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Section 1983 Appropriate for Disciplinary Hearings
The court of appeals for the eighth circuit has held that prisoners can challenge prison disciplinary hearings under § 1983 without exhausting habeas corpus remedies. Billy Joe Armento-Bey, an Iowa state prisoner, filed suit in federal court under § 1983 claiming his due process rights were violated during a prison disciplinary hearing. The district court dismissed the suit without prejudice holding that Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994) does not allow prison disciplinary hearings to be challenged absent an allegation that the hearing had been overturned or reversed. The appeals court reversed and remanded holding the district court had abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint.
"Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Heck court explicitly stated that Wolff claims do not 'call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff's continuing confinement,' and again recognized that section 1983 claims 'for using the wrong procedures, [rather than) for reaching the wrong result (i.e. denying good time credits),' are cognizable.... Likewise, we note that such claims do not require exhaustion." See: Armento-Bey v. Harper, 68 F. 3d 215 (8th Cir. 1995) .
Other circuit courts to consider the application of Heck to prison disciplinary hearings have relied on its plain statement that it does not apply to § 1983 challenges to prison disciplinary hearings. See: Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1995).
"Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Heck court explicitly stated that Wolff claims do not 'call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff's continuing confinement,' and again recognized that section 1983 claims 'for using the wrong procedures, [rather than) for reaching the wrong result (i.e. denying good time credits),' are cognizable.... Likewise, we note that such claims do not require exhaustion." See: Armento-Bey v. Harper, 68 F. 3d 215 (8th Cir. 1995) .
Other circuit courts to consider the application of Heck to prison disciplinary hearings have relied on its plain statement that it does not apply to § 1983 challenges to prison disciplinary hearings. See: Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Related legal case
Armento-Bey v. Harper
| Year | 1995 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 68 F.3d 215 (8th Cir. 1995) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Armento-Bey v. Harper, 68 F.3d 215 (8th Cir. 10/10/1995)
[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[PUBLISHED]
[2] No. 94-4058
[3] Billy Joe Armento-Bey,
[4] Appellant,
v.
[5] Charley Harper,
[6] Appellee.
[7] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
[8] Submitted: June 28, 1995
[9] Filed: October 10, 1995
[10] Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
[11] PER CURIAM.
[12] Iowa inmate Billy Joe Armento-Bey appeals the district court's dismissal as frivolous of his 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983 action. We reverse.
[13] Armento-Bey filed this pro se complaint alleging that he was denied the right to present certain evidence at his disciplinary hearing for improper contact with a female officer. He expressly stated that he sought relief in the form of damages only, and not restoration of good time. Citing Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994), the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1915(d), reasoning that Armento-Bey's claim for damages was not cognizable under section 1983, as he had not alleged the disciplinary decision had been invalidated. Armento-Bey appeals.
[14] The district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint, see Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331, 332 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review for Section(s) 1915(d) dismissal), as Armento-Bey's procedural due process claim has an arguable basis in fact and law. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554, 566 (1974) (inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; damages claim challenging procedures used to deprive prisoners of good time properly before court). Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Heck court explicitly stated that Wolff claims do not "call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff's continuing confinement," and again recognized that section 1983 claims "for using the wrong procedures, [rather than] for reaching the wrong result (i.e., denying good-time credits)," are cognizable. Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2370. Likewise, we note that such claims do not require exhaustion. Cf. Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1258 (8th Cir. 1987) (district court should stay Section(s) 1983 action pending exhaustion of habeas remedies, if favorable decision would establish "an irrefutable claim for early or immediate release under habeas").
[15] Accordingly, we reverse.
[16] BOWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
[17] I read Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), the same way the district court did, i.e., as requiring the dismissal of Armento-Bey's Section(s) 1983 complaint. If, as Armento-Bey claims, he was denied procedural due process during his disciplinary hearing, then it necessarily follows that the disciplinary decision, and the resulting loss of good-time credits, are unconstitutional and cannot stand. Armento-Bey's challenge to the process employed in the hearing is necessarily a challenge to the validity of the disciplinary decision itself. His case therefore is controlled by the holding in Heck (as opposed to dictum in the Heck opinion that the majority here finds persuasive).
[18] Moreover, even if the district court and I have misapprehended Heck, I believe that at the very least this case must be stayed under Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1987), until Armento-Bey exhausts his state remedies. There is no indication in the record that he has done so. Armento-Bey has launched an "indirect attack on the length of his state confinement," and such an attack "directly implicates the policies of federal-state comity requiring exhaustion in a direct attack." Id. at 1257.
[19] For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
[20] A true copy.
[21] Attest:
[22] CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
19951010
Armento-Bey v. Harper, 68 F.3d 215 (8th Cir. 10/10/1995)
[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[PUBLISHED]
[2] No. 94-4058
[3] Billy Joe Armento-Bey,
[4] Appellant,
v.
[5] Charley Harper,
[6] Appellee.
[7] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.
[8] Submitted: June 28, 1995
[9] Filed: October 10, 1995
[10] Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
[11] PER CURIAM.
[12] Iowa inmate Billy Joe Armento-Bey appeals the district court's dismissal as frivolous of his 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983 action. We reverse.
[13] Armento-Bey filed this pro se complaint alleging that he was denied the right to present certain evidence at his disciplinary hearing for improper contact with a female officer. He expressly stated that he sought relief in the form of damages only, and not restoration of good time. Citing Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994), the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1915(d), reasoning that Armento-Bey's claim for damages was not cognizable under section 1983, as he had not alleged the disciplinary decision had been invalidated. Armento-Bey appeals.
[14] The district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint, see Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331, 332 (8th Cir. 1994) (standard of review for Section(s) 1915(d) dismissal), as Armento-Bey's procedural due process claim has an arguable basis in fact and law. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554, 566 (1974) (inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; damages claim challenging procedures used to deprive prisoners of good time properly before court). Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the Heck court explicitly stated that Wolff claims do not "call into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff's continuing confinement," and again recognized that section 1983 claims "for using the wrong procedures, [rather than] for reaching the wrong result (i.e., denying good-time credits)," are cognizable. Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2370. Likewise, we note that such claims do not require exhaustion. Cf. Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1258 (8th Cir. 1987) (district court should stay Section(s) 1983 action pending exhaustion of habeas remedies, if favorable decision would establish "an irrefutable claim for early or immediate release under habeas").
[15] Accordingly, we reverse.
[16] BOWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
[17] I read Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), the same way the district court did, i.e., as requiring the dismissal of Armento-Bey's Section(s) 1983 complaint. If, as Armento-Bey claims, he was denied procedural due process during his disciplinary hearing, then it necessarily follows that the disciplinary decision, and the resulting loss of good-time credits, are unconstitutional and cannot stand. Armento-Bey's challenge to the process employed in the hearing is necessarily a challenge to the validity of the disciplinary decision itself. His case therefore is controlled by the holding in Heck (as opposed to dictum in the Heck opinion that the majority here finds persuasive).
[18] Moreover, even if the district court and I have misapprehended Heck, I believe that at the very least this case must be stayed under Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1987), until Armento-Bey exhausts his state remedies. There is no indication in the record that he has done so. Armento-Bey has launched an "indirect attack on the length of his state confinement," and such an attack "directly implicates the policies of federal-state comity requiring exhaustion in a direct attack." Id. at 1257.
[19] For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
[20] A true copy.
[21] Attest:
[22] CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
19951010