Ninth Circuit: Continuing-Violations Doctrine Applies for PLRA Administrative Exhaustion Purposes
On December 31, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a prisoner “need not file repeated grievances if the (prisoner) has identified one continuing harm or a single course of conduct [of] which later events are a part.” In other words, the Court adopted the “continuing-violations” doctrine for Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) administrative exhaustion purposes. Applying the doctrine to the facts before it, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
Idaho prisoner Shawn Sheltra filed a civil rights action against prison officials alleging failure to protect. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Sheltra failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho accepted the defendants’ characterization of Sheltra’s claim as relating to an April 17, 2022, attack by another prisoner upon him. The Court concluded that Sheltra failed to exhaust remedies because he sued for “an attack that happened after he filed his grievance.” The defendants’ motion, therefore, was granted and Sheltra appealed.
On appeal, the primary dispute was whether Sheltra’s grievance covered the attack or whether he was required to grieve that event separately. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of that question began with a detailed examination of established case law on the continuing-violations doctrine.
First, the Court noted that the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied the continuing-violations doctrine in the context of PLRA administrative exhaustion. See: Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2013). Most recently, the Sixth Circuit held in a PLRA administrative exhaustion case that “(w)here there is one continuing harm or a single course of conduct (which can lead to discrete incidents of harm), filing repeat grievances is unnecessary.” See: Morgan v. Trierweiler, 67 F.4th 362 (6th Cir. 2023). The Ninth Circuit agreed with its sister circuits and turned to decide whether the doctrine applied to Sheltra’s case.
The Court found that Sheltra filed three Offender Concern forms after he was threatened by another prisoner upon returning to unit D-1 on February 14, 2020. The first form was sent to Deputy warden D.W. McKay, stating that Sheltra was previously threatened when he lived in D-1, he was assaulted the previous day, and he worried about an attack because he was a medium security prisoner housed with maximum security prisoners. McKay’s February 21 response instructed Sheltra to contact Security if he wanted a move.
The second form was sent to the shift commander and stated that Sheltra was warned of an impending attack upon his person. The third form was sent to Sgt. Taylor and expressed Sheltra’s concerns with housing in D-1 and the warning of an impending attack. Taylor responded to both those forms by stating there was no documented safety concern and that further concerns should be forwarded to Investigations.
A fourth form was sent to Sgt. Frahs on February 17; it contained the warning of an attack. Three days later, a fifth form was sent to Frahs to inform him of extortion demands and attack threats against Sheltra. Frahs responded on February 25 that the matter was forwarded to Investigations.
On March 10, 2022, Sheltra filed a formal grievance that explained the threats and extortion demands. That grievance was denied because there were “no active safety concerns” with other prisoners concerning Sheltra. One reviewing official accused Sheltra of “attempting to manipulate housing to be housed around another offender that (he was) romantically involved with.” Sheltra appealed that denial on March 31. Warden Jay Christensen denied relief, accusing Sheltra of launching an extortion ring with other prisoners and threatening Sheltra with isolation during an investigation. After a short period in isolation, Sheltra was returned to D-1 on April 17, 2020; he was assaulted by another prisoner shortly thereafter.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the attack on Sheltra was a “continuation of a problem” and that the continuing-violations doctrine applied to Sheltra’s failure to protect claim. The district court’s summary judgment order was reversed on the individual capacity claims but affirmed on the official capacity claims because Eleventh Amendment immunity applied. See: Sheltra v. Christensen, 124 F.4th 1195 (9th Cir. 2024).
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Related legal case
Sheltra v. Christensen
Year | 2025 |
---|---|
Cite | 124 F.4th 1195 (9th Cir. 2024) |
Level | Court of Appeals |
Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
Appeals Court Edition | F.4th |