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Washington Medical Claim Reinstated
The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-peals reversed part of a grant of summary judgment to Washington State Penitentiary (WSP) officials in an Eighth Amendment challenge of WSP medical policies and practices.
WSP prisoner Garrett Linderman sued WSP officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to WSP officials on all claims, and Linderman appealed.
The Court of Appeals decision does not recite the facts of the case. Linderman appeared, though, to raise four challenges to WSP's medical policies and practices: (1) denial of alternative medical treatment; (2) denial of pillows in higher-security areas of WSP; (3) a policy, causing delay in treatment, requiring that medical care be re-established by a prisoner when transferred from one WSP unit to another; and (4)deliberate delay by WSP in providing Linderman with blankets. Linderman also challenged the district court's causation analysis as faulty.
The appeals court affirmed summary judgment against Linderman on denial of alternative medical treatment. Linderman established no constitutional violation, only a "difference of opinion" over treatment.
The court reversed on Linderman's challenges to the no pillow policy and the policy requiring reestablishment of medical care. The district court analyzed these claims under the "reasonableness" standard of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The appeals court noted Turner does not apply to Eighth Amendment claims. The proper standard is "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."
The appeals court also reversed summary judgment on Linderman's claim that he was denied blankets when transferred to a different WSP unit. The appeals court held that Linderman raised triable fact issues "whether the repeated, foreseeable, and lengthy delays he experienced in getting his substitute blankets ... rises to the level of deliberate indifference."
Finally, the appeals court held that the district court's causation analysis was flawed. The district court found that Linderman did not establish "individualized causation" sufficient to prevail on his § 1983 claim. Because Linderman sought declaratory and injunctive relief, the appeals court held that the district court should have considered "the combined acts or omissions" of WSP officials.
The district court judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. On remand, the district court was instructed to appoint pro bono counsel for Linderman. This is not a ruling on the merits. This case is published in the Federal Appendix and is subject to rules governing unpublished cases. See: Linderman v. Vail, 59 Fed. Appx. 180 (9th Cir. 2003).
WSP prisoner Garrett Linderman sued WSP officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to WSP officials on all claims, and Linderman appealed.
The Court of Appeals decision does not recite the facts of the case. Linderman appeared, though, to raise four challenges to WSP's medical policies and practices: (1) denial of alternative medical treatment; (2) denial of pillows in higher-security areas of WSP; (3) a policy, causing delay in treatment, requiring that medical care be re-established by a prisoner when transferred from one WSP unit to another; and (4)deliberate delay by WSP in providing Linderman with blankets. Linderman also challenged the district court's causation analysis as faulty.
The appeals court affirmed summary judgment against Linderman on denial of alternative medical treatment. Linderman established no constitutional violation, only a "difference of opinion" over treatment.
The court reversed on Linderman's challenges to the no pillow policy and the policy requiring reestablishment of medical care. The district court analyzed these claims under the "reasonableness" standard of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The appeals court noted Turner does not apply to Eighth Amendment claims. The proper standard is "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."
The appeals court also reversed summary judgment on Linderman's claim that he was denied blankets when transferred to a different WSP unit. The appeals court held that Linderman raised triable fact issues "whether the repeated, foreseeable, and lengthy delays he experienced in getting his substitute blankets ... rises to the level of deliberate indifference."
Finally, the appeals court held that the district court's causation analysis was flawed. The district court found that Linderman did not establish "individualized causation" sufficient to prevail on his § 1983 claim. Because Linderman sought declaratory and injunctive relief, the appeals court held that the district court should have considered "the combined acts or omissions" of WSP officials.
The district court judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. On remand, the district court was instructed to appoint pro bono counsel for Linderman. This is not a ruling on the merits. This case is published in the Federal Appendix and is subject to rules governing unpublished cases. See: Linderman v. Vail, 59 Fed. Appx. 180 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Related legal case
Linderman v. Vail
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 59 Fed. Appx. 180 (9th Cir. 2003) |
| Level | Unpublished Court of Appeals |
GARRETT WADE LINDERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELDON VAIL; JOHN LAMBERT; RON KNIGHT; BARBARA CROFT; PATTI RIMA; BARRY KELLOGG, Dr.; CHRISTOPHER BOWMAN; DAVID SNELL; CAROL NOONAN, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 01-35684
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
59 Fed. Appx. 180; 2003 U.S. App.
October 11, 2002 **, Submitted, Seattle, Washington
** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
February 3, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] RULES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. D.C. No. CV-98-00388-WFN. Wm. Fremming Nielsen, Chief Judge, Presiding.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
COUNSEL: GARRETT WADE LINDERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro se, Florence, CO.
For ELDON VAIL, JOHN LAMBERT, RON KNIGHT, BARBARA CROFT, PATTI RIMA, BARRY KELLOGG, CHRISTOPHER BOWMAN, DAVID SNELL, CAROL NOONAN, Defendants-Appellees: Michael T. Mitchell, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Olympia, WA.
JUDGES: Before: BROWNING, FISHER, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION:
[*181] MEMORANDUM *
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: BROWNING, FISHER, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Garrett Wade Linderman ("Linderman") [**2] appeals pro se the district court's order granting the Washington State Penitentiary's ("WSP") motion for summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, they are not recited here.
[*182] We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Whether the prison's actions violate the Eighth Amendment is a mixed question of law and fact. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error. Id. We review the district court's legal conclusion that the facts do not demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation de novo. Id. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that he suffered from the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976). "Under traditional Eighth Amendment analysis, we first consider whether there is an 'infliction of pain,' and, if so, whether that infliction is 'unnecessary and wanton.'" Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993) [**3] (en banc). To determine if the policy is "necessary," we consider the prison's security interests. See id. at 1526-27. To determine if the infliction of pain is "wanton," we look to see if prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's serious medical needs. Id. at 1527.
A finding of deliberate indifference requires something more than negligence, but is satisfied with something less than purposefully causing the harm alleged. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). It is not enough that a prison official should have known about a risk of harm; rather, the official must actually be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn, actually draw the inference, and nonetheless disregard the risk to the inmate's health. Id. at 837. Knowledge may be inferred from evidence establishing an obvious risk of harm. Id. at 842.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Linderman's claim regarding the provision of alternative medical modalities while he was housed in higher-security areas of the prison. Linderman's claim does not allege facts sufficient to support [**4] a finding that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Rather, Linderman's claim merely raises a difference of opinion about the proper course of his medical treatment. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).
The district court, however, erred in granting summary judgment as to potential declaratory or injunctive relief on Linderman's challenges to WSP's policies prohibiting pillows in higher-security areas of the prison and requiring inmates to reestablish medical treatment upon transfer between units. In reaching its decision, the district court relied on the analysis set forth in Turner v. Safley, requiring courts to balance the rights of the inmate against the legitimate penological interests of the prison. 482 U.S. 78, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). Under Turner, "a lesser standard of scrutiny" is applied to determine the constitutionality of prison rules. Id. at 81. But the Turner analysis does not apply to Eighth Amendment claims. Hallett, 296 F.3d at 747 n.7; Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1530. We therefore reverse and remand for reconsideration of the facts [**5] under the traditional Eighth Amendment "unnecessary and wanton" analysis.
The district court also erred in granting summary judgment on Linderman's claim that he suffered the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain as a result of delays he incurred in receiving medical modalities when he was transferred into higher-security areas of the prison. "Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs when they deny, delay, or intentionally [*183] interfere with medical treatment." Hallett, 296 F.3d at 744 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Linderman raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether the repeated, foreseeable, and lengthy delays he experienced in getting his substitute blankets upon transfer to higher-security units of the prison rises to the level of deliberate indifference.
The district court also erred in its causation analysis. The district court found that Linderman could not show the individualized causation required to prevail on a section 1983 claim alleging a constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). But when a prisoner seeks injunctive or declaratory [**6] relief against prison officials, his inquiry into causation is "broader and more generalized." Id. Because Linderman seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, the district court should have considered "the combined acts or omissions of the state officials responsible for operating" the WSP. Id.
Upon remand, the district court should appoint pro bono counsel to represent Linderman. The Court expresses no opinion as to the merits of Linderman's claims. Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
No. 01-35684
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
59 Fed. Appx. 180; 2003 U.S. App.
October 11, 2002 **, Submitted, Seattle, Washington
** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
February 3, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] RULES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. D.C. No. CV-98-00388-WFN. Wm. Fremming Nielsen, Chief Judge, Presiding.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
COUNSEL: GARRETT WADE LINDERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro se, Florence, CO.
For ELDON VAIL, JOHN LAMBERT, RON KNIGHT, BARBARA CROFT, PATTI RIMA, BARRY KELLOGG, CHRISTOPHER BOWMAN, DAVID SNELL, CAROL NOONAN, Defendants-Appellees: Michael T. Mitchell, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Olympia, WA.
JUDGES: Before: BROWNING, FISHER, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION:
[*181] MEMORANDUM *
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: BROWNING, FISHER, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Garrett Wade Linderman ("Linderman") [**2] appeals pro se the district court's order granting the Washington State Penitentiary's ("WSP") motion for summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, they are not recited here.
[*182] We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Whether the prison's actions violate the Eighth Amendment is a mixed question of law and fact. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error. Id. We review the district court's legal conclusion that the facts do not demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation de novo. Id. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that he suffered from the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976). "Under traditional Eighth Amendment analysis, we first consider whether there is an 'infliction of pain,' and, if so, whether that infliction is 'unnecessary and wanton.'" Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993) [**3] (en banc). To determine if the policy is "necessary," we consider the prison's security interests. See id. at 1526-27. To determine if the infliction of pain is "wanton," we look to see if prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's serious medical needs. Id. at 1527.
A finding of deliberate indifference requires something more than negligence, but is satisfied with something less than purposefully causing the harm alleged. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). It is not enough that a prison official should have known about a risk of harm; rather, the official must actually be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn, actually draw the inference, and nonetheless disregard the risk to the inmate's health. Id. at 837. Knowledge may be inferred from evidence establishing an obvious risk of harm. Id. at 842.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Linderman's claim regarding the provision of alternative medical modalities while he was housed in higher-security areas of the prison. Linderman's claim does not allege facts sufficient to support [**4] a finding that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Rather, Linderman's claim merely raises a difference of opinion about the proper course of his medical treatment. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).
The district court, however, erred in granting summary judgment as to potential declaratory or injunctive relief on Linderman's challenges to WSP's policies prohibiting pillows in higher-security areas of the prison and requiring inmates to reestablish medical treatment upon transfer between units. In reaching its decision, the district court relied on the analysis set forth in Turner v. Safley, requiring courts to balance the rights of the inmate against the legitimate penological interests of the prison. 482 U.S. 78, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). Under Turner, "a lesser standard of scrutiny" is applied to determine the constitutionality of prison rules. Id. at 81. But the Turner analysis does not apply to Eighth Amendment claims. Hallett, 296 F.3d at 747 n.7; Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1530. We therefore reverse and remand for reconsideration of the facts [**5] under the traditional Eighth Amendment "unnecessary and wanton" analysis.
The district court also erred in granting summary judgment on Linderman's claim that he suffered the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain as a result of delays he incurred in receiving medical modalities when he was transferred into higher-security areas of the prison. "Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs when they deny, delay, or intentionally [*183] interfere with medical treatment." Hallett, 296 F.3d at 744 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Linderman raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether the repeated, foreseeable, and lengthy delays he experienced in getting his substitute blankets upon transfer to higher-security units of the prison rises to the level of deliberate indifference.
The district court also erred in its causation analysis. The district court found that Linderman could not show the individualized causation required to prevail on a section 1983 claim alleging a constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). But when a prisoner seeks injunctive or declaratory [**6] relief against prison officials, his inquiry into causation is "broader and more generalized." Id. Because Linderman seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, the district court should have considered "the combined acts or omissions of the state officials responsible for operating" the WSP. Id.
Upon remand, the district court should appoint pro bono counsel to represent Linderman. The Court expresses no opinion as to the merits of Linderman's claims. Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.