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Edwards No Bar to Seg Suit

Afederal district court In Michigan held that a retaliatory infraction lawsuit could be pursued via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even though the disciplinary bearing result bad not been invalidated. The court also held that the plaintiff's claim that a guard had threatened to have him shot for filing a grievance required a trial.

Arthur Johnson, a Michigan state prisoner, was threatened by guard James Freeburn. Johnson complained about the threats and Freeburn later confronted Johnson and instructed a tower guard to shoot Johnson if he moved. Freeburn also infracted Johnson, causing him to spend six days in administrative segregation. Johnson filed suit under § 1983 claiming he was subjected to retaliation for exercising his First amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances.

In the defendants' second motion for summary judgment the court refused to dismiss the claim related to Freeburn threatening to have Johnson shot. The court held that if true, Johnson's claim would entitle him to relief. The court held that the party's conflicting testimony required a trial to resolve.

The most significant part of the ruling deals with the court's lengthy analysis to Johnson's challenge to the segregation placement. The defendants argued that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584 (1997) barred the § 1983 action because the segregation decision had not been invalidated administratively or via court action. Readers should note that no good time credits were involved, the punishment consisted solely of six days in segregation.

Of crucial importance in the Heck and Edwards analysis is whether a favorable ruling In a § 1983 action would effect the duration or length of the plaintiff's confinement and whether a favorable ruling in the plaintiff's favor would call into question the underlying judgment. Also of importance is whether the plaintiff is still "in custody" for purposes of seeking habeas relief. The absence of a habeas remedy may preclude the invalidation requirement.

The court held that Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978 (1998) narrowed Heck and Edwards. The court gives a lengthy, detailed discussion to this issue and concludes: "In light of Spencer, there simply is not a Heck/Balisok issue present when a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim when he or she is no longer "in custody...."

"...In a prison context, where there has been no deprivation of good time credits (as there was in Prelser and Balisok ) and the inmate has served whatever period of time in segregation or top lock that was Imposed by the bearing officer, again there is no concern that a § 1983 action could be used as an end run on the habeas exhaustion requirement or for issue preclusive effects to force a state court to reach a conclusion that the conviction or disciplinary bearing was invalid.

"In the present case, the only sanction plaintiff received from the bearing officer was six days In top lock. This sanction had been served by the time he commenced his § 1983 action, and he was not 'in custody' because of any wrongful disciplinary determination. Thus, for the reasons stated above, this suit should not be precluded by Heck and B alisok." The defendants' motion to dismiss was denied.

This ruling is significant because, to date, the circuit courts have not addressed the applicability of Spencer to suits challenging disciplinary hearings that do not result in the loss of good time credits. While most circuit courts have held that Heck/Edwards applies only in cases that involve the loss of good time credits, some circuits have held that Heck/Edwards applies to cases involving only segregation placement, even after the sanction has been served. See: Johnson v. Freeburn, 29 F. Supp.2d 764 (ED MI 1998).

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Related legal case

Johnson v. Freeburn

ARTHUR JOHNSON, JR., Plaintiff, v. JAMES FREEBURN, Defendant.



Case No. 96-CV-74996-DT



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN DIVISION



29 F. Supp. 2d 764; 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21393



September 30, 1998, Decided

September 30, 1998, Filed







PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Adopting Magistrate's Document of August 26, 1998, Reported at: 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21400.



DISPOSITION: Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe's Report and Recommendation dated August 26, 1998 ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law; Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment (Docket Nos. 36-1 and 36-2, filed February 13, 1998) DENIED; retaliation claim under the First Amendment remained against Defendant Freeburn.



COUNSEL: ARTHUR JOHNSON, JR., plaintiff, Pro se, Ionia, MI.


For JAMES FREEBURN, defendant: Lamont M. Walton, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI.


For JAMES FREEBURN, LYNDA GRADOVILLE, KENNETH L. MCGINNIS, THOMAS TAYLOR, RAY TAMINGA, LINDA BECKWITH, defendants: Terry L. Norton, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI.



JUDGES: DENISE PAGE HOOD, United States District Judge.



OPINIONBY: DENISE PAGE HOOD



OPINION:

[*765] MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe's Report and Recommendation dated August 26, 1998. To date, no objections have been filed to the Report and Recommendation.

The only remaining defendant in this matter is Defendant James Freeburn. On September 29, 1997, the Court entered an Order accepting the Magistrate Judge's August 28, 1997 Report [**2] and Recommendation dismissing all of the defendants except Defendant James Freeburn. The Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Plaintiff has stated a claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights against Defendant Freeburn. Discovery proceeded in this matter and Defendant Freeburn has now filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and/or Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.

The Court has had an opportunity to review the matter and finds that the Magistrate Judge reached the correct conclusion for the proper reasons. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff has stated a claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights against Defendant Freeburn and that the supplemental evidence submitted by Defendant Freeburn was not conclusive on the issue. There remains a genuine issue of material fact on the retaliation claim. The Court further agrees with the Magistrate Judge that because Plaintiff has served the sanction imposed on him by the hearing officer, he was not "in custody" when he filed the instant claim against Defendant Freeburn. The instant suit is not [*766] precluded by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 129 L. Ed. 2d [**3] 383, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 137 L. Ed. 2d 906 (1997) pursuant to the reasoning set forth in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S. Ct. 978, 140 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1998).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe's Report and Recommendation dated August 26, 1998 is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment (Docket Nos. 36-1 and 36-2, filed February 13, 1998) is DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the retaliation claim under the First Amendment remains against Defendant Freeburn;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an attorney be appointed to prepare for and represent Defendant Freeburn at trial; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Status Conference be held on this matter on Monday, January 11, 1999, 2:30 p.m.


DATED: SEP 30 1998

DENISE PAGE HOOD

United States District Judge