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Indiana Law Requires Service by Mail at Place of Employment
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Indiana law requiring
service of process upon an individual by mail at the individual's "place
of business or employment" requires service at the location where he
actually reports for work rather than at a geographically separated
headquarters. This case originated when a prison guard sued another guard
who injured him during baton training sanctioned by the Indiana Department
of Corrections (IDOC).
The plaintiff sent his complaint and summons by certified mail to the
IDOC's headquarters addressed to the defendant's attention, rather than to
the prison where the defendant was actually employed. It was received by a
mail clerk, who did not recall forwarding it to the defendant. After
default judgment was entered for the plaintiff, the defendant stated he
never received process, moved to overturn the defendant and moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the
motion and plaintiff appealed.
The Seventh Circuit held Fed.R.Civ.P.4(e)(1) provides a federal court will
have personal jurisdiction over a defendant if service is effected
pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is located.
The court held that if Indiana law desired the phrase "place of business
or employment" to allow service at a geographically separated
headquarters, rather than the actual location of employment, it would use
language such as "at the individual's employer." Accordingly, the district
court's order was affirmed. See: Clause v. Mize, 317 F.3d 725 (7th Cir.
2003).
service of process upon an individual by mail at the individual's "place
of business or employment" requires service at the location where he
actually reports for work rather than at a geographically separated
headquarters. This case originated when a prison guard sued another guard
who injured him during baton training sanctioned by the Indiana Department
of Corrections (IDOC).
The plaintiff sent his complaint and summons by certified mail to the
IDOC's headquarters addressed to the defendant's attention, rather than to
the prison where the defendant was actually employed. It was received by a
mail clerk, who did not recall forwarding it to the defendant. After
default judgment was entered for the plaintiff, the defendant stated he
never received process, moved to overturn the defendant and moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the
motion and plaintiff appealed.
The Seventh Circuit held Fed.R.Civ.P.4(e)(1) provides a federal court will
have personal jurisdiction over a defendant if service is effected
pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is located.
The court held that if Indiana law desired the phrase "place of business
or employment" to allow service at a geographically separated
headquarters, rather than the actual location of employment, it would use
language such as "at the individual's employer." Accordingly, the district
court's order was affirmed. See: Clause v. Mize, 317 F.3d 725 (7th Cir.
2003).
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Related legal case
Clause v. Mize
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 317 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2003). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
[18] Service may be made upon an individual . . . by: (1) sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail or by other public means by which a written acknowledgment or receipt may be requested and obtained to his residence, place of business or employment with return receipt requested and returned showing receipt of the letter. IND. T. R. 4.1(A)(1).
[19] As noted above, Claus attempted to serve process by sending the complaint and summons via certified mail to the IDOC's central office in Indianapolis rather than the Wabash Valley facility at which Mize actually worked. Thus, the question before us is whether the phrase "place of business or employment" can be read broadly enough to include not only the place where a defendant reports to work but also the headquarters of the defendant's employer.
[20] As Indiana courts have yet to interpret the scope of "place of business or employment," Claus is unable to offer any law to support his assertion that the phrase should be read so broadly. Our interpretation of the phrase "place of business or employment" leads us to believe that a plaintiff must serve a defendant at a location where he actually reports for work. Had the drafters of the rule wanted to allow service at a geographically separated headquarters, language such as "at the individual's employer" might have been more apt.
[21] As constructed, it is our view that "place of employment" connotes the physical location at which the defendant works. From a practical standpoint, if a plaintiff were allowed to serve a defendant at a geographically separated headquarters, the chances that the defendant would fail to receive service in time to respond to a complaint would be greatly increased. This would be particularly so in large businesses and governmental organizations, like the IDOC, which may have scores of facilities and thousands of employees. In this case, for example, the IDOC operates 24 adult institutions scattered throughout Indiana and employs more than 8000 personnel in those various institutions.
[22] Therefore, we find that the phrase "place of business or employment" should not be given the broad interpretation that Claus urges, and Claus's attempted service at the IDOC's central office did not comply with the requirements of Indiana Trial Rule 4.1.
[23] Claus next argues that even if he did not strictly comply with Indiana's service requirements, service was still sufficient under Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(F), which provides:
[24] Defects in summons. No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him, the name of the court, and the time within which he is required to respond. IND. T.R. 4.15(F). We disagree.
[25] First, it is not at all clear from Indiana case law that T.R. 4.15 applies to Claus's situation. The Indiana Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "T.R. 4.15(F) only cures technical defects in the service of process, not the total failure to serve process." LaPalme v. Romero, 621 N.E.2d 1102, 1107 (Ind. 1993). Arguably, mailing the summons and complaint to IDOC headquarters, a place where Mize did not work, is more than a technical defect. Indeed, in Robinson v. Turner, a case with some similarity to this one, the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana held that T.R. 4.15 did not apply when the plaintiff attempted to serve the defendants at a place where they did not work because "failure to serve Defendants at their place of employment constituted a complete failure of service of process rather than a technical failure of service of process." 886 F. Supp. 1451, 1458 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
[26] Even assuming, however, that the defect here is merely technical and that T.R. 4.15 could apply, it would still be the case that Claus's attempted service of process at the IDOC's central office in Indianapolis could not be "reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served." IND. T.R. 4.15(F). In arguing that service was sufficient, Claus notes that the training session at which the incident occurred was a mandatory IDOC exercise, and that Mize was sent there by the IDOC to conduct the exercise. Further, he asserts that he did not know anything about Mize other than that he was employed by the IDOC. According to him, it would be too great a burden to require him to serve process at each individual IDOC facility; thus, Claus maintains that it was reasonable for him to send the summons and complaint to IDOC headquarters.
[27] We do not find this argument availing. Claus would not be required to serve process at every IDOC location, just the location where Mize actually worked. As the district court noted below, it is not unfair to require a plaintiff who chooses to serve a defendant at his place of employment to serve the defendant where he actually works. That is especially true here. Claus himself was an IDOC correctional officer for nine years, so we doubt it would have been excessively burdensome for him to discover where Mize actually reported to work. Further, to satisfy the "reasonably calculated" requirement, there must be a "reasonable degree of certainty" that the method chosen will actually get the papers to the defendant. Robinson, 886 F. Supp. at 1455. As we noted above, in large organizations, like the IDOC, serving process at the central office will greatly decrease the likelihood that it will ever reach the defendant. And Claus, as an IDOC officer himself, should have known that IDOC officers do not generally receive mail at the central office and therefore that the likelihood Mize would receive the complaint and summons was diminished substantially by sending them to the IDOC's headquarters in Indianapolis.
[28] III. Conclusion
[29] For the reasons discussed above, we agree with the district court's finding that there was insufficient service of process. Therefore, the district court's decision to set aside the clerk's entry of default and grant Mize's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.
[19] As noted above, Claus attempted to serve process by sending the complaint and summons via certified mail to the IDOC's central office in Indianapolis rather than the Wabash Valley facility at which Mize actually worked. Thus, the question before us is whether the phrase "place of business or employment" can be read broadly enough to include not only the place where a defendant reports to work but also the headquarters of the defendant's employer.
[20] As Indiana courts have yet to interpret the scope of "place of business or employment," Claus is unable to offer any law to support his assertion that the phrase should be read so broadly. Our interpretation of the phrase "place of business or employment" leads us to believe that a plaintiff must serve a defendant at a location where he actually reports for work. Had the drafters of the rule wanted to allow service at a geographically separated headquarters, language such as "at the individual's employer" might have been more apt.
[21] As constructed, it is our view that "place of employment" connotes the physical location at which the defendant works. From a practical standpoint, if a plaintiff were allowed to serve a defendant at a geographically separated headquarters, the chances that the defendant would fail to receive service in time to respond to a complaint would be greatly increased. This would be particularly so in large businesses and governmental organizations, like the IDOC, which may have scores of facilities and thousands of employees. In this case, for example, the IDOC operates 24 adult institutions scattered throughout Indiana and employs more than 8000 personnel in those various institutions.
[22] Therefore, we find that the phrase "place of business or employment" should not be given the broad interpretation that Claus urges, and Claus's attempted service at the IDOC's central office did not comply with the requirements of Indiana Trial Rule 4.1.
[23] Claus next argues that even if he did not strictly comply with Indiana's service requirements, service was still sufficient under Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(F), which provides:
[24] Defects in summons. No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him, the name of the court, and the time within which he is required to respond. IND. T.R. 4.15(F). We disagree.
[25] First, it is not at all clear from Indiana case law that T.R. 4.15 applies to Claus's situation. The Indiana Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "T.R. 4.15(F) only cures technical defects in the service of process, not the total failure to serve process." LaPalme v. Romero, 621 N.E.2d 1102, 1107 (Ind. 1993). Arguably, mailing the summons and complaint to IDOC headquarters, a place where Mize did not work, is more than a technical defect. Indeed, in Robinson v. Turner, a case with some similarity to this one, the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana held that T.R. 4.15 did not apply when the plaintiff attempted to serve the defendants at a place where they did not work because "failure to serve Defendants at their place of employment constituted a complete failure of service of process rather than a technical failure of service of process." 886 F. Supp. 1451, 1458 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
[26] Even assuming, however, that the defect here is merely technical and that T.R. 4.15 could apply, it would still be the case that Claus's attempted service of process at the IDOC's central office in Indianapolis could not be "reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served." IND. T.R. 4.15(F). In arguing that service was sufficient, Claus notes that the training session at which the incident occurred was a mandatory IDOC exercise, and that Mize was sent there by the IDOC to conduct the exercise. Further, he asserts that he did not know anything about Mize other than that he was employed by the IDOC. According to him, it would be too great a burden to require him to serve process at each individual IDOC facility; thus, Claus maintains that it was reasonable for him to send the summons and complaint to IDOC headquarters.
[27] We do not find this argument availing. Claus would not be required to serve process at every IDOC location, just the location where Mize actually worked. As the district court noted below, it is not unfair to require a plaintiff who chooses to serve a defendant at his place of employment to serve the defendant where he actually works. That is especially true here. Claus himself was an IDOC correctional officer for nine years, so we doubt it would have been excessively burdensome for him to discover where Mize actually reported to work. Further, to satisfy the "reasonably calculated" requirement, there must be a "reasonable degree of certainty" that the method chosen will actually get the papers to the defendant. Robinson, 886 F. Supp. at 1455. As we noted above, in large organizations, like the IDOC, serving process at the central office will greatly decrease the likelihood that it will ever reach the defendant. And Claus, as an IDOC officer himself, should have known that IDOC officers do not generally receive mail at the central office and therefore that the likelihood Mize would receive the complaint and summons was diminished substantially by sending them to the IDOC's headquarters in Indianapolis.
[28] III. Conclusion
[29] For the reasons discussed above, we agree with the district court's finding that there was insufficient service of process. Therefore, the district court's decision to set aside the clerk's entry of default and grant Mize's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.