Arvie v. Stalder, 53 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 06/02/1995)

[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT


[2] No. 94-30151


[4] decided: June 2, 1995.


[5] HUBERT ARVIE, BRO., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD L. STALDER, WARDEN, WADE CORRECTIONAL CENTER, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.


[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. D.C. DOCKET NUMBER CA93-70-B-M1. JUDGE Frank J. Polozola.


[7] ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Hubert Arvie, (pro se), Kinder, LA.


[8] Before Reynaldo G. Garza, Garwood and Davis, Circuit Judges.


[9] Author: Garwood


[10] GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:


[11] Plaintiff-appellant Hubert Arvie (Arvie) appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1). We affirm.


[12] Facts and Proceedings Below


[13] Arvie, an inmate at the Dixon Correctional Institute in Jackson, Louisiana, filed this section 1983 suit on January 27, 1993, against numerous prison officials, alleging various constitutional violations associated with his confinement.*fn1 In his pro se complaint, Arvie sought both monetary and injunctive relief.*fn2 The district court referred Arvie's case to a magistrate Judge, who, on April 14, 1993, issued a 90-day stay order pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, ordering Arvie to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. This order informed Arvie that failure to exhaust these administrative remedies would result in the dismissal of his suit with prejudice. After the 90-day period expired, Defendants filed a Notice of Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies and the affidavit of Carlos Messina (Messina), the General Administrator of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Administrative Remedy Procedure. In his affidavit, Messina averred that Arvie had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.


[14] On July 23, 1993, the magistrate Judge issued an order directing Arvie to show cause why his complaint should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1). Rejecting Arvie's arguments to the contrary, the magistrate Judge determined that he had "not made a good faith attempt to exhaust the administrative remedy procedure" and recommended that the district court dismiss his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1). On February 15, 1994, the district court adopted the magistrate Judge's report and recommendation and dismissed Arvie's complaint with prejudice. Arvie filed a timely notice of appeal March 10, 1994. This Court granted Arvie's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.


[15] Discussion


[16] Arvie argues that he exhausted his administrative remedies, and in the alternative, that he made a good faith effort to exhaust his administrative remedies; therefore, he contends that the district court erred in dismissing his suit under section 1997e. Because we find that the magistrate Judge properly determined that Arvie failed to make a good faith attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies, we reject these arguments. We now turn to an issue that Arvie does not raise in his pro se brief: whether, in light of McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 117 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1992), the district court properly invoked section 1997e's exhaustion requirement to dismiss Arvie's section 1983 suit seeking both injunctive and monetary relief.


[17] Section 1997e(a)(1) of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 provides,


[18] "In any action brought pursuant to section 1983 of this title by an adult convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, the court shall, if the court believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of Justice, continue such case for a period of not to exceed 180 days in order to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1).*fn3


[19] In Rocky v. Vittorie, 813 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.1987), we held that "district courts have power to dismiss [section 1983] suits, following a section 1997e continuance, if a prisoner fails to pursue his administrative remedies." Id. at 736. The court in Rocky also held that, before dismissing a suit with prejudice under section 1997e, the district court must determine whether the plaintiff "made a good faith attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies." Id. at 737. We reasoned that this additional requirement was consistent with congressional intent, pointing to the statutory language that continuances be granted "in the interests of Justice" and section 1997e(a)(2)'s requirement that the administrative grievance procedures must meet minimum federal standards. Id. at 736. See Martin v. Catalanotto, 895 F.2d 1040, 1042 (5th Cir.1990) (recognizing that the prison grievance procedures set up by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections meet section 1997e's minimal requirements).


[20] In light of the Supreme Court's decision in McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 117 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1992), we need to reconsider our case law interpreting section 1997e's exhaustion requirement. In McCarthy, a federal prisoner filed a Bivens suit against prison officials, seeking monetary damages for alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. No injunctive or declaratory relief was sought. The district court dismissed the suit because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that courts may impose an exhaustion requirement for the filing of Bivens complaints. The Supreme Court reversed. Because the facts of McCarthy involved a Bivens claim asserted by a federal prisoner, the exhaustion requirement of section 1997e did not apply. Nevertheless, the defendants in McCarthy argued that section 1997e represented a congressional policy favoring exhaustion of prison grievance procedures before filing constitutional claims against prison officials in federal court. Rejecting this argument, the Court noted that section 1997e specifically conditioned the exhaustion requirement on the existence of "effective administrative remedies" and emphasized that the prison grievance procedures at issue did not provide for the award of monetary damages. Id. at 150, 153-54, 112 S. Ct. at 1089, 1091. Thus, the Court held that a district court cannot require exhaustion of administrative remedies if a prisoner files a Bivens suit seeking only monetary damages and the prison grievance system does not afford such a remedy. Id. at 155, 112 S. Ct. at 1092.


[21] Although McCarthy involved a Bivens suit by a federal prisoner, we have applied its reasoning to other types of prisoner suits. Thus, in Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47 (5th Cir.1993), we affirmed a district court's dismissal of a prisoner's in forma pauperis petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking injunctive relief for various asserted constitutional violations for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Because the district court dismissed the suit before service of process, we characterized the district court's action as the dismissal of a frivolous petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Id. at 49. Noting that the plaintiff in Rourke sought only injunctive relief, we distinguished McCarthy and held that "a federal prisoner seeking only injunctive relief must first exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the Bureau of Prisons." Id. at 50. In so holding, the Rourke panel specifically stated that "we express no opinion as to the proper result" in a case involving "a mixed claim for both injunctive and monetary relief." Id. at 50 & n. 9.


[22] The Rourke panel reasoned that its holding was consistent with McCarthy, emphasizing that "the result [in McCarthy ] might well have been different had the federal prisoner sought injunctive relief." Id. at 50. Although Rourke did not involve a section 1983 suit, its holding that inmates must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit for injunctive relief in the federal court properly applies to section 1983 suits by state prisoners seeking injunctive relief. Thus, pursuant to section 1997e, a district court may dismiss a prisoner's section 1983 suit seeking only injunctive and/or declaratory relief if the plaintiff has failed to make a good faith attempt to exhaust administrative remedies.*fn4


[23] Arvie's suit presents the precise issue left open by the court in Rourke: whether section 1997e's exhaustion requirement applies to an inmate's section 1983 suit seeking both injunctive and monetary relief. Id. at 50 & n. 9. In McCarthy, the Supreme Court noted that "On the first page of his [the prisoner's] complaint he wrote: "This Complaint seeks Money Damages Only. ' " Id. at 142, 112 S. Ct. at 1085 (emphasis added). See also id. ("he sought only money damages"); id. at 152, 112 S. Ct. at 1090 ("the prisoner seeking only money damages has everything to lose and nothing to gain from being required to exhaust") (emphasis added). In rejecting the contention that nonmonetary administrative relief might adequately respond to the prisoner's concerns, McCarthy observed: "... we cannot presume, as a general matter, that when a litigant has deliberately foregone injunctive relief and has singled out discrete past wrongs, specifically requesting monetary compensation only, that he is likely to be interested in "other things.' " Id. at 154, 112 S. Ct. at 1091 (emphasis added). Finally, McCarthy states: "Petitioner concedes that if his complaint contained a prayer for injunctive relief, exhaustion principles would apply differently. Brief for Petitioner 20, n. 20. Were injunctive relief sought, the grievance procedure probably would be capable of producing the type of corrective action desired." Id. at 153 n. 5, 112 S. Ct. at 1091 n. 5. Taken together, the implication of these statements is that exhaustion could properly have been required in McCarthy, had the complaint sought both damages and injunctive relief.


[24] The Eleventh Circuit has addressed this issue in two post- McCarthy cases involving Bivens actions by federal prisoners. In Caraballo-Sandoval v. Honsted, 35 F.3d 521 (11th Cir.1994), the court affirmed a district court's dismissal of one of the plaintiff inmate's claims seeking injunctive and monetary damages because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 525 ("Because Caraballo-Sandoval requested more than just money damages, the district court properly dismissed his claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.").*fn5 See also Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 348 (11th Cir.1994) (reasoning that the rule of Caraballo-Sandoval requiring an inmate seeking both injunctive and monetary relief to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court is not inconsistent with McCarthy).*fn6 Although Irwin and Caraballo-Sandoval both involved Bivens actions, their reasoning applies equally to section 1983 suits by state prisoners. We agree with the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit and therefore hold that the exhaustion requirement of section 1997e applies to a prisoner's section 1983 suit seeking both monetary and injunctive relief.*fn7 Because Arvie failed to make a good faith effort to exhaust his administrative remedies, the district court properly dismissed his suit under section 1997e.


[25] Conclusion


[26] For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.



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Opinion Footnotes

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[27] *fn1 On April 5, 1993, Arvie filed an amended complaint. Arvie named some thirty-five defendants, including the prison basketball coach, the mayors of Jackson, Louisiana, and Baton Rouge, Louisiana, a fellow inmate, and a "Ms. John Doe," the mother of the fellow inmate. Arvie alleged, inter alia, that he was denied access to the courts and the right to correspond in violation of the First Amendment; that he was denied adequate medical care, ventilation, sanitation, and recreation in violation of the Eighth Amendment; that prison officials retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional rights; and that prison officials conspired to deny him his constitutional rights.


[28] *fn2 In his prayer for relief in his original complaint, Arvie requested that the court:
"(1) issue a permanent injunction against the state officials in their official capacity from implementing additional unconstitutional violations of federally protected rights, and state local laws giving rise to due process of law; (2) a declaratory judgment enter [sic] declaring the rights of DCI prisoners violated [sic]; (3) require the defendants, in their personal capacities, to hereby pay money damages in the amount of nine hundred million dollars ($900.000.000), or a sum reasonable in the premises jointly, severally, and in solido for any damages caused (e.g., lost [sic] of valuable evidence) or otherwise to the prisoners of DCI or otherwise; (4) permit monetary damages; (5) equitable relief or any other relief deemed appropriate here; and (6) require the named defendants to advance all costs of the proceeding, together with judicial interest collectively, it is so prayed." In his amended complaint, Arvie requested that "the court grant the relief requested in the initial pleading."



[29] *fn3 Section 1997e originally provided for a 90-day continuance. In September 1994, Congress amended the statute to change the length of the continuance to 180 days.


[30] *fn4 We note that there is dicta in McCarthy that calls into question the power of a district court to dismiss a prisoner's suit under section 1997e. Emphasizing that the purpose of section 1997e is to permit the district court to stay the action while the plaintiff exhausts his administrative remedies, the Court in McCarthy stated that " § 1997e does not authorize dismissal of an action for failure to exhaust." Id. at 150, 112 S. Ct. at 1089. In Rourke, a post- McCarthy decision, we held that a district court "may dismiss [a prisoner's suit] under § 1915(d) if [administrative] remedies have not been exhausted." Rourke, 11 F.3d at 49.
Because Rourke did not involve a section 1997e dismissal, we did not specifically consider whether a district court, after McCarthy, has the power under section 1997e to dismiss a section 1983 suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Today we follow our pre- McCarthy holding that a district court may dismiss an inmate's section 1983 suit under section 1997e for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Rocky, 813 F.2d at 736. We continue to adhere to the reasoning of the panel in Rocky: "The structure and purpose of section 1997e persuades us that Congress intended that district courts have power to dismiss suits, following a section 1997e continuance, if a prisoner fails to pursue his administrative remedies. Without the prospect of such a dismissal, a prisoner could circumvent the exhaustion requirement by simply doing nothing for ninety days and then resuming his litigation in the district court. To further Congress's intent to foster expeditious and congenial resolution of prisoner grievances, we believe a district court must have the power to enforce the exhaustion requirement with the threat of a dismissal with prejudice." Id.



[31] *fn5 The district court's dismissal in Caraballo-Sandoval was "without prejudice pending the exhaustion of administrative remedies." Caraballo-Sandoval, 35 F.3d at 524. This dismissal without prejudice is the functional equivalent of the continuance ordered by the district court here.


[32] *fn6 See also Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 357, 356 & n. 8 (3d Cir.1992) (post- McCarthy decision stating in dicta that prisoner seeking both injunctive and monetary relief in Bivens suit must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court).


[33] *fn7 Arvie does not argue that he cannot recover monetary damages through the prison administrative procedures, and the record does not reflect whether monetary damages are available through the Louisiana prison administrative procedures. Our research, however, indicates that the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections administrative procedures now permit prisoners to recover monetary damages for some claims. See LSA-RS 15:1171 (stating that prison administrative procedures provide for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief for prisoners' complaints about conditions of confinement, medical malpractice, personal injuries, time computations, and challenges to rules, regulations, policies, or statutes); Bellard v. Louisiana Correctional & Indus. Sch., 647 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (La.Ct.App.3d Cir.1994) (stating that Louisiana prison administrative remedies were amended in 1989 to provide the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections with the authority to award monetary damages in personal injury claims by inmates).
While it appears that Louisiana prison administrative procedures would permit Arvie to recover money damages for some of his claims (at least for his claims related to the conditions of his confinement), we note that a district court may require exhaustion of administrative remedies under section 1997e whenever an inmate seeks both injunctive and monetary relief, regardless of whether monetary relief is available. See Caraballo-Sandoval, 35 F.3d at 525 ("Because Caraballo-Sandoval requested more than just money damages, the district court properly dismissed his claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.").




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Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707 (5th Cir. 06/02/1995)

[1] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT


[2] No. 94-30458


[4] decided: June 2, 1995.


[5] TANYA MARSH, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
JOHNNIE W. JONES, JR., WARDEN, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.


[6] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. D.C. DOCKET NUMBER 94-CV-330-A. JUDGE John V. Parker.


[7] ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Tanya Marsh, (Pro Se), Mansfield, La.


[8] Before Reynaldo G. Garza, Garwood and Davis, Circuit Judges.


[9] Author: Garwood


[10] GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:


[11] Plaintiff-appellant Tanya Marsh (Marsh) appeals the district court's dismissal of her suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1). We affirm.


[12] Facts and Proceedings Below


[13] On April 12, 1994, Marsh, an inmate at the Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women in St. Gabriel, Louisiana, filed this section 1983 suit against various prison officials, asserting several claims stemming from a June 24, 1993, slip and fall accident.*fn1 As a result of falling on a wet floor near her cell, Marsh alleges that she suffered head injuries requiring stitches, that her engagement ring was damaged, and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs.*fn2 On October 25, 1993, Marsh filed an administrative grievance, but the prison dismissed her complaint as untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after the incident.*fn3


[14] In her pro se complaint, Marsh sought only monetary damages.*fn4 The district court assigned Marsh's case to a magistrate Judge, who, on April 18, 1994, issued an order requesting Marsh to show cause why her suit should not be dismissed under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In her response, Marsh attempted to explain her failure to file a timely administrative grievance, and in the alternative, argued that she did not need to exhaust her administrative remedies because the value of her ring exceeded the fifty-dollar limit allowable for replacement of damaged property under the prison administrative procedures and because prison administrative procedures did not provide for recovery of money damages for her other claims.


[15] On May 26, 1994, the magistrate Judge issued a report concluding that Marsh offered no justifiable explanation for her failure to make a good faith attempt to exhaust her administrative remedies. The magistrate Judge also rejected Marsh's argument that she should not be required to exhaust administrative remedies because the value of her ring exceeds the prison regulations' fifty-dollar limit for lost or damaged property claims. The magistrate Judge reasoned that the extent of the loss is best evaluated as of the time of the loss instead of several months later and that the prison's administrative remedies were well suited to address property claims. The magistrate Judge's report recommended that the district court dismiss Marsh's suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1). Overruling Marsh's objections, the district court adopted the magistrate's report and dismissed Marsh's complaint with prejudice on July 13, 1994. Marsh filed a timely notice of appeal.


[16] Discussion


[17] Marsh argues that the district court erred in dismissing her suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) for failure to exhaust prison administrative procedures. Although Marsh concedes that she did not file a timely request for administrative relief, she asserts that exhaustion would be futile because she claims that the prison administrative procedures do not permit the award of money damages for her personal injury claim and because prison regulations cap recovery for property claims at fifty dollars.


[18] Section 1997e(a)(1) of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (the Act) states:


[19] "In any action brought pursuant to section 1983 of this title by an adult convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, the court shall, if the court believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of Justice, continue such case for a period of not to exceed 180 days in order to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available."


[20] In Martin v. Catalanotto, 895 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir.1990), we held that a prisoner seeking only money damages in a section 1983 suit must satisfy section 1997e's exhaustion requirement even if the prison administrative procedures did not authorize the award of monetary damages. See id. at 1043 ("When a claim is truly for money damages, it will be filed in federal court after exhaustion."). Today we reconsider Martin in light of McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 117 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1992).


[21] In McCarthy, a federal prisoner filed a Bivens suit against prison officials, seeking monetary damages for alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court dismissed the suit because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the courts may impose an exhaustion requirement for the filing of Bivens complaints. The Supreme Court reversed. Because McCarthy involved a Bivens claim asserted by a federal prisoner, the exhaustion requirement of section 1997e did not apply. Nevertheless, the defendants in McCarthy argued that section 1997e's exhaustion requirement for section 1983 suits represented a congressional policy favoring exhaustion of prison grievance procedures before filing constitutional claims against prison officials in federal court. Rejecting this argument, the Court noted that section 1997e specifically conditioned the exhaustion requirement on the existence of "effective administrative remedies" and emphasized that the prison grievance procedures at issue did not provide for the award of money damages. Id. at 150, 153-55, 112 S. Ct. at 1089, 1091.*fn5


[22] Although McCarthy involved a Bivens suit by a federal prisoner, we have applied its reasoning to other types of prisoner suits. Arvie v. Stalder, 53 F.3d 702, 5th Cir.1995 (section 1983 suit); Rourke v. Thompson, 11 F.3d 47 (5th Cir.1993) (section 2241 petition). In Rourke, we held that a prisoner seeking only injunctive relief must exhaust prison administrative procedures before filing suit in federal court. Id. at 50. In Arvie, we held that a state prisoner seeking both injunctive and monetary relief must exhaust prison administrative procedures before filing a section 1983 suit in federal court. Marsh's case presents a third scenario: whether a state prisoner seeking only money damages under section 1983 must exhaust prison administrative remedies or face dismissal of his suit under section 1997e. The import of McCarthy is clear: A district court should not require exhaustion under section 1997e if the prisoner seeks only monetary damages and the prison grievance system does not afford such a remedy. Accordingly, we hold that a district court cannot invoke section 1997e to require a state prisoner seeking only money damages to exhaust prison administrative remedies that do not authorize monetary relief. See Prunty v. Branson, 1993 WL 328037 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 1993), 7 F.3d 234 (table) (holding that state prisoner seeking only money damages in section 1983 suit need not exhaust administrative remedies if such remedies do not provide for the award of money damages) (citing McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 149-151, 112 S. Ct. at 1089). To the extent that our decision in Martin is inconsistent with this holding, we believe it has been in substance overruled by McCarthy.*fn6


[23] Section 1997e provides that the district court should grant an inmate a continuance "in order to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective remedies as are available." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1). Although the language of the statute does not explicitly grant a district court the power to dismiss a suit, we have held that a district court has the power to dismiss section 1983 suits, following a section 1997e continuance, if a prisoner fails to exhaust his administrative remedies. Rocky v. Vittorie, 813 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir.1987). In so holding, we reasoned, "without the prospect of such a dismissal, a prisoner could circumvent the exhaustion requirement by simply doing nothing for ninety days and then resuming his litigation in the district court." Id. However, the court in Rocky held that, before dismissing a suit with prejudice under section 1997e, the district court must determine whether the plaintiff "made a good faith attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies." Id. at 737. In Arvie, we again recognized a district court's power to dismiss a prisoner's suit under section 1997e for failure to make a good faith attempt to exhaust administrative remedies. Arvie at .


[24] The district court dismissed Marsh's case under section 1997e. Because the prison had already rejected Marsh's administrative grievance as untimely, her administrative remedies were foreclosed, and a continuance would have served no purpose. When a section 1997e continuance would serve no purpose, a district court still has the power to dismiss a prisoner's suit under section 1997e for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The reasoning of Rocky applies in this context. Without the prospect of a dismissal with prejudice, a prisoner could evade the exhaustion requirement by filing no administrative grievance or by intentionally filing an untimely one, thereby foreclosing administrative remedies and gaining access to a federal forum without exhausting administrative remedies. Rocky, 813 F.2d at 736. Thus, we hold that a district court has the power to dismiss a prisoner's section 1983 suit under section 1997e even when administrative relief is time-barred or otherwise precluded.*fn7


[25] Applying these holdings to Marsh's case, we must first determine whether the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (LDPSC) administrative procedures permit Marsh to recover monetary damages for her claims. In her brief, Marsh asserts that the prison administrative procedures do not permit the recovery of monetary damages for her personal injury claim and cap the maximum recovery for property damage claims at fifty dollars. Our research reveals that Marsh's characterization of the relief available in the Louisiana prison administrative procedures is partly erroneous. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997, the Louisiana legislature enacted LSA-RS 15:1171 et seq., the enabling statute authorizing the LDPSC to promulgate an Administrative Remedy Procedure (ARP) for inmate complaints against the state. The enabling statute provides that the ARP will dispose of all inmate complaints and grievances against the state and that "such complaints and grievances include but are not limited to any and all claims seeking monetary, injunctive, declaratory, or any other form of relief authorized by law and by way of illustration includes actions pertaining to conditions of confinement, personal injuries, medical malpractice, [and] time computations...." LSA-RS 15:1171(B). LSA-RS 15:1171(C) provides that "the department or sheriff may also ... promulgate rules and regulations governing the recommendation, review, and approval of an award for monetary relief." LSA-RS 15:1171(C). We note that LSA-RS 15:1171 did not originally authorize the LDPSC to award money damages. See Bellard v. Louisiana Correctional & Indus. Sch., 647 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (La.Ct.App.3d Cir.1994) (describing 1989 amendments to LSA 15:1171 that explicitly granted the LDPSC the authority to award money damages); Gibson v. Barnes, 597 So. 2d 176, 177 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.1992) ("[LSA-RS 15:1171] was amended [on June 30, 1989] ... to provide that administrative remedy procedures could be adopted to resolve complaints and grievances including actions pertaining to conditions of confinement as well as personal injuries, medical malpractice, and other tort actions....").*fn8


[26] In her section 1983 complaint, Marsh sought monetary damages for Defendants' deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs as well as for damage to her engagement ring. Marsh characterizes her deliberate indifference claim as a claim for money damages for personal injury and she could thus obtain monetary damages through the LDPSC administrative remedies. Before dismissing Marsh's case pursuant to section 1997e, the district court adopted the magistrate Judge's report determining that Marsh failed to offer a justifiable explanation for her failure to make a good faith attempt to exhaust her administrative remedies. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's dismissal of Marsh's personal injury claim pursuant to section 1997e was well within its broad discretion.


[27] Marsh also argues that the district court erred in dismissing her claim based on the damage to her ring because its value exceeds the fifty-dollar limit on recovery for lost or damaged property under the prison ARP. The magistrate Judge rejected this argument, reasoning that the extent of the loss is best evaluated at the time of the loss instead of several months later. We need not address this argument because we hold that Martin's claim seeking money damages for the damage to her engagement ring is not actionable under section 1983. In considering Marsh's section 1983 claim based on damage to her engagement ring, our first inquiry is whether Marsh was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-148, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2695-96, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979) ("Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under traditional tort-law principles.").


[28] In her complaint, Marsh alleged that Defendants "breached a duty owed to plaintiff; and are liable for damages." Specifically, Marsh alleged that a leaking or sweating air conditioning unit made the floor wet and that Defendants failed to warn inmates of the wet floor, and that, as a result of Defendants' conduct, she slipped and damaged her ring. Because Marsh's claim for damage to her engagement ring is a garden-variety negligence claim, we hold that it is not actionable under section 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986) (holding that negligence is not actionable under section 1983); see also Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 965, 112 S. Ct. 2323, 119 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1992) ("Not every common law tort committed by state or local government officials is actionable under § 1983.") (citation omitted).


[29] Conclusion


[30] For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.



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Opinion Footnotes

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[31] *fn1 Marsh's complaint named Warden Johnnie Jones; Deputy Warden Nellie Fanguy; Richard Stalder, the Secretary for the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections; Dr. Raynando Banks, a former prison doctor; and Jeannette Jones, the prison's Director of Medical Treatment; as defendants.


[32] *fn2 Marsh received nine stitches at Earl K. Long Hospital as a result of her fall. In her section 1983 suit, Marsh complains that prison officials refused to take her back to the hospital for the removal of the stitches and instead arranged for Dr. Banks, a prison doctor, to remove them. Marsh also claims that Dr. Banks delayed in removing her stitches until mid-July 1993 and that this delay resulted in an enlarged scar.


[33] *fn3 Marsh's grievance is dated October 13, 1993, but the prison's stamp indicates that it was not received until October 25, 1993. Even if Marsh did file her grievance on October 13, 1993, it would still be untimely because the incident occurred on June 24, 1993, and the stitches were removed in July 1993.


[34] *fn4 In the prayer for relief in her complaint, Marsh stated that she was seeking "compensation for personal injury and damaged property ... [and] damages in compensation for constitutional injury, [and] civil rights violations ..." In her administrative grievance complaint, Marsh also stated the relief that she was seeking: "I'm seeking Judicial Relief for damages for personal injury, civil rights violations, constitutional violations, and damages for my personal engagement ring."


[35] *fn5 Discussing section 1997e's requirement of effective administrative remedies, the Court looked to the House Conference Committee Report, which stated: " "It is the intent of the Congress that the court not find such a requirement [of exhaustion] appropriate in those situations in which the action brought ... raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved by the grievance resolution system.' " Id. at 151 & n. 4, 112 S. Ct. at 1089 & n. 4 (quoting H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 96-897 at 15 (1980)). The Court also pointed to the following statement from the Department of Justice: " "Presumably, where monetary relief was the sole adequate remedy and could not be obtained through a grievance procedure, exhaustion would not be appropriate.' " Id. (citing 46 Fed.Reg. 3845 (1981)).


[36] *fn6 Our decision in Rourke foreshadowed McCarthy's abrogation of Martin. In Rourke, we emphasized that "the linchpin of the McCarthy holding was the failure of the prescribed administrative remedies to provide for the monetary damages sought by the prisoner." Rourke, 11 F.3d at 50.


[37] *fn7 We observe that our holding need not produce harsh or unjust results. First, the plain language of section 1997e provides that a district court should require exhaustion only "if the court believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of Justice." Second, under Rocky, a district court may only dismiss a suit under section 1997e after determining that the prisoner failed to make a good faith attempt to exhaust administrative remedies. Rocky, 813 F.2d at 736. Third, we note that section 1997e does not require a district court to insist on exhaustion in every case. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 149-151, 112 S. Ct. at 1089 ("If an inmate fails to meet filing deadlines under an administrative scheme, a court has ample discretion to determine that exhaustion nonetheless should be forgone."). Fourth, section 1997e(a)(2) requires that the state administrative procedures meet certain minimum standards. See Martin v. Catalanotto, 895 F.2d 1040, 1042 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that the administrative remedy procedures promulgated by Louisiana meet section 1997e's minimum requirements).


[38] *fn8 When the inmates in Martin filed suit, LDPSC regulations did not permit an inmate to recover money damages through the prison ARP. Martin, 895 F.2d at 1042 ("It is true, of course, that money damages cannot be granted by the Louisiana procedure.").



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