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Beating by Guards, Destroyed Eyeglasses May Toll AEDPA Time Limit
The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a California federal district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition, holding that, if proven true, the prisoner's claim that prison officials failed to replace his broken eyeglasses for two years could toll the one-year limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) for filing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254.
Freddy Alonzo, a California state prisoner, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief which the district court denied as being untimely under the AEDPA. Alonzo raised in traverse that the AEDPA time limitation should be tolled because he was beaten by staff while in administrative segregation and his eyeglasses were broken as a result. Further, it took two years for prison officials to replace the broken glasses. Alonzo appealed the denial.
The Court of Appeals held that if it was true that prison officials broke Alonzo's eyeglasses in a beating by staff, and if officials then took two years to replace the broken eyeglasses, then the AEDPA time period must be tolled. The circumstances were beyond Alonzo's control and, further, it would be bad faith on the part of state officials to break Alonzo's glasses and then demand that he file his petition without the aid of glasses.
California argued that Alonzo's claim was raised in traverse and could not be considered. The appeals court held that the district court had discretion to consider or not consider an argument raised for the first time in traverse. The district court failed to make clear whether it exercised its discretion not to consider a claim made in traverse or whether it summarily denied the claim.
The district court's decision was reversed and the case was remanded for the district court to consider Alonzo's claim or to explain why it would not consider it. This is not a decision on the merits of the claim. This case is published in the Federal Appendix and is subject to rules governing unpublished cases. See: Alonzo v Pliler, 53 Fed.Appx. 854 (9th Cir. 2003).
Freddy Alonzo, a California state prisoner, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief which the district court denied as being untimely under the AEDPA. Alonzo raised in traverse that the AEDPA time limitation should be tolled because he was beaten by staff while in administrative segregation and his eyeglasses were broken as a result. Further, it took two years for prison officials to replace the broken glasses. Alonzo appealed the denial.
The Court of Appeals held that if it was true that prison officials broke Alonzo's eyeglasses in a beating by staff, and if officials then took two years to replace the broken eyeglasses, then the AEDPA time period must be tolled. The circumstances were beyond Alonzo's control and, further, it would be bad faith on the part of state officials to break Alonzo's glasses and then demand that he file his petition without the aid of glasses.
California argued that Alonzo's claim was raised in traverse and could not be considered. The appeals court held that the district court had discretion to consider or not consider an argument raised for the first time in traverse. The district court failed to make clear whether it exercised its discretion not to consider a claim made in traverse or whether it summarily denied the claim.
The district court's decision was reversed and the case was remanded for the district court to consider Alonzo's claim or to explain why it would not consider it. This is not a decision on the merits of the claim. This case is published in the Federal Appendix and is subject to rules governing unpublished cases. See: Alonzo v Pliler, 53 Fed.Appx. 854 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Related legal case
Alonzo v. Pliler
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 53 Fed.Appx. 854 (9th Cir. 2003). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
FREDDY ALONZO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. C. K. PLILER, Warden, et al., Respondents-Appellees.
No. 01-55673
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
53 Fed. Appx. 854; 2003 U.S. App.
November 8, 2002, Argued and Submitted, Pasadena, California
January 7, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] RULES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. D.C. No. CV-00-05618-CAS. Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding.
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.
COUNSEL: For FREDDY ALONZO, Petitioner-Appellant: Alissa Sawano Peterson, Irvine, CA.
For C. K. PLILER, Respondent-Appellee: Susan D. Martynec, Esq., OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Los Angeles, CA.
For C. K. PLILER, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondents-Appellees: Deborah J. Chuang, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, Los Angeles, CA.
JUDGES: Before: HALL, THOMPSON, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
OPINION:
[*855] MEMORANDUM *
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: HALL, THOMPSON, and WARDLAW, Circuit [**2] Judges.
Freddy Alonzo, a California state prisoner, appeals the district court's denial of his habeas petition as time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The district court denied Alonzo's petition, adopting the magistrate's report without addressing Alonzo's claim that the limitations period should be equitably tolled because prison guards beat him and destroyed his eyeglasses, rendering him unable to read or write for nearly two years. We granted a certificate of appealability on the following issue:
If Petitioner's allegations are true that he was unable to read or write for almost two years because his eyeglasses were broken when he was beaten by "adseg staff" and the prison took almost two years to replace his glasses, is equitable tolling warranted for the time that Petitioner's eyeglasses were not replaced by the prison?
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and hold that the answer to this question is yes.
Equitable tolling applies when: 1) extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control make it [**3] impossible to file a claim on time; or when 2) the plaintiff is prevented from asserting the claim by wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996). Where "adseg staff" beat a prisoner, break his glasses, render him unable to read and write, and fail for two years to provide him with replacement glasses, this is both an extraordinary circumstance beyond appellant's control that makes it impossible to file his claim on time and gross misconduct by the state that prevents appellant from asserting his claim.
The government argues that we should affirm the district court because appellant's claim regarding his eyeglasses was raised in a traverse and a traverse is not a proper pleading in which to raise additional grounds for relief. Our rule, however, is that "a district court has discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence presented for the first time in a party's objection to a magistrate judge's recommendation." United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 831, 122 S. Ct. 76, 151 L. Ed. 2d 40 (2001). Further, "in [**4] making a decision on whether to consider newly offered evidence, the district court must actually exercise its discretion, rather than summarily accepting or denying the motion." Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
Here, it is impossible to tell whether the District Court declined to exercise its discretion or summarily accepted the findings of the magistrate judge. As in Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2002), "there is nothing in the record that shows the district court actually exercised its discretion in refusing to consider [appellant's] newly-raised claim ... The district court's order in this case is very brief, stating without elaboration that it conducted a de novo review of the magistrate's findings and recommendations." Id. at 745 (citation omitted).
The District Court's order in the instant case is reversed and remanded to give the court an opportunity to consider appellant's equitable tolling claim based on the allegation that prison guards beat him, destroyed his glasses and failed to replace them for two years. See id. The District [*856] Court is free to make whatever factual findings it deems necessary. Further, [**5] if the District Court chooses not to entertain appellant's newly raised claim, it should explain its decision to refuse to consider appellant's evidence on procedural grounds. See Howell, 231 F.3d at 623; see also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 925 (9th Cir. 2002); Whalem/ Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
No. 01-55673
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
53 Fed. Appx. 854; 2003 U.S. App.
November 8, 2002, Argued and Submitted, Pasadena, California
January 7, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] RULES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. D.C. No. CV-00-05618-CAS. Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding.
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.
COUNSEL: For FREDDY ALONZO, Petitioner-Appellant: Alissa Sawano Peterson, Irvine, CA.
For C. K. PLILER, Respondent-Appellee: Susan D. Martynec, Esq., OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Los Angeles, CA.
For C. K. PLILER, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondents-Appellees: Deborah J. Chuang, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, Los Angeles, CA.
JUDGES: Before: HALL, THOMPSON, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
OPINION:
[*855] MEMORANDUM *
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: HALL, THOMPSON, and WARDLAW, Circuit [**2] Judges.
Freddy Alonzo, a California state prisoner, appeals the district court's denial of his habeas petition as time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The district court denied Alonzo's petition, adopting the magistrate's report without addressing Alonzo's claim that the limitations period should be equitably tolled because prison guards beat him and destroyed his eyeglasses, rendering him unable to read or write for nearly two years. We granted a certificate of appealability on the following issue:
If Petitioner's allegations are true that he was unable to read or write for almost two years because his eyeglasses were broken when he was beaten by "adseg staff" and the prison took almost two years to replace his glasses, is equitable tolling warranted for the time that Petitioner's eyeglasses were not replaced by the prison?
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and hold that the answer to this question is yes.
Equitable tolling applies when: 1) extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control make it [**3] impossible to file a claim on time; or when 2) the plaintiff is prevented from asserting the claim by wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996). Where "adseg staff" beat a prisoner, break his glasses, render him unable to read and write, and fail for two years to provide him with replacement glasses, this is both an extraordinary circumstance beyond appellant's control that makes it impossible to file his claim on time and gross misconduct by the state that prevents appellant from asserting his claim.
The government argues that we should affirm the district court because appellant's claim regarding his eyeglasses was raised in a traverse and a traverse is not a proper pleading in which to raise additional grounds for relief. Our rule, however, is that "a district court has discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence presented for the first time in a party's objection to a magistrate judge's recommendation." United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 831, 122 S. Ct. 76, 151 L. Ed. 2d 40 (2001). Further, "in [**4] making a decision on whether to consider newly offered evidence, the district court must actually exercise its discretion, rather than summarily accepting or denying the motion." Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
Here, it is impossible to tell whether the District Court declined to exercise its discretion or summarily accepted the findings of the magistrate judge. As in Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2002), "there is nothing in the record that shows the district court actually exercised its discretion in refusing to consider [appellant's] newly-raised claim ... The district court's order in this case is very brief, stating without elaboration that it conducted a de novo review of the magistrate's findings and recommendations." Id. at 745 (citation omitted).
The District Court's order in the instant case is reversed and remanded to give the court an opportunity to consider appellant's equitable tolling claim based on the allegation that prison guards beat him, destroyed his glasses and failed to replace them for two years. See id. The District [*856] Court is free to make whatever factual findings it deems necessary. Further, [**5] if the District Court chooses not to entertain appellant's newly raised claim, it should explain its decision to refuse to consider appellant's evidence on procedural grounds. See Howell, 231 F.3d at 623; see also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 925 (9th Cir. 2002); Whalem/ Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
REVERSED and REMANDED.