Seventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment Dismissal in Case Where Prisoner Failed to Provide Verifying Medical Evidence
by Douglas Ankney
On June 1, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of prisoner Leon Barnes’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit because Barnes had failed to provide verifying medical evidence that a delay in his medical treatment was detrimental.
Barnes is in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) and while confined at the Stateville Correctional Center (SCC), he sought treatment for prolapsed hemorrhoids. The DOC contracts with Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) to provide, inter alia, medical and pharmaceutical services to prisoners at SCC and at Hill Correctional Center (HCC).
Barnes was initially examined by Dr. Evaristo P. Aguinaldo, Jr., the onsite physician at SCC, in July 2016. Aguinaldo observed that Barnes was not in distress, conducted a rectal exam that revealed no external hemorrhoids, and conducted an occult blood test that showed no blood in Barnes’s stool. Two months later, Barnes was examined at SCC by Dr. Saleh Obaisi, who prescribed a fiber supplement (“Fiberlax”) to treat Barnes’s hemorrhoids.
In January 2017, Barnes complained to Obaisi that he was experiencing rectal bleeding and pain during bowel movements. Obaisi sought and received permission via collegial review from Wexford for an evaluation by Dr. Nordenstam—a colorectal surgeon at the University of Illinois Hospital in Chicago (“UIC”). Nordenstam recommended a radiological exam and prescribed Metamucil in lieu of Fibermax.
Obaisi sought and received permission from Wexford for the radiological exam which was completed in September 2017. Testing indicated Barnes’s straining during bowel movements had made his hemorrhoids worse. However, Nordenstam didn’t want to perform surgery until after Barnes had completed pelvic floor therapy. Nordenstam placed no time limit on when the surgery needed to be performed. Again, Obaisi sought and received permission from Wexford via collegial review to send Barnes to UIC for the pelvic floor therapy. However, UIC refused to accept Barnes as a therapy patient.
In April 2018, Dr. Okezie replaced Obaisi at SCC. Okezie also sought and received permission from Wexford for the therapy, but UIC again refused to accept Barnes as a therapy patient. Barnes was later transferred to HCC, and in August 2018, Wexford approved Dr. Bautista’s request for Barnes’s pelvic floor therapy. In October 2018, Barnes completed pelvic floor therapy at Cottage Rehabilitation and Sports Medicine. Finally, in April 2019—almost three years after Barnes had initially sought treatment from Aguinaldo—Barnes underwent a hemorroidectomy to surgically remove his hemorrhoids.
Barnes sued Obaisi and Aguinaldo, alleging they violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they were deliberately indifferent to his prolapsed hemorrhoids. Barnes also brought a claim against Wexford under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) on the theory that Wexford’s collegial review policy was the driving factor of the violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
Wexford, Obaisi, and Aguinaldo (collectively “Defendants”) moved for summary judgement. The district court found that Barnes had failed to produce evidence to show that the actions of Obaisi and Aguinaldo evinced deliberate indifference. Further, Barnes had failed to provide the required “verifying medical evidence” necessary to show that the delay of pelvic floor therapy caused him harm. Since Barnes had failed to establish deliberate indifference, there was no constitutional violation; consequently, there could be no Monell claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, and Barnes appealed.
The Court observed that a prison official’s deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment. See: Clemons v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 106 F.4th 628 (7th Cir. 2024).
Evaluating a claim of deliberate indifference required the Court to first determine if an objectively serious medical condition existed. Then the Court determines if the individual defendant was deliberately indifferent to that condition. Because Barnes’ serious medical condition was indisputable, the Court needed only to determine whether Aguinaldo or Obaisi had been deliberately indifferent.
“Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard that is met if a defendant either knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety or is both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he draws the inference,” the Court wrote, citing Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948 (7th Cir. 2024).
When undertaking this inquiry, the Court considers “the totality of an inmate’s medical care when considering whether that care evidences deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” See: Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287 (7th Cir. 2025). To establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show “treatment decisions so unacceptable that no minimally competent professional would have so responded under the circumstances.”
In the instant case, the evidence showed that Obaisi “exercised medical judgment when he prescribed Barnes fiber supplements to ease the pain of hemorrhoids until his referrals were approved by the collegial review board.” And Nordenstam had testified that prescribing fiber supplements “is a common treatment protocol to help a patient avoid pain associated with having hemorrhoids.”
Obaisi was not, therefore, deliberately indifferent to Barnes’ serious medical needs. Barnes also argued that the district court erred in finding that Barnes was required to provide verifying medical evidence that the delay in surgery caused him harm. The Court concluded this was a “nonstarter.” When a plaintiff alleges that “the defendant delayed, rather than denied, medical treatment,” the Court has “required that the plaintiff present verifying medical evidence that the delay, and not the underlying condition, caused some harm.” See: Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2019).
Expert testimony that a prisoner suffered because of a delay in treatment may suffice. See: Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2007). But “a showing of delay, in isolation, is insufficient to support a deliberate indifference claim” because “a prisoner must offer verifying medical evidence that shows the delay was detrimental.”
In the instant case, Barnes neither offered expert testimony nor presented any other verifying medical evidence showing that the delay was detrimental. As to Aguinaldo, Barnes offered no evidence that Aguinaldo was aware of a serious medical need and disregarded it. In response to Barnes’s medical complaint, Aguinaldo conducted appropriate diagnostic testing that proved to show negative results for prolapsed hemorrhoids.
With regard to the Monell claim, Barnes had failed to prove that Obaisi or Aguinaldo had violated his constitutional rights. Since a violation of constitutional rights is one of the essential prerequisites to establishing a Monell claim, Barnes had failed to establish a Monell claim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Defendants. See: Barnes v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 177 F.4th 825 (7th Cir. 2026).
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Related legal case
Barnes v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
| Year | 2026 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 177 F.4th 825 (7th Cir. 2026) |
| Level | District Court |

