Third Circuit Upholds Award of $265,000 to Prisoner Who Was Sexually Assaulted Twice by the Same Guard
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a jury’s award of $265,000 to Pennsylvania prisoner Henry Unseld Washington who was sexually assaulted twice by guard T.S. Oswald.
In 2013, Oswald and another guard identified as a “sergeant” escorted the handcuffed Washington to the visiting room. Oswald and the sergeant began to “rub and touch [Washington] in a very sexual manner.” They also attempted to push a nightstick into Washington’s rectum. At the visiting room, “someone ... insert[ed] their finger into the cleavage of [Washington’s] buttocks.” When Washington jumped, Oswald yanked on the tether to the handcuffs so hard that it pulled Washington’s arms “through the wicket” in the door to the visiting room. Then the sergeant prodded Washington’s testicles with such vigor that Washington “collapsed to the floor.” When returning Washington to his cell, Oswald and the sergeant prodded Washington with the nightstick, poked him with a needle or pin, and called him “honey,” “sugar,” and “blackberry.” Back at his cell, Washington’s “crotch was all soaked with blood” and “blood [was] running down the back of his leg.”
Two years later, Oswald—now a sergeant himself—again escorted a handcuffed Washington back to his cell. Oswald fondled Washington’s back and “rump,” “shoved a finger into [Washington’s] buttocks” attempting “to insert a finger into [Washington’s] rectum,” while calling Washington “sweet dark sugar” and “blackberry.”
In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 complaint, Washington sued Oswald, alleging infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment. A jury found in favor of Washington and awarded him $20,000 in compensatory damages for each sexual assault; $25,000 in punitive damages for the first assault; and $200,000 in punitive damages for the second assault. Oswald moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, alleging there was insufficient evidence to show that he was the one who assaulted Washington. He also moved for remittitur, alleging that the punitive damages were excessive under the Constitution, state law, and federal law. The district court denied the motions and Oswald appealed.
The Court observed “[j]udgment as a matter of law is proper only if the record is ‘critically deficient of the minimum quantity of evidence’ needed to support the verdict.” See: Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079 (3d Cir. 1995). Oswald did not deny that Washington was sexually assaulted by someone but argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was the one who assaulted Washington. The Court disagreed. As to the first assault, the jury heard: Oswald was named as one of the guards involved; Oswald was the one who yanked the tether to the cuffs while the sergeant fondled Washington; Oswald and the sergeant prodded Washington’s rear end and testicles with a nightstick and poked him with a needle or pin; and Oswald referred to Washington with sexual terms.
As to the second assault, the jury heard Washington identify Oswald as the guard “in the first event” who had “since become a sergeant.” At the time of the first event, the other perpetrator was already a sergeant so Oswald was the only one who could have later “become a sergeant” at the time of the second assault. The Court concluded: “Drawing ‘all reasonable and logical inferences’ in Washington’s favor, the jury had enough evidence to find Oswald was one of the assailants.”
Oswald also argued that “federal common law limits punitive damages in section 1983 suits” and cited Exxon Shipping Co. v. Beker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). But the Court observed that “Exxon does not provide any common-law principles that govern here. That case arose in federal maritime jurisdiction, where the [U.S. Supreme] Court decides issues ‘in the manner of a common law court.’ In making common law, the [U.S. Supreme] Court held that ‘punitive damages in maritime law’ should not exceed compensatory damages.”
But the instant case was under a statute—42 U.S.C. section 1983—and not at sea under maritime law. While there may be limits on punitive damages under section 1983 coming from settled common law incorporated by the statute, Oswald had not presented any such claim based on section 1983; therefore, the Court left it “to future courts to decide what common-law limits, if any, the statute incorporated.”
Finally, under the framework of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), the Court determined that the punitive damages did not violate the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court found that Oswald’s actions were reprehensible, i.e., he physically injured Washington; he did it on purpose; he repeatedly injured Washington; he did it not for a legitimate reason but “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm” (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)); and he “targeted one of the most vulnerable among us: a prisoner.... Prisoners are ‘stripped of virtually every means of self-protection’ and cannot get outside help; they depend on their guards to safeguard them.”
Finally, the 10 to 1 ratio of the highest punitive damages award was not excessive compared to the harm inflicted. “Sexual assault inflicts the kind of non-economic harm that is hard to put a price on, justifying a higher ratio.” Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. See: Washington v. Gilmore, 124 F.4th 178 (3d Cir. 2024).
As a digital subscriber to Prison Legal News, you can access full text and downloads for this and other premium content.
Already a subscriber? Login
Related legal case
Washington v. Gilmore
| Year | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 124 F.4th 178 (3d Cir. 2024) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Conclusion | Bench Verdict |