Second Circuit Rules Eighth Amendment Governs Claims of Excessive Force Brought by Parole Violator
by David M. Reutter
On August 6, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, is applicable when a person finally adjudicated as a parole violator brings a lawsuit for excessive force.
Danny Farrington in March 2020 was booked into New York’s Albany County Correctional Facility (ACCF) for an alleged parole violation. On April 14, 2020, Farrington was adjudicated to have violated his parole and was remanded to prison. He remained at ACCF until August 2020.
Farrington’s 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 complaint alleged that on May 11, 2020, he was subjected to excessive force after an altercation with Sgt. Michael Poole. Farrington alleged that Poole and guards Heath Furbeck, Joseph Haley, Andrew Cohen, Padraic Lyman, Eric Gettings, Vincent Livreri and David Dollard used force to subdue him or observed that force without intervening. Farrington’s April 15, 2022, complaint alleged Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations.
The guards disputed the specifics of the incident and moved for summary judgment. On September 10, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The court was unclear as to whether or not Farrington had been adjudicated a parole violator at the time of the incident. Therefore, the court dismissed the Eight Amendment claim and allowed the Fourteenth Amendment claim to proceed after concluding Farrington was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged use of excessive force. As disputed facts existed on the Fourteenth Amendment claim, that claim was allowed to proceed. The guards appealed.
The Second Circuit found it had jurisdiction to resolve whether an issue was material, but not whether it was genuine. At issue was whether the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment excessive force standard was material. Noting that it, unlike the district court, had the benefit of the transcript of Farrington’s parole violation hearing, the Second Circuit found that Farrington had been convicted of violating his parole at the time of the events at issue. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(a), (d), the court could take judicial notice of that fact. The Court reminded “all counsel” that Rule 11 “imposes … an affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before filing.”
The finding that Farrington was a parole violator impacted whether the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment standard applied to the excessive force claim. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees. To establish excessive force, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” See: Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015).
By contrast, for convicted prisoners “only the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” See: Ingram v. Wright, 430 U.S. 670 (1977).
As Farrington was adjudicated as a parole violator, his excessive force claim falls under the Eighth Amendment. The district court’s order was therefore vacated and the case remanded for a qualified immunity analysis of the Defendant jailers under the Eighth Amendment. See: Farrington v. Poole, Case No. 24-2718 (2nd Cir. 2026).
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