by Douglas Ankney

The California Court of Appeal (CCA), First Appellate District, ruled that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) amendments to the California Code of Regulations (“CDCR Regs.”) § 3043 (“Rule 3043”) narrowing the application of credits to advance the Youth Parole Eligibility Date (“YPED”) of persons sentenced to indeterminate terms violated neither the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause nor California’s parole statutes.

The issues came before the CCA in the habeas corpus petition of prisoner Hieu Ho Trong Thai, who is serving an indeterminate sentence of 45 years to life in the custody of the CDCR after being convicted of first-degree murder. The CCA initially summarily dismissed the petition. But the California Supreme Court granted review and the case was transferred back to the CCA with instructions to issue a show cause order.

Thai argued in his habeas petition that limiting him under Rule 3043 to only his earned educational merit credits (“EMCs”) to advance his YPED violated California’s parole statutes, namely, California Penal Code §§ 3041 through 3046 and § 3051. (Note to Readers: All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Thai also argued that the CDCR violated his right to equal protection because Rule 3043 allowed non-youth offenders serving indeterminate sentences to advance their minimum eligible parole date (“MEPD”) via their EMCs and four additional categories of credits, viz., their good conduct credits (“GCCs”), milestone completion credits (“MCCs”), rehabilitative achievement credits (“RACs”), and extraordinary conduct credits (“ECC”).

The CCA observed that under §§ 3041 through 3044 (the “§ 3041 Parole Scheme”) “all inmates serving indeterminate life sentences are entitled to periodic parole hearings.” See: In re Sturm, 11 Cal.3d 258 (1974). For these prisoners, the Board of Parole Hearings first considers parole suitability at an “initial parole hearing one year before the inmate’s [MEPD].” § 3041(a)(2). “The MEPD is ‘the earliest date on which an [indeterminately sentenced life] or life prisoner may be legally released on parole’,” the court wrote citing CDCR Regs. § 2000(b)(67). For example, § 3046(a) provides that prisoners serving indeterminate sentences must serve the greater of either seven years or “a term as established pursuant to any other law that establishes a minimum term or minimum period of confinement under a life sentence before eligibility for parole.” Unless some other law allows credits to be used to lower this floor, § 3046 “sets an irreducible minimum.”

Therefore, under the § 3041 Parole Scheme, Thai must serve 45 years until his MEPD arrives. But in 2013, the Legislature enacted § 3051. Section 3051 “codified an alternate parole scheme designed specifically for youth offenders (the “Section 3051 Parole Scheme”). The purpose of the Section 3051 Parole Scheme is to “bring California juvenile sentencing law into line with” a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that held imposition of the death penalty or imprisonment for life without parole on juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment of the federal constitution. See: People v. Hardin, 15 Cal.4th 834 (2024). The Section 3051 Parole Scheme divides youth into two tiers based on their age when the “Controlling” offense was committed and the length of their minimum sentences.

Tier one consists of prisoners with indeterminate sentences of less than 25 years to life who were under age 26 at the time they committed their controlling offense. Tier one prisoners must be considered for parole by the first day of their 20th year of incarceration. Tier two consists of prisoners with indeterminate sentences of 25 years to life who were under age 26 at the time they committed their controlling offense or who were juveniles when they committed their controlling offense and received a sentence of life without possibility of parole.

Tier two prisoners must be considered for parole by the first day of their 25th year of incarceration, per § 3051(b)(3)-(4). “The ‘initial youth offender parole hearing’ must occur within six months following the YPED,” as outlined in § 3051(a)(2)(C). “The YPED is defined as ‘the earliest date upon which a youth offender is eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing.’” Consequently, “the timing of initial youth offender parole hearings under § 3051 is linked to the YPED, just as the timing of initial parole hearings for other indeterminately sentenced [prisoners] under § 3041 is linked to the MEPD.” Importantly, if a prisoner is found suitable for parole at a youth offender parole hearing, he is entitled to early release notwithstanding § 3046’s “irreducible minimum.”

However, “legislatively authorized post-sentence conduct credits” have long been made available, primarily to prisoners serving determinate sentences to reduce the amount of time of actual incarceration. See: Penal Code, Pt. 3, Tit. 1, Ch. 7, Art. 2.5. (“Art. 2.5”). But in its 2019-2020 Session, the Legislature amended Art. 2.5 via Assembly Bill No. 965 (“AB 965”), authorizing the Director of the CDCR “to determine what, if any, credit earning programs shall apply to an incarcerated person, including any and all credits to advance a youth parole eligible date.”

The CDCR responded to AB 965 by overhauling its former credit-earning scheme and replacing it with the current final scheme now in effect as provided in Rule 3043-3043.6 of the CDCR Regulations. While amended Rule 3043 expanded the availability of Art. 2.5 credits to advance the initial parole dates of all prisoners serving indeterminate sentences, the CDCR added new Rule 3043(f) which allowed only EMCs to advance the YPEDs under the § 3051 Parole Scheme.

But the CDCR continued to allow the four additional categories of credits to advance the MEPDs under the § 3041 Parole Scheme. Consequently, the number of credits available to youth offenders under the § 3051 Parole Scheme is far fewer than the number of credits available to all other indeterminately sentenced prisoners under the § 3041 Parole Scheme. In the “notice-and-comment” process that preceded the amendments of Rule 3043, the CDCR was heavily criticized for the perceived unfairness in making fewer credits available to youth offenders. The CDCR responded that, unlike EMCs, the other credits were subject to forfeiture and reinstatement, making them “difficult to track accurately in the complex process of scheduling parole hearing dates.”

Inclusion of only EMCs in the YPED formula was justified as a means to “balance the goal of incentivizing youth offenders with the [CDCR’s] operational need to eliminate fluctuation of the YPED that could occur due to credits earned or lost,” promoting “certainty and stability in the process of scheduling youth offender parole hearings.” With the foregoing principles in mind, the CCA addressed first Thai’s statutory argument.

Thai argued that the phrase “initial youth offender parole hearing” in § 3051(a)(2)(C) meant the same as the phrase “initial parole hearing” in Rule 3043(a)—therefore, all of the credits available under Rule 3043 must be applied when determining his YPED and his corresponding initial youth offender parole hearing. The CCA rejected that argument because Rule 3043(a) specifically referenced § 3041 and the initial parole hearings of the § 3041 Parole Scheme, which included indeterminately sentenced prisoners not eligible for youth offender parole hearings.

Section 3051(a)(2)(C) provided that the YPED is “the earliest date upon which a youth offender is eligible for release on parole at a youth offender parole hearing” under the § 3051 Parole Scheme. The CDCR added Rule 3043(f) to address the initial youth offender parole hearings authorized by the § 3051 Parole Scheme. And Rule 3043(f) authorized only EMCs to advance YPEDs. Turning to Thai’s equal protection claim, the CCA observed that, at its core, “the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification. … Courts apply heightened scrutiny when a challenged statute or other regulation involves a suspect classification such as race, or a fundamental right such as the right to vote, and accordingly will demand greater justification for the differential treatment.”

Otherwise, “the general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. A court applying this standard finds a denial of equal protection only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose.”

The CCA observed that in In re Nguyen, 107 Cal.App.5th 15 (2024), the Second Appellate District of the CCA rejected an equal protection claim similar to Thai’s. The Nguyen court ultimately ruled that “[b]ased on the already significant benefit afforded only to youthful offenders” (namely, the § 3051 Parole Scheme that accelerates youth parole eligibility hearings for prisoners with YPEDs as compared to prisoners with only MEPDs), “the [CDCR] could rationally conclude that youth offenders should not benefit further from an award of credit other than educational merit credit.”

The CCA in the instant case agreed with the Nguyen court that the rational basis review applied. But the CCA found no violation of equal protection because the CDCR had provided a rational basis for excluding prisoners with YPEDs from credits other than EMCs to advance their initial parole eligibility hearings, viz., the CDCR’s interest in “balanc[ing] the goal of incentivizing youth offenders with the [CDCR’s] operational need to eliminate fluctuation of the YPED that could occur due to credits earned or lost” and thereby promoting “certainty and stability in the process of scheduling youth offender parole hearings.”

Accordingly, the CCA denied relief and discharged the petition. See: In re Thai, No. A170701 (Cal. App. 2026).

[Note to Readers: In the instant opinion, the CCA acknowledged that the CDCR’s “difficulty” in tracking additional credits for YPED purposes stemmed from the Parole Board’s apparently outdated “Information Technology System” and the Board didn’t want to manually track them.]  

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