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Oregon Prison Escape Report, 2010

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SRCI Escape Review
June 22, 2010


On June 21-23, 2010, an audit team consisting ofPaula Myers, Superintendent
CRCI/SFFC, Jeri Taylor, Assistant Superintendent of Security/TRCI, Brandon Kelly,
Institution_Security Manage1'lOSCI, Ken Neff, Operations Manager/PRCF and Melissa
Premo, Transport Manager conducted a review of the physicnl security as well as security
practices at the Snake River Correctional Institution (SRCI) in response to the attempted
escape by inmate Micltael Norwood, #8403436 on June 12~ 2010 and inmate Robert
Emery #13650508 on June 14,2010.
Reviewed Items:
Count Pl'occss:
The review team observed unit counts as well as the out count process in the laundry and
physical plant. In addition, we reviewed the current SRCI procedure on Institution
Counts# 10 and the DOC policy on Counts 40, 1.3. While our observations are just a snap
shot of reality, we found the institution out of compliance with its own procedure and
DOC security standards. The institution management team should review the DOC
policy on Counts and cross reference it with its own procedure to be in compliance with
The review team observed counts being preformed on both first and second shift. There
were no discrepancies noted on second shift with how count was conducted. The review
team was concerned about
The review team was told the





In regard to the attempted escape by inmate Emery, staff failed to account for only living
breathing inmates for three official counts. He was missed by two different count
officers. Inmate Emery was in a privileged housing unit which had
om untill
am. His absence was not observed for the entire shift.

Out Cout1ts: The review team also observed the 011t cO\mt process in Physical Plant at~d
the OCE Laundry. The out count in the Physical Plm1t was completed prior to count
being atUlO\Ulced. There were 61 imnates in the area during the 11 am count. The
to the area was in the
itunates were eating lunch in the area, and the officer
office th the
his own lunch.
sical Plant is not an area listed as
on count.
is standard practice at all medium custody institutions to require inmates assigned to
Physical Plant to retum to their housing unit for count for the 11 am an.d 4:15pm count
unless otherwise approved by the OIC. In the laundry, the out count process was
disorganized and was not it1 compliance with the jnstitution procedure. Inmates did not
line up nor did they show any identification. The inmates just called off their name and
celt number and the officer checked off tlteir information without looking up.
The 2009 Security Audit noted areas of concern and nonwcompliance in the area of
Counts and Out Counts (Food Se~·vices).
Given the level of complacency in this area, we would recommend a systematic approach
to training which includes ha11ds on training (OJT) documented including security staff,
lieutenants, captains and OD's to bring the institution into compliance of its own written


Mr. Nooth asked the review team to look at the system for allowing pedestrian traffic
tlll'ough the vehicle gate find whether or not pedestrian traffic should be eliminated
through the vehicle gate. After reviewing systems in place, the review team snw no
reason to eliminate pedestdan traffic from the vehicle gate. Pedestrian traffic should be
limited to business needs only. Staff assigned to the Vehicle Gate are doing a good job
checking ID cards prior to allowing access to the area. In fact, we heard complaints when
staff known to the institution were denied access because they had lost ot• forgotten their
ID cards.

Mr. Nooth also asked the review team to make a recommendation on the use o f It is the recommendation of the review ~

This should be a priority not only for
The review team discussed the reqtlest for additional security equipment
for the mait1 tower sally port and the concem with movjng
houses and furniture out thro\Jgh the vehicle gate. Given the cmrent
economic times, the review team would have a hard time recommending
The team believes the institution has sound policies in

Controlled Movement:


tlll'ough the metal detector.
Mr. Nooth requested the review team look at housing and work assignments. The team
did some following up on ho·using ·unit moves because it was noted in the report that
inmate Emeris celhnate had requested a move on June ll 11t citing that his cellmate was
acting strange. We found there was a formal system in place for housing and work
assigrunents but we were told the informal system was used more frequently especially in
incentive housing. In the Emery case when his cellmate requested a move the housing
officer called down. and made it happen. It was never challenged. We also observed
during a line movement in Complex 3 an inmate approached the Complex Lieutenant and
asked for a new cellmate. The Lieutenant told the inmate to give him the name of only
one imuate he wanted to live with beca\1se he didn't want to have to make a decision and
he would make the move happen that day. The institution has guidelines for job
.,.,.,.,..,.,,,,...,,.,t<, as it relates to conduct. The review team would recommend


Tours/M.anfigement Presences:
In reviewing the post information logs it does not appear in the past 30 days that there
was a regular presence of management tours. The log books indicated the shift sergeants
are making daily unit checks but there were limited signatures to indicate that the
Complex Lieutenants, Captains, OIC or Officer of the Day l1ave been making tours.
(Note: Lt. Sullivan in Complex 1 and Captain JR Smith, Perimeter Captain, were very
consistent in making rounds).
Laundl'y/Cart Process:

- - - - - - - - -

team suggested that the
In the event of inclement weather, the review team recommends

Cell Lighting:

The review team observed especially in Complex 3 that the lighting in the cells was very
dint. Inmates are only required to keep their night light on during daylight hours or
dming the 11:00 a.m., and 4:15p.m., co1mt. Dming our tour we observed during daylight

The review team would recommend the institution review the cell light procedure during
business hours.


Scarcbcs/Pnt Downs:

The review team looked at unit log books and found the number of searches to be
average. An area of concern was the number of notations during cell searches that
nothing was found or taken (NF
The review team observed
down searches
line movements
It appeared to be unclear whether or not the

locating inmate Norwood on the

We had been told all the
checked in and out daily
identified to us as
there is only one
day we did our ·
team would recommend


The review team would recommend the institution
existing procedure on
Classification Review:
Classification Review of Innulte Robert Emery, #13650508
Inmate Emery was classified on 5/29/08 as a custody level 4 by Correctional Counselor
Steve Olson. Emery has two classification policy elements that drove his ct1stody level to
a 4. (1) Sentence Remaining: Emery is serving betwecnl21 months to Life (PRD
2/28/2060); (2) Escape History: Emery was scored with a ESNV escape designator from
an attempted escape from EOCI in 2001. Inmate Emery was found in violation for
Escape (4H) on 2/23/2001 by a DOC Hearings Officer. In reviewing his case file, the
classification was scored correctly at custody leve14.
ClassificRtion Review of Inmate Norwood, Michael, #8403436

Itunate Norwood was classified 12/15/2009 as a custody level4 by Intake Counselm·
Terry Foreman. Norwood has one classification policy element that drove his custody
level to a 4- Sentence Remaining: Norwood is serving between 121 months to Life
(PRD 9/17/2021 ). Norwood does have a prlor discontitmed Escape designator of ESMO
on record. The discontinued escape designator showed he escaped from a halfway hO\lSe
in Colorado in order to evade apprehension for a prior crime. The escape designator was
removed from the classification policy element on 12/19/2009. The escape data was
entered incorrectly by the Intake counselor. The classification rule states that all non
DOC escapes are based upon the date of apprehension. The counselor had entered the
date as the offense date of escape, not date of apprehension. Therefore, the escape
category ofESMO was correct, however the timeframes for the escape should have
started on 5/27/05. This escape (ESMO) would have remained on his classification until
5/27/10, and would have scored the classification escape policy element as 3. So in this
case, the Sentencing Remaining policy element would have ovel'l'idden his Escape policy
element anyway since the scoring was higher and the ESMO would have expired 2 weeks
prior to the actual SRCI attempted esca]Je. Even though there was an error in the
classification, it didn't affect the overall classification level of custody level 4.
However, we need to captme the correct data in the DOC400 even though the Colorado
escape has now expired. OPM will take care ofthis matter.
Both inmates we1·e ,,.,,,,,.,....,H.'~' ...·-·J
Emery was listed