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Texas Sex Offender Counseling Provision Not Ex Post Facto
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a statute enacted after a
prisoner was convicted and sentenced is not ex post facto if it is not
punitive. Texas prisoner George W. Rieck, Jr., filed a habeas corpus
petition challenging the revocation of his mandatory supervision on a
charge of indecency with a child. His revocation was based upon violating a
condition of supervision by being involuntarily discharged from a sex
offender counseling program, which was mandated by a law enacted after his
conviction.
The appellate court applied an "intent-effects" test to determine if the
law was punitive and thus violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Under this
test, "courts ask whether (1) the legislature intended the sanction to be
punitive, and (2) the sanction is so punitive in effect as to prevent
courts from legitimately viewing it as regulatory or civil in nature. The
appeals court found the law at issue was not intended to be punitive, and
served important non-punitive goals. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of habeas corpus. See: Rieck v. Cockrell, 321 F.3d
487 (5th Cir. 2003).
prisoner was convicted and sentenced is not ex post facto if it is not
punitive. Texas prisoner George W. Rieck, Jr., filed a habeas corpus
petition challenging the revocation of his mandatory supervision on a
charge of indecency with a child. His revocation was based upon violating a
condition of supervision by being involuntarily discharged from a sex
offender counseling program, which was mandated by a law enacted after his
conviction.
The appellate court applied an "intent-effects" test to determine if the
law was punitive and thus violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Under this
test, "courts ask whether (1) the legislature intended the sanction to be
punitive, and (2) the sanction is so punitive in effect as to prevent
courts from legitimately viewing it as regulatory or civil in nature. The
appeals court found the law at issue was not intended to be punitive, and
served important non-punitive goals. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of habeas corpus. See: Rieck v. Cockrell, 321 F.3d
487 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Related legal case
Rieck v. Cockrell
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 321 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2003) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Rieck v. Cockrell, 321 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 01/21/2003)
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
[2] No. 02-40649
[3] 321 F.3d 487, 2003
[4] January 21, 2003
[5] GEORGE WILLIAM RIECK, JR., PETITIONER-APPELLANT,
v.
JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
[7] Before Jones, Duhe, and Clement, Circuit Judges.
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
[9] Summary Calendar
[10] George W. Rieck, Jr., Texas prisoner # 654389, was convicted of indecency with a child and was sentenced to 16 years in prison. He was released on mandatory supervision, but it was revoked when he failed to abide by its conditions and was involuntarily discharged from a sex offender counseling program. He filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition to challenge the revocation of his mandatory supervision. The district court denied him relief, and this court granted him a certificate of appealability on the issue "whether the revocation of [his] mandatory supervision due to his failure to comply with the statute requiring him to attend sex offender counseling which was enacted after he was convicted and sentenced is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause."
[11] This court applies an "intent-effects" test to determine whether a law is punitive and thus violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Center, 253 F.3d 870, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2001). Under this test, "courts ask whether 1) the legislature intended the sanction to be punitive, and 2) the sanction is 'so punitive' in effect as to prevent courts from legitimately viewing it as regulatory or civil in nature." Id.
[12] Our analysis of the law at issue here convinces us that it was not intended to be punitive and serves important non-punitive goals. See id.; see also McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2023-26 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 421 U.S. 346, 350 (1997). Rieck has not shown that the state courts acted unreasonably in rejecting this claim. See DiLosa v. Cain, 279 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Lockhart v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 54, 56-57 (5th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
[1] U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
[2] No. 02-40649
[3] 321 F.3d 487, 2003
[4] January 21, 2003
[5] GEORGE WILLIAM RIECK, JR., PETITIONER-APPELLANT,
v.
JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
[7] Before Jones, Duhe, and Clement, Circuit Judges.
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
[9] Summary Calendar
[10] George W. Rieck, Jr., Texas prisoner # 654389, was convicted of indecency with a child and was sentenced to 16 years in prison. He was released on mandatory supervision, but it was revoked when he failed to abide by its conditions and was involuntarily discharged from a sex offender counseling program. He filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition to challenge the revocation of his mandatory supervision. The district court denied him relief, and this court granted him a certificate of appealability on the issue "whether the revocation of [his] mandatory supervision due to his failure to comply with the statute requiring him to attend sex offender counseling which was enacted after he was convicted and sentenced is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause."
[11] This court applies an "intent-effects" test to determine whether a law is punitive and thus violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Center, 253 F.3d 870, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2001). Under this test, "courts ask whether 1) the legislature intended the sanction to be punitive, and 2) the sanction is 'so punitive' in effect as to prevent courts from legitimately viewing it as regulatory or civil in nature." Id.
[12] Our analysis of the law at issue here convinces us that it was not intended to be punitive and serves important non-punitive goals. See id.; see also McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2023-26 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 421 U.S. 346, 350 (1997). Rieck has not shown that the state courts acted unreasonably in rejecting this claim. See DiLosa v. Cain, 279 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Lockhart v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 54, 56-57 (5th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.