Indiana prisoner Kenneth Marshal filed a handwritten, pro se complaint in federal court on June 25, 2003. He alleged that prison officials implemented a restrictive law library policy which diminished his library access. He claimed that his inability to prepare for a May 29, 2003 court proceeding resulted in denial of “credit time” he was entitled to.
Before defendants were served, on September 3, 2003, Marshall sought leave to amend his complaint to; (1) name previous Doe defendants; (2) increase his damages request; (3) demand a jury trial; and (4) attach several exhibits and affidavits. “His petition also contained new factual allegations that suggested a claim for retaliation.”
On November 24, 2003, the court issued a single-sentence order denying Marshall’s motion to amend. On December 18, 2003, the court dismissed Marshall’s action pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (b)(1), finding that Marshall failed to state a viable claim for relief. The dismissal was based on the court’s interpretation of Lewis v. Casey, 518 US 343 (1996) as requiring prisoners to allege that they were prevented from filing a complaint or appeal, to state a valid access-to-courts claim. Marshall failed to meet this standard.
The Seventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that under FRCP8’s “notice-pleading system,” prisoners need not plead facts or legal theories. They must only set out a “short and plain statement of the claim” sufficient to notify defendants of the claims against them and enable them to file an answer. When applied to prisoner access-to-courts claims, however, “notice pleading requires plaintiffs to ‘make specific allegations as to the prejudice suffered because of the defendants’ alleged conduct.’ Ortloff v. United States, 335 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 1990)).” The court explained, however, that the requirement of alleging “specific prejudice should not be understood as an onerous fact-pleading burden; it is simply a requirement that a prisoner’s complaint spell out, in minimal detail, the connection between the alleged denial of access to legal materials and an inability to pursue a legitimate challenge to a conviction, sentence, or prison conditions.”
“Applying these lenient pleading standards to Marshall’s pro se complaint,” the court concluded that “his allegations sufficiently stated a claim for denial of access to the courts.” The court also rejected the lower court’s narrow reading of Lewis as confining “access-to-court claims to situations where a prisoner has been unable to file a complaint or an appeal. Indeed, Lewis explained that a prisoner could prove a denial of access to the courts by showing that a complaint he prepared and filed ‘was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he could not have known.’”
The court also found that under FRCP 15(a), Marshall “had a right to amend his complaint ‘as a matter of course.’ The district court’s summary denial of Marshall’s request to amend was thus contrary to Rule 15 (a).” Therefore, “Marshall should have been permitted to amend his complaint to identify previously unnamed defendants, to make a jury demand, and to increase his damages claim to $10,000.” He also should have been allowed to allege his post-filing retaliation claim. See: Marshall v. Knight, 445 F3d 965 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Related legal case
Marshall v. Knight
|Cite||445 F3d 965 (7th Cir. 2006)|
|Level||Court of Appeals|