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Attorney Fee Cap Inapplicable to Pre-PLRA Suits; PLRA Automatic Stay Provisions Constitutional

S.Ct. Grants Review of Fee Issue

by Matthew T. Clarke

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that the attorney fee cap contained within the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §1997e(d), (PLRA) does not apply to attorney fees in cases filed prior to the enactment of the PLRA on April 24, 1996, even if the fees are for work occurring after the enactment date. The court also held the automatic stay provisions of the PLRA were constitutional if interpreted to allow courts to indefinitely suspend the automatic stay under their inherent equity powers. The United States Supreme court granted review of the attorney fee issue in these cases. this is significant because this is the first PLRA case to be heard by the Supreme court.

In 1977, female state prisoners in Michigan filed a class-action lawsuit challenging their conditions of confinement and unequal treatment when compared to male prisoners in Michigan. See: Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich.1979). The female prisoners prevailed and a remedial order issued. See: Glover v. Johnson, 510 F.Supp. 1019 (E. D. Mich. 1981). In 1985, an order was issued to the prevailing attorneys in Glover, awarding attorney fees and providing for future attorney fees at the rate of $150/hour.

In 1980, Everett Hadix and other male state prisoners incarcerated at the State Prison of Southern Michigan-Central Complex (SPSM-CC) filed a class-action lawsuit challenging their conditions of confinement. The SPSM-CC prisoners prevailed and the prison authorities entered into a consent decree which covered a broad range of daily prison operations, but specifically excluded several issues, including classification, visitation, and provision of attorneys. See: Hadix v. Johnson, 740 F.Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich.1990). In 1985, an order was issued to the prevailing attorneys in Hadix awarding attorney fees and providing for future attorney fees at the rate of $150/hour.

This fee arrangement functioned well in both cases even though several district court proceedings and appeals were necessitated during the course of the continuing litigation. However, on April 24, 1996, the PLRA was enacted, amending 42 U.S.C. §1997e(d) to include a provision capping attorney fees for prevailing parties in prisoner civil rights litigation to 150% of the maximum amount paid court-appointed counsel in criminal cases under 18 U.S.C. §3006A. For the Eastern District of Michigan, the §3006A amount is $75. Thus, the PLRA cap would be $112.50, 25% less than the Glover and Hadix attorneys were being paid.

The defendants previously challenged the award of attorney fees for work performed prior to the enactment of the PLRA. However, the Sixth Circuit held that the attorney fees cap in the PLRA did not apply to work performed prior to enactment. See: Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 1998). This holding was reaffirmed. The defendants challenged the attorney fees for work performed after the enactment of the PLRA. The district court ruled that the PLRA attorney fees cap applied to work performed after enactment and plaintiffs appealed. The defendants also objected to the award of attorney fees in several appeals which the plaintiffs lost. Defendants appealed.

In rejecting the defendants' contention that the PLRA attorney fees cap should apply to work performed after the enactment date, even though the suit was filed before the enactment date, the Sixth Circuit performed an analysis pursuant to Landgraf v. USI Film Products, Inc., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). Using the previous analysis in Glover as a guide, the court held that there was no temporal reach expressed by Congress in the PLRA. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit had previously held that applying the fee cap to a pending fee motion for work completed prior to the enactment date would be impermissibly retroactive because it would attach significant new legal burdens to the completed work and impair rights acquired under pre-existing law. The same logic applied to post-enactment work in a pending case. Thus, the previous Glover ruling controls and the PLRA attorney fees cap should not be applied to work performed after the enactment of the PLRA in a case filed prior to the enactment of the PLRA.

The Sixth Circuit also noted that the recent cases of Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997), and Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414 418 (8th Cir, 1997) lent support to their reasoning. In Lindh, the Supreme Court held that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act did not apply to federal petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in non-capital cases filed prior to its enactment. In Wright, the Eighth Circuit held that the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA did not apply to cases pending upon enactment.

The Sixth Circuit also examined the legislative history of the PLRA. Noting that it had come from two efforts to reform two separate areas of prisoner litigation, the court examined its unsuccessful legislative predecessors and found specific provisions for application to pending cases. Since the previous, unsuccessful acts contained provisions applying them to pending cases and the PLRA did not, this was indicative of a congressional intent not to apply the PLRA to pending cases.

In a previous Glover v. Johnson, 942 F.2d 703, 716 (6th Cir. 1991), the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that a party must prevail on the appeal to be counted as the prevailing party and awarded attorneys' fees. The court's order establishes who the prevailing parties were and, when plaintiffs succeed on a significant issue, they are the prevailing party. A prevailing party should be compensated for work done in monitoring post-judgment compliance, even if they do not prevail in each individual post-judgment dispute.

The award of attorney fees was reversed in two instances. They involved the unsuccessful appeal and petition for certiorari on the issue of defendants' termination of legal support services for parental rights matters. There was no order specifically requiring legal support in parental rights matters. Therefore, termination of such support was not within the purview of the suit and appeals from such termination were not compensable because they went beyond the underlying litigation.

The defendants also objected to the amount of hours billed by plaintiffs' attorneys as excessive" and "inappropriate" and alleged plaintiffs filed pleadings which were "unnecessary" and "frivolous. " The Sixth Circuit held that, without any specific indication by the defendants of how the hours billed were excessive or inappropriate or which pleadings were unnecessary or frivolous, the objections were properly overruled.

In a related case originating from an investigation (from 1982 to 1984) and complaint filed in 1984 by the U. S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, et seq., the Michigan prison system entered into a consent decree involving many aspects of prison administration. United States v. Michigan, 680 F.Supp. 928 (W.D.Mich. 1987) (U.S.). Some Hadix issues were transferred into the U.S. case.

The PLRA contains termination provisions which entitle defendants "to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than is necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). Such prospective relief, however, "shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary [narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means] to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).

Under the PLRA, the filing of a motion to terminate a prison conditions consent decree triggers an automatic stay of all prospective relief after 30 days. The court can delay the automatic stay's implementation by another 60 days for good cause. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2)-(3). Once triggered, the automatic stay remains in effect until the court rules on the motion.

Defendants moved to terminate longstanding consent decrees and sought stays of prospective relief in the Hadix and U.S. suits. The district courts ruled the PLRA's automatic stay provision unconstitutional because it violated separation of powers and due process. Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp.1100 (E.D.Mich. 1996) [ PLN April,1997]. Defendants appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, Congress amended the automatic stay's provisions. Pub.L. No. 105-119 § 123, 111. Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997). The USDOJ and the prisoners argued that the amendment making any order suspending the stay immediately appealable via interlocutory appeal implicitly allowed courts to suspend the automatic stay. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the prisoners and held that "the PLRA automatic stay provision, as construed to permit the courts to exercise their inherent equitable powers, does not give rise to an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into the powers reserved for the Judiciary."

In U.S., the district court refused to terminate the provisions of the consent decree dealing with prisoner classification due to defendants' failure to regularly and consistently apply the agreed upon classification system. The Sixth Circuit upheld the continuation of the court's jurisdiction on the classification issue. See: Hadix v, Johnson, 143 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 1998) (post-PLRA enactment attorney fees), 144 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 1998) (consent decree termination and pre-PLRA enactment attorney fees).

On November 16, 1998, the United States Supreme court granted certiorari and agreed to decide the following issues, (1) In litigation pending on effective date of PLRA does attorneys' fees provision apply to fees awarded after that date? (2) In such litigation, does fee provision apply to fees awarded after Act's effective date for services rendered before that date? See Johnson v. Hadix, Case Number 98-262. PLN will report the outcome of the case.

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Related legal cases

Hadix v. Johnson

Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 04/17/1998)

[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

[2] Nos. 96-2567/ 2568/2586/2588, 97-1218/1272

[3] 143 F.3d 246, 1998
[4] April 17, 1998

[5] EVERETT HADIX, ET AL. (96-2567/2568); MARY GLOVER, ET AL. (96-2586/2588; 97-1218/1272), PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES/ CROSS-APPELLANTS,
v.
PERRY M. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS/ CROSS-APPELLEES.

[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. Nos. 77-71229; 80-73581 John Feikens, District Judge. Argued: December 11, 1997

[7] COUNSEL ARGUED: Leo H. Friedman, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Deborah A. LaBelle, LAW OFFICES OF DEBORAH LABELLE, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Jeffrey D. Dillman, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Leo H. Friedman, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Deborah A. LaBelle, LAW OFFICES OF DEBORAH LABELLE, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Michael Barnhart, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees.

[8] Before: Kennedy, Jones, and Suhrheinrich, Circuit Judges.

[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kennedy, Circuit Judge.

[10] RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 24

[11] File Name: 98a0117p.06

[12] KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SUHRHEINRICH, J., joined. JONES, J. (p. 29), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

[13] These four appeals primarily concern attorney fees in the Michigan prison reform litigation which has been the subject of numerous appeals to our Court for decision. We have consolidated the appeals for decision. One of these appeals, No. 97-1218, is moot because the order challenged in that case has expired by its terms. The three other appeals present overlapping issues surrounding the propriety of three awards of attorney fees for work performed primarily during the period of January 1, 1996 through June 30, 1996.

[14] The major issue before us is whether the attorney fee limitation of section 803(d) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA" or the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) applies to work performed after the PLRA's enactment date of April 26, 1996 in a case filed before the enactment date. Section 803(d), among other things, places a cap on the hourly rate attorneys may be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in civil rights litigation brought by prisoners. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3). Recently, in a separate Glover appeal, we held that section 1997e(d) does not apply to work performed prior to the PLRA's enactment. Glover v. Johnson, ___ F.3d ___ (6th Cir. 1998). For reasons fully explained below, we conclude that section 1997e(d) is likewise inapplicable to post-enactment work. Neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history permits us to conclude that Congress intended to differentiate between pre-enactment and post-enactment services.

[15] In Glover, defendants also argue for reversal of the fee awards because plaintiffs were not prevailing parties within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in three appellate matters. As explained below, we uphold the awards as to two of the three matters and reverse as to the third because the work was not compensable compliance monitoring and plaintiffs did not prevail on appeal or on their petition for certiorari. On cross-appeal, the Glover plaintiffs argue that the District Court abused its discretion in declining to increase the hourly rate of a paralegal from the rate last approved by the court. We shall reject this contention as without merit.

[16] I. OVERVIEW OF THE LITIGATION

[17] A. Glover v. Johnson

[18] In 1977, a now-certified class of female inmates incarcerated in the Michigan prison system, filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which they alleged violations of certain constitutional rights surrounding the conditions of their confinement. The District Court found that the Glover plaintiffs had been denied the same vocational and educational opportunities provided to male inmates, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the female inmates had been unconstitutionally denied meaningful access to the courts. Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979) ("Glover I"). After extensive negotiations, the District Court entered an order specifying remedial actions to be undertaken by the defendants to remedy the constitutional violations found and retained jurisdiction until substantial compliance with the remedial order is achieved. Glover v. Johnson, 510 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("Glover II"). Neither of these orders were appealed by defendants.

[19] On November 12, 1985, the parties stipulated to an order of the District Court, which awarded plaintiffs attorney fees, including fees for monitoring defendants' compliance with the District Court's orders, and established a system providing for plaintiffs' submission of fees and costs on a semi-annual basis and for the lodging of defendants' objections thereto. This 1985 Order, which plaintiffs contend establishes their entitlement to monitoring fees, has never been appealed. It provides in relevant part:

[20] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees and that requests for such fees shall be submitted to opposing counsel every six months. Defendants will have twenty-eight days in which to contest the amount of the fee request.

[21] Thus, since 1985, the parties have followed this procedure and plaintiffs' attorneys have been paid attorney fees at the prevailing market rate, which has increased over the years, to the current rate of $150.00 per hour. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated November 27, 1989 (the "1989 Order"), the District Court interpreted its 1985 Order as authorizing attorney fees for monitoring compliance with the court's orders in this case in addition to non-monitoring legal work, and as having decided the prevailing party issue. It also held that the prevailing party issue will not be re-decided with each petition for fees, and that the court is therefore not required to await the completion of an appeal before determining whether plaintiffs are prevailing parties on otherwise compensable work. Defendants appealed the 1989 Order, and this Court affirmed the District Court's holdings. Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Glover III").

[22] B. Hadix v. Johnson

[23] In 1980, a class of male prisoners incarcerated in the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex ("SPSM-CC"), brought a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of their rights under the First, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The parties entered into a comprehensive consent decree, which was approved by and made an order of the District Court on April 4, 1985. The detailed 33-page consent decree addresses sanitation, health care, fire safety, overcrowding, volunteers, access to courts, food service, management, operations and mail at SPSM-CC and called for the submission of more detailed remedial plans to carry out a number of the consent decree mandates. Overall, the consent decree was intended to "assure the constitutionality" of the conditions of confinement at SPSM-CC. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the consent decree until compliance is achieved. Plaintiffs' attorneys have responsibility for monitoring defendants' compliance with the decree, which continues to this day.

[24] On November 19, 1987, the District Court entered an order awarding fees and costs to plaintiffs' attorneys for compliance monitoring. Plaintiffs construe this order as establishing their entitlement to post-judgment monitoring fees. Under the terms of this order, defendants have the right to review and make objections to plaintiffs' fee requests. In the absence of agreement, the District Court will resolve the fee dispute.

[25] II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW

[26] In Glover and Hadix, each class of plaintiffs filed a fee petition for work performed from January 1, 1996 through June 30, 1996 pursuant to established procedure. Appeal Nos. 96-2586/2588 and 96-2567/2568. The Glover plaintiffs filed a second fee petition that covered all outstanding fees and costs related to work on two appeals. Appeal No. 97-1272. Defendants objected on several grounds to all three petitions. The District Court rejected all but one of the objections in three separate orders.

[27] Defendants argued that the attorney fee limitation of the PLRA should be applied to the fee petitions in appeal nos. 96-2586/2588 and 96-2567/2568. In nearly identical opinions, the District Court held the fee provision inapplicable to fees earned before enactment of the PLRA but applied it to those earned thereafter.

[28] Defendants also objected to fees for work on all appellate matters in the Glover fee petitions in appeal nos. 96-2586/2588 and 97-1272, which included work on three appeals, because plaintiffs had not prevailed in these matters. The first involves Case No. 94-1617, a 1996 appeal regarding defendants' obligation to provide legal assistance to plaintiffs for parental rights matters. This case has been decided against plaintiffs and the Supreme Court has denied their petition for certiorari. Glover v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 264 (6th Cir.) ("Glover IV"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 67 (1996) (hereinafter referred to as the "parental rights appeal" ). The second involves appeal nos. 95-1903/95-2037/95-2120/96-1155, consolidated appeals regarding a Compliance Committee established by the District Court (hereinafter referred to as the "Compliance Committee appeals"). These appeals were voluntarily dismissed by stipulation of the parties in March, 1996 upon dissolution of the Committee by the District Court. The third involves appeal no. 95-1521, an appeal regarding the District Court's denial of defendants' motion to terminate the District Court's supervisory jurisdiction because substantial compliance with the Remedial Plan had been achieved (hereinafter referred to as the "termination appeal"). We recently vacated this judgment, retained jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the District Court for a new determination of whether a disparity now exists between female and male inmates in educational and vocational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and whether female inmates are presently being denied access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment. Glover v. Johnson, ___ F.3d ___ (6th Cir. 1998) ("Glover V").

[29] In rejecting this challenge, the District Court concluded that plaintiffs were deemed prevailing parties in the 1985 Order, that plaintiffs are not required to establish prevailing party status each time fees are sought but instead need only establish that the legal work was reasonably related to ensuring compliance with the District Court's orders. The District Court went on to conclude that the legal work at issue in all three appeals was related to monitoring compliance with the Remedial Plan and consequent court orders.

[30] The District Court also rejected defendants' objection that the award in No. 96-2586/2588 was otherwise unreasonable as conclusory and unsubstantiated. Finally, the District Court declined to increase the rate of payment for a paralegal to the prevailing market rate because she had been approved at an established lower rate. Defendants and plaintiffs filed timely notices of appeal and cross-appeal. *fn1

[31] III.THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PLRA TO THESE ACTIONS

[32] A. Statutory Background

[33] The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996), was signed into law by President Clinton on April 26, 1996. *fn2 The PLRA, which comprises 10 sections, significantly affects prison litigation by amending several provisions of the United States Code. *fn3 The Act was intended to curtail what was perceived to be the over involvement of federal courts in managing state prison systems pursuant to remedial orders and consent decrees such as those involved in Glover and Hadix. *fn4 The second purpose of the Act was to stem the tide of frivolous prisoner suits. *fn5 Today we focus on section 802, which serves the first purpose identified above by limiting judicial remedies in prison condition litigation, and section 803, which serves the second statutory purpose enumerated above by amending the Civil Rights Of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, et seq. ("CRIPA").

[34] Section 803(d) of the PLRA includes the provision governing the award of attorney fees in prisoner civil rights litigation. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). It provides in relevant part:

[35] § 1997e. Suits by prisoners

[36] (d) Attorney's fees

[37] (1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under section 2 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1988), such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that --

[38] (A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 2 of the Revised Statutes; and

[39] (B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.

[40] (3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of title 18, United States Code, for payment of court-appointed counsel.

[41] 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1), (3). In the Eastern District of Michigan, $75 per hour is the maximum amount a court-appointed attorney may be reimbursed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1). The established rate of pay for plaintiffs' attorneys in both cases has been $150 per hour since at least 1993. Capping attorney fees at $112.50 (which represents 150% of the $75 maximum) would reduce plaintiffs' attorneys' hourly rate by 25%. Whether or not we apply the fee provision to the attorney fee petitions at issue in these pending cases turns on matters of statutory construction and congressional intent.

[42] B. Judicial Construction Of PLRA Section 803(d)

[43] 1. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, Inc.

[44] The analytical framework to be used when determining whether to apply a newly-enacted law to pending cases, or whether such application is impermissible because it would have retroactive effect is set forth by the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, Inc., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). In step one of the Landgraf analysis, a court determines whether Congress clearly defined the temporal reach of a new law. Id. at 257-63, 280. Where Congressional intent is clear, it is controlling. Id. at 264. If Congressional intent is ambiguous, a court must proceed with step two, an analysis of retroactivity.

[45] The long-standing presumption against retroactive legislation does not arise every time a statute is applied to a pending case or when its application would upset settled expectations. Id. at 269 Rather, a statute operates retroactively when it "attaches new legal consequences to events completed before enactment" or "impair[s] rights a party possessed when he acted." Id. at 269, 280. The determination of retroactivity is made after assessing "the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event." Id. at 270. Judicial inquiries should be guided by "familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations." Id. Retroactive legislation will not be applied in absence of manifestly clear Congressional intent. Id. at 280.

[46] 2. Glover V

[47] In Glover V, supra, we analyzed the attorney fee limitation under Landgraf in the context of a petition for fees for work completed before enactment of the PLRA but awarded after enactment. Under step one, we held that Congress had not explicitly prescribed the temporal reach of the provision. Slip Op. at pp. 40-41. In so doing, we rejected the Fourth Circuit's view that the plain language of the statute providing that fees "shall not be awarded" except as provided, evinces clear congressional intent that all post-enactment fee awards, including those compensating for pre-enactment work, must comply with section 803(d). Id. at 41 (declining to follow Alexander v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 880 (1998)). Under step two of Landgraf, we held that application of section 803(d) to a pending fee motion which sought compensation for work completed prior to enactment would be impermissibly retroactive because it would "attach[] significant new legal burdens to the completed work . . . [and impair] rights acquired under pre-existing law." Id. at 43. We thus concluded that Congress did not intend the statute to be applied retroactively. We expressly limited our holding to work completed prior to enactment. Id. at 44. Now that we are squarely presented with the issue of post-enactment work in a pending case, we believe that our earlier Conclusion regarding retroactivity controls the application of the very same statutory language to post-enactment fees.

[48] Under Landgraf, the Court is to determine the temporal reach Congress intends a new statute to have in the absence of clear congressional intent. In Hadix, we determined that the attorney fee provision of section 803(d), as applied to a fee petition for pre-enactment work, would be impermissibly retroactive. From this Conclusion, it followed that the historic presumption against retroactive legislation arose to bar retroactive application of the statute. The presumption is invoked to interpret new statutory language overall, and we do not believe that the resulting statutory interpretation can be limited to specific circumstances. That certain applications of the statute might be permissible does alter the statutory construction unless it can be said that Congress possessed different intentions with respect to different applications.

[49] In this case, a court would have to find that Congress relied upon the same statutory language to convey an intent that the temporal reach of the statute is dependent upon the timing of the work, i.e., that it intended the fee provision to apply in pending cases for post-enactment fees but did not intend the provision to apply in pending cases for pre-enactment fees. We do not believe the statutory language is capable of such a sophisticated construction; either the fee provision applies in pending cases or not. Our interpretation of section 1997e(d) in Glover V controls our interpretation of that section here. We therefore hold that the fee limitation is inapplicable to the fee petitions before us, which include work performed both prior to and after the enactment date.

[50] While the Glover court did not rely upon the recent decision in Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997), that decision supports our Conclusion regarding retroactivity. As in Lindh, we have the negative inference that section 803(d) is inapplicable to pending cases arising from the fact that Congress made section 802 expressly applicable to pending cases but did not do the same with section 803. We believe that under Lindh, the artificial distinction between pre-enactment and post-enactment work breaks down. In addition, in Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 263 (1997), we held that the plain language of the exhaustion requirement of section 803(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), evinced Congress' intent that it not be applied to pending cases. Thus, Wright provides additional support for concluding that Congress did not intend to apply the fee provision to pending cases because the attorney fee provision, also part of section 803(d), contains very similar temporal language to that of the exhaustion requirement.

[51] 3. Lindh v. Murphy

[52] In Lindh, the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), which amended the federal habeas statute, applied to an application for habeas corpus pending at the time the new statute was enacted. The Court held that because one section of the AEDPA explicitly applied to pending cases and the other relevant section did not, this evinced clear congressional intent that the latter would not apply to pending cases. Lindh v. Murphy, supra, 117 S. Ct. at 2063. The majority appears to say that when general rules of statutory construction are employed to determine a new statute's temporal reach -- the first step of the Landgraf analysis -- and a court determines that Congress intended purely prospective application, i.e., no application to pending cases, then the court need not apply the judicial default rules employed in the second step of the Landgraf analysis because there is no risk of retroactive effect. Id. at 2062-63 ("Although Landgraf's default rules would deny application when a retroactive effect would otherwise result, other construction rules may apply to remove even the possibility of retroactivity . . . .").

[53] In its approach, "[t]he Court relies on one canon of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est esclusio alterius, to the exclusion of all others." Id. at 2068 (Rehnquist, J., Dissenting). "The Court's opinion rests almost entirely on the negative inference that can be drawn from the fact that Congress expressly made Chapter 154, pertaining to capital cases, applicable to pending cases, but did not make the same express provision in regards to Chapter 153." Id. "Chapter 153" refers to sections 2242 and 2253-2255 of Chapter 153 of Title 28 of the United States Code, which are amended by sections 101-106 of the AEDPA. "Chapter 154" was created by section 107 of the AEDPA and refers to new sections 2261-2266 of Title 28. Congress chose to make Chapter 154 explicitly applicable to pending cases. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 107(c), 110 Stat. 1214, 1226 (1996) ("EFFECTIVE DATE. - Chapter 154 of title 28 . . . shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act.") Congress did not say anything about the effective date of Chapter 153. The Court read section 107(c), which made Chapter 154 explicitly applicable to pending cases, as "indicating implicitly that the amendments to chapter 153 were assumed and meant to apply to the general run of habeas cases only when those cases had been filed after the date of the Act." Lindh v. Murphy, supra, 117 S. Ct. at 2063.

[54] The Court distinguished procedural amendments, which it recognized would most likely be applied to pending cases. Id. (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275) *fn6 . The Court also suggested that had the legislative history of the two chapters been different, it might have reached a different result. Id. at 2064. Though the two chapters began in separate bills in separate houses, they were brought together in the same bill before section 107(c) was added. "The insertion of § 107(c) with its different treatments of the two chapters thus illustrates the familiar rule that negative implications raised by disparate provisions are strongest when the portions of a statute treated differently had already been joined together and were being considered simultaneously when the language raising the implication was inserted." Id. at 2065 (citing Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437, 446 (1995) ("The more apparently deliberate the contrast, the stronger the inference, as applied, for example to contrasting statutory sections originally enacted simultaneously in relevant respects.")).

[55] 4. Legislative History of the PLRA

[56] Section 802 of the PLRA contains a provision similar to that found in chapter 154 of the AEDPA making the section applicable to pending cases. *fn7 On the other hand, section 803 of the PLRA does not contain an effective date, just like chapter 153 of the AEDPA. The legislative history of sections 802 and 803 of the PLRA is slightly different than that of Chapters 153 and 154 of the AEDPA. The PLRA represents the culmination of efforts to reform two areas of prison litigation. First, the reformers desired to deter federal courts from so closely managing state prison systems in the context of supervising compliance with judicial decrees mandating remedies for unconstitutional prison conditions in litigation that has, in states such as Michigan, spanned decades. Second, the reformers sought to deter the "torrent" of frivolous civil rights lawsuits filed by prisoners.

[57] Congress first proposed reform legislation in Titles II and III of the Violent Criminal Incarceration Act of 1995. H.R. 667, 104th Cong. (1995). Title II -- entitled Stop Turning Out Prisoners or STOP -- addressed the "judicial remedies" concern. "The purpose of the STOP Act is to keep our Federal courts from taking over State prisons." 141 Cong. Rec. S2648-02, S2649 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hutchison) *fn8 . The STOP Act is the forerunner to section 802; both limit judicial remedies in prison condition litigation by amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Since, like section 802, the STOP Act was directed at ongoing litigation, it was made expressly applicable to pending cases. Significantly, the STOP Act included a limitation on attorney fees, which like the rest of the STOP provisions, was applicable to pending cases. Title III of H.R. 667 amended CRIPA and addressed the "frivolous lawsuit" concern. Title III is the forerunner to PLRA section 803; both intend to deter frivolous prisoner suits by amending CRIPA. Title III's CRIPA amendments were not given an effective date and, significantly, did not contain a limitation on attorney fees.

[58] As it made its way through the legislative process, the provision limiting attorney fees was moved from the STOP Act to the CRIPA amendments in a bill introduced by Senator Abraham of Michigan. S. 1275, 104th Cong. (1995). S. 1275 continued to expressly apply the STOP Act to pending cases and to refrain from providing an effective date for the CRIPA amendments. Thus, the attorney fee limitation was moved from a section of the statute that was expressly applicable to pending cases to a section that did not contain an effective date. None of the measures in the CRIPA amendments directed at stemming frivolous lawsuits included an effective date. See S. 1275, 104th Cong. §§ 3-4 (1995). S. 1275 contains no reference to H.R. 667 nor any explanation of why the attorney fee limitation was moved from the STOP Act to the CRIPA amendments.

[59] Additional and extensive CRIPA amendments were proposed in S. 866, a bill focused exclusively on stemming frivolous lawsuits. S. 866, 104th Cong. (1996). The provisions of S. 866 went on to become sections 803, 804, 805, 806 and 809 of the PLRA. S. 866 did not contain the STOP Act or any limitation on attorney fees. The sponsors of S. 866 subsequently introduced S. 1279, which incorporated the STOP Act of S. 1275 and the CRIPA amendments of S. 866. The STOP Act was made expressly applicable to pending cases and the CRIPA amendments were not. S. 1279 placed the attorney fee limitation in the CRIPA amendments, which is where it would remain through passage of the PLRA.

[60] In the instant case then, "the language raising the implication" was not inserted after the STOP and CRIPA amendments had been joined in one bill as was the case in Lindh. Lindh v. Murphy, supra, 117 S. Ct. at 2065. We believe that any negative inference drawn from Congress' decision to move the attorney fee provision from STOP to CRIPA is weaker than the inference drawn in Lindh. Nonetheless, the identical negative inference that was drawn in Lindh can be drawn when sections 802 and 803 are compared. Furthermore, nothing in the PLRA's legislative history suggests that Congress intended section 803 to apply to pending cases. In fact, we believe that the legislative history suggests otherwise. As discussed above, the STOP Act arose to address the perceived excesses of the federal judiciary in pending litigation such as the instant cases and was logically made expressly applicable to pending cases. In contrast, the CRIPA amendments are forward looking as they are aimed at curtailing the filing of frivolous lawsuits. We have found nothing to suggest that the CRIPA amendments were aimed at pending litigation. This interpretation is also consistent with Wright v. Morris, supra, which held the exhaustion requirement of section 803(d) inapplicable to pending cases.

[61] 5. Wright v. Morris

[62] PLRA section 803(d) governs the bringing of civil rights lawsuits by prisoners. Entitled "Suits by Prisoners", the section comprehensively amends section 7 of CRIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, which was formerly entitled "Exhaustion of Remedies." In addition to the attorney fee limitation, section 803(d) requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies before a prisoner may bring an action under section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). *fn9 In Wright v. Morris, supra, this Court recently held that the plain language of the statute provides that this exhaustion requirement does not apply to pending cases.

[63] § 1997e. Suits by prisoners

[64] (a) Applicability of administrative remedies

[65] No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . [42 U.S.C. § 1983] by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

[66] 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis supplied). Issued prior to Lindh, we declined to conclude that section 803 of the PLRA was inapplicable to pending cases based solely on the negative inference drawn from the fact that section 802 is expressly applicable to pending cases. Wright, 111 F.3d at 418. Instead, we relied upon the statutory text alone: "[T]he text of the new requirement plainly states that `no action shall be brought' without exhaustion of administrative remedies." Id. We reasoned further:

[67] Thus, it is likely that had Congress intended the new requirement to pertain to pending cases it would have employed the same language as it used in § 802(b)(1) to make that intent clear. This strengthens our Conclusion that the text of the PLRA indicates that the new administrative exhaustion requirement applies only to cases filed after the Act's passage.

[68] Id. Even though we declined to rely solely upon the negative inference, we found the fact that section 802 contains a provision expressly applying it to pending cases to be significant.

[69] Our interpretation of section 1997e(a) and reliance upon the negative inference that arises when section 803 is read together with section 802 is equally applicable when analyzing the attorney fee limitation. Section 1997e(d) admonishes that "fees shall not be awarded" in any way inconsistent with the rest of the subsection. This language is not meaningfully distinguishable from the temporal language of section 1997e(a), emphasized above, which provides that no action "shall be brought" prior to exhausting remedies and which we've interpreted as applying prospectively only.

[70] C. Conclusion

[71] In sum, our interpretation of section 803(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), under Landgraf in Glover V controls our interpretation of that same section here. Because application of the attorney fee provision would have an impermissible retroactive effect in a pending case involving a petition of attorney fees for pre-enactment work, section 803(d) cannot be applied to pending cases regardless of when the underlying legal work is performed. Further, the fact that Congress chose to move the attorney fee provision from a section of the PLRA made expressly applicable to pending cases to a section without an effective date raises a negative inference under Lindh that Congress intended that the fee provision apply only to cases filed after enactment of the PLRA. Finally, under Wright, the plain language of section 803(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), is prospective. For all of these reasons, we hold that the attorney fee provision of the PLRA is inapplicable to cases brought before the statute was enacted whether the underlying work was performed before or after the enactment date of the statute.

[72] IV.THE PREVAILING PARTY STANDARD IN POST-JUDGMENT INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION

[73] We next turn to whether plaintiffs are prevailing parties in these various appeals.

[74] A. The Law In The Sixth Circuit

[75] 1. Glover v. Johnson (Glover III)

[76] In Glover III, this Court rejected the same "prevailing party" argument that is advanced by defendants here. We held that "plaintiffs may rely on the trial court's 1985 order to establish that they are prevailing parties and, pursuant to that order, plaintiffs have succeeded on a significant issue." Glover III, supra, 934 F.2d at 716. We also held that moving for contempt to compel compliance with earlier District Court orders is a compensable post-judgment monitoring activity. Id. at 715-16. (citing Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980)). In so holding, we rejected defendants' argument that prevailing party status was dependent upon the outcome of their appeal of the District Court's contempt findings. Id. We also upheld the award despite reversing the District Court in part because it interpreted its remedial order beyond the order's express terms in two areas. Id. at 712 (vocational training), 713 (work pass program). Thus, when plaintiffs seek fees for compliance monitoring, plaintiffs are not required to again establish prevailing party status, nor is the award dependent upon the outcome of an appeal.

[77] 2. Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools

[78] Defendants rely heavily, if not exclusively, on our statement in Northcross in their argument that plaintiffs are not entitled to fees unless they prevail on each post-judgment dispute. There we stated, "[t]he [1977] hearings [which involved plaintiffs' work defending a desegration plan from attack] were collateral to and distinct from the desegregation suit itself, which had been finally terminated in 1974, so had the plaintiffs failed to prevail on the merits the district court would have been justified in denying fees altogether." Northcross, 611 F.2d. We believe that this reliance is misplaced for several reasons. First, because the Northcross plaintiffs prevailed in defending the remedy and because the Court held that plaintiffs are prevailing parties, this statement is dicta. Second, defending a remedy from collateral attack is indistinguishable from affirmatively moving for contempt to enforce compliance with the remedy because both activities share the same purpose of protecting court-ordered relief. See Jenkins v. State of Missouri, 127 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 1997) (compliance monitoring, enforcement of the remedy, and defense of the remedy are generally viewed as "necessary adjuncts to the initial litigation" and compensable). Finally, the Northcross dicta relied upon by defendants is inconsistent with Glover III, which held that compliance monitoring is compensable regardless of the degree of success or the outcome of appeals.

[79] Glover III does not however definitively answer how courts should handle the prevailing party issue when unsuccessful legal work for which fees are requested does not relate to compliance monitoring or otherwise protecting a remedy previously affirmed or not appealed. In such cases, we elect to follow the approach outlined recently by the Eight Circuit.

[80] In an ongoing school desegregation case involving the Kansas City School District, the Eighth Circuit had occasion to examine the prevailing party issue when the Supreme Court struck down the use of certain remedial measures employed in the court-approved desegregation plan. Jenkins v. State of Missouri, supra. Because the Supreme Court's decision did not affect the district court's underlying holding that the State of Missouri had committed constitutional violations and was obligated to remedy those violations, the court found that the decision did not "retroactively take away the Jenkins class's status as a prevailing party." Id., 127 F.3d at 714 (discussing Balark v. City of Chicago, 81 F.3d 658, 665 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that prospective termination of a 10-year-old consent decree pursuant to Rule 60(b) -- as opposed to reversal on direct appeal -- did not deprive plaintiffs of prevailing party status, which they enjoyed for 10 years). The Eighth Circuit treated the prevailing party question as a "threshold" issue and went on to examine "whether fees should be awarded for matters on which the plaintiff lost." Id. at 716.

[81] The Jenkins court applied the paradigm of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), a case involving a civil rights plaintiff who had prevailed on some but not all issues, to the prevailing party issue surrounding post-judgment fees in institutional reform cases. Id. (citing Assoc. for Retarded Citizens v. Schafer, 83 F.3d 1008, 1010-12, (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 482 (1996)). The test asks first whether the issues in the post-judgment litigation are "inextricably intertwined with those on which the plaintiff prevailed in the underlying suit or whether they are distinct." Id. at 717. Compliance monitoring, enforcement of the remedy, and defense of the remedy are generally viewed as "necessary adjuncts to the initial litigation" and compensable. Id. Other activities, such as efforts to expand the scope of the original relief obtained, may amount to the assertion of distinct new claims that cannot rest upon the prevailing party determination in the underlying case. Id. When the issues are intertwined, plaintiffs are entitled to fees, i.e., they maintain their prevailing party status. Id. at 718. If on the other hand, the issues are distinct, plaintiffs are entitled to fees only if they prevail on the separate issue. Id. at 717 (discussing Arvinger v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 31 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 1994) and Schafer, supra, which denied prevailing party status on strength of underlying litigation under these circumstances). In applying this analysis to the facts before it, the Jenkins court concluded that the issues that went up to the Supreme Court were related to the issues on which the Jenkins class prevailed as the plaintiffs were placed in the position of defending the scope of the district court's remedial authority. Id. at 719. *fn10

[82] B. Application of The Glover III/Jenkins Standard

[83] 1. The Compliance Committee Appeals

[84] In yet another Glover appeal, appeal no. 96-1852, defendants raised the identical prevailing party issue with respect to the same Compliance Committee fees at issue here, albeit for a different time period. In our recently-issued decision, we held that plaintiffs were prevailing parties in these appeals by virtue of defendants' voluntary dismissal and that the work was otherwise compensable as post-judgment compliance monitoring. Glover V, supra, at 46. We therefore reject this portion of defendants' challenge.

[85] 2. The Termination Appeal

[86] The analysis of the termination appeal fee award is controlled by Glover III. Defendants do not argue that the work was unrelated to ensuring compliance with court orders or that the work was unrelated to the underlying issues on which plaintiffs prevailed. As the District Court found: "[T]he relief sought amounted to a complete termination of the Remedial Plan. Work provided by plaintiffs' counsel on this issue was critically related to monitoring compliance with the judgment." *fn11 Rather, defendants argue that the prevailing party issue cannot be decided without awaiting the outcome of appeal no. 95-1521. As explained above, this argument was made and rejected once before. Glover III, 934 F.2d at 715-16.

[87] Additionally, we vacated the judgment denying the motion to terminate in appeal no. 95-1521, and, in lieu of assessing whether substantial compliance has been achieved, we retained jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the District Court for a new determination of whether a disparity now exists between female and male inmates in educational and vocational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and whether female inmates are presently being denied access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment. Glover V, supra, pp. 26-28. Given this outcome, we hold that plaintiffs have prevailed in appeal no. 95-1521. We further hold that this work qualifies as compensable post-judgment compliance monitoring because plaintiffs sought to protect the remedy ordered by the District Court for the equal protection violations and access to court violations it found so many years ago.

[88] 3. The Parental Rights Appeal

[89] The remaining issue concerns the fees related to the parental rights appeal and petition for certiorari. This appeal originated when plaintiffs filed a motion for injunctive relief to compel compliance with the District Court's orders regarding court access. Glover v. Johnson, 850 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Mich. 1994). Plaintiffs were prompted by defendants' notice of decision to reduce funding for Prison Legal Services ("PLS"), the agency which provides legal assistance to female inmates, and to wholly eliminate PLS' provision of legal assistance on parental rights matters. The District Court interpreted its earlier orders on court access as having ordered the indefinite continuation of defendants' contract with PLS, which since 1978 had required PLS to provide assistance in the area of parental rights, and held defendants in contempt of those earlier orders. Id. at 594. The District Court also concluded that the elimination of legal assistance in the area of parental rights would violate plaintiffs' newly-enunciated constitutional right to legal assistance in parental rights matters. Id. at 595-601.

[90] The district court proceedings were broader than those on appeal. What is relevant for our purposes here is not what happened below, but instead the issues litigated on appeal. Appeal no. 96-1617 was limited to whether defendants were required by court order or by the Constitution to provide plaintiff inmates with legal assistance in parental rights matters. Plaintiffs lost on both issues. Glover IV, supra, 75 F.3d 264.

[91] In reversing, we first held that the court had abused its discretion in holding defendants in contempt because we found no order requiring the funding of legal assistance in any particular area of law. In the absence of a violated order, the contempt finding could not be sustained. Id. at 267. Next, we held that defendants are not constitutionally required to provide plaintiffs legal assistance in parental rights matters. Id. at 269. The Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' petition for certiorari. 117 S. Ct. 67 (1996).

[92] In awarding fees for appellate work on this matter, the District Court acknowledged this Court's Conclusion that defendants had provided legal services for parental rights matters without the support of a direct order but nevertheless concluded that the "work done by plaintiff contesting the termination of services was a post-judgment monitoring activity and is therefore compensable." We disagree with this Conclusion. Given the lack of any remedial order, plaintiffs' counsel's efforts might best be characterized as a failed offensive attempt to expand the remedy. In such circumstances courts are less inclined to award fees. See, e.g., Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 990 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs' attorneys' efforts do not qualify as post-judgment compliance monitoring and plaintiffs cannot rely upon their status as prevailing parties in the underlying litigation. We therefore reverse this portion of the challenged awards given plaintiffs' lack of success in appeal no. 96-1617 and in the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

[93] C. Conclusion

[94] Defendants' challenges to the award of fees for work on the Compliance Committee appeals and on the termination appeal are rejected because the work is compensable compliance monitoring and because plaintiffs prevailed. Defendants' challenge to the award of fees for the unsuccessful work on the parental rights appeal and petition for certiorari is sustained because this claim went beyond the underlying litigation and plaintiffs did not prevail.

[95] V. OTHER ISSUES ARISING IN GLOVER

[96] A. The District Court's Denial of Defendants' Objections To The Award As Unreasonable Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[97] Defendants objected to 47.4 hours in plaintiffs' fee petition as "frivolous" and "unnecessary"; 48.7 hours as "excessive" and "inappropriate"; and 18.9 hours as "non-Glover" related. The District Court found that "defendants' broad objections and conclusory allegations" were an insufficient basis for denying these fees.

[98] On appeal, defendants make absolutely no effort to add specificity to their objections or to otherwise substantiate their claims. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have filed "unnecessary" and "frivolous" pleadings without identifying those pleadings for this Court or explaining why any such pleadings were unnecessary or frivolous. Defendants' argument that certain fees were "non-Glover related" is just a rehashing of their "prevailing party" argument, which we have rejected on numerous occasions. The District Court was not clearly erroneous in rejecting defendants' objections as an insufficient basis to deny fees which have been carefully documented by plaintiffs' counsel.

[99] B. Whether the District Court Erred in Refusing to Approve An Award of Fees For Paralegals At The Prevailing Market Rate

[100] Despite finding that $80 was well within the prevailing market rate for paralegals, the District Court refused to approve that rate because the rate established for paralegals in its order 1990 was $45 per hour. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in so refusing. Plaintiffs could have submitted a petition for a higher rate before or while the services were being rendered if a higher rate was necessary.

[101] C. Appeal No. 97-1218

[102] The last appeal, No. 97-1218, involves a challenge to the District Court's order of January 31, 1997 enjoining defendants from eliminating funding for provision of legal services to women prisoners at current levels. The order terminated by its own terms upon a decision in appeal No. 96-1931, which was pending at the time of the court's ruling. Thus, the issues raised in appeal no. 97-1218 became moot upon entry of our opinion in Glover V, supra, which decided, among others, appeal no. 96-1931.

[103] VI. CONCLUSION

[104] We dismiss appeal no. 97-1218 as moot. In appeal nos. 96-2567/2568, 96-2586/2588 and 97-1272, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand the cases to the District Court for a recalculation of the fee awards in a manner consistent with this opinion.

[105] Concurring

[106] NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge, Concurring.

[107] I generally concur in the majority's well drafted opinion. However, I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority's reversal of the district court's award of attorney's fees for work in the parental rights appeal, No. 96-1617, and the subsequent petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Although the plaintiffs were not ultimately successful in the appeal, I feel that this work, along with all of the other work plaintiffs' counsel performed in this case, was compensable post-judgment compliance monitoring and related to the underlying equal protection and access to court claims upon which plaintiffs prevailed in their original action. I would therefore affirm all of the fee awards in this case.


Opinion Footnotes

[108] *fn1 Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the constitutional challenges they made to the PLRA's fee provision in Glover, No. 96-2586/2588, which the court denied. Plaintiffs timely appealed the denial of its motion. Because we decide that the PLRA fee provision is inapplicable to this case, we need not and do not reach plaintiffs' constitutional arguments.

[109] *fn2 The Act is found in Title VIII of the omnibus appropriations bill for fiscal year 1996 for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies.

[110] *fn3 The Act amends the following: 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (Section 802 -Appropriate Remedies For Prison Conditions); 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (Section 803 - Amendments To Civil Rights Of Institutionalized Persons Act); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (Section 804 - Proceedings In Forma Pauperis); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (Section 804 - Proceedings In Forma Pauperis); 23 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Section 806 - Federal Tort Claims); and 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (Section 809 - Earned Release Credit or Good Time Credit Revocation). The Act also adds provisions, including new sections 1915A (Section 805 - Judicial Screening) and 1932 (Section 809 - Earned Release Credit or Good Time Credit Revocation) to title 28 of the United States Code.

[111] *fn4 See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S14316 (daily ed., Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) ("The legislation I am introducing today [S. 1275] will return sanity and State control to our prison systems by limiting judicial remedies in prison cases [such as those in the State of Michigan] . . . ."); 141 Cong. Rec. S14414 (daily ed., Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("These guidelines will work to restrain liberal federal Judges who see violations on [sic] constitutional rights in every prisoner complaint who have used these complaints to micromanage state and local prisons.").

[112] *fn5 See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S14316 (daily ed., Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (in addition to problems with "massive judicial interventions in state prison systems, we also have [the problem of] frivolous inmate litigation); 141 Cong. Rec. S14414 (daily ed., Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (legislation introduced, S. 1279, will address the "alarming number of frivolous lawsuits" filed by prisoners).

[113] *fn6 In Landgraf, the Court considered without deciding whether attorney fee provisions are procedural or whether they affect substantive rights. Compare Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 277 ("[a]ttorney's fee determinations are `collateral to the main cause of action'") (citations omitted), with Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 292 (Scalia, J., Concurring) ("holding a person liable for attorney's fees affects a `substantive right'"). In Glover V, we rejected the argument that attorney fee provisions can never result in retroactive effect because they may be procedural in nature or are collateral to the main cause of action. Glover V, supra, at 43. "[L]aws regulating litigation conduct [including attorney fee provisions] often impact the substantive rights of the parties as well. . . [and must be scrutinized under the Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis]. Id.

[114] *fn7 Section 802(b)(1) provides that section 802(a), which amends 18 U.S.C. § 3626, "shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this title."

[115] *fn8 Senator Hutchison of Texas introduced S. 400 in the Senate, which was identical to Title II of H.R. 667.

[116] *fn9 Under section 803(d), a court may sua sponte dismiss a civil rights action filed by a prisoner, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); a prisoner may not bring an action for emotional injury without a showing of physical injury, id. § 1997e(e); courts are instructed to conduct hearings by phone to the extent practicable, id. § 1997e(f); and civil rights defendants may waive their right to reply to a complaint without prejudice, id. § 1997e(g).

[117] *fn10 The Jenkins court went on to examine the reasonableness of the fee award and reduced the fee amount by 50% to reflect plaintiffs' limited success. Id. at 718-20. We express no opinion on this portion of the decision.

[118] *fn11 The District Court had ruled in an earlier opinion of May 30, 1996, that a decision on fees related to work on No. 95-1521 would be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. However, the District Court must have reconsidered the issue because it granted both fee petitions involved here, which included fees for work in No. 95-1521.

Hadix v. Johnson

Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 05/20/1998)

[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit


[2] Nos. 96-1851, 96-1907, 96-1908, 96-1943


[3] 144 F.3d 925, 1998.C06.158


[4] May 20, 1998


[5] EVERETT HADIX, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,
v.
PERRY M. JOHNSON, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS (96-1851/1908/1943), UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERVENOR (96-1908/1943). UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS (96-1907).


[6] Counsel Argued: Susan Przekop-Shaw, Office OF The Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Deborah A. LaBelle, Law Offices OF Deborah Labelle, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Elizabeth R. Alexander, National Prison Project, Washington, D.c., Marie K. McElderry, U.s. Department OF Justice, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.c., for Appellees. Marie K. McElderry, U.s. Department OF Justice, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.c., for Intervenor. ON Brief: Susan Przekop-Shaw, Michael A. Nickerson, Office OF The Attorney General, Corrections Division, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Deborah A. LaBelle, Law Offices OF Deborah Labelle, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Elizabeth R. Alexander, National Prison Project, Washington, D.c., Marie K. McElderry, Steven H. Rosenbaum, U.s. Department OF Justice, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.c., Patricia A. Streeter, Detroit, Michigan, Michael Barnhart, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees. Marie K. McElderry, U.s. Department OF Justice, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.c., for Intervenor.


[7] Before: Martin, Chief Judge; Norris and Moore, Circuit Judges.


[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Karen Nelson Moore, Circuit Judge.


[9] RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION


[10] Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 24


[11] File Name: 98a0149p.06


[12] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern and Western Districts of Michigan at Detroit, Grand Rapids, and Kalamazoo.


[13] Nos. 80-73581; 84-00063; 92-00110--John Feikens, District Judge, Richard


[14] A. Enslen, Chief District Judge.


[15] Argued: February 4, 1997


[16] MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MARTIN, C. J., joined. NORRIS, J. (pp. 47-51), delivered a separate concurring in part and Dissenting in part.


[17] We are called upon in this appeal to perform the delicate task of determining whether Congress unconstitutionally encroached into matters reserved for the Judiciary in enacting the automatic stay provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA" or "Act"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996), as amended by the Department of the Judiciary Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997). 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) (as amended in 1997). Under the PLRA, the filing of a motion to terminate a prison conditions consent decree triggers an automatic stay of all prospective relief under the decree on the thirtieth day after the filing of the motion, or the ninetieth day after the filing should the court postpone the effective date of the automatic stay by sixty days for good cause. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2)-(3) (as amended in 1997). The automatic stay remains effective until the court rules on the termination motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2).


[18] In these consolidated cases the Michigan Department of Corrections moved to terminate longstanding consent decrees and sought to have prospective relief under the decrees automatically stayed pending resolution of the motions. The district courts invalidated the PLRA automatic stay provision on separation-of-powers and due process grounds. During the pendency of this appeal, Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997), which amended the PLRA's automatic stay provision. The prisoners and the Department of Justice argue that under the amended statute Congress implicitly recognizes the inherent power of the courts to suspend the automatic stay in accordance with generally applicable equity standards, an interpretation with which the state officials disagree.


[19] We believe the state officials' construction of the PLRA's automatic stay provision violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because under their interpretation, the automatic stay amounts to a direct legislative suspension of a judicial order and, alternatively, intrudes impermissibly into the effective functioning of the Judiciary under certain circumstances. In contrast, the reasonable construction espoused by the prisoners and the Department of Justice does not violate separation-of-powers principles. Accordingly, we hold that the PLRA automatic stay provision, as construed to permit the courts to exercise their inherent equitable powers, does not give rise to an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into the powers reserved for the Judiciary. The parties also raise several other issues that we address below, including whether the attorney fees provisions of the PLRA should apply retroactively to pre-enactment conduct.


[20] I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY


[21] In 1980, Everett Hadix and other prisoners incarcerated at the State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex ("SPSM-CC") brought a class action suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against various state officials charged with the operation of SPSM-CC. The inmates asserted that their conditions of confinement violated their rights under the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Five years later, the parties entered into a comprehensive consent decree covering most aspects of prison life, including medical and mental health care; fire safety; sanitation; safety and hygiene; overcrowding and protection from harm; volunteers; food service; management; operations; access to courts; and mail. The Hadix consent decree specifically excluded from the decree issues concerning classification *fn1 ; due process; visitation; and access to courts as it relates to the provision of attorneys. See Joint Appendix (J.A.) #96-1943 at 109-58. Though the state officials admitted no liability on the inmates' claims, the decree explicitly stated that it was "intended by the parties to assure the constitutionality of the conditions under which prisoners are incarcerated at SPSM-CC." J.A. #96-1943 at 109. Under the decree's terms, the state officials could apply for termination of the decree when they were in compliance with all decree provisions. See J.A. # 96-1943 at 145. U.S. District Judge John Feikens approved the decree, ruling that it was both fair and reasonable. He has since issued several orders implementing the Hadix decree, several of which have been the subject of appeals to this court. *fn2


[22] In 1982, the United States Department of Justice *fn3 began an investigation of conditions in certain Michigan prisons pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, et seq. Two years later, after extensive investigation and negotiation with Michigan officials, the Justice Department filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the State of Michigan and various Michigan officials alleging that conditions in five Michigan prisons (SPSM-CC, State Prison of Southern Michigan Trusty, Charles Egeler Facility, Marquette Branch Prison, and Michigan Reformatory) violated the constitutional rights of the prisoners confined therein. The issues were never adjudicated; simultaneously with the filing of the complaint, the United States tendered a proposed consent decree and a "State Plan for Compliance." The United States agreed that implementation of the State Plan for Compliance would be adequate to bring the defendants into full compliance with the consent decree. U.S. District Judge Richard A. Enslen approved a revised version of the tendered decree that covered medical and mental health care; fire safety; sanitation; safety and hygiene; crowding and protection from harm; access to courts; and legal mail. See United States v. Michigan, 680 F. Supp. 928, 955 (W.D. Mich. 1987); J.A. #96-1907 at 181-92.


[23] In the interest of uniformity, the medical and mental health care components of the Hadix decree were transferred in 1992 and 1993 from judge Feikens in the Eastern District to Judge Enslen in the Western District. Judge Enslen has entered several orders implementing the USA decree and his portion of the Hadix decree.


[24] In April 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996), amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Enacted in part in response to criticisms that federal courts had overstepped their supervisory authority in prison conditions cases, the PLRA was specifically intended to limit the use of court-enforced consent decrees and to restrict "the ability of Federal Judges to affect the capacity and conditions of prisons and jails beyond what is required by the Constitution and Federal law." See H.R. Rep. No. 104-21, at 21 (1995). Section 802(a)(1) of the Act directs that prospective relief in prison conditions cases "shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). Correspondingly, § 802(b)(2) of the Act entitles the defendant "to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). Such prospective relief, however, "shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary[, narrowly drawn, and the least intrusive means] to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3) (as amended in 1997).


[25] On the basis of their new-found rights under the PLRA, the defendants moved to terminate the Hadix and USA decrees pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). The defendants sought to take advantage of a provision in the PLRA that at the time of their motion instituted an automatic stay of prospective relief thirty days after the filing of a such a motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (1996), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997). *fn4 The defendants asserted that on the thirtieth day after the filing of their termination motions, unless the court had made the findings required by § 3626(b)(3) during that period, all prospective relief under the decree would be automatically stayed pending the courts' rulings on the motions.


[26] The district courts refused to allow the automatic stay to take effect in these cases, ruling that the automatic stay provision violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362 (W.D. Mich. 1996). Following the rulings, the defendants unsuccessfully moved in this court for emergency stays and mandamus relief to block the district courts from holding evidentiary hearings on the termination motions.


[27] After this case was submitted to this court on appeal, Congress enacted Pub. L. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997), which amended the PLRA's automatic stay provision. Whereas prior to the amendments the automatic stay provision instituted an automatic stay of all prospective relief on the thirtieth day after the filing of a motion to terminate such relief, the amended provision additionally permits a court to "postpone the effective date of an automatic stay . . . for not more than 60 days for good cause." § 123(a)(3)(c), 111 Stat. at 2470, amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e). Good cause does not include "general congestion of the court's calendar." Id. Although the amended provision enables a court to extend for good cause the effective date of the automatic stay by sixty days, it still provides that a court-enforced consent decree will be automatically stayed if the court fails to make the findings required by § 3626(b)(3) within the prescribed time period. Congress also added a subsection providing for interlocutory appeal of "[a]ny order staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay," other than an order postponing the stay for up to sixty days pursuant to § 3626(e)(3). *fn5 § 123(a)(4), 111 Stat. at 2470, amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e).


[28] Subsequent to the congressional amendments to the PLRA automatic stay provision, the prisoners suggested that these appeals were now moot. We asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing discussing the effect of the amendments on these cases, specifically addressing the retroactive application of the amended statute, the authority the amended provision grants to a district court, the prisoners' claim of mootness, and whether the amendments affect the constitutionality of the automatic stay provision.


[29] II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES


[30] The primary issue now before us is whether the automatic stay provision of the PLRA is constitutional. The plaintiffs, however, raise preliminary issues that must be addressed.


[31] A. Jurisdiction


[32] As an initial matter, the plaintiffs claim that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the denial of a stay is not an appealable interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), *fn6 nor an appealable order under the collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. *fn7 The recent amendments to the PLRA's automatic stay provision provide that "[a]ny order staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay . . . shall be treated as an order refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction and shall be appealable pursuant to section 1292(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, regardless of how the order is styled or whether the order is termed a preliminary or a final ruling." Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 123(a)(c)(3), 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997). A court must "apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision," Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974), unless doing so affects "substantive rights, liabilities, or duties [pertaining] to conduct arising before their enactment." Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 278 (1994). Application of a new statute giving jurisdiction to the courts "takes away no substantive right," Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916) (quoted in Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274), but simply "speak[s] to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274 (quotation omitted); see also Figueroa-Rubio v. INS, 108 F.3d 110, 122 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that statute regulating courts' jurisdiction affected power of courts rather than substantive rights of parties).


[33] We therefore conclude that the recent amendments to the PLRA explicitly vest this court with the power to review a district court order barring the operation of the automatic stay prior to the termination of the underlying litigation, thereby providing a specific statutory authorization for immediate appellate review. We need not decide whether the collateral order doctrine affords an additional basis for immediate appellate review.


[34] B. Mootness


[35] During the pendency of this appeal, Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997), amending § 802(e) of the PLRA. The prisoners assert that these amendments to the PLRA's automatic stay provision render this case moot. See Pls.-Appellees' Mem. in Supp. of Suggestion of Mootness. We disagree.


[36] The case or controversy requirement continues through all stages of the litigation. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). To sustain our appellate jurisdiction, "it is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed[;] [t]he parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit." Id. at 477-78 (quotation omitted). "[A] controversy does not cease to exist by mere virtue of a change in the applicable law." Public Serv. Co. of Col. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 30 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 1994). As the Supreme Court recognized in Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993), where the new statute is substantially similar to the old statute and operates in "the same fundamental way," the statutory change has not "sufficiently altered [the circumstances] so as to present a substantially different controversy," and the case is not moot. Id. at 662 & n. 3; see also Rosenstiel v. Rodriquez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1548 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 117 S. Ct. 1820 (1997). In other words, where the changes in the law arguably do not remove the harm or threatened harm underlying the dispute, "the case remains alive and suitable for judicial determination." Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 30 F.3d at 1205.


[37] We conclude that the controversy in this case is not moot for two reasons. First, the parties dispute whether the PLRA's automatic stay provision as amended preserves the courts' traditional equity powers. The state officials contend that the statute displaces the courts' inherent powers in equity, whereas the prisoners, as well as the Justice Department, argue that § 4 of the automatic stay provision implicitly recognizes and preserves the courts' power to stay the automatic stay in accordance with equitable principles.


[38] Second, under the statutory construction advocated by the state officials, the objectionable aspects of the automatic stay provision remain. Under the prior version of § 3626(e)(2), all prospective relief under the challenged consent decrees would be automatically stayed on the thirtieth day after the filing of a motion to terminate the decrees under § 3626(b)(3) pending the courts' rulings on the motion. Before the expiration of the thirty-day automatic-stay safety period, both district Judges entered orders finding the PLRA's automatic stay provision constitutionally flawed under separation-of-powers and due process principles. *fn8 See Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (Feikens, J.) (hereinafter "Hadix I"); Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (Enslen, J.) (hereinafter "Hadix II"). Both Judges concluded that the consent decrees and associated orders affording prospective relief were "final judgments" protected from congressional interference under the holding of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). See Hadix I, 933 F. Supp. at 1361; Hadix II, 933 F. Supp. at 1367. In light of the finality of the decrees and orders, the district Judges also found that the automatic stay abrogated vested property rights without affording due process. See Hadix II, 933 F. Supp. at 1369; Hadix I, 933 F. Supp. at 1361-62 (concurring with Hadix II). Moreover, the district Judges believed that the automatic stay mandated the outcome of a pending case in an attempt by Congress to alter constitutional rights. See Hadix II, 933 F. Supp. at 1366-67; Hadix I, 933 F. Supp. at 1361-62 (concurring with Hadix II). If the PLRA as amended simply allows the courts to postpone by sixty days for good cause the effective date of the automatic stay without preserving the courts' equitable powers, see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3)-(4) (as amended in 1997), the amendments do not cure these objections, and the controversy between the parties regarding the constitutionality of such legislation continues in full force. Accordingly, we hold that the case is not moot. *fn9


[39] Where a change in law does not extinguish the controversy, the preferred procedure is for the court of appeals to remand the case to the district court for reconsideration of the case under the amended law. See Concerned Citizens of Vicksburg v. Sills, 567 F.2d 646, 650 (5th Cir. 1978); Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1208 (2d Cir. 1972); cf. Faries v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 909 F.2d 170, 173 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that where the administrative law Judge or Benefits Review Board erred by applying an incorrect legal standard, remand of the case is normally appropriate for development of additional evidence pertinent to new standard). We normally pursue this course of action so that "`the district court [may have] an opportunity to pass [judgment] on the changed circumstances,'" Concerned Citizens of Vicksburg, 567 F.2d at 650 (quoting Korn, 456 F.2d at 1208), and so that we may be aided in our appellate review by the district court's findings of fact and Conclusions of law. In this case, however, we see little to be gained from further delaying this litigation so that the district court may reconsider the constitutionality of the automatic stay provision as now amended. The prisoners challenge the validity of the PLRA's automatic stay provision on its face, and as such their challenge raises purely legal issues. Consequently, because this case does not necessitate any findings of fact, the district Judges' expertise in evaluating factual matters cannot advance our appellate review of this action. Rather than further delay this case by remanding to the district court, we choose to reach the merits of this case in the interest of judicial economy. Cf. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1173 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1983) (choosing to reach the merits "in the interest of judicial economy" rather than remand where the district court failed to reach the merits because it erroneously held that it lacked jurisdiction, and where the case was submitted on the law and neither side argued that further fact-finding was necessary to decide the issues presented), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1549-57 (reviewing constitutionality of amended campaign finance law without remanding to district court where amendment simply changed the mechanics of the expenditure limitation waiver and appellants assailed the validity of the amended law on primarily the same grounds); Probert v. INS, 954 F.2d 1253, 1255 (6th Cir. 1992) (interpreting statute amended while on appeal). We now turn to the constitutionality of the PLRA's automatic stay provision as amended.


[40] III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PLRA AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION


[41] Section 802 of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, as amended by Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997), imposes standards for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions concerning conditions in prisons, designed to ensure that relief in prison reform cases would be narrowly tailored to cure actual violations of federal rights. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-21, 24 n.2 (1995). The Act defines "prospective relief" to include all relief, other than compensatory monetary damages, "in any form that may be granted or approved by the court, and includes consent decrees but does not include private settlement agreements." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7), (9). For prospective relief entered after the passage of the PLRA, § 802 provides for periodic review to determine whether the prescribed relief remains necessary and narrowly drawn to remedy violations of federal rights. For relief entered before the PLRA's effective date, April 26, 1996, § 802 requires that only prospective relief that comports with present legal standards should continue. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). Congress stated explicitly that § 802 of the PLRA "shall apply with respect to all prospective relief whether such relief was originally granted or approved before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this title." See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 note (Effective Date of 1996 Amendments). Congress also directed that the 1997 amendments to § 802 of the PLRA "shall take effect upon the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to pending cases." Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 123(b), 111 Stat. 2440, 2471 (1997). Congress included a severability provision that preserves the remainder of the PLRA should any portion be deemed unconstitutional. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 note (Severability of Provisions). *fn10


[42] The filing of a motion to terminate a consent decree under the PLRA triggers an automatic stay of all prospective relief under the decree on the thirtieth day after the motion's filing, or upon the ninetieth day after the motion's filing should the court postpone the automatic stay's effective date by sixty days for good cause, pending a final ruling on the motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2)-(3) (as amended in 1997). The parties dispute whether the statute, as amended, permits the courts to invoke their equitable authority and suspend the automatic stay.


[43] The prisoners and the Justice Department argue that the PLRA as amended implicitly recognizes the lower courts' discretionary power to stay the automatic stay in accordance with principles of equity. Where courts improperly exercise power they do not possess or fail to take required action, the appropriate recourse for the aggrieved party is to petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus, not interlocutory appellate review. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 257 (1957). For example, Congress amended § 3626(e)(1) to provide for mandamus where the district court fails "to issue a prompt ruling" on a motion to terminate or modify a consent degree brought under § 3626(b), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(1) (as amended in 1997), in order "to make clear that mandamus relief is available to compel the court to issue a ruling on a pending motion." H.R. Conf. Rep. 105-405, at ___ (1997), reprinted in 143 Cong. Rec. H10845 (November 13, 1997). Rather than provide for a writ of mandamus to remedy "[a]ny order staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay," other than an order postponing the automatic stay pursuant to § 3626(e)(3), Congress enacted § 3626(e)(4), which provides for interlocutory appeal of such orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See 18 U.S.C. § 3636(e)(4) (as amended in 1997). The prisoners and the justice Department logically argue that Congress would have no need to provide for expedited review of orders suspending the automatic stay if the courts did not have the power to issue such orders. In other words, had Congress intended to bar the courts from issuing orders suspending operation of the automatic stay, Congress would have explicitly stated as much and would have provided the remedy of mandamus rather than for appellate review of such orders.


[44] Disagreeing with this interpretation, the state prison officials contend that the automatic stay provision as amended does not authorize any court to postpone the effective date of the automatic stay by more than sixty days, and that in adding § 4 Congress merely established appellate jurisdiction over district court orders suspending the automatic stay. Noting that prior to the 1997 amendment, the prisoners in this case argued on appeal that the district courts' initial orders suspending the automatic stay were not appealable interlocutory orders and that we therefore lacked jurisdiction over this appeal, the state officials suggest that Congress enacted § 4 in order to put to rest the prisoners' jurisdictional challenge.


[45] In resolving this conundrum as to the proper interpretation of the PLRA automatic stay provision, we rely on two rules of statutory construction. First, we will not interpret a statute as limiting the equitable jurisdiction of federal courts absent a clear command from Congress to the contrary. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705 (1979); see also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). Because our review of the amended statute and its accompanying legislative history fails to reveal a clear congressional intent to displace the equitable powers of the federal courts, we must construe the PLRA automatic stay provision as preserving the courts' inherent power to suspend the automatic stay. Second, "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the [courts] will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1993) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)); see also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 711 (1962) ("[A] statute should be interpreted, if fairly possible, in such a way as to free it from not insubstantial constitutional doubts."). For the reasons explained below, we believe the statutory construction advanced by the state prison officials constitutes an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into the powers reserved for the Judiciary, whereas the alternative construction put forward by the prisoners and the Justice Department avoids such constitutional infirmities. Because "[f]ederal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality," International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961), we agree with the prisoners' and Justice Department's construction of the PLRA's automatic stay provision and hold that the courts retain the power to suspend the automatic stay in accordance with general equitable principles. Given this construction, the amended automatic stay provision is constitutional.


[46] A. Displacement of Courts' Inherent Powers


[47] Certain inherent powers of the courts are said to be "rooted in the notion that a federal court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the common law equity tools of a Chancery Court . . . to process litigation to a just and equitable Conclusion." ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978). Included among the courts' traditional inherent powers is the authority to issue injunctive relief, such as the power to stay court orders. This authority derives not only from the power of the Judiciary to manage its affairs, see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (explaining that the courts' inherent powers are governed "by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious Disposition of cases" (quotation omitted)); cf. Clinton v. Jones, --- U.S. ---, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1650 (1997) (underscoring a district court's broad discretion "to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket"), but also furthers the pursuit of achieving complete Justice by enabling the court to suspend those judgments whose enforcement leads to inequitable results. Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 233-34 (explaining that Rule 60(b) "merely reflects and confirms the courts' own inherent and discretionary power, `firmly established in English practice long before the foundation of our Republic,' to set aside a judgment whose enforcement would work inequity") (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (stating that the historic power of equity allows a federal court to vacate its own judgment where induced by fraud). Although "the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal courts can be limited by statute and rule, for [t]hese courts were created by act of Congress," Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original), "the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command." Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; see also Califano, 442 U.S. at 705 ("Absent the clearest command to the contrary from Congress, federal courts retain their equitable power to issue injunctions in suits over which they have jurisdiction."). We require Congress to make plain its desire to limit the courts' inherent powers because "`[t]he great principles of equity, securing complete Justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.'" Porter, 328 U.S. at 398 (quotation omitted).


[48] We do not think the language of the PLRA automatic stay provision or the statute's legislative history compels a departure from the courts' inherent power to stay judicial orders in order to achieve equity. As explained previously, the prisoners' and the Justice Department's statutory construction is based on the logical assumption that Congress would not have provided in § 3626(e)(4) for expedited review of orders suspending the automatic stay if the courts did not have the authority to issue such orders. Moreover, the legislative history does not reveal a clear congressional command limiting the courts' inherent powers. Although the Conference Report accompanying the 1997 bill amending the automatic stay provision explains that Congress wished "to make clear that mandamus relief is available to compel the court to issue a ruling on a pending motion [to terminate or modify the consent decree] and to provide the courts additional time (60 days) to rule on motions to terminate before the automatic stay takes effect," the report is silent as to the legislative intent behind § 4. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-405 (1997). Nor does the report indicate whether Congress sought to eliminate all judicial discretion over the operation of the automatic stay. *fn11 Accordingly, we must resolve the ambiguities surrounding the automatic stay provision in favor of the interpretation which preserves the courts' ability to consider proceedings brought under the PLRA termination provisions in accordance with traditional equitable practices. Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944) (resolving the ambiguities of § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. App. § 925(a) (1944), "in favor of that interpretation which affords a full opportunity for equity courts to treat enforcement proceedings under this emergency legislation in accordance with their traditional practices"). We therefore accept the statutory construction advanced by the prisoners and the Department of Justice.


[49] B. Constitutional Considerations: Separation-of-Powers Doctrine


[50] We are committed to interpreting the PLRA automatic stay provision not only as preserving the courts' inherent powers absent clear congressional command to the contrary, but also in a manner that renders the statute constitutionally valid. See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762 (1988); see also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992). We thus must confront the fundamental question of whether the state prison officials' construction of the statute raises serious constitutional problems, specifically, under that view whether the statute constitutes an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into powers reserved to the Judiciary. We conclude that the state officials' construction of the PLRA automatic stay provision violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. Because the prisoners' and the Justice Department's construction of the provision avoids the serious constitutional problems posed by the state officials' statutory construction, it is incumbent upon us to interpret the PLRA automatic stay provision as preserving the court's inherent authority to suspend the automatic stay in accordance with general equitable principles.


[51] The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, reviewable de novo. See United States v. Brown, 25 F.3d 307, 308 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1045 (1994). Our analysis begins with a general presumption favoring the constitutionality of an act of Congress. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953); Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901). Bearing this presumption in mind, we turn to the challenges to the constitutionality of the automatic stay provision of the PLRA as construed by the state prison officials.


[52] 1. State Officials' Interpretation - Displacement of Courts' Equitable Powers


[53] Under the state officials' construction of the PLRA automatic stay provision, the federal courts do not retain the authority in equity to suspend the automatic stay beyond sixty days as provided in § 3626(e)(3). The prisoners argue that 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2), as amended, violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by unconstitutionally prescribing a rule of decision without changing the underlying substantive law. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). *fn12 Prior to the enactment of the 1997 amendments, the Department of Justice identified two other aspects of the operation of the automatic stay which affect the balance of power between the Legislature and the Judiciary - that the PLRA automatic stay directly suspends existing court orders, and places mandatory time restrictions on judicial decision-making which preclude the effective functioning of the Judiciary. The amendment of the PLRA automatic stay provision to permit the courts to postpone the effective date of the automatic stay for up to sixty days does not dispel these concerns.


[54] Although we do not believe that the state officials' construction of § 3626(e)(2), as amended, prescribes a rule of decision, we conclude that under the state officials' interpretation the automatic stay provision violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because it amounts to a direct legislative suspension of a judicial order. Alternatively, under certain circumstances, the automatic stay as construed by the state officials impermissibly intrudes into the effective functioning of the Judiciary. We therefore conclude that the automatic stay as interpreted by the state officials results in an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into the powers reserved for the Judiciary, and we decline to adopt that interpretation of the automatic stay provision.


[55] a. Prescribing a Rule of Decision:


[56] The inmates insist that through the PLRA's automatic stay provision, as construed by the state officials, Congress prescribed a rule of decision in a pending judicial case without changing the underlying law in contravention of United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). In Klein, the Supreme Court held that legislation dictating that acceptance of a presidential pardon constituted conclusive evidence of a person's disloyalty to the United States and directing the Court to dismiss actions pending on appeal in which property had been recovered based on a pardon was impermissibly "founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress." Id. at 146. Although Congress remains free to amend governing law and thereby affect the outcome of pending cases, see Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 438 (1992) (upholding statute against separation-of-powers challenge where new statute "compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law"), the Legislature may not impose a rule of decision for pending judicial cases without changing the applicable law. Ultimately, the Judiciary must remain free to "say what the law is" in any given case or controversy. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).


[57] By contrast, the PLRA automatic stay provision does not mandate a rule of decision. The automatic stay will not take effect if the court within the prescribed time period finds that the relief is no greater than that necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of a federal right. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2)-(3) (as amended in 1997). Although Congress has specified that certain timely findings are necessary to override the stay, the legislation does not direct any particular evidentiary findings nor dictate a result in a specific case. Courts are not restrained from giving "the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence should have." Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. Aside from its self-executing feature and its stringent time constraints, the interpretation and application of law to fact and the ultimate resolution of prison conditions cases at all times remains with the Judiciary. See Gavin, 122 F. 3d at 1089 ("The PLRA leaves the judging to Judges."); cf. Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he termination provision . . . does not dictate the result a court must reach in determining whether relief is warranted. The interpretation and application of law to fact and the ultimate resolution of prison condition cases remain at all times with the judiciary.") The PLRA automatic stay therefore technically withstands a separation-of-powers challenge based on Klein.


[58] b. Direct Legislative Suspension of Court Order:


[59] That the automatic stay provision does not manifestly prescribe a rule of decision in a pending case does not end our separation-of-powers inquiry. We also must closely examine the operation of the automatic stay provision, as construed by the state officials, in terms of the respective roles of Congress and the Judiciary in the suspension of existing court orders. We conclude that under the state officials' statutory construction the automatic stay provision is tantamount to direct legislative suspension of an existing court order, and we decline to embrace the state officials' construction of the statute because of this constitutional infirmity.


[60] As has often been expressed, "the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution [was] that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). The Framers intended that, as nearly as possible, each branch of government should confine itself to its assigned powers, and "that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments," The Federalist No. 48, at 146 (James Madison) (Roy Fairfield 2d ed., 1981) (emphasis added); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). Thus, "each of the three general departments of government [must remain] entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others." Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (quoted in Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380) (alteration in Mistretta). Actions of one branch which undertake directly a role reserved exclusively to another branch disrupt this constitutional balance of power.


[61] The constitutional principle drawn from Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), as articulated in Plaut, is "that Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch." Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218. We make no impermissible leap to suggest that this principle carries weight as well in a legislative suspension of a judicial order. Review of decisions of Article III courts, whether final judgments or orders implementing consent decrees, must be confined within the judicial branch. Because the suspension of a judicial order is a judicial act not to be undertaken directly by the Legislature, the Judiciary must play some role in the suspension of its own orders. Automatic legislative suspension of existing and presumptively valid judicial decrees violates this principle.


[62] The PLRA automatic stay provision, as construed by the state officials, runs afoul of the separation of constitutional powers because it makes the stay self-executing, taking effect without judicial action. *fn13 Under the state officials' interpretation, courts may not postpone the effective date of the stay beyond sixty days, and the sixty-day extension is limited to situations involving good cause (not including "general congestion of the court's calendar"). See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3) (as amended in 1997). Should the court fail to enter a final order ruling on the motion to modify or terminate prospective relief before the expiration of the sixty-day postponement, the automatic stay takes effect without judicial action. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (as amended in 1997). Thus, under the state officials' statutory construction, even if the court postpones the effective date of the automatic stay by the full sixty days allowed, on the ninety-first day after filing its motion, the state officials could simply refuse to comply with existing court orders implementing the consent decrees because the state could claim that pursuant to a congressional mandate those orders "automatically" have no force. Thus, if we applied the statute in the manner urged by the state officials, the "practical consequences" of the PLRA automatic stay would result, quite simply, in a temporary legislative veto over court-ordered relief in an ongoing case before the court. Such direct legislative suspension of orders of Article III courts simply cannot be harmonized with our tripartite system of governance.


[63] It is of course true that at any time Congress can alter the outcome of pending cases, or those involving ongoing supervisory court jurisdiction, by changing the substantive law that courts use in rendering decisions. Cf. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226 ("Congress can always revise the judgments of Article III courts in one sense: When a new law makes clear that it is retroactive" and thus is applied in pending cases). When that happens, however, the new law must still be applied in the particular case. The litigating parties are not entitled to act simply on Congress's command; they must go back to the court that issued the order to have the new law applied to their situation. Were Congress able to stay judicial orders directly, then any party subjected to a continuing court order might be able to bypass the issuing and reviewing courts entirely. The PLRA automatic stay, as construed by the state prison officials, impermissibly circumvents the judicial process.


[64] The defendants argue that legislative authority to enact an automatic stay of judicial proceedings has long been established, as evidenced by the time-honored automatic stay in the bankruptcy arena. Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, § 362(a) of Title 11 requires a stay of civil litigation against a debtor unless the bankruptcy court determines otherwise. In upholding the constitutionality of this bankruptcy automatic stay, the Supreme Court explained that although "[i]t is generally true that a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction bears a presumption of regularity and is not thereafter subject to collateral attack," Congress, pursuant to its plenary constitutional power over bankruptcy, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, "may by specific bankruptcy legislation create an exception to that principle and render judicial acts taken with respect to the person or property of a debtor whom the bankruptcy law protects nullities and vulnerable collaterally." Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940) (footnotes omitted). Thus, under the exclusive constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate bankruptcy, "Congress can limit the jurisdiction which courts, State or Federal, can exercise over the person and property of a debtor who duly invokes the bankruptcy law." Id. at 439. In contrast, once Congress establishes jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in an area outside Congress's enumerated Article I plenary powers, "the courts are vested with judicial powers pursuant to Article III." Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). Having conferred jurisdiction upon the lower courts in this area, the Legislature cannot then displace the courts and itself exercise judicial power, save through impeachment. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1317 (1996) ("[N]o decision of any court of the United States can, under any circumstances . . . agreeable to the constitution, be liable to a revision, or even suspension, by the legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested, but the important one relative to impeachments."). As articulated by Madison, "[t]he entire legislature can perform no judiciary act," and "[w]ere the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the Judge would then be the legislator." The Federalist No. 47, at 141 (James Madison) (Roy Fairfield 2d ed., 1981) (quoting Montesquieu).


[65] Our analysis convinces us that were we to interpret the PLRA' s automatic stay provision as automatically suspending judicial orders without allowing for the exercise of the courts' equitable authority to stay the automatic stay, the PLRA automatic stay provision would be constitutionally deficient and could not stand. *fn14


[66] c. Encroachment into the Functioning of the Judiciary:


[67] The state officials argue that the PLRA automatic stay, as they have construed it, amounts to no more than a legislative enactment in keeping with Congress's constitutional authority to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The express language of our Constitution confers in Congress the power to constitute inferior federal courts in which may be vested some or all of the judicial power of the United States. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. Nevertheless, having granted the courts jurisdiction to entertain a particular case or controversy, Congress cannot then diminish the power of the courts to an extent which renders the courts unable to meet their obligation of providing adequate remedies. See Benjamin, 124 F.2d at 170; see also Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 Yale L.J. 498, 527 (1974) ("Congress . . . may enact any jurisdictional statute that does not prevent vindication of a constitutional right."). We must therefore carefully consider whether in enacting the PLRA's automatic stay provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2), the Legislature impermissibly conditioned the exercise of judicial power so as to render it ineffective.


[68] To achieve separate yet balanced power among the branches, certain inherent powers issue by necessity to each of the three branches:


[69] [I]f there is one maxim which necessarily rides over all others, in the practical application of government, it is, that the public functionaries must be left at liberty to exercise the powers which the people have entrusted to them. The interests and dignity of those who created them, require the exertion of the powers indispensable to the attainment of the ends of their creation.


[70] Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226 (1821). Recognizing this maxim, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the constitutional structure requires "that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982); see also The Federalist No. 78, at 228 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield 2d ed., 1981) ("The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution."). Thus, we will only uphold a statute challenged as an impermissible legislative incursion into the workings of the judicial branch where it cannot "be construed as preventing the judicial branch `from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.'" Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).


[71] A statutory scheme that poses a serious danger of encroachment or threatens the ability of the Judiciary to carry out its constitutional duties, however, so impinges upon the autonomy of the Judiciary as to run afoul of the separation-of-powers doctrine. Cf. Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 668, 712 (1990) ("The measure of the constitutionality of a government action challenged as violating the principle of separation of powers . . . [is whether] it so hamstring[s] the ability of any of the branches independently to exercise its powers or to perform its functions that it is prevented from effectively carrying out its constitutional responsibilities . . . .").


[72] It is beyond dispute that there are certain inherent powers of the Judiciary that are untouchable by legislative act, see United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) ("Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of Justice from the nature of their institution."); see also Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("That courts have inherent powers - powers vested in the courts upon their creation, and not derived from any statute- is not disputed." (citations omitted)). Although the exact boundaries of the courts' inherent powers thus far has eluded complete categorization, at a minimum those boundaries encompass "activity so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms `court' and `judicial power.'" Eash, 757 F.2d 562. Because the denial of these fundamental powers renders courts practically inoperative, courts must be allowed to exercise those inherent powers essential to their constitutionally assigned role notwithstanding contrary legislative direction. Id.


[73] The Judiciary's fulfillment of its Article III responsibilities requires, at its core, meaningful judicial decisionmaking. See United States v. Rojas, 53 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir.) ("[S]eparation of powers would be implicated when the actions of another Branch threaten an Article III court's independence and impartiality in the execution of its decisionmaking function."), cert. denied, 1165 S. Ct. 478 (1995). The preservation of this inherent power, so fundamental to the bestowal of evenhanded Justice, requires that all federal courts be permitted to analyze relevant facts and the applicable substantive law untethered by the legislative branch. Otherwise, were the Legislature permitted to tie the deliberative hands of the Judiciary by erecting procedural hurdles that render thorough and thoughtful deliberation an impossibility, the will of the majority could effectively take control of the judicial process by sufficiently elevating the procedural hurdles in select areas of especially unpopular litigation. See J. Richard Doidge, Note, Is Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by the Separation Powers?: Rethinking United States v. Klein, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 910, 924 (1994) ("The legislature cannot do indirectly that which it cannot do directly."). Moreover, unconstrained deliberation by the Judiciary not only is necessary to preserve the independence of the Judiciary but also to protect due process rights of individual parties who come before the courts. Accordingly, Congress cannot restrict the independent and unconstrained judicial decisionmaking of the courts any more than it can directly stay the judicial order itself. *fn15


[74] We fear that in many prisoner cases, the application of the PLRA automatic stay, as construed by the state officials, implicates the integrity and fairness of judicial decisionmaking by substantially impeding the courts' capability for thorough and thoughtful consideration. As interpreted by the state officials, the PLRA automatic stay requires non-discretionary suspension of court-ordered prospective relief thirty days following the filing of a termination motion, or ninety days following the filing of the termination motion should the court postpone the effective date of the automatic stay by sixty days for good cause. This grace period is the only qualification on the otherwise compulsory suspension; beyond this grace period, under the state's view courts retain no discretion to defer the operation of, or dissolve, the automatic stay. In many cases, including those now before us on this appeal, the district courts' statutory task of ascertaining the presence of a current or ongoing violation of a federal right requires delving into complex factual or legal intricacies and a court record spanning many years. See, e.g., Hadix I, 933 F. Supp. at 1361; Hadix II, 933 F. Supp. at 1364. Consequently, thirty or ninety days before onset of the automatic stay may prove an inadequate period of time in which to find a constitutional violation where one has never before been explicitly recognized. By not allowing for judicial discretion in those cases where a court simply cannot exercise meaningful review within the prescribed time period, the PLRA automatic stay, as construed by the state officials, impedes the courts' substantive decisional role and can result in deleterious and distorting effects upon the outcome of the legal determination. Accordingly, in cases where the provision's deadline proves impossible to meet, if we were limited to the state officials' interpretation we would be obligated to declare that the automatic stay provision's time restriction unconstitutionally denigrates the Judiciary's status as a coequal branch in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. *fn16


[75] 2. Prisoners' and Justice Department's Interpretation - Preservation of Courts' Equitable Powers


[76] Disagreeing with the state officials' reading of the PLRA automatic stay provision, the prisoners and the Justice Department argue that by its terms the provision implicitly recognizes the courts' inherent power to invoke the injunctive process in order to do equity. As we explained previously, this construction of the automatic stay provision is reasonable and not contrary to clear legislative intent. In order to assess whether the prisoners' and the justice Department's construction of the automatic stay provision avoids the serious constitutional problems posed by the state officials' statutory construction, we must first identify the contours of the equitable powers retained by the courts.


[77] Because the lower courts are created by Congress, a lower court's equitable powers are "conditioned by the necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to protect" in enacting the statute governing the case before the court. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 330. We therefore begin our analysis with the policy objectives underlying the PLRA. Concern that the life of consent decrees in prisoner litigation cases often extended beyond the time necessary to correct violations of the prisoners' federal rights, Congress sought to terminate judicial supervision of prisons where the necessity for that supervision no longer exists. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-21, at 24 n.2 (1995). To this end, Congress provided for review of all prospective relief and commanded that the federal courts terminate such relief absent proof of an ongoing violation of the prisoners' federal rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). In an effort to encourage speedy resolution of motions brought under the PLRA termination provisions, Congress enacted the automatic stay provisions because it believed that "[b]y providing that the prospective relief that is subject to the motion will be stayed if the motion is not decided promptly, Judges will be motivated to decide the motions and avoid having the stay automatically take effect." H.R. Rep. No. 104-21, at 26 (1995). At the same time, Congress did not seek to limit the courts' authority to grant or approve relief where prisoners "can prove a violation of [their] federal rights." Id. at 23.


[78] Deference to Congress's intent of restricting prospective relief to only those prisoner cases where such relief is necessary to correct a proven violation of a federal right requires that courts invoke their equitable authority to suspend the automatic stay in very limited circumstances. Were district courts routinely to exercise their inherent power to suspend the automatic stay, the very tool Congress utilized in an effort to encourage expeditious review of motions to terminate prospective relief in prisoner reform cases would be rendered useless. Moreover, "[b]ecause of their very potency," the inherent powers of the courts "must be exercised with restraint and discretion." Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. At the same time, the lower courts' authority must remain flexible enough so that they may fulfill the guiding principle of equity - "securing complete Justice." Porter, 328 U.S. at 398 (quotation omitted).


[79] We are satisfied that the traditional standard governing the issuance of a preliminary injunction in equity properly balances these considerations, although we do not rule out the possibility that a lower court may justifiably suspend the operation of an automatic stay under other equitable standards. *fn17 The determination of whether to grant a preliminary injunction involves balancing the following factors:


[80] (1) the likelihood that the party seeking the preliminary injunction will succeed on the merits of the claim; (2) whether the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm without the grant of the extraordinary relief; (3) the probability that granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest is advanced by the issuance of the injunction.


[81] Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994); see also International Resources, Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 294, 302 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 973 (1992). Because these factors are not prerequisites but must be balanced, the likelihood of success required to support a suspension of the automatic stay depends on the strength of the other factors considered. See Washington, 35 F.3d at 1099.


[82] While we do not attempt here to identify all scenarios in which the district court may appropriately suspend the automatic stay, we pause to note the fundamental importance of the courts' ability to provide meaningful review. As explained previously, where Congress impedes the Judiciary's capacity for thorough and thoughtful consideration so as to undermine inevitably the integrity and fairness of judicial decisionmaking, the constitutional principle of separation-of-powers is severely compromised. In those complex cases where the district court simply cannot exercise meaningful review before the effective date of the automatic stay, the public interest in protecting the courts' deliberative role militates in favor of suspending the automatic stay. We emphasize that although courts often may find it difficult to provide meaningful review, constitutional concerns about an unwarranted incursion by Congress into the province retained for the Judiciary arise only where thorough and thoughtful judicial decisionmaking is virtually impossible. Where a district court retains the ability, however difficult, to probe relevant factual and legal issues and deliberate upon matters before the court, it is in a position to protect its judicial orders against direct legislative suspension and to fulfill its "obligation to exercise its jurisdiction meaningfully," United States v. Michigan, 18 F.3d 348, 352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 925 (1994).


[83] By preserving the federal courts' ability to suspend the automatic stay where necessary to ensure meaningful review and to protect judicial orders against direct legislative suspension, the prisoners' and Justice Department's construction of the PLRA automatic stay provision avoids the constitutional infirmities which plague the state officials' construction. Our commitment to construing federal statutes not only to preserve the federal courts' inherent powers but also to avoid where fairly possible serious doubt as to their constitutionality necessitates our rejecting the state officials' construction of the automatic stay provision in favor of the prisoners' and Justice Department's construction. Accordingly, we hold that the § 3626(e), as amended, does not interfere with the traditional inherent powers of the courts and therefore as so interpreted does not give rise to an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into the powers reserved for the Judiciary. Because the time period prescribed by the automatic stay provision long ago expired in the cases before us, on remand the district courts should consider whether to exercise their inherent equitable powers to suspend the automatic stay in conformity with this opinion, to allow the automatic stay to take effect, or to terminate the decrees.


[84] IV. RETROACTIVITY OF ATTORNEY FEES PROVISION


[85] We now turn to the award of attorney fees entered in the Hadix litigation by Judge Feikens on May 30, 1996. See J.A. #96-1851 at 464-69. What would have amounted to a rather commonplace judicial ruling on disputed attorney hours in an ongoing litigation has been complicated by its unfortunate timing. The inmates' entitlement to attorney monitoring fees and procedures for payment was established in the Hadix litigation in 1987. See J.A. #96-1851 at 165-66. Pursuant to prescribed procedure, in early 1996 the inmates submitted to the state officials petitions for attorney fees covering the period of July through December 1995. The state officials objected to certain hours, and the parties could not resolve the dispute by themselves. The inmates therefore filed a motion for attorney fees with the court on March 12, 1996. J.A. #96-1851 at 277-78. The motion, entirely for fees incurred in the latter half of 1995, was pending before the district Judge on April 26, 1996, when the PLRA took effect.


[86] Section 803(d) of the PLRA amended the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, et seq., as it applied to awards of attorney fees. Prior to the passage of the PLRA, courts were authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to award attorney fees in this type of prison reform litigation based on the community's market rate for the services rendered. See Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 536 (6th Cir. 1995); Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283 (1989). Section 803(d) of the PLRA, however, limits attorney fees authorized in prison litigation to an amount "directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights" and proportional to or directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the court-ordered relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). *fn18 In addition, the rate upon which the award is based may not exceed 150 percent of the hourly rate established under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. *fn19 The 1995 established rate of pay in the Hadix litigation was $150 per hour. See J.A. #96-1851 at 174, 392. Though the parties do not agree on how the PLRA would affect the rate of pay in this case, we assume, for illustrative purposes only, that the PLRA would cap the maximum hourly rate for attorney fees in this case at $112.50 (150% of $75 maximum hourly rate). *fn20 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3).


[87] Seeking to take advantage of the lesser rate and more stringent standard, the state officials asked the district court to apply the PLRA's attorney fees provisions to the pending motion, arguing that the PLRA applies to all "awards" entered after the enactment date, April 26, 1996, regardless of when the fees were actually earned. Upon consideration, the district court denied application of the PLRA to the fees earned in 1995 and directed payment at the pre-established rate of $150 per hour. J.A. #96-1851 at 464-69. Before us the state officials renew their arguments and ask us to hold that the PLRA's new attorney fees limitations apply to legal work completed prior to the passage of the PLRA. We decline their invitation.


[88] We recently addressed the retroactivity of the PLRA's attorney fee provisions to legal work performed before its enactment, and held "that allowing the PLRA's limitations on attorney fees to alter the standards and rate for awarding fees for legal work competed prior to passage of the PLRA results in an impermissible retroactive effect by attaching significant new legal burdens to the completed work, and by impairing rights acquired under pre-existing law." Glover v. Johnson, --- F.3d ---, 1998 WL 83102, at * 23 (6th Cir. March 2, 1998). Accordingly, we hold that the award of attorney fees for legal work performed prior to the enactment of the PLRA is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and not § 803(d) of the PLRA.


[89] As for the propriety of any given fee award, provided the district court explains its reasoning in a clear and concise manner, an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 "is entitled to substantial deference." Hadix, 65 F.3d at 534-35; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). "Accordingly, we review a district court's award of attorney fees, including the fee rate, only for abuse of discretion." Hadix, 65 F.3d at 534. The state officials assert that some of the hours to prepare an appellate brief were excessive, duplicative, and thus unreasonable. *fn21 The contested brief was prepared for an appeal to this court of a district court order refusing to modify the out-of-cell activity plan and mandating college programming following Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992). Judge Feikens, who was intimately aware of the work being performed by the attorneys, of the of the case, and of the need to revisit the modification request following Rufo, found the hours at issue to be reasonable for the composition of a complex appellate brief. See J.A. #96-1851 at 464-69 (Op. and Order Regarding Pls.' Mot. for Att'y Fees). Our primary concern is that the fee awarded was reasonable, and we are satisfied that it was. See Hadix, 65 F.3d at 535; cf. Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schs., 611 F.2d 624, 640-42 (6th Cir. 1979) (discussing reasonableness of attorney fees award for large school desegregation case), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980). Not having been persuaded that the district court's reasonableness finding was erroneous, we affirm the district court's May 30, 1996 order awarding attorney fees.


[90] V. OTHER ISSUES


[91] A. Termination of Security Classification


[92] As part of the USA decree, the state officials agreed to design and implement a plan to classify prisoners' risks and security levels for the various facilities. Through his July 3, 1996 opinion, Judge Enslen refused to terminate federal court jurisdiction over the security classification system at the Michigan Reformatory, one of the five correctional facilities subject to the USA decree. That decision is now before us.


[93] In April 1992, the parties to the USA decree filed a joint motion to dismiss most components of the decree and simultaneously asked the court to modify the USA decree's termination clause so that termination would occur as to any consent decree provision in isolation when the defendants are in compliance with constitutional requirements. The district court accepted the piecemeal termination proposal, but refused to allow termination solely upon compliance with constitutional requirements; rather, termination would depend upon compliance with the terms of the decree, but if constitutional requirements have been met, termination would not be precluded. J.A. #96-1907 at 422. The court also refused to rule on the joint motion to dismiss until after it had received updated compliance information from the independent expert monitoring the decree. Upon receipt of the compliance information, the court granted the joint motion for dismissal as to Michigan Reformatory and Marquette Branch Prison as to most issues excluding access to courts. J.A. #96-1907 at 432-35. Following this court's decision, the parties entered into negotiations culminating in a Joint Review Process for addressing the remaining issues and a joint motion and stipulation filed with the court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), (6), proposing dismissal of all provisions of the USA decree at the Michigan Reformatory and the Marquette Branch Prison, excluding medical and mental health care. J.A. #96-1907 at 249-364.


[94] In its July 3, 1996 order which is the subject of this appeal, the district court addressed the joint motion for dismissal. The court ruled that it was "satisfied that the provisions with regard to sanitation, safety and hygiene; fire safety; crowding and protection from harm; access to the courts; and legal mail should be deleted from the State Plan and Consent Decree" as applied to the Michigan Reformatory and the Marquette Branch Prison, yet the court retained jurisdiction over the classification issues as to the Michigan Reformatory. J.A. #96-1907 at 381. The court relied upon expert evaluations showing that while Michigan had maintained an acceptable range of overrides *fn22 in 1993 and 1994, it had fallen out of compliance in March 1995 and had not returned to compliance as of June 1996. The district court expressed concern that Michigan did not maintain steady compliance and was out of compliance at the time of the court's review of the joint motion.


[95] We have already articulated in a prior opinion in this case that the district court is not subject to the parties' stipulation with respect to termination of a consent decree component, but may exercise independent judgment regarding compliance with the decree. See United States v. Michigan, 18 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 312 (1994). The district court properly adhered to that obligation in determining that the consent decree provision dealing with the implementation of a professionally-based classification plan should remain in effect at the Michigan Reformatory. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over classification issues at the Michigan Reformatory.


[96] B. Evidentiary Record for Resolving Motion to Terminate


[97] Michigan further contends that under the statute a motion for immediate termination of a consent decree must be considered on the record existing at the time the motion was filed, disallowing the district Judge to engage in supplemental fact-finding. The state supports its argument by § 3626(b)(3)'s directive that "[p]rospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record" (emphasis added) that relief remains necessary and narrowly drawn. That language, the inmates respond, does not mean simply the existing record at the time the motion was filed. Rather, the statute necessarily enables a district Judge to examine current conditions at the prisons which become part of the judicial record, since the very task before the Judge is to ascertain the existence of "a current or ongoing violation" of a federal right. As the state would have it, the district court would be forbidden from supplementing the past record in a case to determine whether a current constitutional violation exists. The Second Circuit recently adopted the prisoners' interpretation, finding it the "most sensible" construction of § 3626(b) "[g]iven that the pre-existing record will rarely contain information on the `current' state of affairs." Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 179 (2nd Cir. 1997); see also Thompson v. Gomez, --- F. Supp. ---, 1997 WL 824986, *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 1997) ("If the existing record is not adequate to determine present circumstances, subsection (3) gives the court the power to supplement the record by taking further evidence."); Ruiz v. Scott, 1996 WL 932104, *8 n.6 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 1996) ("Th[e] `record' is not necessarily limited to the record that existed prior to the filing of a motion to terminate under Section 3626(b). Rather, . . . the record may include supplemental information that is presented to the court."). We note that other courts have also allowed the record to be supplemented with information on current conditions when considering a motion under § 3626(b)(2). See, e.g., Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397, 406-07 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (declining to terminate consent decree until after a hearing is held to determine whether ongoing constitutional violations exist); Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727, 733 (D. V.I. 1997) (relying on evidence introduced at a hearing following defendants' motion to modify or terminate consent decrees under the PLRA).


[98] We believe this debate is premature at this juncture and should await appellate review of the lower courts' actual rulings on the termination motions. The proper evidentiary methods and materials that a district court may utilize in deciding a § 3626(b)(2) motion is a question more aptly considered when this court has before it a concrete example of how a district court actually proceeded in ruling upon a motion under § 3626(b)(2). Since we hold the automatic stay provision constitutional in light of the inherent equity powers of the courts to stay the stay if necessary, this debate does not touch upon any issue before this court at this time.


[99] C. Partial Stay of Phases II and III


[100] On September 19, 1996, we issued a partial stay relieving the defendants of their obligation to implement Phases II and III of the Hadix decree pending this appeal. We now lift that partial stay, although we note that the parties may ask Judge Feikens to continue the stay of Phases II and III until the district court issues a ruling on the issues remaining in this litigation.


[101] VI. CONCLUSION


[102] We conclude that the 1997 amendments to the automatic stay provision, as properly construed to avoid constitutional infirmity, do not interfere with the traditional inherent powers of the courts. Since the lower courts retain the power to suspend the automatic stay in accordance with the traditional standards governing the granting of preliminary injunctions in equity, we REVERSE the lower court orders holding the pre-1997 automatic stay provision unconstitutional. We also AFFIRM the May 30, 1996 award of attorney fees entered in the Hadix litigation by Judge Feikens, and we AFFIRM Judge Enslen's decision to retain jurisdiction over the security classification system at the Michigan Reformatory. We REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.


[103] CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART


[104] ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge, Concurring in part, Dissenting in part.


[105] I agree with the majority that the decisions of the district courts, which held the pre-1997 automatic stay provision of the PLRA to be unconstitutional, must be reversed because the provision, as amended, "does not give rise to an unconstitutional incursion by Congress into the powers reserved for the Judiciary." In my view, however, it is not necessary for us to construe the automatic stay provision to permit courts to "suspend the automatic stay in accordance with general equitable principles," in order to save the amended statute. As I read the statute, a district court may postpone the operation of the automatic stay once for a period of sixty days, provided that it finds good cause to do so. Nothing more is authorized by § 3626(e) and, from a constitutional perspective, nothing more is required.


[106] Before discussing the substance of the automatic stay provision, I feel obliged to touch briefly upon the issue of mootness. Because the amendments to the automatic stay provision significantly alter the inquiry into its constitutionality, I believe that the appropriate response is to remand the matter to the district courts so that they can consider the effect of the amendments on the statute. This is the position taken by both the Justice Department and the prisoner plaintiffs and, as the majority opinion recognizes, this is the preferred procedure in cases where a change in the law fails to extinguish the controversy.


[107] In declining to hold that the case before us is moot, the majority explains that "because this case does not necessitate any findings of fact, the district Judges' expertise in evaluating factual matters cannot advance our appellate review of this action." This Conclusion ignores the obvious consideration that, since the automatic stay provision directly affects the manner in which district courts handle prison conditions cases, the ideal place to begin an inquiry into the ramifications of the provision would be in these very same courts. As the result of the amendments, for instance, district courts can postpone the effective date of the automatic stay by an additional sixty days. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3). This tripling of the original statute's time period before an automatic stay takes effect represents a significant change, and we ought not to preclude the district courts from their traditional role in helping us to determine in the first instance whether Congress exceeded its authority under the Constitution.


[108] Finally, as the Justice Department points out, while this appeal was pending another panel of this court upheld the constitutionality of § 3626(b), the immediate termination provision of the PLRA. Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998). That development certainly alters the legal landscape facing the district courts on remand and we should permit them the opportunity to reassess their initial decisions.


[109] In sum, I agree with the Justice Department and the prisoner plaintiffs that this appeal is moot in light of the 1997 amendments to the automatic stay provision.


[110] Turning to the merits, I fail to see why we need to read an "equitable exception" into the automatic stay provision in order to avoid a separation-of-powers problem. The majority contends that if district courts are limited to a one-time, sixty-day postponement of the automatic stay, the provision "violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because it amounts to a direct legislative suspension of a judicial order." It does nothing of the kind: the suspension is neither immediate nor permanent; at all times the district court retains the authority to avoid (or, alternatively, to lift) a stay by simply complying with certain substantive provisions of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b). *fn23 The automatic stay neither mandates a rule of decision in contravention of Klein nor reopens a final judgment in contravention of Plaut. Rather, the provision simply encourages the district court to comply with the PLRA in a timely fashion without divesting the court of the authority to decide the merits of the case.


[111] What are the practical consequences of the automatic stay provision? First, the stay is, by definition, a temporary state that is lifted when the district court makes the factual findings required by the PLRA. While the realities of a crowded court docket coupled with the complexity of litigation related to prison conditions will occasionally make it difficult for district courts to comply with the time constraints imposed by § 3626(e), they do not make it impossible. Courts, after all, do control their own dockets and are free to impose deadlines upon parties and to shift schedules in response to evolving priorities. See Harris v. Callwood, 844 F.2d 1254, 1255 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1961)).


[112] Even in the event that the automatic stay provision were triggered by inaction, the consequences are hardly as dire as the majority would have us believe. In the event that prospective relief is stayed pending the factual findings mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b), none of the improvements to prison conditions made by the State over the past decade will be jettisoned nor will prison policies relating to concerns such as health care revert to those in effect before 1985. Rather, the State will be permitted to pause in its implementation of those programs that have not been fully realized.


[113] The automatic stay provision does not represent a way in which the State can evade its obligations. It merely allows the State to request that the status quo be maintained pending a factual finding by the district court that further relief is constitutionally required. Considering the lengthy span of prison litigation, *fn24 a relatively brief hiatus to review the continued legitimacy of extensive court-ordered relief strikes me as both constitutionally permissible and practically advisable.


[114] Within certain limits, what Congress can create, Congress can take away. The Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power to establish "inferior Courts" and to determine the jurisdiction of those courts. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. Even the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is, after all, subject to regulation under the Exceptions Clause. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868); see Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 895, 908 (1984). Once jurisdiction is conferred, of course, Congress must permit the courts a "meaningful" opportunity to decide the case. In my view, the automatic stay provision does not, as the majority would have it, implicate "the integrity and fairness of judicial decisionmaking." Rather, it merely represents a permissible exercise of Congress' undisputed authority to establish regulations governing the manner in which inferior federal courts operate.


[115] Finally, the majority's invocation of the doctrine of separation-of-powers seems especially ironic, since Congress enacted the PLRA in part due to a perception that federal courts flouted the doctrine by assuming control over prisons. The majority now lectures Congress that it need not have concerned itself with that aspect of the doctrine. Perhaps the lesson to be drawn by Congress is that the only side that matters is our side -- that while federal courts may encroach upon the prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches (not to mention those of the States), Congress dare not tinker with ours.


[116] For the reasons just outlined, I concur in the decision to reverse the decisions of the district courts below, but Dissent with respect to the reasoning. I also concur in the majority's resolution of the award of attorney fees by Judge Feikens and of Judge Enslen's decision to retain jurisdiction over security classification.



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Opinion Footnotes

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[117] *fn1 By stipulation the classification issue was referred for resolution in the United States v. Michigan parallel consent decree. See Hadix v. Johnson, 943 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1991).


[118] *fn2 Some of Judge Feikens's orders have involved implementing a plan to break up SPSM-CC into five autonomous units. Phase I of the break-up has been implemented. On September 19, 1996, this court issued a partial stay that relieved the defendants of their obligation to implement Phases II and III pending this appeal.


[119] *fn3 The United States is involved in this appeal as a direct party in the USA suit, as amicus in the health care portions of the Hadix suit in the Western District, and as an intervenor in both the Eastern and Western Districts on the issues regarding the constitutionality of the PLRA automatic stay provision.


[120] *fn4 Before the 1997 amendments, § 3626(e) provided in pertinent part as follows: (1) Generally. -- The court shall promptly rule on any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions. (2) Automatic stay. -- Any prospective relief subject to a pending motion shall be automatically stayed during the period -- (A)(i) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed, in the case of a motion made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b); . . . and (B) ending on the date the court enters a final order ruling on the motion.


[121] *fn5 The amended version of § 3626(e) provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) Generally - The court shall promptly rule on any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions. . . . (2) Automatic Stay - Any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief made under [§ 3626(b)] shall operate as a stay during the period - (A)(i) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed under, in the case of a motion made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b); . . . and (B) ending on the date the court enters a final order ruling on the motion. (3) Postponement of Automatic Stay - The court may postpone the effective date of an automatic stay specified in subsection (e)(2)(A) for not more than 60 days for good cause. No postponement shall be permissible because of general congestion of the court's calendar. (4) Order Blocking the Automatic Stay - Any order staying, suspending, delaying, or barring the operation of the automatic stay described in paragraph (2) (other than an order to postpone the effective date of the automatic stay under paragraph (3)) shall be treated as an order refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction and shall be appealable pursuant to section 1292(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, regardless of how the order is styled or whether the order is termed a preliminary or a final ruling.


[122] *fn6 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), "the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . . ."


[123] *fn7 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, "[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . ."


[124] *fn8 Both district courts properly rejected non-constitutional grounds for their decisions. Judge Enslen concluded that the automatic stay provision does not directly conflict with either Rule 60(b) or Rule 62(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hadix II, 933 F. Supp. at 1365; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Judge Feikens declined to suspend the effect of the automatic stay provision pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). See Hadix I, 933 F. Supp. at 1361.


[125] *fn9 Judge Feikens issued an order on November 1, 1996 that found the immediate termination provisions of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2), (b)(3), unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds and denied the defendants' motion to terminate the consent judgment under § 3626(b)(2) and Rule 60(b). See Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996). On November 18, 1996, Judge Enslen entered a similar order for the Hadix and USA decrees pending in his court, but reserved final determination pending this appeal. See Appellants' Reply Br. at 2. Hadix v. Johnson, File No. 4:92:CV:110 (W.D. Mich. 1996), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 134 F.3d 371 (Table), 1998 WL 30820 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 1998). Although the inmates had previously suggested that part of this appeal was rendered moot by the district courts' resolution of the underlying motion to terminate the consent decree, this circuit's recent opinion holding the immediate termination provisions constitutional and directing the district court to reconsider the state officials' termination motion forecloses the inmates' mootness argument. See Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, the matter before us is justiciable as an exception to the mootness doctrine as a scenario capable of repetition yet evading review. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911) (maintaining jurisdiction over "shortterm orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review" that otherwise may forever defeat redressability).


[126] *fn10 Thus far, courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3626 since passage of the PLRA, including this court, have focused primarily on the immediate termination standards, § 3626(b)(2)-(b)(3), and not on the automatic stay, § 3626(e)(2). These cases have largely concluded that the immediate termination provisions are constitutional. See Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding § 3626(b)(2)'s termination provision constitutional); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding § 3626 constitutional); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (2nd Cir. 1997) (interpreting language of the PLRA immediate termination provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b), to avoid constitutional problems); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding constitutionality of § 3626(b)(2)-(b)(3)); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996) (same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2460 (1997); Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (same); James v. Lash, 965 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (same); but see Taylor v. Arizona, 972 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Ariz. 1997) (finding § 3626(b) unconstitutional). Though the immediate termination and automatic stay provisions are connected and share similar features, we direct our inquiry in the instant appeal solely to review of the automatic stay provision.


[127] *fn11 Although the Conference Report accompanying the 1997 bill amending the automatic stay provision does not reveal a clear congressional intent to displace the federal courts' inherent equitable authority, the comments of Senator Spencer Abraham support the state officials' construction of the provision. Speaking on the floor of the Senate, Senator Abraham explained the purpose of the 1997 amendments as follows: The Department of Justice . . . has contended that the stay is not really automatic at all . . . . The amendments . . . clarify that the stay is in fact is automatic by expressly modeling it on the bankruptcy automatic stay, and they state explicitly that any order blocking the automatic stay is appealable, thereby ensuring review of the district court's action. 143 Cong. Rec. S12269 (November 9, 1997). Although Senator Abraham's statements indicate his view that Congress sought to confine the courts' discretionary power to suspend the automatic stay to the conditions explicitly stipulated in § 3626(e)(3) (as amended in 1997), we hesitate to find a clear congressional intent to curb traditional equity practice on the basis of only one congressional member's statements.


[128] *fn12 Prior to the enactment of the 1997 amendments, the prisoners argued 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (1996) violated the separation-of-powers doctrine not only by prescribing a rule of decision without changing the underlying substantive law, but also by directing the reopening of final judgments of courts. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). Critical to this argument is the issue of whether the consent decrees constitute final judgments not subject to legislative alteration for separation-of-powers purposes. We recently addressed this issue in Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998), in the context of a challenge to the constitutionality of the PLRA's termination provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2)-(3). In Hadix, we agreed with other circuits holding that the consent decrees consist of ongoing prospective relief that is not final for separation-of-powers purposes. See Hadix, 133 F.3d at 942-43. Accordingly, the prisoners are foreclosed from challenging the automatic stay provision on the grounds that it unconstitutionally reopens a final judgment.


[129] *fn13 See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 148 (1986) (defining "automatic" as "having a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that performs a required act at a predetermined point in an operation"); Random House Unabridged Dictionary 140 (2d ed. 1993) (defining "automatic" as "having the capability of starting, operating, moving, etc., independently").


[130] *fn14 We note in passing that Congress did not restrict the PLRA automatic stay to operation solely in the federal courts, as it did with the special masters procedural provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f). Section 3626 applies to civil proceedings initiated in federal or state court arising under federal law with respect to prison conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2). Because the cases we review were brought in federal court, we do not address possible effects of the legislative mandate upon state court processes.


[131] *fn15 We do not quarrel with Congress's unquestioned authority, which is routinely exercised, to prescribe procedural requirements that regulate federal court practice. Descending from the earliest days of the federal judiciary, it is by now beyond contention that "Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts," Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941), and such rules "bind Judges and courts in the proper management of the cases before them." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391. See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472, 473 (1965). Apart from time restrictions on the parties, however, temporal strictures upon actual judicial decisionmaking are scarce. See Speedy Trial Act of 1974 § 101, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (setting forth time limits in criminal trials for both pre-trial and trial procedures)). Rarely do such rules and statutes intrude upon the Judiciary's substantive decisional role; where a judicial decision is tied to a temporal stricture, the court usually retains discretion to override the restriction for good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), 65; Speedy Trial Act § 101(h), 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (ends of Justice); see also United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 696 (4th Cir. 1982) (dismissing notion that statutes of limitations or Speedy Trial Act sanctions infringe the court's substantive role). It is one thing for Congress to prescribe procedures to be followed in federal court; conferring jurisdiction and then directing that judicial deliberation be exercised in an unduly restrictive manner is quite a different matter.


[132] *fn16 The inmates also argue that the PLRA's automatic stay provision, as construed by the state officials, deprives them of their entitlement to relief that has vested by a court judgment in violation of their due process rights. Under the "vested-rights" doctrine, Congress lacks the power to abridge constitutionally-protected property interests that have vested through a final judgment of law. McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898). The inmates, however, do not have vested rights in the prospective relief afforded under these consent decrees. See Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 943 n.3 (6th Cir. 1998). While consent decrees in certain respects resemble contracts, they are fundamentally judicial acts that have never been held to be beyond a court's power to modify as equity requires. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (recognizing contractual aspects of consent decrees but holding them "subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees."). To the extent that the decrees and their implementing orders remain subject to modification and continuous court supervision, they cannot confer protected property interests for due process purposes. See System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 649-52 (1961) (the plaintiffs had no vested right to have a consent decree enforced after Congress altered the decree's enabling statute since "the parties have no power to require of the court continuing enforcement of rights the [enabling] statute no longer gives"). Accordingly, the prospective relief under a consent decree is not a final judgment for purposes of the vested-rights doctrine. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 176 (2d Cir. 1997); Gavin v. Brandstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1090-92 (8th Cir. 1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 374 (4th Cir. 1996). Thus the PLRA automatic stay does not dispossess or trammel upon judicially-vested rights.


[133] *fn17 The Department of Justice suggests that the lower courts may issue an order staying the PLRA's automatic stay where requiring plaintiffs to make a preliminary showing on the merits would be inequitable due to circumstances beyond plaintiffs' control which impair their ability to present adequately their position to the court. Supplemental Br. for the U.S. at 10-11, 15-16. While this position strikes us as reasonable, we believe it premature at this juncture to rule definitively on this matter without the benefit of briefing from all parties in a case that by its factual posture squarely presents the issue to the court.


[134] *fn18 Section 1997e of Title 42, as amended by the PLRA, provides in relevant part: (d) Attorney's Fees (1) In any action brought by a prisoner . . . in which attorney's fees are authorized under [42 U.S.C. § 1988], such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that- (A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under [42 U.S.C. § 1988]; and (B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.


[135] *fn19 Section 1997e of Title 42, as amended by the PLRA, provides in relevant part: (d) Attorney's Fees . . . (3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under [18 U.S.C. § 3006A], for payment of court-appointed counsel.


[136] *fn20 As we hold the PLRA's attorney fees provisions inapplicable to the fee award underlying this appeal, we have no occasion to resolve what would be the hourly rate in this case under the PLRA.


[137] *fn21 On appeal the state officials object to 100 hours for Deborah LaBelle and 17.4 hours for Michael Barnhart. See J.A. #96-1851 at 287-304 for itemization of hours.


[138] *fn22 Section D.1 of the consent decree requires the state prison officials to design and implement a professionally-based classification plan. J.A. #96-1907 at 185. By order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dated July 2, 1991, section D.1 requires the state prison officials to maintain the classification system override rate at a general norm of 20 percent or less. See J.A. #96-1907 at 381. In other words, defendants may inaccurately classify up to 20 percent of the prisoner population should circumstances require them to do so.


[139] *fn23 These substantive provisions have been upheld in the face of constitutional challenge by several circuits, including, as mentioned earlier, our own. See Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 1997); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir. 1997); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996).


[140] *fn24 Many consent decrees dealing with prison litigation, including those before us, have been in effect for more than a decade. See, e.g., Dougan, 129 F.3d at 1425 (since 1983); Suffolk County Jail, 129 F.3 at 653 (since 1979); Benjamin, 124 F.3d at 165 (since 1978-79); Gavin, 122 F.3d at 1084 (since 1984); Plyler, 100 F.3d at 369 (since 1986).