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U.S. Supreme Court Resolves Split Over Heck v. Humphrey, §1983
U.S. Supreme Court Resolves Split Over Heck v. Humphrey, §1983
On February 25, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision,
resolved a split among U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding the
applicability of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129
L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), to litigation under 42 U.S.C. §1983 regarding prison
disciplinary actions.
Shakur Muhammad, a Michigan prisoner, was eating breakfast when he noticed
prison guard Mark Close staring at him. Muhammad stared back, and Close
confronted him. Words were exchanged and Close locked Muhammad in
segregation, charging him with "Threatening Behavior," for which pre-
hearing detention was mandatory. A prison disciplinary board found
Muhammad guilty of insolence, a lesser charge for which pre-hearing
detention was not mandatory.
Muhammad then sued Close under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that Close had
charged him with threatening behavior and subjected him to pre-hearing
detention in retaliation for prior grievances and lawsuits he had filed
against Close. After obtaining counsel, Muhammad amended his original
complaint. Neither in his amended complaint nor in any subsequent
proceeding did Muhammad ever challenge the validity of his insolence
conviction. Indeed, he conceded the conviction was justified.
After the close of discovery, the Magistrate Judge recommended, and the
District Court agreed, that summary judgment should be granted to Close on
the ground that Muhammad had failed to produce sufficient evidence of
retaliation to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Muhammad appealed.
The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment but on
different grounds from those cited by the District Court. The Court of
Appeals held that Muhammad sought expungement of his insolence conviction
and, consequently, his action was barred by Heck, which holds that a suit
cannot be brought under §1983 if a favorable verdict in that suit would
imply invalidity of the conviction that is the basis of the suit. Rather,
in such cases, a prisoner must first exhaust his state remedies to get the
conviction overturned. See: Muhammad v. Close, 47 Fed.Appx. 738 (6th Cir.
2002) (unpublished). Muhammad again appealed.
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Circuits were split over the
applicability of Heck when a prisoner did not challenge "the fact or
duration of the underlying sentence." Further, the Court noted that the
Sixth Circuit made a factual mistake in finding that Muhammad sought
expungement of his insolence conviction. Muhammad had conceded the
validity of his disciplinary conviction. Moreover, the disciplinary
conviction did not affect the fact or duration of his underlying criminal
conviction, and no good time credits were lost by the pre-hearing
detention.
The Supreme Court held that Heck does not apply to all suits challenging
prison disciplinary proceedings but only to those suits which would, if
successful, challenge the validity of the underlying conviction or affect
the fact or duration of confinement. The Court's holding overruled in part
Sixth Circuit precedent set forth in Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 230-231
(6th Cir. 2000).
The Court of Appeals' decision was reversed and the case was remanded
for "consideration of summary judgment on the ground adopted by the
District Court, and for any further proceedings consistent with [the
Supreme Court's] opinion." See: Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 124 S.Ct.
1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004).
On February 25, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision,
resolved a split among U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding the
applicability of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129
L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), to litigation under 42 U.S.C. §1983 regarding prison
disciplinary actions.
Shakur Muhammad, a Michigan prisoner, was eating breakfast when he noticed
prison guard Mark Close staring at him. Muhammad stared back, and Close
confronted him. Words were exchanged and Close locked Muhammad in
segregation, charging him with "Threatening Behavior," for which pre-
hearing detention was mandatory. A prison disciplinary board found
Muhammad guilty of insolence, a lesser charge for which pre-hearing
detention was not mandatory.
Muhammad then sued Close under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that Close had
charged him with threatening behavior and subjected him to pre-hearing
detention in retaliation for prior grievances and lawsuits he had filed
against Close. After obtaining counsel, Muhammad amended his original
complaint. Neither in his amended complaint nor in any subsequent
proceeding did Muhammad ever challenge the validity of his insolence
conviction. Indeed, he conceded the conviction was justified.
After the close of discovery, the Magistrate Judge recommended, and the
District Court agreed, that summary judgment should be granted to Close on
the ground that Muhammad had failed to produce sufficient evidence of
retaliation to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Muhammad appealed.
The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment but on
different grounds from those cited by the District Court. The Court of
Appeals held that Muhammad sought expungement of his insolence conviction
and, consequently, his action was barred by Heck, which holds that a suit
cannot be brought under §1983 if a favorable verdict in that suit would
imply invalidity of the conviction that is the basis of the suit. Rather,
in such cases, a prisoner must first exhaust his state remedies to get the
conviction overturned. See: Muhammad v. Close, 47 Fed.Appx. 738 (6th Cir.
2002) (unpublished). Muhammad again appealed.
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Circuits were split over the
applicability of Heck when a prisoner did not challenge "the fact or
duration of the underlying sentence." Further, the Court noted that the
Sixth Circuit made a factual mistake in finding that Muhammad sought
expungement of his insolence conviction. Muhammad had conceded the
validity of his disciplinary conviction. Moreover, the disciplinary
conviction did not affect the fact or duration of his underlying criminal
conviction, and no good time credits were lost by the pre-hearing
detention.
The Supreme Court held that Heck does not apply to all suits challenging
prison disciplinary proceedings but only to those suits which would, if
successful, challenge the validity of the underlying conviction or affect
the fact or duration of confinement. The Court's holding overruled in part
Sixth Circuit precedent set forth in Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 230-231
(6th Cir. 2000).
The Court of Appeals' decision was reversed and the case was remanded
for "consideration of summary judgment on the ground adopted by the
District Court, and for any further proceedings consistent with [the
Supreme Court's] opinion." See: Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 124 S.Ct.
1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004).
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Related legal case
Muhammad v. Close
| Year | 2002 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 47 Fed.Appx. 738 (6th Cir. 2002). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
SHAKUR MUHAMMAD, also known as John E. Mease, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK CLOSE, Correctional Officer, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 02-1043
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
47 Fed. Appx. 738; 2002 U.S. App.
September 23, 2002, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: US Supreme Court certiorari granted by, Motion granted by Muhammad v. Close, 156 L. Ed. 2d 602, 123 S. Ct. 2573, 2003 U.S.
Motion granted by Muhammad v. Close, 157 L. Ed. 2d 690, 124 S. Ct. 861, 2003 U.S. (U.S., 2003)
Reversed by, Remanded by Shakur Muhammad v. Mark Close, 2004 U.S. (U.S., Feb. 25, 2004)
PRIOR HISTORY: Eastern District of Michigan. 98-10153. Lawson. 12-18-01.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
COUNSEL: SHAKUR MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro se, Ionia, MI.
For MARK CLOSE, Defendant-Appellee: Kevin R. Himebaugh, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, MI.
JUDGES: Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; MOORE, Circuit Judge; WISEMAN, District Judge. *
* The Honorable Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
OPINION: [*738]
ORDER
Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; MOORE, Circuit Judge; WISEMAN, District Judge. *
* The Honorable Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
[**2]
Shakur Muhammad appeals a district court grant of summary judgment for defendant in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Muhammad filed his complaint in the district court alleging that the defendant corrections officer falsely charged him with major misconduct threatening behavior in retaliation for prior lawsuits and grievances plaintiff filed against defendant. Plaintiff named defendant in his individual and official capacities and sought compensatory and punitive damages [*739] and expungement of the resulting misconduct conviction on a reduced charge of insolence. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint or for summary judgment, and plaintiff responded in opposition and moved for leave to amend his complaint. The magistrate judge recommended that defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment be denied and that plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint be granted, and defendant filed objections. The district court adopted the [**3] magistrate judge's recommendation and denied defendant's motion, and plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
Thereafter, the magistrate judge appointed counsel to represent plaintiff, and defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied, and defendant filed objections. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
Following discovery, defendant again moved the district court for summary judgment, plaintiff responded in opposition, and defendant submitted a reply. The magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment for defendant be granted, and the district court granted plaintiff leave to file pro se objections after counsel declined to do so. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal pro se. On appeal, plaintiff contends that he established a genuine issue of material fact remaining for trial with respect to whether defendant retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. Defendant responds [**4] that the district court's judgment was proper.
Upon de novo review, see Brooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 1991), we affirm the judgment of the district court. The plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages and requests that "the misconduct charge [be] expunged from his file." J.A. at 14. Thus this case falls directly within the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), which this circuit applied to a prisoner seeking damages and expungement of a disciplinary infraction in Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 2000). "In order to grant the plaintiff in this case the relief he seeks, we would have to unwind the judgment of the state agency." Id. at 230. Thus Heck bars the plaintiff's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Accordingly, the district court's judgment is affirmed. See Rule 34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
No. 02-1043
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
47 Fed. Appx. 738; 2002 U.S. App.
September 23, 2002, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: US Supreme Court certiorari granted by, Motion granted by Muhammad v. Close, 156 L. Ed. 2d 602, 123 S. Ct. 2573, 2003 U.S.
Motion granted by Muhammad v. Close, 157 L. Ed. 2d 690, 124 S. Ct. 861, 2003 U.S. (U.S., 2003)
Reversed by, Remanded by Shakur Muhammad v. Mark Close, 2004 U.S. (U.S., Feb. 25, 2004)
PRIOR HISTORY: Eastern District of Michigan. 98-10153. Lawson. 12-18-01.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
COUNSEL: SHAKUR MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro se, Ionia, MI.
For MARK CLOSE, Defendant-Appellee: Kevin R. Himebaugh, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, MI.
JUDGES: Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; MOORE, Circuit Judge; WISEMAN, District Judge. *
* The Honorable Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
OPINION: [*738]
ORDER
Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; MOORE, Circuit Judge; WISEMAN, District Judge. *
* The Honorable Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
[**2]
Shakur Muhammad appeals a district court grant of summary judgment for defendant in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Muhammad filed his complaint in the district court alleging that the defendant corrections officer falsely charged him with major misconduct threatening behavior in retaliation for prior lawsuits and grievances plaintiff filed against defendant. Plaintiff named defendant in his individual and official capacities and sought compensatory and punitive damages [*739] and expungement of the resulting misconduct conviction on a reduced charge of insolence. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint or for summary judgment, and plaintiff responded in opposition and moved for leave to amend his complaint. The magistrate judge recommended that defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment be denied and that plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint be granted, and defendant filed objections. The district court adopted the [**3] magistrate judge's recommendation and denied defendant's motion, and plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
Thereafter, the magistrate judge appointed counsel to represent plaintiff, and defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied, and defendant filed objections. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
Following discovery, defendant again moved the district court for summary judgment, plaintiff responded in opposition, and defendant submitted a reply. The magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment for defendant be granted, and the district court granted plaintiff leave to file pro se objections after counsel declined to do so. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal pro se. On appeal, plaintiff contends that he established a genuine issue of material fact remaining for trial with respect to whether defendant retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. Defendant responds [**4] that the district court's judgment was proper.
Upon de novo review, see Brooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 1991), we affirm the judgment of the district court. The plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages and requests that "the misconduct charge [be] expunged from his file." J.A. at 14. Thus this case falls directly within the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), which this circuit applied to a prisoner seeking damages and expungement of a disciplinary infraction in Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 2000). "In order to grant the plaintiff in this case the relief he seeks, we would have to unwind the judgment of the state agency." Id. at 230. Thus Heck bars the plaintiff's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Accordingly, the district court's judgment is affirmed. See Rule 34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.