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Retroactive Residency Restrictions for Missouri Sex Offenders Unconstitutional
by Matt Clarke
On May 24, 2007, Cole County, Missouri Circuit Court Judge Patricia S. Joyce ruled that a Missouri statute requiring certain registered sex offenders to move if they lived within 1,000 feet of a school (§ 566.147, R.S.Mo.) was unconstitutional as applied to offenders who had established residences that predated the statute.
R.L., a registered Missouri sex offender, filed suit in state court after his probation officer notified him that he had violated probation by failing to move from his residence which was located within 1,000 feet of an elementary school. In 2004, the Missouri Legislature enacted § 566.147.1, which made it a Class D felony for certain sex offenders to establish a residence within 1,000 feet of a school. Effective June 5, 2006, § 566.147.1 was amended to include sex offenders who resided within 1,000 feet of a school if the school existed at the time they established their residence.
R.L. was notified that his residency constituted a Class D felony; he was instructed to stop living at that location and develop a relocation plan with an agreed upon timeframe or face revocation of his probation. R.L.’s probation officer later notified him that he had violated probation by failing to move.
R.L. challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The circuit court held that the amended version of the statute interfered with R.L.’s quiet use and enjoyment of his property. The statute was punitive because it required affected persons who lived within 1,000 feet of a school before its amendment to vacate their residences or face probation or parole revocation and felony prosecution, and was retrospective in operation. Therefore, the law was in violation of Article I, § 13 of the Missouri Constitution, which prohibits retrospective laws that impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, create new obligations, impose new duties or attach new disabilities. It also violated Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution in that it was a punitive, retrospective ex post facto law that disadvantaged and criminalized sex offenders living within 1,000 feet of a school at the time of the statute’s amendment, when such residency prior to the 2006 amendment was not criminal. Even if the Missouri legislature had a nonpunitive intent in enacting the statute, the felony criminal effect of the statute negated that intent.
The statute also violated the equal protection clauses of the Missouri Constitution (Article I, § 2 ) and the U.S. Constitution (14th Amendment ), even under the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny, the “rational relationship” test. There was no rational basis for treating those living lawfully within 1,000 feet of an existing school at the time of the statute’s amendment differently from those living within 1,000 feet of a school built after the statute’s amendment.
The amended statute also violated the due process rights set forth in Article I, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution and the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by depriving affected persons of their property rights without notice or an opportunity to be heard.
The court specifically differentiated its ruling from that of the Eighth Circuit’s opinion upholding the constitutionality of Arkansas’ sex offender residency restrictions, which contained an exemption for sex offenders living within the designated distance from a school when the statute was enacted. [See: PLN, July 2007, p.40].
The court thus declared the amended statute unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined the Missouri DOC from enforcing it against R.L. and similarly situated sex offenders. See: R.L. v. Missouri DOC, Circuit Court for Cole County, Missouri, Case No. 07AC-0000269.
On February 19, 2008, following an appeal by the state, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The Court held that “The constitutional bar on retrospective civil laws has been a part of Missouri law since this State adopted its first constitution in 1820,” citing Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 850 (Mo. banc 2006), a decision that overturned a statute requiring registration of sex offenders who committed offenses prior to the law’s effective date. [See: PLN, July 2007, p.36].
“As with the registration requirements in Phillips, the residency restrictions at issue in this case impose a new obligation upon R.L. and those similarly situated by requiring them to change their place of residence based solely upon offenses committed prior to enactment of the statute,” the Missouri Supreme Court found. See: R.L. v. State of Missouri DOC, 245 S.W.3d 236 (Mo. 2008).
Additional source: Associated Press
On May 24, 2007, Cole County, Missouri Circuit Court Judge Patricia S. Joyce ruled that a Missouri statute requiring certain registered sex offenders to move if they lived within 1,000 feet of a school (§ 566.147, R.S.Mo.) was unconstitutional as applied to offenders who had established residences that predated the statute.
R.L., a registered Missouri sex offender, filed suit in state court after his probation officer notified him that he had violated probation by failing to move from his residence which was located within 1,000 feet of an elementary school. In 2004, the Missouri Legislature enacted § 566.147.1, which made it a Class D felony for certain sex offenders to establish a residence within 1,000 feet of a school. Effective June 5, 2006, § 566.147.1 was amended to include sex offenders who resided within 1,000 feet of a school if the school existed at the time they established their residence.
R.L. was notified that his residency constituted a Class D felony; he was instructed to stop living at that location and develop a relocation plan with an agreed upon timeframe or face revocation of his probation. R.L.’s probation officer later notified him that he had violated probation by failing to move.
R.L. challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The circuit court held that the amended version of the statute interfered with R.L.’s quiet use and enjoyment of his property. The statute was punitive because it required affected persons who lived within 1,000 feet of a school before its amendment to vacate their residences or face probation or parole revocation and felony prosecution, and was retrospective in operation. Therefore, the law was in violation of Article I, § 13 of the Missouri Constitution, which prohibits retrospective laws that impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, create new obligations, impose new duties or attach new disabilities. It also violated Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution in that it was a punitive, retrospective ex post facto law that disadvantaged and criminalized sex offenders living within 1,000 feet of a school at the time of the statute’s amendment, when such residency prior to the 2006 amendment was not criminal. Even if the Missouri legislature had a nonpunitive intent in enacting the statute, the felony criminal effect of the statute negated that intent.
The statute also violated the equal protection clauses of the Missouri Constitution (Article I, § 2 ) and the U.S. Constitution (14th Amendment ), even under the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny, the “rational relationship” test. There was no rational basis for treating those living lawfully within 1,000 feet of an existing school at the time of the statute’s amendment differently from those living within 1,000 feet of a school built after the statute’s amendment.
The amended statute also violated the due process rights set forth in Article I, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution and the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by depriving affected persons of their property rights without notice or an opportunity to be heard.
The court specifically differentiated its ruling from that of the Eighth Circuit’s opinion upholding the constitutionality of Arkansas’ sex offender residency restrictions, which contained an exemption for sex offenders living within the designated distance from a school when the statute was enacted. [See: PLN, July 2007, p.40].
The court thus declared the amended statute unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined the Missouri DOC from enforcing it against R.L. and similarly situated sex offenders. See: R.L. v. Missouri DOC, Circuit Court for Cole County, Missouri, Case No. 07AC-0000269.
On February 19, 2008, following an appeal by the state, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The Court held that “The constitutional bar on retrospective civil laws has been a part of Missouri law since this State adopted its first constitution in 1820,” citing Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 850 (Mo. banc 2006), a decision that overturned a statute requiring registration of sex offenders who committed offenses prior to the law’s effective date. [See: PLN, July 2007, p.36].
“As with the registration requirements in Phillips, the residency restrictions at issue in this case impose a new obligation upon R.L. and those similarly situated by requiring them to change their place of residence based solely upon offenses committed prior to enactment of the statute,” the Missouri Supreme Court found. See: R.L. v. State of Missouri DOC, 245 S.W.3d 236 (Mo. 2008).
Additional source: Associated Press
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Related legal cases
R.L. v. Missouri DOC
| Year | 2008 |
|---|---|
| Cite | Circuit Court for Cole County, Missouri, Case No. 07AC-0000269 |
| Level | State Trial Court |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
No other information is currently available.
R.L. v. State of Missouri DOC
| Year | 2008 |
|---|---|
| Cite | (Mo. 2008) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Injunction Status | N/A |
R.L., Respondent, vs. State of Missouri Department of Corrections, Appellant.
No. SC88644
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
245 S.W.3d 236
February 19, 2008, Decided
OPINION
[*236] The Missouri Department of Corrections appeals from a judgment declaring that section 566.147, RSMo 2006, is an unconstitutional retrospective law under article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution. The judgment is affirmed.
FACTS
In December 2005, R.L. pled guilty to attempted enticement of a child in violation of 566.151, RSMo 2000. He received a three-year suspended execution of sentence, was placed on probation for five years, and was required to register as a sex offender. At the time R.L pled guilty, there was no provision in Missouri law restricting where he could live based upon his status as a sex offender. R.L. has resided at his current residence since 1997. A grade school is within 1,000 feet of this [*237] residence. The school has been at that location since 1988.
In June 2006, section 566.147, RSMo Supp. 2006, became effective, so that those convicted of attempted enticement of a child and similar crimes against minors were prohibited from residing "within one thousand feet of a public school as defined in section 160.011, RSMo, or [**2] any private school giving instruction in a grade or grades not higher than the twelfth grade, or a child-care facility as defined in section 210.201, RSMo, which is in existence at the time the individual begins to reside at the location."
The department of corrections informed R.L. that pursuant to the new residency restrictions in 566.147, he was committing a felony by residing within 1,000 feet of a school and that he needed to establish a plan to relocate. The department further informed R.L. that he could be subject to prosecution if he did not move.
R.L. filed a petition for preliminary and permanent injunction and a petition for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Cole County. The circuit court declared that section 566.147, RSMo Supp. 2006, is an unconstitutional retrospective law with respect to R.L. and other similarly situated registered sex offenders who already resided within 1,000 feet of a school or child care facility at the time of the 2006 amendment. 1 The Department of Corrections appeals.
FOOTNOTES
1 The court also found that the new residency restrictions constituted an invalid ex post facto law and violated equal protection and due process guarantees. The circuit [**3] court determined correctly that the law violated article I, section 13; therefore, it is unnecessary to address the court's alternative indings.
ANALYSIS
The constitutional bar on retrospective civil laws has been a part of Missouri law since this State adopted its first constitution in 1820. Jane Doe I v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 850 (Mo. banc 2006). The 1875 constitutional debates note the constitutional bar on retrospective laws is broader than the ex post facto bars in other states. Id., citing, Debates of the Missouri Constitutional Convention 1875, vol. IV at 95 (Isidor Loeb & Floyd C. Shoemaker, eds., State Historical Soc'y of Mo., 1938). In interpreting Missouri's broad constitutional prohibition of retrospective laws, this Court established the following framework for analysis:
A retrospective law is one which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past. It must give to something already done a different effect from that which it had when it transpired.
Squaw Creek Drainage Dist. v. Turney, 235 Mo. 80, 138 S.W. 12, 16 (1911).
In Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d at 850, the Court applied the foregoing [**4] principles to hold that a law requiring registration as a sex offender for an offense that occurred prior to the registration law's effective date was an invalid retrospective law in violation of article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution. The registration requirement was invalid because when Doe pled guilty, he had no obligation to register and his duty to register stemmed only from a subsequent change in the law. Id.
The same long-standing principles applied in Phillips apply in this case. As with the registration requirements in Phillips, the residency restrictions at issue in this case impose a new obligation upon R.L. and those similarly situated by requiring them to change their place of residence based solely upon offenses committed prior to enactment of the statute. [*238] Attaching new obligations to past conduct in this manner violates the bar on retrospective laws set forth in article I, section 13.
The judgment is affirmed.
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge
All concur.
No. SC88644
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
245 S.W.3d 236
February 19, 2008, Decided
OPINION
[*236] The Missouri Department of Corrections appeals from a judgment declaring that section 566.147, RSMo 2006, is an unconstitutional retrospective law under article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution. The judgment is affirmed.
FACTS
In December 2005, R.L. pled guilty to attempted enticement of a child in violation of 566.151, RSMo 2000. He received a three-year suspended execution of sentence, was placed on probation for five years, and was required to register as a sex offender. At the time R.L pled guilty, there was no provision in Missouri law restricting where he could live based upon his status as a sex offender. R.L. has resided at his current residence since 1997. A grade school is within 1,000 feet of this [*237] residence. The school has been at that location since 1988.
In June 2006, section 566.147, RSMo Supp. 2006, became effective, so that those convicted of attempted enticement of a child and similar crimes against minors were prohibited from residing "within one thousand feet of a public school as defined in section 160.011, RSMo, or [**2] any private school giving instruction in a grade or grades not higher than the twelfth grade, or a child-care facility as defined in section 210.201, RSMo, which is in existence at the time the individual begins to reside at the location."
The department of corrections informed R.L. that pursuant to the new residency restrictions in 566.147, he was committing a felony by residing within 1,000 feet of a school and that he needed to establish a plan to relocate. The department further informed R.L. that he could be subject to prosecution if he did not move.
R.L. filed a petition for preliminary and permanent injunction and a petition for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Cole County. The circuit court declared that section 566.147, RSMo Supp. 2006, is an unconstitutional retrospective law with respect to R.L. and other similarly situated registered sex offenders who already resided within 1,000 feet of a school or child care facility at the time of the 2006 amendment. 1 The Department of Corrections appeals.
FOOTNOTES
1 The court also found that the new residency restrictions constituted an invalid ex post facto law and violated equal protection and due process guarantees. The circuit [**3] court determined correctly that the law violated article I, section 13; therefore, it is unnecessary to address the court's alternative indings.
ANALYSIS
The constitutional bar on retrospective civil laws has been a part of Missouri law since this State adopted its first constitution in 1820. Jane Doe I v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 850 (Mo. banc 2006). The 1875 constitutional debates note the constitutional bar on retrospective laws is broader than the ex post facto bars in other states. Id., citing, Debates of the Missouri Constitutional Convention 1875, vol. IV at 95 (Isidor Loeb & Floyd C. Shoemaker, eds., State Historical Soc'y of Mo., 1938). In interpreting Missouri's broad constitutional prohibition of retrospective laws, this Court established the following framework for analysis:
A retrospective law is one which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past. It must give to something already done a different effect from that which it had when it transpired.
Squaw Creek Drainage Dist. v. Turney, 235 Mo. 80, 138 S.W. 12, 16 (1911).
In Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d at 850, the Court applied the foregoing [**4] principles to hold that a law requiring registration as a sex offender for an offense that occurred prior to the registration law's effective date was an invalid retrospective law in violation of article I, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution. The registration requirement was invalid because when Doe pled guilty, he had no obligation to register and his duty to register stemmed only from a subsequent change in the law. Id.
The same long-standing principles applied in Phillips apply in this case. As with the registration requirements in Phillips, the residency restrictions at issue in this case impose a new obligation upon R.L. and those similarly situated by requiring them to change their place of residence based solely upon offenses committed prior to enactment of the statute. [*238] Attaching new obligations to past conduct in this manner violates the bar on retrospective laws set forth in article I, section 13.
The judgment is affirmed.
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge
All concur.