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PLRA: Exhaustion Of Nonexistent Administrative Remedies Not Required
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held that
class certification for prisoners suing a county jail for unconstitutional
mental health care was inappropriate, and that the prisoners were not
required to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where administrative remedies did not exist.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Foundation of Colorado and the
National Prison Project of the ACLU Foundation brought action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of plaintiffs, prisoners in the El Paso
County Jail, alleging that prisoners with "'serious mental health needs'"
were subjected "to actions and omissions by jail personnel that result in
systemic violations" of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Plaintiffs moved for class certification. Defendants moved for dismissal,
or alternatively, for summary judgment, contending that plaintiffs failed
to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.
The district court denied the motions, holding: 1) Class certification of
"All persons with serious mental health needs who are now, or in the future
will be, confined in the El Paso County Jail," was inappropriate as the
requested relief (that the court delineate procedures for the humane
treatment of mentally ill prisoners at the jail) was not within the court's
authority or jurisdiction under the PLRA. 2) Plaintiffs were not required
to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the PLRA because there
was no available administrative remedy which the plaintiffs ... could have
used for relief."
See: Shook v. The Board of County Commissioners of the County of El Paso,
216 F.R.D. 644 (D CO 2003).
class certification for prisoners suing a county jail for unconstitutional
mental health care was inappropriate, and that the prisoners were not
required to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where administrative remedies did not exist.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Foundation of Colorado and the
National Prison Project of the ACLU Foundation brought action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of plaintiffs, prisoners in the El Paso
County Jail, alleging that prisoners with "'serious mental health needs'"
were subjected "to actions and omissions by jail personnel that result in
systemic violations" of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Plaintiffs moved for class certification. Defendants moved for dismissal,
or alternatively, for summary judgment, contending that plaintiffs failed
to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.
The district court denied the motions, holding: 1) Class certification of
"All persons with serious mental health needs who are now, or in the future
will be, confined in the El Paso County Jail," was inappropriate as the
requested relief (that the court delineate procedures for the humane
treatment of mentally ill prisoners at the jail) was not within the court's
authority or jurisdiction under the PLRA. 2) Plaintiffs were not required
to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the PLRA because there
was no available administrative remedy which the plaintiffs ... could have
used for relief."
See: Shook v. The Board of County Commissioners of the County of El Paso,
216 F.R.D. 644 (D CO 2003).
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Related legal case
Shook v. The Board of County Commissioners of the
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 216 F.R.D. 644 (D CO 2003). |
| Level | District Court |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
In responding to the defendants' opposition to class certification, the plaintiffs identified the following questions of fact said to be common:
" Whether there are a sufficient number of competent and adequately-trained mental health staff at the jail to deal with the serious mental health needs of prisoners;
" Whether the defendants have in place adequate procedures to ensure that the medical provider complies with its contract and delivers the medical and mental health services specified therein;
" Whether the jail can safely and humanely protect prisoners who become suicidal;
" Whether the defendants are able to ensure that all prisoners who require in-patient psychiatric care are able to receive it in a timely fashion;
" Whether there is a sufficient number of security staff adequately trained to respond appropriately to the needs of prisoners with serious mental health needs;
" Whether security staff rather than medical staff or mental health staff make the decision to place suicidal or mentally ill prisoners in restraints;
" Whether security staff respond with inappropriate use of force to behavior that is caused by prisoners' mental illness;
" Whether the jail has an inadequate system for ensuring that the proper medications are delivered in the proper doses at the appropriate time to the appropriate prisoners;
" Whether the jail has an inadequate system for monitoring the effects of psychotropic medications that are delivered to prisoners with serious mental health needs;
" Whether the jail has an inadequate system for assuring continuity of care for prisoners with serious mental health needs who are recent arrivals or who are being released.
Plaintiffs' counsel have also submitted an opinion from a professor in the medical school of Yale University about requirements for the humane treatment of persons with serious mental health needs.
It is apparent from the plaintiffs' papers that this civil action is an effort to reform jail practices rather than to redress past constitutional torts and prevent their reoccurrence. The initial problem in this case is the identification *648 of members of the class. As the plaintiffs and intervenors have observed, more than one thousand persons are housed in the El Paso County Jail facilities at any one time. National statistics suggest that approximately 20% of the prison population in the United States are persons with mental health needs. Jail populations are inherently fluid and the time in custody varies greatly. The El Paso County Jail houses persons who have just been arrested and may be released on bail or dismissed charges or transferred to other institutions within hours of their detention. The inmate population includes pre-trial detainees and prisoners sentenced to confinement for less than two years or are awaiting transfer to Colorado Department of Corrections facilities. The identification of members of the class in this case necessarily would require an intake diagnostic procedure to determine persons having serious mental health needs. To find deliberate indifference to serious mental health needs there must be an awareness by the custodial authority that a prisoner has such needs. The named plaintiffs and interveners had prescriptions for medications which, by their nature, indicate the existence of mental health problems. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires the Sheriff of El Paso County to hire a competent professional staff to screen all persons coming to the jail to determine their mental and emotional status.
The plaintiffs make much of the facts that there have been suicides by prisoners in the El Paso County Jail and there are now pending in this court cases seeking damages for such suicide. Liability in those cases will depend upon a factual showing that there was some basis for a belief that the inmate was at risk for reasons other than custodial confinement. This court is not aware of any case that imposes liability for suicide or any other injury to an inmate because the jailers did not provide a mental health evaluation by a competent professional to determine mental health needs in advance of incarceration.
The law of liability for deliberate indifference to mental health needs of prisoners is not different from that regarding a failure to provide care for physical problems. There is no constitutional requirement that every person taken into custody be given a full physical examination to determine the existence of any such medical problems. Many such medical needs are not identifiable by obvious signs and symptoms and may not be known to the person in custody. Whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred is a question for a jury after a trial on historical evidence following appropriate instructions on the law. In determining that question, the jurors are the arbiters of the defendants' conduct and, in effect, make the law for the case in the same manner that the jury in a common law negligence case decide what a reasonable person would or would not do in the same or similar circumstances.
The objective of this proposed class action is to have this court prescribe jail practices for humane treatment of prisoners. That is beyond the competence and the jurisdiction of this court. The questions sought to be addressed and answered are policy determinations to be made by the political branches of local and state government. The evident purpose of the PLRA was to emphasize the functional difference between the judiciary and the agencies of representative government. The limitations on remedy established by the PLRA would preclude this court from replicating Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir.1980).
The plaintiffs' recitation of common fact questions quoted above illustrate the failure to demonstrate the feasibility of class relief in this case. The prevention of deliberate indifference to substantial mental health needs of prisoners does not equate with establishing "adequate" and "appropriate" measures determined by a court relying on expert witnesses.
The breadth of the relief sought in this case is far wider than those cases preventing the use of restraint boards or other specific types of excessive force. That breadth makes the proposed class action not manageable with this court's limited jurisdiction.
The defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies is denied because there is no available administrative remedy which the plaintiffs and intervenors could have used for relief.
*649 Upon the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that the plaintiffs' and intervenors' motion for class certification is denied. The defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is denied and the plaintiffs and intervenors have 30 days to file an amended complaint for individual remedies.
" Whether there are a sufficient number of competent and adequately-trained mental health staff at the jail to deal with the serious mental health needs of prisoners;
" Whether the defendants have in place adequate procedures to ensure that the medical provider complies with its contract and delivers the medical and mental health services specified therein;
" Whether the jail can safely and humanely protect prisoners who become suicidal;
" Whether the defendants are able to ensure that all prisoners who require in-patient psychiatric care are able to receive it in a timely fashion;
" Whether there is a sufficient number of security staff adequately trained to respond appropriately to the needs of prisoners with serious mental health needs;
" Whether security staff rather than medical staff or mental health staff make the decision to place suicidal or mentally ill prisoners in restraints;
" Whether security staff respond with inappropriate use of force to behavior that is caused by prisoners' mental illness;
" Whether the jail has an inadequate system for ensuring that the proper medications are delivered in the proper doses at the appropriate time to the appropriate prisoners;
" Whether the jail has an inadequate system for monitoring the effects of psychotropic medications that are delivered to prisoners with serious mental health needs;
" Whether the jail has an inadequate system for assuring continuity of care for prisoners with serious mental health needs who are recent arrivals or who are being released.
Plaintiffs' counsel have also submitted an opinion from a professor in the medical school of Yale University about requirements for the humane treatment of persons with serious mental health needs.
It is apparent from the plaintiffs' papers that this civil action is an effort to reform jail practices rather than to redress past constitutional torts and prevent their reoccurrence. The initial problem in this case is the identification *648 of members of the class. As the plaintiffs and intervenors have observed, more than one thousand persons are housed in the El Paso County Jail facilities at any one time. National statistics suggest that approximately 20% of the prison population in the United States are persons with mental health needs. Jail populations are inherently fluid and the time in custody varies greatly. The El Paso County Jail houses persons who have just been arrested and may be released on bail or dismissed charges or transferred to other institutions within hours of their detention. The inmate population includes pre-trial detainees and prisoners sentenced to confinement for less than two years or are awaiting transfer to Colorado Department of Corrections facilities. The identification of members of the class in this case necessarily would require an intake diagnostic procedure to determine persons having serious mental health needs. To find deliberate indifference to serious mental health needs there must be an awareness by the custodial authority that a prisoner has such needs. The named plaintiffs and interveners had prescriptions for medications which, by their nature, indicate the existence of mental health problems. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires the Sheriff of El Paso County to hire a competent professional staff to screen all persons coming to the jail to determine their mental and emotional status.
The plaintiffs make much of the facts that there have been suicides by prisoners in the El Paso County Jail and there are now pending in this court cases seeking damages for such suicide. Liability in those cases will depend upon a factual showing that there was some basis for a belief that the inmate was at risk for reasons other than custodial confinement. This court is not aware of any case that imposes liability for suicide or any other injury to an inmate because the jailers did not provide a mental health evaluation by a competent professional to determine mental health needs in advance of incarceration.
The law of liability for deliberate indifference to mental health needs of prisoners is not different from that regarding a failure to provide care for physical problems. There is no constitutional requirement that every person taken into custody be given a full physical examination to determine the existence of any such medical problems. Many such medical needs are not identifiable by obvious signs and symptoms and may not be known to the person in custody. Whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred is a question for a jury after a trial on historical evidence following appropriate instructions on the law. In determining that question, the jurors are the arbiters of the defendants' conduct and, in effect, make the law for the case in the same manner that the jury in a common law negligence case decide what a reasonable person would or would not do in the same or similar circumstances.
The objective of this proposed class action is to have this court prescribe jail practices for humane treatment of prisoners. That is beyond the competence and the jurisdiction of this court. The questions sought to be addressed and answered are policy determinations to be made by the political branches of local and state government. The evident purpose of the PLRA was to emphasize the functional difference between the judiciary and the agencies of representative government. The limitations on remedy established by the PLRA would preclude this court from replicating Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir.1980).
The plaintiffs' recitation of common fact questions quoted above illustrate the failure to demonstrate the feasibility of class relief in this case. The prevention of deliberate indifference to substantial mental health needs of prisoners does not equate with establishing "adequate" and "appropriate" measures determined by a court relying on expert witnesses.
The breadth of the relief sought in this case is far wider than those cases preventing the use of restraint boards or other specific types of excessive force. That breadth makes the proposed class action not manageable with this court's limited jurisdiction.
The defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies is denied because there is no available administrative remedy which the plaintiffs and intervenors could have used for relief.
*649 Upon the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that the plaintiffs' and intervenors' motion for class certification is denied. The defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is denied and the plaintiffs and intervenors have 30 days to file an amended complaint for individual remedies.