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Arizona Statue of Limitations Tolled Until Prisoner Knows of or Should Have Known of Right to Bring Suit
Arizona Statue of Limitations Tolled Until Prisoner Knows of or Should
Have Known of Right to Bring Suit
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Arizona law tolls the
statute of limitations to file a civil action until a prisoner knows or
reasonably should know of the right to bring the action. This
consolidated appeal relates to complaints filed by 9 prisoners of the
Arizona State Prison who were removed from their cells, strip searched,
taken to an area where between twenty-five and thirty prison officials
were congregated, and were advised they were to undergo a body cavity
search or they would be forced to do so. After objecting to the searches,
they were forced face down onto a table, undressed from their waist to
their knees, and forcibly subjected to a digital rectal cavity probe in
full view of the congregated guards and other prisoners. Several guards
made lewd and obscene comments during the search.
An Arizona district court dismissed the complaints, holding the statute of
limitations had expired. The limitation for filing 42 U.S.C. §1983
actions in Arizona is two years. The status of imprisonment conditionally
tolls the limitation statute to the time the prisoner knows or reasonably
should know of the right to bring the action. The district court held the
prisoners must have been instantaneously aware of the alleged
constitutional violations." The Ninth Circuit, however, found the court
erroneously looked to the discovery or accrual of the prisoners' cause of
action rather than when they knew or should have known of their right to
bring the action. The two issues are different. The cause of action did
occur on the date of injury. However, there is nothing in the record to
show when the prisoners knew or should have known of their right to bring
the action. The Court held this interpretation of Arizona's disability
statute is supported by the ruling in Zuck v. State, 159 Ariz. 37, 764
P.2d 772 (App. 1988).
Accordingly, this matter was reversed for the district court to determine
when the prisoners knew or should have known of their right to file these
actions. The Court noted the filing of other prisoners' complaints within
the 2-year limitation period making the same claim would have no bearing
on this determination. See: Vaughn v. Grijalua, 927 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.
1991).
Have Known of Right to Bring Suit
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Arizona law tolls the
statute of limitations to file a civil action until a prisoner knows or
reasonably should know of the right to bring the action. This
consolidated appeal relates to complaints filed by 9 prisoners of the
Arizona State Prison who were removed from their cells, strip searched,
taken to an area where between twenty-five and thirty prison officials
were congregated, and were advised they were to undergo a body cavity
search or they would be forced to do so. After objecting to the searches,
they were forced face down onto a table, undressed from their waist to
their knees, and forcibly subjected to a digital rectal cavity probe in
full view of the congregated guards and other prisoners. Several guards
made lewd and obscene comments during the search.
An Arizona district court dismissed the complaints, holding the statute of
limitations had expired. The limitation for filing 42 U.S.C. §1983
actions in Arizona is two years. The status of imprisonment conditionally
tolls the limitation statute to the time the prisoner knows or reasonably
should know of the right to bring the action. The district court held the
prisoners must have been instantaneously aware of the alleged
constitutional violations." The Ninth Circuit, however, found the court
erroneously looked to the discovery or accrual of the prisoners' cause of
action rather than when they knew or should have known of their right to
bring the action. The two issues are different. The cause of action did
occur on the date of injury. However, there is nothing in the record to
show when the prisoners knew or should have known of their right to bring
the action. The Court held this interpretation of Arizona's disability
statute is supported by the ruling in Zuck v. State, 159 Ariz. 37, 764
P.2d 772 (App. 1988).
Accordingly, this matter was reversed for the district court to determine
when the prisoners knew or should have known of their right to file these
actions. The Court noted the filing of other prisoners' complaints within
the 2-year limitation period making the same claim would have no bearing
on this determination. See: Vaughn v. Grijalua, 927 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.
1991).
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Related legal case
Vaughn v. Grijalua
| Year | 1991 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 927 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1991). |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Attorney Fees | 0 |
| Damages | 0 |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 03/01/1991)
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[2] Nos. 89-16170, 89-16171
[3] 927 F.2d 476
[4] Filed: March 1, 1991.
[5] TRACY RAY VAUGHAN, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, AND PAUL EPPINGER; RAY FELL CHATMAN; FRANK KOZELOU; JOHN MALONE; RAYMOND L. CLEVIDENCE; GARY W. BERNARD; FELIPE TREVINO; STEPHEN A. BOYES; CHARLES W. SHEPHERD, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
v.
ALFRED GRIJALVA, WARDEN, ARIZONA STATE PRISON; JAMES D. RICKETTS, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; C.A. Muecke, District Judge, Presiding; D.C. No. CV 84-0624-CAM (Consolidated) D.C. Nos. CV 86-1273-CAM, CV 86-1414-CAM, CV 86-1762-CAM, CV 87-0805-CAM, CV 87-0922-CAM, CV 87-0930-CAM, CV 87-1362-CAM, CV 87-2259-CAM, CV 88-0839-CAM.
[7] Mary E. Berkheiser, Meyer, Hendricks, Victor, Osborn & Maledon, Phoenix, Arizona, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
[8] Thomas Prose, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona, for the defendants-appellees.
[9] Herbert Y. C. Choy, Charles Wiggins and Edward Leavy, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Edward Leavy.
[10] Author: Leavy
[11] LEAVY, Circuit Judge
[12] Nine Arizona state prisoners appeal from the district court's dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaints for failure to state a claim against Arizona prison officials. The district court dismissed the complaints under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the applicable statute of limitation period had run. We reverse and remand.
[13] FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
[14] Appellants Paul Eppinger, Ray Fell Chatman, Frank Kozelou, John Malone, Raymond L. Clevidence, Gary Bernard, Felipe Trevino, Stephen A. Boyes, and Charles W. Shepard ("Appellants") were inmates in the Arizona State Prison at Florence in March 1984. Appellants variously allege that on March 15 and March 22, 1984, they were subjected to forced digital rectal cavity examinations by prison guards and officials. Specifically, appellants allege that they were removed from their cells and strip-searched by prison guards in full riot gear; taken in handcuffs to a hallway in the cell-block where somewhere between twenty-five to thirty prison guards and officials were congregated; informed by prison officials that they were to undergo a body cavity search and that if they refused to submit, that they would be forced to do so; and then, after objecting to the searches, pushed face down onto a table, undressed from their waist to their knees, and forcibly subjected to a digital rectal cavity probe in full view of the congregated guards as well as other inmates. Appellants also maintain that several guards made lewd and obscene comments during these examinations, and that at least one guard videotaped the episodes.
[15] Appellants individually filed pro se complaints alleging violation of their civil rights and seeking damages and injunctive relief.*fn1 The complaints were consolidated with those of several other inmates at the Arizona State Prison in Florence alleging identical section 1983 violations. The defendant prison officials and employees moved to dismiss the complaints of the nine appellants based on Arizona's two-year statute of limitation. The district court granted the motion, ruling that the statute of limitation barred recovery. Appellants timely appeal.
[16] STANDARD OF REVIEW
[17] We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1989). In such a case, we must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Usher v. City of Los Angeles,828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of a statute of limitation period, dismissal can be granted "only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled." Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980).
[18] Discussion
[19] Congress did not establish a specific statute of limitation governing section 1983 actions, a void commonplace in federal statutory law. Board of Regents v. Tomanio,446 U.S. 478, 483 , 64 L. Ed. 2d 440 , 100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980). When such a void is present, federal courts have "borrowed" the state law of limitations governing analogous causes of action. Id. The appropriate state statute of limitation for section 1983 actions is that for personal injury cases. Wilson v. Garcia,471 U.S. 261, 276 , 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 , 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985). The closely related questions of tolling and application also are governed by state law. Id. at 268.
[20] The limitation period for personal injuries in Arizona is two years. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (1990).*fn2 The tolling of the running of this limitation period is provided for under certain conditions. At the time appellants' claims arose in March 1984, imprisonment was a statutory disability that automatically tolled the two-year limitation period until the prisoner's release. Id. § 12-502. This section was amended by the Arizona Legislature effective August 3, 1984, changing the status of imprisonment from an automatic disability to a conditional one. Amended section 12-502 provides in pertinent part:
[21] If a person entitled to bring an action . . . is at the time the cause of action accrues imprisoned, the period of such disability shall exist only until such time as the person imprisoned discovers the right to bring the action or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the right to bring the action, whichever occurs first, and such person shall have the same time after the disability ceases to exist which is allowed to others.
[22] Id. § 12-502(B) (emphasis added). Hence, a prisoner's claim was automatically tolled until August 3, 1984 under the terms of the repealed statute; afterwards, "a prisoner had the same time others would have to bring a claim, from that date, or at a later date if that was when the prisoner first reasonably discovered his or her right to bring the action." Zuck v. State, 159 Ariz. 37, 764 P.2d 772, 775 (App. 1988).*fn3
[23] The district court dismissed appellants' complaints for failure to state a claim on the ground that Arizona's two-year limitation period for personal injuries had run. A statute of limitation defense may be raised by a motion to dismiss if the running of the limitation period is apparent on the face of the complaint. Jablon,614 F.2d at 682. The district court found this to be the case, reasoning that since appellants' complaints were filed more than two years after the incidents giving rise to their causes of action, as well as more than two years after the effective date of the amended statute, the statute of limitation barred recovery on their claims. Although recognizing that none of the complaints contained outright declarations of when appellants learned of their rights to bring the actions, the district court found that appellants must have been "instantaneously aware" of the alleged constitutional violations because they were committed in their presence. As such, the district court ruled that the limitation period had not been tolled.
[24] As a preliminary matter, we reverse the dismissal of appellant Paul Eppinger's complaint. The district court dismissed Eppinger's claim upon relying on defendants' erroneous assertion that Eppinger had filed his complaint on September 15, 1986, more than two years after the effective date of the amended statute. In fact, this was the date that Eppinger's amended complaint was filed. Eppinger's original complaint was filed on August 1, 1986. Because this date is less than two years from before the effective date of the amended statute, Eppinger's complaint was timely.*fn4
[25] As to the eight other complaints, appellants contend that the district court misconstrued amended section 12-502(B). Appellants argue that the district court mistakenly relied upon a finding of when their causes of action accrued rather than a determination of when they knew or reasonably should have known of their rights to bring their actions. Appellants maintain that the amended statute requires a factual finding of when they knew or reasonably should have known of their rights to bring their actions.
[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[2] Nos. 89-16170, 89-16171
[3] 927 F.2d 476
[4] Filed: March 1, 1991.
[5] TRACY RAY VAUGHAN, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, AND PAUL EPPINGER; RAY FELL CHATMAN; FRANK KOZELOU; JOHN MALONE; RAYMOND L. CLEVIDENCE; GARY W. BERNARD; FELIPE TREVINO; STEPHEN A. BOYES; CHARLES W. SHEPHERD, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
v.
ALFRED GRIJALVA, WARDEN, ARIZONA STATE PRISON; JAMES D. RICKETTS, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; C.A. Muecke, District Judge, Presiding; D.C. No. CV 84-0624-CAM (Consolidated) D.C. Nos. CV 86-1273-CAM, CV 86-1414-CAM, CV 86-1762-CAM, CV 87-0805-CAM, CV 87-0922-CAM, CV 87-0930-CAM, CV 87-1362-CAM, CV 87-2259-CAM, CV 88-0839-CAM.
[7] Mary E. Berkheiser, Meyer, Hendricks, Victor, Osborn & Maledon, Phoenix, Arizona, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
[8] Thomas Prose, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona, for the defendants-appellees.
[9] Herbert Y. C. Choy, Charles Wiggins and Edward Leavy, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Edward Leavy.
[10] Author: Leavy
[11] LEAVY, Circuit Judge
[12] Nine Arizona state prisoners appeal from the district court's dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaints for failure to state a claim against Arizona prison officials. The district court dismissed the complaints under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the applicable statute of limitation period had run. We reverse and remand.
[13] FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
[14] Appellants Paul Eppinger, Ray Fell Chatman, Frank Kozelou, John Malone, Raymond L. Clevidence, Gary Bernard, Felipe Trevino, Stephen A. Boyes, and Charles W. Shepard ("Appellants") were inmates in the Arizona State Prison at Florence in March 1984. Appellants variously allege that on March 15 and March 22, 1984, they were subjected to forced digital rectal cavity examinations by prison guards and officials. Specifically, appellants allege that they were removed from their cells and strip-searched by prison guards in full riot gear; taken in handcuffs to a hallway in the cell-block where somewhere between twenty-five to thirty prison guards and officials were congregated; informed by prison officials that they were to undergo a body cavity search and that if they refused to submit, that they would be forced to do so; and then, after objecting to the searches, pushed face down onto a table, undressed from their waist to their knees, and forcibly subjected to a digital rectal cavity probe in full view of the congregated guards as well as other inmates. Appellants also maintain that several guards made lewd and obscene comments during these examinations, and that at least one guard videotaped the episodes.
[15] Appellants individually filed pro se complaints alleging violation of their civil rights and seeking damages and injunctive relief.*fn1 The complaints were consolidated with those of several other inmates at the Arizona State Prison in Florence alleging identical section 1983 violations. The defendant prison officials and employees moved to dismiss the complaints of the nine appellants based on Arizona's two-year statute of limitation. The district court granted the motion, ruling that the statute of limitation barred recovery. Appellants timely appeal.
[16] STANDARD OF REVIEW
[17] We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1989). In such a case, we must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Usher v. City of Los Angeles,828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of a statute of limitation period, dismissal can be granted "only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled." Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980).
[18] Discussion
[19] Congress did not establish a specific statute of limitation governing section 1983 actions, a void commonplace in federal statutory law. Board of Regents v. Tomanio,446 U.S. 478, 483 , 64 L. Ed. 2d 440 , 100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980). When such a void is present, federal courts have "borrowed" the state law of limitations governing analogous causes of action. Id. The appropriate state statute of limitation for section 1983 actions is that for personal injury cases. Wilson v. Garcia,471 U.S. 261, 276 , 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 , 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985). The closely related questions of tolling and application also are governed by state law. Id. at 268.
[20] The limitation period for personal injuries in Arizona is two years. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (1990).*fn2 The tolling of the running of this limitation period is provided for under certain conditions. At the time appellants' claims arose in March 1984, imprisonment was a statutory disability that automatically tolled the two-year limitation period until the prisoner's release. Id. § 12-502. This section was amended by the Arizona Legislature effective August 3, 1984, changing the status of imprisonment from an automatic disability to a conditional one. Amended section 12-502 provides in pertinent part:
[21] If a person entitled to bring an action . . . is at the time the cause of action accrues imprisoned, the period of such disability shall exist only until such time as the person imprisoned discovers the right to bring the action or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the right to bring the action, whichever occurs first, and such person shall have the same time after the disability ceases to exist which is allowed to others.
[22] Id. § 12-502(B) (emphasis added). Hence, a prisoner's claim was automatically tolled until August 3, 1984 under the terms of the repealed statute; afterwards, "a prisoner had the same time others would have to bring a claim, from that date, or at a later date if that was when the prisoner first reasonably discovered his or her right to bring the action." Zuck v. State, 159 Ariz. 37, 764 P.2d 772, 775 (App. 1988).*fn3
[23] The district court dismissed appellants' complaints for failure to state a claim on the ground that Arizona's two-year limitation period for personal injuries had run. A statute of limitation defense may be raised by a motion to dismiss if the running of the limitation period is apparent on the face of the complaint. Jablon,614 F.2d at 682. The district court found this to be the case, reasoning that since appellants' complaints were filed more than two years after the incidents giving rise to their causes of action, as well as more than two years after the effective date of the amended statute, the statute of limitation barred recovery on their claims. Although recognizing that none of the complaints contained outright declarations of when appellants learned of their rights to bring the actions, the district court found that appellants must have been "instantaneously aware" of the alleged constitutional violations because they were committed in their presence. As such, the district court ruled that the limitation period had not been tolled.
[24] As a preliminary matter, we reverse the dismissal of appellant Paul Eppinger's complaint. The district court dismissed Eppinger's claim upon relying on defendants' erroneous assertion that Eppinger had filed his complaint on September 15, 1986, more than two years after the effective date of the amended statute. In fact, this was the date that Eppinger's amended complaint was filed. Eppinger's original complaint was filed on August 1, 1986. Because this date is less than two years from before the effective date of the amended statute, Eppinger's complaint was timely.*fn4
[25] As to the eight other complaints, appellants contend that the district court misconstrued amended section 12-502(B). Appellants argue that the district court mistakenly relied upon a finding of when their causes of action accrued rather than a determination of when they knew or reasonably should have known of their rights to bring their actions. Appellants maintain that the amended statute requires a factual finding of when they knew or reasonably should have known of their rights to bring their actions.