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Shocks the Conscience" Standard Incorrect for First Amendment Claims
Shocks the Conscience" Standard Incorrect for First Amendment Claims
Affirming its prior holding in Bell v Johnson, 308 F.3d 594 (6th Cir.
2002), the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a district court
in Michigan incorrectly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds to a prison official.
Michigan state prisoner David J. Scott sued Philip Bair, Judy Cowing,
Patric Churchill and Terry Maniez, all Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) employees, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that Bair had issued a
misconduct report against Scott in retaliation for Scott filing a
grievance against Bair, and that all of the defendants had conspired to
issue the misconduct report and had used excessive force on Scott. The
district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, but the Sixth
Circuit reversed as to Bair while affirming as to the remaining
defendants. On remand, the district court held that Scott had to show that
Bair's retaliatory acts "shocked the conscience." Finding its conscience
not shocked, the district court granted summary judgment to Bair on
qualified immunity grounds. Scott appealed again.
While the appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit decided Bell v. Johnson,
holding that the proper standard for analyzing First Amendment retaliation
claims was not whether the alleged retaliatory acts shocked the conscience
but whether the act or acts alleged are "capable of deterring a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising [First Amendment] rights...." The
district court decision was, therefore, incorrect in light of Circuit case
authority.
The district court's decision was reversed and the case remanded for
reconsideration. This is not a ruling on the merits of the claim. This
case is published in the Federal Appendix and is subject to rules
governing unpublished cases. See: Scott v. Bair, 55 Fed.Appx. 268 (6th
Cir. 2003).
Affirming its prior holding in Bell v Johnson, 308 F.3d 594 (6th Cir.
2002), the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a district court
in Michigan incorrectly granted summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds to a prison official.
Michigan state prisoner David J. Scott sued Philip Bair, Judy Cowing,
Patric Churchill and Terry Maniez, all Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) employees, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that Bair had issued a
misconduct report against Scott in retaliation for Scott filing a
grievance against Bair, and that all of the defendants had conspired to
issue the misconduct report and had used excessive force on Scott. The
district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, but the Sixth
Circuit reversed as to Bair while affirming as to the remaining
defendants. On remand, the district court held that Scott had to show that
Bair's retaliatory acts "shocked the conscience." Finding its conscience
not shocked, the district court granted summary judgment to Bair on
qualified immunity grounds. Scott appealed again.
While the appeal was pending, the Sixth Circuit decided Bell v. Johnson,
holding that the proper standard for analyzing First Amendment retaliation
claims was not whether the alleged retaliatory acts shocked the conscience
but whether the act or acts alleged are "capable of deterring a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising [First Amendment] rights...." The
district court decision was, therefore, incorrect in light of Circuit case
authority.
The district court's decision was reversed and the case remanded for
reconsideration. This is not a ruling on the merits of the claim. This
case is published in the Federal Appendix and is subject to rules
governing unpublished cases. See: Scott v. Bair, 55 Fed.Appx. 268 (6th
Cir. 2003).
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Related legal case
Scott v. Bair
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 55 Fed.Appx. 268 (6th Cir. 2003). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
DAVID J. SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PHILIP BAIR, Defendant-Appellee. PATRICK CHURCHILL, Defendant.
No. 01-1625
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
55 Fed. Appx. 268; 2003 U.S. App.
January 8, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Appeal after remand at Scott v. Churchill, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15269 (6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Mich., 2004)
PRIOR HISTORY: On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. 95-00571. Hillman. 03-29-01. Scott v. Churchill, 2000 U.S. App. (6th Cir. Mich., Apr. 6, 2000)
DISPOSITION: REVERSED and REMANDED.
COUNSEL: For DAVID J. SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant: Susan G. Davis, Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey, Grand Rapids, MI.
David J. Scott, Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro se, Muskegon, MI.
For PATRICK CHURCHILL, Defendant: Christine M. Campbell, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, MI.
For PHILIP BAIR, Defendant-Appellee: Christine M. Campbell, Kevin R. Himebaugh, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, MI.
JUDGES: Before: GUY and BOGGS, Circuit Judges; EDMUNDS, District Judge. *
* The Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
OPINION:
[*269] PER CURIAM. Plaintiff-Appellant David Scott, an inmate in the Michigan Department of [**2] Corrections prison system, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to Defendant-Appellee, Philip Bair. Scott sued four Michigan correctional personnel. Philip Bair, Judy Gowing, Patrick Churchill, and Terry Maniez, in their individual capacities, alleging that the defendants violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Specifically Scott claimed that Bair issued a misconduct citation against him on July 7, 1995, in retaliation for Scott's filing a grievance against Bair the previous day and that defendants conspired to issue the retaliatory misconduct citation and used excessive force on him.
On August 28, 1997, the district court granted summary judgment to all four defendants, finding an absence of evidence to support Scott's claims. That order initially was upheld on appeal in its entirety. Scott v. Churchill, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32683, No. 97-2061, 1999 WL 1206937 (6th Cir. December 29, 1999)(unpublished disposition)("Scott I"). Scott, however, petitioned the court for a rehearing. This court granted Scott's petition and, upon reconsideration, found that Bair had not met his initial [**3] burden of showing an absence of evidence to support Scott's retaliation and conspiracy claims. (J.A. 129); Scott v. Churchill, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6714, No. 97-2061, 2000 WL 519148 (6th Cir. April 6, 2000)(unpublished disposition)("Scott II") This court therefore vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to Bair on those claims, affirmed the remainder of the court's decision as to the other defendants, and remanded the matter for further proceedings as to Bair. (Id.)
On March 29, 2001, the district court issued an order holding that Bair was entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. (J.A. 54) The court concluded that the established standard at the time of Bair's alleged retaliatory acts required Scott to show that Bair's conduct "shocked the conscience." (J.A. 61-62) The court found that Scott could not meet this burden. The court further dismissed Scott's civil conspiracy claim, finding that it added nothing to his First Amendment claim because it neither expanded the scope of individuals who could be held liable nor was necessary to satisfy Section 1983's "color of state law" requirement. (J.A. 63)
On October 17, 2002, a panel of this Court decided Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2002). [**4] The issue presented by Scott, and resolved in Bell, is the applicability of the "shocks the conscience" standard to prisoner First Amendment retaliation claims alleging conduct in 1995. The Bell Court held that "the clear weight of [*270] published authority in this circuit in 1994 directed courts not to apply the 'shocks the conscience' standard to inmate retaliation claims expressly raised under the First Amendment." Id. at 608. The court concluded that as early as 1989, the applicable standard for evaluating an adverse action undertaken in retaliation for an individual's exercise of his or her First Amendment rights is whether "it is capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from exercising [such] rights ...." Id. at 609-11.
In light of Bell, we REVERSE the district court's decision, and REMAND to the district court for reconsideration.
No. 01-1625
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
55 Fed. Appx. 268; 2003 U.S. App.
January 8, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Appeal after remand at Scott v. Churchill, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15269 (6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Mich., 2004)
PRIOR HISTORY: On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. 95-00571. Hillman. 03-29-01. Scott v. Churchill, 2000 U.S. App. (6th Cir. Mich., Apr. 6, 2000)
DISPOSITION: REVERSED and REMANDED.
COUNSEL: For DAVID J. SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant: Susan G. Davis, Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey, Grand Rapids, MI.
David J. Scott, Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro se, Muskegon, MI.
For PATRICK CHURCHILL, Defendant: Christine M. Campbell, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, MI.
For PHILIP BAIR, Defendant-Appellee: Christine M. Campbell, Kevin R. Himebaugh, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, MI.
JUDGES: Before: GUY and BOGGS, Circuit Judges; EDMUNDS, District Judge. *
* The Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
OPINION:
[*269] PER CURIAM. Plaintiff-Appellant David Scott, an inmate in the Michigan Department of [**2] Corrections prison system, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to Defendant-Appellee, Philip Bair. Scott sued four Michigan correctional personnel. Philip Bair, Judy Gowing, Patrick Churchill, and Terry Maniez, in their individual capacities, alleging that the defendants violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Specifically Scott claimed that Bair issued a misconduct citation against him on July 7, 1995, in retaliation for Scott's filing a grievance against Bair the previous day and that defendants conspired to issue the retaliatory misconduct citation and used excessive force on him.
On August 28, 1997, the district court granted summary judgment to all four defendants, finding an absence of evidence to support Scott's claims. That order initially was upheld on appeal in its entirety. Scott v. Churchill, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32683, No. 97-2061, 1999 WL 1206937 (6th Cir. December 29, 1999)(unpublished disposition)("Scott I"). Scott, however, petitioned the court for a rehearing. This court granted Scott's petition and, upon reconsideration, found that Bair had not met his initial [**3] burden of showing an absence of evidence to support Scott's retaliation and conspiracy claims. (J.A. 129); Scott v. Churchill, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6714, No. 97-2061, 2000 WL 519148 (6th Cir. April 6, 2000)(unpublished disposition)("Scott II") This court therefore vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to Bair on those claims, affirmed the remainder of the court's decision as to the other defendants, and remanded the matter for further proceedings as to Bair. (Id.)
On March 29, 2001, the district court issued an order holding that Bair was entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. (J.A. 54) The court concluded that the established standard at the time of Bair's alleged retaliatory acts required Scott to show that Bair's conduct "shocked the conscience." (J.A. 61-62) The court found that Scott could not meet this burden. The court further dismissed Scott's civil conspiracy claim, finding that it added nothing to his First Amendment claim because it neither expanded the scope of individuals who could be held liable nor was necessary to satisfy Section 1983's "color of state law" requirement. (J.A. 63)
On October 17, 2002, a panel of this Court decided Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2002). [**4] The issue presented by Scott, and resolved in Bell, is the applicability of the "shocks the conscience" standard to prisoner First Amendment retaliation claims alleging conduct in 1995. The Bell Court held that "the clear weight of [*270] published authority in this circuit in 1994 directed courts not to apply the 'shocks the conscience' standard to inmate retaliation claims expressly raised under the First Amendment." Id. at 608. The court concluded that as early as 1989, the applicable standard for evaluating an adverse action undertaken in retaliation for an individual's exercise of his or her First Amendment rights is whether "it is capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from exercising [such] rights ...." Id. at 609-11.
In light of Bell, we REVERSE the district court's decision, and REMAND to the district court for reconsideration.