Kansas Supreme Court Revives Prisoner’s Challenge to Loss of Parental Rights
On September 6, 2024, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that a prisoner’s due process rights were violated when he was able only to observe his parental rights termination hearing via videoconferencing and was unable to testify or consult with his attorney during the hearing.
Federal prisoner “H.S.” and “R.A.” are the biological father and mother of the minor child, “A.S.” While pregnant and after the birth, both the mother and A.S. tested positive for amphetamines multiple times. The state Department of Children and Families then took custody of A.S. and eventually moved for termination of both parents’ rights.
H.S. was being held in a federal prison in Kansas at the time of the parental rights hearing, which he was allowed to attend via Zoom. But the prison was unable to provide an adequate connection, so he was unable to participate in the meeting. At its conclusion, the trial court found H.S. was an unfit father and terminated his parental rights.
H.S. appealed, claiming that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to support termination of his rights and raising, for the first time, a claim that his due process rights were violated by the refusal to allow him to testify via Zoom. When that appeal failed, H.S. petitioned the state Supreme Court for review, aided by Kansas City attorney Chandler E. Colgan.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s comments in the record indicated that the issue of H.S. testifying had been previously raised and ruled on. Further, his presence inferred his desire to testify, and he gave an explanation why the issue should be addressed even though not raised in court. Thus, the appellate court erred in refusing to address the due process issue pursuant to Kan. S. Ct. Rule 602(a)(5).
Using the three factors set out in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court found that the importance of the right at stake made the first factor—“the private interest that will be affected by the official action”—weigh in H.S.’s favor. Because parents have unique and exclusive knowledge in a termination case, the “risk of error is too great if a parent does not have an opportunity to hear the evidence and respond to it,” the Court said.
A recent and similar Supreme Court of Iowa ruling, In re M.D., 921 N.W.2d 229 (Iowa 2018), satisfied the second factor, which involved “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used.” Like earlier rulings in Kansas, the one in Iowa came down to recognizing “the compelling interest of the parent to hear the evidence offered in support of a termination petition and to respond effectively to the evidence.”
Considering the final factor, the government’s interest—“including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail”—the Court found nothing sufficiently compelling to justify precluding H.S. from meaningfully participating in the hearing.
“If a party appears for a hearing in his own case, we presume he wants to fully and meaningfully participate in the hearing because he is entitled to do so,” the Court declared. Moreover, since the state could not show that the outcome of the hearing would have been the same had H.S. been permitted to participate and testify, the error was not harmless. Thus the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were reversed and the case remanded. See: In the Int. of A.S., 319 Kan. 396 (2024).
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Related legal case
In the Int. of A.S.
| Cite | 319 Kan. 396 (2024) |
|---|---|
| Level | State Supreme Court |