Sixth Circuit: Michigan Tolling Statute Applies to PLRA Administrative Exhaustion Requirement
On January 29, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Michigan’s “tolling provision” does not affect the administrative remedy exhaustion requirement in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Instead, the provision only pauses Michigan’s statute of limitations.
Michigan prisoner Lamont Heard, who is serving a life sentence, alleged in a civil rights lawsuit that prison officials retaliated against his litigation activities by transferring him to different housing in “the Burns unit.” The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and Heard appealed.
The Sixth Circuit found that the case hinged on the procedural timeline. Heard stated that he was transferred to the Burns unit on January 10, 2017, and that he filed a grievance the next day. Months later, the grievance was returned with instructions to file it with the local grievance coordinator, which Heard did. He never received a response.
Heard had filed a separate civil rights complaint on December 4, 2017, concerning a different prison transfer. On March 2, 2018, Heard moved to amend that complaint to add the Burns unit claim. The district court then dismissed the claim for failure to exhaust. In the wake of the dismissal, Heard administratively exhausted the Burns unit claim. He then filed a civil rights complaint on January 19, 2021, alleging the Burns unit retaliation claim.
In all, Heard filed his action four years and nine days after his claim accrued on January 10, 2017. But Michigan’s three-year personal injury action statute of limitations applied to Heard’s First Amendment claim. Thus, Heard’s claim was deemed untimely. Heard, however, argued that Michigan’s “tolling provision” statute pauses the statute of limitations while a case is pending in court. See: Mich. Comp. Laws §600.5856. Under that statute, the 16 months from when Heard added the Burns unit claim on to his pending lawsuit up until the time the district court dismissed the claim would be added back to the clock.
The parties disputed whether the tolling provision statute applied. The State argued that the tolling provision was “inconsistent with” the PLRA. To answer that question, the Sixth Circuit began by looking to the history of federal courts “borrowing” state statute of limitations.
The Court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute that allows individuals to sue state officials for violations of their constitutional rights, does not have a statute of limitations. Congress instructed federal courts in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to borrow from the “common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State,” so long as the state’s law “is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Thus, state tolling statutes are used for § 1983 actions. See: Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
But § 1988 “only codified a longstanding practice.” As far back as 1830, federal courts borrowed state statutes of limitations. The question, therefore, was whether Michigan’s tolling provision was inconsistent with federal law—specifically, the PLRA.
The PLRA provides: “No action shall be brought…by a prisoner…until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” The Sixth Circuit found that the PLRA says nothing about tolling, and it concluded that Michigan’s tolling provision does not affect the exhaustion requirement. Rather it said that federal courts routinely create their own tolling rules for prisoner suits subject to the PLRA. For instance, “The Sixth Circuit already tolls for the time a prisoner spends exhausting his claim.” See: Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2000).
The Sixth Circuit found no conflict between the purposes of the PLRA and Michigan’s tolling provision. The purpose behind the PLRA exhaustion requirement is to allow prison officials to address an issue, reduce litigation by resolving claims in-house, and improve litigation by creating an administrative record. The tolling provision does not defeat those purposes. How long a prisoner has to bring a claim rests with the states.
The district court’s order of dismissal was therefore reversed and the case remanded. Before the Court, Heard was represented by attorney James Y. Xi of Clement & Murphy PLLC in Alexandria, Virginia. See: Heard v. Strange, 127 F.4th 630 (6th Cir. 2025).
Related legal case
Heard v. Strange
| Year | 2025 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 127 F.4th 630 (6th Cir. 2025) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |