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Corrective Action Plan for Corrections Standards Authority Staff Safety Eval 2005

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(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8. 2005

.,'

Page: 1 of 17
Date: 2120/2007

PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Pro osed Action Plan

Recommendations/Descri tion

CommentslProof Of Practice

Finding #1: There were no obvious trends identified relative to the issue of staff battery.
1.

Thirty-nine incidents of battery and attempted
battery on staff were reported during the time
period of July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005 at
Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP). The
institution reports that over 40 staff members
were victims of battery or were injured during
incidents:
Twenty-eight victims were from the ranks of
correctional officers (C/O's) and two were
sergeants. The remaining ten victims included
five Medical Technical Assistanfs (MTA's) and
five health care workers.
The average age of the victims was
approximately 38 years with 9.5 years of
service.
Twenty-nine of the victims were male and ten
were female.
Twenty-Six of victims were white, six were black,
six were Hispanic, and two were reported as
"other".

N/A

No corrective action necessary as this is information
prOVided for discussion only.

NlA

N/A

N/A

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8, 2005
PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Recommendations/Descri tion

Pro osed Action Plan

CommentslProof Of Practice

Finding #2: Additional training is needed for staff responding to emergencies.

2.

3.

The Return to Work Coordinator provided
statistics showing a category described as
"Responding to Alarms" as being the third
leading category of frequencies of staff injury,
with 15 reported injuries during the last fiscal
year. These statistics would support the need
for training ways to safely respond to incidents.

In-Service
Training (1ST)
Manager

Emergency Alarm Response Training is in place for Continuous
Off Post Training Sessions (OPTS). In addition, training.
effective July 1, 2005 Mule Creek began monthly
training on the facilities for alarm response. Alarm
response identifies safety issues for responding to
emergencies.

Return To Work
Coordinator

In monthly safety meetings, MCSP will continue to
review all reported injuries to determine trends and
identify trainina needs as warranted.

Finding # 3: Race and age do not appear to be 51 ;Jnificant assau t factors.
No significant variances were noted when N/A
No corrective action necessary as this is information
comparing the race, age or county of
provided for discussion only.
commitment of the assaultive inmates to that of
the overall facility inmate population. Hispanic
and white inmates were responsible for 29
incidents with the remaining 10 being dispersed
among the other races. The inmates had been
committed from twelve counties with none being
unusually represented.

Training and Safety Meetings are Alann Response Memorandum
being completed on a monthl~ (Attachment A), Cell Extraction
.basis.
Alann Response Overview
(Attachment B) and 1ST
Records.

Ongoing.

N/A

August 9, 2005 Safety Meeting
Minutes (Attachment C).

NlA

N/A

N/A

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8,2005
Page: 3 of 17
Date: 2/20/2007

PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

RecommendationslDescri tion

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Pro osed Action Plan

Finding #4: Inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues are more likely to commit assaults on staff.

4.

Enhanced Outpatient (EOP) inmates, while
generally described as mental health patients
because of their diagnosis, require a
significantly higher level of clinical care.

1ST Manager

1ST provides awareness training concerning the
potential of assaultive behavior of this population to
all custody and non-custody staff during OPTS.

Continuous
training.

Training is being completed on a
monthly basis.

1ST records, Mental Health
Services
Overview/Update
(Attachment D), Recognizing the
Signs and Symptoms of Mental
Disorders Student Handbook
(Attachment E) and Post Quiz
(Attachment F).

Health Care
Manager

During Mental Health staff meetings, safety and
security topics are consistently discussed. These
topics include personal alarm, emergency response,
personal whistle, reporting unusual inmate behavior
and inmate staff relations. Medication requirements
are frequently reviewed by Mental Health staff and
they do use the Keyhea Injunction for inmates who
are not medication compliant and are determined to
be a danger to himself and others. Violence risks or
assault risk inmate/patients are addressed in each
Inter-Disciplinary Treatment Team (IDTT) and an
appropriate treatment plan is developed. When
assaultive tendencies are identified, staff are made
aware of those individuals and a review for
appropriate housing is conducted. Medication
management Quality Improvement Teams (OITS)
are conducted in an effort to ensure inmates receive
prescribed medications in a timely manner.

Continuous
training and
IOTT.

Ongoing.

Keyhea Involuntary Medication
List "Confidential" (Attachment
G)
EOP
IDTT
Schedule
(Attachment H).

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 -8.2005
Page: 4 of 17

PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Date:
Item

Recommendations/Descri tion

Current
Status

Pro osed Action Plan

2120/2007

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Finding #4: Inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues are more likely to commit assaults on staff (continued).

4.

5.

Facility "B", Building 6, has been housing
approximately fifty Level IV EOP/SNY inmates.
The institution has just activated an EOP Unit in
a Level IV building in Facility "A", housing 6
inmates as of this review date.

Facility "A" and
"B" Captains

Facility "B" will continue to refer the Level IV EOP
inmates to the C&PR for endorsement to Facility "A",
Level IV EOP.

Findina #5: Inmate manufactured weapons were not a factor In assau ts on staff.
Inmate manufactured weapons were not N/A
No corrective action necessary as this information for
involved in any of the incidents reviewed.
discussion only. Institution will continue to conduct
Inmates threw or attempted to throw an
program yard and housing searches.
unknown liquid substance on staff in 6 of the
incidents.
In the remainder of the cases
reviewed, inmates battered or attempted to
batter staff by head-butting, kicking or unlawful
touching with their hands. In the incident
resulting in the most serious injury to staff, the
inmate was able to head butt the C/O, knock
him off balance, kick him several times and
finally bite him on the leg. Six incidents occurred
during escorts and three during meal service
When C/O' opened food ports.

Continuous

N/A

As of August 19, 2005, sixteen
Level IV EOP inmates have been
transferred to Facility "A". Thirtythree Level IV EOP inmates are
in Level III housing and are being
evaluated for Level IV EOP
housing.

Inmate Housing Assignment
Change (Attachment I).

N/A

N/A

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8, 2005
PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Recommendations/Descri tion
Finding #6:

6.

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Pro osed Action Plan

Custody staff appears to be receiving training in safety related issues. Non- custody staff; however, receive fewer hours of training and are less compliant in
attending training (continued).

MCSP tracks the supervisors' annual training
based on the employee's birthday. Each
employee's training year begins on their
birthday, not a calendar or fiscal year; therefore,
using the current 1ST tracking program, we were
unable to confirm that all of the training
mandates were being met.

1ST Manager

Non-Custody staff receives Block Training, which is
a required annual course of training at MCSP. It
incorporates the requirements listed in DOM for all
employees except those with OPTS responsibilities
and is held once a month. Non-Custody supervisors
receive an 1ST deficiency notice two (2) months prior
to their annual performance evaluation which
identifies needed training.

August

10,

2005

Memorandum will be completec
by August 10, 2005 and
distributed to all Non-Custod"
supervisors.

Non-Custody Block Training
memorandum
dated
August 10, 2005 (Attachment J)
1ST Deficiency Notice - Annual
(Attachment K) and 1ST records.

Non-custody personnel are scheduled to receive
8 hours of annual training, 6 of which are related
to staff safety. The training manager reported
that 80% of the non-custody personnel were
compliant with the training mandates. The
sample files reviewed and supported that
percentage.

Finding #7:

7.

During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from specified training (cell extraction, mental health intervention, etc.). In fact, the majority of staff
interviewed identified the need for more meaningful training.

Staff need hands-on training for cell extractions
(the use of cell extraction equipment), and
mental health techniques for dealing with EOP
and Correctional Clinical Case Management
System (CCCMS) inmates.

1ST Manager

Cell extraction and mental health training is given on
a monthly basis during OPTS per departmental
lesson plans.
Based on departmental funding
hands-on cell extraction training is not provided at
MCSP. Mental Health training is also provided
during OPTS along with on-site training in Buildings
#5 and #6 (EOP) on how to interact with EOP
inmates.
Draft memorandum to all supervisors
identifying the aforementioned training advising
supervisors to attend training.

August

2005

10,

Monthly training during OPTS

Memorandum dated August 10
2005 (Attachment L). 1ST records
and OJT records for EOP Building

#6. Cell Extraction Lesson Outline
(Attachment M).

(MCSP)
CORRECTNE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8, 2005
PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Recommendations/Deseri tion

Pro osed Action Plan

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Finding #8: Correctional Officers in some positions are not provided sufficient communications equipment.
8.

The C/O assigned to Body Cavity Surveillance
cells was not equipped with a personal alarm.
intercom capabilities or radio (although post
orders reflect a personal alarm is to be worn).
The camera did not monitor the hall where the
staff person is stationed, but positioned to
monitor the inmate.

Correctional
Captain
Watch
Commander

Memorandum regarding equipment to be worn dated
July 6, 2005. Post order instructing staff to wear
personal alarm device will be revised. The camera is
positioned to monitor the inmate only.

August
2005

Only 1 radio is issued to 2 C/O's working inside
the housing unit as floor officer's. Typically the
position designated as "floor one" is assigned to
maintain the radio. This position is also
designated as the primary respondent. dUring
Code I and Code II emergencies. This process
results in the second C/O remaining in the unit
without radio communication. A radio was
assigned to the Facility "A" Gym. In an effort to
maximize the use of a single radio, staff had
secured the radio to the podium as a point of
centralized use. The evaluation team agreed
that the institution should consider providing all
floor officers with a radio.

Correctional
Captain
Facility Captain
Armory Sgt.

MCSP is currently utilizing all the radios we have
been authorized. MCSP will prepare an Issue
Memorandum to Operations Review Committee, via
chain of command, regarding the feasibility of
issuing radios to all housing unit officers.

September
30. 2005

19.

Post Order completed.

Memorandum dated July 6, 2005
Body Cavity Surveillance (BCS)
Cells/CTC Overflow (Attachment
N). Post order (Attachment 0)
and Operational Procedure MC
48-52050,
Quarantine
BCS
(Attachment P).

In process.

N/A

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8, 2005
PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Ite

Page: 7 of 17
Date: 2/20/2007

Recommendations/Descri tion

Current
Status

Pro osed Action Plan

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Finding #9: There are 87 Correctional Officers and many Medical Technical Assistant's (MTA's) and Correctional Counselor's (CC's) that have not been Issued a stab-resistant vest.

9.

The Armory Sgt. informed us that 651 CIO's
have been designated to be issued a stab
resistant vest. The records reflect that 54 C/O's
within the ranks of CIO, sergeant, and lieutenant
have been fitted for vests; however, the vests
have yet to be issued. Thirty-three C/O's have
not been fitted for or issued a vest at the time of
the evaluation. Sufficient vests are available at
the facility for those CIO's to check out for use
during their shift until their personal vests are
available. C/O's reported a reluctance to wear
these vests, saying that the vests were not
cleaned appropriately. The records reflect that
the remaining 564 CIO's have been fitted and
have been issued a vest.

MTA's and CC's, who were custody staff, are
not included in the above numbers. The team
was informed that many of these personnel
have been fitted for vests but have not received
vests. The team was further informed that the
bargaining unit representing MTA's and CC's
has filed a grievance (With the agency, not the
institution) over this matter.

Correctional
Captain
Armory Sgt.

Pool vests are assigned to each facility and are to be
used in the absence of personal vests. MCSP has
continued to stay current with Departmental policies
and procedures pertaining to this issue.

Upon
Emergency
Operations
Unit (EOU)
approval to
purchase
vest.

MCSP currently has 101 staff Memorandum dated August 18,
members who do not have a 2005 (Attachment Q).
vest. Twelve are out on extended Memorandums dated November
sick or workers compensation to 20, 2003, January 14, 2005,
bring the total to 87. Fifty eight February 10, 2005, email dated
of the 87 have been fitted and March
28,
2005,
and
are waiting for their vests. The memorandum dated June 2,
remaining staff will be fitted on 2005 (Attachments R, S, T, U &
V).
September 30, 2005.

Cleaning procedures are being written for the
cleaning of pool vests on all facilities.

September

N/A

Warden's memorandum dated February 9, 2005
instructs all C/O's, sergeants and lieutenants issued
vests, the requirement to mandatorily wear the Stab
Resistant Vests.

N/A

A representative from Second Chance Vest has
been contacted and is scheduling a new date to fit
the remaining staff.
MCSP is fol/owing the Departmental directive issued
by Deputy Director, Institutions Division, identifying
which custody classifications are reqUired to wear
the Stab Resistant Vest.

N/A

1, 2005

N/A

Memorandum dated February 9,

2005 (Attachment W).

30,2005

Second Chance will be on site
for fitting, approximately on
September 30, 2005.

N/A

N/A

September

N/A

Memorandum dated March 4,

2004 (Attachment X).

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8, 2005
PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Recommendations/Oescri tion

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Pro osed Action Plan

Findina #10: Specific to Facilities "A". "B" & "C".
10. The gymnasium was observed by the staff Facility "A", "B"
safety audit team to have towels, blankets and and "C"
clothing draped from bunks. Such coverings Captains
obscure visibility.

Facility"C"
Captain

Post Orders for all facilities has special instructions
regarding bed covering removal. Gymnasium rules
are provided to inmates.

N/A

Gym staff will be provided training on expectations
that inmates do not hang/drape any item that
reduces visibility.

August
2005

First, Second and Third line supervisors conduct
daily/weekly/monthly
inspections and
provide
training to staff.

Ongoing.

Facility "C" to submit work order for installation of
drying racks.

August
2005

29,

19,

N/A

Post Orders for Facility "A", "B",
& "C· (Attachments Y, Z, & AA).

On-going training being provided.

N/A

N/A

Inspection
sheets
(Attachment BB).

example.

Facility "C" gymnasium has Work Order (Attachment CC).
problems with clothing, towels,
blankets, etc, being hung on the
bunks as there is currently no
drying rack. Facility "A" and "B"
currently have drying racks.

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN

For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8, 2005

Page: 9 of 16

PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Date: 212012007
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Recommendations/Deseri tion

ction ReqUired
8 Whom

Finding #10: Specific to Facilities "A","B" & "e" (continued).
10. PadJocks are applied to each cell during the Plant Manager
sleeping hours to prevent inmates from lifting
the sliding door off the track.

Pro osed Action Plan

Over five years ago it was discovered inmates could
open cell doors. As a result, the Warden ordered
"boot locks" to be installed until the problem could be
resolved. The Deputy State Fire Marshal for this
district was advised and subsequently toured the
site. The determination was made that the security
of the institution took precedence. Faulty locking
devices have been discovered at other institutions
creating a state-wide funding issue.

Date To Be
Com leted

Unknown pending
funding.

Current

Status

The practice of padlocking cell
doors dUring sleeping hours will
continue.

Comments/Proof Of Practice

February 2001
electromechanical door operator
repairs and schedule

(Attachment DD) and COBCP.

A Capital Outlay Budget Change Proposal (COBCP)
by the Security Operations
was
initiated
Management Branch in August of 2000. A majority
of institutions were affected. MCSP is in Phase It
behind California Correctional Institution and Wasco
State Prison.
Convex
security
mirrors
are
being
recommended at the end of the dayroom of
each bUilding to enable CIO's at the control
desk to see blind spots near inmate telephone
areas.

Associate
Warden,
Programs I
Housing and
Plant Manager

Emergency Beds (E-Beds) on the dayroom floors
are anticipated to deactivate in September-October
2005. With this action, blind spots in the bUildings
wiIJ be reduced. CIO's, as part of their daily
assign ments, rove the dayroom floors in the
buildings, and work in conjunction with the control
booth officers to ensure blind spots are covered and
activities monitored. Because various buildings have
different missions, vantage points and convex mirror
needs will differ. All facility buildings have a minimum
of 3 mirrors which can be adjusted to address blind
spots. MCSP convex mirrors are sufficient for C/O
coverage. We will continue to monitor the need for
mirrors.

N/A

N/A

N/A

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8, 2005
PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Recommendations/Descri tion

Finding #11: Specific to Facility "Au.
The inmate exercise yard is very large for
level IV operations and only three CIO's
assigned to yard coverage.
Additionally,
supervisory staff were not able to focate
assigned yard staff.

11.

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Pro osed Action Plan

Facility
Lieutenant

Due to the SNY designation of the facility, the size of
the yard is mitigated by the nature of the inmates
assigned to the facility. Yard staff have been given
training regarding their obligation to remain within
their assignment area unless authorized to leave by
their supervisor.

August
2005

19,

Training is on-going. Yard CIO's
1ST Sign-In sheets and Post
remain at their assigned post until Orders (Attachments EE, FF and
relieved.
GG)

Responses from staff regarding incident
response procedures were inconsistent.

Facility
Lieutenant

All Facility staff will be provided specific training
regarding their individual obligation during incident
response. Contained within each Post Order is the
specific Code Response designation. All staff are
required to read and acknowledge their individual
obligation during Code Response. Staff routinely
participate in prison alarm response training drills
scheduled by In-Service Training.

August
2005

22,

Training is on-goiog. Staff are
reading and acknowledging their
Code Response Obligations

Building five has in the dayroom area, various
office fumiture items to facilitate the EOP
treatment program.
This
furniture
and
equipment may pose a staff safety issue, as it
could be used as a weapon or used to make
weapons. The team recommends that the office
furniture to be replaced with detention grade
furnishings.

N/A

This is a temporary program setting designed to
deliver Mental Health Service to approximately 35
inmates. Currently a permanent treatment facility is
being planned for construction within this year. Once
completed, this temporary treatment facility will be
dismantled and removed. At this time, the need for
detention furnishings is not warranted. This rationale
is based upon the short term projected use of this
treatment area. In similar program settings
throughout the Department. there have been no
negative behavioral trends, which justify the use of
this type of furniture. However, through routine
security checks, the ability to use or make weapons
will be minimized.

N/A

1ST
Records
Response
(Attachment A).

Office furnishings continued in use N/A
for this program.

and
Alarm
Memorandum

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN

For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8, 2005

Page: II of 16
Date: 2120/2007

PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

I

I
ItemJ

Recommendations/Description

IAction Required
By Whom

I

I

Date To Be
Completed

Proposed Action Plan

I

Current
Status

I

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Finding #12: Specific to Facility "Bn •
12.

Only two officers were assigned to this exercise
yard. The team agreed this was an insufficient
number of yard officers. The evaluation team

Facifity "B"
Captain

suggests that the institution consider assigning
an additional CIO to this yard.

Facility B has two yard officers. two Search and

N/A

N/A

N/A

Ongoing.

N/A

Inspection sheet example and
Post Order (Attachments BBand
Z) and Operational Procedure
Me 72 Daily Housing

Escort officers and one ya rd observation post officer
for the exercise yard. Add itionally, there are two
sergeants and one lieutenant. MCSP is within

established

budgetary

authority

at

1900k

overcrowding, 160 gym beds and 144 emergency
dayroom beds. Based on the very low violence level.
this current staffing appears adequate to maintain
staff and inmate safety.
E-beds contained in Building 7, 8. 9 and 10
present a staff safety risk. Poor visibility due to
inmates draping items between the bunks and
inability to secure these inmates contribute to
this concern.

Facility liB"
Captain

CIO's are expected to remove any draping items in
bed areas as indicated

in their Post Orders.
Supervisors and Managers conduct inspections.
(Sergeants daily, Lieutenants weekly, Captains
monthly, AW's quarterly). Additionally, C/O's, as part
of their daily assignments. are expected to rove the
day room floors in the buildings and work in
conjunction with the control booth officers to ensure
blind spots are covered and activities monitored.

Inspections of the Housing Units
for Supervisors and Managers
(Attachment HH).

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8, 2005
PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Recommendations/Descri tion

Finding #13: Specific to Facility lie".
13. C/O's in Building 14 stated the inmates have the
ability to control the TV volume and the volume
becomes loud enough to hinder verbal
communication between C/O's.

Comments/Proof Of Practice

C/O's will monitor and correct any
TV volume issues impacting their
ability to communicate. The parts
are on order.

1ST sheet on TV Volume
(Attachment II) Memorandum to
staff dated August 19, 2005 on
TV Volume (Attachment JJ).

N/A

Work orders dated August 19,
2005. (Attachments KK and LL).

With the addition of E-beds in the housing units, the
institution agreed to install receivers on the TV that
broadcasts on FM reception thus eliminating the
sound from the TV speakers. These receivers have
been ordered. Pending the installation, C/O's have
been instructed to order inmates to turn the volume
down or off if warranted. C/O's have always had the
ability and discretion to monitor TV volume.

August 19,
2005
Ongoing.

Current process allows for approval of each work
order by the Facility Captain. If urgent, the Facility
Secretary faxes the work order to Plant Operations,
then submits original. Submit work orders for lights
and door repairs.

August
2005

Plant Manager

MCSP will initiate a Work Order Report for all
pending work orders to the respective areas.

October
2005

N/A

N/A

Facility"C:
Captain

A total of twelve custody staff are at the Facility
Dining Hall to monitor inmates as they enter and exit
the Dining Hall. This is adequate coverage for a 270
design Level III Facility. MCSP is within established
bUdgetary authority.

N/A

N/A

N/A

Facility "C'
Captain

C/O's in Building 11, 14 & 15 reported that work
orders are not addressed consistently. 'Team
members observed lights that were burned out
and doors located near the showers with locks
that were sticking.

Staff in Building 11,14 & 15 reporting concerns
about not having adequate coverage dUring the
a.m. feeding release and recall.

Current
Status

Pro osed Action Plan

19,

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 -8, 2005
PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Page: 13 of 16
Date: 2120/2007

Recommendations/Descn tion

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Pro osed Action Plan

Finding #14: Specific to Central Services, Correctional Treatment Center (eTC).
14. The institutional fire identification system alarm Plant Manager
In September 2005 MCSP will again submit a
is not working properly. Staff reported that the
system has historically not functioned correctly
and that during the rainy season, the problem
with the system is exacerbated.

Special Repair Project (SRP) to the Facilities
Management Section.

Unknownpending
funding

Fire identification alarm system
still not working properly.

SRP request originally submitted
in April 1999 was denied. SRP
resubmitted in August 2001 was
denied.
EqUipment
Budget
Request submitted September
2004
was
not
approved.
Headquarters
Operational
(HOAn
Assessment
Team
funding requested January 2005,
no response from Office of
Financial Management Section
6.00 submitted February 2005,
no response yet by Facilities
Management Section. MCSP will
resubmit again in September

2005.
CTC Officer did not have a personal alarm.

In the eTC, an electrical room has been
converted into a staff break room/inmate clerk
office. The room contained cleaning supplies
and a staff refrigerator. The inmate clerk was
not being directly supervised and had access to
C/O food.

Correctional
Captain

Associate
Warden,
Medical
Department

Draft memorandum advising staff that wearing their
personal alarm device (PAD) is mandatory.

August 8,
2005

Memorandum has been drafted Memorandum dated August 8,
and issued to Managers and 2005,
and
Post
order
Supervisors.
(Attachments MM and NN).

Watch Commander will provide training to CTC
C/O's.

August 25,
2005

N/A

N/A

The electrical room is no longer being used by
inmate clerks and the staff refrigerator is no longer
inside the room. The inmate workers are only
allowed in the room under direct supervision of the
Building Maintenance Worker.

August 4,
2005

Completed.

N/A

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5-8, 2005
Page: 14 of 16
Date: 2120/2007

PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Recommendations/Descri tion
Findina #15: Level IV inmates with mental health
15. Staff shared with us that MCSP is considered
the "hub" for EOP/SNY inmates, designating it
as the only institution that houses EOP and SNY
inmates. Compounding the situation, many of
the SNY inmates have level IV classification
points requiring 180 design housing; however,
this institution was designed as level III with
270 design housing. As a result, staff safety
becomes a concern when SNY inmates, with
assaultive histories, are housed in these
facilities. The team was informed that the
Department has no 180 design facilities to
house these level IV SNY inmates.

issues and sensitive needs are being housed in inappropriate facilities (270 vs.180 deshml.
Associate
The Level IV EOP MCSP inmates have been September
NlA
Wardenevaluated through the current classification process 30, 2005
and endorsed Level IV 270 design. MCSP will initiate
Housing 1
Programs
an Issue Memorandum to the Operations Review
Committee to determine feasibility of activation of a
180 design unit.

Finding #16: Crowding leads to a potentiallv unsafe environment.
A second concern is the overcrowding in the Associate
facilities, which result in Emergency beds (E- Warden,
beds), or triple bunk beds placed in housing unit Programs 1
dayrooms, and double and triple bunking of the Housing
gymnasiums. Designated housing units have up
to 40 inmates sleeping in E-beds. While an
additional floor officer is assigned to supervise
these inmates, it is difficult for the officer to
supervise these inmates due to obstructed
sightJines. Gymnasium "A" uses triple bunks,
and Gymnasium "B" and "c" use double bunks
to house up to 160 inmates. Gymnasium "A"
has two floor officers and one gunner, and
Gymnasium "B" and "C" have two floor officers
but no gunner, because the inmates are
classified as level I-II. These gymnasiums are
perceived as staff safety issues, as it is difficult
to supervise the inmates due to the large
number of beds and diminished siahtlines.

16.

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Pro osed Action Plan

On occasion, inmates released
from Psychiatric Security Unit to
SNY/EOP's have very assaUltive
past behavior. After received and
reviewed at MCSP, they have
subsequently been re-endorsed
for an Indeterminate Security
Housing Unit (SHU) term due to
their inability to program within a
270 design building program.
General Population inmates are
required to go to a 180 design
after serving a SHU, though
EOP's nor SNY's have that same
reauirement.

E-beds and dormitories in the facilities meet
departmental security requirements as it pertains to
custody.

NlA

N/A

N/A

August 8, 2005 memorandum authored by Mike
Knowles, Deputy Director (A), Division of Adult
Institutions, advised institution's that the conversion
of 950 level IV beds to 950 Level III (SNY) beds at
Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) is tentatively
scheduled to begin in September 2005. Based on
this information MCSP would deactivate 228 E-beds
by the week of October 24. 2005.

October 24,
2005

N/A

August 8, 2005 memorandum
(Attachment 00)

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8.2005
PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Page: 15 of 16
Date: 2120/2007

RecommendationsJOescri tion

.

.

F'In d"Ing #17 P ost an d S'd
I preven ts managers rom fill"109 posts WI'th th e b est-qua
t
I I S taff
rfied
17. Additionally, the captains believe that Post and Associate
MeSp follows Departmental policy as it pertains to
Bid (a process in Which lieutenant's, sergeants
and C/O's request to work a specific post based
on their seniority) restricts their ability to ensure
a high level of institutional and staff safety. The
best qualified individual is not always placed in a
position, based solely on seniority.

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Pro osed Action Plan

Warden, Central
Services

N1A

N/A

Post and Bid for supervisors and the Memorandum
of Understanding for C/O's. Training and corrective
action will occur for these personnel who fail to
perform.

on

Personnel
Action
(Confidential)

.
. th e ~0 trowrng:
F'In d'Ing #1 8: Supervlsor concerns m rrore d t hose 0 f t h e managers In
18. Crowding with E-beds and using gymnasiums Associate
See comments for Findings #16 and #17.
as dormitories.
Warden,
Programs I
Post and Bid - supervisors were restricted from Housing
diverting an C/O from one position to another
based on operational needs.

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Finding #19: During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from specified training.

19.

Supervisors said that correctional staff needed
hands-on training for cell extractions (the use of
cell extraction equipment), and mental health
techniques for dealing with EOP and CCCMS
inmates.

1ST Manager

See comments for Finding # 7

file

(MCSP)
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
For
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY· STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT
JULY 5 - 8, 2005
PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison

Recommendations/Descri tion

Pro osed Action Plan

Comments/Proof Of Practice

Findina #20: Staff reported that safety equipment Is adequate for lJerforming their duties and rated the equipment as "good" to "oka~".
Line staff said the type of safety equipment N/A
No corrective action necessary as this is information N/A
N/A
issued to them includes personal alarms, radios
proVided for discussion only.
in designated positions, handcuffs, side~handle
batons, and Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray.
They indicated that equipment could be
obtained at the sergeant's office, control booths,
or from the person being relieved at shift
chanae.

20.

N/A

Finding #21: Not all custody staff have been issued stab resistant vests and are reluctant to wear ves~ from the "vest pool".

21.

Of staff interviewed, all had been fitted for stab
resistant vests, but not all had been issued
vests. The evaluation team reviewed the body
armor report, and noted that 567 custody staff
had been issued vests and 87 custody staff had
not. Staff indicated that if they were assigned to
a position which required a vest, they would not
wear a vest from the avest pool" as they
believed that these vests are not maintained in a
sanitary condition, and they were concerned
with the integrity of the material to withstand an
attack by an inmate. Staff were familiar with
department policy which requires that a vest be
worn by staff in specified positions, but did not
alwavs comoly.

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED:

ROSANNE CAMPBELL
Warden (A)

Armory
Sergeant

See comments from Finding # 9

N/A

N/A

N/A