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Fact Finding of Segregation Conditions Required in Disciplinary Suit
The district court dismissed both cases relying on Sandin v. Connor, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995) [PLN, Aug. 1995], by holding the plaintiffs were not entitled to due process because the punishment they received "did not present the type of 'atypical, significant deprivation' in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest."
The court held that "In contrast to the detailed record in Sandin, the record here did not cite any factual basis for concluding that the segregation at issue did not impose an 'atypical and significant hardship' on Hemphill in relation to the 'ordinary incidents of prison life.' We agree with the circuit courts which have concluded that this factual determination is required under Sandin. See: Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34, 38 (2nd Cir. 1996); ... Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1995); ... Whitford v. Bogliano, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1995) .... Thus, we remand this case for such a factual determination."
The court also held that Sandin could be retroactively applied to cases that arose before it was decided by the supreme court.
Prisoners claiming a denial of due process in prison disciplinary hearings where segregation was imposed as a sanction, and no good time credits were forfeited, will need to be prepared to argue, and prove, that the prison's segregation unit imposed a significant and atypical hardship upon them compared with life in the prison's general population. The length of time spent in segregation will also impact this analysis, see: Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1996). See: Hemphill v. Delo, 105 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 1997) and Driscoll v. Youngman, 105 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997).
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Driscoll v. Youngman
Year | 1997 |
---|---|
Cite | 105 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997) |
Level | Court of Appeals |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Driscoll v. Youngman, 105 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 01/21/1997)
[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 95-4037
[3] Robert Driscoll,
[4] Appellant,
v.
[5] Larry Youngman,
[6] Defendant,
[7] Paul K. Delo; Fred Johnson; George E. White; Don Roper;
[8] Appellees,
[9] Mike Rawson,
[10] Defendant.
[11] Submitted: August 2, 1996
[12] Filed: January 21, 1997
[13] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
UNPUBLISHED
[14] Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
[15] PER CURIAM.
[16] Robert Driscoll appeals from the final judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granting summary judgment to prison officials in this 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983 action. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
[17] Driscoll, an inmate at the Potosi Correctional Center (PCC), filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that on September 14, 1992, defendant Larry Youngman issued him a false conduct violation (CV) charging him with violating Rule #5 -- Riot -- by "being present" at an August 16 incident and "supporting those inmates who were fighting." Driscoll appeared at a September 22 disciplinary hearing, at which defendants Fred Johnson and George White found him guilty and sentenced him to thirty days in disciplinary segregation, referred the matter for criminal prosecution, and recommended referral to administrative segregation. Defendant Don Roper approved the action. Driscoll alleged that the CV did not state any facts supporting the violation and that he was never advised what evidence defendants relied on to support the guilt finding. Driscoll also challenged the conditions of his confinement, claiming he was denied meaningful exercise, natural light, and adequate time in the library.
[18] Adopting the magistrate judge's recommendations, the district court dismissed as legally frivolous Driscoll's claims that he was denied access to the courts and natural light, but allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis on the other claims. Defendants then moved for summary judgment and submitted documentary evidence in support thereof. Driscoll also moved for summary judgment, asserting that he spent 135 days in the "hole," and arguing that the evidence submitted in defendants' summary judgment motion conclusively established he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[19] On October 31, 1994, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Driscoll on his due process claim, concluding that the only evidence relied on by defendants that implicated him in the August 16 riot was the CV issued by Youngman, which stated that an "investigation" revealed Driscoll was involved by "being present and supporting those inmates who were fighting." There was no evidence, however, that Driscoll was engaged in rioting as that offense was defined. *fn1 Thus, there was not "some evidence" to support the guilt determination. The district court further concluded defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity and postponed determining Driscoll's damages for having spent over 100 days in administrative segregation. Defendants moved to reconsider this grant of summary judgment.
[20] On July 31, 1995, defendants supplemented their motion for summary judgment, arguing that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (Sandin), Driscoll had no liberty interest in remaining free from segregation because he did not show it resulted in an atypical or significant deprivation falling outside the expected parameters of the sentence imposed. Without conducting further proceedings, the district court concluded that Driscoll was not entitled to due process protection in light of Sandin and granted defendants summary judgment.
[21] On appeal, Driscoll argues Sandin should not be applied retroactively and is distinguishable because Driscoll was punished for no reason and Sandin was not; alternatively, this court should remand for the district court to make a particularized determination regarding PCC's conditions of confinement.
[22] Driscoll's argument that Sandin is not retroactive is foreclosed by this court's decision in Callender v. Sioux City Residential Treatment Facility, 88 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 1996).
[23] The Supreme Court in Sandin concluded that Sandin's confine-ment in disciplinary segregation did not impose an "atypical and significant hardship." The Court supported its conclusion by discussing the various custodial conditions at the particular prison in question and by demonstrating that Sandin's segregation "did not work a major disruption in his environment." 115 S. Ct. at 2301.
[24] In contrast to the detailed record in Sandin, the record here did not contain and the district court did not cite any factual support for concluding that Driscoll's segregation did not impose on him an "atypical and significant hardship" in relation to the "ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 2300. We hold that Sandin requires this factual determination. See Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-1385); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Thus, we remand for such a factual determination. See Samuels, 77 F.3d at 38 (factual determination should not be made by appeals court in first instance).
[25] Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
[26] A true copy.
[27] Attest:
[28] CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
***** BEGIN FOOTNOTE(S) HERE *****
[29] *fn1 Institutional Rule #5 defines Riot as "[k]nowingly assembling with six or more inmates and agreeing or participating with such inmates to violate any institutional, divisional, departmental, state or federal rule or law with force or violence."
***** END FOOTNOTE(S) HERE *****
[Editor's note: Illustrations from the original opinion, if any, are available in the print version]
19970121
Driscoll v. Youngman, 105 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 01/21/1997)
[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 95-4037
[3] Robert Driscoll,
[4] Appellant,
v.
[5] Larry Youngman,
[6] Defendant,
[7] Paul K. Delo; Fred Johnson; George E. White; Don Roper;
[8] Appellees,
[9] Mike Rawson,
[10] Defendant.
[11] Submitted: August 2, 1996
[12] Filed: January 21, 1997
[13] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
UNPUBLISHED
[14] Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
[15] PER CURIAM.
[16] Robert Driscoll appeals from the final judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granting summary judgment to prison officials in this 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983 action. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
[17] Driscoll, an inmate at the Potosi Correctional Center (PCC), filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that on September 14, 1992, defendant Larry Youngman issued him a false conduct violation (CV) charging him with violating Rule #5 -- Riot -- by "being present" at an August 16 incident and "supporting those inmates who were fighting." Driscoll appeared at a September 22 disciplinary hearing, at which defendants Fred Johnson and George White found him guilty and sentenced him to thirty days in disciplinary segregation, referred the matter for criminal prosecution, and recommended referral to administrative segregation. Defendant Don Roper approved the action. Driscoll alleged that the CV did not state any facts supporting the violation and that he was never advised what evidence defendants relied on to support the guilt finding. Driscoll also challenged the conditions of his confinement, claiming he was denied meaningful exercise, natural light, and adequate time in the library.
[18] Adopting the magistrate judge's recommendations, the district court dismissed as legally frivolous Driscoll's claims that he was denied access to the courts and natural light, but allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis on the other claims. Defendants then moved for summary judgment and submitted documentary evidence in support thereof. Driscoll also moved for summary judgment, asserting that he spent 135 days in the "hole," and arguing that the evidence submitted in defendants' summary judgment motion conclusively established he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[19] On October 31, 1994, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Driscoll on his due process claim, concluding that the only evidence relied on by defendants that implicated him in the August 16 riot was the CV issued by Youngman, which stated that an "investigation" revealed Driscoll was involved by "being present and supporting those inmates who were fighting." There was no evidence, however, that Driscoll was engaged in rioting as that offense was defined. *fn1 Thus, there was not "some evidence" to support the guilt determination. The district court further concluded defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity and postponed determining Driscoll's damages for having spent over 100 days in administrative segregation. Defendants moved to reconsider this grant of summary judgment.
[20] On July 31, 1995, defendants supplemented their motion for summary judgment, arguing that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (Sandin), Driscoll had no liberty interest in remaining free from segregation because he did not show it resulted in an atypical or significant deprivation falling outside the expected parameters of the sentence imposed. Without conducting further proceedings, the district court concluded that Driscoll was not entitled to due process protection in light of Sandin and granted defendants summary judgment.
[21] On appeal, Driscoll argues Sandin should not be applied retroactively and is distinguishable because Driscoll was punished for no reason and Sandin was not; alternatively, this court should remand for the district court to make a particularized determination regarding PCC's conditions of confinement.
[22] Driscoll's argument that Sandin is not retroactive is foreclosed by this court's decision in Callender v. Sioux City Residential Treatment Facility, 88 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 1996).
[23] The Supreme Court in Sandin concluded that Sandin's confine-ment in disciplinary segregation did not impose an "atypical and significant hardship." The Court supported its conclusion by discussing the various custodial conditions at the particular prison in question and by demonstrating that Sandin's segregation "did not work a major disruption in his environment." 115 S. Ct. at 2301.
[24] In contrast to the detailed record in Sandin, the record here did not contain and the district court did not cite any factual support for concluding that Driscoll's segregation did not impose on him an "atypical and significant hardship" in relation to the "ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 2300. We hold that Sandin requires this factual determination. See Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-1385); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Thus, we remand for such a factual determination. See Samuels, 77 F.3d at 38 (factual determination should not be made by appeals court in first instance).
[25] Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
[26] A true copy.
[27] Attest:
[28] CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
***** BEGIN FOOTNOTE(S) HERE *****
[29] *fn1 Institutional Rule #5 defines Riot as "[k]nowingly assembling with six or more inmates and agreeing or participating with such inmates to violate any institutional, divisional, departmental, state or federal rule or law with force or violence."
***** END FOOTNOTE(S) HERE *****
[Editor's note: Illustrations from the original opinion, if any, are available in the print version]
19970121
Hemphill v. Delo
Year | 1997 |
---|---|
Cite | 105 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 1997) |
Level | Court of Appeals |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hemphill v. Delo, 105 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 01/21/1997)
[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 95-3357
[3] Roman Hemphill,
[4] Appellant,
v.
[5] Paul K. Delo, Individually and in his Official Capacity as the Superintendent at Potosi Correctional Center,
[6] Defendant,
[7] Fred Johnson, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Caseworker at PCC; Lonnie Salts, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Corrections Officer at PCC; Ray Pogue, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Function Unit Manager at FCC; Greg Wilson, Individually and in his Official Capacity as an Investigator at PCC,
[8] Appellees.
[9] Submitted: August 2, 1996
[10] Filed: January 21, 1997
[11] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
UNPUBLISHED
[12] Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
[13] PER CURIAM.
[14] Roman Hemphill, an inmate at Potosi Correctional Center, appeals from the final judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granting defendants summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983 action. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
[15] In an amended complaint, Hemphill alleged that he was denied due process in connection with a conduct violation he received on June 19, 1992, charging him with violating Rule #3 -- Dangerous Contraband -- for being "involved in the introduction and distribution of drugs into Potosi Correctional Center." Hemphill alleged he was placed on disciplinary segregation -- locked in his housing unit -- prior to appearing before the adjustment board. At his disciplinary hearing, the adjustment board members informed him they had received information from a confidential informant, but they did not disclose the informant's name or information received. Without revealing the evidence used against him, the adjustment board found Hemphill guilty, sentenced him to thirty days in disciplinary segregation, referred him for criminal prosecution, and referred the matter to the administrative segregation committee. Hemphill was assigned to administrative segregation effective July 18, 1992, and was released to the general population on May 4, 1993. Hemphill claimed defendants conspired to deny him due process and equal protection in connection with the disciplinary action, and he sought damages.
[16] Defendants moved for summary judgment, and submitted documentary evidence in support. Hemphill opposed the motion. On January 30, 1995, the district court granted defendants summary judgment on all claims, except the claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the disciplinary action. Defendants appealed, and we remanded the case for a ruling on qualified immunity. Hemphill v. Johnson, No. 95-1451 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995) (judgment).
[17] On remand, defendants filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority, noting that the Supreme Court had issued its decision in Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995) (Sandin), and arguing that Hemphill was not entitled to the procedural protections of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974). On August 8, 1995, without conducting further proceedings, the district court concluded that Hemphill was not entitled to due process protection because the punishment that he received did not present the type of "atypical, significant deprivation" in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest, see Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300, and that Hemphill's allegation of insufficient evidence no longer supported a cause of action in the wake of Sandin. The district court thus vacated its January 30 order and granted defendants summary judgment on all claims.
[18] The Court in Sandin recognized that
[19] States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
[20] Id. at 2300 (citations omitted).
[21] The Court determined that a Hawaii inmate did not have a liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation because the inmate's thirty days in segregated disciplinary confinement did not present the type of "atypical, significant deprivation" in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest. Id. at 2301. In reaching that conclusion, the Court reviewed the record and made findings that, "with insignificant exception," the inmate's disciplinary segregation "mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody." Id. The Court supported its conclusion by discussing the various custodial conditions at the particular prison in question and by demonstrating that the plaintiff's segregation "did not work a major disruption in his environment." Id.
[22] In contrast to the detailed record in Sandin, the record here did not contain and the district court did not cite any factual basis for concluding that the segregation at issue did not impose an "atypical and significant hardship" on Hemphill in relation to the "ordinary incidents of prison life." We agree with the circuit courts which have concluded that this factual determination is required under Sandin. See Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-1385); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Thus, we remand this case for such a factual determination. See Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d at 38 (factual determination should not be made by appeals court in first instance).
[23] Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
[24] A true copy.
[25] Attest:
[26] CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
[Editor's note: Illustrations from the original opinion, if any, are available in the print version]
19970121
Hemphill v. Delo, 105 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 01/21/1997)
[Editor's note: footnotes (if any) trail the opinion]
[1] U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[2] No. 95-3357
[3] Roman Hemphill,
[4] Appellant,
v.
[5] Paul K. Delo, Individually and in his Official Capacity as the Superintendent at Potosi Correctional Center,
[6] Defendant,
[7] Fred Johnson, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Caseworker at PCC; Lonnie Salts, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Corrections Officer at PCC; Ray Pogue, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Function Unit Manager at FCC; Greg Wilson, Individually and in his Official Capacity as an Investigator at PCC,
[8] Appellees.
[9] Submitted: August 2, 1996
[10] Filed: January 21, 1997
[11] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
UNPUBLISHED
[12] Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
[13] PER CURIAM.
[14] Roman Hemphill, an inmate at Potosi Correctional Center, appeals from the final judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granting defendants summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983 action. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
[15] In an amended complaint, Hemphill alleged that he was denied due process in connection with a conduct violation he received on June 19, 1992, charging him with violating Rule #3 -- Dangerous Contraband -- for being "involved in the introduction and distribution of drugs into Potosi Correctional Center." Hemphill alleged he was placed on disciplinary segregation -- locked in his housing unit -- prior to appearing before the adjustment board. At his disciplinary hearing, the adjustment board members informed him they had received information from a confidential informant, but they did not disclose the informant's name or information received. Without revealing the evidence used against him, the adjustment board found Hemphill guilty, sentenced him to thirty days in disciplinary segregation, referred him for criminal prosecution, and referred the matter to the administrative segregation committee. Hemphill was assigned to administrative segregation effective July 18, 1992, and was released to the general population on May 4, 1993. Hemphill claimed defendants conspired to deny him due process and equal protection in connection with the disciplinary action, and he sought damages.
[16] Defendants moved for summary judgment, and submitted documentary evidence in support. Hemphill opposed the motion. On January 30, 1995, the district court granted defendants summary judgment on all claims, except the claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the disciplinary action. Defendants appealed, and we remanded the case for a ruling on qualified immunity. Hemphill v. Johnson, No. 95-1451 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995) (judgment).
[17] On remand, defendants filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority, noting that the Supreme Court had issued its decision in Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2301 (1995) (Sandin), and arguing that Hemphill was not entitled to the procedural protections of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974). On August 8, 1995, without conducting further proceedings, the district court concluded that Hemphill was not entitled to due process protection because the punishment that he received did not present the type of "atypical, significant deprivation" in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest, see Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300, and that Hemphill's allegation of insufficient evidence no longer supported a cause of action in the wake of Sandin. The district court thus vacated its January 30 order and granted defendants summary judgment on all claims.
[18] The Court in Sandin recognized that
[19] States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
[20] Id. at 2300 (citations omitted).
[21] The Court determined that a Hawaii inmate did not have a liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation because the inmate's thirty days in segregated disciplinary confinement did not present the type of "atypical, significant deprivation" in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest. Id. at 2301. In reaching that conclusion, the Court reviewed the record and made findings that, "with insignificant exception," the inmate's disciplinary segregation "mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody." Id. The Court supported its conclusion by discussing the various custodial conditions at the particular prison in question and by demonstrating that the plaintiff's segregation "did not work a major disruption in his environment." Id.
[22] In contrast to the detailed record in Sandin, the record here did not contain and the district court did not cite any factual basis for concluding that the segregation at issue did not impose an "atypical and significant hardship" on Hemphill in relation to the "ordinary incidents of prison life." We agree with the circuit courts which have concluded that this factual determination is required under Sandin. See Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Gotcher v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-1385); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Thus, we remand this case for such a factual determination. See Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d at 38 (factual determination should not be made by appeals court in first instance).
[23] Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
[24] A true copy.
[25] Attest:
[26] CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
[Editor's note: Illustrations from the original opinion, if any, are available in the print version]
19970121