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California Disability Statute Tolls Limitation Statute for §1983 Suit

California Disability Statute Tolls Limitation Statute for §1983 Suit


The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that California's
Disability Statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §352(a)(3), tolls California's
one-year statute to file a 42 U.S.C. §1983 action. This action sought to
recover damages for injuries the plaintiff received during his arrest by
Union City police officers. The district court held the statute of
limitations was not tolled and dismissed the suit because it was filed one
year after the injury occurred.


The plaintiff was in a constant state of incarceration from the time of
his arrest until the filing of this action. §352(a)(3) tolls the statute
of limitations when a person is [I]mprisoned on a criminal charge, or in
execution under sentence of a criminal court for a term less than life."
The question before the court was whether being continuously incarcerated
prior to arraignment constitutes being imprisoned on a criminal charge"
within the meaning of the California disability statute. The Court said
it would be ill-serving the statute by creating an arbitrary distinction
between pre- and post-arraignment incarceration. Accordingly, the court
held that actual, uninterrupted incarceration is the touchstone" for
assessing tolling under §352(a)(3), which covers all post-arrest custody.


The matter was reversed and remanded to reinstate the suit because the
statute of limitations was tolled at the time of the plaintiff's arrest
and continuing through his custody. See: Elliott v. City of Union City,
25 F. 3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Related legal case

Elliott v. City of Union City

Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 06/01/1994)

[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[2] No. 92-16036

[3] 25 F.3d 800

[4] filed: June 1, 1994.

[5] CHARLES LEONARD ELLIOTT, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF UNION CITY, ET AL. DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. D.C. No. CV-87-4947 DLJ. D. Lowell Jensen, District Judge, Presiding.

[7] Charles L. Elliott, pro se, Union City, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

[8] Bryan A. Marmesh, Vogl & Meredith, San Francisco, California, for the defendants-appellees.

[9] Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Edward Leavy, Circuit Judges, and William D. Browning,*fn* District Judge. Opinion by Judge Reinhardt.

[10] Author: Reinhardt

[11] REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

[12] The issue before us is whether the California disability statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(a)(3), tolls the statute of limitations when a plaintiff, suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover for injuries suffered during an arrest, is held in continuous custody from the time of that arrest through the period of his incarceration following his conviction. Plaintiff Charles Elliott appeals pro se the district court's judgment in favor of defendants Union City, the Union City Police Chief, and members of the Union City Police Department. The district court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that Elliott's claim that Union City police officers used excessive force in arresting him was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Because we hold that § 352(a)(3) tolls the limitations period when the plaintiff has been in continuous custody, commencing at the time of his arrest, we reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

[13] FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[14] In 1985, after a domestic dispute, Elliott was arrested and charged with two felony counts of battery on a police officer, and was held in continuous police custody until he was convicted on both counts and sent to prison. His imprisonment lasted from October 1985 to November 1990. On September 29, 1987, while in state prison, Elliott filed this § 1983 action in federal district court alleging that the defendant police officers used excessive force in subduing him with a taser "stun gun" during his arrest.

[15] The district court granted defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the statute had not been tolled by Elliott's arrest and incarceration, and consequently held that the statute of limitations applicable to Elliott's claim expired on April 17, 1986, approximately 18 months prior to the date Elliott filed his federal complaint.*fn1

[16] Discussion

[17] I. The Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar

[18] Elliott's Section 1983 Action

[19] Federal law determines when a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run for a § 1983 action. Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp.,923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 117 L. Ed. 2d 409, 112 S. Ct. 1161 (1992). Specifically, in cases of the type before us, the claim accrues when the plaintiff "knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Id. (quoting Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County,801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, Elliott's cause of action accrued with his arrest on March 17, 1985.

[20] Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period, but the Supreme Court has held that the appropriate period is that of the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985). In California this period is one year. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3) (West Supp. 1992). Although Elliott's cause of action accrued prior to the Court's decision in Wilson, the one-year period is still relevant to this action. In Usher v. City of Los Angeles,828 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1987), we articulated a "uniform rule" governing Wilson 's retroactive effect, according to which the limitations period for Elliott's claim expired one year after Wilson was decided, that is, on April 17, 1986.

[21] A. Tolling Under § 352(a)(3)

[22] Elliott contends that the limitations period was tolled commencing with his arrest because from that moment on he was held in continuous custody awaiting trial. He also contends that the tolling continued both while he was awaiting trial and during the period he was serving his prison sentence. State tolling statutes apply to § 1983 claims. Hardin v. Straub,490 U.S. 536, 543-44, 104 L. Ed. 2d 582, 109 S. Ct. 1998 (1989). Elliott therefore relies on Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(a)(3), a disability provision that tolls the statute of limitations when a person is "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under sentence of a criminal court for a term of less than for life." However, § 352(a)(3) only tolls the statute of limitations if the disability existed at the time the claim accrued. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 357 (West 1982). Because Elliott remained in police custody from the time of his arrest, when his excessive force claim accrued, until he was convicted and sent to prison, the critical issue is whether being continuously incarcerated prior to arraignment constitutes being "imprisoned on a criminal charge" within the meaning of the California disability statute.*fn2

[23] While neither this court nor the California courts have considered the California disability statute in this context,*fn3 we held in construing a nearly identical Washington statute that tolling was triggered by the individual's arrest and incarceration. See Bianchi v. Bellingham Police Dept.,909 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1990). As a result, we concluded that a Washington inmate who had been "continuously imprisoned since his arrest" could benefit from tolling with respect to claims accruing during the arrest. Id. We find the reasoning of that case persuasive, and believe that the California Supreme Court would also, especially given the like wording of the Washington and California statutes.*fn4

[24] As the Bianchi court explained, the purpose of disability statutes would be ill-served by creating an arbitrary distinction between pre- and post-arraignment incarceration. Id. Disability statutes are meant to "protect those who are incapable of protecting themselves," id. (quoting Mitchell,100 F.2d at 187): they apply to prisoners in recognition of their more limited ability to investigate their claims, to contact lawyers and to avail themselves of the judicial process. See Hawkins v. Justin, 109 Mich. App. 743, 311 N.W.2d 465, 467 (Mich. 1981) (interpreting disability statute and stating that "prisoners are more restricted than ordinary citizens . . . . [they have] restraints imposed by their confinement which place[ ] them at a disadvantage compared to ordinary citizens"); Ortiz v. Lavallee,442 F.2d 912, 914 (2d Cir. 1971). *fn5 A person held in police custody prior to arraignment is faced with the same limitations as someone in custody after arraignment. In light of this fact, we hold that "actual, uninterrupted incarceration is the touchstone" for assessing tolling under § 352(a)(3), which covers all post-arrest custody. See Bianchi,909 F.2d at 1318.

[25] B. Uninterrupted Incarceration

[26] Relying on the Bianchi Dissent, the defendants argue that because there are two phrases in the Washington disability statute - "imprisoned on a criminal charge" and "in execution under sentence of a criminal court" - only disjunctive tolling should be allowed. Under this view, there might be one tolling for all detention prior to conviction, and another tolling for all post-conviction incarceration, but not a single continuous tolling. The defendants assert that tolling the statute of limitations for Elliott's entire period of incarceration amounts to tacking together two separate disabilities, like tacking tolling for minority together with tolling for insanity. We squarely rejected this argument in Bianchi, and we reject it again here.