to due process. According to the court, even if the detainee was involved in several
altercations with other inmates, he never filed grievances or complaints about those incidents,
he claimed only some bruising and a bloody nose as result of the altercations, and although the
detainee requested medical attention for a sore finger after the altercations, he did not complain
at that time about injuries from fights. (Kankakee County Jail, Illinois)

32.140
XX

The court held that fact issues remained as to whether the county had a widespread practice or
custom of inordinate delay in providing methadone treatment to inmates. The court found that a
county jail officer was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s methadone withdrawal
symptoms, and thus was not subject to liability under § 1983 for an Eighth Amendment
violation following the inmate’s death, even though the officer received a call from the inmate’s
wife informing her that the inmate had not yet received methadone treatment and was in
excruciating pain. The officer responded that the county “don’t work that fast,” but appropriately
transferred the call to a person responsible for the inmate’s medical care. There was no evidence
that the officer’s job duties included anything more than answering the telephones. (Cook
County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Davis v. Township of Paulsboro, 421 F.Supp.2d 835 (D.N.J. 2006). The parents of an arrestee

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
ATTEMPT
SUPERVISION

Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 445 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2006). The legal guardian for an
incapacitated person who attempted to commit suicide while he was a pretrial detainee in a
county jail, and a state department of human services sued a county and various officials in their
individual and official capacities under § 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and asserted a state law claim for negligence. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and the guardian appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. On rehearing, the appeals court held that county jailers' actions did not constitute
deliberate indifference, and the jailers' decision not to assign a special need classification to the
pretrial detainee was a discretionary decision protected by official immunity. According to the
court, the jailers' actions of conducting well-being checks of the pretrial detainee only every 30
minutes, failing to remove bedding and clothing, and failing to fill the detainee's anti-anxiety
prescription in a timely manner did not constitute deliberate indifference. The court found that
the jailers' view of the risk was shaped by the diagnosis and recommendations of a psychiatrist,
who indicated that the detainee was not suicidal but simply manipulative. The court noted that
the jailers' decision not to assign a special need classification to the pretrial detainee, that would
have required more frequent observation, was a discretionary decision rather than a ministerial
duty, protected by official immunity. The detainee was discovered hanging by a bed sheet from a
ceiling vent in his cell. He was not breathing and the jailers immediately set to work
resuscitating him and then transported him to a nearby hospital. He survived, but suffered
serious brain injuries as a result of the suicide attempt. (McLeod County Jail, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Dukes v. Georgia, 428 F.Supp.2d 1298 (N.D.Ga. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against state and county defendants as well as jail personnel, alleging deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act, and medical malpractice. The defendants filed motions for summary
judgment. The court held that jail personnel did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act when an officer and others allegedly told other inmates of the
detainee's status as an HIV infected person, where the detainee did not show that such
disclosure denied him the benefits of any program or service or that it discriminated against
him. The court also found no ADA or Rehabilitation Act violation when an officer did not place a
mask on the detainee when he was being transported to the hospital, where the failure to place a
mask on the detainee did not deny him the benefits of any program or service or discriminate
against him. The court noted that transportation can be construed as a “program or service

brought a federal civil rights claim against a county, a township, and various law enforcement
officers, arising from arrestee's death which occurred after he had been struck in the head by a
bottle during a fight and then taken into police custody. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the officers did not use
excessive force in spraying the suspect with pepper spray, where he was visibly agitated, was
acting aggressively, was yelling profanities, banged walls in his house, and shoved an officer
three times, and no lasting injury occurred. According to the court, the officers did not use
excessive force in waiting to wash the pepper spray from the suspect's eyes until after he had
been transported from the site of the spraying to a police station because the suspect continued
to physically resist officers and persisted in yelling and cursing after being sprayed. The court
found that an officer did not use excessive force in removing the arrestee from his cell, where the
officer nudged the arrestee several times on his lower leg in an attempt to rouse him, stepped
into the cell and grabbed the arrestee by the arm, smoothly pulled the suspect by the arm off the
bench and onto his hands and knees, pulled him a few feet across the floor, and placed handcuffs
on him. The court held that Township officers were not deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of the arrestee who had been hit on the head with a bottle in a fight prior to
arrest, and thus due process principles were not violated, where an ambulance arrived to
transport the arrestee to a hospital within minutes of the arrestee's arrival at police
headquarters, a doctor examined the arrestee and determined he was fit for incarceration, and
the arrestee was periodically checked once back at the police station. According to the court, the
fact that the arrestee vomited and was still bleeding upon his return to the police station did not
establish deliberate indifference. (Gloucester County Sheriff's Department, Township of
Paulsboro, New Jersey)

32.141
XX

provided by the public entity” for the purposes of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). According to the court, even if a physician's failure to diagnose the pretrial detainee's
cryptococcus was negligent or even severely negligent, her actions and treatment of the detainee
did not constitute deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of
due process where the detainee was receiving treatment for his symptoms and his underlying
illness, HIV, and while in hindsight it appeared that a lesion shown by the x-rays was in fact
cryptococcus, there was no showing that indicated that the physician was ever aware of that
severe risk. The court held that a jail nurse was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's
serious medical needs in violation of the due process clause, where she responded to all requests
for medical service and conveyed the requests and relevant information to a physician, and did
not have substantial knowledge of a serious medical risk when she observed that the detainee
was not moving about, was urinating on his mat, and was cursing at the staff. (Coweta County
Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Gilanian v. City of Boston, 431 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Mass. 2006). A detainee brought a civil rights
action against a municipality, county, sheriff, and corrections officers alleging that strip searches
violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
district court denied the detainee’s motion, finding that fact issues as to whether the strip search
of the detainee was justified and whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner,
precluded summary judgment. The case challenged two strip-searches of the detainee conducted
while she was held in pretrial detention, and asserted claims against the City of Boston, Suffolk
County, Suffolk County Sheriff Richard Rouse, and two unidentified Suffolk County corrections
officers. The court suggested that the trial should focus primarily on the question of whether
there was a less restrictive alternative. The court posed questions, including: could the policy
change, from strip-searching to segregation, have been implemented at the time of the detainee’s
second strip-search; what changes, if any, in staffing, space allocation, and budget were
necessary for the jail to switch to segregation after the Roberts decision; what less restrictive
alternatives, other than segregation, might have been available to the Jail in March 2000; if the
switch to segregation was possible in 2001, how far back in time is it proper to assume that the
same switch could have been made? (Nashua Street Jail, Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Glass v. Rodriguez, 417 F.Supp.2d 943 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A state inmate brought an action against
a doctor at a county jail, alleging deliberate indifference to his back problems while he was a
pretrial detainee. The doctor moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the doctor was not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
condition of the detainee with back pain, as would violate the Due Process Clause, even though
the detainee never underwent an MRI and he was not able to see a physician every week as he
would have wished. The court found that doctors, orthopedic specialists, and physical therapists
used x-rays and CAT scans to diagnose the detainee's condition and to develop a treatment plan,
and the detainee was provided with pain medication, physical therapy, and visits to an outside
clinic. The court noted that neither simple medical malpractice nor mere dissatisfaction with a
doctor's prescribed course of treatment is actionable as Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference under § 1983. (Cook County Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO
COURTS
MENTAL
HEALTH
RESTRAINTS

Glisson v. Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, 408 F.Supp.2d 609 (C.D.Ill. 2006). A detainee
brought a civil rights action against county defendants and a police officer, alleging various
violations of his constitutional rights in connection with his arrest and detention. The
defendants moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed in part and declined to dismiss in
part. The court held that the detainee sufficiently stated claims under the Eighth Amendment
and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against a jail and a correctional officer
with respect to both his first and second detentions. The court found that the detainee, who was
awaiting a probation revocation hearing, sufficiently stated a claim under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments by alleging that the county jail maintained policies and customs that
tolerated cruel and unusual punishment of convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, and that
the correctional officer strapped him to a wheelchair for several hours, forcing him to urinate on
himself and to sit in his urine for several hours, while he was in a manic state. The inmate
alleged that the jail and correctional officer knew of his mental condition because it was
documented and that the officer's and jail's acts were intentional with malice and reckless
disregard for his federally protected rights. The court held that the detainee sufficiently stated
denial of access to courts claims against a county jail and correctional officers by alleging that
the jail maintained a policy and practice of arbitrarily denying inmates’ confidential
consultations with their attorneys and that the officers directly participated in the arbitrary and
capricious denial of his access to counsel. The court found that the detainee stated an equal
protection claim against a county jail and officer by alleging that the jail maintained a policy and
practice that discriminated against him because of his mental illness, and that an officer
discriminated against him in terms of the type of confinement on the basis of his mental illness.
(Sangamon County Jail, Village of Grandview Police, Illinois)

32.142
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
SUICIDE

Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2006). The personal representative of the estate of a

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Ha'min v. Lewis, 440 F.Supp.2d 715 (M.D.Tenn. 2006). A Muslim county jail inmate sued a
county, claiming that the county violated his First Amendment rights by failing to accommodate
his religious needs. The district court dismissed the complaint in part and the county moved for
summary judgment. The court held that the Establishment Clause was not violated when the
county provided Bibles to inmates, but did not provide the Quran to the Muslim inmate, where
the county, which did not pay for any religious materials, distributed donated Bibles to inmates
and would have distributed donated Qurans, if any had been received. The inmate's request the
county removed his copy of the Quran from his stored personal property and gave it to him. The
court found that the county did not violate the free exercise of religion rights of the inmate by
failing to hold Muslim services, where two Imams recruited by the county quit, the county was
searching the Muslim community for a replacement, the complaining inmate was barred from
conducting services himself by a policy against any inmate-led religious ceremonies, and the
county accommodated the inmate in private worship by providing a Quran, prayer rug, and a
compass. (Montgomery County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
CLASSIFICATION

Hanks v. Prachar, 457 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2006). A former county jail detainee brought a § 1983
action against county jail officials, alleging violation of his due process rights in connection with
the use of restraints and confinement, requesting damages and injunctive relief. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials and the former detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the claims for injunctive relief,
reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claims for damages, and remanded for further
proceedings. The court held that the detainee's claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot by
detainee's release from jail. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the detainee was restrained in shackles and chains or
confined in a padded unit for the purpose punishment, or for valid reasons related to legitimate
goals. The detainee alleged he was placed in four-point restraints, chained to a wall in a “rubber
room,” forced to shower in waist chains and shackles, and denied hearings before being
punished. The detainee was 17 years old when he was admitted to the jail. (St. Louis County
Jail, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action
against a city and county sheriff’s department, alleging that police and sheriff’s deputies violated
his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to entertain his claim that he was
being held in custody due to mistaken identity. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of city, and entered judgment upon a jury verdict against the sheriff’s department. The
arrestee and sheriff’s department appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. The court held that the sheriff’s department was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in
the arrestee’s § 1983 action, where units of government were not entitled to immunity in § 1983
actions, and the judge who arraigned the arrestee did not forbid the sheriff’s department from
conducting further inquires into the arrestee’s identity. The court found that the sheriff’s
department policy of ignoring an arrestee’s claims of mistaken identity after an arrestee has
appeared in court and a judge had ordered him held in custody did not violate the arrestee’s
right to due process, as required for the department to be liable under § 1983 to the arrestee.
The detainee was held by the department for 13 days after his arraignment on a warrant that
had been issued for someone else. The court noted that the judge did not abdicate responsibility
to determine the arrestee’s identity or delegate that responsibility to the department, and there
was no doubt that the arrestee was the person that the judge ordered held at arraignment.
(Cook County, Illinois)

pretrial detainee who died following self-mutilation while incarcerated in a jail, brought a civil
rights action against the county sheriff, the arresting police officer, and jailers in their
individual and official capacities alleging violation of the pretrial detainee’s right to medical
treatment and to due process. The district court granted judgment for the defendants and the
estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part. The court held that: (1) the detainee did not
have an objectively serious medical need on intake from the perspective of the arresting police
officer, as a layperson; (2) the arresting police officer did not subjectively know that the detainee
required medical attention; (3) a reasonable police officer would not have known on intake that
the pretrial detainee had an objectively serious medical need; (4) the detainee did not have an
objectively serious medical need on intake from the perspective of the jailer, as a layperson; (5)
the jailer did not subjectively know that the detainee required medical attention; (6) a
reasonable jailer would not have known on intake that the pretrial detainee had an objectively
serious medical need; (7) the county did not have an official practice of booking inmates who
were hallucinating without providing medical care; and (8) the district court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding the Arkansas State Jail Standards from evidence in the trial, as the jail
standards did not represent minimum constitutional standards. (Crawford County Detention
Center, Arkansas)

32.143
XX

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL
HEALTH

Hills v. Kentucky, 457 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought a civil rights action against
a treating psychiatrist at a state correctional psychiatric center where the arrestee was held,
alleging constitutional violations arising out of his being forcibly medicated. The district court
denied the psychiatrist’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity and
the psychiatrist appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding that the
psychiatrist was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, a reasonable
governmental employee in the position of the treating psychiatrist who prescribed medication to
be forcibly administered to the arrestee would not have clearly known his conduct was unlawful,
and thus, the psychiatrist was entitled to qualified immunity in the arrestee’s civil rights action
against him. The court order that authorized the arrestee’s transfer to the center for treatment
and examination after the court had found that the arrestee was not competent to stand trial on
a burglary charge, stated that the treatment ordered included forced medication if necessary,
and after seven weeks of treatment, the center’s mental health professionals concluded that the
arrestee could benefit from antipsychotic medication. (Kentucky Cor’l. Psychiatric Center)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
CONDITIONS
CROWDING

Hubbard v. Taylor, 452 F.Supp.2d 533 (D.Del. 2006). Pretrial detainees filed suit under § 1983,

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006). Arrestees brought an
action against a county and others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip
search policy for newly-admitted, misdemeanor detainees. The district court denied the
plaintiffs' class certification motions, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court reversed in
part and remanded in part. The court held that common issues predominated over individual
issues as to liability in this case, and the class action device was a superior litigation mechanism
as to the issue of liability. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
RELIGION

Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 438 F.Supp.2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A detainee in a state facility

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
RESTRAINTS

Jenkins v. Wilson, 432 F.Supp.2d 808 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Johnson v. District of Columbia, 461 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C. 2006). Pre-presentment arrestees

challenging conditions of their confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds, and
a prisoner imprisoned at the same facility asserted a claim under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
and plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that requiring the pretrial
detainees to sleep on a mattress on the floor of their cells for a period of three to seven months
did not violate the detainees' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, because providing
sleeping accommodations on the floor was in response to overcrowding at the facility and was not
intended to punish. The court noted that even if the pretrial detainees' constitutional rights were
violated by requiring them to sleep on mattresses on the floor, the law was not sufficiently clear
so that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violated a constitutional
right, entitling the officials to qualified immunity. The court held that a former inmate's
allegations that he was released from prison due to his end stage renal disease, rather than be
provided with medical care, failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), where the inmate was not denied adequate medical
services because of his end stage renal disease and he received regular dialysis treatment while
he was incarcerated. (Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice Facility, Delaware)

sued officers and supervisors under § 1983, claiming that he was searched in violation of his due
process rights. The district court held that the detainee stated a claim of unconstitutional strip
search, under the Fourth Amendment, when he alleged that officers, having conducted a
legitimate search in connection with prison-wide strip searches, took him out of his cell and
subjected him to a second search, even though he had been in their custody ever since the first
search, precluding any hiding of contraband on his person. The court also found that the
detainee stated claim that the second of two strip searches violated his First Amendment rights
as a Muslim, to avoid being seen naked. The court noted that while first search was in
furtherance of a compelling government need to maintain order, allowing the search despite
religious objection, there was no compelling government need for the second search. The court
held that the detainee stated a claim that officers imposed a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of the Muslim inmate, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), by forcing him to submit to the second strip search. (George Motchan
Detention Center, New York City)

claim alleging that jail officers used excessive force. The district court held that a genuine issue
of fact, as to whether deputies were justified in hitting the pretrial detainee about the head in
attempting to handcuff him and transport him to segregation, precluded summary judgment.
(Dane County Jail, Wisconsin)

brought a § 1983 action against the District of Columbia, U.S. Marshal’s Service, and former
U.S. Marshal, alleging that arrestees were subject to blanket strip searches and visual cavity
searches without a reasonable individualized suspicion that the arrestees were concealing
weapons or contraband. The government defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a

32.144
XX

claim. The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The district court held that: (1)
arrestees’ allegations that the District of Columbia knew, or should have known, that marshals
were unconstitutionally strip searching arrestees supported a § 1983 claim as to the District of
Columbia; (2) the alleged policy under a former U.S. Marshal, if true, violated the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments; (3) the right to be free from a blanket strip-search policy was clearly
established; and (4) allegations that a former marshal and District of Columbia acted in concert
in developing a policy stated a claim that the marshal was “state actor.” The arrestees alleged
that there were blanket strip searches and visual cavity searches at Superior Court without a
reasonable individualized suspicion, that subjected all female arrestees, but not male arrestees,
to blanket strip searches. (District of Columbia and U.S. Marshal for the D.C. Superior Court)
U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO
COURT
CONDITIONS
INITIAL
APPEARANCE
RESTRAINTS

Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought an action against a
city and city police officers, alleging the duration and conditions of his detention violated his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and asserting a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The district court entered judgment as matter of law in favor of the
defendants. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court found
that the arrestee’s conditions of confinement civil rights claim for the five-day period between
his arrest and his preliminary probable cause hearing was required to be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment, using the “objectively unreasonable” standard, rather than under the
Eighth Amendment's “deliberate indifference” standard. The court held that the question was
for the jury. The arrestee presented evidence that he was shackled to the wall of an
interrogation room for four days, that he was deprived of food, drink, and sleep, and that he was
forced to yell for a long period of time before being let out to use the bathroom, and that the
defendant officers denied such treatment. The court found that the police officers violated the
arrestee's Fourth Amendment right to a prompt judicial probable cause determination by
holding him for a period of five days after his arrest without a probable cause hearing, for the
purpose of arrestee's § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim, absent any justification for the delay.
The arrestee had been arrested for a murder he did not commit. Following his arrest, the
defendants-- all police detectives-- kept him shackled to the wall of a windowless, nine-by-sevenfoot interrogation room for four days and nights while they investigated the case. The arrestee
had nowhere to sleep but a four-foot-by-ten-inch metal bench or the dirty brick floor. The
interrogation room had no toilet or sink; he had to “scream” for the detectives to let him out to
use a bathroom. He was given only one bologna sandwich and one serving of juice as food and
drink during the entire four days and nights that he was kept in the interrogation room. The
detectives questioned him from time to time and made him stand in two lineups. After two-anda-half days in these conditions, the arrestee started to become disoriented and began hearing
voices telling him to confess. He ultimately gave a statement containing a false confession that
did not match the details of the crime. On the fifth day of his detention, the arrestee was moved
to a city lockup, charged, and finally taken to court. The following day, the police investigation
led detectives to another individual who confessed to the murder. The arrestee was released the
next day. (Chicago Police Department's Area 5, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Marriott v. County of Montgomery, 426 F.Supp.2d 1 (N.D.N.Y. 2006.) Arrestees brought suit,

individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, against a county sheriff's
department, county sheriff, county undersheriff, former county undersheriff, a jail administrator
and a lieutenant, challenging the constitutionality of the search policy of the county jail. The
district court held that the policy, pursuant to which arrestees being admitted to a county jail
were effectively subjected to strip searches, violated the Fourth Amendment and that the
arrestees were entitled to permanent injunctive relief. The court found that the arrestees were
the “prevailing parties” entitled to an award of attorney fees. According to the court, the Fourth
Amendment precludes officials from performing strip searches and/or body cavity searches of
arrestees charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses unless the officials have a
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based on the
crime charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestee, and/or the circumstances of the
arrest. The court held that the indiscriminate strip-searching of misdemeanor arrestees is
unconstitutional. The policy required arrestees to remove their clothing in front of a corrections
officer (CO) and take a shower, regardless of the nature of their crime and without any
determination that there was a reasonable suspicion that they possessed contraband. The court
found that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the claim that the written policy
did not involve either a command for the arrestee to undress completely or a command for the
CO to inspect the naked arrestee. The court noted that the procedure that was followed in fact by
the COs required all admittees to remove their clothes, submit to a visual examination by the
CO, and shower. The court held that the arrestees were entitled to a permanent injunction
prohibiting county jail officials from conducting a strip search, as set forth in the jail's “change
out” procedure. (Montgomery County Jail, New York)

32.145
XX

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
PROTECTION
MEDICAL CARE

Moore v. Morales, 445 F.Supp.2d 1000 (N.D.Ill. 2006). The administrator of the estate of a
detainee who died in police custody brought a § 1983 action against arresting officers, and other
officers and employees of a police department who had processed the detainee at a police
station, alleging that the defendants either had used excessive force on the detainee, ultimately
leading to his death, or had been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The defendants
moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to the degree
of force used on the detainee, and whether some police officers failed to stop the infliction of
injuries on the detainee by fellow officers. The court found that the police had not shown
deliberate indifference to the condition of the detainee and that there was no cover-up of the
use of excessive force. (Chicago Police Department, 12th District Police Station, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXERCISE
ACCESS TO
COURT
SANITATION
CONDITIONS
VISITING

Murray v. Edwards County Sheriff's Dept., 453 F.Supp.2d 1280 (D.Kan. 2006). A former

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION
FEMALE

Newsome v. Lee County, Ala., 431 F.Supp.2d 1189 (M.D.Ala. 2006). A female county jail
detainee who had been raped by three inmates, sued a county and employees, alleging violation
of her federal and state rights. The district court dismissed the case in part, and denied
dismissal in part. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the
claim that they retaliated against the detainee for her efforts to report the rape. The court
found that the detainee stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation against the
officer who placed the detainee in a cell with male inmates, but against no other jail personnel.
The court also found valid claims of conspiracy, and conspiracy to block the opportunity to
report the rape, under § 1983 on the part of officer who placed the detainee in the cell with the
male inmates. After the incident, officers allegedly cut off the detainee’s access to phones and
visitors and threatened that there would be negative consequences if she persevered with her
charges. (Lee County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Omar v. Casterline, 414 F.Supp.2d 582 (W.D.La. 2006). A detainee brought an action pursuant
to Bivens and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), alleging that federal prison
officials subjected him to an unconstitutional search and failed to accommodate his religious
needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. The
district court held that: the warden of the federal penitentiary at which the detainee was held
was not liable for alleged violations of the detainee's right to free exercise of religion; the
detainee failed to show that officials served him pork in violation of his right to free exercise of
religion; qualified immunity shielded the officials from liability to the extent that their alleged

pretrial detainee at a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff's department,
sheriff, undersheriff, and county attorney, alleging various constitutional violations. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the
inmate's alleged weight loss while he was a pretrial detainee at the county jail did not satisfy
the section of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requiring a showing of physical injury in
addition to mental or emotional injury in order to obtain compensatory damages. The court
noted that the inmate’s alleged weight loss was contrary to the uncontroverted facts, where the
inmate did not allege that he was not fed while at jail but that he was not allowed to exercise
out of his cell, and it was not clear how a lack of exercise would have caused weight loss.
The court found that the lack of outdoor exercise for the pretrial detainee at a small county
jail did not violate due process, where the cells were large, the detainee did a wide variety of
inside exercises during his stay at jail, and no physical deterioration occurred due to failure to
obtain outdoor exercise.
The court held that alleged inadequate temperature-control and ventilation, the presence of
insects, and a lack of cleaning at the county jail did not violate the due process rights of pretrial
detainee, where jail cells were heated and cooled by air conditioning that was on the same
ventilation system as the rest of the courthouse in which the jail was located, detainees had the
ability to open cell windows and had fans to use in the Summer, detainees were allowed
additional blankets in Winter, the jail and courthouse were treated for insects on a monthly
basis, and cleaning materials were provided to detainees to use in their cells.
According to the court, the county jail's policy prohibiting friends from visiting the pretrial
detainee did not violate due process, where the detainee had free access to visits by family
clergy and counsel to the extent that they wished to visit him, the detainee had the free use of a
telephone in his cell to speak with his friends, and the detainee sent and received over 200
letters while at jail.
The court held that the detainee was not deprived of access to the courts and competent
counsel, even if he was not permitted direct, physical access to a law library, was not separately
assigned a paralegal to assist him, and was unable to call counsel on a few instances, where the
detainee was given frequent and heavy access to law library materials, the county had limited
resources for providing physical access to a law library, the detainee was an able and
experienced prison litigator, the detainee decided not to file civil actions while at the jail, the
detainee spoke with counsel on many occasions, and the detainee was satisfied with counsel's
representation. (Edwards County Jail, Kansas)

32.146
XX

failure to inform the detainee that he was being served pork substitutes violated his right to
free exercise of religion; prison officials did not violate the detainee's free exercise rights by not
informing him of the time so that he could pray at appropriate times of day; officials' refusal to
hold three of the detainee's meals during Ramadan did not violate his free exercise rights;
allegations that prison officials mocked the detainee's religion at most asserted a de minimis
violation of the detainee's free exercise rights; and, the detainee did not establish a violation of
his rights under RFRA. According to the court, allegations that the Muslim detainee asked his
case manager at the federal penitentiary for a clock so that the he would know when to say his
prayers, and that the case manager said “You think this is going to work?” after the detainee
was praying, sufficiently alleged the case manager's personal participation in alleged violations
of the detainee's right to free exercise of religion. (U.S. Penitentiary, Pollock, Louisiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Pietrafeso v. Lawrence County, S. D., 452 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2006). A widow, as personal

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING
MEDICAL CARE

Poole v. Taylor, 466 F.Supp.2d 578 (D.Del. 2006). A former pretrial detainee filed a § 1983
action alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and that he was denied adequate
medical care. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The
court held that the detainee’s due process rights were not violated when he was required to
sleep on a mattress on the floor for over six months in an overcrowded facility that experienced
sporadic hot and cold temperatures and insect and rodent infestations. The court noted that the
officials had issued numerous work orders for temperature repairs and pest control, the
detainee was not denied access to toilet facilities, the officials determined that triple-celling
pretrial detainees was a method to deal with their overcrowded facilities, and there was no
evidence of intention on the officials’ part to punish the detainee. The court found that officials
were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical needs, in violation of the Due
Process Clause, even though he was not hospitalized or sent to a plastic surgeon after he
sustained a large cut over his right eye. The court noted that the detainee’s treatment included
sutures, bandaging of his wound, and administration of medication, as well as a follow-up visit.
The detainee was given instructions to contact the medical department for any perceived
problems with the wound, and the detainee did not seek additional treatment. (Multi-Purpose
Criminal Justice Facility, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Posey v. Southwestern Bell Telephone L.P., 430 F.Supp.2d 616 (N.D.Tex. 2006). The family of
deceased county jail detainee sued a county and the company that provided telephone services
to a jail, after the detainee hanged himself using the cord from a defective telephone in his cell.
The county moved for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the federal claims
against all defendants. The court held that jail employees did not violate the due process rights
of the detainee by displaying deliberate indifference to his condition while he was being booked
and placed in a cell, when they left him alone in the cell, with a broken telephone that had an
exposed cord. The court noted that where there was no showing that the employees knew the
detainee was a suicide risk, and any shortcomings in following the county's suicide screening
procedures were at most gross negligence, which was below the deliberate indifference standard
needed to impose § 1983 liability. The court held that there was no policy or custom by which

representative of a pretrial detainee who died of an acute asthma attack while detained in a
county jail, brought a civil rights action against the county and jailers alleging deliberate
indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs. The detainee had arrived at the jail at 7:10
p.m. with an envelope marked with the detainee’s name, inmate number, and the following
notation in bold red letters: “URGENT Colo. Inter-Correctional Medical Summary Transfer
Report DELIVER TO MEDICAL DEPARTMENT AT ONCE.” In an intake interview, the
detainee told the jailer that he suffered from a severe asthma condition. The detainee said he
was taking a “bunch” of medications, though he brought with him to the jail only an Albuterol
inhaler. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants as a
matter of law. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the head jailer was not
deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs in failing to take the detainee to a
physician shortly after the detainee’s arrival, absent any evidence that the jailer actually knew
of and recklessly disregarded the risk of serious harm to the detainee posed by the lack of
access to his prescribed medications over the weekend. According to the court, the head jailer’s
failure to take the detainee and his medical records to the physician was at most negligence.
The court held that the jail administrator and the chief deputy were not deliberately
indifferent, notwithstanding the chief deputy’s instructions to another jailer to attempt to get
the inmate’s prescriptions filled without taking the detainee to an emergency room. Although
the jail administrator failed to ensure that the detainee visited a physician to secure a refill of
his prescriptions, the day before the detainee died the administrator had been advised by a
physicians assistant that an emergency room visit was not necessary unless the detainee made
frequent use of the inhaler. The administrator was following that advice. The court noted that a
jailer repeatedly asked others to obtain the detainee’s medications and, on his day off, took
medical notes transferred with the detainee to the physicians assistant and then visited the
detainee in the jail to tell him of the physicians assistant’s advice. (Lawrence County Jail,
South Dakota)

32.147
XX

county could be held liable under a § 1983 action for the suicide death of the detainee.
According to the court, the two previous incidents of detainee suicide, over almost two decades,
one of which may have involved telephone cords, did not establish that the existing suicide
policy was defective for failure to instruct staff on this contingency, and that failure of staff to
follow some suicide prevention policies did not rise to level of deliberate indifference required
for county liability. (Dallas County Jail, Texas)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Pryor v. Dearborn Police Dept., 452 F.Supp.2d 714 (E.D.Mich. 2006). The estate of an arrestee
brought a § 1983 action against police officers and a police department, alleging failure to
provide the arrestee with adequate medical care. The district court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the arrestee's
condition-- a crack cocaine overdose-- constituted a serious medical need, and whether the
police officers acted with deliberate indifference to the arrestee's serious medical need. The
detainee was arrested, and while he was in custody in a police vehicle he consumed an
unknown quantity of cocaine. He again ingested cocaine when he was detained at the police
station and subsequently collapsed on the floor of his cell and began convulsing. Paramedics
were eventually called, and they transported the arrestee to a hospital, where he died three
days later. (Dearborn Police Station, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Rand v. Simonds, 422 F.Supp.2d 318 (D.N.H. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se action
against a superintendent, assistant superintendent, and physician's assistant for a county
correctional facility, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.
The court held that the detainee administratively exhausted his claim that the superintendent
and assistant superintendent were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, even
though he did not file a formal grievance, given that “rules” on grievance procedures in the
inmate handbook did not require that the grievance take a particular form. The court noted
that the detainee submitted a request form asking for referral to a specialist, as specified in the
medical procedures section of handbook, and that inquiries made by an investigator for the
detainee's criminal defense attorney into the facility's refusal to refer the detainee to an outside
medical care provider for his shoulder pain gave the superintendent and assistant
superintendent the requisite opportunity to address the detainee's complaints, which they took
advantage of by explaining the decision made. The court held that the detainee failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
on his claim that a physician's assistant at the county correctional facility was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to refer him to specialist outside the facility
for his shoulder injury. According to the court, the complaints made on the detainee's behalf by
an investigator for the detainee's criminal defense attorney did not allege any misfeasance on
the part of the physician's assistant or even mention him, and therefore did not give the
facility's officials sufficient notice of the detainee's concerns about treatment received from the
physician's assistant to allow those concerns to be dealt with administratively. The court found
that material issues of fact existed as to whether the superintendent and assistant
superintendent denied outside care to the detainee on prohibited bases, such as the detainee's
ability or willingness to pay for such medical services, precluding summary judgment for the
officials on the detainee's claims alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
But the court concluded that a delay in having the detainee examined by an orthopedic surgeon
did not cause him any additional pain or permanent injury, given that the specialists who
eventually saw the detainee did not believe that surgery was an appropriate treatment for his
shoulder pain and the measures recommended did not appreciably reduce the detainee's pain
and discomfort, such that implementing them earlier would not have measurably improved his
condition. The court found that the detainee's injury did not amount to a “serious medical need”
for alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Merrimack County House of
Corrections, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 433 F.Supp.2d 58 (D.D.C. 2006). Detainees at the United States naval
facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, sued the government, claiming that their treatment violated
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court denied the government’s
motion to dismiss holding that: (1) RFRA applied outside of the continental United States; (2)
RFRA applied to Guantanamo Bay; (3) a claim of liability under RFRA was stated; and (4)
there was no qualified immunity from suit under RFRA. The Muslim inmates claimed
harassment when practicing their religion, forced shaving of religious beards, and placement of
the Koran in a toilet. (United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Rentz v. Spokane County, 438 F.Supp.2d 1252 (E.D.Wash. 2006). The personal representatives
of the estate of a pretrial detainee, who was murdered by two fellow pretrial detainees in a
county jail, sought recovery of damages from county defendants under Washington's wrongful
death and survival statutes. Parents and siblings, as beneficiaries of the estate, also sought
recovery of damages. The court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants. The
court held that neither the parents nor the siblings could recover under Washington's wrongful
32.148

XX

death and survival statutes, but that the parents could seek recovery from the county
defendants under § 1988 for violations of the detainee's constitutional rights. The court also
held that the parents were entitled to assert Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
causes of action against the county defendants to vindicate their constitutional rights for loss of
companionship with their adult son, but the siblings were not. The court allowed the plaintiffs
to amend their complaint to include the jail officers and a jail nurse because they were allegedly
involved with the placement of the detainee in the same jail dormitory as the individuals who
murdered him. (Spokane County Jail, Washington)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2006). A detainee brought an action against a jail's
physician alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the physician who provided
medication for a respiratory infection and to reduce fever and coughing did not consciously
disregard the substantial risk of serious harm arising from the detainee's symptoms. According
to the court, the detainee's allegation that the physician diagnosed his heart problem but
ignored it, was based on speculation and conjecture. The court noted that, at most, the
physician's actions amounted to a misdiagnosis or failure to conduct further testing. (Denver
County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
SUICIDE

Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 2006). The wife and administrator of the estate of a
detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action against a county and sheriff's
deputies alleging deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that the detainee would commit
suicide. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants and they appealed. The
appeals court held that jailers who placed the detainee in a cell under video surveillance were
entitled to qualified immunity, but the jailer who observed the detainee in the cell by video
surveillance was not entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the jailers who
placed the detainee in a cell under video surveillance were entitled to qualified immunity even
though they did not remove the detainee's clothing and shoelaces, because the detainee did not
have the right to have his jailers take precautions against his suicide beyond placing him in a
cell under video surveillance. The court found that the jailer who observed the detainee in his
cell by video surveillance was not entitled to qualified immunity because the jailer observed the
detainee remove his shoelaces, tie them to a bar, place a noose around his neck, and test the
weight of his rope. The jail policy and procedures manual in effect at the time addressed the
proper treatment of potentially suicidal inmates and required custodial officers to remove all
potential tools such as sheets, blankets, and shoelaces, to conduct inmate checks at random
intervals at least twice per hour, and to make reports of any unusual occurrences. The jail used
surveillance cameras to monitor inmate activity. The court reviewed the videotape taken from
the surveillance camera that recorded the detainee’s activity and it showed the detainee
removing the laces from his shoes, tying them together, and climbing from his bed to the bars of
his cell. (Warren County Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS

Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 439 F.Supp.2d 751 (E.D.Ky. 2006). Inmates, former

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Smith v. Brevard County, 461 F.Supp.2d 1243 (M.D.Fla. 2006). The personal representative of

inmates, and relatives and friends of inmates brought a § 1983 action against counties, alleging
that the methods used by the counties to collect fees imposed on prisoners for the cost of
booking and incarceration violated the Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the Kentucky statute authorizing
county jailers to adopt prisoner fee and expense reimbursement policies did not require that
prisoners be sentenced before fees could be imposed, and that due process did not require a predeprivation hearing before prison fees were assessed. According to the court, the First
Amendment rights of non-prisoners who contributed funds to prisoners' accounts were not
violated. The court noted that the statute authorized jails to begin to impose fees, and to deduct
them from prisoners' canteen accounts, as soon as prisoners' were booked into the jail.
(Campbell County and Kenton County, Kentucky)
the estate of pretrial detainee who hung himself in his cell, brought a § 1983 action on behalf of
the survivors of the estate, against a county sheriff, officers, and a non-profit corporation which
was under contract to provide mental health services to the prisoners at detention center. The
sheriff, officers and corporation moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion in
part, and denied in part. The court held that allegations by the estate that, prior to the
detainee’s hanging himself in his cell, his family members and friends called and went to the
detention center in person to inform the non-profit corporation that the detainee was suicidal,
were sufficient to satisfy the deliberate indifference test in the suit. After receiving knowledge
of the detainee’s suicidal tendency, the corporation failed to provide adequate mental health
care to the detainee. According to the court, knowledge that the detainee was actually
threatening to commit suicide was certainly enough to show knowledge of a substantial risk of
suicide, rather than just a mere possibility. The court held that the estate stated a cause of
action under § 1983 against the county sheriff, in his official capacity, for violating the

32.149
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detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. According to the court, violation of the detainee’s
constitutional rights was the result of the sheriff’s failure to provide adequate staffing and safe
housing for suicidal inmates, and in light of the sheriff’s knowledge that inmate suicide was a
problem, his failure to address any policies that were causing suicides constituted deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of inmates. (Brevard County Detention Center, Florida)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCH
JUVENILES

Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2006). Former detainees at a county

juvenile detention center brought a § 1983 class action against a county and individual county
officials, challenging the center's policy of strip-searching all juveniles admitted to the facility
regardless of the seriousness of the charged offense or the existence of suspicion. The district
court entered partial summary judgment for the former detainees, finding that the searches
violated the minors' constitutional rights, and that the officials were not qualifiedly immune
from the minors' claims. The county and officials appealed the denial of qualified immunity.
The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that requiring a juvenile to strip to her
undergarments upon admission to the facility was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A
juvenile female had been brought to the center for a curfew violation. A female staff person took
her to a private restroom, directed her to remove her shorts, t-shirt, and sandals, but allowed
her to remain attired in her undergarments. The staff person touched her to look under her
arms, between her toes, and through her hair and scalp. The court held that the search was
reasonable under Fourth Amendment in light of the state's responsibility to act in loco parentis
with respect to juveniles in lawful state custody, and that the special needs for such a search
outweighed the invasion of personal privacy. The court held that the officials were entitled to
qualified immunity where there was no appellate decision from the Supreme Court or any
federal circuit ruling on such an issue, and, although many courts had concluded that the strip
search of adult offenders without individualized suspicion was unreasonable, those cases did
not consider interests involved when state had responsibility to act in loco parentis.
(Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2006). A former pretrial detainee brought a pro se

U.S. District Court
PROTECTION

Stephens v. Correctional Services Corp., 428 F.Supp.2d 580 (E.D.Tex. 2006). A pretrial detainee

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 425 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Me. 2006). A class action suit was brought
against a county, its sheriff, and unidentified jail correctional personnel under § 1983, claiming
that the Fourth Amendment rights of detainees alleged to have committed non-violent, nonweapons, and non-drug felonies, and detainees alleged to have committed misdemeanors, were
violated when they were subjected to strip searches without reasonable suspicion that they
were harboring contraband on or within their bodies. Summary judgment was granted in part
and denied in part to the plaintiffs, and the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. The
district court held that: (1) evidence, including booking logs at the county jail, demonstrated
that corrections officers routinely strip searched misdemeanor detainees without reasonable
suspicion; (2) a jail administrator's letter was highly probative of what municipal policymakers
knew about ongoing strip search practices at the jail; (3) intake and release log evidence
provided proof that, for at least some corrections officers, strip searching was customary; and
(4) the actions taken by the county in response to the unconstitutional practice of strip
searching misdemeanor detainees amounted to acquiescence in it. According to the court, a
county jail inspection report provided information about the circumstances surrounding search

§ 1983 action against a county sheriff and officials of the sheriff's office, alleging overcrowding
and inadequate shelter at the jail in violation of Due Process Clause. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, and detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the detainee's
evidence that county officials had failed to address serious and obvious problems with
conditions, namely a continuously cold and wet cell area, for a period of months, especially
given additional evidence including officials' alleged wearing of winter coats inside jail, raised a
fact issue as to whether officials had been deliberately indifferent to a serious deprivation,
precluding summary judgment for the officials. (Oakland County Jail, Michigan)
brought an action against a private jail corporation, alleging civil rights violations and common
law negligence stemming from an attack while he was incarcerated. The corporation moved for
dismissal. The district court held that the corporation was not entitled to state sovereign
immunity and that the corporation was potentially liable under § 1983. The court found that
the detainee properly stated a negligence claim, and also a viable claim for failure to train
and/or supervise. The court noted that although the establishment and maintenance of jails
were “governmental functions” under state law, jail services provided by a private entity were
not. The detainee alleged that the corporation had a duty to protect his well-being and to
ensure his reasonable safety while incarcerated, and that the corporation breached such duty
by not properly segregating him from violent inmates who threatened his life. He alleged that
he informed officials of the death threats and they took no action, and that he was severely
beaten by three prisoners and suffered life-threatening injuries. (Jefferson County Corrections
Facility, Texas)

32.150
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practices at the jail, as well as the knowledge of the county policymakers before the
commencement of the class period, and, thus, was relevant in the class action suit. (Knox
County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Tate v. Gusman, 459 F.Supp.2d 519 (E.D.La. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, arising from conditions of confinement following a hurricane. The district
court held that the detainee failed to state a nonfrivolous claim upon which relief could be
granted and dismissed the action. The detainee alleged that the manner and timing of his
evacuation from a flooded prison system medical unit following a hurricane constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, but the court found that the detainee did not allege that the sheriff
personally acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee’s safety. The court noted that the
detainee did not allege that he suffered any physical injury as a result of any of the conditions
or lack of medical attention. (Orleans Parish Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D.Wis. 2006). The estate of a
pretrial detainee who had committed suicide in jail brought § 1983 claims against a county
corrections officer, alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a claim against the
county alleging that the county maintained an unconstitutional informal policy of allowing
inmates on suicide watch to turn out their lights, and a state law wrongful death claim against
the officer and county. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer and
county. The court held that the county was not liable for a due process violation under § 1983
for deliberate indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs absent evidence that the
officer's delay in turning on the detainee's light after the detainee had turned it off, during
which time the detainee hanged himself, was a standard practice or an aberration. According to
the court, even if the jail's unofficial policy of allowing inmates on suicide watch access to light
switches was the cause of the detainee's suicide, in that it compromised corrections officers'
ability to supervise the detainee, the county was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's
serious medical needs in violation of his due process rights. The court found that the jail's
classification of the detainee as a suicide risk did not indicate he was actually a suicide risk, the
fact that the detainee was a former corrections officer charged with heinous crimes did not
indicate a substantial suicide risk, and, even if suicide risk was indicated by facts that the
detainee stole a razor, that there were scratches on his wrists, and that he removed elastic from
his underwear, the county placed him on suicide watch and thus was not indifferent. The court
noted that the absence of mental illness in an inmate who commits suicide is not fatal to a
claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The detainee was a former
correctional officer charged with attempted murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault of a minor.
He was admitted to jail where he was placed on a suicide watch in a cell with constant camera
surveillance. (Fond du Lac County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491 (2nd Cir. 2006). A detainee brought a Bivens action against
named and unnamed federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents and prison
officials, alleging that his blindness was caused by the defendants' deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs while in federal custody. The district court dismissed the case and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court held that allegations by the detainee, that federal prison officials were on notice of his
glaucoma and resulting medical needs, that they were aware of the improper administration of
his medications and that they still failed to address the situation, that he was transferred to
one correctional facility where he received no medication despite the requests of his family, his
lawyer, and outside physicians, and that the officials were personally ordered by a magistrate
judge to see to the detainee's medical needs, stated a Bivens claim against prison officials, for
deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. (New York Metropolitan
Correctional Center, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
INTAKE
SCREENING
MEDICAL CARE

Thompson v. County of Cook, 428 F.Supp.2d 807 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A detainee held for civil

contempt brought an action against a county and a sheriff, alleging civil rights violations due to
invasive search procedures. Following a jury verdict for the defendants, the detainee moved for
a new trial. The district court held that a jury's verdict as to an unreasonable body cavity
search was against the manifest weight of evidence. The court noted that, notwithstanding the
detainee's purported intermingling with others who were incarcerated, he was not charged with
any crime, and there was no evidence that deputies noticed anything suspicious about detainee
which would have otherwise justified a search. The detainee was subjected to an invasive
urethral swabbing procedure without his consent. The detainee had been held in civil contempt
and ordered held in custody after he refused to sign certain documents related to his pending
divorce proceedings. Upon arrival at the jail, the detainee was processed along with
approximately 250 other new inmates. After spending some time in a holding pen, the detainee
and others were photographed and given identification cards. An employee from Cermak
Health Services, the agency responsible for administering medical treatment to detainees at the
jail, then asked Thompson a number of medical screening questions. During the interview, the
detainee responded to the questions on a standard form concerning his medical history and

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signed the following “consent for treatment” portion of the form: I consent to a medical and

mental health history and physical including screening for tuberculosis and sexually
transmitted diseases as part of the intake process of the Cook County Jail. I also consent to
ongoing medical treatment by Cermak Health Services staff for problems identified during this
process. I understand I may be asked to sign forms allowing other medical treatments. I
understand that every effort will be made by CHS staff to keep my medical problems
confidential. I understand the policy of CHS regarding access to health care at Cook County
Jail. The defendants presented evidence at trial that during the interview, an employee
informed the detainee of his right to refuse the medical screening, but the detainee denied that
anyone informed him of his right to refuse to consent. Following the medical screening
interview, his personal property was inventoried and then he and other inmates then
underwent a urethral swabbing procedure. He claimed that he felt pain both during and after
the procedure. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
USE OF FORCE

Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought § 1983 action
against an arresting officer and city, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the arrestee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that a police officer acted reasonably, and thus, did not violate
the arrestee's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, when he made an arrest
on an outstanding traffic warrant. According to the court, although the arrestee had a different
middle initial and different birth date than the person listed on the warrant, the arrestee had
the same first and last name, and when the officer questioned the arrestee about the warrant,
he replied, apparently confusing it with a traffic violation that he had actually committed, that
he thought it had been taken care of already. The court found that there was no indication that
officer knew that the arrestee was not the person for whom the warrant had been issued. The
court noted that when the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they
reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, the arrest of the second party is a valid
arrest. The court also noted that when a person is lawfully arrested pursuant to a valid
warrant, police officers and jailers have no constitutional duty to investigate whether the
arrestee is actually the person named in the warrant. The court held that the police officer did
not use an unreasonable amount of force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, by putting
tight handcuffs on the arrestee and leaving them on for approximately 30 minutes until the
arrestee was taken to a lockup at a police station. The arrestee complained only once to the
officer that the handcuffs were too tight, he offered the officer no indication of the degree of
pain caused by the handcuffs, he suffered minimal, if any, injury, other than redness on his
wrists for less than two days, and he sought no medical care for any wrist injury. The arrestee
was held in custody for two days. About twenty to twenty-five minutes after arriving at the
station, the arrestee was taken to a lockup where his handcuffs were removed. (City of Chicago,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans
With Disabilities
Act
TELEPHONE

Tucker v. Hardin County, 448 F.Supp.2d 901 (W.D.Tenn. 2006). Deaf detainees and their deaf
mother sued a county and a city, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held
that a county court did not violate the ADA's Title II, which prohibits discrimination in public
services, by asking the deaf mother to serve as interpreter for her deaf sons at their plea
hearing, despite her contention that the request deprived her of her right to participate as a
spectator. The court noted that the mother expressed no reservations to the court about serving
as an interpreter, that she could have refused the request, and, even if the court were somehow
responsible for her service as an interpreter, its request was based on her skill in lip-reading
and sign language, not on her disability. According to the court, assuming that overnight
incarceration was covered by the ADA's Title II which prohibits discrimination in public
services, and assuming that placing a phone call was an “aid, benefit, or service” within the
meaning of an ADA regulation prohibiting public entities from providing a disabled person aid,
benefit, or service that was not as effective as that provided to others, the county did not violate
ADA in using relay operators and notes to allow the deaf detainees to communicate with their
mother, rather than providing them with a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. The court noted
that information was transmitted and received, which was the same benefit non-disabled
person would have received. While in custody, the two brothers communicated with officers
through written notes. The jail was not equipped with a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone.
Instead, the officers acted as relay operators, using paper and pencil, as they spoke with an
operator acting on their behalf to complete the call, which lasted 45 minutes. (Hardin County
Jail, and the City of Savannah Police Department, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

U.S. v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2006). Following a jury trial, deportation officers were

convicted of deprivation of civil rights and one defendant appealed. The appeals court held that
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant willfully sprayed a detainee,
who had a broken neck, with pepper spray and that the use of pepper spray resulted in bodily
injury. The court noted that a detention officer testified that while the defendant was carrying
the detainee to the bus, he said “Let's Mace the fucker and see if he budges” and two other

32.152
XX

detention officers remembered a similar statement, and when the defendant exited the bus, he
was coughing, smirking sarcastically, and claiming that there had been an “accidental
discharge.” After the pepper spray was used, the detainee's mouth was foaming, he complained
of stinging pain, and his eyes were swollen shut for at least three hours. The court found that
the force that caused this pain and that the pepper spray was applied when the detainee was
paralyzed, handcuffed, and lying on the floor of the bus. The detainee made his injury known to
the defendant, screaming “they broke me...” and in response to his pleas the officers taunted
him and invited people to wipe their feet on him. Two of the defendants dragged his limp body
from a house to the van, dragged him off the van onto a bus, and witnessed his reaction to being
pepper sprayed. According to the court, by moving the detainee without stabilizing him, the
officers exposed him to a risk of harm. The detainee was left alone on the bus floor, handcuffed,
eyes swollen shut, and foaming at the mouth, despite the officers’ training that, due to the risk
of potentially fatal asphyxiation, those who had been pepper sprayed should be continually
monitored and placed upright, never in a prone position. (San Antonio Division of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] and Brazos County Jail, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE
PRIVACY

U.S. v. Morin, 437 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006). A defendant was convicted in district court and he

U.S. District Court
PRE-SENTENCE
DETENTION

U.S. v. Nedd, 415 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.Me. 2006). A defendant convicted of two federal firearms
charges sought pre-sentence release. The district court denied release, based on the defendant’s
failure to comply with the terms of his pretrial release, and his belligerence toward a pretrial
services officer who indicated that he posed a danger to the community. (U.S. District Court,
Maine)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
MENTAL
HEALTH
MEDICAL CARE
CRIPA- Civil
Rights of
Institutionalized
Persons Act

U.S. v. Terrell County, Ga., 457 F.Supp.2d 1359 (M.D.Ga. 2006). The federal government

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Vaughn v. Greene County, Arkansas, 438 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2006). The sister of a pretrial
detainee brought a civil rights action against a sheriff and others to recover damages related to
the in-custody death of her brother. The district court denied the sheriff's motion for summary
judgment and the sheriff appealed. The court of appeals dismissed in part, reversed and
remanded in part. The court held that the county sheriff had no knowledge of the pretrial
detainee's serious medical needs, and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted
that the sheriff had no personal interaction with the pretrial detainee during his incarceration,
and there was no indication that the sheriff knew the pretrial detainee had been vomiting for
several hours, was not provided with his anti-depressant medication for two to three days
preceding his death, or had heart problems that put him at risk for a heart attack. According to
the court, the sheriff's practice of delegating to others such duties as reading mail and
responding to communications regarding jail inmates did not amount to deliberate indifference
to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs, as required to be held individually liable for the
detainee's death in a § 1983 action. The 46-year-old detainee had completed a medical intake
form indicating he had a history of mental illness, headaches, epilepsy/seizures, ulcers, and
kidney/bladder problems, but indicating that he did not have a history of heart problems or
high or low blood pressure. Although he had no medications with him upon his arrival at the
jail, his mother later brought his medications, including an anti-depressant. The jail ran out of
his anti-depressant medication for two days and the detainee began to act odd. He was moved
to an isolation cell to be monitored. He was later found dead in the cell. An autopsy led to the
determination that the detainee died of natural causes--arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease-causing a heart attack that resulted in his death. Detectable amounts of his anti-depressant
medication were found in the detainee’s system during the autopsy. (Greene County Jail,
Arkansas)

appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that recordings of the defendant's jailhouse
telephone calls were admissible for sentencing purposes. The court found that the defendant
impliedly consented to the warrantless tape-recording of his jailhouse telephone calls, and thus,
the recordings were admissible for sentencing purposes. The defendant had been given a
prisoners' handbook that informed him that his jailhouse calls would be monitored, and there
were signs above the phones in the prison informing him of that fact. (North Dakota)

brought a Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) action against a county, county
sheriff, and various other county officials, seeking a determination that county jail conditions
were grossly deficient in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the
government’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the sheriff and other officials
were deliberately indifferent to the jail's gross deficiencies in the areas of medical and mental
health care for inmates, protection of inmates from harm, environmental health and safety of
inmates, and fire safety, in violation of the due process clause. The court noted that the lack of
funds is not a defense to, nor legal justification for, unconstitutional conditions of a jail, for the
purpose of analyzing a deliberate indifference claim under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Even if a defendant argues that it is planning or working towards
construction of a new jail to remedy the unconstitutional conditions at the current facility, the
failure to implement interim measures to alleviate those conditions demonstrates deliberate
indifference, according to the court. (Terrell County, Georgia)

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U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006). Two separate actions were brought
against a county and individual officers arising out of a police shooting and the subsequent
detention of witnesses to the shooting. The district court granted the officers’ motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The appeals court held that the 90-minute
detention of witnesses to a police shooting was not reasonable for investigative purposes under
the Fourth Amendment, but that the constitutional rights of the witnesses to a police shooting
to not be detained for 90 minutes following the shooting was not clearly established at the time.
According to the court, the witnesses to the shooting failed to establish the county’s policy or
custom to train its officers concerning the constitutional limitations on detention of witnesses
in connection with the police shooting investigations. (Utah County Sheriff’s Office, Utah)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2006). A female arrestee who had undergone

U.S. District Court
BAIL
CONDITIONS
SUICIDE
ATTEMPT

White v. Crow Ghost, 456 F.Supp.2d 1096 (D.N.D. 2006). An arrestee brought a Bivens action
against personnel of a jail operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), alleging failure to
provide adequate medical care, unsanitary conditions, and delayed or prevented bond hearings.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that jail
officials were not deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's medical needs, in violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights, where officials provided the arrestee with medical care promptly
after learning of his suicide gestures or attempts, and again upon learning he might have an
infection. The court noted that when the arrestee's need for medication was established,
officials ensured that the medications were administered. The court found that the officials
were not deliberately indifferent to any risk of harm to arrestee from his placement in two
different, allegedly cold and unsanitary jail cells for a total of four days, and thus such
placement did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that the
arrestee was placed in those cells after his suicide gestures or attempts so that he could be
monitored, his clothing and bedding was removed for his protection after he tried to hang
himself, and cleaning supplies were withheld to protect him. The court held that, absent any
evidence that any of the named jail officials were responsible for the delay in the arrestee's
bond hearing and subsequent failures to respond to his numerous requests for a bond reduction,
the arrestee's bare allegations of such delay and failures were insufficient to demonstrate the
deliberate indifference necessary to establish the violation of any constitutional right against
excessive bail. (Standing Rock Agency, Fort Yates Detention Center, North Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE
SCREENING

Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2006). The mother of a detainee who died while
in jail brought a § 1983 action, claiming that police officers violated the detainee’s rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings
in favor of the officers. The mother appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
mother lacked standing. The detainee, the daughter of the plaintiff, had been brought to a jail
and was being interrogated when she began talking unintelligibly and experiencing seizures.
An officer said that she was “faking a seizure” to avoid jail time. She lost consciousness but
officers did not request an ambulance for nearly an hour. She had ingested cocaine at the time
of her arrest and died from cocaine intoxication. (Howard County Jail and City of Nashville,
Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Wilson v. Maricopa County, 463 F.Supp.2d 987 (D.Ariz. 2006). In a civil rights suit arising from

a strip search with body cavity inspection upon booking on a misdemeanor charge of being
under the influence of a controlled substance, brought § 1983 Fourth Amendment action
against a county sheriff and against the deputy who had performed the search. The district
court granted summary judgment for the arrestee, and defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that a suspicionless strip search
conducted solely on basis of the county's blanket policy for controlled-substance arrestees
offended the Fourth Amendment, where the intrusiveness of the search was extreme, the
county did not show any link between the policy and legitimate security concerns for persons
spontaneously arrested and detained temporarily on under-the-influence charges, and the
arrestee was detained only until bail was posted and never entered the jail's general
population. The court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the
appellate court in the county's federal circuit had never previously addressed the
constitutionality of a body cavity search policy premised on the nature of drug offenses, and had
held that the nature of offense alone may sometimes provide reasonable suspicion. (Ventura
County Sheriff's Department, California)

a fatal assault on a county jail inmate by other inmates, the county defendants filed motions for
summary judgment on all claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s
order that had dismissed the county sheriff’s office. The summary judgment motions were
granted in part and denied in part; the motion for reconsideration was denied. The court held
that summary judgment on Eighth Amendment liability for the fatal assault on the inmate was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the county, through its final
policy maker the sheriff, implemented policies, customs, and practices with the requisite
subjective intent of deliberate indifference; (2) whether the county, through the sheriff, failed to

32.154
XX

act in the face of obvious omissions and likely constitutional violations; and (3) whether that failure to act
caused a constitutional violation. The court held that the estate sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim against the
sheriff in his individual capacity by alleging that the sheriff was directly liable under § 1983 for being
deliberately indifferent in failing to supervise and train jail officers in appropriate, lawful, and constitutional
policies and procedures for providing a safe environment for inmates. The court also found that the estate
sufficiently alleged a claim that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent in fostering, encouraging, and
knowingly accepting formal and informal jail policies condoning brutality among the inmates and indifference
to proper supervision. According to the court, a jail supervisor could be found to have been deliberately
indifferent to the safety of the inmate if he knew that not having an officer on the ground in the jail yard posed
a risk of violence among the inmates and nonetheless allowed an officer to cover both the yard and another
post, which required the officer to leave the yard unattended for a significant period of time. (Maricopa County
Facility, known as “Tent City”, Phoenix, Arizona)
U.S. District Court
MENTAL
HEALTH
CIVIL
COMMITMENT

Winters ex rel. Estate of Winters v. Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, 437 F.Supp.2d 851
(E.D.Ark. 2006). The administrator of the estate of mentally ill pre-trial detainee/civil committee who had died
of peritonitis while in custody of a sheriff sued the sheriff and the Arkansas Department of Human Services
(DHS) under § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. Following bench
trial, the district court held that neither DHS nor the sheriff caused or contributed to the death of the
detainee/committee, and they were not liable under the Due Process Clause, Eighth Amendment, Rehabilitation
Act, or ADA. The court found that the sheriff had no policy or custom to apprehend and incarcerate acutely
mentally ill persons, as indicated by the fact that the detainee may have been only person under civil
commitment ever housed in the sheriff's detention facility. (Benton County Jail, Arkansas)
2007

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Adams v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, 485 F.Supp.2d 940 (N.D.Ill. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983
claim against physicians, alleging they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The
district court dismissed the claim in part, and denied the defendants’ motion for dismissal in part. The court
held that the prisoner alleged sufficiently serious medical needs to support his claim that jail officials acted with
deliberate indifference to such needs, in violation of due process, by alleging that he had “shortness of breath,”
“severe pain in [his] right side” and a high fever. The court found that the inmate stated a § 1983 claim for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment by alleging that he had a
serious medical need and that he was insufficiently treated by two defendant physicians. (Cook County Jail,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH

Anderson ex rel. Cain v. Perkins, 532 F.Supp.2d 837 (S.D.Miss. 2007). A daughter, as next friend of a jail
detainee who suffered second-degree burns on her ankles, thighs, and buttocks while awaiting mental health
commitment, brought a civil rights suit against a sheriff and a county. The sheriff moved for summary
judgment on claims brought against him in his individual capacity. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the sheriff did not violate the detainee's right to be protected from harm, absent evidence
showing that restraints were likely used to subdue her. The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's medical needs in failing to administer her anti-psychotic medications, where the
detainee's refusal to take her medications prior to being taken into custody, coupled with her violent and
psychotic behavior as the result of the refusal, was the basis for her commitment. The court found that the
sheriff was not deliberately indifferent in failing to discover second-degree burns of an unknown origin on the
detainee's ankles, thighs, and buttocks because jailers regularly observed the detainee through a viewing
window in her cell door, but did not actually enter the cell to visually inspect the detainee for signs of injury.
(Amite County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
RELEASE
MEDICAL CARE
ACCESS TO COURT

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
harsh living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part.
The court held that the detainee’s allegations that his teeth became chipped and his gums became infected,
leading to damage to his gums, disfigurement of his face, infection, pain, anxiety, and extraction of four teeth,
were sufficient allegations of a serious medical need. Officials had confiscated his dental crown. The court
found that the detainee stated a claim under § 1983 for cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. The court held that the detainee stated a claim with his allegation that
the prison's dental unit should have replaced his dental crown or permitted him to have his private dentist do so.
The prison's dental unit had treated him with antibiotics and offered to extract the seven affected teeth. The
court held that this involved a mere disagreement over proper treatment and did not support a § 1983 claim of
violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate
indifference to prisoner's serious medical needs.
According to the court, the private corporation which operated a prison as contractor for the District of
Columbia, was performing functions normally performed by a municipality, and thus, the corporation could be
liable to the prisoner under § 1983 if the prisoner alleged and ultimately proved that his injuries were the result
of an unconstitutional custom or policy of corporation.
The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that the Director of District of Columbia Department of
Corrections (DOC) was directly involved in violations of the detainee's constitutional rights, as required to state

32.155
XXI

a claim under § 1983 against a government official in his individual capacity. The detainee alleged that the
Director refused to transfer the detainee from the jail to a correctional treatment facility and failed to train DOC
employees under his supervision in such a way as to prevent the detainee's over-detention (detention beyond
proper release date). The court found that the Director of District of Columbia Department of Corrections
(DOC) could not be liable in his individual capacity, under the theory of respondeat superior, to the
jail detainee for allegedly unconstitutional actions or omissions of his subordinates.
The appeals court found that the detainee's allegation that policies or practices of the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC) pertaining to training, supervision and discipline of employees responsible
for the detainees' release from DOC custody resulted in his untimely release from jail, in violation of his
constitutional rights, stated a claim for municipal liability under § 1983.
The court held that dismissal of the detainee’s § 1983 claims of cruel and unusual punishment at the District
of Columbia jail based on lack of reading material, lack of recreational equipment, failure of the commissary to
stock items such as lotions, skin oils, hair oils, and peanut butter, the detainee's exposure to the stench created
by regular sewage backups, as well as the jail's use of bunk beds without ladders was required under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) because the detainee did not allege that he suffered any physical injury.
Instead, the detainee alleged mental and emotional injuries.
The court held that the provision of Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies before bringing a civil action against prison officials regarding prison conditions
applied to the detainee who brought a § 1983 action before he was released from jail, even though the detainee
had been released from jail by the time that the defendants brought their motion to dismiss.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that the District of Columbia jail provided only one desk and
chair in each two-person cell, failed to provide him with nail clippers, skin lotions, and a microwave oven and
failed to provide rehabilitative courses, did not allege deprivations sufficiently serious to rise to the level of
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment.
According to the court, the alleged conditions from overcrowding at a District of Columbia jail-- showers
infested with bacteria, standing water, various diseases and hundreds of unsanitary and defective mattresses,
some of which contained roaches and other insects, did not constitute the deprivation of basic human needs, as
required for jail overcrowding to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The court found that merely alleging that the lack of appropriate security at the District of Columbia jail
created a risk of personal injury to detainees, without any allegation that the detainee reasonably feared an
attack on his personal safety, failed to set forth sufficient facts to state a claim under § 1983 for cruel and
unusual punishment.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he has special dietary needs as a diabetic, that officials at
the District of Columbia jail were deliberately indifferent to his needs and that such indifference occurred
pursuant to a custom, policy and systemic practices of the District, were sufficient to state a claim under § 1983
for cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate indifference to serious medical need.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that due to lack of heating and ventilation at the jail he
suffered from temperatures ranging from 30 to 40 degrees during the winter, that he was not provided with
sufficient blankets for cold jail cells, and that such actions were taken with deliberate indifference to his needs
and pursuant to policy of Department of Corrections (DOC) were sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 for
cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The court noted that
warmth is a basic human need, the deprivation of which can amount to a violation of Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
The court held that the detainee did not state a claim under § 1983 that inadequacies in the jail's law library
violated his First Amendment right of access to the courts, even if he alleged that such inadequacies caused the
filing of his appeals to be untimely, in the absence of an allegation that such untimeliness had an actual adverse
impact on the appeals.
The court held that the detainee's allegations that his legal mail was opened by officials at the jail outside of
his presence on numerous occasions during a four-month period, and that such actions were intentional and
pursuant to a policy or systemic practice, stated a claim under § 1983 for violation of First Amendment free
speech rights. The court held that the alleged refusal of officials of Department of Corrections (DOC) to
transfer the detainee to a correctional treatment facility at which conditions were far less restrictive did not
implicate a due process liberty interest. The court noted that an inmate has no due process liberty interest in a
particular place of confinement or a particular level of security.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that a DOC captain placed him in solitary confinement in
retaliation for his oral complaint to the captain that his newly-assigned cellmate was HIV positive, stated a
claim under § 1983 for retaliation for exercising First Amendment free speech rights. The court found that
whether the detainee had a protected right under the First Amendment, to complain to the captain was not
clearly established at the time, and thus, the captain had qualified immunity from the detainee's§ 1983 claim.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that the Director of the Department of Corrections (DOC),
despite his actual and constructive knowledge that DOC employees were engaged in conduct that posed a
pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury through over-detention, failed to train, monitor, and
discipline DOC employees with regard to timely release of inmates from DOC custody, that the Director's
deliberate failure to do so caused detainee's over-detention, were sufficient when construed liberally to state a
claim under § 1983 for violation of due process and violation of protection against cruel and unusual
punishment. The court noted that the detainee had a clearly established constitutional protection against overdetention and thus, the Director was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that the detainee at the
correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private contractor was not excused from the
requirement, under Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), of exhausting his administrative remedies before
bringing a § 1983 action against the contractor's employee relating to denial of detainee's requests for dental
care, even if the detainee believed it would be futile to pursue the facility's grievance procedures. (Central
Detention Facility. D.C. and Correctional Treatment Facility operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

32.156
XXI

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Branton v. City of Moss Point, 503 F.Supp.2d 809 (S.D.Miss. 2007). The son of a pre-trial detainee who
had committed suicide while in custody, filed suit against the city and jail officers asserting claims pursuant
to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failure to train, failure to adopt a policy for safe custodial
care of suicidal detainees, and failure to adopt a policy of furnishing medical care to suicidal detainees. The
detainee was detained on suspicion of drunk driving and was resistant during the booking process. During
the booking process the detainee answered a series of questions. When he was asked, “Have you ever
attempted suicide or are you thinking about it now?” he responded, “No.” He was taken to a cell that was
designated for intoxicated or combative prisoners, given a sheet and a blanket, and was locked in the cell at
3:30 a.m. While conducting a jail check at approximately 5:30 a.m., an officer discovered the detainee
kneeling in a corner of the cell with the sheet around his neck. He was unable to be revived. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officers
had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide by the detainee, and that fact issues precluded
summary judgment in the claim against the city and officers in their official capacities. On appeal (261
Fed.Appx. 659), the appeals court reversed and remanded. (City of Moss Point, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Clarke v. Blais, 473 F.Supp.2d 124 (D.Me. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against jail
officers, alleging they subjected him to excessive force, and against a physician’s assistant for allegedly
failing to give him proper treatment for his physical and mental health issues. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
questions as to whether jail officers used excessive force in restraining the detainee and whether qualified
immunity was available as a defense precluded summary judgment in the detainee’s § 1983 action. The
court found that the physician’s assistant was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical
needs, by not embarking upon anti-viral therapy for the detainee’s hepatitis C because, as a pretrial
detainee, he was subject to further movement among facilities, and in not prescribing Seroquel, an antipsychotic drug, as recommended by a counselor/social worker at an outside clinic. The court noted that the
physician’s assistant consulted an outside gastroenterologist, the detainee’s liver function was monitored,
and the counselor did not renew the Seroquel recommendation at a subsequent clinic evaluation. (Knox
County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Cox v. Hartshorn, 503 F.Supp.2d 1078 (C.D.Ill. 2007). A former pretrial detainee in a county jail brought a
§ 1983 action against a county sheriff and county jail nurse, alleging that he was denied proper medical
care within the county jail in violation of his constitutional rights. The district court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. According to the court, the detainee's medical complaint of a foot rash did
not rise to the level of an objectively serious medical need, so as to afford the detainee due process
protections against the county sheriff and county jail nurse's alleged deliberate indifference to his request
for medical attention. The court noted that the detainee's fungal foot rash was not so serious that it was life
threatening or posed a risk of needless pain or lingering disability, and after being treated by a nurse, the
detainee did not submit any further medical requests for treatment of the rash, nor did he receive any
treatment of the rash after leaving the county jail. (Vermilion County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE

Danley v. Allyn, 485 F.Supp.2d 1260 (N.D.Ala. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
jail officers, alleging that he was subjected to excessive force and then denied medical treatment when they
sprayed him with pepper spray. The district court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss and they
appealed. The court of appeals vacated and remanded. On the remand, the district court again denied the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from
the detainee's claim that the officers subjected him to excessive force, in violation of Fourteenth
Amendment, by pepper spraying him in response to a dispute over toilet paper. The court noted that the
officers had fair warning that to employ pepper spray as punishment, or for the sadistic pleasure of the
sprayers, as distinguished from what was reasonably necessary to maintain prisoner control, was
constitutionally prohibited. The court found that the detainee' allegations that a jail administrator and sheriff
created an atmosphere or practice under which the defendant officers operated in allegedly subjecting the
detainee to excessive force and then denying him medical treatment when they sprayed him with pepper
spray, were sufficient, if proven, to create supervisory liability under § 1983. The court held that the
detainee's claim of deliberate indifference on behalf of defendant officers, wherein they failed to provide
medical attention to the detainee after using pepper spray against him, was no more than a continuation of
the detainee's excessive force claim, and thus was not a separate cause of action under § 1983. (Lauderdale
Detention Center, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CROWDING
MEDICAL CARE
PRIVACY

Desroche v. Strain, 507 F.Supp.2d 571 (E.D.La. 2007). A pre-trial detainee brought a pro se, in forma
pauperis action against prison officials, alleging improper conditions of confinement, negligent medical
treatment, invasion of privacy, and excessive force. The district court dismissed the action. The court held
that the alleged conditions of the detainee's confinement, including being required to sleep on the floor of
an overcrowded holding tank, being deprived of a mattress, and being provided with water only in a dirty
sink, if proven, did not violate his Eighth Amendment or due process rights, given that he experienced such
conditions for only ten days, and that use of sink did not cause him to suffer disease or other serious harm .
The court found that the detainee's attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) was not a serious
condition, and therefore any denial of medical care for the condition did not violate his Eighth Amendment
rights. The court noted that even if ADHD was a serious condition, prison officials were not deliberately
indifferent in treating it, and any denial of medical care did not violate the detainee's Eighth Amendment
rights, in that the detainee merely disagreed with the treatment offered by two doctors at the jail.

32.157
XXII

According to the court, a deputy's alleged recording of the detainee in a jail dormitory with a cell phone
video camera, if proven, was not a violation of any constitutional right to privacy, inasmuch as the detainee
had no expectation of privacy while in a public area of the jail, and any possible harm to the detainee's
reputation was so speculative as to be non-existent. (River Parish Correction Center, Louisiana)
U.S. District Court
INTAKE
SCREENING
SEARCHES

Doe v. Balaam, 524 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D.Nev. 2007). A transsexual arrestee, who was strip searched at a
county jail, brought an action against the county and county sheriff seeking damages, attorney fees, and a
permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from conducting certain strip searches. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that deputies at the
county jail had a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulated facts coming directly from the
transsexual arrestee concealing a sock in his crotch area, that the arrestee was carrying or concealing
contraband, so as to justify a strip search of the arrestee prior to being housed in the general jail population.
The court noted that the arrestee had turned himself in for a misdemeanor destruction of property charge,
and even though he had told deputies that he was a transsexual and that he had a rolled-up sock concealed
in his crotch area, the deputies had no way of knowing whether the arrestee was truthful about what he was,
in fact, concealing. According to the court, even if there had been a violation of the arrestee's Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, the transsexual arrestee failed to allege that
the county sheriff knew of and failed to act or prevent any alleged violation, or that any individual
employees acted pursuant to an official county policy or custom, as required to state a cognizable § 1983
claim against the sheriff and county for alleged constitutional violations. (Washoe County, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Doe No. 1 v. Balaam, 494 F.Supp.2d 1173 (D.Nev. 2007). Arrestees who were subjected to strip searches
when they self-surrendered at a county jail and were then released on their own recognizance, pursuant to
the sheriff department's contraband control policy, brought an action against the county and county sheriff.
The arrestees sought damages, attorney fees, and a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from
conducting certain strip searches, prohibiting the defendants from engaging in similar unconstitutional
conduct in the future, and requiring and ordering the defendants to institute proper training and policy
changes. The inmates moved for partial summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The
court held that the county's policy of strip searching all arrestees who self-surrendered to the county jail,
absent reasonable suspicion that any arrestee was smuggling contraband, was unreasonable, and thus
amounted to deliberate indifference to the arrestees' Fourth Amendment rights, especially given that all of
the arrestees were booked and then released on their own recognizance without ever being housed with the
general jail population. (Washoe County Detention Facility, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
FALURE TO
PROTECT

Eichelman v. Lancaster County, 510 F.Supp.2d 377 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county, the warden of the county prison, and a corrections officer, seeking monetary relief relating
to his treatment while detained in the county prison for a short period of time. The district court granted the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the corrections officer acted with
deliberate indifference to the detainee's safety when he informed inmates of the arrival of the detainee
charged with shooting incident involving a two-year old boy. The officer knew that the detainee was not in
protective custody but rather was in the general population among violent offenders with whom he would
have contact and was housed in a cell furthest from the guard post. The inmate subsequently suffered
injuries at the hands of other inmates. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
officer acted recklessly and callously by intentionally inciting inmate animosity toward the detainee and as
to whether he acted with an awareness of the risk that his actions would result in serious harm to the
detainee when other inmates inevitably would have access to him. (Lancaster County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
INTAKE
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Estate of Puza v. Carbon County, 586 F.Supp.2d 271 (M.D.Pa. 2007). The estate of a pretrial detainee who
committed suicide brought an action alleging civil rights violations against a county and its corrections
officers, and negligence claims against the architect of a county prison. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that correctional and intake officers were
not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's vulnerability to suicide, as was required for the officers'
liability under the due process clause for the detainee's suicide. The court noted that the suicide was a
“complete surprise” to the police chief who spent one and a half hours with the detainee, the detainee told
an officer “he had much to look forward to, and [did] not believe in suicide,” the detainee was placed in a
cell next to an inmate who was on suicide watch and could be regularly observed, and the officer
intervened when he noticed the detainee was still kneeling during a second observation of the detainee. The
court found that county employees, through the jail's suicide policy, were not deliberately indifferent as to
whether the pretrial detainee successfully committed suicide, as required to support a due process claim.
According to the court, the policy was annually reviewed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
and was never found deficient, the detainee's screening form did not trigger a suicide watch, and the
employees acted without deliberate indifference in allowing the detainee to retain his shoelaces while in his
jail cell. (Crabtree, Rohrbaugh & Associates, Carbon County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MENTAL HEALTH
INTAKE
SCREENING
CLOTHING

Forgan v. Howard County, Tex., 494 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 2007). The family of a county jail inmate who
committed suicide brought an action against the county, county sheriff's department, and various jail
officers, alleging deliberate indifference under § 1983 and claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act
(TTCA). The inmate was arrested for driving while intoxicated and possession of marijuana. During the
booking process, the inmate indicated that he was medicated for a number of mental ailments, including
depression, but that he was not thinking about killing himself at the time. Based on this and other
information, a jail officer classified the inmate as a “risk” for suicide, meaning that he would be checked

32.158
XXII

every fifteen minutes. The inmate was issued a pair of trousers and a shirt to wear, and he was placed in a
holding cell. After approximately one hour, the inmate was found hanging from his jail-issued trousers. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and the family appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that providing a county jail inmate with non-defective trousers, which the
inmate later used to commit suicide, did not equate to “use of property” by the county, within the meaning
of the TTCA, and that the county was not liable under § 1983. According to the court, the county was not
liable in the § 1983 deliberate indifference claim absent a showing that the county lacked an adequate
suicide prevention policy for jail inmates, or that the county failed to adequately train its jail officials in
suicide prevention. The court noted that proof of a single incident generally will not support a finding of
inadequate training as a matter of custom or policy, for the purpose of establishing § 1983 municipal
liability. (Howard County Jail, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL

Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2007). A domestic violence arrestee brought a §
1983 Eighth Amendment action against a county, county sheriff, and individual sheriff's deputies, alleging
that bail of $1 million was excessive. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and awarded attorney fees in favor of the defendants. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that bail was not excessive, and that the
deputy who requested a bail enhancement and the deputy's superior who authorized the enhancement
request were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that individual sheriff's deputies were not
entitled to the award of attorney fees under § 1988, but that the arrestee's post-discovery litigation of a
Monell claim was frivolous, supporting the award of attorney fees to the county. (Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Gary v. Floyd, 582 F.Supp.2d 741 (D.S.C. 2007). An arrestee brought a civil rights action against an
arresting officer and a police department, alleging he was arrested pursuant to improperly obtained
warrants. The arrestee sought compensatory and punitive damages for allegedly being held for
approximately one month after the charges against him were dropped. The district court held that the
arresting officer had probable cause to make the arrest and that the department could not be held liable
under the theory of respondeat superior. But the court found that the arrestee was entitled to amend his
complaint to include as defendants a sergeant and directors of the detention center. According to the court,
an amendment to the arrestee's complaint, alleging that he was not released from confinement within a
reasonable time after charges of forgery were dismissed, would not be futile, even though the sergeant's
affidavit indicated that the arrestee was released within 48 hours after the detention center received
notification that he was to be released. The arrestee alleged that the detention center was immediately
notified when the charges were dismissed, but that he was not released for nearly one month. (Greenville
City Police Department, Greenville County Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
PLRA- Prison
Litigation
Reform Act

Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2007). A pretrial detainee in a county jail, who had been
pregnant during her detention and whose child had been stillborn, brought a § 1983 action against county
and jail officials, a physician, and the jail's medical services provider, alleging deliberate indifference to her
serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants based on failure to
satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held
that the jail's administrative appeal procedure for inmates was not “available” within the meaning of PLRA,
where the detainee had no way of knowing about it. According to the court, the detainee adequately
exhausted her available remedies under PLRA by filing a document titled “request form.” The court noted
that the handbook given to inmates did not mention a grievance form, but only spoke of a “written request,”
and the inmate checked the “complaint” box on the request form rather than the “request” box and cogently
described her grievance. The court found that the detainee's amniotic fluid leak constituted a serious
medical need and the facility commander exceeded gross negligence in answering the detainee's complaint
about lack of treatment, supporting a deliberate indifference claim. The commander apparently held a
general disbelief of inmates' medical complaints, and responded only with a statement that the detainee
could visit an outside physician if she could pay for it. (Lee County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
CLASSIFICATION

Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
county jail officials and a sheriff alleging violations of his right to due process as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a corrections officer was not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's safety and welfare, as required for the detainee's § 1983 due process claim,
arising out of a fight with another inmate and resulting in serious injury to the detainee. The court noted
that the detainee had never before interacted with the inmate involved in the altercation nor had he ever
communicated to the corrections officer or to anyone else that the inmate might be a specific danger to him.
Immediately after the fight broke out, the officer called for back-up. The court held that there was no
evidence that the sheriff had knowledge that the classification and reclassification of inmates were being
poorly implemented by corrections officers, as required for the detainee's § 1983 official capacity claim
against the sheriff. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE
SCREENING

Hall v. County of Nemaha, Neb., 509 F.Supp.2d 821 (D.Nev. 2007). A pretrial detainee's survivors sued a
city, county, and various city and county officers and officials, asserting various claims under § 1983 in
connection with the death of the detainee from an overdose after swallowing his methamphetamine during
a roadside stop of a vehicle in which he was riding. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by

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genuine issues of material fact as to whether a deputy sheriff and a jailer knew that the detainee had
swallowed the methamphetamine during a roadside stop and whether they ignored the detainee's panting
and gasping, his claims that he could not see or breathe, and his crying and screaming that he needed to go
to the hospital. The court found that law enforcement officers and other jail officers, who were unaware
that the detainee had swallowed his methamphetamine during a roadside stop, were not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs, so as to violate his Eighth Amendment rights, even
though he was complaining, uncooperative and acted like an intoxicated person. The court noted that from
their perspective, the detainee was behaving like many other “besotted” pretrial detainees who were
“plucked from the highway in the wee hours of the night and who suffered nothing more than a druginduced stupor while cooling their heels in a cell awaiting their turn to see the local magistrate.” (Nemaha
County, Nebraska)
U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
CONDITIONS

Harrison v. Moketa/Motycka, 485 F.Supp.2d 652 (D.S.C. 2007). A pretrial detainee sued various prison
officials and medical care providers under § 1983, claiming violations of a variety of his constitutional
rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the detainee did
not suffer a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights when he was allegedly served cold food and two
nutritionally deficient breakfasts. According to the court, merely serving food cold did not present a serious
risk of harm or an immediate danger to the health of the detainee, and while he had significant pre-existing
health problems, there was no indication that those conditions were caused or exacerbated by the diet
provided. The court held that the detainee's right of access to the courts was not violated by any restriction
on his access to a law library, despite his claim that his “wrongful” conviction was proof of his actual
injury. He did not identify a specific defense or legal claim that he was unable to pursue due to his alleged
lack of access to legal materials, and any finding that he had been injured by a “wrongful” conviction
would have impermissibly implied the invalidity of his conviction. The court noted that lack of free
photocopying of law library materials did not deny the indigent detainee access to the courts. (Alvin S.
Glenn Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hartsfield v. Colburn, 491 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
nurse, physician, and captain, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
The inmate alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when they
delayed referring him to an oral surgeon to have three teeth extracted. On remand the district court entered
judgment for the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the nurse and physician acted reasonably in requiring
a second sick call request from the detainee before referring him to a dentist, and that most of the delay in
the detainee seeing the dentist resulted when the detainee unreasonably failed or refused to submit a second
request. The court found that the captain in charge of transporting inmates to medical appointments did not
deny or delay the detainee's dental treatment by interfering with or overriding any medical staff decisions to
schedule an earlier appointment. (Scott County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE
MEDICAL CARE

Herman v. County of York, 482 F.Supp.2d 554 (M.D.Pa. 2007). The estate of a prisoner who had
committed suicide in a county prison sued the county, a warden, the prison health service, and nurses,
asserting Eighth Amendment claims under § 1983, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), and state medical malpractice claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court found that, notwithstanding a Pennsylvania
statute stating that the safekeeping, discipline, and employment of prisoners was exclusively vested in a
prison board, the county could be held liable to the prisoner under § 1983 for the actions of the warden if he
was acting as an agent of the county. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the warden was acting as an agent for the county in allegedly failing to
prevent the prisoner's suicide, and as to the warden's role in ratifying county prison policies. The court
found that the county, warden, nurses, and prison health service were not deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of prisoner who committed suicide, where alleged failures to check on the prisoner in his cell
was by officers other than the defendants, nurses could not have been deliberately indifferent if they were
unqualified as the prisoner's estate said, and the nurses' failure to place the prisoner on a suicide watch did
not fall outside their professional judgment, given the prisoner's denials of suicidal ideation and his family's
testimony. The court found that the prisoner was not denied access to county prison's programs or services
because of disability, and any failure by the county and warden to prevent his suicide thus was not
discrimination in services, programs, or activities of a public entity in violation of ADA. The prisoner
denied thoughts of suicide, he told a nurse that he did not wish to take anti-depressant medications that had
been prescribed for him, and a nurse told him to return to mental health services if necessary. (York County
Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Jenkins v. DeKalb County, Ga., 528 F.Supp.2d 1329 (N.D.Ga. 2007). Survivors of a county jail detainee
who had died as the result of an apparent beating by a fellow inmate brought a § 1983, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment action against a county sheriff in his individual capacity, and against corrections
officers. The defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court
granted the motion. The 71 year old pretrial detainee suffered from multiple mental illnesses including
schizophrenia and dementia, which reportedly manifested themselves in theform of delusions, paranoia,
bizarre thoughts and behavior, physical violence, and verbal outbursts that included racial epithets. The
court held that county corrections officers' putting the inmate into a cell different from the one to which he
had been assigned, allegedly leading to the beating death of a pretrial detainee who shared the same cell,
did not violate the detainee's right against cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that even though
the action violated a jail policy, the policy was created primarily to keep track of inmates' placement, not to
maintain inmate safety, and there was no evidence of widespread inmate-on-inmate violence due to the

32.160
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misplacement of inmates. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the sheriff's alleged poor
training and supervision of corrections officers led to the officers' allegedly inadequate reaction to the
incident between the jail inmates, which ended with the beating death of one inmate. The court also found
that the sheriff's failure to comply with a court order to transfer the pretrial detainee to a mental health
facility did not show supervisory liability because the purpose of the transfer order was likely to get the
detainee treatment for mental illness, not to protect him. The court held that the county corrections officers
were acting within the scope of their duties when they mistakenly placed a fellow inmate in the same cell
with a pretrial detainee, and thus the officers were eligible for qualified immunity in the detainee’s
survivors' § 1983 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment action. The court noted that the fact that the mistake
violated jail policies or procedures did not mean that the officers were not exercising discretionary
authority. (DeKalb County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL HEALTH
SUICIDE

Justus v. County of Buchanan, 517 F.Supp.2d 810 (W.D.Va. 2007). The administrator of a pretrial
detainee's estate filed a § 1983 action against a sheriff and county jail employees arising out of the
detainee's jail suicide. The detainee had a history of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, anxiety, paranoia, and
delusions and had been hospitalized for these conditions several times in the three years prior to his suicide.
His treatment records show that he was hospitalized because family members reported suicidal ideation and
bizarre, violent, and sexually inappropriate behavior. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that the sheriff's deputies' failure to provide the pretrial
detainee with prompt medical care after they discovered him hanging in his cell did not amount to
deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious bodily injuries, in violation of the detainee's due process
rights. The court noted that, even though the detainee was still alive when they took him down
approximately 13 minutes after discovering him, there was no showing of an affirmative causal link
between their inaction and the detainee's death from hypoxic brain injury.
The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's suicidal nature,
and thus was not subject to liability under § 1983 for failing to take steps to prevent his suicide, even
though a notation on an incident report two months before the detainee's suicide indicated that another
prisoner reported that the detainee “was threatening suicide”. The court found no proof that the report did
not simply inadvertently escape the sheriff's knowledge.
The court held that a reasonable sheriff would not have understood from existing law that the absence of
an operating video surveillance system in the county jail would violate a suicidal pretrial detainee's
constitutional rights, and thus the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983,
even though the jail policy and procedure manual required immediate repair of any defective security
equipment, and the sheriff was aware that the equipment had not been operating for some time.
According to the court, under Virginia law, the deputies' failure to provide the pretrial detainee with
prompt medical care after they discovered him hanging in his cell did not amount to gross negligence as
required to overcome their immunity from tort liability. (Buchanan County, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544 (8th Cir. 2007). A female pretrial detainee sued a deputy sheriff under §
1983, alleging that the deputy was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that she would be sexually
assaulted by a correctional officer. The district court denied the deputy’s motion for summary judgment
seeking qualified immunity. The deputy appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a county jail official was aware of a substantial risk of
serious harm from a male correctional officer’s alleged action of going to a female inmate’s cell three times
after lockdown, and as to whether the official exhibited deliberate indifference to that risk, precluded
summary judgment as to whether the official was liable under § 1983 for due process violations. The court
found that, for purposes of qualified immunity, the law was clearly established at the time of the detainee’s
assault (December 2002) that it would violate a county jail inmate’s due process rights for a jail official to
exhibit deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that a correctional officer would sexually assault the
inmate, and that a supervisor who was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of such assault could be
held liable under § 1983. (Pennington County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007). An arrestee brought an action against police
officers under § 1983 and state law alleging excessive force. The district court denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and they appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that even if
an officer pushed the arrestee, who was drunk, to the ground as he exited the police vehicle upon arrival at
the police station, the officer did not use excessive force. The court noted that the arrestee was on the
ground outside of the vehicle for less than fifteen seconds, and as soon as the arrestee ended up on the
ground the officer closed the vehicle's door, joined another officer in helping arrestee to his feet, and
walked the arrestee inside to the booking room. The court found that the officers did not use excessive
force in the booking room when they moved the arrestee's arms behind him and over his head for less than
twenty seconds after the arrestee refused to keep his hands on a bench and struck out at an officer with
closed-fist swing. According to the court, the officers did not use excessive force outside of the cell in
which they attempted to place the arrestee when they restrained the arrestee on the floor for approximately
thirty seconds after the arrestee fell. (City of Taylor Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Meuir v. Greene County Jail Employees, 487 F.3D 1115 (8th Cir. 2007). A prisoner who suffered from
chronic dental problems brought a § 1983 action against a county and county jail medical staff, alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The prisoner suffered from chronic dental problems.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner failed to establish that jail medical staff acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, where jail nurses provided the prisoner with over-thecounter pain medication and encouraged him to brush and gargle with salt water in response to his

32.161
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complaints of bleeding gums and toothaches. The court noted that staff referred him to a county dentist, but
the prisoner refused to go. According to the court, in the face of medical records indicating that medical
treatment was provided and physician affidavits indicating that the care provided was adequate, an inmate
cannot create a question of fact, to avoid summary judgment, in a claim for deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs by merely stating that he did not feel he received adequate treatment. The court held
that the prisoner failed to show that the county jail physician was motivated by an impermissible motive in
refusing to provide the prisoner with free over-the-counter pain medication, although the prisoner claimed
that he refused to see the dentist because the dentist was allegedly a “pull-teeth only” provider. The court
found that the physician refused to provide prisoner with medication based on his refusal to see the dentist,
and there was no showing that the physician knew why the prisoner refused to go to the dentist or that the
physician's motive was otherwise retaliatory. The court noted that the medication was available to the
prisoner for purchase in the commissary. According to the court, the prisoner lacked standing to seek
injunctive relief to end the county jail's unwritten “pull-teeth-only” policy for treatment of chronic dental
problems, where the prisoner filed suit against the county four months after he was transferred to another
correctional facility, his dental ailments were treated without complaint at the transferee facility, and there
was no reason to believe that detainee would be returned to the county jail. (Greene County Jail, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE

Mombourquette ex rel. Mombourquette v. Amundson, 469 F.Supp.2d 624 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A pretrial
detainee in a county jail who was left seriously brain damaged after she attempted suicide by hanging in her
cell, brought a civil rights suit against a county sheriff, correctional officers, and jail nurses, alleging that
they violated her constitutional rights by failing to protect her from harming herself. The defendants filed
motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions. The court held that evidence that
the pretrial detainee reported to county jail personnel that a jail lieutenant was taking another female inmate
out of her cell at night to engage in sexual activity was admissible, because such evidence showed that the
lieutenant had a strong motive to withhold protection from the detainee, and thus was relevant to show he
intentionally disregarded a risk to the detainee’s safety. The court also found that evidence that county
sheriff refused to investigate allegations that the county jail lieutenant was engaging in sexual misconduct
with another inmate was relevant and admissible, where the sheriff’s dismissive attitude of the complaint
exhibited deliberate indifference, both toward the detainee’s health and safety in particular and generally
toward the health and safety of all inmates. The court denied summary judgment because it found a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether a nurse and correctional officers at the county jail were deliberately
indifferent to pretrial detainee’s health and safety. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether there was an affirmative link between the county sheriff’s failure to properly train and supervise
county jail personnel and the failure to prevent the detainee’s suicide. (Monroe County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
CONDITIONS
SANITATION

Murphy v. Franklin, 510 F.Supp.2d 558 (M.D.Ala. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff and jail administrator, alleging that he was subjected to punitive, degrading and inhumane
treatment when, without explanation, he was shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet in an isolation cell, and, on
another occasion, shackled to his cot. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part
and denied in part. The court held that although the detainee's complaint against the sheriff and jail
administrator did not allege that he was subjected to mistreatment pursuant to any specific official policy,
the detainee's allegations that the sheriff promulgated all policies and procedures in the county jail, that the
detainee was placed in an isolation cell and shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet, which was nothing more
than a hole in the ground covered by a grate, and that the sheriff ordered the detainee removed from this
cell for an interview and then reshackled to the toilet grate, were sufficiently specific to state a § 1983 claim
against the sheriff under the theory of supervisory liability. The detainee alleged that without explanation,
he was moved into a ‘lockdown’ cell for one day, in which his right hand was cuffed to the frame of his cot
and his right leg was shackled to the other end of the cot's frame. Again without explanation, he was
allegedly then moved to an isolation cell, where he was shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet, which is
actually nothing more than a hole in the ground. He alleged that he was held in this configuration for almost
12 days and was not released to allow urination or defecation, which caused him to soil himself, and that he
was also not given any personal necessities such as clean, dry clothing, personal hygiene items, or bedding.
(Elmore County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
RESTRAINTS
PROTECTION

Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2007). A county jail detainee, who had been diagnosed with manic
bipolar depression, sued a jail official under § 1983, alleging due process violations arising from his
physical restraint. The district court denied the official's motion for summary judgment based upon
qualified immunity. The official appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the
official's alleged conduct of cuffing the detainee to a floor-grate toilet in an uncomfortable manner for
approximately three hours, if proven, did not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights.
According to the court, the official’s alleged actions did not shock the conscience and thus did not violate
the detainee's substantive due process rights, inasmuch as official took such action after the detainee, who
had been diagnosed with manic bipolar depression, had threatened to pull out her own peripherally inserted
central catheter (PICC) so that she would bleed to death, and after the detainee had shown that being
handcuffed behind her back was alone not an adequate form of restraint. (Independence Co. Jail, Ark.)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Orange v. Fielding, 517 F.Supp.2d 776 (D.S.C. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
two detention center administrators to recover for a beating by officers. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of one administrator, and denied the other administrator's motion. The court held that the
detainee's conclusory statements in an affidavit, that the administrator was aware of an officer's
aggressiveness toward inmates and failed to protect the detainee, were insufficient to preclude summary
judgment. The court found that the detainee's affidavit stating that he spoke with the administrator several
times about danger from officers, but that the administrator failed to take action, raised genuine issues of

32.162
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material fact, precluding summary judgment in favor of the other administrator. (Georgetown County
Detention Center, South Carolina)
U.S. District Court
LENGTH
RELEASE

Portis v. City of Chicago, 510 F.Supp.2d 461 (N.D.Ill. 2007). Arrestees brought a class action challenging
the unconstitutional practice of delaying the release of persons arrested for ordinance violations that were
punishable by only a fine. After their class was certified, the arrestees moved for summary judgment. The
district court denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact as to when the steps necessary to process persons arrested for fine-only ordinance violations
were completed. (City of Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
STAFFING

Roberts v. County of Mahoning, Ohio, 495 F.Supp.2d 784 (N.D.Ohio 2007). Pretrial detainees and
convicted prisoners being held in the custody of an Ohio sheriff at two correctional facilities that were
allegedly understaffed and overcrowded brought a § 1983 class action against the county, sheriff, and
county commissioners, alleging that conditions of confinement at those facilities were unconstitutional. The
district court appointed a special master for the remedial phase of the litigation. A three-judge panel of the
district court approved the proposed stipulated order. The district court held that the appointment of a
special master had accomplished the court's original objective and the appointment would be terminated.
The court noted that the special master's reports and other actions had fulfilled the requirement that he
“assist the parties, specifically the Defendants, in attempting to find a solution to the problems which
created the unconstitutional conditions in the Jail,” and his fourth report had established a mechanism for
the litigation's actual resolution. The first two reports addressed a narrowly avoided crisis that would have
resulted from massive layoffs of security staff as a result of a budget shortfall in the county. The third
report, filed after passage of a successful ballot issue increasing revenues available for the funding of the
MCJC, described the parties' continued cooperation in attempting to resolve the problems facing the jail, in
particular, the need for accelerated collection of the proceeds from the successful bond issue. The court
concluded “These reports, to which no party filed any objection, were instrumental in establishing an
informational foundation for discussions of possible remedies to the phenomenon of chronic and serious
crowding in the jail.” (Mahoning County Justice Center, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
STAFFING

Roberts v. Mahoning County, 495 F.Supp.2d 719 (N.D.Ohio 2007). Pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners being held in the custody of an Ohio sheriff at one of two correctional facilities that were
allegedly understaffed and overcrowded brought a § 1983 class action against the county, sheriff, and
county commissioners alleging that conditions of confinement at those facilities were unconstitutional. The
district court held that there was clear and convincing evidence that crowding was the primary cause of the
violation of a federal right, and that no other relief besides a prisoner release order would remedy that
violation. The release order provided for incarceration of all violent felons and for reopening of all jail
facilities under the control of the county to maximum occupancy, while at the same time protecting the
constitutional rights of inmates in the county jail facilities. (Mahoning County Justice Center, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ruiz-Rosa v. Rullán, 485 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2007). The mother of a pretrial detainee brought suit against
officials of the Puerto Rico prison system and prison medical personnel after her 18-year-old son died of
septicemia while incarcerated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and
the mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court's dismissal
with prejudice of the mother's complaint for failure to comply with a court order requiring her to file a
clearly stated amended complaint was an abuse of discretion, but that there was no evidence of deliberate
indifference on the part of prison personnel to the serious medical needs of pretrial detainee, as required for
the mother's claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the detainee received medical
care in the form of draining of his abscess, blood cultures, and two different antibiotics. (Bayamón
Correctional Complex, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Saunders v. U.S., 502 F.Supp.2d 493 (E.D.Va. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought an action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) seeking to hold the United States liable for injuries that he suffered during
a fight at a state jail while in federal custody. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
The court held that the detainee's claim that the United States Marshals Service acted negligently in placing
him in an unsafe state jail, and in failing to respond to his verbal concerns about his safety, involved
discretionary decision making, and thus fell within the scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
discretionary function exception. The court noted that there was no allegation that the Marshals Service had
any knowledge of unsafe conditions at the jail other than an apprehension expressed by the detainee
himself. (Western Tidewater Regional Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
ASSESSMENT OF
COSTS

Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 501 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2007). Inmates, former inmates, and relatives
and friends of inmates brought a § 1983 action against two counties, challenging methods used by the
counties to collect fees imposed on prisoners for the cost of booking and incarceration. The district court
entered summary judgment for the counties and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the county was not required under the Due Process Clause to grant a predeprivation hearing
to inmates prior to withholding a portion of money from their canteen accounts to pay the costs of booking,
room, and board. The court found that the relatives lacked a property interest in the money they sent to
inmates and that the counties did not violate the free speech rights of relatives of inmates in withholding
money. According to the court, the county inmates had a property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause in money withheld from their canteen accounts to pay the costs of booking, room, and board, but the
county was not required under the Due Process Clause to grant a predeprivation hearing to inmates prior to
withholding money from their canteen accounts where the amounts withheld were small, the risk of
erroneous deprivation was minor in that withholding involved elementary accounting and was non-

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discretionary, the potential benefits of a hearing were small, and the government's interests of sharing costs
and furthering offender accountability were substantial. The court also found that the county did not violate
the free speech rights of relatives of inmates in withholding a portion of money that relatives had sent to the
inmates for their canteen accounts, notwithstanding that if the money had not been withheld the inmates
might have spent it making telephone calls. (Campbell County and Kenton County, Kentucky)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS

Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62 (3rd Cir. 2007). Three pretrial detainees filed a pro se § 1983 action
against a warden, alleging that their placement in restrictive confinement violated their substantive and
procedural due process rights. The district court dismissed the action and the detainees appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the detainees’ allegations stated a claim for
violation of substantive due process rights and a claim for violation of procedural due process rights. The
court remanded the case for consideration of the qualified immunity claim. The detainees alleged that they
were punished prior to being sentenced by being placed in restrictive confinement, that they were subjected
to lengthy stays in isolation with prisoners who had disciplinary problems or who were in protective
custody, and that they were subjected to additional hardships that were not shared by the general prison
population. The court found that the detainees’ allegations were sufficiently factual to raise the detainees'
right to relief above a speculative level. The detainees also alleged that they were placed in restrictive
confinement indefinitely and removed from the general prison population while awaiting resentencing after
their sentences were vacated, and that they were not given any explanation or opportunity to contest the
restrictive placement. (Security Housing Unit [SHU], Delaware)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
TRANSPORT

Stewart v. Beaufort County, 481 F.Supp.2d 483 (D.S.C. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought an action in state
court against a county, county sheriff's department, and deputy, alleging claims for assault and battery
against the deputy, gross negligence against the sheriff's department, and, pursuant to § 1983, violation of
his constitutional rights. Following removal to federal court, the defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court denied the motion. The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the deputy's use of force in transporting the pretrial detainee to a detention center was excessive,
precluding summary judgment for deputy on the basis of qualified immunity. The court noted that, at the
time of the alleged violation, a pretrial detainee's right to be free from excessive force was clearly
established. (Beaufort County Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2007). United States citizens brought an action alleging that the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials violated their constitutional and statutory rights
by detaining and searching them at a border when they returned from an Islamic conference in Canada. The
district court entered summary judgment in the government's favor, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that the suspicionless searches of the plaintiffs did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. The court found that the burden placed on the plaintiffs' associational rights as the result of
the CBP searches and detention was sufficiently significant to implicate First Amendment protections, but
the searches and detention constituted the least restrictive means to protect the nation from terrorism. (U.S.
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Buffalo, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Thomas v. Baca, 514 F.Supp.2d 1201 (C.D. California 2007). Pre-trial detainees and post-conviction
prisoners who alleged they were required to sleep on the floor of county jail facilities brought a civil rights
class action suit against a sheriff in his individual and official capacities. The prisoners moved for summary
adjudication of certain issues and the sheriff moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for
summary adjudication. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that
undisputed evidence established the custom of forcing inmates to sleep on the floor and that this custom
violated the Eighth Amendment, even if the majority of inmates had bunks and floor-sleeping inmates were
provided with mattresses. The plaintiffs had presented undisputed evidence that over 24,000 instances of
floor sleeping occurred in the jail system in a four month period. The court found that the sheriff was
entitled to qualified immunity from liability for the jail's custom of forcing some inmates to sleep on the
floor, where it was not clearly established during the 2002 to 2005 period covered by the suit, that
providing inmate with a mattress would not avoid a violation or that floor sleeping violated the Eighth
Amendment rights of convicted inmates as well as due process rights of pretrial detainees. (Los Angeles
Sheriff Department, California)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
STAFFING
SUPERVISION

Thomas v. Sheahan, 499 F.Supp.2d 1062 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator filed a § 1983 suit against
a county, sheriff, county board, correctional officers, supervisors, and a correctional medical technician, on
behalf of a pretrial detainee who died at a county jail from meningitis and pneumonia. The administrator
alleged violations of the detainee’s constitutional rights and state law claims for wrongful death, survival
action, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to
strike documents. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court did not strike
all of the plaintiff's summary judgment submissions, for allegedly failing to disclose witnesses or
individuals with relevant information who submitted affidavits, given that the plaintiff had disclosed
witnesses prior to discovery deadline.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the detainee's illness was an objectively serious medical need, and whether correctional officials and a
correctional medical technician were aware of the detainee's serious medical symptoms. The court found
that the supervisors of the correctional officers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious
medical condition, where the officers did not contact their supervisors about the detainee until the morning
that he died, the supervisors obtained medical care for the detainee, and the supervisors were not
responsible for security checks or rounds of jail. The court also found that summary judgment was
precluded on the issue of causation due to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county was

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deliberately indifferent to its widespread practice of failing to train its employees on how to handle inmate
medical requests at the county jail. Summary judgment was also precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the county was deliberately indifferent to: (1) its widespread practice of understaffing
correctional officers at the county jail; (2) its widespread practice of failing to repair broken video
monitoring systems for inmate surveillance at the jail; and, (3) its widespread policy or practice of
falsifying daily logs to cover up missed security checks on inmates. (Cook County Jail, Illinois).
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Thomas v. Sheahan, 514 F.Supp.2d 1083 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator filed a § 1983 suit against
a county, sheriff, county board, correctional officers, supervisors and correctional medical technician on
behalf of a pretrial detainee who died at a county jail from meningitis and pneumonia, alleging violations of
constitutional rights and state law claims for wrongful death, survival action, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court held that the administrator's failure to produce documentary evidence of lost
wages or child support payments did not preclude her from introducing evidence at trial. The court found
that the physician was not qualified to testify as to the manifestations of meningitis absent evidence that the
physician was an expert on meningitis or infectious diseases. According to the court, a jail operations
expert's proposed testimony that the county did not meet minimum standards of the conduct for training of
correctional staff was inadmissible. The court also found that evidence of jail conditions was relevant and
thus admissible, where the administrator of the detainee's estate argued that county officials should have
known the detainee was sick because he was throwing up in his cell and in a day room. (Cook County,
Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

U.S. v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2008). The government appealed an order of the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island suppressing cocaine seized from a defendant pursuant to a visual
body cavity search. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the strip search for
contraband and weapons was justified given the defendant's arrest for a drug trafficking crime, but that the
arresting officer did not have individualized suspicion that the arrestee was “cheeking” drugs, as required to
justify a visual body cavity search. According to the court, the evidence before the officer was that the
arrestee was a suspected drug dealer in possession of narcotics and that some drug dealers concealed drugs
between their buttocks. (Woonsocket Police Department, Rhode Island)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

U.S. v. Miller, 477 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2007). A supervisor at a county detention center was convicted in the
district court of depriving two prisoners of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. The supervisor appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was
sufficient evidence that the supervisor acted maliciously and sadistically toward the prisoner, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, even though the supervisor could
have inflicted even greater injuries upon the prisoner. Evidence indicated that the supervisor punched the
prisoner when there was no legitimate reason to do so, kicked the prisoner, and stomped on the prisoner
while he was lying on the ground. The court noted that the assailing officer's ability to inflict greater
injuries upon a prisoner does not make an attack any less malicious or sadistic, for the purposes of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the prisoner's
medical records, which did not identify the supervisor as the individual responsible for the prisoner's
injuries, were admissible under the medical treatment or diagnosis exception to the hearsay records.
(Craighead County Detention Facility, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

U.S. v. Ramirez-Gutierrez, 503 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2007). A defendant pled guilty in the district court to
reentering the United States illegally after being deported. On appeal, the court held that the conditions of
the defendant's pretrial confinement were not so substandard or onerous as to warrant special consideration
at sentencing, and the sentencing judge considered the defendant's claim that he committed crimes because
of substance abuse problem. The defendant complained that he was unable to obtain care for his broken
tooth, lived in poorly ventilated quarters, and was given inadequate opportunity to exercise during his two
and a half month detention. (Kankakee County Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
INTAKE SCREENING

Wakat v. Montgomery County, 471 F.Supp.2d 759 (S.D.Tex 2007). The estate of inmate who died in a
county jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, jail physician, and other county personnel. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the county was not liable based on a
county policy, the county was not liable for failure to train or supervise county jail personnel, and a
physician did not act with deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. The court held that
the county sheriff was not liable in his individual capacity under § 1983 to the estate of the inmate absent a
showing that he participated in any of the alleged activities in any individual capacity. According to the
court, the county was not liable to the estate under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, since the county policy did not directly cause county
personnel to fail to seek physician approval to reinitiate the inmate's prescription medication. The court
noted that although the jail had a written policy of abruptly discontinuing any narcotic medications when
inmates were initially processed for booking, regardless of whether the inmate had a valid prescription for
the narcotic, the jail also had a policy allowing the narcotic medications to be reinstated with the permission
of a doctor. The court found that the county did not act with deliberate indifference in its training and
supervision of county jail personnel in dealing with inmates' medical needs, absent a showing of a pattern
or a recurring situation of tortuous conduct by inadequately trained employees. The court held that the
county jail physician did not act with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the inmate,
where the physician did not refuse to treat the inmate nor ignore his complaints, prescribed medication
when he was first called about the inmate's disorientation and hallucinations, and saw the inmate and
diagnosed him with undifferentiated schizophrenia. According to the court, although the physician failed to

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see signs of withdrawals from benzodiazepine, there was no indication that he intentionally treated the
inmate for schizophrenia while knowing that, in fact, he was suffering dangerous withdrawals from a
prescription drug to which he was addicted. (Montgomery County Jail, Texas)
U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Webb v. Budz, 480 F.Supp.2d 1050 (N.D. Ill. 2007). African-American civil detainees in a state treatment
and detention facility for sexually violent persons brought a § 1983 action against facility officials, alleging
discrimination on the basis of race. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
The court held that the African-American civil detainees who were placed on temporary special/secure
management status (SMS) for committing acts of violence toward staff members were not similarly situated
to five Caucasian detainees who were placed on SMS for committing acts of violence toward staff
members, as required to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory effect in violation of equal
protection. According to the court, after being placed on SMS, each of the Caucasian detainees progressed
out of SMS as a result of good behavior and acceptance of responsibility, while the African-American
detainees engaged in numerous acts of insubordination while on SMS, including threats on security staff,
concealing weapons and contraband, and throwing urine at staff members. (Illinois Department of Human
Services Treatment and Detention Facility for Sexually Violent Persons, Sheridan, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2008). An arrestee sued a city and others under § 1983,
asserting claims for false arrest and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court entered
summary judgment for the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the arrestee's asthma was not objectively serious during the time he was being processed, and therefore
an officer was not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. According to the court, the arrestee's
statements to the officer that he had asthma, needed his medication, and could not breathe, made in the
context of a request that the arrestee take a breathalyzer test, were insufficient by themselves to show that
he was suffering from a serious attack. (City of Chicago Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MENTAL HEALTH
MEDICAL CARE

Winters v. Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services, 491 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2007). The administrator
of the estate of a mentally ill pretrial detainee/civil committee who had died of peritonitis in a county jail
sued a sheriff and the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) under § 1983, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court entered judgment for the defendants.
The administrator appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the pretrial detainee
was not discriminated against on the basis of his mental illness, as required to a establish violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act. The court noted that the detainee was
arrested for criminal trespass, and although he was not treated for his peritonitis due to his inability to
communicate because of his mental illness, the sheriff and other jail officials sought immediate treatment
for the detainee's mental illness, and attempted to transport him to a state hospital, but he was denied
admittance due to lack of available space. The court found that neither the Arkansas Department of Human
Services (DHS) nor the county sheriff were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the
detainee, nor was there a policy or custom to deprive mentally ill detainees of treatment. According to the
court, the detainee died from a condition that neither defendant knew of or suspected, the sheriff and other
jail officers attempted to get the detainee into a mental health treatment facility, but no facility would
accept custody of him. (Benton County Jail, Arkansas)
2008

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1205 (D.Colo. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a civil
rights action, alleging that a county sheriff, county jailers, and others violated her rights to due process and
free speech, as well as her right to be free from unreasonable seizure, by forcibly injecting her with
antipsychotic medication while in custody at a county jail. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants in part. The court held that a county sheriff's deputy personally participated in the decision
to sedate the detainee and therefore the deputy could be liable in his individual capacity under § 1983. The
deputy had called paramedics and admittedly lobbied the medics to sedate the detainee, he allegedly falsely
reported to the paramedics that the detainee had been banging her head and throwing herself against her
steel cell door, and he participated in physically restraining the detainee during the injection, at the request
of the paramedics. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the deputy falsely reported to the paramedics. The court found that the deputy was not
entitled to qualified immunity from liability. The court found that the training of county jail personnel by
the county sheriff and other officials with respect to forcible sedation of pretrial detainees in the county jail,
was not deliberately indifferent to the due process rights of the detainees, and therefore the sheriff and
county officials were not liable under § 1983 for failure to properly train. The training required personnel to
call the paramedics and let the paramedics, with the advice of a physician, make the decision as to whether
or not to sedate. (Pitkin County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
MEDICATION

Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1229 (D.Colo. 2008). A jail inmate brought a civil rights
action, alleging that an emergency room physician violated her constitutional rights by forcibly injecting
her with antipsychotic medication while she was in custody. The physician filed a motion for summary
judgment, which was granted by the district court. The court held that the physician “acted under color of
state law” within the meaning of § 1983 when he ordered the inmate to be involuntarily sedated, and that
the physician exercised reasonable medical judgment in deciding to forcibly sedate the inmate. The court
noted that although the private physician did not contract directly with the state to treat the inmate, the
physician however undertook a public function because the provision of medical services to inmates was
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. The inmate appeared highly intoxicated and out of

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control, was pounding and throwing her body against her cell door, was violently pulling against her
restraints and thrashing about, and was unable to gain control in the presence of the paramedics or to allow
her vital signs to be taken. (Pitkin County Jail, Colorado)
U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
INTAKE SCREENING
SEARCHES

Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a jailer
and others alleging her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was strip
searched. The district court denied the jailer's request for qualified immunity and the jailer appealed. The
appeals court affirmed the district court decision. The court held that the jailer was not justified in
conducting the strip search during booking, following the arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant for
harassment, where the arrestee never intermingled with the general jail population but rather was confined
in a cell by herself for several hours while awaiting bail. The court noted that three pat down searches had
been performed on the arrestee prior to booking, the arrestee was wearing shorts and a sleeveless blouse at
the time of booking, the jailer saw that the arrestee did not have any tattoos or moles indicating that she was
the culprit, and the crime of harassment was not a crime of violence. The court found that the arrestee had a
right not to be strip searched during booking when she was not going to intermingle with the general prison
population. She had already been through a pat-down search, and there was no reasonable suspicion that
she had a weapon. According to the court, the jailer who conducted the strip search was not entitled to
qualified immunity because at the time of this incident it was clearly established that a strip search could be
justified if there was a reasonable suspicion that the detainee possessed weapons and the detainee
intermingled with the general jail population. The 46