Sixth Circuit Revives Pro Se Prisoner’s § 1983 Lawsuit for Second Time
by Sagi Schwartzberg
On September 10, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a triable issue of material fact existed as to when prisoner Danyale Tubbs learned of the prison’s final determination of the rejection of his mail. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s granting of summary judgment to the prison’s employee on the issue of administrative exhaustion and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Tubbs was a prisoner at the Michigan Department of Corrections’ (DOC) Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF). On March 22, 2022, Tubbs received notice that a package containing a book written by his sister, a childhood sexual abuse survivor, was rejected by Sherry Payton, a mail room clerk at LRF. Pursuant to the DOC’S “Grievance Process,” Tubbs requested a hearing to overturn Payton’s determination.
On April 5, 2022, prison counselor Emitt Short held a hearing wherein Short disagreed with Payton’s rejection and determined that Tubbs should have received his sister’s book. Tubbs did not receive a copy of the report or a formal decision from Short. After not receiving either the book or a new notice of rejection from the mail room, Tubbs asked Short for an update.
Shortly thereafter, according to Tubbs, Short held another hearing wherein he informed Tubbs that despite his earlier determination, the book had been submitted to be placed on the DOC’S restricted publications list.
On May 9, 2022, Tubbs received a written report dated April 5, 2022 that was signed by Short. This report determined that despite the initial determination at the first hearing, the “Central Office” recommended that the book be submitted for placement on the restricted publications list. This report specifically stated that this was a “second hearing, because the decision [Short] submitted to the mailroom was rejected the first time.”
Upon receiving this report from Short, on May 9, 2022, Tubbs submitted a formal-Step I-written grievance pursuant to the DOC’s grievance policy. Such policy required, in part, that a prisoner submit a Step I grievance within five days of an adverse (or lack of) determination of an informal resolution attempt.
On May 11, 2022, the DOC rejected Tubbs’ Step I grievance as untimely, claiming that the date of the final determination on the issue of his sister’s book was April 5, 2022. Tubbs filed a Step II grievance and the DOC upheld its response on the Step I determination of untimeliness. Tubbs then filed a Step III grievance, and again the DOC concluded that his Step I grievance was untimely. This was the DOC’S final determination.
Tubbs then filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan against Payton asserting two claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: that Payton violated his First Amendment right to free speech and that she violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by rejecting his sister’s book.
After screening his complaint as mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the magistrate judge dismissed it for failing to state a claim. Tubbs appealed, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the district court’s dismissal of his complaint. Shortly after the matter was remanded to the district court, Payton filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Tubbs failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.
Specifically, she argued that Tubbs’ Step I grievance was not filed within the five days after the final determination of the DOC on his mail rejection issue. In opposition, Tubbs provided an affidavit that claimed that he had two hearings on this issue, that Short sided with him on the first one and that he did not receive the DOC’S final determination until May 9, 2022.
Therefore, his Step I grievance was not untimely. In reply, Payton filed an affidavit from Short that set forth his general practice with writing reports and submitting them to the mail room for distribution on the same day.
On September 19, 2025, the district court granted Payton’s motion. The district court discredited Tubbs’ “bald[] assertions…that he did not receive the April 5, 2022 report until May 9, 2022,” and found that Tubbs did not raise the exhaustion requirement in his complaint.
Additionally, relying on Short’s affidavit, the district court reasoned that Tubbs’ failed to contest it and, therefore, failed to present a genuine issue of material fact about whether his Step I grievance was timely. Tubbs, with the assistance of appointed counsel from Goodwin Proctor LLP and the Roderick & Solange Macarthur Justice Center, timely appealed.
The Court of Appeals initially reviewed the law applicable to the PLRA’s exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement and summary judgment in general. “In cases challenging a litigant’s duty to exhaust, ‘[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if defendants establish the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding non-exhaustion’,” the Court stated, citing Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2012). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit,” and a dispute is genuine where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” See: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)).
A prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit “is an affirmative defense under the PLRA,” which means “that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” See: Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). As a result, defendants carry the burden of proof of exhaustion and, therefore, shoulder “an initial summary judgment burden that is higher” because they “must show that the record contains evidence satisfying their burden of persuasion and that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” See: Morgan v. Trierweiler, 67 F.4th 362 (6th Cir. 2023).
In this case, the Court concluded that, viewing the evidence in light most favorable to Tubbs, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to when Tubbs learned of the DOC’S final determination as to the rejection of his sister’s book for the clock to have started running on his Stage I grievance.
First, the Court observed that the April 5, 2022 report Payton submitted was not signed by Short and its contents differed from the version Tubbs submitted. Tubbs’ version was signed by Short and stated that a “second hearing” took place. The Court noted that the DOC had been unable either to explain the discrepancy or to produce a signed copy of the report that is different than Tubbs’. The Court explained that this discrepancy, along with Tubbs’ written grievances claiming that the date of incident was May 9, 2022 and his affidavit in opposition to Payton’s motion, raised a disputed issue of material fact as to when Tubbs learned of the DOC’S final determination.
Secondly, the Court disagreed with the district court’s characterization of Tubbs’ affidavit as merely “bald assertions” and found that the evidence submitted provides that Tubbs’ claims that he did not receive the report until May 9, 2022 has been consistent throughout the administrative remedy process and this lawsuit.
Finally, the Court found that because it is a well-established principle in the PLRA exhaustion context that “the failure to exhaust must be established by the defendants,” the district court’s finding that Tubbs’ complaint failed to mention the date when he received Short’s report as a basis for granting Payton’s motion was erroneous.
After examining all of the evidence, the Court held that at least one genuine dispute existed as to a material fact, necessarily when the clock began to run on Tubbs’ time to exhaust his administrative remedies under the DOC’s policies. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: Tubbs v. Payton, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 27822 (6th Cir. 2026).
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Related legal case
Tubbs v. Payton
| Year | 2026 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 27822 (6th Cir. 2026) |
| Level | District Court |

