SCOTUS Reverses Mississippi Capital Conviction
by Matt Clarke
On May 28, 2026, the Supreme Court of the Unites States (SCOTUS) reversed the conviction and death sentence of a Mississippi prisoner whose trial counsel raised an objection to the prosecutor’s racially biased use of peremptory strikes but was not given an opportunity to argue that the racially-neutral reasons for the strikes proffered by the prosecution were pretextual.
In 2004, two black teenagers, Terry Pitchford (then-18) and Eric Bullins (then-16), robbed a Mississippi grocery store. During the robbery, Bullins fatally shot the store’s white owner. Pitchford also fired a gun loaded with rat shot but claimed he aimed at the floor.
Bullins entered a plea agreement to receive a 20-year sentence for the homicide. Pitchford was charged with, and tried for, capital murder.
During jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove four of the five Black potential jurors. Defense counsel raised an objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Batson Court set out a three-step procedure for a trial court to determine whether a prosecutor employed a peremptory strike based on race. First, the defense must make prima facie showing of racial bias. Second, the prosecutor must provide a race-neutral reason for the strike. Third, the defense must be given an opportunity to rebut the race-neutral reason by showing it is pretextual. Only then does the trial court determine whether a Batson violation occurred.
However, the trial court did not follow the Batson procedure. Instead, as the prosecutor proffered reasons for the strikes, it declared that each was race neutral: “Upon hearing the prosecutor’s reason for the last strike, the trial court stated that ‘[t]he Court finds that to be race neutral as well,’ and pivoted immediately to the defense’s peremptory strikes. At that time, the trial court did not afford defense counsel an opportunity to rebut as pretextual the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for striking the four black jurors, nor did the trial court make any findings regarding whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons were pretextual.” The empaneled jury consisted of 11 white people and one Black person.
Defense counsel tried to raise the Batson issue again at the close of jury selection but the trial court “twice cut off defense counsel,” and stated the Batson challenge was clear in the record. Defense counsel raised the Batson issue a final time in a motion for new trial that was denied. Pitchford was convicted and given the death penalty.
On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court (MSC) held that Pitchford waived his Batson claims by failing to argue the prosecutor’s reasons were pretextual. He later filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal court granted relief after holding the MSC had unreasonably applied Batson.
The state appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit deferred to the MSC and reversed. Aided by attorney Joseph J. Perkovich, Pitchford successfully petitioned SCOTUS for a writ of certiorari.
SCOTUS noted that “enforcing Batson rests first and foremost with trial judges,” per Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019). In this case, the “trial court erroneously omitted Batson’s third step” when it failed to allow defense counsel sufficient time to rebut the prosecutor’s reasons and failed to make findings on whether the reasons were pretextual.
The Court noted that the AEDPA’s deferential standard of review did not preclude relief. See: Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). It held that the MSC’s “conclusion that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral reasons was unreasonable.”
Therefore, the judgment of the Fifth Circuit was reversed and the case remanded. See: Pitchford v. Cain, 146 S.Ct. 1345 (2026).
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Related legal case
Pitchford v. Cain
| Year | 2026 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 146 S.Ct. 1345 (2026) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |