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County Officials Not Liable in Prisoner' Beating by Fellow Prisoner
The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the U.S. District
Court, Western District of Kentucky, held that Ohio County, Kentucky, jail
officials were not liable for a prisoner's vicious beating by a fellow
prisoner.
Sherman Taylor and Charles Allen were both prisoners in the Ohio
County Jail in December 1998, housed in adjoining cells. Taylor was
serving time for alcohol-related charges; Allen was awaiting trial for
capital murder. In November 1998, Allen attacked and beat up fellow
prisoner Charles Jones, who was scheduled to testify against Allen at
trial. On the night of December 4, 1998, Allen and Taylor had a verbal
argument. Allen told Taylor, "when the doors open tomorrow, I'm coming in
there and whipping your ass."
On the morning of December 5, 1998, Deputy Jailer Stephen Little
opened both cells simultaneously. Allen rushed into Taylor's cell, beat
Taylor on the head and chest with fists and feet, rammed Taylor's head
into a steel bench, and bit off part of Taylor's ear. Taylor passed out
and did not remember the assault. Deputy Jailer Little ordered Allen to
stop the beating, tried to obtain a stun gun, and ordered a deputy to call
911. The beating lasted about one minute.
Taylor sued Little, Ohio County Jailer Darrell Curtis and Ohio
County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He claimed that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his safety by overcrowding the jail, by
failing to segregate violent and non-violent offenders, and by failing to
prevent or intervene in the assault. The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants and Taylor appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that no evidence showed that jail
officials were aware of the threat to Taylor by Allen. Nor should Allen's
prior assault on Charles Jones have put them on notice that Allen was a
threat to Taylor. Jones was a witness against Allen, giving Allen reason
to assault him. Taylor had no connection to Allen other than being in the
adjoining cell. That was not enough for officials to foresee a threat.
Further, the court held, Deputy Jailer Little did intervene in the fight,
and his steps were reasonable, even though he failed to physically stop
the beating.
The appeals court held that Taylor failed to explain or
demonstrate how prison overcrowding (the jail held five more people than
its rated capacity) caused Allen's assault or how "lack of security caused
or even contributed to his injuries." There was no Constitutional
requirement for security cameras in cells or prohibiting opening two cell
doors at once, contrary to Taylor's claims. And, since Taylor failed to
show how jailers could have reasonably anticipated Allen's assault, the
appeals court also upheld denial of Taylor's state law claims, citing
Ratliff v. Stanly, 224 Ky.819, 7 S.W.2d 230 (1928), and distinguishing
Glover v. Hazelwood, 387 S.W.2d 600 (1964) on the facts.
The district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants was
affirmed. This case is published in the Federal Appendix and is subject to
rules governing unpublished cases. See: Taylor v. Little, 58 Fed. Appx. 66
(6th.Cir. 2003).
Court, Western District of Kentucky, held that Ohio County, Kentucky, jail
officials were not liable for a prisoner's vicious beating by a fellow
prisoner.
Sherman Taylor and Charles Allen were both prisoners in the Ohio
County Jail in December 1998, housed in adjoining cells. Taylor was
serving time for alcohol-related charges; Allen was awaiting trial for
capital murder. In November 1998, Allen attacked and beat up fellow
prisoner Charles Jones, who was scheduled to testify against Allen at
trial. On the night of December 4, 1998, Allen and Taylor had a verbal
argument. Allen told Taylor, "when the doors open tomorrow, I'm coming in
there and whipping your ass."
On the morning of December 5, 1998, Deputy Jailer Stephen Little
opened both cells simultaneously. Allen rushed into Taylor's cell, beat
Taylor on the head and chest with fists and feet, rammed Taylor's head
into a steel bench, and bit off part of Taylor's ear. Taylor passed out
and did not remember the assault. Deputy Jailer Little ordered Allen to
stop the beating, tried to obtain a stun gun, and ordered a deputy to call
911. The beating lasted about one minute.
Taylor sued Little, Ohio County Jailer Darrell Curtis and Ohio
County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He claimed that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his safety by overcrowding the jail, by
failing to segregate violent and non-violent offenders, and by failing to
prevent or intervene in the assault. The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants and Taylor appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that no evidence showed that jail
officials were aware of the threat to Taylor by Allen. Nor should Allen's
prior assault on Charles Jones have put them on notice that Allen was a
threat to Taylor. Jones was a witness against Allen, giving Allen reason
to assault him. Taylor had no connection to Allen other than being in the
adjoining cell. That was not enough for officials to foresee a threat.
Further, the court held, Deputy Jailer Little did intervene in the fight,
and his steps were reasonable, even though he failed to physically stop
the beating.
The appeals court held that Taylor failed to explain or
demonstrate how prison overcrowding (the jail held five more people than
its rated capacity) caused Allen's assault or how "lack of security caused
or even contributed to his injuries." There was no Constitutional
requirement for security cameras in cells or prohibiting opening two cell
doors at once, contrary to Taylor's claims. And, since Taylor failed to
show how jailers could have reasonably anticipated Allen's assault, the
appeals court also upheld denial of Taylor's state law claims, citing
Ratliff v. Stanly, 224 Ky.819, 7 S.W.2d 230 (1928), and distinguishing
Glover v. Hazelwood, 387 S.W.2d 600 (1964) on the facts.
The district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants was
affirmed. This case is published in the Federal Appendix and is subject to
rules governing unpublished cases. See: Taylor v. Little, 58 Fed. Appx. 66
(6th.Cir. 2003).
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Related legal case
Taylor v. Little
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 58 Fed. Appx. 66 (6th Cir. 2003). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
SHERMAN TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEPHEN LITTLE, DARRELL CURTIS, and OHIO COUNTY, KENTUCKY, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 01-5651
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
58 Fed. Appx. 66; 2003 U.S. App.
January 6, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
PRIOR HISTORY: ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY. 99-00245. McKinley Jr. 04-18-01.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.
COUNSEL: For SHERMAN TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant: Michael Trent Lee, Owensboro, KY.
For STEPHEN LITTLE, DARRELL CURTIS, OHIO COUNTY, KENTUCKY, Defendants-Appellees: Marvin P. Nunley, McCarroll, Nunley & Hartz, Owensboro, KY.
JUDGES: BEFORE: KEITH, KRUPANSKY, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
OPINION:
[*66] PER CURIAM: Plaintiff Sherman Taylor appeals from an order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Taylor brought this action against Defendants Stephen Little, Darrell Curtis, and Ohio County, Kentucky, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Taylor also sued the defendants for negligence, asserting various theories of [**2] liability under Kentucky tort law. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I.
On December 5, 1998, Sherman Taylor was viciously beaten by Charles Allen. At the time, both Taylor and Allen were detained at the Ohio County (Kentucky) Detention Center. The two men were housed in adjoining cells. Taylor was incarcerated as a result of alcohol-related offenses, while Allen was awaiting trial on a charge of capital murder.
The assault occurred after Deputy Jailer Stephen Little opened the doors to both cells for a visitation period. Allen immediately entered Taylor's cell and attacked him. According to witnesses, Allen beat Taylor about the head and chest with his fists and feet and rammed his head into the corner of a steel bench. During the attack, Allen bit off part of Taylor's ear. Taylor was rendered unconscious during [*67] the attack and has no memory of the incident.
The night before the assault, Taylor and Allen had a verbal disagreement, during which Allen told Taylor that "when the doors open tomorrow I'm coming in there and whipping your ass." There is no evidence that any jail employee was aware of this threat.
Approximately [**3] two weeks before Allen's attack on Taylor, Allen had attacked another inmate, Charles Jones. Jones was to testify against Allen in his upcoming murder trial.
II.
In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court found that there was no evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could find that the defendants either acted with deliberate indifference to Taylor's safety or could have reasonably anticipated the assault. We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir. 2000).
A. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claim
Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution, including violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982). In the prison context, the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). The Amendment forbids [**4] prison officials from acting with "deliberate indifference" to the serious needs of prisoners. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990). "Deliberate indifference of a constitutional magnitude may occur when prison guards fail to protect one inmate from an attack by another." Walker, 917 F.2d at 1453.
The Supreme Court has held that "a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety". Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant: (1) had actual knowledge of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed; and (2) actually drew the inference. Id. at 837.
Taylor bases his Eighth Amendment claim on the failure of Ohio County and Curtis n1 to segregate violent prisoners from nonviolent ones; the failure of Ohio County and Curtis to prevent overcrowding at the prison or provide adequate staffing; and Little's failure to intervene [**5] in the assault. The district court rejected each of these bases for Taylor's claim. First, the district court found that the prison officials were not aware that Allen posed a risk to Taylor's safety. Second, the district court found that there was no proof that the overcrowding of the facility or the lack of adequate security proximately caused his injuries. Third, the district court concluded that Deputy Little reacted reasonably to the incident by ordering Allen to stop, attempting to obtain a stun gun, and requesting that another deputy call 9-1-1.
n1 Darrell Curtis was Ohio County Jailer at the time of the assault.
We agree with the district court. With regard to Taylor's first claim, there was no evidence that the defendants knew of Allen's [*68] threat on December 4. The only indication of Allen's propensity for violence toward fellow prisoners was his attack on Jones, who was scheduled to testify against Allen at his murder trial. This lone incident was insufficient to put prison officials on notice that Allen [**6] might attack Taylor. One can easily understand why Allen might want to hurt or intimidate a witness scheduled to testify against him. In contrast, prison officials had no reason to suspect that Allen might harm someone like Taylor, to whom Allen had no apparent connection. Taylor also cites evidence that Allen had been hostile to the staff of another correctional facility, had complained about his nerves and emotional state, and had been incarcerated for violent felonies before. At most, this evidence merely suggests that Allen, not unlike many inmates in our prison system, is prone to antisocial and sometimes violent behavior. It does not suggest that prison officials should have been aware that he might randomly attack a fellow inmate.
With respect to Taylor's second claim, he has not explained how the overcrowded facility n2 and lack of adequate security caused or even contributed to his injuries. Nor does Taylor cite any authority for his apparent contention that the Constitution requires security cameras in prison cells and forbids prison officials from opening two cell doors at the same time.
n2 The prison was five inmates over its capacity of 50.
[**7]
Finally, it does not appear that Deputy Little failed to intervene or otherwise act to prevent an assault. Rather, his response to the situation was reasonable under the circumstances. The entire incident lasted less than one minute. During that time, Little ordered Allen to stop, attempted to obtain a stun gun, and told another deputy to call 911. "Prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
B. Plaintiff's State Law Claim
The district court noted that under Kentucky law, prison officials cannot be held liable for inmate injuries unless, in the exercise of ordinary care, the injury could have been reasonably anticipated. Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819, 7 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Ky. 1928). As discussed above, the district court found no evidence to support a finding that the defendants could have reasonably anticipated Allen's attack on Taylor.
Taylor relies on Glover v. Hazelwood, 387 S.W.2d 600 (Ky. 1964), in which the Kentucky Supreme Court [**8] held that a jury issue was created in a case alleging jailer liability for inmate-on-inmate violence, where there was evidence that the same inmate had attacked other prisoners in the past. However, Glover is factually distinguishable from the present case. The attacker in Glover had apparently assaulted fellow inmates on numerous occasions in the nearly twelve months leading up to the attack on Glover. In contrast, Allen had attacked only one other prisoner prior to his assault on Taylor, and that previous attack was readily explained by the victim's impending testimony in Allen's murder trial.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
No. 01-5651
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
58 Fed. Appx. 66; 2003 U.S. App.
January 6, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
PRIOR HISTORY: ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY. 99-00245. McKinley Jr. 04-18-01.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED.
COUNSEL: For SHERMAN TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant: Michael Trent Lee, Owensboro, KY.
For STEPHEN LITTLE, DARRELL CURTIS, OHIO COUNTY, KENTUCKY, Defendants-Appellees: Marvin P. Nunley, McCarroll, Nunley & Hartz, Owensboro, KY.
JUDGES: BEFORE: KEITH, KRUPANSKY, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
OPINION:
[*66] PER CURIAM: Plaintiff Sherman Taylor appeals from an order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Taylor brought this action against Defendants Stephen Little, Darrell Curtis, and Ohio County, Kentucky, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Taylor also sued the defendants for negligence, asserting various theories of [**2] liability under Kentucky tort law. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I.
On December 5, 1998, Sherman Taylor was viciously beaten by Charles Allen. At the time, both Taylor and Allen were detained at the Ohio County (Kentucky) Detention Center. The two men were housed in adjoining cells. Taylor was incarcerated as a result of alcohol-related offenses, while Allen was awaiting trial on a charge of capital murder.
The assault occurred after Deputy Jailer Stephen Little opened the doors to both cells for a visitation period. Allen immediately entered Taylor's cell and attacked him. According to witnesses, Allen beat Taylor about the head and chest with his fists and feet and rammed his head into the corner of a steel bench. During the attack, Allen bit off part of Taylor's ear. Taylor was rendered unconscious during [*67] the attack and has no memory of the incident.
The night before the assault, Taylor and Allen had a verbal disagreement, during which Allen told Taylor that "when the doors open tomorrow I'm coming in there and whipping your ass." There is no evidence that any jail employee was aware of this threat.
Approximately [**3] two weeks before Allen's attack on Taylor, Allen had attacked another inmate, Charles Jones. Jones was to testify against Allen in his upcoming murder trial.
II.
In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court found that there was no evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could find that the defendants either acted with deliberate indifference to Taylor's safety or could have reasonably anticipated the assault. We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir. 2000).
A. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claim
Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution, including violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982). In the prison context, the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). The Amendment forbids [**4] prison officials from acting with "deliberate indifference" to the serious needs of prisoners. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990). "Deliberate indifference of a constitutional magnitude may occur when prison guards fail to protect one inmate from an attack by another." Walker, 917 F.2d at 1453.
The Supreme Court has held that "a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety". Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant: (1) had actual knowledge of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed; and (2) actually drew the inference. Id. at 837.
Taylor bases his Eighth Amendment claim on the failure of Ohio County and Curtis n1 to segregate violent prisoners from nonviolent ones; the failure of Ohio County and Curtis to prevent overcrowding at the prison or provide adequate staffing; and Little's failure to intervene [**5] in the assault. The district court rejected each of these bases for Taylor's claim. First, the district court found that the prison officials were not aware that Allen posed a risk to Taylor's safety. Second, the district court found that there was no proof that the overcrowding of the facility or the lack of adequate security proximately caused his injuries. Third, the district court concluded that Deputy Little reacted reasonably to the incident by ordering Allen to stop, attempting to obtain a stun gun, and requesting that another deputy call 9-1-1.
n1 Darrell Curtis was Ohio County Jailer at the time of the assault.
We agree with the district court. With regard to Taylor's first claim, there was no evidence that the defendants knew of Allen's [*68] threat on December 4. The only indication of Allen's propensity for violence toward fellow prisoners was his attack on Jones, who was scheduled to testify against Allen at his murder trial. This lone incident was insufficient to put prison officials on notice that Allen [**6] might attack Taylor. One can easily understand why Allen might want to hurt or intimidate a witness scheduled to testify against him. In contrast, prison officials had no reason to suspect that Allen might harm someone like Taylor, to whom Allen had no apparent connection. Taylor also cites evidence that Allen had been hostile to the staff of another correctional facility, had complained about his nerves and emotional state, and had been incarcerated for violent felonies before. At most, this evidence merely suggests that Allen, not unlike many inmates in our prison system, is prone to antisocial and sometimes violent behavior. It does not suggest that prison officials should have been aware that he might randomly attack a fellow inmate.
With respect to Taylor's second claim, he has not explained how the overcrowded facility n2 and lack of adequate security caused or even contributed to his injuries. Nor does Taylor cite any authority for his apparent contention that the Constitution requires security cameras in prison cells and forbids prison officials from opening two cell doors at the same time.
n2 The prison was five inmates over its capacity of 50.
[**7]
Finally, it does not appear that Deputy Little failed to intervene or otherwise act to prevent an assault. Rather, his response to the situation was reasonable under the circumstances. The entire incident lasted less than one minute. During that time, Little ordered Allen to stop, attempted to obtain a stun gun, and told another deputy to call 911. "Prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
B. Plaintiff's State Law Claim
The district court noted that under Kentucky law, prison officials cannot be held liable for inmate injuries unless, in the exercise of ordinary care, the injury could have been reasonably anticipated. Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819, 7 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Ky. 1928). As discussed above, the district court found no evidence to support a finding that the defendants could have reasonably anticipated Allen's attack on Taylor.
Taylor relies on Glover v. Hazelwood, 387 S.W.2d 600 (Ky. 1964), in which the Kentucky Supreme Court [**8] held that a jury issue was created in a case alleging jailer liability for inmate-on-inmate violence, where there was evidence that the same inmate had attacked other prisoners in the past. However, Glover is factually distinguishable from the present case. The attacker in Glover had apparently assaulted fellow inmates on numerous occasions in the nearly twelve months leading up to the attack on Glover. In contrast, Allen had attacked only one other prisoner prior to his assault on Taylor, and that previous attack was readily explained by the victim's impending testimony in Allen's murder trial.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.