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Alabama Ad Seg Publication Ban Struck Down

On March 20, 2000, a Federal Magistrate recommended declaratory relief striking down a ban on subscription publications in the Alabama Department of Corrections' (DOC) Administrative Segregation (Ad Seg) unit.

This recommendation follows a previous ruling where the Court held, after a bench trial, that the Ad Seg ban on the receipt of subscription magazines and newspapers violated the First Amendment. Both declaratory and injunctive relief were ordered. The Magistrate examined Administrative Regulation 433 (AR 433), in effect since 1987, and five facilityspecific versions known as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS), "policy statements issued at the institutional level to implement the [AR]." While the SOPS were very inconsistent, and sometimes even conflicted with AR 433, the Magistrate held the SOPS to extend no more broadly than the AR itself which generally authorized only one religious book, one additional book or magazine from the facility library, and one Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous book while in Ad Seg.

The bulk of the original order was spent analyzing John Spellman's claims under the standard of review for constitutional claims set forth in Turner v. Safley, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987). In Turner, the Supreme Court held that a prison regulation impinging on constitutional rights is valid if it is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." The Turner court established a four prong analytical framework: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and a legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional right that remain open to the prisoners; (3) whether, and the extent to which, accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on staff, prisoners, and the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) whether the regulation represents an exaggerated response to prison concerns.

Against this framework the Magistrate concluded that AR 433 is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and a "permanent, acrosstheboard, and (in some cases) lifetime prohibition of all subscription publications in administrative segregationwhere there are virtually no alternative publications available, and [where] there is no punitive justification for the restrictionoffends the Constitution even under the most deferential standard."

AR 433 was subsequently amended on January 10, 2000. While the DOC claimed the case was now moot, the Magistrate disagreed recommended against injunctive relief as moot. The newly amended AR 433 now allows Ad Seg prisoners to receive up to four subscription publications (any combination of newspapers and magazines) while housed in Ad Seg. Subscriptions in excess of four must be cancelled within 30 days of arriving in Ad Seg.

While the parties agreed to this result, the bulk of the 2000 recommendation centers around a single disputed phrase that limits prisoner Ad Seg subscriptions to prisoners "who have been authorized while housed in general population to subscribe [to] and receive personal newspapers and/or magazines ...." Essentially, the phrase identifies qualified prisoners as all prisoners formerly in general population, which is redundant.

The plaintiffs want the phrase removed because of the legitimate fear that it "has been, and may be in the future, misinterpreted and used to do mischief by those applying the amended regulation." The defendants argue that it must remain because a "prison official at some point wrote this phrase, whatever its intended meaning." They also claim it informs new prisoners that if they had been subscribing to more than four publications while in general population that they must cancel the excess subscriptions. The magistrate disagreed but recommended against declaring the phrase in violation of the Constitution holding that there is no immediate threat to the plaintiffs and thus it has not ripened into an actual controversy suitable for declaratory judgment. The defendants did not appeal the original ruling striking down the Ad Seg publication ban.

The successful result of this litigation was due to the efforts of the Southern Poverty Law Center and Rhonda Brownstein. Readers should note that at this point only Washington enforces a ban on publications in their control units. See: Spellman v. Hopper, Case No. 95 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (MD AL 1999)

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Related legal case

Spellman v. Hopper

Post Trial Brief of the Defendant at 4-5. Defendant also cites two cases in his brief which he says recognize "deterrence of rule infractions" as a legitimate penological interest: Gregory v. Auger, 768 F.2d 287, 290 (8th Cir., 1985), and Daigre v. Maggio, 719 F.2d 1310, 1313 (5th Cir.1983). Finally, defendant's post-trial brief asserts in connection with the discipline rationale that some inmates want to be in an administrative segregation setting for a variety of reasons. If everything was allowed in administrative segregation that was allowed in general population then more and more inmates would want to go to those lockdown units as they would not have to put up with the day-to [-]day problems and activities they have to encounter in general population. It is much nicer in a single cell, working on lawsuits all day, rather than being outside in the hot sun, hoeing a field. There is no need to add to the attractiveness of a single cell by allowing books, magazines and newspapers.

Post Trial Brief of the Defendant at 4-5.

Defendant's statements concerning "discipline," although not entirely clear, appear to suggest that the ban on subscription publications in Regulation 433:(1) helps correctional officials control and manage difficult inmates by "imposing" discipline; (2) "helps in the rehabilitation of inmates"; (3) deters "reentry into the prison system"; (4) deters "rule infractions"; and (5) deters inmates from seeking assignment to administrative segregation.

The court has some difficulty understanding the first of these rationales. It appears that defendant contends that the *1281 purpose of the regulation is to make inmates in administrative segregation behave properly. However, defendant has offered no evidence that the rule achieves or could achieve this purpose. The state deprives administrative segregation inmates of subscription reading material under Regulation 433 before any specific infraction occurs, and without any exception for good behavior. Administered in this way, the rule logically could have neither punitive nor deterrent value, as it is not linked to the occurrence or non-occurrence of any specific offense.

If the regulation is meant to punish administrative segregation inmates solely for being problem inmates in general, without reference to any specific rule infraction, then the regulation may achieve its purpose (that is, of making life for these inmates more unpleasant)-but the legitimacy of the government interest in such status-based punishment is questionable. See Guajardo, 568 F.Supp. at 1366 ("A blanket denial of [the right to receive publications] solely for the purpose of punishment, and not for a legitimate goal of the [department of corrections] in maintaining security or order or in facilitating rehabilitation, would be unconstitutional."). Finally, if the rule is meant to constitute additional punishment for the crimes that brought these inmates into the prison system-assuming that imposing such additional punishment is permissible without due process-there is no reason, for example, that it should not be applied to death row inmates, who presumably committed the crimes most deserving of opprobrium. The court simply cannot discern a valid, rational connection between the purpose asserted and any legitimate government interest in discipline from the evidence before it.FN25
FN25. To the extent that defendant claims that the subscription ban helps him manage and control inmate behavior concerning inmate property, the rationale advanced has been previously addressed in the context of the government's interest in security.
Similarly, if Regulation 433"helps in the rehabilitation of inmates," as defendant asserts, the court cannot determine how it does so, at least on this record. On the contrary, the only relevant testimony at the hearing tended to show that deprivation of reading materials in segregation caused "psychological deterioration," which in turn caused inmates either to be "very withdrawn, and curl up in infancy, or they become acting out and aggressive people." Tr.-1 at 126.

Defendant's claim that the ban on subscription publications deters "reentry into the prison system" is perhaps a more plausible justification, but this could be asserted about any condition of confinement, no matter how harsh, that makes incarceration unpleasant. Further, defendant presented no evidence in support of its suggestion that Regulation 433 actually has some general or specific deterrent value. Absent such evidence, the court is unwilling to assume that would-be criminals consider the relative lack of reading materials in administrative segregation before breaking the law-and possibly desist as a result. In addition, if decreasing rates of recidivism were indeed defendant's purpose in promulgating the regulation, this rule logically would also apply to general population, death row, and protective custody inmates, not just to administrative segregation inmates.
Defendant's contention that the subscription ban deters "rule infractions" also lacks both logic and evidentiary support. Again, the rule applies whether or not an inmate commits an infraction; thus, it provides no incentive for good behavior. However, defendant's reference to the Gregory and Daigre cases from the Eighth and Fifth circuits, respectively, suggests that he may intend to make a different argument. In both Gregory and Daigre, temporary restrictions on prisoners' receipt of certain mail (including subscription publications) in disciplinary segregation FN26*1282 were upheld in part because such restrictions made disciplinary segregation more onerous-which, in turn, discouraged inmates from rule infractions that would result in segregation. See Gregory, 768 F.2d at 290; Daigre, 719 F.2d at 1313; see also Guajardo, 568 F.Supp. at 1366 (Permitting inmates in solitary confinement access to books, magazines and newspapers may " 'water down' the conditions in solitary and make the threat of solitary confinement meaningless.").FN27 However, the reasoning of these cases does not apply to administrative segregation inmates, because such segregation is not imposed in the Alabama prison system for disciplinary infractions. P.Ex. 16 (Defendant's admission # 9); Tr.-1 at 159.

FN26. The rule in Daigre applied to "administrative and punitive lockdown," but the context makes it clear that the plaintiff in that case was in fact in some form of disciplinary segregation. Daigre, 719 F.2d at 1312.
FN27. The Gregory court found it significant that the policies in question were "not directed at what mail an inmate could receive, but only at when he could receive it." Gregory, 768 F.2d at 290 (disciplinary segregation was for no longer than sixty days.). Here, of course, the subscription ban can apply indefinitely.
Finally, defendant's argument that Regulation 433 deters inmates-who allegedly prefer to "work[ ] on lawsuits all day, rather than being outside in the hot sun, hoeing a field"-from seeking assignment to administrative segregation utterly lacks evidentiary support. The court has before it no basis on which it could conclude that the alternative to administrative segregation in Alabama is farm work, that inmates actually prefer the restrictive conditions of administrative segregation to hoeing, or that the floodgates will open and inundate the prison system with inmates clamoring for a single cell if subscription publications are allowed. Defendant's argument might have more force if applied to disciplinary segregation, where prisoners arguably choose assignment to this classification by breaking rules. See Daigre, 719 F.2d at 1313 ("Left free to write to anyone in the world and to receive literature of any kind, a prisoner might find punitive isolation desirable, offering solitude and leisure as an alternative to the ordinary conditions of prison work and life."). However, inmates may be placed in administrative segregation, for example, pending the completion of an investigation or a disciplinary due process hearing, as a result of assignment to close or maximum custody, as an initial placement upon a sentence to life imprisonment without parole, or during evaluation or outpatient treatment for psychological problems. In this connection, inmates certainly do not choose administrative segregation in any straightforward sense, so the deterrent value of the publications rule is, again, doubtful.

For the forgoing reasons, the court cannot conclude that there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and a legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it, even under the deferential standard that the court applies to restrictions on First Amendment rights in the prison context. Any other view of this case would render the reasonableness standard toothless, despite the confidence of the United States Supreme Court that this standard will not be so applied. Abbott, 490 U.S. at 412, 109 S.Ct. 1874.
B. Alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional right.

The parties agree that the court must view the constitutional right at issue in this case "sensibly and expansively." Id. at 417, 109 S.Ct. 1874. However, they disagree on the definition of that right. Defendant contends that the right in question is "the ability to receive information." Post Trial Brief of Defendant at 5. Plaintiff argues that this right should be more narrowly defined as "the right to receive information that is intellectually stimulating and of interest to him [the plaintiff]." Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 12 (emphasis in original). Neither party cites case law defining the right in question. After looking to relevant cases for guidance, the court declines to adopt either definition *1283 offered by the parties and instead follows the Supreme Court's practice when it has reviewed alternatives available to inmates in the context of restrictions on publications in prison.

Two Supreme Court cases concerning such restrictions provide some assistance. In Abbott, the Court approved regulations authorizing wardens to reject publications mailed to prisoners under certain circumstances (e.g., where the publications were detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution). Although it discussed whether alternative means were open for exercising the right in question, the Court did not specifically define that right. Id. at 416, 109 S.Ct. 1874. Instead, the Court reviewed the alternative publications available to inmates, and determined in that case that "[a]s the regulations at issue in the present case permit a broad range of publications to be sent, received, and read, this factor is clearly satisfied." Id. The Court did not canvass prisoners' other options for receiving information (e.g., television, radio, correspondence, visitation) but considered publications exclusively.

Similarly, in Bell v. Wolfish, a pre- Turner case, the Court discussed only "alternative means of obtaining reading material" in deciding whether to uphold restrictions placed on prisoners' receipt of hard back books to prevent the introduction of contraband into prison. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). As in Abbott, the Bell Court did not inquire whether radios, televisions, correspondence, or other means of obtaining information were available to prisoners. Instead, it considered only those written publications available to prisoners as alternatives for exercising the right in question. The Court observed that [t]he restriction, as it is now before us, allows soft-bound books and magazines to be received from any source and hardback books to be received from publishers, bookstores, and book clubs. In addition, the MCC has a "relatively large" library for use by inmates. Id. Accordingly, following Abbott and Bell, this court will consider the written publications available to administrative segregation inmates in order to assess their alternative means of exercising their First Amendment right to receive published written materials through the mail.FN28

FN28. Radio, of course, is the only alternative news, information and entertainment medium available to administrative segregation inmates in this case, because television is expressly forbidden. The court does not address whether media such as radio or television are fairly viewed as alternatives to the printed word because it follows the Supreme Court's implicit practice of confining its review of alternatives to written publications in cases similar to this one. However, the court notes that there is considerable popular and academic literature distinguishing the experience of reading from that of watching television or listening to radio. See, e.g., McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man; see also Mann, 796 F.2d at 83 ("Whatever the intrinsic merits of television in comparison with newspapers and magazines, the contents of television are different from what one finds in the printed media.").
In approving the restrictions in question, the Bell Court took some comfort from the fact that inmates retained access to an extensive prison library, as well as numerous other publications. The general library described in Bell consisted of more than 3,000 hardback books, which include general reference texts and fiction and nonfiction works, and more than 5,000 assorted paperbacks, including fiction and nonfiction. The MCC offers for sale to inmates four daily newspapers and certain magazines. Other paperback books and magazines are donated periodically and distributed among the units for inmate use.
Id. at n. 33 (citations omitted). Further, as noted above, inmates could receive soft-bound books and magazines from any source and hardback books from publishers, bookstores, and book clubs. Id. at 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Similarly, the Abbott*1284 Court seemed to approve the "broad range of publications" available to inmates as alternatives to excluded publications. Despite the restriction upheld in Abbott, inmates could still receive a large number of books, magazines, newspapers, advertising brochures, flyers and catalogs. Abbott, 490 U.S. at 405 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (defining "publications").

In this case, inmates in administrative segregation cannot have any subscription magazines and newspapers. They have no access whatsoever to a newspaper of any kind, even through the prison library. They can obtain only one non-subscription magazine FN29 or book monthly from the prison library, in addition to the single religious book, Alcoholics Anonymous book and Narcotics Anonymous book that are permitted.
FN29. At Easterling, it appears that such inmates may not have magazines of any kind, even from the library.
Neither plaintiff nor defendant presented any testimony comprehensively describing the written publications available to inmates in Alabama from each institution's library. However, according to plaintiff-at least at Donaldson-the magazines available in the prison libraries are not generally current issues, because they are donated by general population inmates when they are finished with them. Tr.-1 at 19. The library at Donaldson does not have its own subscriptions to magazines. Id. Plaintiff is not sure what magazine titles are available from the library-he orders books because they last longer, and there is no list of magazines or books to choose from. However, plaintiff has himself seen only "common magazines" such as National Geographic, Time and Newsweek. Id. at 17-19. Plaintiff has never seen any newspaper in the library at Donaldson. Id. at 19. Defendant offered no evidence to contradict plaintiff's testimony concerning Donaldson or to show that more publications were available at any other correctional facility.
While the court cannot conclude from this testimony that no alternative reading material is available to administrative segregation inmates, the inmates' choices clearly are profoundly limited. Although religious works such as the Bible and the Koran undeniably reward re-reading, there is still a limit to the number of hours-in a potentially indefinite period of confinement in administrative lockdown-that an inmate can consume in studying these texts. Cf. Abbott, 490 U.S at 417 n. 15, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (referring to Dostoyevsky's The House of the Dead, in which prisoners were permitted to read only the Bible). The court has not seen copies of the Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous books that are permitted but, again, these surely can be read in a matter of days or weeks. Further, with regard to other books and magazines available from the prison library, plaintiff testified:

[B]ecause I read fairly fast, """ I will use a magazine in 30 to 45 minutes. A large book might last me two days, maybe. It's just a matter of trying to get it, you know, to stretch out a little longer.

Tr.-1 at 20. Even administrative segregation inmates who do not read so fast clearly experience many days in each month in which they have exhausted their reading material. On such days (which would considerably outnumber the days when unread materials are available) inmates' alternative ways of exercising the right in question are not just profoundly limited-they are nil. Under the circumstances, the court cannot conclude that meaningful alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional right remain open to administrative segregation inmates during the majority of the time that they are in this status.
C. The impact on prison staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources generally of accommodation of the asserted right.

Defendant suggests that allowing inmates in administrative segregation to receive*1285 subscription magazines or newspapers would cause correctional officials to spend more time searching such publications for contraband. Tr.-1 at 137 ("It just would-it takes longer to shakedown, the more material that's in there."); see also Tr.-2 at 7 ("[I]t takes time to process the materials into the lockdown units."). Defendant did not present testimony explaining exactly how magazines and newspapers are searched in the Alabama prison system. Tr.-2 at 34.FN30 Nor did he attempt to quantify the total amount of additional time that correctional officers would need to process mail into prisons or conduct shakedowns of cells if administrative segregation inmates had the same access to subscription magazines as did the general population, death row and protective custody. Nor did Defendant argue that such searches will actually require additional staff.
FN30. Administrative Regulation 301, which concerns institutional security, simply instructs correctional officers to "[s]earch all envelopes, books, packages, magazines for contraband being concealed within these items." P.Ex. 3 at 2(b)(13). In addition, defendant's expert was asked at the hearing how magazines are searched for contraband:

Q. Is that how it's done in Alabama? Do they turn each page before they give a magazine to someone in general population?

A. I couldn't tell you. I haven't stood there and watched them go over it, page by page, to do it. You can do it that way, you can put it through a fluoroscope to determine if it can detect any items in it. But it has to be looked at""""

Thus, the evidence before the court concerning the effect of any change in Regulation 433 on prison resources is limited. From the information that the court does have, however, it appears that the expansion of mail privileges sought by plaintiff would likely have minimal consequences for a prison system of this size. Again, as of April 1997, there were only six or seven hundred inmates in administrative segregation throughout the state prison system. Tr.-1 at 148. The total number of inmates housed by the Alabama Department of Corrections at this time was 19,892, so administrative segregation inmates comprised at most approximately 3.5 percent of the total. Of these inmates, the majority could not afford magazine or newspaper subscriptions, according to defendant. Tr.-2 at 10 ("the majority of the inmates in any prison-and I don't think Alabama is any different than most of them-might be worse than most of them-have very little money, and the majority of them wouldn't be able to subscribe to a magazine or newspaper."). In addition, perhaps 40 percent of inmates are illiterate. See Tr.-1 at 108; see also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969) ("Jails and penitentiaries include among their inmates a high percentage of persons who are totally or functionally illiterate, whose educational attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited."); Austin v. Hopper, 15 F.Supp.2d 1210, 1238 n. 101 (M.D.Ala.1998) ("In a 1996 DOC ranking of the 21,320 inmates in Alabama's prison population, the average educational level was the tenth grade, but the average reading level was below the sixth grade; more than 30% of the inmate population read at the third-grade level or below."). Given the fact that subscription magazines are sent to inmates by publishers rather than family or friends-and, thus, are unlikely to conceal contraband FN31-any additional contraband searches in the mail room may not be particularly onerous.FN32 Further, shakedowns in administrative segregation cells should be less difficult to *1286 conduct for these inmates than for general population inmates permitted to receive magazines and newspapers because the latter, again, have much greater access to contraband. See Note 18, supra. Accordingly, any additional time or trouble to prison staff caused by accommodation of the right in question appears, in context, to be de minimis.
FN31. In Bell, the warden testified, and the Court appeared to accept, that " 'there is relatively little risk that material received directly from a publisher or book club would contain contraband""""' " Bell, 441 U.S. at 549, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
FN32. Under Administrative Regulation 303, "[i]nmates shall not be utilized to handle mail." P.Ex. 4 at XVIII. In contrast, inmates do handle magazines and books delivered from the library on the book cart-and sometimes pass on contraband by this means. Tr.-2 at 56.
This conclusion is underscored by defendant's own policies. The Administrative Regulations and SOP's before the court reflect no limit on the quantity of mail (excluding packages) that inmates normally may receive, and that correctional officials therefore must search. See P.Ex. 4, 9. Also, the prison permits inmates to accumulate as much property as can be stored in a personal locker or similar storage area. P.Ex. 4.; P.Ex. 10. Thus, prison officials have already committed the resources necessary to conduct searches for contraband: (1) in the mail room, for as much mail as happens to arrive for inmates on any given day, an amount which is clearly variable; and (2) in individual cells, for as much material (publications or otherwise) as can fit in a storage box. Accommodation of the right asserted in this case obviously fits within the tolerances established by these policies. Accordingly, the court concludes that any burden resulting from the exercise of the right would be negligible, at best. Certainly the impact of a change in Regulation 433 would not be "significantly less liberty and safety for everyone else, guards and other prisoners alike.' " Abbott, 490 U.S. at 417, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 92, 107 S.Ct. 2254).
D. The regulation as an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns.

The Supreme Court has suggested that one way to determine whether a regulation represents an exaggerated response to the prison's concerns is to look at available alternatives. "The existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an exaggerated response to prison concerns"""" But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, the court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard." Id. at 418, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, plaintiff argues that defendant has an "easy, cost-free" alternative to banning all subscription publications in administrative segregation: to limit the quantity of newspapers and magazines allowed to a reasonable number (e.g., the number permitted in the general population, death row, and administrative segregation) and to enforce current regulations restricting personal property to the amount that will fit in approved storage containers.

The court agrees that the existence of this alternative-which would address security, fire, and sanitation concerns without otherwise altering the prison's existing rules-constitutes evidence that defendant's response is indeed exaggerated. Further, the fact that other correctional systems readily permit administrative segregation inmates more reading material than does the state of Alabama also suggests that defendant has overreacted. See, e.g., P.Ex. 15 at 14 (Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations); see also P.Ex. 17 at 6 (State of New York Department of Correctional Services regulations) (allowing 10 books, magazines or newspapers after 30 days in administrative segregation); P.Ex. 20 at 6 (Pelican Bay State Prison regulations) (permitting 10 books and magazines in administrative segregation and implicitly permitting newspapers up to 14 days old). In addition, the American Correctional Association Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions (ACA standards) affirm that inmates in segregation "should be provided a sufficient quantity of reading materials and have an opportunity to borrow reading materials from the institution's library," and that administrative segregation library services should generally *1287 be similar to those for the general population. P.Ex. 21.FN33 These examples strongly suggest that Regulation 433's absolute ban on subscription publications in administrative segregation is exaggerated.

FN33. Even defendant's own expert seemed to believe that one book or magazine once a month from the prison library was inadequate. Newsome testified: "My personal opinion is, I would like to see them have more of an opportunity to get the reading materials." Tr.-2 at 17.

III. Conclusion.

Although prison officials may find it inconvenient to give administrative segregation inmates reasonable access to subscription newspapers and magazines, defendant has not suggested how such access is actually inconsistent with any legitimate prison function. See Mann, 796 F.2d at 83. This is not to say that restricting inmates from receiving such publications for a limited period of time FN34 and for specific fire, security or health reasons is not permissible.FN35 But an a priori, permanent, across-the-board, and (in some cases) lifetime prohibition of all subscription publications in administrative segregation-where there are virtually no alternative publications available, and there is no punitive justification for the restriction-offends the Constitution even under the most deferential standard.

FN34. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 551, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (approving publishers-only rule limited to maximum of 60 days); Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1082 (4th Cir.1993) (finding denial of certain publications had minimal impact when detainees held 60 days or less); Auger, 768 F.2d at 290 (upholding temporary deprivation of mail in disciplinary detention); cf. Austin, 15 F.Supp.2d at 1236 (permanent elimination of visitation rights could present "a question of constitutional breach.").
FN35. For example, an inmate who actually set fires, violently resisted disposal of old newspapers, made weapons, or persistently refused to clean his cell might reasonably be subject to restrictions on his receipt of publications.
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the MAGISTRATE JUDGE that the court enter judgment for plaintiff in this case, and grant appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiff is hereby DIRECTED to submit a proposed draft of a permanent declaratory and injunctive order for the court's review, and a brief addressing the legal standards applicable to fashioning an appropriate remedy in this case-if the court must in fact approve any remedy-on or before September 7, 1999. Defendant's response to this submission is due on September 21, 1999. Plaintiff may reply on or before September 28, 1999.

The Clerk of the Court is ORDERED to file the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and to serve by mail a copy thereof on the parties to this action. The parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said Recommendation within a period of thirteen days from the date of mailing to them. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir.1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981), en banc, adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.