Oregon Prison Escape Report, 2010
Download original document:
This text is machine-read, and may contain errors. Check the original document to verify accuracy.
SRCI Escape Review June 22, 2010 ,• On June 21-23, 2010, an audit team consisting ofPaula Myers, Superintendent CRCI/SFFC, Jeri Taylor, Assistant Superintendent of Security/TRCI, Brandon Kelly, Institution_Security Manage1'lOSCI, Ken Neff, Operations Manager/PRCF and Melissa Premo, Transport Manager conducted a review of the physicnl security as well as security practices at the Snake River Correctional Institution (SRCI) in response to the attempted escape by inmate Micltael Norwood, #8403436 on June 12~ 2010 and inmate Robert Emery #13650508 on June 14,2010. Reviewed Items: Count Pl'occss: The review team observed unit counts as well as the out count process in the laundry and physical plant. In addition, we reviewed the current SRCI procedure on Institution Counts# 10 and the DOC policy on Counts 40, 1.3. While our observations are just a snap shot of reality, we found the institution out of compliance with its own procedure and DOC security standards. The institution management team should review the DOC policy on Counts and cross reference it with its own procedure to be in compliance with standards. The review team observed counts being preformed on both first and second shift. There were no discrepancies noted on second shift with how count was conducted. The review team was concerned about The review team was told the ---- - - -- In regard to the attempted escape by inmate Emery, staff failed to account for only living breathing inmates for three official counts. He was missed by two different count officers. Inmate Emery was in a privileged housing unit which had om untill am. His absence was not observed for the entire shift. Out Cout1ts: The review team also observed the 011t cO\mt process in Physical Plant at~d the OCE Laundry. The out count in the Physical Plm1t was completed prior to count being atUlO\Ulced. There were 61 imnates in the area during the 11 am count. The to the area was in the itunates were eating lunch in the area, and the officer office th the his own lunch. sical Plant is not an area listed as SRCI's on count. is standard practice at all medium custody institutions to require inmates assigned to Physical Plant to retum to their housing unit for count for the 11 am an.d 4:15pm count unless otherwise approved by the OIC. In the laundry, the out count process was disorganized and was not it1 compliance with the jnstitution procedure. Inmates did not line up nor did they show any identification. The inmates just called off their name and celt number and the officer checked off tlteir information without looking up. The 2009 Security Audit noted areas of concern and nonwcompliance in the area of Counts and Out Counts (Food Se~·vices). Given the level of complacency in this area, we would recommend a systematic approach to training which includes ha11ds on training (OJT) documented including security staff, lieutenants, captains and OD's to bring the institution into compliance of its own written procedures. 2 Mr. Nooth asked the review team to look at the system for allowing pedestrian traffic tlll'ough the vehicle gate find whether or not pedestrian traffic should be eliminated through the vehicle gate. After reviewing systems in place, the review team snw no reason to eliminate pedestdan traffic from the vehicle gate. Pedestrian traffic should be limited to business needs only. Staff assigned to the Vehicle Gate are doing a good job checking ID cards prior to allowing access to the area. In fact, we heard complaints when staff known to the institution were denied access because they had lost ot• forgotten their ID cards. Mr. Nooth also asked the review team to make a recommendation on the use o f It is the recommendation of the review ~ This should be a priority not only for The review team discussed the reqtlest for additional security equipment for the mait1 tower sally port and the concem with movjng program houses and furniture out thro\Jgh the vehicle gate. Given the cmrent economic times, the review team would have a hard time recommending The team believes the institution has sound policies in Controlled Movement: 3 was were tlll'ough the metal detector. Mr. Nooth requested the review team look at housing and work assignments. The team did some following up on ho·using ·unit moves because it was noted in the report that inmate Emeris celhnate had requested a move on June ll 11t citing that his cellmate was acting strange. We found there was a formal system in place for housing and work assigrunents but we were told the informal system was used more frequently especially in incentive housing. In the Emery case when his cellmate requested a move the housing officer called down. and made it happen. It was never challenged. We also observed during a line movement in Complex 3 an inmate approached the Complex Lieutenant and asked for a new cellmate. The Lieutenant told the inmate to give him the name of only one imuate he wanted to live with beca\1se he didn't want to have to make a decision and he would make the move happen that day. The institution has guidelines for job .,.,.,.,..,.,,,,...,,.,t<, as it relates to conduct. The review team would recommend 4 Tours/M.anfigement Presences: In reviewing the post information logs it does not appear in the past 30 days that there was a regular presence of management tours. The log books indicated the shift sergeants are making daily unit checks but there were limited signatures to indicate that the Complex Lieutenants, Captains, OIC or Officer of the Day l1ave been making tours. (Note: Lt. Sullivan in Complex 1 and Captain JR Smith, Perimeter Captain, were very consistent in making rounds). Laundl'y/Cart Process: - - - - - - - - - team suggested that the to In the event of inclement weather, the review team recommends Cell Lighting: The review team observed especially in Complex 3 that the lighting in the cells was very dint. Inmates are only required to keep their night light on during daylight hours or dming the 11:00 a.m., and 4:15p.m., co1mt. Dming our tour we observed during daylight hours The review team would recommend the institution review the cell light procedure during business hours. 5 Scarcbcs/Pnt Downs: The review team looked at unit log books and found the number of searches to be average. An area of concern was the number of notations during cell searches that nothing was found or taken (NF The review team observed down searches line movements It appeared to be unclear whether or not the locating inmate Norwood on the We had been told all the checked in and out daily identified to us as there is only one day we did our · team would recommend 6 The review team would recommend the institution existing procedure on Classification Review: Classification Review of Innulte Robert Emery, #13650508 Inmate Emery was classified on 5/29/08 as a custody level 4 by Correctional Counselor Steve Olson. Emery has two classification policy elements that drove his ct1stody level to a 4. (1) Sentence Remaining: Emery is serving betwecnl21 months to Life (PRD 2/28/2060); (2) Escape History: Emery was scored with a ESNV escape designator from an attempted escape from EOCI in 2001. Inmate Emery was found in violation for Escape (4H) on 2/23/2001 by a DOC Hearings Officer. In reviewing his case file, the classification was scored correctly at custody leve14. ClassificRtion Review of Inmate Norwood, Michael, #8403436 Itunate Norwood was classified 12/15/2009 as a custody level4 by Intake Counselm· Terry Foreman. Norwood has one classification policy element that drove his custody level to a 4- Sentence Remaining: Norwood is serving between 121 months to Life (PRD 9/17/2021 ). Norwood does have a prlor discontitmed Escape designator of ESMO on record. The discontinued escape designator showed he escaped from a halfway hO\lSe in Colorado in order to evade apprehension for a prior crime. The escape designator was removed from the classification policy element on 12/19/2009. The escape data was entered incorrectly by the Intake counselor. The classification rule states that all non DOC escapes are based upon the date of apprehension. The counselor had entered the date as the offense date of escape, not date of apprehension. Therefore, the escape category ofESMO was correct, however the timeframes for the escape should have started on 5/27/05. This escape (ESMO) would have remained on his classification until 5/27/10, and would have scored the classification escape policy element as 3. So in this case, the Sentencing Remaining policy element would have ovel'l'idden his Escape policy element anyway since the scoring was higher and the ESMO would have expired 2 weeks prior to the actual SRCI attempted esca]Je. Even though there was an error in the classification, it didn't affect the overall classification level of custody level 4. However, we need to captme the correct data in the DOC400 even though the Colorado escape has now expired. OPM will take care ofthis matter. Both inmates we1·e ,,.,,,,,.,....,H.'~' ...·-·J Emery was listed 7