by David M. Reutter

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Western Division, held that Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits the imposition of a mandatory life without parole sentence upon persons convicted of felony murder. The Court’s opinion delved deeply into the history behind the creation of the Pennsylvania charter and its penal code, and it reversed the Court’s prior decisions on the issue.

Derek Lee and his codefendant Paul Durham entered a private residence on October 14, 2014, to commit a robbery. The couple who lived at the residence were ultimately taken to the basement. Lee pistol whipped the victim, Leonard Butler, in an attempt to force him to give them money. Lee left Durham, who was armed with a pistol, to watch over Butler and his girlfriend, Tina Chappel, so Lee could seek out loot. While Lee was upstairs searching the house, Butler and Durham became involved in a struggle over the firearm, which resulted in Butler being shot and killed.

Lee and Durham were subsequently identified by Chappel and arrested. Lee was charged with homicide, burglary, robbery, serious bodily injury and criminal conspiracy. A jury acquitted Lee of first-degree murder, but found him guilty of felony murder, which is defined as second degree murder in Pennsylvania’s Criminal Code, infliction of serious bodily injury, and conspiracy. On December 19, 2016, Lee was sentenced to serve a mandatory life sentence without parole on the second-degree murder charge and a consecutive 10-to-20-year sentence on the conspiracy charge.

Lee did not appeal or file a post-conviction motion. On November 4, 2020, Lee’s post-conviction and appellate rights were reinstated under the Post-Conviction Relief Act. Represented by the Abolitionist Law Center, Lee filed a motion for modification of sentence that argued this mandatory life sentence violated the Eight Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The trial court denied relief, and the Superior Court affirmed the denial after Lee appealed. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review.

The Supreme Court’s analysis included a background analysis of the felony murder doctrine and life without parole sentences. Felony murder is murder committed in the course of another felony. Under the felony murder doctrine, the defendant’s intent to commit is immaterial. Intent is derived from the intent to commit the underlying felony. The origins of the felony murder doctrine are uncertain. The Court noted instances from the 13th and 17th centuries that described the doctrine. It noted that the English common law rarely invoked felony murder in charging defendants, and English law eliminated felony murder in 1957.

American legislatures enacted felony murder statutes in the 19th century, with Illinois passing the first statute in 1827. Both English and American courts observed the harshness of the rule and limited its application. In most instances, the law limited felony murder to crimes that were more likely to result in death.

Pennsylvania’s Criminal Code was first promulgated in 1794. It did not specifically delineate felony murder as a crime. Pennsylvania began the unique American approach of dividing murder into degrees with a grading element. The Code limited the death penalty to first degree murder, which was defined as murder “perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate or premeditated killing,” or was committed by the “perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary.” All other types of murder were deemed second degree murder. After various amendments over the years, the Code was amended to define second degree murder as “when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a principle or accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.”

“As to the origins of a sentence of life without parole, such punishment did not exist in common law,” the Court found. The 20th Century saw sentences grow longer, but they were mitigated by early parole and commutation of sentences. Pennsylvania implemented life without parole in 1941. Only Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi and North Carolina impose mandatory life without parole sentences for second degree murder, rendering Pennsylvania’s felony murder punishment “an outlier compared to most other states.”

The Court then turned to an analysis of the Eighth Amendment claim. Lee presented two lines of Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) cases: (1) decisions considering whether a term of years sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense, and (2) cases analyzing capital punishment or life without parole sentencing practice is excessive as to a category of offenses or offenders. Lee argued only the categorical approach applied to his two claims. The Court found that that Eighth Amendment interpretations relating to the death penalty for persons with diminished capacity and relating to life without parole for juveniles is distinguishable from the sentencing of adults to life without parole. Absent further guidance from SCOTUS, the Eighth Amendment claim failed.

Next, the Court turned to Lee’s second claim. Lee argued that Article I, Section 13’s prohibitory language against “cruel punishments inflicted” provides greater protection than the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” The claim was subjected to the four-prong test in Commonwealth v. Edmunds 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). Under Edmunds, litigants and courts must, in contrast to the federal constitutional provision, review: (1) the text of the Pennsylvania Constitution provision; (2) the history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case law; (3) related case law from other states; and (4) policy considerations, including issues of state and local concern and their applicability in modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence.

The Court found the Pennsylvania text is facially distinct from its federal counterpart, and seemingly provides greater protection. While the Court’s precedents found the “unusual” language of the Eighth Amendment of no moment in finding that Amendment and the Pennsylvania Constitution carry the same protection, the Court found a distinction between the two constitutional provisions.

The Court noted that punishments were cruel because they were calculated to “superad[dition] of ‘terror, pain, and disgrace.’… And they were ‘unusual’ because, by the time of the Amendment’s adoption, they had ‘long fallen out of use.’ “ Exclusion of the unusual in Article I, Section 13, the Court found, “excludes the requirement that a challenged sentence be contrary to long-standing practice or contrary to common law.”

Next, the Court extensively examined the history behind the Pennsylvania Constitution and Criminal Code. The U.S. Constitution and that of many of the original states followed English law, which considered retribution as a basis behind the imposition of criminal punishments. By contrast, Pennsylvania founder William Penn recoiled from English Penal Codes and relied upon long-standing Quaker ideals. Pennsylvania’s founders further relied upon Enlightenment Theories, which believed permissible punishment was ideally the most lenient means to deter, as a foundation for criminal punishment.

Pennsylvania case law previously found that the Eight Amendment and Article I, Section 13 were “co-extensive.” The Court recognized its precedents, but it found those cases, which were decided prior to Edmunds, failed to make the required rigorous assessment. As to other states’ case law, the Court found that some states have found co-extensiveness with the Eighth Amendment while other have found greater protection. Finally, the Court found protected policy considerations failed to weigh heavily in the matter.

In application, the Court found Article I, Section 13 was intended to provide greater protection than the Eighth Amendment. Culpability is a cornerstone assessment in classifying crimes. Finding one who did not kill as culpable as one who killed is unjust. “The gravity of a sentence of life without parole cannot be overstated,” the Court stated. Mandatory imposition of such a sentence for felony murder poses a great risk of disproportionate punishment. Deterrence, retribution, and the incapacitation justification require an individualized assessment of one’s culpability.

The Court found that imposing a mandatory life without parole sentence upon persons convicted of felony, or second degree, murder violates Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The judgment of sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing. The Court stayed its order for 120 days to allow the General Assembly to consider appropriate remedial measures. See: Commonwealth v. Lee, 357 A.3d 356 (Pa. 2026).  

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