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Federal Prisoner Must Exhaust BOP Remedies Before Seeking Habeas Corpus Relief

Federal prisoner Ivan Gonzalez was convicted of possession with intent to distribute three kilograms of cocaine. He was sentenced to five years of imprisonment. The U.S. Parole Commission calculated a presumptive parole date of May 30, 1990. When that date came and went the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) did not release Gonzalez, and he remained incarcerated. In February of 1991 Gonzalez filed for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. He claimed that because his release date had passed he did not have to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. The district court denied the petition.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the writ. The appeals court held that while the courts have original jurisdiction in imposing sentences, the BOP is responsible for computing that sentence and applying the appropriate good time credits.

Because the BOP has established regulations that set forth procedures for prisoners to follow before seeking relief from a district court, the administrative remedies must be exhausted before a federal court has jurisdiction to hear a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See, Gonzalez v. United States , 959 F.2d 211 (11 Cir. 1992).

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Related legal case

Gonzalez v. United States

Gonzalez v. United States, 959 F.2d 211 (11th Cir. 04/27/1992)

[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit


[2] No. 91-5738, Non-Argument Calendar


[4] April 27, 1992


[5] IVAN GONZALEZ, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.


[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. DISTRICT BANKRUPTCY COURT DOCKET NO. 91-336-Civ-CCA. D/C Judge ATKINS


[7] ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Stephen Finta, 3015 N. Ocean Blvd., Ste. 122, Ft. Lauderdale, FL. 33308, (305) 537-5565.


[8] For appellee: Dexter Lehtinen, U.S. Attorney, 155 S. Miami Ave., Miami, FL 33128. Linda Collins Hertz, 155 S. Miami Ave., Miami, FL 33128, (FTS) 350-5420. Dawn Bowen, AUSA, 155 S. Miami Ave., Miami, FL 33128, (FTS) 350-5420. Carol Herman, 155 S. Miami Ave., Miami, FL 33128, (FTS) 350-5420.


[9] Before Tjoflat, Chief Judge, Kravitch, Circuit Judge, and Godbold, Senior Circuit Judge.


[10] Author: Per Curiam


[11] PER CURIAM:


[12] This appeal concerns denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus because petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. We affirm.


[13] Petitioner Ivan Gonzalez was convicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute three kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On December 29, 1988 he was sentenced pursuant to pre-guidelines law to five years imprisonment and four years of supervised release.*fn1


[14] The U.S. Parole Commission calculated a presumptive parole date of May 30, 1990. The U.S. Bureau of Prisons did not, however, release petitioner on this date, and he remains incarcerated.


[15] In February 1991 Gonzalez filed in the district court a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He asserted that because his presumptive release date had passed, he need not exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking relief from the district court.


[16] Courts have original jurisdiction over imposition of a sentence. The Bureau of Prisons is, however, responsible for computing that sentence and applying appropriate good time credit. U.S. v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 865-66 (9th Cir.1988). The Bureau of Prisons has established regulations that set forth the procedures that a prisoner must follow before seeking relief from a district court. U.S. v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir.1990). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is jurisdictional. Id.


[17] Petitioner relies upon cases in which the court resentenced a defendant. Those cases do not deal with computation of sentences by administrative agencies. See e.g., U.S. v. Whittington, 918 F.2d 149 (11th Cir.1990); U.S. v. Jones, 722 F.2d 632 (11th Cir.1983).


[18] AFFIRMED.


[19] Disposition


[20] AFFIRMED.



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Opinion Footnotes

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[21] *fn1 Gonzalez appealed his conviction, challenging the district court's denial of his request for a supplemental jury instruction. He did not challenge his sentence. This court affirmed the conviction. U.S. v. Gonzalez, 886 F.2d 1324 (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 1989).