Seventh Circuit Holds Federal Law Prohibits County Jail from Forcing Immigration Detainees to Perform Custodial Labor by Threatening Solitary Confinement
by Matt Clarke
On June 5, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that federal criminal law prohibiting forced labor, 18 U.S.C. §1589, applies to a county jail threatening immigration detainees with loss of phone and commissary privileges or up to 10 days of solitary confinement should they refuse to perform unpaid custodial work in the jail.
According to court documents, the Kenosha County Jail in Wisconsin held immigration detainees Aleksey Ruderman, Arturo Saldivar and Chris Pocknell (Plaintiffs) pursuant to contracts with federal agencies. The jail required immigration detainees to perform unpaid custodial work, such as sweeping floors and cleaning floors, tables, and showers. Those who refused could be disciplined by loss of phone and commissary privileges or up to ten days of solitary confinement.
The Plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1589, a criminal statute with a civil remedy, that prohibits forced labor. The district court dismissed the suit on the pleadings, holding that §1589 applied only to human trafficking. Aided by attorney Margaret Truesdale of Hughes Socol Piers Resnick and Dym, Ltd., plaintiffs appealed.
The Seventh Circuit noted that the district court “based its conclusion not on the language of §1589, or its title (“ Forced Labor”), but on the title and imputed purpose of a larger enactment of which §1589 is a part: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.” However, such large acts often contain provisions that “do not fit neatly under an umbrella title.” Therefore, the Court looked “at what it says rather than what was enacted at the same time.”
The Court noted that other circuits concluded §1589 applies to labor required of civil immigration detainees: Gonzalez v. Core Civic, Inc., 986 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2021), and Barrientos v. Core Civic, Inc., 951 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2020). Another held §1589 is not limited to human trafficking, Birrell v. Staff, 60 F.4th 25 (3d Cir. 2023). Thus, to affirm the district court would put the court in conflict with three other circuits.
The Court rejected the county’s argument that the holdings in Gonzalez and Barrientos were limited to privately run detention facilities. It noted that a Wisconsin county is a corporate body that is treated as a “person” for federal judicial purposes and thus can be sued per Wisconsin Statutes §59.01 and Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Further, §1589 states that it applies to “whoever” forces a person to perform labor.
The Court also held that threatening detainees with solitary confinement fit within the meaning of threats of physical restraint prohibited by §1589(a)(1) and the practice could also be seen as “abuse of law or legal process” prohibited by §1589(c)(1) since neither a statute nor the contracts authorize the jail to compel work. In fact, the contracts authorize the county to pay detainees for their labor, not to coerce said labor.
The Court clarified that its ruling did not apply to convicted felons, who may be compelled to work per Taylor v. Salvation Army, 110 F 4th 1017 (7th Cir. 2024). The Court held that §1589 applies to civil detainees. It vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. See: Ruderman v. Kenosha Cty., 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 16358 (6th Cir.).
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Related legal case
Ruderman v. Kenosha Cty.
| Year | 2026 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 16358 (6th Cir.) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |