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CO CCA Riot After Action Report

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COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

AFTER ACTION REPORT
Inmate Riot: Crowley County Correctional Facility
July 20, 2004

October 1, 2004

After Action Report
Inmate Riot: July 20, 2004

Crowley County Correctional Facility

Prepared by:
Nolin Renfrow, Director of Prisons
Cherrie Greco, Legislative Liaison
Anna Cooper, Prison Operations

October 1, 2004

2

Table of Contents
Colorado Department of Corrections Officials

Page
5

Corrections Corporation of America Officials

5

CDOC Private Prisons Monitoring Unit Staff

5

Crowley County Commissioners

5

Part I Executive Summary
• Introduction
• History of Privatization
• Statutory Authority
• Organizational Work Force
• Colorado Private Prison Operators
• Housing Out of State Inmates in Private Prisons
• Private Prison Monitoring Unit

6
6
7
10
10
11
11
11

Part II
•
•
•

13
13
15
16

Information/Events leading up to Incident
Reports from Staff and Inmates
Recent PPMU Visits
Crowley’s Level of Emergency Preparedness

Part III Incident Summary
• Chronological Order and Narrative Account of Events
• Use of Force
• Observations
• Office of Inspector General: Investigations and
Findings

17
17
56
57
58

Part IV Conclusion and Recommendations:
• Conclusions
• Recommendations
• Emergency Preparedness

65
65
65
67

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Appendices:

Page:

Photos:

70 – 89

Intergovernmental Contract – State of Colorado
and the Colorado Department of Corrections and
Crowley County and Exhibits

90– 177

Crowley County Correctional Facility Riot Response
Expenses to be Reimbursed

178

Glossary

179

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Colorado Department of Corrections Officials
Joe Ortiz, Executive Director
Nolin Renfrow, Director of Prisons
L.D. Hay, Director of Administration and Finance
Jeaneene E. Miller, Director, Adult Parole, Community Corrections & YOS,
Mike Rulo, Inspector General,
Madline SaBell, Director of Human Resources,
Alison Morgan, Director of Public Affairs
Cherrie Greco, Legislative Liaison

Corrections Corporation of America Officials
John D. Ferguson, President and CEO
James A. Seaton, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
Dr. Stephen W. Kaiser, Managing Dir., Facility Operations Division IV
Josh Brown, Senior Director, Business Development
Brent Crouse, Warden, Crowley County Correctional Facility
Bill Bridges and Michael Miller, Associate Wardens, Crowley County
Correctional Facility

Private Prisons Monitoring Unit-Colorado Department of Corrections
Michael Arellano, Unit Chief
Terry Flanagan, CO III Security Specialist
Sue Rael, Administrative Assistant
Deborah Ahlin, CM II, Intelligence Specialist
Gaynell Pritts, CM II, Monitor
John Bongirno, GP III, Monitor
Jim Webber, CM II, Monitor
Dana Bustos, Mental Health Program Specialist

Crowley County Commissioners
T.E. (Tobe) Allumbaugh, Dwight Gardner, Mathew Heimerich, Warren
Davis, Assessor; Mike McDonnell, Attorney; Lucile Nichols, Recorder;
Jeff Keyes, Sheriff; Lynne Bauer, Treasurer;
Bill Wilson, Crowley County Private Prison Monitor
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Part I: Executive Summary
Introduction
On the evening of July 20, 2004, the Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC) was notified of an inmate disturbance which erupted in the recreation
yard of the Crowley County Correctional Facility (CCCF). The facility is
located approximately forty miles east of Pueblo on Highway 96, near the
community of Olney Springs. CCCF is designated a Level III, or medium
custody security correctional institution with an offender capacity of 1,144
dispersed throughout six cell houses (Cellhouse 5 construction incomplete at
the time of the riot), including the recent completion of an additional 312-bed
unit. There are no towers, although an observation deck is located over the
gymnasium; observation cameras are located throughout. The facility is
owned and operated by Corrections Corporation of America (CCA),
Nashville, Tennessee.
At approximately 7:30 P.M., the facility’s inmate population, many of
whom were located in the recreational yard, began to disregard staff orders to
clear the yard and openly displayed non-compliant behavior. A disturbance
quickly escalated to the level of a riot, which included inmates destroying
property, setting fires, seriously assaulting other inmates and, over the period
of the next several hours, causing damage to the facility’s physical plant and
security systems. Additional costs were incurred for emergency medical
assistance, staff overtime, rehabilitation of buildings and grounds, as well as
costs associated with the activation of emergency response teams,
investigators, K-9 units and the Emergency Mobile Command Center, all
deployed to assist with the uprising.
During the days and weeks after the riot, over 1,400 investigative
interviews were conducted by the Office of Inspector General, Colorado
Department of Corrections. Colorado Bureau of Investigations agents were
utilized to assist, as well as a Washington State Department of Corrections
investigator, Crowley County Sheriff’s Office and the CCCF investigator.
Information resulting from these interviews is found throughout the report.
Extensive staff time by a number of other CDOC employees has resulted in
the accumulation and compilation of critical details related to the incident.
This document is being presented for the benefit of state government
officials, the media, members of the general public and others for the purpose
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of analyzing the facts and circumstances related to the incident. During the
preparation of this report, a simultaneous criminal investigation was ongoing
and being conducted by the Office of the Inspector General, Colorado
Department of Corrections. Therefore, certain sensitive data which might be
utilized during legal proceedings is referred to in this document in general
terms only, so as not to compromise the process.
Riots and disturbances in correctional institutions are complex and varied
and often cannot be attributed to any single cause or groups of causes.
Whether public or private, the correctional setting is, by its very nature, an
unusual living environment, which may contribute to the emotional stress of
those incarcerated. There are limited personal freedoms, monotony,
regimentation, frustration, hopelessness, anxiety about family and friends and
racial or other conflicts. However, correctional organizations are accustomed
to utilizing management strategies which strive for fairness and parity with
regard to conditions of confinement, treatment, education, training and
necessary community reentry opportunities, while, at the same time, carrying
out the orders of the court.
For all involved, prison riots are fundamentally a threat to life and safety,
which can turn a stressful environment into a tragedy. In the case of the
Crowley riot, every attempt has been made to identify those elements that may
have contributed to the incident, knowing full well that the propensity for any
unrest can rarely be attributed to a single point of origin.
Among the goals of this report, therefore, are conclusions and
recommendations. Corrections professionals, whether working in publiclyoperated or private correctional facility environments, can often discover
useful strategies from lessons learned, and, if acted on appropriately, may
prevent riots of this magnitude in the future.

History of Prison Privitization in Colorado
In recent years, virtually every state in the Union has experienced rapid
growth of their prison populations. In fact, Colorado’s inmate population
exceeded CDOC’s physical capacity beginning in 1988. On September 2,
1988 the Colorado Department of Corrections moved 105 inmates to an
empty, state owned facility in Washington. At that time, the Department's
capacity for male inmates in other than community corrections beds was
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4,547. Records show the on-grounds count was 4,517 with and additional 151
inmates off-grounds (out to court or in hospitals). Additionally, the county
jails were holding 374 inmates that had been sentenced to the Department but
were being held due to the lack of bed space. During the ten (10) year
experience of housing inmates in out of state placement, the highest number
was 1,684 in October, 1997 and the low was 13 in December, 1990. County
jails became over crowded and lawsuits against the state were initiated in an
effort to remove CDOC inmates. Court orders were issued and subsequent
contempt citations filed to compel removal of state prisoners from county
jails. No state beds were available, however, and a process of prioritization
ensued, virtually pitting counties against each other. Early parole was not a
viable option. The American Civil Liberties Union began to threaten
litigation against Denver and Arapahoe Counties, forcing them to build new
jail space. In all, the CDOC went to the Colorado Supreme Court three times
seeking resolution.
Consequently, county, state and private beds were contracted for in the
states of Missouri, Minnesota, Washington, Wyoming and Texas. Offenders
classified as medium custody and below were selected for out of state moves.
During this period, a number of lawsuits were filed; however, the courts
unanimously upheld CDOC’s position regarding these placements.
Eventually, beds became available with the construction of additional state
and privately funded facilities, so that, by December, 1998, all inmates had
been returned to Colorado.
Like most states, Colorado’s budget has been challenged for the past
several years, virtually eliminating the availability of capital construction
funding for additional, state-owned prison bed space. Therefore, partnerships
have been further enhanced with the governmental entities where private
prisons are constructed, in order to manage inmates and meet the state’s
public safety mission. Today, approximately 2,797 Colorado offenders are
housed in these facilities. Of that number, 121 are located in Tallahatchie
County, Mississippi.
The merits of privatization are often discussed with regard to
differential costs, liability, level of oversight, staffing and quality of physical
plant construction. The private prison industry is driven by a need created
when the number of inmates exceeds the number of state owned beds.
Simply, the public expects to be protected; if no state funds are available for
prison construction, a market for private prisons exists, based upon the need
for bed space at any given time. Arguments can be made for and against the
8

concept of private prisons. However, as of this date, due to the lack of
sufficient public beds, the choice is stark; approximately 2,797 Colorado
felons can either be placed in private facilities, in out of state facilities or on
the street.
For the most part, private prison operators are exempted from many
governmental requirements with regard to purchasing and personnel
management. While constructing and activating private correctional facilities
can benefit local communities and provide positive economic impact,
conversely, accessing and hiring sufficient numbers of employees to staff such
institutions can be challenging.
Contractual arrangements are made between the Colorado Department
of Corrections and cities or counties where the facilities have been sited. A
daily per diem rate, approved by the Colorado State Legislature each year, is
paid to these local governments; they, in turn, create subcontracts with private
prison operators. At present, a rate of $49.56 is being paid per inmate, per day
in Colorado. $51.00 is being paid to Tallahatchie County in Mississippi for
Colorado inmates being housed there. This fee does not cover case
management oversight, transportation or non-routine medical care for TCCF.
The arrangement is often known as the “Customer Model” whereby a level of
services is defined, in keeping with standards imposed by the American
Correctional Association, CDOC regulations, state and federal law.
Which offenders are best placed in privately owned beds? Bed
management for CDOC’s offender population is driven by a number of
factors: trends in population growth, average length of stay, new criminal
laws and sentences, parole populations, community corrections, rate of
revocation, medical and mental health needs, other special program needs, as
well as an inmate’s ability to progress to a less secure environment. Further,
the department’s classification system characterizes levels of risk, which
ultimately influences facility placement. With this is mind, the Colorado
Department of Corrections houses the most difficult to manage inmates, with
behavior and custody issues, as well as those with advanced medical and
mental health conditions, while the private facilities provide only moderate
medical care to relatively healthy inmates classified at medium custody and
below. Prior to release for parole or discharge, offenders are returned to
CDOC facilities for out-processing.

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Statutory Authority
The Colorado Revised Statutes governing authorization of CDOC to
place offenders in private prisons, expectations regarding performance and
oversight are found in Title 17. Private facilities are expected to follow
CDOC Administrative Regulations where specified, as defined in the
contracts. Waivers may be requested and granted for those regulations that do
not apply.

Organizational Work Force
Observable differences exist between the private and public prison
workforce, and the two can be compared in several ways. In both the private
and public sectors, program opportunities have been developed, providing
inmates with treatment, education, work and leisure time activities. Speciallytrained and credentialed staff are responsible for implementing and managing
such programs. Operational support from food service, clinical services and
case management are provided by employees trained in correctional security
and other fields germane to their duties and responsibilities. However, unlike
employees at private prisons, alignment of the Colorado Department of
Corrections’ staff is designed and structured with positions defined by the
classification system of Department of Personnel and Administration. Private
prison staff are generally “at-will”, hourly employees, and company policies
dictate operational decision-making nation-wide.
While searching, screening and hiring qualified staff is challenging in
both the private and public sectors, the staff attrition rate at CCA in Colorado
is double that of staff employed by the Colorado Department of Corrections,
thus making it more difficult to establish long held traditions or utilize the
benefit of experienced staff. For example, years of policy development,
practice and understanding the changing dynamics of a prison’s population
have created a culture where the mission is readily understood in publiclyoperated institutions. To that end, it is not unusual for CDOC staff to spend
years serving in volunteer capacities with specialized response units; i.e.,
Escape Teams, Tracking, Emergency Response Teams (ERT) and Special
Operations Response Teams (SORT). Regularly scheduled training affords
these groups with the confidence needed to mobilize swiftly and perform as
needed. Over time, a sense of “community” has evolved, statewide, where
professional relationships have developed regarding all matters of offender
10

management. For their part, offenders know that attempts to defeat security
will be summarily thwarted by a confident and experienced staff. However,
this sense of preparedness is more difficult to achieve among private prisons.

Colorado Private Prison Operators
At present, Corrections Corporation of America operates four facilities
in Colorado: Crowley County Correctional Facility, Bent County
Correctional Facility, Kit Carson Correctional Center and Huerfano County
Correctional Center. In addition, GRW Corporation owns and operates an
adult female facility at Brush. Besides housing Colorado inmates, the states
of Washington, Wyoming and Hawaii have contracted for bed space in some
of these facilities.

Housing Out of State Inmates in Colorado’s
Private Prisons
Private prison operators assume a substantial investment when the
decision is made to site a facility in Colorado. Costs associated with
construction, utility plant upgrades, and other infrastructure improvements are
sizable, but are intended to be recovered when daily bed capacity is attained.
Keeping beds filled is essential to realizing the full return on investment.
Therefore, when other states reach their own capacity and seek bed space
elsewhere, it is not uncommon for CDOC offenders being housed in private
corrections institutions to share facility space with other states’ inmates.
Through the authority of CDOC’s Executive Director (CRS 17.1.104.5), the
Private Prisons Monitoring Unit reviews inmate files for suitability and
appropriateness of placement, prior to inmates’ being transferred to Colorado.
Individual states vary with regard to the daily rate being paid to the private
operator or other conditions established in their contracts.

Private Prisons Monitoring Unit (PPMU)
Per CRS 17-1-202(1) (a) (III) (g): The Executive Director of the
Colorado Department of Corrections shall monitor the contracted private
correctional facilities. Until the passage of HB04-1419, all operating
expenses and personal services to monitor the private facilities were
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reimbursed quarterly by the contracted entities. Today, however, the PPMU
is General Funded and the daily rate to counties and cities has been reduced
accordingly. The purpose of the PPMU is to monitor and provide oversight of
private facilities and their operations. Per CRS 17-1-202 (1) (a) (III) (f): The
contractor shall be responsible for a range of services and programs at least
equal to those services and programs provided by the CDOC at comparable
state correctional facilities. Site visits are conducted on a regular basis to
monitor consistency with CDOC in such areas as the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Facility and Contract Oversight
Selective Training for Private Prison Staff
Security Audits
Case Management Oversight
Mental Health Treatment Program Reviews
Medical and Dental Oversight
Security Threat Group Monitoring
Drug Interdiction
Food Service Monitoring
Program Reviews for Education and Treatment
Inmate Banking
Background Checks for Visitors

The PPMU recognizes that tracking and follow-up to these areas are
essential in order to manage small issues before they develop into larger,
security-related problems. Therefore, monitor-observed deficiencies are
documented, brought to the attention of the institution’s management, and,
where appropriate, to the contractor. Ideally, a cooperative remedy is
discussed and agreed upon. The relationship between the Colorado
Department of Corrections and the private prisons is mutually beneficial only
when the latter fulfill the terms and conditions of the contract. When contract
deficiencies are noted, however, and the private prison delays in the
implementation of needed corrections, PPMU staff are obligated to document
and report to the CDOC Executive Staff.
The practice of monitoring and evaluating conditions of confinement
for CDOC inmates housed in private facilities is critical for the ongoing
contractual relationship to be successful. This relationship has been impeded
by lack of responsiveness by private prison operators to issues identified for
improvement by PPMU staff. For example, failure of private prison staff to
demonstrate a fundamental knowledge of appropriate policy and procedures is
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one of the most frustrating issues. Attention to physical plant repairs, kitchen
cleanliness, menu and food portions, medical staffing and services, as well as
basic security practices are of such importance that, when ignored, these
concerns can quickly escalate and eventually impact the safety and security of
the entire facility. At present, there are few mechanisms in place for holding
private operators or contractors accountable when deficiencies are delayed or
never corrected.

Part II: Events Prior to the July 20th Incident
Reports From Staff and Inmates
In any prison riot, it can be difficult to distinguish valid warning signs
from false ones. In this case, some factors have emerged, linking conditions
for the time period prior to the incident with the actual disturbance. During
the days prior to July 20, 2004, 198 inmates from the state of Washington
were moved to the Crowley Facility. They, along with 116 inmates from
Wyoming and 807 Colorado inmates, brought the facility’s total population to
1,130. The investigation conducted by the CDOC Office of Inspector
General, indicates that the inmates were angry over real or perceived inequity
of treatment. For example, the amount of inmate wages paid by each state per
month for similar inmate work assignments is different, ranging from $60.00
paid to Washington and Wyoming inmates, while Colorado pays $18.60 per
month. Colorado requires it’s inmates to contribute each month to
court/victims’ restitution owed, child support and medical appointment copayments. Buying power is strongest, therefore, among Washington and
Wyoming inmates. The CDOC Inspector General concluded that resentment
developed over this difference.
Other complaints have become known as a result of the ongoing
investigation:
• Several inmates alleged that two instances of misuse of force by
Crowley County Correctional (CCCF) staff occurred.
• Inmates’ complaints and criticisms about food quality and quantity
were allegedly ignored by the food service manager.
• Inmates’ perception that an alleged conflict of interest exists between
canteen operations and food service operations as Canteen Corporation
owns and operates both.
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• Inmates’ allegations of treatment disparity between Colorado inmates
and Washington inmates regarding allowable property and food
portions.
• Inmates’ allegations that administration failed to listen or acknowledge
inmate complaints.
• Inmates’ allegations that on the day of the riot, facility administration
ignored requests to discuss issues and grievances.
• CCCF staff’s and inmates’ perception that facility administration had
prior warnings or knowledge of a potential riot; information may have
been provided in staff reports and inmate letters and memos from
inmates to staff.
• CCCF staff’s and inmates’ perception that too many new, untrained
facility staff were assigned to key posts.
• CCCF staff’s perception that there were too few resources to manage
the riot.
• CCCF staff’s perception that the facility was understaffed on the night
of the riot.
These complaints, leading to continued and progressive frustrations among
the population, were reportedly aired to line staff and administration in the
days prior to the actual riot.
In addition to complaints, the investigation has revealed that three CCCF
staff members submitted reports to CCCF Supervisory Staff noting possible
trouble forthcoming from inmates. The first report, dated May 15, 2004,
indicated that a Wyoming inmate made veiled threats during an altercation
with staff saying that he would “make his point on July 5.” (July 5, 2004 was
the designated time frame for a second group of Washington inmates to arrive
at CCCF)
The second report is dated July 5, 2004. An inmate, who asked not to
be identified, communicated to staff that Washington inmates planned to take
an officer hostage. The third report submitted from staff (no date) indicated
that the reporting officer had overheard inmates talk about “getting even” with
the people who hurt another inmate on the East Yard basketball court.
According to the staff member, inmates said they would “fight it out” in Unit
C.
It is unknown what action was taken by CCA to follow-up on any of these
reports.
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Recent PPMU Visits
Site visit reports for the six month period prior to the disturbance
indicate that monitors noted and communicated a number of concerns to
facility management. The following is a partial list of issues:
• Food quality and quantity
• Inconsistency in completing required forms for reportable incidents
• Training for food service staff in the preparation of medical and
religious diets
• Emergency plans compliance
• Emergency Response Teams staffing and training
• Use of ambulance and emergency room services for routine medical
care
• Pharmaceutical management
• Mental health and medical treatment staff ratios
• Tracking Security Threat Group intelligence
• Timeliness of gang activity report filings
• Staff termination reports
• Investigations and Code of Penal Discipline Reports
• Accuracy of Quarterly Reports
• Canteen pricing structure and items sold
• Inmate telephone services contract
• Case manager attrition since January, 2004
• Escape team training
• Facility organization charts
• Inmate grievance process
• Inmate banking account activity and records
• Inmate access to computers in food service area
• Other recent audits include:
¾ June 30, 2004
¾ March 30, 2004
¾ April 4, 2004

Monthly security inspection
Quarterly key inventory/inspection
Quarterly tool inventory

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¾ January 12, 2004 Evaluation of communications equipment
¾ July 23, 2003
Crowley County Commissioners approved
CCCF’s Emergency Plan
On July 9, 2004, a CDOC monitor visited the Crowley facility. The
report, filed, July 13, noted that offender morale appeared to be “low” with
regard to food quality, and inmates complained of not earning enough money
to purchase needed canteen items.

Crowley’s Level of Emergency Preparedness
Besides reports analyzed from staff, inmates and monitors, regarding
the Crowley riot, a review of recent security systems inspections, staffing
matters and frequency of emergency activation drills is also important. While
these areas of concern may not have directly impacted the start of the
disturbance, the ability to gain control of the situation may have been
hampered by the breakdown of any or all of these essential operational
elements of the institution. The following information is known about the
status of the facility’s emergency preparedness, prior to July 20, 2004.
Staffing Complement: Not fully staffed; new employees on the job for two
days or less when riot erupted.
Emergency Plan:
Failed to achieve contract compliance in the area of
developing an emergency plan consistent with
CDOC Administrative Regulation 300-30RD,
making mutual response more complicated.
Emergency Response Failed to maintain a recommended percentage of
Teams:
emergency response team members (5% of offender
population)
Armory Practices:
Failed to gain compliance in the area of armory
management and practices.
Barber Tool Control: The facility recently moved the Barber Shops into
the Living Units. (This practice contributed to the
loss of Class A tools during the riot.)
Emergency Activation Rarely conducted.
Drills
For example, on one occasion, an inmate was
utilized to participate in an emergency drill, causing
a staff member, unaware the exercise was in
progress, to draw a weapon on him.
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Training:

Training was provided for 7 staff members on the
topic of munitions and crowd control on April 29,
2004. On May 27, 2004, 6 staff received other
specialized training, and on June 3, 2004, 11 staff
completed firearms requalifications.

Part III: Incident Summary
Chronological Order and Narration of Events
Note Physical Plant Layout: The physical plant layout of the Crowley
County Correctional Facility runs from east to west with the main entry and
Administration Offices (Building A) being in the center of the facility on the
north side perimeter. Living Units 1 and 2 are located on the west side of the
baseball field with access to the programs areas located on the south side of
the facility. A security fence separates the west side from the east and
includes Living Units 3 and 4. The east side also includes a large exercise
yard, basketball court and weight pile. Living Unit 6, located on the west side
was recently constructed, and, at the time of the riot was occupied by
Washington inmates. Unit 6 lies outside the main complex on the southwest
side, separated by security fences from the main facility compound. The
facility program and support area (Building B) is located on the south side of
the compound, directly across from Building A, separated by the two large
exercise yards. A greenhouse sits just to the southwest side of the programs
area building. Another building (furniture shop) is known as Building G and
is located to the southeast of the programs area on the south side of the East
Yard.
On the night of the riot the Crowley County Correctional Facility had
an inmate population of 1144 inmates with 22 inmates being off grounds.
There were 807 Colorado inmates, 198 Washington State inmates and 117
Wyoming inmates on grounds at the time the disturbance occurred. There
were 47 CCCF employees on posts with 33 officers working in security and
housing related posts on grounds, 3 were food service employees, 3 were
medical personnel, and 8 additional staff (new hires) were doing their FTO
(Field Training or OJT on the job training). There was also a librarian, two
religious volunteers, and two electrical contractor employees on grounds at
the time the incident started.
17

July 20, 2004
7:00 – 7:30 PM

On July 20th at approximately 7:05 PM, inmates were
released to the West Recreation Yard. Large groups
reportedly began to assemble at approximately 7:30
demanding an audience with the Warden over some
complaints. The inmates making the demands were
confronted by a Shift Commander a Captain who denied
their demands to talk with the Warden but, reportedly
attempted to engage the group’s leader concerning their
demands. It was reported that the Captain was
unsuccessful in attempts to find a spokesman for the group
and that the group became threatening towards the Captain
and other officers present. They retreated from the yard for
their own safety. At the Shift Commanders direction, a
public address system announcement was made giving an
order to all inmates in the yard to disperse and return to
their living units, and announcing that the yard was closed.
The inmates became unruly, started to become hostile and
refused the directives to return to their living units. Captain
Garcia notified Warden Crouse and 2 deputy wardens,
Miller and Bridges. CCCF Chief Selman and SORT
Commander Jaramillo were on grounds. The order was
given for Living Units to lock their doors and for staff to
prepare for an emergency evacuation from their posts.
Once the officers evacuated the yards and Living Units,
the inmates began moving back into Housing Units 1 and
2, and, using parts of free weights, began breaking
windows. As the incident escalated from a disobedience of
directives, the inmates became bolder and began engaging
in more violent conduct. Inmates began doing property
damage, inciting other inmates to riot, and threatening to
breach the living unit security doors. The inmates realized
that their conduct was unchecked and there was no officer
presence to stop them. They began to engage in more
flagrant criminal misconduct. Living Unit 1 and 2 case
management offices were then broken into, furniture and
equipment was demolished. Rioting inmates rifled
through case management records and files looking for
information on other inmates considered to be police
18

informants (snitches) and sex offenders who were then
targeted for assault.
7:30 – 8:00 P.M. The Unit Control Center staff who had no means in place
to defend the Units when the riot started, abandoned their
posts through roof escape hatches. They were unable to
secure the hatch doors, which allowed inmates access to
the roof of the living units and inmates also climbed a
drain pipe outside the building to gain access to the roof.
Inmates breached the Control Center security doors in
Units 1 and 2 by 7:52 P.M. and totally destroyed the
electronic control center panels and security systems.
Private Prisons Monitoring Unit (PPMU) Chief Michael
Arellano is notified by PPMU Duty Officer of the incident
at CCCF. Mr. Arellano notified Offender Services
Manager, Bill Zalman and Prison Operations Manager,
Lou Archuleta. Mr. Arellano assessed the situation with
CCCF Warden Crouse and maintained communication
with Mr. Zalman and Director of Prisons, Mr. Renfrow,
while they were in route to CCCF.
8:00 – 8:30 P.M. By approximately 8:04 P.M., the Crowley County
Sheriff’s Department was notified. Simultaneously,
rioting inmates began to release segregated inmates and
continued destroying property. Two officers in Unit 2 were
left behind on the unit floor by control room officers when
they abandoned their posts. The two officers were forced
to hide from rioting inmates by locking themselves in a
cell in the segregation unit.
Windows, furniture, plumbing fixtures, filing cabinets,
appliances, sections of walls and doors were broken in
Unit 2 by inmates using weight bars and free weights from
the weight piles. There was extensive damage in all Living
Unit case management offices. Documents, records and
other files were destroyed by burning them outside in the
yard or by water damage. Most offices and Control Center
equipment and furnishings were completely destroyed by
the rampaging inmates with inmates having set several
small fires within case manager’s offices and control
19

centers by burning debris within them. Vending machines
were damaged, rifled through, and the contents were
stolen. Televisions were destroyed along with inmates’
washing machines and dryers. The interiors of Living
Units 1 and 2 sustained heavy, significant water damage
due to flooding caused by breakage of porcelain toilets and
sinks along with damage to water lines and sprinkler
systems. Other damage was sustained by units and security
systems were defeated. At 8:11 P.M., inmates had begun
to break into maintenance and canteen areas of the
institution and the first scatter shots of rubber pellets were
fired by CCCF SORT members in an effort to disperse the
groups.
PPMU staff Deb Ahlin reported receiving a call from
Captain Garcia of CCCF in Master Control. Captain
Garcia indicated that the facility was experiencing a
disturbance involving approximately 150-200 inmates
from Washington, Wyoming and Colorado on the West
yard. Captain Garcia indicated that staff had been called
into the Control Centers and were off of the yard. Garcia
indicated that he would remain in Master Control for
further notifications and instructions.
The two CCCF Officers, Bachicha and Verela, who were
forced to hide from rioting inmates by locking themselves
in a cell in the segregation unit in Unit 2 were in extreme
danger as rioting inmates were advancing on the cell door.
CCCF Chief Selman authorized use of a control agent
(hand held OC canisters) to move inmates back so that
CCCF SORT could allow their officers to exit.
PPMU Chief Arellano contacted PPMU staff Curtis
Robinette and directed him to respond immediately to
CCCF.
CCCF Warden Crouse arrived at facility and assumed role
as Incident Manager and instructed staff member Baylor to
continue working on staff accountability. Trapped officers
in Unit 2 were freed from the segregation cell by CCCF
SORT.
20

CDOC Director of Prisons, Nolin Renfrow, while in route
to CCCF, ordered chemical agents to be used to control
rioting inmates; i.e., CS and CN gas. Arkansas Valley
Correctional Facility and Fort Lyon Correctional Facility
Emergency Response Teams were placed on standby.
However, chemical agents were not deployed by CCCF;
the Warden was waiting for approval from Corporate
headquarters. CDOC SORT Team Leaders report that
Alpha and Bravo squads had been contacted and were
ready to report to CCCF in full mission gear.
8:30 – 9:00 PM

PPMU staff Curtis Robinette arrives at CCCF. PPMU
staff Ahlin departs her residence and is instructed by Mr.
Arellano to contact PPMU staff Gaynell Pritts, Terry
Flanagan, John Bongirno, and Dana Bustos, who were
placed on stand-by. Ms. Ahlin contacted Gaynell Pritts
while in route and instructed her to make further staff
notifications. CDOC PIO Alison Morgan notifies the
Governor’s Office of the situation.
CCCF Chief Selman instructed Lt. Luna to go to zone 5 to
attempt to push inmates away from CCCF Greenhouse.
Seven CCCF SORT members were on grounds and Unit 6A Pod was locked down. Deputy Warden Miller and Unit
6 Manager Satterly arrived at CCCF. Emergency
Command Center opened. Warden Miller was the Incident
Management Team Leader, staff member Baylor was the
Incident Management Team Support; Officer Virginia
Lewis was the temporary Public Information Officer and
Unit Manager Satterly reports staff accountability and
plans to move inmates. Manager Satterly assumes staff
accountability. CCCF Officer Griffith and Captain Garcia
were not responding to radio calls. Chief Selman gave the
order to fire rubber pellets and bird shot attempting to get
inmates to retreat from B Building. Deputy Warden Miller
attempted to contact Dr. Kaiser, Managing Director of
Facility Operations, Division IV.
PPMU staff Robinette received a briefing from Deputy
Warden Miller in Emergency Command Center at CCCF.
21

Warden Miller briefed the CCCF SORT Team and
indicated that Living Units 3 & 4 were secured, but a few
offenders remained in the East yard. Approximately 150200 inmates were in the West yard causing facility
disruption. Unit 4 inmates continued to be non-compliant
with lockdown orders and inmates were advancing on BBuilding. Chief Selman authorized less lethal ammo and
instructs CCCF SORT Team to push inmates toward Unit
6. Fires were ignited by rioting inmates outside Units 1
and 2 using flammable materials such as clothing,
mattresses, files, and papers stuffed into microwaves,
washers, dryers, and file cabinets dragged from inside the
units. Inmates had breached control rooms in Units 1 and
2.
CDOC Director of Prisons, Mr. Renfrow, contacted CDOC
SORT Commander to activate Alpha and Bravo squads
and activated the AVCF and FLCF ERT members who
were ordered to report to CCCF. CCCF Deputy Warden
Miller was in the CCCF conference room with Captain
Garcia and Officer Griffith.
Mr. Renfrow contacted CCCF Emergency Command
Center and repeated orders to utilize chemical agents prior
to his arrival at CCCF. He was informed that approval
was being sought by CCCF Warden Crouse from the
corporate office in Nashville; however, authorization had
not yet been received. CCCF Chief Selman reported
inmates were backed up between Units 1 and 6. Inmates
defeated one 6 foot fence and a 12 foot security fence in
order to gain access to the Greenhouse and a fire is
reported. The fire ignited in front of Unit 1 had flames
reaching 20-30 feet into the air. Fire Department staff
were on site were notified and CCCF SORT members are
deployed to escort fire trucks. Inmates in the East Yard
are beginning to remove weights from the weight pile.
Inmates were yelling, throwing rocks, and some were
sitting on the ground. CCCF SORT members were firing
rubber pellets to attempt to contain and disperse rioting
inmates.
22

PPMU staff Robinette was informed that all staff were
accounted for. CCA Corporate Public Information Officer
Steve Owen, received notification and drafted an initial
release and made local media contact.
Notification was made to local CCCF Public Information
Officer, Lori Pinkerton. PPMU staff member Robinette
reported that a CDOC SORT member, Deputy Warden
Miller and the Crowley County Sheriff, Jeff Keys
reviewed facility diagrams.
9:00 – 9:30 PM

DOC SORT Teams, Charlie, Delta, and Sniper squads
were activated to report to CCCF. Inmates were reported
to be cutting through a fence along side Unit 1. The
Crowley County, Otero County and Pueblo Sheriffs’
Offices were on grounds, as well as Colorado State Patrol
personnel. Mr. Renfrow verified that the CCCF perimeter
was secure and fortified with additional staff support. Mr.
Renfrow activated the AVCF SORT members and ERT
Team. CCCF Deputy Warden Miller made contact with
PPMU Chief Arellano. The CDOC Emergency Support
Center in Colorado Springs was activated with Offender
Services Director, Bill Zalman, in command, and Manager
of Prison Operations, Lou Archuleta.
PPMU Chief Arellano arrived at CCCF. PPMU staff
Robinette was directed to perform as a monitor, and to
assign staff liaison for fire and police departments. CCCF
staff attempted to contact Washington State contract
monitors. CCCF Emergency Support Center reported 10
Kit Carson and 11 Bent County SORT Team members
were in route. Huerfano County Correctional Facility had
activated their SORT. An Incident Management Team
was assembled in CCCF Emergency Command and an
Operations Plan was being developed. Captain Garcia
called in CCCF off-duty staff to assist. Public Information
Officer Pinkerton attempted to secure Olney Springs
Public Library for Media Center. Deputy Warden Bridges
was assigned to handle media staging. CCCF staff located
three working video cameras. Identification of inmates
was begun, documenting via video camera, establishing
23

lists, etc. CCCF staff made additional attempts to reach
Washington State contract officials and left messages.
First media representatives arrived at the facility.
PPMU Chief Arellano contacted CDOC Emergency
Support Center and reported inmates were entering
Cellhouse 1, 2, 3, and 4, tearing out everything they could
and placing items in front of entry doors. Uninvolved
inmates from CH-3 are being pulled out of side doors by
CCCF staff. Mr. Arellano was on the roof of the
Administration Building and observed 200-300 inmates in
the yard. Unit 1 fire escape door was breached and inmates
were getting on the roof.
CCCF staff attempted to contact Marty Lyons, the
Washington State contract monitor, who was in route from
Pueblo.
First entry onto the incident area occurred with teams
comprised of approximately 15 CCCF SORT members, 7
AVCF ERT members, and 5 CDOC SORT members.
Additional CDOC SORT members arrived at CCCF. One
CDOC SORT Team Leader reported to the CCCF
Emergency Command Center for briefing.
CCCF Unit 3 Officers were instructed to begin escape to
the roof. Permission was obtained to use Olney Springs
library for media staging. CCCF Unit 4 Officers escaped
to the roof. CDOC SORT members assisted in rescue of
CCCF Officers from roof of Units 3 & 4. CCCF Business
Manager Frazier was notified of riot at CCCF. Contact was
made with Wyoming State Contract Monitor, Mike Wise,
who was in route to CCCF.
CCCF Deputy Warden Miller indicated he did not have
enough staff on grounds to handle the Operations Plan.
The AVCF SORT members arrived on grounds. Chemical
agents and rubber pellets were being utilized to hold
rioting inmates back temporarily. The first EMS team
arrived on grounds. Nick Hobbs, CCCF Maintenance,
arrived on grounds.
24

9:30 – 10:00 PM The entire CDOC 19 member SORT team was fully
activated and on site at CCCF. SORT Commander
assumed command in the CCCF Emergency Command
Center, and directed CCCF staff to contact AVCF to
obtain additional less lethal munitions and Self Contained
Breathing Apparatus equipment as CCCF reported they did
not have this equipment on grounds. CCCF Captain
Garcia joined the ground operators and CDOC SORT
members assumed sniper positions on the Administration
Building.
CCCF Deputy Warden Bridges assigned PIO Pinkerton
with one correctional officer to go to the media staging
area in Olney Springs. PPMU Chief Arellano approved
the press statement prepared by CCCF PIO Steve Owen
and was awaiting Washington and Wyoming contract
monitoring staff approval. CCCF Deputy Warden Bridges
assumed the role of Planning Team Leader. CCCF
Business Manager Frazier, Human Resources staff,
Nichelle Valdez, and Program Manager, Hale arrived at
the facility.
SORT staff from CCA Bent County Correctional Facility,
Huerfano County Correctional Facility and Kit Carson
Correctional Center were in route.
10:00 - 10:30 PM The SORT ground operators were staged outside the
emergency entrance of Unit 3, along with mixed ERT
teams from FLCF, AVCF, CCCF, and BCCF. SORT
Team Leader took command of the combined SORT from
CDOC and CCCF, and began to enter Unit 3 to take
control. Chemical agents were utilized with 870
Remington shotgun, Ispra Jet, and 37MM Baton Launcher.
Barricades in front of doors were broken through by the
Team members upon entry. CN and OC gas was
dispersed. The weapon teams penetrated the hallway into
the main entry outside the pods quickly without any
offender opposition. The remainder of the Entry Team,
including cuff and retention personnel, staged outside the
pod covering each door to prevent any offenders from
escaping the pods. CDOC and CCCF SORT and ERT
25

members entered “A Pod” lead by CDOC SORT members.
Upon entry, gas was dispersed and less lethal rounds
consisting of 12 gauge high velocity stingers and FIN
stabilized rubber rounds were fired at offenders who were
involved in the disruption inside the Pod. Offenders
returned to their cells and control of the Pod was obtained
by the Team. Cuff and retention teams entered the Pod and
extraction of offenders began. The Pod was cleared by
SORT members and cover was provided during
detainment and securing of the offenders; Unit 3 was
secured without incident. All inmates were removed to
west side of Unit 3. The building’s interior sustained
excessive damage to include approximately 1” of standing
water throughout, flooded tiers, damaged and destroyed
furniture and fixtures, broken plumbing, trash and debris
throughout.
CDOC Training Academy Director, Ross Kimbrell, was
notified of the CCCF emergency by Cherrie Greco,
Legislative Liaison. Mr. Kimbrell further notified Jere
Chaddick, Training Academy staff. Ms. Chaddick initiated
the shipment of 22 cases of less lethal ammunition and two
electronic shields that had arrived at CTA armory. Bent
County Correctional Facility SORT arrived on CCCF
grounds.
CDOC SORT Team Leader advised Bravo squad that
snipers had been placed on the roof of the Administration
Building. Intelligence reported that during the earlier
stage of the disturbance offenders had gained access to the
roof tops of some of the units and that inmates had
barricaded themselves in Unit 2. Bravo squad was
ordered to deploy to Unit 2 and the Pods were cleared in
the same manner as Unit 3. SORT entered Unit 2 C&D
Pods preceded by chemical agents and pods were secured.
SORT also entered Unit 3, B and A Pods were secured
with out further incident. CDOC SORT remained in
secured pods until further assistance could arrive.
A small group of Bravo squad and ERT officers were
ordered to clear the roof top of Unit 2. Access was gained
26

through the control room which had been defeated and
occupied by the offenders, but was clear upon SORT entry.
CDOC SORT members proceeded to clear the roof
encountering no opposition or offender threats. Officers
on the roof observed approximately 15-20 inmate rioters
on the ground throwing rocks, debris, and burning devices
at a small group of officers barricaded outside the Unit’s
main entry into the yard. The offenders were attacking the
officers using metal wall lockers as shields. Assisted by
the ground units, CDOC officers dispersed gas toward the
offenders from the roof. The offenders then began to
attack the squad on the roof with rocks and debris. No
injuries were sustained by the squad positioned on the roof
and the squad was then ordered to withdraw and join the
defending team on the ground. As the squad re-entered the
building, the rioters were under control and were being
contained by cuff and retention teams. All of the offenders
that were involved and detained were then escorted and
placed in the holding cells outside “D Pod”.
Wyoming State Contract Monitor Mike Wise was briefed
in Warden Crouse’s Office. CCCF Chief Selman reports
staff from Unit 3 and 4 were off roofs and safe. Fires
continued burning in the Greenhouse and outside the doors
of Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 4. The yard was under staff
control and the offenders were secured and being closely
observed. CCA PIO Steve Owens was notified of the
current situation by Lori Pinkerton, CCCA Public
Information Officer.
PPMU Chief Arellano reported inmates were calling the
press from inside the Units. Inmate phones were shut off
to prevent further media contact. Deputy Warden Miller
reported wooden cell doors had been removed and were
stacked in the yard by the inmates. Mr. Arellano and
CCCF Warden Crouse were requesting information of
available segregation beds from other DOC and CCA
facilities to be faxed to them to begin assigning alternate
housing for an undetermined number of inmates. CDOC
Emergency Support Center staff contacted AVCF to
deploy extra staff for assistance at CCCF. AVCF
27

Associate Warden Hartley deployed additional staff
coming off swing shift. Mr. Arellano also requested
additional assistance from LCF through Emergency
Support Center staff. CDOC Prison Operations Manager,
Lou Archuleta, in the Emergency Support Center,
contacted Carolyn Sutherland to arrange to have CDOC
Clinical Staff assist. Health Service Administrators Kellie
McRae (AVCF), Renae Jordan (YOS, PMC, TCF), Jerri
Green (SCCF), and Betty Salas (FLCF) were notified. Ms.
McRae had already been activated by AVCF’s Emergency
Plan and the other clinical staff were contacted to report to
CCCF at 5:00 a.m. on 7-21-04. CCA PIO Steve Owens
faxed a press release to local and national media outlets.
PPMU Intelligence Specialist Deb Ahlin arrived at CCCF.
CM II PPMU Monitor Pritts contacted Mental Health
Specialist Dana Bustos to be on stand-by for incident
briefing. Training Academy Director Ross Kimbrell and
Jere Chaddick had retrieved 22 cases of less lethal
ammunition, 60 sets of hard restraints, and two electronic
shields and were in route to CCCF at 10:30 p.m.
Emergency Support Center contacted Limon Correctional
Facility Captain Lockhart and LCF ERT call-out was
initiated.
A page was sent to contact Doug Armstrong, Central
Transportation Unit Lieutenant, advising him to get
transport buses to CCCF. Business Technology staff,
Molly Hamilton, was contacted and advised that she would
provide technical support for CDOC Emergency Mobil
Command Center. PPMU Chief Arellano notifies CDOC
ESC that the use of CS gas had been approved by CCA for
deployment. Mr. Arellano also reported inmates were
burning wooden cell doors in the yard in front of Unit 4.
CDOC K-9 units arrive.
10:30 – 11:00 PM CCCF staff member Baylor reported contact from CDOC
Emergency Support Center Commander Zalman and
advised LCF ERT were in route to CCCF.

28

Transport security measures for injured inmates were
uncertain. One unconscious inmate was brought to the
entry gate and transported out for medical treatment.
Reports from staff to CCCF Public Information Officer
indicates 2 inmates down. Emergency Support Center
Commander Zalman contacted PPMU Chief Arellano with
plans to move offenders to other facilities. CDOC
Director of Prisons Renfrow directed the AVCF ERT to
move to the CCCF parking lot to provide facility entry
security. Reports were received into CCCF Command
Center of a possible injured inmate in Unit 2. SORT teams
were divided and begin investigating Unit 2. 1000 flexcuffs reported in the facility by CCCF staff Baylor.
CDOC Director of Clinical Services Barry Pardus, was
contacted by the Director of Finance and Administration L.
D. Hay, about the CCCF incident. CDOC Limon
Correctional Facility initial ERT members began to report.
Lt. Butler reported to LCF staff to issue weapons and
munitions from the armory. Ten LCF staff responded to
the facility with additional staff reporting to CCCF from
Colorado Springs. Channel 9 news from Denver arrived at
CCCF. Approximately 30 inmates were still in the yard
causing a disturbance. SORT, ERT and Medical staff were
advised to be ready for smoke inhalation victims due to the
fires burning outside the Units. Deputy Warden Bridges
advised Emergency Medical teams to be ready with
oxygen. PPMU Chief Arellano reported 6 inmates were
observed on the roof of Unit 1 breaking up air conditioning
system and the roof was on fire. A group of inmates with
shields were seen entering and leaving Unit 2.
Channel 5 News and Rocky Ford Gazette were at press
staging area in Olney Springs. CCCF Public Information
Officer Pinkerton went to the press staging area in Olney
Springs to provide an update.
CDOC Director of Prisons, Nolin Renfrow, Director of
Administration and Finance, L. D. Hay, and Director of
Business Technology, Paul Lewin, arrived at CCCF.
29

Business Technology staff were called in to operate and
monitor all LAN and WEB communications.
11:00 – 11:30 PM CDOC Emergency Support Center contacted CTU Rick
Martinez to move the CDOC Emergency Mobile
Command Center to the Crowley County Correctional
Facility. Pueblo Complex ERT was activated and ordered
to report to San Carlos to prepare for a response to
Crowley County Correctional Facility.
While in route to CCCF, CDOC Inspector General Mike
Rulo, contacted CCCF Command Center for an up-date.
Triage was being set up by CDOC and CCCF Nursing
staff and they were asking for a back up team to report.
Mr. Rulo reported helicopter support was being requested,
two Flight for Life and one military. PPMU Chief
Arellano contacted CDOC Emergency Support Center
requesting medical supplies from nearby facilities; two
inmate injuries were reported so far. They were being
transported to St. Mary Corwin Hospital for treatment.
Inmates were being pulled out of Unit 3 and being
restrained in grass area of the yard.
The largest concentration of inmates were visible in front
of Unit 6 where there were an estimated 200-300 inmates.
CDOC and CCCF SORT and ERT were at vantage points.
PPMU Chief Arellano notified CDOC ESC that
Washington State Monitoring Staff had established a
command center with Executive Director Lehman in
command.
CDOC San Carlos Correctional Facility ERT Commander
Lt. Randy Cordova, reported to SCCF and was informed
by Associate Warden Rod Cozzetto to fully arm with lethal
and less lethal ammunition and report to CCCF when the
remainder of the team was on site and prepared. SCCF
Warden Leyba briefed Tim Desiata and Randy Cordova
regarding the incident in CCCF. San Carlos Correctional
Facility and Pueblo Complex deployed 16 ERT members.
30

CDOC Emergency Support Center advised CCCF
Command Center that Park County advises 50 vacant beds
available. Command Center received information that 5-7
inmates had gained access to “G” building and others were
advancing to that location. Inmates were attempting to
pull down the light outside Unit 1; they were successful.
Inmates continued feeding fires outside Units 1 and 2.
11:30 – 12:00 PM Combined SORT members were deployed to south side of
“G” building and deployed 2 chemical agents towards
group advancing to “G” building, causing inmates to move
away. East yard inmates placed their hands on their heads
and proceed to basketball court and lie on their stomachs.
Retention Team immediately established and restrained
inmates on East yard. A fire alarm is going off in “G”
building.
CDOC Emergency Support Center had advised Carolyn
Sutherland that 6 CDOC Medical Staff would arrive at
CCCF at 5:00 a.m. to assist.
CDOC SORT members were inside entry door to Unit 2.
Inmates began throwing rocks and using filing cabinets as
shields to advance on SORT inside Unit 2. CCCF Chief of
Security Selman and Captain Palomino deployed three (3)
515 triple chaser chemical agents onto the advancing
inmates. Inmates retreated into the existing crowd. CDOC
SORT forms skirmish line that inmates attempt to flank. A
second DOC SORT team was dispatched from “G”
building to intercept inmates trying to flank first SORT
team. Skirmish lines advanced on inmates forcing retreat
to fenced area in front of Unit 6. Approximately 75% of
the inmates surrendered and lie on stomachs as ordered.
CCCF and CDOC SORT were attempting to put out the
fire in front of Unit 2

July 21, 2004
12:00 - 12:30 AM CDOC Youth Offender Services and Pueblo Minimum
Center activated Emergency Command Centers.
31

Less lethal CS grenades were deployed on remaining 25%
of inmates who continue throwing rocks at combined
SORT and refused orders to lie down. CDOC CTU staff
Rick Martinez advised Emergency Support Center that
Emergency Mobile Command Center was in route with 1
driver and 2 operators. All inmates on West yard complied
with orders to lie on their stomachs and cease further
resistance. CDOC Emergency Support Center was
contacted and updated. CDOC Youth Offender Services
and Pueblo Minimum Center advised Emergency Support
Center that they could have 45 segregation beds available
if needed. They also had extra DTR radios available if
needed. CTU staff Doug Armstrong advised Emergency
Support Center that two buses, 1 high risk van, 7 staff and
5 electronic restraining devices were in route to CCCF
from Canon City.
CCCF Officers called for assistance with injured inmates.
CCCF clinical staff left the Administration Area where
they had been waiting for approximately 2 hours. CDOC
Clinical Administrator Kellie McRae assumed CCCF
clinical staff were proceeding to assist the officers
requesting assistance with injured inmates. Ms. McRae
learned later that CCCF clinical staff did not assist the
officers. Initially, CCCF nurses would not go to the yard
to assist a severely injured inmate.
Combined SORT and ERT members began securing the
remainder of the inmates in East and West yards, 3C and
3B. CDOC CSP and CCF Warden Larry Reid notified
Emergency Support Center that 54 administrative
segregation beds were available and CSP/CCF ERT was
on stand-by to respond to CCCF, and Command Center
was activated at CSP/CCF. The Crowley County coroner
was notified of the riot situation.
CCCF Unit 1 staff reported an inmate was down and fires
in Units 1, 2 and 3 were still burning. Unit 3 fires were
nearly extinguished. Unit 4 fires had been extinguished
completely.
32

CDOC Executive Director Joe Ortiz, Director of
Administration and Finance, L. D. Hay, and Director of
Business Technologies, Paul Lewin, arrived at CCCF and
were briefed in the Command Center. “G” Building staff
reported secure.
12:30 - 1:00 AM CDOC SCCF and TCF Warden Ron Leyba notified
Emergency Support Center that 16 Pueblo Complex ERT
members had been deployed to CCCF along with 9 TCF
ERT, and 1 canine. YOS/PMC had also sent 10 DTR
radios and 15 batteries. CDOC Director of Prisons Mr.
Renfrow ordered two buses capable of holding 50+
inmates to CCCF. The CCCF visitation room was
designated as a temporary staging for CDOC staff and
SORT. CDOC SORT members entered Unit 1, A-Pod
preceded by chemical agents and met with little resistance.
Unit 1 was secured without incident. G Building was then
secured by CDOC SORT. SORT members began to
sweep the program buildings for inmates. Involved
offenders were detained inside the library area and the
dining hall. CDOC SORT continued to clear the
remainder of the buildings and surrounding areas.
The Washington State DOC Executive Director was
contacted and updated on the situation. Combined SORT
members located a severely injured inmate and medical
staff responded immediately to the scene. The East yard
was secured. The Pueblo Complex ERT team was on-site
at CCCF and CDOC Emergency Support Center was
contacted with an update.
1:00 - 1:30 AM

CCA Josh Brown contacted CDOC Emergency Support
Center and spoke with Commander Bill Zalman. He
advised Mr. Zalman of anticipated movement of
Washington and Wyoming inmates to other CCA facilities.
PPMU Chief Mike Arellano advised the CDOC
Emergency Support Center that there were several inmate
injuries. A CCCF nurse asked CDOC Clinical
Administrator Kellie McRae if she, Ms. McRae, would
33

assist their medical staff in the yard with injured inmates.
Ms. McRae agreed and proceeded into the yard with one
CCCF nurse and followed CDOC Officers and the SORT
Team members attempting to locate, triage and treat
severely injured inmates. They found one inmate severely
injured. Flight for Life was requested. Training Academy
Director Ross Kimbrell and Jere Chaddick arrived at
CCCF, inventoried all equipment on site and advised
CDOC SORT member Jim Moore who relayed the
information to the CDOC SORT Commander. Mr.
Kimbrell and Ms. Chaddick notified Mr. Zalman at the
Emergency Support Center of their arrival, delivery and
securing of equipment. YOS dayshift staff were contacted
and directed to report to the facility at 2:00 a.m. to begin
working 12 hour shifts. The CDOC Emergency Support
Center received information that the situation at CCCF
was calming down and coming under control. The Pueblo
Complex ERT made contact with the CDOC SORT
Commander and received orders to bring only less lethal
rounds into CCCF.
CDOC SORT reported Unit 3 fires were extinguished.
The Pueblo Complex ERT assisted combined SORT in
securing Unit 4 and ensured that all inmates were placed in
secure cells. The doors in some of the cells were
inoperable due to damage caused by rioting inmates hitting
those cell doors with weights and weight bars. CDOC
SORT reported Unit 3 was secured. Flight for Life took a
severely injured inmate to Saint Mary Corwin Hospital in
Pueblo with numerous stab wounds and scalp injuries.
CDOC Public Information Officer Alison Morgan, arrived
at CCCF. Combined SORT members entered Unit 4 and
CDOC SORT entered Unit 6. SORT members were
escorting inmates from Unit 4 to the yard area for
retention. CDOC Director of Prisons, Nolin Renfrow,
advised the Emergency Support Center that significant
structural and property damage had occurred at CCCF and
an assessment was underway. CDOC SORT Commander
contacted the Emergency Support Center and stated that
the CCCF facility was under staff control and order
regained.
34

CDOC Limon Correctional Facility ERT arrived at CCCF.
The team began preparing to enter the facility. The ERT
Commander checked in with the CDOC SORT Team
Leader and initial assignments were to break into two
teams armed 6 with weapons and 8 to conduct retention of
inmates in the yard areas. LCF ERT staff entered the
facility and were further directed to the triage areas to
perform security and containment while medical staff
performed assessments of the offenders. Offenders were
maintained sitting on the ground and agitators were
removed from the area. All offenders were in flex cuffs
with replacement cuffs provided when necessary.
1:30 - 2:00 AM

CDOC Emergency Support Commander Bill Zalman,
communicated damage assessment to the Washington
State authorities. CDOC Director of Prisons, Nolin
Renfrow, PPMU staff Curtis Robinette, and Director of
Administration and Finance, L. D. Hay, were checking the
Food Service, Medical Clinic and Library areas when they
discovered the CCCF librarian along with 36 inmates,
inside the CCCF library where they had been waiting
throughout the entire riot. Inmates continued to be
escorted by SORT members from Unit 3.
CCA Senior Director Josh Brown, communicated with
CDOC Emergency Support Center Bill Zalman. Director
of Prisons, Mr. Renfrow, advised the Emergency Support
Center that the CCCF Food Service and Medical areas are
intact. The Emergency Support Center contacted Arkansas
Valley Correctional Facility Warden Carl Zenon and
requested preparation of 1100 lunches to be delivered to
CCCF. Warden Zenon advised that his food service staff
would be contacted and meals would be prepared for
delivery. CDOC SORT reported that Unit 4, Pods A, B and
C were in bad shape but all doors were operable. Inmates
were being secured in their cells.

2:00 - 2:30 AM

CDOC Director of Prisons, Mr. Renfrow contacted the
Emergency Support Center regarding bed space and
inmate movement. The CDOC Mobile Emergency
35

Command Center arrived at CCCF. Present were Mike
Ryan, Linda Guiterrez, Tom Adamic and Molly Hamilton.
A joint meeting between CDOC staff and CCCF staff was
conducted. CCCF Warden Crouse indicated that options
were unknown at that time. CDOC begins to make plans
for restoring facility operations and moving inmates.
CDOC Clinical Administrator Kellie McRae, returned to
the Administration area to find CCCF Health
Administrative Services and the nurses still staged in this
area and not providing assistance to staff or inmates.
The Pueblo Complex ERT reported building searches were
completed in the Programs, Intake, Medical and Food
Service areas. All CDOC staff were instructed to check in
and out at the Emergency Mobile Command Center.
Staging areas for the retained inmates were established
combined staff began determining what Units were still
operable and could be utilized to house inmate. Units 4, 6
and Administrative Segregation assessed for a total of 634
beds useable. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano approved
assignment of 3 inmates per cell. YOS Major Hager and
Sgt. Estrada moved 3 female offenders from remediation
in C-Pod, to general population within building #101 at
YOS in preparation of receiving CCCF inmates. Clinical
Administrator Kellie McRae took CDOC nurses and 3
CCCF nurses out to the yard where there were 250 inmates
being retained and began triage, treatment and set up
anatomical stations. CCCF sent a Clinical Supervisor to
“run” the triage area, however, after she made her initial
assignments, she left and was not seen again until 6:00
a.m. Ms. McRae took over the triage site operations and
continued to treat inmates. At that time, 7 inmates had
been sent off-site for treatment. Ms. McRae and assisting
medical staff, identified another inmate possibly having a
heart attack and he was sent out for treatment. One of the
CCCF officers told Ms. McRae that Warden Crouse and
Deputy Warden Bridges were getting “pissed” because
they were sending too many inmates out for treatment.
The officer went on to say that Medical Staff should only
be sending those inmates out that could not treated at
CCCF. Lt. McKenna from AVCF, intervened and the
36

CCCF officer backed off. Assistant Director of Clinical
Services Barry Pardus, contacted the CDOC Emergency
Command Center and spoke with Commander Bill
Zalman, to follow-up on the resource needs from Clinical
Services. Three additional CDOC nurses were directed to
report to CCCF. Digital Radios were delivered to IG and
CDOC staff. Three CDOC transport vehicles arrived at
CCCF.
2:30 - 3:00 AM

CCCF Kitchen was reported secure by CDOC Sort
members. CCCF Officer Griffith had a count team ready
consisting of 12 staff. Portable toilets were positioned in
the yards. Two ambulances and chase vehicles were
leaving the facility. Digital radios were delivered to the
CDOC Legislative Liaison Greco and Assistant Director of
Business Technology Paul Lewin. Trinidad Correctional
Facility ERT staff arrived at CCCF. CDOC Inspector
General Mike Rulo, contacted Chief Investigator Alex
Wold, directing staff to check the disk trail around the
CCCF perimeter for possible escape attempts. The CDOC
staff assisting with inmate detainment in the yards were
directed to begin taking down the names of the inmates.

3:00 - 3:30 AM

CDOC Lt. Perry and DOC track teams began checking the
CCCF perimeter for any signs of possible escapes. CCCF
Public Information Officer Lori Pinkerton was in route to
Olney Springs to meet with staff families, and media were
to be directed to facility for a briefing by CDOC Public
Information Officer Alison Morgan and a press release
was prepared. Mobile Emergency Support Center staff
Mike Ryan was setting up trackers from Trinidad
Correctional Facility and Tom Adamic to check disk trail.
Training Academy Director Ross Kimbrell and Jere
Chaddick checked in with Ms. Greco at the Emergency
Mobile Command Center and Bill Zalman at Emergency
Support Center. Mr. Kimbrell and Ms. Chaddick then
proceeded to the CCCF facility and began communicating
to the Emergency Support Center the details of the ongoing operations there. Emergency Support Center was
sending four TCF staff to CCCF to meet with Investigator
Matt Richardson. Emergency Support Center Lou
37

Archuleta checked in with Emergency Mobile Support
Center Ms. Greco on the status of the disk trail check.
CDOC Director of Finance and Administrations L.D. Hay
begins checking on motel and hotel room accommodations
for CDOC staff to shower and rest. YOS reports that 5
offenders from Boot Camp-remediation in C-Pod at YOS
were being moved to building #109, lower south in
preparation of arrival of CCCF inmates.
3:30 - 4:00 AM

CDOC Emergency Support Center was advised by PPMU
Chief Mike Arellano that CCCF food service staff had
been sent to the kitchen for meal preparations. CDOC
Pueblo Complex ERT provide non-lethal support to escort
teams as well as assistance with escorts and flex cuffing of
inmates in the yard.
CDOC Emergency Support Center Lou Archuleta,
contacted AVCF Warden Zenon and advised him that the
meals previously requested from AVCF would not be
needed. CDOC Public Information Officer Alison Morgan
prepared to meet with Channel 9 News. One helicopter
was leaving the facility. Four AVCF ERT staff were
leaving the facility and checking out with Ms. Greco at the
Emergency Mobile Command Center. An inmate with a
seizure was sent out in an ambulance and two additional
helicopters left the facility. CDOC staff Tom Adamic
observed that due to ongoing construction in the area, there
were too many tracks through the disk trails to determine if
inmates had been there.

4:00 - 4:30 AM

CDOC Public Information Officer Alison Morgan was
setting up staging area for all media. The time frame for
serving breakfast to CCCF inmates is 7:00 a.m. Five
vehicles from the Pueblo County Tactical Rescue arrived
at CCCF. The CDOC Central Transportation Unit was
performing security for media on site at CCCF. Another
helicopter was arriving at the facility. YOS Associate
Warden Steve Rossi, contacted Bill Zalman at the
Emergency Support Center to notify him of current plans
at YOS to handle the incoming inmates from CCCF.
YOS staff began IDO intake cell shakedown in preparation
38

for CCCF inmates. Emergency Support Center had
identified 138 beds available in other private facilities, and
299 in state facilities. CDOC recommends Wyoming
offenders be sent to Kit Carson Correctional Center. An
ambulance with a chase vehicle leaves the facility.
Emergency Mobile Command Center staff Mike Ryan
contacts CCCF to advise that anyone entering or leaving
the facility grounds must check in with EMCC. CDOC
Chief Investigator Alex Wold reported to Cherrie Greco
that 2 CDOC nurses were reporting to CCCF.
4:30 - 5:00 AM

CDOC Emergency Support Center was contacted by
Training Academy staff Jere Chaddick with an update on
inmate injuries at CCCF. Five (5) additional CDOC
nurses and two (2) Health Services Administrative staff
arrived at CCCF. A total of 10 nurses and 3 Health
Service Administrators were on site. In addition, a
Physician’s Assistant from AVCF arrived along with a
Nurse Practitioner from SCCF. CDOC clinical staff
cleared the CCCF East yard of 250 inmates. They
proceeded to the West yard where three (3) CCCF nurses
were present and had been doing triage for approximately
15 minutes. A CCCF nurse stated to Clinical
Administrator Kellie McRae that anatomicals needed to be
done. Ms. McRae and 6 CDOC nurses set up to begin
doing the anatomicals. Thirty (30) minutes later, the CCCF
nurses left the yard without assisting the CDOC nurses
with anatomicals. CBI Investigations staff arrives at
CCCF. Pueblo Complex ERT maintained perimeter
around inmates detained in the yard areas. A nurse from
Fort Lyon Correctional Facility arrived at CCCF. CBI
canine were proceeding to the front entrance at CCCF.
PPMU Monitor Pritts received a call from Deb Ahlin,
PPMU Intelligence Specialist, stating that PPMU Chief
Mike Arellano wanted John Bongirno and Terry Flanagan
dispatched to CCCF. Mr. Bongirno was contacted at his
home and directed to contact Flanagan. Both PPMU staff
were then directed to respond to CCCF immediately. YOS
staff contacted the CDOC Emergency Support Center
stating that 45 bedrolls and hygiene kits were prepared and
available for CCCF inmate’s upon their arrival at YOS. A
39

CCCF Investigator arrived at the CDOC Emergency
Mobile Command Center for instructions or to provide
assistance. Another ambulance and chase vehicle were
leaving CCCF.
5:00 - 5:30 AM

CDOC San Carlos Correctional Facility and Trinidad
Correctional Facility Warden Ron Leyba, checked in with
Emergency Support Center for an update. The CDOC
SORT Commander reported the last offender was removed
from his cell and taken to the yard for containment. SORT
members continued to assist with the control of the
offenders throughout the morning and medical staff
assisted the offenders while they accessed the restroom
and were provided a breakfast meal. CCCF day shift staff
began to report to work. CDOC LCF ERT staff report that
all offenders had been checked by medical and were
moved to the basketball court in the recreation yard. Flex
cuffs were removed and offenders were cuffed in front.
Staff reported an attempt to get an inmate count was
conducted, but did not know if it ever cleared. LCF ERT
staff noticed that more CCCF offenders were being
brought out of Units 3 & 4, indicating that these Units
were never completely cleared. PPMU Chief Mike
Arellano advised ESC that there was damage to Unit 6 and
that several windows and doors were broken. Units 1 and
2 were unusable, however, CCCF Warden Crouse had
recommended that inmates be returned to these Units and
that CCA Corporate Office would deploy 35 to 40 staff to
assist with inmate management. Currently, meals for
inmates were being prepared and inmate count had not yet
been completed.
YOS reports STU moves for both outgoing and incoming
inmates have been cancelled. YOS Major Hager had
requested 30 pillow cases from PMC as the YOS laundry
had only 15 on hand. CDOC CSP and CCF Warden Larry
Reid checked in with Emergency Support Center for an
update on the CCCF situation. Caroline Sutherland
checked in with the Emergency Support Center and
advised that more nursing staff should arrive shortly at
CCCF. ERT and CDOC SORT staff were preparing to
40

feed inmates detained in the yard areas. Limon
Correctional Facility Warden Estep contacted the
Emergency Support Center for an update on the CCCF
situation.
5:30 - 6:00 AM

CDOC Assistant Director of Clinical Services Barry
Pardus, checked in with the Emergency Support Center for
an update of the CCCF situation. Emergency Mobile
Command Center redeployed the Trinidad Correctional
Facility ERT staff to search for signs of escape on the
CCCF perimeter. No signs found. PPMU Chief Michael
Arellano advised the Emergency Support Center that
CCCF inmate count cannot be cleared; they are off by 8
inmates and a recount was in progress. YOS and PMC
facilities were functioning at normal operations. A
possible need for Trauma Counselors was discussed by
CDOC and CCCF staff. CDOC staff Daryl Vigil checked
in with Emergency Support Center and movement
planning of CCCF inmates was beginning.
CDOC Crime Analyst Brandon Davis checked in with
Emergency Support Center. PPMU Monitor Pritts
received contact from Intelligence Specialist Deb Ahlin
stating Chief Arellano requested Clinical Manager Brad
Kinney and Dana Bustos, Mental Health Program
Specialist to respond to CCCF. Mr. Kinney and Ms.
Bustos had already been notified and were in route to
CCCF. Trinidad Correctional Facility ERT continue
checking disk trails around CCCF perimeter. CDOC
Training Academy Director Kimbrell and Jere Chaddick
transferred selected equipment to the SORT vehicle and
departed CCCF.

6:00 - 6:30 AM

PPMU Chief Mike Arellano, advised Emergency Support
Center that the recount from 5:35 has not begun. Director
of Prisons Nolin Renfrow advised Emergency Support
Center that CCCF Unit 3 could be used to assign inmates.
Preliminary reports and interviews conducted with inmates
indicated that the entire incident may have been due to an
improper use of force by CCCF staff. Clinical Services
Administrator Brad Kinney, contacted CCCF Health
41

Services Administrator Del LeCount, to determine
quantities of medical supplies and medication on hand at
CCCF. Ms. LeCount reported inadequate supplies
although Fort Lyon Correctional Facility and Arkansas
Valley Correctional Facility had provided additional
medical supplies. Additional supplies would be needed.
Mr. Kinney indicated he would stop in route at the Pueblo
Pharmacy to obtain the needed supplies. PPMU Chief
Mike Arellano, advised Emergency Support Center that a
medical report of inmate injuries was being faxed to them.
All ambulances had been cleared to leave the facility.
CCCF staff indicated counting of inmates would resume
during feeding. CDOC CTU staff Rich Martinez advised
the Emergency Support Center that relief for the
Emergency Mobile Command Center would occur at 2:00
p.m.
6:30 - 7:00 AM

CDOC Emergency Support Center notified SCCF that the
Gym space at SCCF would not be needed for housing
inmates. CDOC Clinical staff reported that 75% of inmate
anatomicals were completed. CCCF Chief Selman wants
strip searches performed on all inmates to reveal possible
injuries unreported. PPMU staff Terry Flanagan and John
Bongirno arrived on grounds at CCCF. Mr. Bongirno was
assigned as logistics support in the Administration Area
and Mr. Flanagan was assigned to logistical support for
Brad Kinney and the SORT and ERT teams. The Pueblo
Complex ERT staff assisted in reapplying flex cuffs
cuffing inmates in the front following restroom breaks in
the yard areas. YOS CO Garcia had contacted Swing Shift
Staff informing them to arrive at YOS facility at 10:00
a.m. to begin their 12 hour shift. Limon Correctional
Facility ERT staff report they began to rotate the CCCF
inmates for hydration and rest. Clinical Services
Administrator Brad Kinney reported the Pueblo Pharmacy
did not open until 7:00 a.m. He had obtained needed
medical supplies and was in route to CCCF.

7:00 - 7:30 AM

CDOC Emergency Support Center notified YOS Associate
Warden Steve Rossi, that 45 beds at YOS would be needed
immediately. YOS staff began Unit #104 shakedown in
42

preparation of inmates moving from YOS A & B Pods
IDO-STU. PPMU staff Terry Flanagan reported to the
yard area and John Bongirno checked in with Incident
Command Center, DOC staff and CCCF staff. After initial
briefing, Mr. Bongirno and Ms. Ahlin preceded to the yard
areas where offenders were staged and flex cuffed. The
inmates were being fed sack breakfasts. Inspections were
conducted to assess the damages inflicted on housing
Units, the Greenhouse and fences. Mr. Bongirno provided
bottled water to staff positioned on the roof of the
Administration Building. YOS food service received
notification of the 45 CCCF inmates arriving.
7:30 - 8:00 AM

CDOC Emergency Support Center indicated a conference
call between CDOC Director of Prisons Nolin Renfrow,
CCCF Warden Crouse, stating that 138 Wyoming inmates
from CCCF would be moved to the 3 other private CCA
facilities in Colorado. CDOC Legislative Liaison Cherrie
Greco allowed entry of a Shamrock Food Truck onto
CCCF grounds. CDOC Trinidad Correctional Facility
requested to move 10 CCCF inmates to that facility.
All CCCF inmates had been fed breakfast. All inmates not
detained in the yard areas had been moved into temporary
housing assignment until repairs could be completed to the
damaged Units. YOS Lt. Cordova contacted YOS
Command Center stating that the Pueblo Campus had 16
ERT members at CCCF. All were issued less lethal
weapons and none were involved in any use of force
incidents at that time. Unit #104 had been searched and
cleared per Capt. Romero. Major Hager contacted
Physical Plant Manager Dave Zupan, to inform him that
the chiller in Unit #104 required repairs in order to receive
CCCF inmates, water fountains needed repaired and other
accommodations would be necessary to maintain order and
control of arriving CCCF inmates. Following
administrative roll call, YOS graveyard shift would be
released to return at their regularly scheduled time of 10:00
p.m.

43

8:00 - 8:30 AM

CDOC Clinical Administrator Brad Kinney, Debra Kinney
and Dana Bustos arrived and reported to the medical
Department to assist in preparing transportation related
information, medications and preparing offender files for
transport. Returning to the CCCF Administration Area,
PPMU staff John Bongirno coordinated housing
reservations with local motels and hotels for DOC
Executive staff and SORT members. Plans were being
made to move a number of Colorado offenders and
Wyoming offenders out of CCCF. Offender Services
coordinates the move lists with PPMU staff John
Bongirno and Terry Flanagan, and CCCF staff. Teams
would be established to locate and escort offenders
scheduled to move to the CCCF Intake area. Mr. Flanagan
coordinated activities in the Intake area. CCCF Case
Managers and Mr. Bongirno established teams, located the
offenders scheduled to move and escort them to Intake.
Director of Community and Parole Jeaneene Miller,
contacted YOS Associate Warden Steve Rossi and was
informed of the pending YOS plans to receive 45 CCCF
Inmates. Graveyard staff was briefed on the CCCF inmate
arrival.
CDOC Emergency Support Center notified Park County
authorities that 50 beds would be needed to move CCCF
inmate into and CDOC will deploy staff to CCCF to assist
with movement. A list of inmates to be transferred from
CCCF to YOS was transmitted on DCIS.

8:30 - 9:00 AM

CDOC Emergency Support Center Lou Archuleta spoke
with Curtis Robinette who was directed to advise the
inmates moving to Park County and YOS that this was not
a regressive move. Assistant Director of Clinical Services
Barry Pardus and Chris Petrozzi, Regional Health Services
Administrator, arrived at CCCF. Dana Bustos and Brad
Kinney preceded to CCCF Medical and meet with Hilbert
Navarro and Dan Plagge, mental health providers at
CCCF. They discussed debriefing the staff and inmates
and provided support to facility staff. Ms. Bustos
interviewed an inmate and provided his name to
Investigator Dave Smith. The Pueblo Complex ERT
44

assisted in feeding and maintaining inmates in the yard
areas. Emergency Support Center began the process of
notifying the next of kin of injured inmates. YOS reported
moving 30 inmates from STU to BLDG. #104 at YOS to
accommodate the CCCF inmate arrivals. Medical staff
reported working with CCCF, AVCF and FLCF staff to
ensure triage and coordinate transfer of offenders to other
facilities. Updates were maintained with PPMU staff,
Offender Services and others. Medical records,
documentation, medications, were packaged and
coordinated with transport trips with offenders. All CCCF
offenders, with the exception of one seriously injured
inmate, were returned to the facility.
YOS reported the list of 45 CCCF inmates and time of
arrival at YOS were received via DCIS message. Offender
Services staff Darryl Vigil contacted YOS ESC stating
CCCF inmates arriving at YOS would not have working
files because they were destroyed by fire at CCCF.
However these inmates were not involved in the
disturbance. YOS Captain Ellis contacted Lt. Williams for
confirmation of list of inmates and asked that QT files be
accessed for information on incoming inmates. YOS
reported that 30 inmates from A & B Pods were moved to
Unit #104 to accommodate incoming CCCF inmate bed
space needs. Major Hagar directed Sgt. Cordova to
prepare Intake for incoming CCCF Inmates. Video
equipment was prepared and medical staff were contacted
to provide anatomical exams of all incoming inmates.
9:00 - 9:30 AM

CDOC CSP & CCF Warden Larry Reid contacted
Emergency Support Center stating that the CSP/CCF
Command Center was deactivating and he would be
available by pager if needed. Limon Correctional Facility
ERT staff reported that CCCF offenders were separated by
Unit and were given a sack meal. Some inmates were
returned to Units 3 and 4 after clean up measures were
completed. The remaining inmates were escorted to the
West yard and contained with additional CCCF inmates.
YOS Major Hagar contacted San Carlos Correctional
Facility requesting a nurse be provided to assist with the
45

intake process of CCCF inmates upon their arrival.
Leonard Vigil contacted Captain Romero at YOS stating
that inmate count still had not cleared at CCCF and no
inmates would be moved until count was cleared. Mr.
Vigil requested a call at 30 minute intervals to determine
count progress. Assistant Director of Parole and
Community Tim Hand, contacted YOS Associate Warden
Steve Rossi to confirm a parole officer in route to YOS to
pick up three Phase III inmates. YOS Lt. Williams
contacted YOS Command Center to state there was 1
inmate in D-Pod in remediation status and would be left
there. YOS Captain Ellis contacted Command Center to
determine status of incoming CCCF inmates and would
proceed counting inmates in A and B Pod prior to their
move to Unit #104. Lt. Reaux contacted Command Center
stating staff were proceeding to IDO to retrieve count
sheets. Staff would then proceed to Visiting for briefing
and remain until there until deployed.
9:30 - 10:00 AM CDOC Emergency Support Center received an update
from PPMU Chief Mike Arellano who was sending an
updated medical list. Trinidad Correctional Facility ERT
Commander Winden contacted the CDOC SORT
Commander and it was determined that the TCF mobile
armory and half of the TCF ERT staff would return to
TCF. YOS Major Hager and Lt. Torrez brief swing shift
staff and deploy them to CCCF. LCF ERT staff escort
CCCF inmates to the newly constructed Units. Those
inmates were secured in cells. CCCF Command Center
was advised that Washington State officials had arrived at
CCCF. The Colorado Governors office contacted the
Emergency Support Center with notification that the
Governor would visit CCCF. Emergency Support Center
directed CTU staff to stop media security. YOS ERT Lt.
Cordova contacted YOS Command Center stating 50-60
inmates remained in the yard at CCCF and asked the
information be passed to Major Lynn at SCCF.
10:00 – 11:00 AM TCF Lt. Stickler and 4 TCF ERT staff departed CCCF to
return to TCF. Three TCF ERT staff remained to transport
8 offenders from CCCF to TCF. YOS Command Center
46

received message from Laurie Gephart, DOC Accounting
Technician, directing all involved staff to track staff hours
and expenses incurred during the CCCF disturbance and
response by CDOC. YOS Captain Machin contacted the
YOS Command Center with list of swing shift staff on
duty assignments and where they were deployed. CDOC
Emergency Support Center contacted Larry Reid,
CSP/CCF Warden, regarding the need to move 8 CCCF
inmates to CSP. YOS Major Hagar directed staff to begin
working on 12 hour staffing pattern schedule to operate
YOS. Pueblo Complex ERT escorted CCCF inmates to
Units and assist with feeding process.
11:00 - 12:00 PM CTU buses were en route to pick up CCCF inmates for
transport. CDOC ERT and SORT staff were released from
facility after debriefing. YOS Staff contacted Leonard
Vigil to verify CCCF inmates were in route. CCCF count
had not cleared and no movement would occur until count
cleared. TCF ERT staff would be transporting the inmates
being assigned to the Trinidad Correctional Facility.
Emergency Mobile Support Center was sending fresh radio
batteries into facility to CDOC staff. YOS Captain Ellis
notified Commander Center that STU inmates had been
fed and moved to Unit #104. STU Unit was being
prepared for arrival of CCCF Inmates.
PPMU Chief Mike Arellano advises Emergency Support
Center that preparations for transport process have begun.
A debrief was conducted at CCCF Visiting area
administered by L. D. Hay, Director of Administration and
Finance, Mike Rulo, Inspector General, and the CDOC
SORT Commander. All CDOC ERT teams were released,
with the exception of the Fort Lyon Correctional Facility
team, which remained on site and continued to assist with
movement of offenders to interviews conducted with
CDOC CID staff. The Pueblo Complex ERT was in route
back to SCCF.
12:00 – 1:00 PM Detained CCCF offenders were provided a lunch meal, and
systematically, one small group at a time, began to be
returned to cleaned and restored living units. One half of
47

the SORT members were relieved to return to their homes,
while the other half remained at CCCF to assist with the
clean up operations. YOS Captain Ellis contacted
Command Center stating A and B Pods were ready for
CCCF inmate arrivals. YOS Command Center contacted
Leonard Vigil to check status of CCCF inmate transport
and informed that CCCF Count still had not cleared.
YOS Management Team arrived at YOS Command
Center.
12:30 - 1:00 PM

CDOC CTCF Associate Warden Kevin Milyard contacted
Emergency Support Center to inform them that CTCF
could accept 10 inmates. Pueblo Complex ERT secured
weapons, ammunition and equipment upon their return to
SCCF and debriefed. Fremont Correctional Facility
Associate Warden Bobby Allen contacted the Emergency
Support Center to requested FCF Command Center be
permitted to stand down. Request was approved. YOS
Associate Warden Steve Rossi briefed Assistant Director
Tim Hand of current situation at YOS. The YOS LAN
Coordinator informed Command Center that two
computers were installed and operational in Building #104
at YOS. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano checked in with the
Emergency Support Center stating the movement process
was going very slowly. Leonard Vigil contacted YOS
Command Center stating that 45 CCCF inmates would be
arriving at YOS at approximately 3:00 p.m. YOS Captain
Ellis contacted SCCF to ensure a Medical Nurse reported
to YOS medical at 2:30 p.m. to assist with the arrival of
CCCF Inmates. Communications contacted YOS
Command Center stating that telephones in Unit #104
were disabled. Telephone in A and B Pods were activated.

1:00 – 2:00 PM

CCA Public Information Officer Steve Owen arrived at
CCCF. Pueblo Complex ERT Team was released to
recover and get personal gear ready. TCF ERT staff were
notified that CCCF inmates assigned to move to TCF were
staged in Intake and ready to transport. TCF ERT staff
departed CCCF Intake with 8 inmates assigned to TCF. It
is unclear if CCCF inmate count had been cleared.
48

CDOC Emergency Support Center advised CTCF that the
10 beds at that facility would not be needed. Director of
Parole and Community Jeaneene Miller contacted the YOS
Command Center to receive an update on CCCF riot
situation. Ann Diggs, Regional Health Services
Administrator, contacted Command Center stating that
nurses would be deployed from Canon Area Facilities to
assist with the intake process of the 45 CCCF Inmates
arriving at YOS.
All of the inmates previously transported out of CCCF for
medical care have been returned to the facility except for
the seriously injured inmate taken by Flight for Life.
2:00 – 3:00 PM

CDOC Emergency Support Center contacted CCCF
Warden Crouse and requested a direct line for contact to
discuss a press conference with Governor Owens and
CDOC Executive Director Joe Ortiz. Governor Owens
arrived at CCCF for a press conference. Emergency
Mobile Command Center staff Martinez, Bennett, and
Brady reported for duty and relieved MECC staff.
Leonard Vigil contacted the YOS Command Center stating
the departure time of the 45 CCCF Inmates was delayed.
Departure was anticipated at 3:00 p.m. YOS Associate
Warden Steve Rossi, contacted the Shift Commander
directing all day shift staff to report to Visiting Room to
receive amended schedules for the next day. Staff
contacted the YOS Command Center stating Unit #113
would be short-staffed with the departure of the Day Shift
Staff. Additional staff were deployed to ensure minimum
staffing was achieved. Leonard Vigil contacted YOS
Command Center stating departure time of the 45 CCCF
Inmates was expected at 3:45 p.m.
CTU staff Rich Martinez, relief for mobile command, had
arrived. TCF ERT staff arrived at TCF with the 8 CCCF
inmates who were taken to visiting for processing and
urinalysis. CTU began transporting 45 Colorado offenders
to YOS. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano checked in; packing
of inmates going slowly. Park County Jail arrived on
grounds at CCCF to pick up 57 DOC offenders.
49

3:00 - 4:00 PM

CDOC CTU began transporting 8 Colorado offenders to
CSP. CCCF Incident Commander was not allowing
offenders to move off grounds until count clears.
SORT members were deployed to CCCF Intake area to
assist CTU with transport of CCCF offenders to other
locations. SORT members were advised that Governor
Owens had arrived to tour the facility and SORT members
were deployed to provide protection for Governor Owens
during his walk through at CCCF. CSP/CCF, and CTCF
ERT members arrived to relieve FLCF ERT. CCF and
CSP ERT arrived at CCCF to assist with transport and
operations. Governor Owens left CCCF. Leonard Vigil
contacted YOS Command Center stating CTU transport
would arrive at YOS in approximately 15 minutes. YOS
Management Team report to Intake to observe Intake
process of CCCF inmates.
45 CCCF inmates arrived at YOS and proceeded into A, B,
and C Pods of IDO Building number #104
Business Technology staff Molly Hamilton relieved by
Gary Cassio who would remain on site to provide BT
support to the Emergency Mobile Command Center.
Three CSP ERT members transported 8 offenders to CSP.
Remainder of ERT members stayed at CCCF to provide
assistance. PPMU Chief Mike Arellano checked in with
Emergency Support Center and would be leaving CCCF at
4:00 p.m. PPMU staff Terry Flanagan would be taking
over. Inspector General’s staff were at the facility
throughout the day but were unable to conduct any inmate
interviews because CCCF staff were unavailable to escort
the inmates.

4:00 - 5:00 PM

All CDOC SORT members were present at CCCF and a
team debrief was conducted. A schedule of SORT
member presence and assignments at CCCF was passed
out to all members, providing coverage and assistance
through July 29th, 2004. CTU staff Doug Armstrong
contacted the Emergency Support Center and indicated
50

that bus 5 would return to CCCF to pick up inmates to
transport to Park County. Estimated time of arrival at
CCCF is 5:30 p.m. Command Center at YOS was
contacted to determine if college classes or library
privileges would occur that evening at YOS. The Shift
Commander stated notification would be made upon his
return to the YOS Command Center.
The CDOC Emergency Support Center was deactivated.
The Pueblo Complex Command Center was deactivated.
The YOS Command Center was contacted by Prison
Operations Manager Lou Archuleta stating that the
Emergency Support Center at Headquarters was standing
down and he would be available by pager if necessary.
YOS-Management Team returning to Command Center.
Director of Parole and Community Jeaneene Miller,
contacted YOS Command Center for an update on the
arrival of CCCF inmates. Associate Warden Rossi and
Major Hagar stated that the intake process occurred
smoothly with no incidents.
A portion of CDOC nurses are relieved by FLCF nurses.
CDOC nurses left CCCF. Inmate count at CCCF had not
cleared due to offenders being located in cells they were
not assigned to and they were triple bunked. Evening
CCCF Incident Manager Deputy Warden Miller, ordered a
numbers count to facilitate expediency in clearing the
inmate count. No moves were allowed. Offender
transport staff from CTU, Park County Jail, KCCC and
BCCF were held up waiting hours for count to clear.
Buses were staged on grounds awaiting offenders. The
three CCA (ERT) SORT teams were briefed and staged to
locate and escort offenders to Intake for the moves. All
three teams were from CCA facilities in other states,
Arizona, Tennessee, and Florida. They had just arrived and
were not familiar with the facility layout making count
more difficult.
PPMU staff Dana Bustos departed CCCF for Colorado
Springs office.
51

5:00 - 6:00 PM

CCA Public Information Officer Steve Owens conducted a
press conference at facility.
PPMU Chief Mike Arellano turned in his assigned radio to
the Emergency Mobile Command Center and would be off
grounds for the night. PPMU staff Terry Flanagan would
be the liaison between CCCF and Mobile Command.
CCCF staff were conducting an offender and staff
accountability. CDOC staff were unsure as to what time it
began and if it had cleared.

6:00 - 7:00 PM

All evidence gathered by CDOC Inspector General’s staff
would be stored at AVCF in the property area. All IG staff
were off grounds for the evening and would report again at
CCCF in the morning. CDOC Investigator Jay Kirby was
the only IG staff remaining on grounds. Any further
information would be reported to CDOC Investigator Dave
Smith by pager.
Dave Smith advised the CCF/CSP ERT Commander to
walk the CCCF perimeter looking for signs of bloody
clothing, take pictures if possible, and write a report. Any
items found would be placed in individual bags and
identified insuring to note the location they were found.
CDOC SORT members reported that they would end their
shift as of 10:00 p.m. unless Mr. Renfrow advised them
otherwise. All CDOC ERT teams would no longer be
needed at CCCF.

7:00 - 8:00 PM

CCF/CSP ERT reported to the CCCF Visiting area to
assist in the offender movement process and transports out
of the facility. Offenders were currently being housed in
Unit 3 and 4 pending movements. The Mobile Emergency
Command Center satellite dish was broken due to wind
gusts that caused the awning to hit the arm. The dish was
temporarily repaired.
9:00 – 10:00 PM After count clears, CCA (ERT) SORT Teams located and
escorted offenders to Intake. PPMU Staff Terry Flanagan
coordinated the Intake activities to timely process
offenders. With the limited number of CCCF staff on
52

grounds, PPMU staff John Bongirno directed the SORT
Teams to the specific Units and cell houses and guided the
SORT escorts around the Programs Building to Intake.
Mr. Bongirno escorted a SORT member to Medical for
treatment of a laceration.
10:00 - 11:00 PM The Crowley County Sheriff’s Department departed
CCCF. Perimeter security is in place and Sheriff’s Office
staff would not be providing assistance to the facility
throughout the evening. The Crowley Fire Department
reported to the CCCF facility to contain a flare up that
occurred in the facility. They would stand by pending
offender movement completion. The Mobile Command
Center generator was shut down in order to check the oil
and add fuel. Systems were shut down until the generator
service was completed. The system restarted at EMCC
with no problems noted. The Crowley Fire Department
contained the flare up and had departed the facility.
11:00 - 12:00 PM The CCA Tennessee SORT staff arrived on site at CCCF

July 22, 2004
12:00 - 1:00 AM Park County departed CCCF with 13 offenders
1:00 - 2:00 AM

CDOC CTU and Park County Jail staff were transporting
57 offenders to the Park County Jail. Estimated time of
arrival at Park County is 4:30 p.m.
ERT and SORT were debriefed and would be off grounds
for the remainder of the evening. SORT would leave 2
staff at the facility on 7-22-04. SORT Member contacted
CSP Master Control to clear staff from 24 hours of duty
since the beginning of the disturbance at CCCF. CTU staff
transported 44 CCCF offenders to Park County.

4:30 – 5:00AM

Two private charter buses with 76 CCCF offenders
departed to Kit Carson Correctional Facility and 40
offenders were transported to Bent County Correctional
Facility.
53

6:30 - 7:00 AM

Three (3) CDOC nurses arrived with a Health Services
Administrator at the request of CCCF medical, to
complete anatomicals. When the nurses arrived, they find
out that CCCF medical staff wanted them to do medication
lines. CDOC nurses were not comfortable with
performing this function and, after consultation with
Headquarters Medical staff, it was determined that their
mission at CCCF was complete.
PPMU Chief Arellano reported for duty at CCCF. CTU
staff Baum, Guiterrez, and Thomas reported for duty in the
Emergency Mobile Command Center and relieved CDOC
staff Martinez, Bennett, and Brady. Two CDOC SORT
members reported for duty.

7:00 - 7:30 AM

PPMU Chief Michael Arellano advised Emergency Mobile
Command Center to allow construction workers into
CCCF, however, they were allowed only to work outside
the perimeter of CCCF.

7:30 - 8:00 AM

A King Soopers delivery truck arrived to deliver bread to
CCCF. Mr. Arellano advised staff to send the delivery
truck to the CCCF Back Gate. Investigators Dave Smith,
Jay Kirby and Danny Lake reported for duty at CCCF.

12:00 to 12:30 PM Business Technologies staff Richard Cochran, arrived at
EMCC.
1:30 to 2:00 PM

Business Technologies staff Molly Hamilton is leaving
CCCF with Legislative Liaison Cherrie Greco.

3:00 to 3:30 PM

Emergency Mobile Command Center was deactivated.

5:30 to 6:00 PM

Inmate count cleared at CCCF.

7:30 PM

PPMU staff John Bongirno and Terry Flanagan were
relieving Curtis Robinette and Michael Arellano at CCCF.
SORT members reported that some ERT members
assigned to do shakedowns in the evening of 7-21-04 had
found several homemade knives secreted in the offender
54

mattresses. This information was forwarded to CCCF
Associate Warden Bridges and Acting Incident Manager
Mike Miller.

July 23, 2004
8:00 AM

PPMU Staff Terry Flanagan and John Bongirno departed
CCCF.

8:34 PM

Park County Jail contacted to follow up on status of the
Colorado offenders assigned to that facility. Sergeant
Crawford stated that everything went well with the intake
process.

9:49 PM

CCA Kit Carson Correctional Center contacted on the
status of the 76 Wyoming offenders moved to that facility.
Staff indicated that a few of the offenders were mouthy
during the trip, but all offenders were processed into the
facility. Facility had total of 6 empty beds, three in
segregation and three in general population.

9:54 PM

CCA Bent County Correctional Facility contacted on the
status of the 40 Wyoming offenders moved to that facility.
Staff report shift briefing included mention of Wyoming
offenders move with no incident.

July 24, 2004
5:00 PM

PPMU staff John Bongirno attended the Incident
Management Team Leader Changeover Briefing at CCCF.

8:20 PM

CCCF Warden Crouse requested CDOC’s approval of
moving offenders from triple bunking on the floor to other
cells. John Bongirno contacted PPMU Chief Mike
Arellano, who authorized the moves.

8:50 PM

CCCF Warden Crouse requested John Bongirno’s
signature on the authorization of the memo stating no
visiting would occur through the weekend. According to
Warden Crouse, Mike Arellano approved the memo
verbally.
55

Use of Force
Rioting inmates actively resisted the efforts of Emergency Response
Teams. From various locations in the facility, inmates threw rocks and
burning debris at officers and used metal lockers and file cabinets as
protective shields for advancing towards officers. They continued to feed
fires. The Office of the Inspector General had determined that reasonable
force was used to bring the inmate population back into compliance and to
regain control of the institution. In all, 19 inmates were treated for serious
injuries and no staff injuries were reported. Numerous other inmates were
treated for less severe injuries. DOC’s Special Operations Response Teams
(SORT) and various DOC Emergency Response Teams (ERT) expended the
following types and amounts of munitions:
YOS ERT:
Shotguns
Rounds of RP23 (non-lethal)
Rounds of Slugs
Rounds of buck shot
OC grenades
Smoke grenades
Stingball grenades
ISPRA-JET

5
50
50
100
10
2
12

AVCF ERT:
Flex cuffs
37 mm .60 caliber rubber rounds
Sting Ball #9594
CS continuous discharge grenade
12 gauge 00 rubber pellet rounds

1000 sets
12
2
2
50

CDOC SORT:
37mm Rubber Pellet Rounds
12
Sting Ball Grenades
2
CN Continuous Discharge Grenades
2
12 Gauge High Velocity Rubber Pellet Rounds
170
Liters of OC for ISPRA jet use
2
Flex Cuffs
1100
Canine Unit was utilized for crowd control and to clear buildings
56

The Crowley County Correctional Facility reports having used the
following types and amounts of munitions:
00 Buckshot
7 ½ Birdshot
12 gauge HV Rubber Pellets
12 gauge Bean Bag
CS Triple Chaser
37mm Bean Bag rounds
60 Cal Stinger
37mm Foam Baton rounds
MK-4 Pepper Spray 10%
MK-4 Pepper Fogger 5.5%
Flex Cuffs

20 rounds
143 rounds
66
6
4
10
8
3
11
2
1000

Observations
A number of observations were made during the incident by CDOC
staff:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Lack of front entry security
Doors propped open at times
No visible evidence of Emergency Plan in use
Line staff not mobilized; confusion regarding shift change; dependent
upon CDOC backup
Inmates escorted without restraints and placed into ambulances
unrestrained; more than one inmate being transported in same
ambulance
Difficulty in accounting for tools and keys
Staff and inmate accountability uncertain; management was not aware
that a librarian was missing and, in fact, was isolated in the library with
approximately 37 inmates.
Wooden cell doors were set on fire by rioting inmates
Porcelain fixtures were broken and pieces used as weapons
Segregation and control center doors were defeated
Case management files accessed in living units and compromised by
inmates
Lack of training for hazardous materials/blood spill clean up
57

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

CDOC nursing staff brought in to provide triage care; only one
Crowley medical staff on site until daybreak.
Delay in providing food service
Chemical agents not deployed in a timely manner by Crowley staff.
Incident commander dependent upon direction from corporate office
Critical Incident debriefing of staff by mental health providers delayed
Tools belts taken from civilian electrical contractors by inmates
Status and location of two religious volunteers uncertain
Inadequate staff training to operate locking mechanisms on living unit
control center escape hatches
No chemical agents in housing unit control centers available for use to
deter inmates
CCCF SORT team ordered to stand down until CDOC’s SORT team
arrived on scene
Inexperienced staff issuing weapons and munitions from armory; CCCF
armorer deployed to the roof

Office of the Inspector General
On July 20, 2004, at 9:00 P.M., Mike Rulo, Inspector General, Chief
Investigator Alex Wold, and four investigators, along with four K-9 teams, all
from the Colorado Department of Corrections, responded to the Crowley
County Correctional Facility in Olney Springs. This response occurred as a
result of a reported inmate uprising/riot at CCCF. Initial reports indicated that
the facility was at risk of being overrun by rioting inmates. Per CRS 17103.8, the Office of the Inspector General is the appropriate law enforcement
authority to investigate criminal matters, use of force and any contributing
factors that may have caused such a disturbance. This authority extends not
only to CDOC facilities, but also to privately owned and operated correctional
institutions that house CDOC inmates.
At approximately 9:30 P.M., investigators arrived at CCCF and
confirmed that the facility’s external perimeter was being secured by the
Crowley County Sheriff’s Office, Pueblo County Sheriff’s Office, Colorado
State Patrol and other local law enforcement agencies. After a briefing from
Brent Crouse, CCCF Warden, and PPMU staff on site, investigators
determined that the entire facility was at risk of being overrun by rioting
inmates. Living units, with the exception of Unit 6, had been taken over by
inmates and institutional property destroyed and burned. Inmates were in
58

control of yards and had access to program areas. They destroyed and burned
the Greenhouse and were threatening G-Building, a trades program area.
Several other fires burned outside living units, and the Administration
Building was at risk. It was reported that no inmates had breached the
external security fences.

Staff Accountability
Investigators were advised by CCCF administration that all staff had
been previously accounted for between 8:30-9:00 P.M, and that all staff had
been evacuated from the yards and living units. It was later determined,
however, when two CCCF officers in Unit 2 were rescued by CCCF’s SORT
team members, that the staff accountability reports were incorrect. When the
disturbance began, the two officers fled to an empty segregation cell and
locked themselves in. Further, during the early morning hours of July 21, a
staff librarian was discovered, along with 37 inmates, in the facility’s library,
and she was subsequently escorted to safety. The whereabouts of these staff
members was never communicated to investigators, since the facility’s
administration believed all staff had been accounted for.

The Onset of the Riot
The investigation has revealed the incident began at approximately 7:30
P.M., after a group of inmates in the West Yard demanded an audience with
the warden concerning their complaints. Inmates making the demands were
confronted by the Shift Commander, a captain who denied their demands to
talk with the warden, but reportedly attempted to engage the group’s leader in
discussion of the demands. It was reported that the Shift Commander was
unsuccessful in attempts to find a spokesman for the group, and the group
became threatening towards the Shift Commander and other officers present.
Staff retreated from the yard for their own safety. At the Shift Commander’s
direction, a public address system announcement was made, giving an order to
all inmates in the yard to disperse and return to their living units, and that the
yard was closed. The inmates became unruly, started to become hostile and
refused to comply with directives. At that time, the order was given for living
units to lock their doors, and staff were told to prepare for an emergency
evacuation of their posts. Inmates became bolder, began to damage property,
incited other inmates to riot and threatened to breach living units’ security
doors. Staff were then ordered to abandon their posts in the interest of safety.
59

Once officers evacuated yards and living units, inmates realized their conduct
was going unchecked, and there was no officer presence to prevent them
from engaging in more criminal misconduct. They became more belligerent
and aggressive.
The CDOC investigation has concluded that Washington inmates
played a major role in instigating and initiating the riot. Reports indicate they
became disruptive in retaliation for a use of force on a Washington inmate by
CCCF staff earlier in the day. The investigation has further revealed that
Washington inmates were the first to remove weight equipment and start
utilizing dumbbells and 45 pound weight bars to damage property. A video
tape observation indicates that a Washington inmate, identified as the leader
of other Washington inmates, was the first to start breaking windows and
pounding on the door of Living Unit 2. He instructed other inmates to break
into the Segregation Unit and release the inmate earlier involved in the use of
force incident. This was accomplished with weight bars being passed through
the cell door’s broken window, allowing the inmate the use of the weight bar
to defeat the door from within. Using this method, inmates were able to
destroy additional doors and locking mechanisms in not only the segregation
areas of the facilities, but throughout.
Colorado and Wyoming inmates became principals in the riot when
they took immediate advantage of the situation and aggressively began
participating. They also destroyed equipment, furnishings and used weight
equipment to break through cell doors and locks. Case Management offices
were broken into and inmate files rifled, in order to identify files belonging to
sex offenders and informants. These inmates were targeted in later assaults
the same night.
At this writing, there is no clear indication that the riot involved a
dispute among Security Threat Groups (STG). If anything, it has become
evident from inmate interviews and an analysis of posted STG graffiti written
on walls during the riot that STG groups banded together and acted in concert
with each other. The only indications of STG related incidents were the
assaults on two inmates, with evidence that two Security Threat groups
carried out those assaults.

Damage

60

Eventually, inmates caused extensive damage to Living Units 1 and 2
with some damage to Units 3 and 4. Case management offices were
compromised and inmate files accessed. Windows were broken and living
unit Control Centers were breached. Inmates destroyed porcelain toilets and
sinks, as well as sprinkler systems. Consequently, water lines were broken
and flooding occurred. Toilet flush valves were tied down to cause continual
flushing. Day Hall televisions were destroyed, as well as vending machines,
clothes washers, dryers and microwave ovens. Most of these items were
dragged outside, stuffed with flammable materials and set on fire.
Ultimately, inmates were able to defeat Control Centers in every Living
Unit. Locking mechanisms were destroyed, windows broken and electronic
control panels were smashed. As Control Center staff realized that inmate
access was imminent, they escaped by way of an overhead hatch. However,
according to witness statements, staff were unable to secure the hatch locks
behind them, thus permitting inmates to follow, gaining access to the roof.
The subsequent investigation indicates that no chemicals or munitions were
available to staff to defend the Control Centers against the advancing inmates.
The Greenhouse was vandalized and completely burned after inmates
breached a security fence behind Living Unit 1. Inmates also reached the
programs building area, Building B, but were not successful in breaching the
building. They did access Building G, housing the furniture shop and Habitat
for Humanity, but did little damage to these structures, other than possibly
removing tools. They did attempt to ignite a fire in this area, however, it was
started under the sprinkling system and was quickly extinguished.

Telephones
From the start of the riot, until approximately 10:00 P.M., inmates used
the telephones to call friends, families and members of the media.
Consequently, taped recordings of phone calls have led to the identification of
at least 40-60 criminal suspects and riot participants. During these calls,
inmates admitted to their own participation in the uprising and implicated
others. Media began calling facility administration to confirm the inmates’
reports of the riot.

Inmate Assaults
61

During the destruction of Living Units 1 and 2, inmates rifled through
case manager records, looking for files of other inmates considered to be
police informants or those identified as sex offenders. Those inmates
identified by the rioters as either informants or sex offenders were targeted for
assault. Two known assaults were perpetrated by bands of roving inmates
within Living Units 1 and 2.
The first and most serious assault occurred when an inmate in Unit 1
was attacked by a group of inmates. The inmate was secured in his cell;
however, other inmates rammed his door with weight bars and set the wooden
door on fire. Once the door had been defeated, perpetrators stabbed the
inmate, struck him with weight bars, beat him and threw him off the second
tier of the living unit. Inmates accosted the severely injured inmate again
while he lay on the first floor and struck him on the head with a microwave
oven, leaving him for dead. Later, the severely injured inmate was discovered
by response team members while retaking control of Living Unit 1. He was
later airlifted to Pueblo for hospital treatment.
The second serious assault occurred in Unit 2. Rioting inmates broke
through a segregation cell, occupied by this inmate. He was dragged from the
cell and beaten. Attacking inmates attempted to stab him repeatedly until the
blade of the weapon was bent. The inmate was later rescued and treated by a
CCCF physicians’ assistant. However, his name was omitted from the list of
injured inmates who had been victims of assault, and he was subsequently
moved the following day to the Park County Jail. This injured inmate
reported the assault to Park County staff.
During additional interviews conducted by investigators, inmates
complained of injuries received from birdshot and rubber bullets, fired by
officers attempting to regain control of the facility.

Response to the Riot
It became apparent to responding CDOC Investigators and the CDOC
SORT Commander arriving on scene that a quicker and stronger response by
the facility security staff at the initial onset of the riot would have limited the
extent of the riot. Investigators believe that the lack of response was due to
indecisive command level decision making or inadequate staffing and
resources, or both. The facility’s command staff either could not or would not
deal with the situation at its inception. Further, reports indicate that the
62

facility’s SORT team was told to “stand down” until Colorado’s Department
of Corrections’ SORT team arrived. The facility’s emergency response team
had been disbanded and was only recently reinstated, thus indicating lack of
training for response to an incident of this magnitude.
Once notified, CDOC staff and units responded to the site and provided
assistance in a variety of ways:
1. The Emergency Support Center was activated at the CDOC
Headquarters Building, Colorado Springs. Personnel provided
assistance and developed a plan to move inmates from CCCF.
2. The Emergency Mobile Command Center was deployed from Canon
City and remained onsite, utilized as a communications hub; staff
controlled access and egress to the riot scene.
3. Escape Team personnel and K-9 Units conducted a sweep of the
perimeter to ensure no inmates had escaped. K-9’s were used for
additional crowd control.
4. Training Academy staff transported multiple sets of hard restraints, 2
shields and 22 cases of less lethal ammunition to CCCF.
5. The Public Information Officer established a staging area for news
media outside the facility and released updated status reports over the
next twenty-four hours. The PIO also arranged for a late morning press
conference/briefing by the CDOC Executive Director, July 21.
Preparations were coordinated for an on-site tour and press conference
by Governor Bill Owens, scheduled for 2:00 P.M. the same day.
6. The Legislative Liaison provided facility escort for arriving CDOC
medical staff to the triage area, communicated with the Mobile
Command Center, assisted with yard supervision and responded to
incoming legislative inquiries.
7. Staff from Business Technologies maintained digital radio
communications equipment and provided ongoing assistance with
telephones, computers, internet and satellite connections and were at
CDOC Headquarters for Web page updates.
8. The Executive Director, Director of Prisons, Director of Administration
and Finance assisted prior to arrival on site and provided direction
regarding use of chemical agents and other strategies to quell the riot.
Further, they provided command management regarding building
sweeps, detainment and control of inmates, yard supervision and
emergency food service operations. Coordination and planning with the
SORT Commander was ongoing over the next 24 hours.
9. Facility Emergency Response Teams from Arkansas Valley, Fort Lyon,
San Carlos and Trinidad Correctional Facilities reported to the SORT
63

Commander, along with staff from the Youthful Offender System
(YOS) and Pueblo Minimum Center and some off-duty staff who reside
in the Colorado Springs area. These teams were instrumental in
providing assistance during the riot and regaining control of the facility.
10. YOS management team developed a plan to receive inmates from
CCCF and provide appropriate services.
11. Central Transport Unit was alerted that inmates would be moved to
available beds throughout the state.
12. The Inspector General and staff provided assistance during and after the
riot, identified potential crime scenes, began to conduct investigations
and have since assimilated over 1,400 interview documents related to
the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident.
At approximately 1:00 A.M., on July 21, 2004, the riot was brought under
control and the process of restoring order began. Inmates were restrained and
staged in exercise yards. A process for medical triage was and treatment was
established.

Criminal Charges
At this writing, there is an ongoing investigation to determine the filing
of criminal cases. Conservatively, over 100 inmates have been identified as
engaging in criminal activity, and 100 or more Disciplinary or Administrative
actions may be pursued against inmate suspects. The Office of the Inspector
General reports that additional criminal related incidents may include the
following:
1. Attempted Homicide of at least one inmate.
2. Inmates inciting and engaging in large scale riot activity.
3. Large scale Criminal Mischief with major property damage.
4. Assaults on inmates by inmates.
5. Assaults or attempted assaults on staff by inmates.
6. Burglary of Case Management offices and destruction of records and
files.
7. Burglary of Living Unit Control Centers and destruction therein.
8. Arson and attempted burning of Living Units.
9. Arson of the Greenhouse.
10. Burglary of Programs Area, Building G.
11. Accosting and robbing two civilian electrical contractors of their tool
belts containing screw drivers and wire cutters, instruments which
could aid in a potential escape.
64

Part IV: Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions
After any prison disturbance, hindsight is useful for drawing
conclusions about missed operational opportunities. Every attempt should be
made to analyze the causes of the riot, its human and financial impact and
address steps needed to make appropriate improvements.
After a comprehensive review of the July 20 inmate riot, the Colorado
Department of Corrections concludes the following:
• CCCF management has failed to comply in a timely manner with
PPMU-noted deficiencies/recommendations.
• High staff attrition rate and inexperience has contributed to lack of
ability to appropriately respond to emergencies. At this writing, 37
CCCF staff members have resigned or been terminated since the
incident.
• Responsiveness to inmates’ food service complaints has been delayed.
There has been a failure to adhere to CDOC mandated menu items.
• Fundamental security measures have not been consistently followed.
• Facility emergency plan has not been effective.
• Inmate living unit construction materials have proven to be easily
destroyed.
• CCCF’s initial response to the incident was indecisive.
• The riot and subsequent damage to CCCF has caused a disruption of
daily inmate intake into the Reception and Diagnostic Center resulting
in an increase in jail backlog. The impact of the incident to normal
operations of population management has been enormous. Inmate
movement back into CCCF by CDOC has ceased to date.

Recommendations
The following recommendations are being made as a result of this
report:

65

• Update facility emergency procedures and schedule training drills on a
frequent basis, utilizing corporate resources; conduct necessary out
briefings and implement corrections.
• Ensure command structure is well-defined with clear lines of authority
and responsibility and organizational chart updated.
• CCA should consider granting more authority to CCCF’s on site
command staff in emergency situations.
• Conduct frequent staff and inmate accountability exercises with and
without observation from PPMU staff. Conduct needed out briefings
and implement corrections.
• Increase the level and frequency of communications with corporate
officials when corrective measures, indicated by PPMU, are not
implemented in a timely manner at the local level.
• Increase notification and level of accountability among county
commissioners and city administrators to the Department of Corrections
for private prison operational deficiencies, when noted by PPMU.
• Increase the level of oversight by County Commissioners and city
administrators for private prison operations.
• Review and update memorandums of understanding with county and
city officials and local law enforcement.
• Practice mobilization of emergency command center at various times,
during all shifts.
• Review CCCF’s staffing complements for emergency response teams
and inventory equipment and supplies; ensure use of force training
records are current and updated as needed.
• Conduct tool and key control audits to CDOC specification.
• Respond to inmate complaints in a timely manner.
• Consider a change in the food service contractor; ensure food service
staff are trained in the preparation of medical and religious diets.
• Provide CCCF staff with use of force and tactical training.
• Provide CCCF staff with hazardous materials and blood spill cleanup
training
• Review security procedures regarding recreational use of weights.
• Replace current wooden doors and porcelain plumbing fixtures and
locking mechanisms.
• Implement a method for improved security of inmate files.
• Create mechanism to address issues of CCCF staff morale.
• Conduct regularly scheduled inspections of living unit control center
escape hatch.
66

• Ensure only trained and credentialed armorer is authorized to issue
weapons and munitions.
• Maintain a list of contingent contract providers should additional or
alternate bed space needs arise.
• Request the Colorado Legislature for additional full time employees for
the CDOC Private Prisons Monitoring Unit.
• Request the Colorado Legislature to authorize the CDOC Executive
Director to take command and compel compliance with recommended
policy and procedure in non-emergency situations.
• Report to PPMU all instances of shift staffing shortages.
• Conduct appropriate investigations, prior to inmate COPD hearings
taking place.

About Emergency Preparedness
Unexpected occurrences, acts of God, and a variety of other anomalies
can disturb a correctional facility at any time and pose a threat to security.
Contingency plans must be developed, training conducted and plans
implemented when needed. Inmate disturbances are one of the most serious
of these unplanned events. Appropriately responding to such emergencies and
taking control of a potentially volatile situation comes with practice. In all
cases, inmates far outnumber staff; therefore, strategies should be developed
to mobilize the work force in such a way as to firmly and aggressively take
control of a situation using the least amount of force necessary. Confidence
about what to do and how to execute an emergency plan is possible only after
training, an updated review of procedures and re-training. An arsenal of
specialized equipment and other supplies should be pre-positioned.
Communication systems must be tested and utilized, and leadership during
such an emergency well established. All the preparation in the world,
however, means nothing if the plan is not implemented, or when employees
fail to execute their roles, accordingly.
In either state or privately operated prisons, complacency is the enemy.
Inmates capitalize on their observation of staff taking shortcuts and exploit
weaknesses whenever possible. Failure to recognize or report unusual inmate
behaviors may ultimately lead to a disruption within the institution. Often,
staff place little importance on individual observations; and, while it is true
that separately some reports lack significance, collectively, they may be of
great use. When patterns emerge and are investigated, disturbances may be
67

prevented. The ability to respond to emergencies is often hindered, therefore,
not by a desire to perform, but due to inexperience and lack of practice. In
short, proactive planning and reactive problem-solving are essential.
A thorough after action review of any facility emergency is important
in order to recognize systems that functioned well and those that need
improvement. This review process has provided CDOC with the opportunity
to examine internal Private Prisons Monitoring Unit practices, and the Unit
looks forward to identifying ways to increase effectiveness. For example, it
has become evident that the PPMU needs to involve and communicate with
the contracting city and county officials to obtain compliance and correct
deficiencies noted when they are conducting inspections. While not every
emergency can be prepared for, common procedures for responding to any
emergency, can, never the less, be practiced. Since staff from all operational
and program areas will likely be utilized during an actual riot, such as
described in this report, frequent rehearsal is necessary with everyone in the
facility participating. Correctional agencies should also account for staff
attrition and retrain in emergency procedures as needed.
On the night of the incident, there were many CCCF staff who
responded appropriately and performed well. Local fire protection units,
police and sheriff’s officers, state patrol and others were quick to initiate
measures to ensure the public’s safety was never compromised. After the
facility’s order was restored, countless hours have been spent in reviewing the
levels of response and discussing ways to improve processes in the future.
The prison riot of July 20, 2004, at the Crowley County Correctional
Facility began with a disturbance which, in retrospect, was not responded to
as quickly and effectively as possible, thus developing into a riot. Some
dynamics among the inmate population, perception that inmate complaints
were not being heard and use of force by CCCF staff likely all contributed to
the onset of the incident. This report was an attempt to summarize the events
and provide recommendations for improvement in order to mitigate such
occurrences in the future.

68

Appendices

69

Appendices:

Page:

Photos:

70 – 89

Intergovernmental Contract – State of Colorado
and the Colorado Department of Corrections and
Crowley County and Exhibits

90– 176

Crowley County Correctional Facility Riot Response
Expenses to be Reimbursed

177

Glossary

178

Unit I: Inmates set fires to wooden cell doors.

70

Debris resulting from fires set to washing machines, vending machines,
clothing and files.

Housing Unit Control Center: Inmates used weights to break windows
and destroy locking mechanisms to access control centers and electronic
panels.

71

Unit 1: Inmates damaged air handling units after accessing roof
through escape hatch, above control center.

Unit 1: Fire damage

72

Unit 1: Fire Damage

Housing Unit 1: Roof and fire damage

73

Housing Unit: Day Hall flooding and debris

Unit 3: Debris at housing unit’s entrance

74

Locking mechanism destroyed by weight bar

Housing Unit 4: Burned debris

75

Housing Unit: Inmates moved and destroyed institution property, files
and clothing to outside entrance of cell house.

Defeated locking mechanism

76

Housing Unit: Damage to sheetrock and flooding

77

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Housing Unit: Flooding of Day Hall area near entrance

Housing Unit Control Center: Inmates gained access and damaged
sprinkler systems, control panel and windows overlooking unit.

79

Housing Unit: Shattered windows overlooking cells

Housing Unit Control Center: Electronic panel destroyed

80

Housing Unit: Destruction of porcelain fixtures

Housing Unit Day Hall Area: Washer and dryer removed

81

Housing Unit: Case Managers’ file cabinets and inmate records
destroyed

82

Housing Unit: Inmates used weight bars and clothing irons to destroy
sheetrock

Housing Unit Control Center: Windows broken by inmates throwing
projectiles

83

Segregation Unit: Cell damage and flooding

84

Segregation Housing Unit: Door damage, day room and cell flooding

Segregation Unit: Cell door compromised, porcelain fixtures destroyed;
flooding

85

Segregation Unit: Concrete block walls destroyed by weight bars

86

Segregation Unit: Pod damage

87

Segregation Unit: Flooding damage and steel door defeated

88

Segregation Unit: View from inside destroyed cell

89

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Crowley County Correctional Facility Riot Response
July 20, 2004

Direct Expenses to be Reimbursed
Personnel

$225,228.22

Travel

1,508.53

Clothing

1,554.43

Medical

116,573.48

Other

40,760.29

Total Reimbursement:

$385,624.95

177

Glossary
AVCF:
BCCF:
CBI:
CCA:
CCCF:
CCF:
CDOC:
CM:
CO:
COPD:
CSP:
CTA:
CTU:
DTR:
EMCC:
ERT:
ESC:
FLCF:
GP:
HCCF:
IDO:
KCCC:
LAN:
LCF:
PIO:
PMC:
PPMU:
SCCF:
SORT:
STG:
TCCF:
YOS:

Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility
Bent County Correctional Facility
Colorado Bureau of Investigation
Corrections Corporation of America
Crowley County Correctional Facility
Centennial Correctional Facility
Colorado Department of Corrections
Case Manager
Correctional Officer
Code of Penal Discipline
Colorado State Penitentiary
Corrections Training Academy
Central Transportation Unit
Digital Transmission Radio
Emergency Mobile Command Center
Emergency Response Team
Emergency Support Center
Fort Lyon Correctional Facility
General Professional
Huerfano County Correctional Facility
Intake, Diagnostic, & Orientation
Kit Carson Correctional Center
Local Area Network
Limon Correctional Facility
Public Information Officer
Pueblo Minimum Center
Private Prisons Monitoring Unit
San Carlos Correctional Facility
Special Operations Response Team
Security Threat Group
Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility
Youth Offender Services

178